FOURTH CONGRESS.—FIRST SESSION. (continued 8)

Upon the whole, he conscientiously believed the Treaty to be a bad one. He believed it contained the most complete evidence of British interference in our internal affairs, and had laid the foundation for the further extension of British influence. It has restricted the exercise of some of the important rights of national sovereignty. It has voluntarily hazarded the neutrality of the United States in the present European war, and destroyed all pretensions to its character of impartiality. It has not afforded protection to our neutral rights, which was amongst its great objects; and in the adjustment of the differences resulting from the inexecution of the Treaty of Peace, it is unequal and unjust. All these important circumstances considered, and when it is also considered that the British persevere in impressing our seamen and seizing our vessels, in violation of the clearest rights of neutral nations, even since the signing of the Treaty, he could not consent to be the instrument of giving it efficacy. He believed that it was one of those extraordinary cases which justified strong and extraordinary resistance.

When Mr. Giles had concluded his speech,

Mr. Goodhue addressed the Chair as follows: Mr. Chairman: Much noise has been made, and every art has been practised to prejudice the people against the Treaty now under consideration. I mean to look at it and see if it be the horrid thing it is represented to be, and particularly to examine the commercial part, to know whether we have made a good bargain or not, I will take notice of some objections that have been made, and then touch on the great evils that may justly be apprehended, if we refuse to carry it into effect. And here let me observe, the subject is the most momentous that ever came before this House, and I mean to put no false colors on it, or to paint any evils that will follow a rejection, beyond what, in such an event, I most conscientiously believe will be realized. I will now state what new sources of commerce are opened to us by the Treaty that we had not before, and then see what we have given for them. 1st. We have got by the Treaty a perfectly free trade across the land, and by means of the lakes with Canada, that we had not before, and on the same terms with British subjects, which I estimate as a great advantage to this country; for it is evident, that we can introduce into Canada—up the North river and across the Lakes—almost any kind of goods, at less expense and on better terms than the British can up the river St. Lawrence, which is very lengthy, and frozen up six or seven months in the year. Having this advantage, can it be doubted that we have not industry and enterprise to improve it? No, sir, the enterprise of our people is such, that we shall unquestionably carry on almost all the trade of Upper Canada, and that great Western country which will be opened to us; by which means we shall have at least an equal share in their fur trade also with them, which we have so long wanted. But it is said, the portages or carrying places being common to both, they will run away with the greater part of the trade. Why so? I am not afraid but the citizens of the United States, if they are put on an equal footing with others, will make their way equal with any people on earth. But it is said, by way of lessening the advantages of this trade, that goods imported into Canada pay little or no duty, and the goods that we import are by our laws subject to high duty, and that no drawback of the duty can be established upon their being sent into Canada, and therefore, we cannot supply them on equal terms. To this, I reply, that I do not know what duty they impose on goods when imported into Canada, but I believe it is considerable; and I do not believe but it is possible to devise a plan for a drawback of the duty which may have been paid on our goods when they are sent into Canada, and that at any rate the ease by which we can send them there up the North river, compared with their being introduced by the St. Lawrence, will more than compensate for any difference of duty, in case a drawback should not be admitted.

2. We have got established by the Treaty, a right to trade with all their settlements in India on the same terms with their own subjects, and thus we have laid open to us a free trade with those vast possessions of theirs in that quarter of the globe, which, it is said, contains twenty or thirty millions of inhabitants. Let me inform the committee, that our trade to India is already very great and profitable. In the town of Salem only, in which I live, we have thirty sail of Indiamen, and doubtless, in the United States, the whole amount must be nearly a hundred; and the number will increase in such a manner, as by our superior enterprise, industry and economy, that we shall not only supply our own wants, but those of the West Indies and Europe, in a great measure, with India articles; for though, by the Treaty which gives us this free trade, we are not permitted to carry India goods from their settlements directly to Europe, yet there is no doubt, in my mind, but we can export from hence thither cheaper than they can get them any other way, for this obvious reason, because their trade to India is carried on by their companies, in which despatch and economy is by no means so much attended to, as it is when managed by an individual. But it is said we had this trade before the Treaty. I answer, it is true we had, but it was only by way of indulgence, subject to be deprived of it whenever they thought fit; and let me ask, is it not vastly better to have it secured as a right, than to have it rest on the precarious tenure of indulgence? Here, Mr. Chairman, let me remark, that they have granted to us this free trade to India, which their own subjects (except the India Company) are entirely shut out from. What must be the feelings of British subjects when they see their Government has given to strangers a perfect freedom of trade to their India settlements, and shut them out from it altogether? And what must be their astonishment when they hear that some people amongst us think that Great Britain has conferred no favor upon us by doing it? Hear what the famous Mr. Grattan, the great Irish patriot, said in the Irish Parliament, on the subject:

"This very America, which the British Minister insulted and then crouched to, had, by the late Treaty of Commerce, been admitted to all the British settlements in the East and West Indies, to the latter of which Ireland was only conditionally admitted, and from the former unconditionally excluded; yet Ireland was a loyal, attached nation, and America an alien."

These are the commercial acquisitions we have obtained by the Treaty; and let me ask, what have we given to Britain in return for them? I answer, nothing more than they have all along enjoyed in our ports, by the laws of the United States, in common with other foreign nations. No new commercial advantages have we given them; they can come here now on no better terms than before. But, it is said, we have tied our hands by the Treaty, that we will not lay any greater duties on their commerce than we do on all other foreign nations. Pray, let me ask, if Great Britain have not equally tied their hands? And can we be so unreasonable as to suppose that they would ever consent to a Treaty that had not such terms of reciprocity?

It is again said, by way of objection, that they have reserved to themselves the right of countervailing the difference of duty, which we, by our laws, have established between our own citizens and foreigners, and that she will now exercise that right by imposing equal duties on our vessels in the ports of Great Britain. Let me answer this objection to the Treaty, by asking if she had not this same right, and even an unlimited one, of imposing what duties she saw proper on our vessels in her ports before the Treaty? She did not see fit to exercise it then, neither is it probable she will now. And, lest it should be said she will now do it, because we are restrained by the Treaty from increasing the duty on her ships beyond what it now is, and, therefore, she has not the same fear operating to prevent it that she had before, let me remark, that if she was restrained by any such considerations, this same restraint would be in force again in two years after the present war ceased, being the period of the existence of those articles of the Treaty—a time so short as to render it highly probable she will not think it worth while to make the experiment.

A great cry has been made against the commercial part of the Treaty, and I must confess I never could see on what ground, for it is a certain fact we have given Great Britain no new privileges in our Atlantic ports by the Treaty, and no other in their intercourse by the way of Canada, than they have given us; and, therefore, it may fairly be said that, by the Treaty, we have given them no new commercial privileges they were not before enjoying in our ports; and they, on their part, have given us considerable; and consequently, on our side, the bargain must be a good one.

Let me ask, why there is for ever so much complaint against Great Britain because she does not open all her colonies freely to us? Does Portugal open the Brazils? No; she shuts out all foreigners. Did Holland, before the present war, open to us all her rich possessions in the East Indies? No. Does Spain open her rich islands in the East and West Indies, and her immense possessions in South America? No. Does she, in the Treaty lately made, open even Florida, as Great Britain has Canada? No. Did France before this war give us free trade to her colonies? No. And do not all those nations, as well as every other, come into our ports on the same terms with the British? Why, then, make this rant about the British? Let them fare as well in our ports as other foreigners, inasmuch as they certainly grant as much to us as most others do, is all I contend for. I do not wish they should fare better.

The impressment of our seamen by the British is made use of as an objection to our carrying the Treaty into effect. It is, to be sure, a mortifying circumstance, and must excite our utmost detestation of such conduct. But let not our passions get the better of our judgment. We have no kind of evidence that such conduct is countenanced by their Admiralty, but the evidence we have is of a contrary nature, for, upon our Minister's remonstrating to the British Ministry on this point, they assured him that orders had been issued, and should be repeated to the commanders of their ships, not to commit such violences on our rights, at the same time observing, that, speaking the same language as we do, it was difficult in all cases to distinguish their seamen from ours. In this situation let us believe that a firm and spirited remonstrance will be made by our Executive against such outrages; and let us hope that it may have the desired effect. But, let me ask, if the Treaty should not be carried into effect, will that relieve that deserving class of our citizens? Will it not have probably a contrary effect, and be the means of increasing the evil tenfold more than it exists at present?

Tuesday, April 19.

Execution of British Treaty.

The House then resolved itself into a Committee of the Whole on the state of the Union, on the motion for making provision for carrying into effect the Treaty with Great Britain; when

Mr. Heath rose and addressed the Chair as follows:

Mr. Chairman: In the discussion of this so momentous and important a subject, and so big at the same time with the dearest interests of our common country, I shall not attempt any critical analysis upon the good and bad parts of the instrument, as the gentlemen preceding me in this debate have already done, but only confine myself to a few remarks, to justify my conduct to God and my country for the vote I shall give in the ultimate decision of the question. Mr. Chairman, permit me here to remark, that during the recess of the last Congress, when the American mind was roused with so much irritation and sensibility through all parts of the Union against this paper, after its first appearance in public print, I was one of those who kept aloof from the storm, suspended my opinion, became of no party, considering myself hereafter bound to discharge the important duties of an American Representative on the occasion. And now since the commencement of the present session, though two-thirds of my time overwhelmed with disease, and daily languishing in the bed of pain, even under such a dreadful personal calamity, my reflections were not turned aside from the awfulness of the subject before us; which before and during this discussion, I confess, as often as I have revolved in my mind, with a review of the situation of my country, I have frequently paused, not knowing the best expedient to pursue to avoid impending evils.

Mr. Chairman, I have strange forebodings on this occasion. By the second and third articles of the instrument before you, in the surrender of the posts, British subjects have a right to reside with us; Indians have a right to pass and repass from post to post from our district to their portages and ferriages free, all in the vicinity within gun-shot. Will not their traders continue their old acquaintanceship with them in spite of us? Are not their capitals for trade larger than ours? Where, then, are the real profits anticipated? All visionary, like the beggar's dream, grasping mountains of gold, and when the morning sun shakes off his slumber, it dissipates the delusion. But time will make more converts than reason. Further, before I quit this subject of inequality, I wish to remark, by way of reply to my much respected friend from Connecticut, who was up a few days ago, in language nearly similar, and the same sort of ingenuity of a celebrated champion, who has dedicated much labor in favor of this instrument, under the signature of Camillus, that Great Britain had never violated the seventh article of the Treaty of Peace in not restoring the slaves and other property; that they were taken in war, and their freedom offered to them by the British commanders, and were not taken after a cessation of hostilities; and, therefore, were not proper objects of surrender. Oh, the deceit, the sophistry of this construction! I shall just answer it by reading from the Journals of the old Congress what the real Camillus, or, in other words, the learned Mr. Hamilton, thought of that article at that time. He read the Journals of 1783, where Mr. Hamilton moved in Congress for commissioners to be sent to New York to the British commander to request an explanation respecting an infraction of that article. So was Mr. Hamilton's opinion at that time, so was the prevalent opinion of all America at that time. My second point, the want of reciprocity in the instrument, has been so well explained by my worthy colleague from Virginia, that I confess I am curtailed in my sentiments a little here. But, suffice it to say, that the local circumstances of this country will make the suspension of the law of alienage more advantageous by tenfold, than could be reaped by American citizens over the other side of the water. Witness the great disproportion between American citizens holding lands in Britain and British subjects in this country. I wish it may not revive old proprietary rights, with its long train of tenure, fealty, and vassalage. Perhaps my fears may ensue from residing in that of Virginia, where this tenure once prevailed. I now come to the third objection, and the most important. Other objections, though they have their weight in my mind, yet perhaps they might yield their force, were it not for this the more insurmountable. This might be said with propriety to be the foundation of the call for papers from the Executive respecting the Treaty.

By the various articles embracing this subject, the House of Representatives of the United States, in the Treaty-making power, have lived to see the day, which I am sure no human sagacity could have ever divined, that they may be considered as a perfect collective cypherical body of men in legislation, reduced to a mere Committee of Ways and Means, subservient to Executive policy, just called together, for voting the necessary supplies of money for foreign negotiation, or for the current annual expenses of Government. America is here totally disarmed of every alternative to resort to in the hour of distress—to prevent the horrors of war, no sequestration, no embargo, no commercial restriction, can be the subject of future legislation against the tender and humane people of Britain.

Is this right, is this just, that all our rights should be thus bartered away under a Treaty-making power? If it is so, and it must be borne, dreadful, dreadful, indeed, must be the calamity of future generations of America, under the operation of this Government; for any one of them, or all together, I would resort to an awful national crisis, sooner than sound the trumpet of war, and let the banners of blood loose upon the earth.

Mr. Williams said, that various opinions had been delivered upon the various subjects involved in the Treaty. He should take the liberty of stating to the committee his sentiments on the occasion, and then inquire into the policy or impolicy of carrying the Treaty into effect. But, in the first place, he conceived it to be necessary to take a view of its origin, the division, and party dissensions which then prevailed—the critical posture of our affairs, the depredations committed on our commerce, and the probability of a war.

Let us, said Mr. W., take a view of the debates of that House in the year 1793 and 1794, and he believed it would be discovered that if the business of negotiation had not taken place, this country must have been involved in a war. It would be remembered, that a gentleman from Virginia, (Mr. Madison,) on the 3d of January, 1794, laid on the table of this House seven resolutions. The object of which was to compel Britain to come to some terms of accommodation, and to prevent further depredations on our commerce.

After a discussion of several weeks, the first resolution, which was for imposing an additional duty on the importation of a great variety of manufactures from nations having no Commercial Treaty with the United States was agreed to by a small majority. Britain had, said he, ever since the end of the war, declined entering into any Commercial Treaty with us. In the mean time, the danger from British depredations augmented with such rapidity that those resolutions became insufficient, by reason of the seizure of an immense number of our vessels, in consequence of instructions that had been given by the British Ministry on the 6th of November, 1793; and other resolutions were then moved for the sequestration of British property, but the result was an embargo and negotiation.

Was it not then urged by members of that House that the British nation refused to negotiate with them? It was, indeed, supposed it would be attended with considerable difficulties, and that a considerable class of citizens, let the consequences be what they might, would not be satisfied with the result. However, it was thought best to adopt the measure.

But, said Mr. W., let us waive this subject, and inquire if negotiation had failed, whether war would not have been the consequence? Can it be supposed that, after the British had committed certain spoliations on our commerce; after their Order of the 6th of November, 1793; after the declaration of Lord Dorchester to the Indians, that war would not have followed? The national pride of Great Britain could not have yielded to compulsion without self-degradation; and it would be remembered, too, that from the relation in which the two countries have stood to each other, it must have cost more to the pride of Britain to have received the law from us than from any other power. And if war had been the consequence, how were we to have recovered the amount of the spoliations committed on the property of our merchants? How were we to act? Were we to demand satisfaction? We have no protection to our commerce, and therefore the British can at any time arrest it without additional expense to themselves, having near 500 vessels of war at command.

What had been our situation ever since the negotiation? Have we not, said he, been one of the happiest nations upon earth? Yet we are about to oppose the necessary appropriations to carry into effect that Treaty which hath been the means of keeping us in a neutrality, and thereby hazard a war which may be our ruin.

But, if we arrest the Treaty by refusing to make the necessary appropriations, can we suppose Great Britain will carry the Treaty into effect on her part? It would be inconsistent to think so. Great Britain was certainly acquainted with what was going on within these walls, and would refuse to give up the posts at the time specified. Who had been the cause of the posts being so long kept from the United States? The State of New York had been too long kept from its just due; that State had not prevented the British from obtaining their debt, and the people now looked with anxious expectation to the time when the posts were to be given up. They were, at present, considerably alarmed, lest the British Treaty should not be carried into effect. He had received letters that morning, from some of his constituents, who were at New York, endeavoring to sell their produce (for a number of the farmers in that part of the country which he came from, did not sell their produce to the merchants, but attended the market with it themselves.) They write the price of flour had already fallen three dollars a barrel, and wheat four shillings per bushel. Who were to be the losers, under these circumstances? The farmers. Who had the most produce to sell? The farmers in the State of New York. The other day a resolution was laid upon our table, proposing to lay an embargo on the exportation of corn. This, if it had been agreed to, would have had an immediate effect on the State of New York.

What was the effect of the embargo in 1794? The farmers were obliged to sell their produce for what they could get. Whatever loss was experienced, fell upon the farmer; and so it will be with respect to their present proceedings. If merchants cannot get insurance, will they send their vessels out? No; and they will certainly give no more produce than they can sell their articles for, with a trade profit.

The great objection against the Treaty was, that payment for the negroes which were carried away by the British, at the close of the war, was not provided for. It appears that this, at best, was a doubtful point. General Carlton, previous to his leaving New York at the close of the war, and when the negroes were demanded of him, said, that many slaves had been declared free by his predecessors before his own arrival; over these, he said, he neither possessed nor could assume any control. He considered them as at liberty to go to any part of the world which they thought proper. He was unwilling to suppose that the British Ministry could stipulate, by any Treaty, to make themselves guilty of a notorious breach of public faith to people of any color. He considered restoration, where inseparable from a violation of that faith, as, in itself, utterly impracticable.

It was acknowledged by every gentleman that the Treaty of 1783 was broken by the United States; and, if so, what could their negotiator do? The British Government would not come into the same terms as the Treaty of 1783, in the sense and meaning of the gentleman from Virginia, nor would they admit that that Treaty compelled them to give up or make restitution for the negroes. Their negotiator, thus situated, no doubt concluded that the amount of the negroes was not an object which ought to prevent a negotiation so desirable at that time, and agreeable to the law of nations. The Treaty of 1783 had been violated. Here Mr. W. quoted several authorities, among which was Marten's Law of Nations: "The violation of one article only of a Treaty, by one party, may, at least successively, give the other a right to violate the whole Treaty, unless this right has been formally renounced."

The United States having violated that Treaty, there was no other way than commencing a negotiation. And would gentlemen say that the negotiation had not been attended with beneficial consequences to this country? Was not peace the most to be desired, especially in our present situation? Had not the managers of our Government kept a watchful eye on our affairs? Had not our neutrality been the occasion of our wealth and prosperity? And having now entered into a Treaty with Spain, Algiers, and Natives, let us carry that with Great Britain into effect, and secure to us peace with all the world.

When Mr. Williams had concluded—

Mr. Hillhouse rose and said, the subject now under consideration was one of the first in magnitude he had ever been called to deliberate upon, and that the circumstances under which it came up were peculiar, for previous to the Treaty's being either promulgated or known, a hue-and-cry had been raised, and the prejudices of the people as much as possible excited against it, and he confessed it had not been without its effect upon his own mind. When the Treaty came out, therefore, he was led to examine it with attention, compare it with our Treaties with other nations, and those between Great Britain and other nations; the result of this inquiry was, that he found that no privilege or advantage given by Great Britain to the other nations was withheld from us; that advantages were secured to us which were enjoyed by no other nation, nor even by her own subjects: that we gave her little that was not enjoyed by every other nation; and, on the whole, that it was as good a Treaty as we had a right to expect, and as he had ever expected to obtain. He was sensible that prejudice, which, like a sentinel at the door of the human mind to keep out truth and argument, had induced many good citizens of the United States at first to be opposed to the Treaty, who, upon being prevailed on to give it a more candid examination, had declared in favor of it; but he hoped the Representatives of the people, called to decide on a question which might affect the dearest interests of millions, would, as much as possible, divest themselves of prejudice and passion: to do it entirely, he believed, was impossible.

The first, and, if well-founded, the most important objection which he had heard made against the Treaty was, that a claim for negroes and other property carried away from New York had been wholly overlooked or given up by our Minister. Here, he said, he was sensible any argument he might adduce would be opposed by the party opinions formed at the time—when judging in our own case, and when we felt a great degree of sensibility for the losses and injuries we had recently experienced. He was not unapprised that Congress had claimed that the construction of the 7th article of the Treaty was such as to require the delivering up of the negroes, and had passed the resolution read by the gentleman from Virginia, (Mr. Heath,) and that that opinion had, without examination, been implicitly followed by many respectable characters; but he hoped at this distance of time, he might expect a candid hearing, whilst he examined their arguments and the law of nations, to which alone resort can be had to decide differences between sovereign and independent nations. To his mind they were conclusive that we had not a well-founded claim; to every mind, he believed, they would render the claim at least doubtful.

His first inquiry, he said, should be, whether negroes were to be considered as property? This, he believed, must be admitted: they were thus recognized by the article itself, which says "negroes or other property." Negroes being mentioned amounts only to a specification of one kind of property; as, in the constitution, it says "capitation or other direct taxes," which is a conclusive recognition that a capitation tax is a direct tax, within the meaning of the constitution. Upon no other ground than that of property could the United States claim them; as men, they had a right to go where they pleased. Our commissioners, at the time of the embarkation, had no hesitation in declaring that they considered "negroes, horses, and other property," as being precisely on the same footing, and selected a claim for a horse as one of the strongest that could be found to enforce a compliance with this construction of the article. The claim was in these words:

"Mr. Vanderburgh had a horse stolen from him, out of his stable in Beekman's Precinct, in Dutchess County, 26th February, 1780, and the horse was conveyed by the person who stole him to a then British post, in Westchester County, where he has since been detained; so that Mr. Vanderburgh could not recover him again. The horse is now in the possession of Col. James De Launcy, of this city, from whom Mr. Vanderburgh has demanded him, and who refuses to deliver him to Mr. Vanderburgh."

In the letter of the Commissioners to General Washington, on this subject, they say:

"In the interview between the 15th and 24th, numbers applied to us for a restitution of their negroes and other property in the possession of others, but we supposed it most eligible to defer a requisition till a clear unequivocal case, similar to that of Mr. Vanderburgh's, where the proofs were at hand and not embarrassed with the circumstances of a capture in war or other pretences under which property is withheld here, should present itself; sensible that if restitution was denied in such an instance, it would inevitably be in every other."

It therefore appears clear that negroes, horses, and other property, were, by this article, placed upon the same footing, and that it was as much a violation of the Treaty to carry away a horse as a negro.

He next proceeded to inquire what was the situation of this property, and in whom, according to the law of nations, it was vested at the time of executing the Treaty? This point, he said, Mr. Jefferson had fully settled to his hand, and read out of his collection the following extracts:

"We now come together (says Mr. Jefferson) to consider that instrument which was to heal our wounds, and begin a new chapter in our history. The state in which they found things is to be considered as rightful; so says the Law of Nations.—Vattel. The state in which things are found at the moment of the Treaty, should be considered as lawful, and if it is meant to make any change in it, the Treaty must expressly mention it. Consequently, all things about which the Treaty is silent, must remain in the state in which they are found at its conclusion.—Bynk. Since it is a condition of war that enemies may be deprived of all their rights, it is reasonable that every thing of an enemy's, found among his enemies, should change its owners, and go to the Treasury. It is moreover usually directed, in all declarations of war, that the goods of enemies, as well those found among us as those taken in war, shall be confiscated."

These authorities, he said, clearly proved that all negroes and other property which in the course of the war had been taken, or in any way had fallen into the hands of the British, had shifted their owner, and were no longer the property of the American inhabitants. In the case of negroes, the British Commander-in-Chief had exercised the highest act of ownership, by manumitting such of them as should conform to certain stipulations, pointed out in his proclamation. If any change was intended to have been made by the Treaty in the circumstances of these negroes, and it had been intended they should be again returned into bondage, there would have been some express stipulation to that effect in the Treaty. The words are, "and without causing any destruction, or carrying away any negroes or other property of the American inhabitants, withdraw all his armies," &c. There is nothing that indicates the least intention that this article should have a retrospective operation. It can only relate to property then belonging to the American inhabitants. Wherever any article was intended to have a retrospective operation, some expression is used that clearly shows such intention. In this same article, speaking of delivering up records, deeds, &c., these words are added, "which in the course of the war may have fallen into the hands of his officers," &c. In the 4th article, "debts heretofore contracted." Any other construction would have required the restoration of vessels which had been taken from the Americans, and were then in New York, under the term "other property," as well as negroes and horses. If any negroes or other property, in the possession of the American inhabitants at or after signing the preliminary articles, were carried off, it was no doubt a violation of the Treaty, but he had not understood that they refused to deliver up property of that description, or that such property was carried off to any great amount.

But this matter does not rest only on there being no words in the Treaty which can be construed to have a retrospective operation, but it is fairly to be inferred from the papers contained in this same collection of Mr. Jefferson, that it was so understood by the negotiators; for, in the course of that negotiation; it appears to have been a primary object with the British Minister to obtain restitution of the Tory estates, or compensation for them. They almost made a sine qua non, and a refusal to comply had well-nigh broken off the negotiation; and to induce the British Minister to relinquish that article, our commissioners brought in a claim for negroes and other property which had been taken, and towns and villages which had been destroyed during the war. He here read the following letter from Mr. Oswald, the British Minister, to our commissioners, viz:

"You may remember, that from the very beginning of our negotiation for settling a peace between Great Britain and America, I insisted that you should positively stipulate for the restoration of the property of all those under the denomination of Loyalists or Refugees, who have taken part with Great Britain in the present war; or if the property had been resold, and passed into such variety of hands as to render the restoration impracticable, (which you assert to be the case in many instances,) you should stipulate for a compensation or indemnification to those persons adequate to their losses. To those propositions, you said, you could not accede. Mr. Stachey, since his arrival at Paris, has most strenuously joined me in insisting upon the said restitution, compensation, or indemnification, and in laying before you every argument in favor of the demands, founded on national honor, and upon the true principles of justice. Those demands you must have understood to extend, not only to all persons of the above-mentioned description who have fled to Europe, but likewise to all those who may now be in any part of North America, dwelling under the protection of His Majesty's arm, or otherwise. We have also insisted on a mutual stipulation for a general amnesty on both sides, comprehending thereby an enlargement of all persons who, on account of offences committed, or supposed to be committed, since the commencement of hostilities, may now be in confinement, and for an immediate repossession of their properties and peaceable enjoyment thereof, under the Government of the United States. To this you have not given a particular and direct answer. It is, however, incumbent on me, as Commissioner of the King of Great Britain, to repeat the several demands, and without going over those arguments upon paper, which we have so often urged in conversation, to press your immediate attention to these subjects, and to urge you to enter into proper stipulations for their restitution, compensation, and amnesty, before we proceed further in this negotiation."

To which our commissioners returned the following answer:

"In answer to the letter you did us the honor to write on the 4th instant, we beg leave to repeat what we often said in conversation, viz: that the restoration of such of the estates of the refugees as have been confiscated, is impracticable, because they were confiscated by laws of particular States, and in many instances have passed by legal titles through several hands. Besides, sir, as this is a matter evidently appertaining to the internal policy of the separate States, the Congress, by the nature of our constitution, have no authority to interfere with it. As to your demand of compensation to those persons, we forbear enumerating our reasons for thinking it ill-founded. In the moment of conciliatory overtures, it would not be proper to call certain scenes into view, over which a variety of considerations should induce both parties at present to draw a veil. Permit us, therefore, only to repeat, that we cannot stipulate for such compensation, unless on your part it be agreed to make restitution to our citizens for the heavy losses they have sustained by the unnecessary destruction of private property. We have already agreed to an amnesty more extensive than justice required, and full as extensive as humanity would demand; we can therefore, only repeat, that it cannot be extended further. We should be sorry, if the absolute impossibility of our complying further with your propositions, should induce Great Britain to continue the war, for the sake of those who caused and prolonged it; but, if that should be the case, we hope that the utmost latitude will not be again given to its rigors. Whatever may be the issue of this negotiation, be assured, sir, that we shall always acknowledge the liberal, manly, and candid manner, in which you have conducted it."

In consequence of information from our commissioners that the claim was made and pertinaciously insisted on by the British Minister, Congress passed the following resolutions, viz:

"Resolved, That the Secretary for Foreign Affairs be, and he is hereby, directed to obtain, as speedily as possible, authentic returns of the slaves and other property which have been carried off or destroyed in the course of the war by the enemy, and to transmit the same to the Ministers Plenipotentiary for negotiating peace.

"Resolved, That, in the mean time, the Secretary for Foreign Affairs inform the said Minister, that many thousands of slaves, and other property to a very great amount, have been carried off or destroyed by the enemy, and that, in the opinion of Congress, the great loss of property which the citizens of the United States have sustained by the enemy, will be considered by the several States as an insuperable bar to their making restitution or indemnification to the former owners of property which has been or may be forfeited to, or confiscated by, any of the States."

Dr. Franklin, in a letter to the British Minister, says:

"I must repeat my opinion, that it is best for you to drop all mention of the refugees. We have proposed, indeed, nothing but what we think best for you as well as ourselves. But if you will have them mentioned, let it be in an article which may provide that they shall exhibit accounts of their losses to commissioners hereafter to be appointed, who shall examine the same, together with the accounts now preparing in America of the damages done by them, and state the account; and that if a balance appears in their favor, it shall be paid by us to you, and by you divided among them, as you shall think proper. And if the balance is found due to us, it shall be paid by you. Give me leave, however, to advise you to prevent so dreadful a discussion, by dropping the article, that we may write to America and stop the inquiry."

The following article was accordingly drawn up and proposed to be inserted in the Treaty, viz:

"It is agreed that His Britannic Majesty will earnestly recommend it to his Parliament to provide for and make compensation to the merchants and shopkeepers of Boston, whose goods and merchandise were seized and taken out of the stores, warehouses, and shops, by order of General Gage, and others of his commanders or officers there; and also the inhabitants of Philadelphia, for the goods taken away by his army there; and to make compensation also for the tobacco, rice, indigo, negroes, &c., seized and carried off by his armies under Generals Arnold, Cornwallis, and others, from the States of Virginia, North and South Carolina, and Georgia: And also for all vessels and cargoes belonging to the inhabitants of the said United States, which were stopped, seized, or taken, either in the ports or on the seas, by his Governors, or by his ships of war, before the declaration of war against the said States. And it is further agreed that His Britannic Majesty will also earnestly recommend it to his Parliament to make compensation for all the towns, villages, and farms, burnt and destroyed by his troops or adherents in the said United States."

After pressing the matter to the utmost extent, we find, by Mr. Adams's journal, that on the evening previous to signing the Treaty, Ministers on both sides came to the following result:

"Upon this I recounted the history of Gen. Gage's agreement with the inhabitants of Boston, that they should remove their effects, upon condition that they would surrender their arms; but as soon as the arms were secured, the goods were forbid to be carried out, and were finally carried off in large quantities to Halifax. Dr. Franklin mentioned the case of Philadelphia, and the carrying off effects there, even his own library. Mr. Jay mentioned several other things; and Mr. Laurens added the plunder in Carolina, of negroes, plate, &c. After hearing all this, Mr. Fitzherbert, Mr. Oswald, and Mr. Stachey, retired for some time, and returning Mr. Fitzherbert said, that upon consulting together, and weighing every thing as maturely as possible, Mr. Stachey and himself had determined to advise Mr. Oswald to strike with us according to the terms we had proposed, as to our ultimatum respecting the fishery, and the loyalists. Accordingly we all sat down, read over the whole Treaty and corrected it, and agreed to meet to-morrow at O.'s house, to sign and seal the Treaties."

Will any candid man say, after reviewing these circumstances, that the 7th article was meant to secure the restitution of negroes and other property taken in the course of the war? If that had been meant, would it not have been improper to have urged it as an argument against the introduction of an article which would have subjected this country to immense embarrassment and expense?

It is true that the United States did challenge negroes and other property, which had fallen into the hands of the British previous to signing the Treaty. This circumstance, for the reason he had mentioned, and others that might be suggested, ought to have very little weight, for it is well known that recrimination of a violation of the Treaty soon commenced on both sides, and each mustered up every tolerable claim; many of which have since been admitted on both sides to be groundless. A circumstance which strongly corroborated what he said was, Sir Guy Carlton's letter on that subject had also been so grossly misunderstood and misrepresented, from that time to this, and now advanced by a gentleman on this floor, (Mr. Giles,) and even by Mr. Jefferson—in this instance departing from that candor which is so conspicuous in almost every other part of this excellent performance—for, when speaking on this subject, he says, "here there was a direct, unequivocal, and avowed violation of this part of the 7th article, in the first moment of its being known." Mr. Jefferson has given us a copy of Sir Guy Carlton's letter to General Washington, which is relied on to support this assertion, which is so far from speaking such a language, that in his opinion, it was directly the reverse, and that in a very pointed manner. His words are:

"I must confess, that the mere supposition that the King's Minister could deliberately stipulate in a Treaty an engagement to be guilty of a notorious breach of the public faith towards people of any complexion, seems to denote a less friendly disposition than I could wish, and I think less friendly than we might expect. After all, I only give my own opinion. Every negro's name is registered, the master he formerly belonged to, with such other circumstances as serve to denote his value, that it may be adjusted by compensation, if that was really the intention and meaning of the Treaty. Restoration was inseparable from a breach of public faith, and is, as I think all the world must allow, utterly impracticable."

Gen. Washington, at that time, seemed disinclined to give an opinion on that subject, but intimated the propriety of leaving any doubtful clause of the Treaty to be settled by future negotiation; for in a letter from him to our commissioners in New York, dated June, 1783, who had written to him for particular and pointed instructions on this very subject, there is this passage:

"It is exceeding difficult for me, not being a witness to the particular cases, or acquainted with the particular circumstances which must fall under your view in the course of the evacuation, to give you a precise definition of the acts which you are to represent as infractions of the Treaty; nor can I undertake to give an official construction of any particular expression or terms of the Treaty, which must, in cases of ambiguity or different interpretations, be explained by the Sovereignties of the two nations, or their commissioners appointed for that purpose."

A letter drawn up with great caution and extremely characteristic of that great man, who has always been extremely careful never to commit himself, but upon mature deliberation and upon sure ground. Here, Sir Guy Carlton, as a public officer of Great Britain, had made an explicit declaration on the subject, and that was directly against our claims; for his directing an inventory of the negroes, was only an evidence of his being disposed to conduct candidly in the matter, and give us an opportunity to recover a compensation, if we could afterwards make out our construction of the Treaty to be right.

Both in the United States and Great Britain it is admitted, as a sound rule of construction, that where any law or instrument is doubtful, and the liberty of any one, even of a slave, to be affected by it, that construction was to be preferred which was favorable to liberty. Under this rule, ought this Treaty to be so construed as to reduce to slavery three thousand persons who had obtained their liberty, by putting themselves under the protection of the British arms, unless there was some positive unequivocal stipulation in the Treaty which could admit of no other construction, he hoped, for the honor of America, they would make no such challenge. There was another circumstance which he had never seen mentioned, which, in his opinion, greatly weakened our claims, which was the doubts he entertained of our right to demand of a foreign nation the restitution of a runaway slave. The United States are now at peace with all the world; suppose a slave should escape into the dominions of a foreign nation, and on demand they should refuse to deliver him up? he very much doubted whether we should have just ground of complaint. On the other hand, if any of our citizens may be so unfortunate as to be reduced to slavery by any of the Barbary powers in Africa, should make their escape into the dominions of any of the European nations, and upon being claimed by such powers, should be delivered up, he did believe we should have good ground of complaint against such nation, as being unjust and inhumane. And, so far as principle is concerned, what difference does it make whether the citizens of the United States are carried into slavery in Africa, or the inhabitants of Africa are brought into slavery in the United States? He knew of no principle that made a difference between the natural rights of a white or black man. The first principle that is laid down in the rights of man, is, that all men are born free and equal; it does not say all white men. He did not believe, he said, that the House would ever admit so absurd a doctrine, as that the different shades in a man's complexion would increase or diminish his natural rights. He hoped no gentleman would take any exception to what he had said on this point; he did not mean to give offence, or to throw any reflection on any part of the Union, on account of their having a larger proportion of slaves. It was an evil which existed at the commencement of our Revolution, and he trusted every part of the Union would get rid of the evil as soon as it should be practicable and safe. What he had said, was only what he felt himself bound to do in justification of our Minister for his having given up that claim.

Mr. Hillhouse requested gentlemen to pause a moment, and reflect what will be our situation if this Treaty is rejected. The peace of 1783 is agreed on both sides to have been infracted, since that Great Britain has committed depredations on our commerce to an immense amount. Is it supposed that all this matter can go off without any noise or combustion? As to treating again, no one can suppose that we could do it to any advantage, after such rejection. What may Great Britain expect, if we will not settle our differences by negotiation? Will she not expect that we shall resort to more violent measures—such as reprisal, sequestration, or stopping of intercourse? And to guard herself against such measures, may we not expect she will lay her hand upon all our property on the ocean? He said he looked upon such events as the natural consequences of our rejecting the Treaty. What may we expect will be the conduct of our own citizens? Will they tamely submit to be robbed of their property, when they lose all hope of aid or protection from the Government? They will not; they will defend it even to the shedding of blood; and not only so, but they will also take every opportunity they have to make reprisal for the property they have already lost upon those who did them the injury, whether they belong to one nation or another. What, he asked, could be the end of all these things but war?

Wednesday, April 20.

Treaty with Great Britain.

The House then resolved itself into a Committee of the Whole on the state of the Union, and the resolution for carrying the British Treaty into effect, being under consideration,

Mr. Page said, that he had heard no arguments in favor of the resolution before the committee, but such as might be used to influence a vote at any other time, and upon almost any occasion; for we are told that war, or popular discontent, and great inconvenience and distress to merchants, underwriters, and others, will be the consequence of its rejection. If such threats can influence this House upon the present occasion, an unhappy and mortifying comparison may be made between the Congress of 1776, and that of the present day. They despised and encountered the dangers of war actually commenced. He wished, when members were disposed to mention their fears of such dangers, they would first clear the galleries; for such communications ought to be secret. Did members really believe that Great Britain will declare war against the United States, if this House should refuse to be accessary to the violation of the constitution, the destruction of their own rights, of the rights of neutral nations, and of the interests of their constituents? If they do believe this, is their belief founded on conjecture alone, or on the negotiator's declaration, that the British Ministers threatened him with war, declaring that war should be the consequence of a rejection of the Treaty? If the latter be the case, and nothing less can justify such repeated assertion that war will be the consequence of a refusal to carry the Treaty into effect, the Treaty ought to be deemed null and void on account of that threat; and if the former, they may be assured that they are mistaken, and that Britain is not so frantic as to engage in a war with the United States upon such slight grounds. The citizens of the United States wish not to be at war with the British nation; nor can the people of Britain desire a war with them. Both must wish for peace, and a full commercial intercourse upon liberal terms; and as the Executive authority of both countries are well disposed to each other, and have, as far as in their power, carried the Treaty into execution, what reason can be assigned why we should be involved in a war? It has been said that the United States will be obliged to declare war, on account of the British refusal (which may be expected) to deliver up the posts, and to make compensation for spoliations of our commerce; but I see no necessity for such conduct. For my part, should Britain never give up the posts, I would not vote for war, nor be at the expense of a single regiment to take them; nor would I go to war to recover losses sustained by spoliations. For, if we reject the resolution before you, sir, we may be at liberty to pass such a bill as we I passed in the year 1794, by a majority of twenty-four members, and for which thirteen Senators then voted; and should the Senate concur with us in passing it, we might use it more effectually than a declaration of war for the recovery of the posts, and reparation of wrongs. As to war, as my colleague yesterday said, I have reason to deprecate it, for the sake of my constituents, and for my own sake; for I have experienced enough of its evils; but I cannot think that I ought to sacrifice their dearest interests merely from an apprehension of the dangers of war. The arguments, therefore, which I have heard, cannot induce me to vote for the resolution before you. Indeed, sir, I must vote against it; because I think that the Treaty is unconstitutional and pernicious; and even if it were constitutional in every respect, and as advantageous to the United States as it has been represented, I should think it impolitic and dishonorable in this House to lend its aid to carry it into effect during the present war, and a continuance of the British depredations on our commerce, and impressment of our seamen. The Treaty appears to me unconstitutional, because it takes from Congress that very power with which it was invested by the constitution, and to invest them with which, the constitution itself was expressly formed; a power which I think should be held as precious and unalienable. I mean the power of regulating the commerce of the United States with Great Britain; so as to induce her to fulfil all the conditions of the Treaty of Peace, and to put the trade of the United States with her upon a footing of reciprocity. It appears also unconstitutional, because it violates a solemn act of Congress passed in conformity to the express words, and I may say, in obedience to the injunction of the spirit of the constitution: I mean the act for establishing a uniform rule of naturalization, and this violation, too, operates partially, and in favor of British subjects alone. It is moreover unconstitutional, because it interferes with the authority of the Judiciary, by establishing a Court of Commissioners, a kind of supreme court of appeals, within the United States, with powers to proceed, unknown to our laws; with temptations to defendants to make no defence; with a right to bind the United States to pay debts which they owe not, and to any extent or amount which that court may think fit to decree; and it is unconstitutional, because it authorizes the President to create certain offices, and annex salaries thereto. In these instances, at least, I think the Treaty unconstitutional; for I think that Congress cannot authorize the President to do away the power of Congress or to establish a court of appeals superior to the Federal Supreme Court; that, whatever would be unconstitutional, if done by Congress, cannot be constitutional if done by the President and British King. But, sir, if the Treaty were not unconstitutional, that is, if the President and Senate had a right to deprive Congress of the power it claims, and to interfere with the Judiciary, yet the exercise of that right in the present case, ought to be viewed as so pernicious to the United States as to render the Treaty null and void; or, at least, it ought to be viewed as an argument of sufficient weight to induce this House to refuse their aid towards carrying this Treaty into operation. And were it even constitutional and advantageous to the United States in every article, yet, as it acquiesces in a violation of the rights of neutral nations in favor of Great Britain, and in some instances, to such a degree as to be thought even by the President himself, to afford just ground for discontent on the part of our allies, it will be dishonorable and highly impolitic in this House to be in any manner instrumental in carrying it into effect. As it has not been in the power of the United States to assist their Republican allies, when fighting in fact their battles, the least they can do, or the least that the world and those allies can expect from them, must be, that they will not put the enemies of those allies into a better condition than they were by making Treaties with them during the present war.

Mr. Findlay said he should not think it necessary to resume any of the arguments relative to a principle which had already been settled in that House; yet, he observed, that every gentleman who spoke on the subject seemed to argue what were the rights of that body upon the subject of Treaties, as if no question had already been had on the occasion.

It had been insisted upon, notwithstanding the decision which had been had, that a Treaty was a law when it came before that House, and they had no power but to appropriate to carry it into effect. He said this opinion was directly contrary to the opinion held on the constitution at the time it was accepted in Pennsylvania. Moral discretion, he said, was necessary to be exercised in every decision of that House, except the constitution had prescribed to them some positive rule of action. In ratifying the constitution in the State of Pennsylvania, this was the understanding of it. The minority in the convention did not wish so much power placed in the Executive, and he appealed to gentlemen in that convention, if this was not the doctrine asserted by the majority in answer to the objections of the minority. Indeed, if they were not to have exercised a moral obligation upon the Treaties, the constitution would have expressly said so, as in the case of the President's salary, the pay of the Judges, Army appropriations, &c. If they had not been limited in these articles by the constitution, they certainly would have had the power to have changed them if they had thought proper.

But, passing over this consideration, there had been pretty large views taken of the manner in which the Treaty came before them. The gentlemen from New York and Virginia had entered into the subject. He must beg leave to differ from the gentleman from New York as to the matter of fact relative to that House in the concerns of Government two years ago. He had no apprehensions at the time the Envoy was sent to Britain to negotiate a Treaty, that Britain would have commenced a war if that measure had not been adopted; so far from it, that a majority of that House thought differently. He had no doubt that war, and the destruction of liberty altogether, had been meditated by Great Britain; but before the negotiation was commenced, circumstances occurred which caused her to give up this extravagant design. Before the negotiator was appointed, it is well known that the plundering Order of the 6th November was revoked. The gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Giles) had given a very good narrative of events in Europe, which fully showed the cause of this change of conduct. That gentleman had also gone through the Treaty, article by article, in a manner so much to his satisfaction, that he should not attempt to follow him. Before the negotiation took place, we had suffered considerably by British spoliations, and that House thought of various means to make it the interest of that power not to continue their depredations. First one plan was proposed and then another. It need not be mentioned that amongst these was the plan of sequestration, the future power of doing which this Treaty proposed to deprive them of. It was discussed in the House, but no question taken on it, to show that negotiation was not thought necessary. He mentioned a conversation which had taken place betwixt a gentleman then in the Cabinet (now no more) and himself, which confirmed his opinion of the propriety of the measures. A bill for regulating commerce in such a manner as to make it the interest of Britain to refrain from injuring us, and redress the wrongs we had suffered by spoliations, was agreed to by the House, but negatived in the Senate. So far from being then afraid of war, they were more and more convinced that it was in their power to make it the interest of Britain to refrain from their acts of violence towards us.

Mr. Moore.—Mr. Chairman, I rise with diffidence to give my sentiments on so important a question as that now before you, especially as I have been preceded by gentlemen whose superior abilities have enabled them to investigate the subject with more accuracy than I am capable of. I consider the object as important of itself. It is rendered more so by the warmth with which it has been discussed—the irritation it has produced, both in this House and on the public mind. I lament that improper motives should be imputed to gentlemen on either side. I am disposed to believe, that gentlemen aim at doing what will best promote the public interest. I entertain no suspicion of designs against the Government by any member of this House, or any branch of the Government. Gentlemen have predicted a war and dissolution of the Government, if provision is not made for carrying the Treaty into effect. I have no apprehensions of either. It is highly improper to attempt to influence the votes of members by such declarations. I hope gentlemen will believe that members who differ from them in opinion, are equally zealous with themselves in discharging their duty, and have firmness enough to repel every attempt to intimidate. For myself, I have equal confidence in every part of the Union, that they have no wish to dissolve it. The suggestion is unfounded, and ought not to be made.

Mr. Chairman, the vote which I shall give on the question before us, will, in some degree, be influenced by a constitutional principle, which I consider as involved in the decision. On the resolution calling for the instructions given to Mr. Jay, and other papers relative to the Treaty, it was insisted on by members of this House, that the Executive has a right, by Treaty, to supersede all Legislative powers vested in Congress by the constitution. The Executive gives the same construction to the constitution. If, under these circumstances, I vote for the resolution before you, I consider myself as admitting, as recognizing the principle contended for. This I cannot do. On the admission, or rejection of this principle, I am of opinion, the future course, the future operations of Government materially depend. By this it will be decided, whether it is wholly Executive or not: whether this House depends on the courtesy of the Executive for their right to interfere in legislation.

It has been argued, that this extensive, unlimited power, was necessarily vested in the Executive, subject only to the control of the Senate. In order to support the sovereignty and independence of the small States, I do conceive that a branch of the Legislature in which the States are equally represented, was all that could be claimed. Can it be conceived to be necessary, just, or proper, that the regulation of all the important interests of the Union should be at the disposal of the Executive? Can gentlemen seriously believe that the citizens of the United States, who opposed, at so great an expense of blood and treasure, the claim of Great Britain to tax us unrepresented, would admit all their interest to be represented by so unequal a representation as that contended for? It has been asked, Is not the Senate as worthy of the confidence of the citizens of the United States as this House? I will ask, are they more? This Legislative power is restrained and checked by the constitution; particular modes and restrictions are prescribed, but no checks are imposed on the Executive. Were the people jealous of this House, and not of the other branches? Did they suspect the Legislature of doing wrong? When this House was connected with the other branches, were they to regulate their interests; and have they reposed unlimited confidence in the other branches when acting without this? Did they consider this House as the only branch from which any danger was to be apprehended? It is impossible, yet this must have been the fact, if the construction given to the constitution is a just one.

A gentleman from Connecticut has said, that gentlemen had prejudged the Treaty; they come forward with prejudices against it, determined to vote against it. It is not so with me. I was strongly inclined to vote for it; to make some degree of sacrifice rather than defeat it.

Gentlemen, on reflection, must be convinced that the question has not been prejudged. The Envoy was appointed at the moment when this House was deliberating on means for preventing further spoliations on our commerce. Commercial regulations were proposed, and other means from which they might have been forced to abandon their unjust and oppressive system. I remember well the arguments then used were convincing to my mind; that those were the only weapons of defence within our power; that they would be effectual. But these were arrested by the despatch of an Envoy Extraordinary. Some of the leading features of the Treaty were then predicted; the event has corresponded with those predictions. Principles were then discussed, which the Treaty contains, before the negotiator was appointed.

This shows there was no prejudging in the manner gentlemen have stated. By this Treaty all the measures then contemplated by the Legislature are arrested; an eternal veto is imposed against our ever carrying the measures then contemplated into effect. This shows that the Executive claims not only the constitutional right of forcing this House to pass what laws they please, but also, by Treaty, to declare what they shall not do.

We have passed a resolution, which is now on your files, declarative of the sense of this House as to their constitutional rights. The question is, however, undecided. The Executive and Senate will proceed to act on their own construction. They may, on their own construction, make a Treaty, which will imply a still more imperious and commanding necessity to provide for its execution, than even the present case. This necessity may force a relinquishment of the right contended for by this House. It may force an acquiescence in the Executive regulating all the interests of the Union. I believe it was not the sense of the framers of the constitution. It is not the sense of the people who adopted it. It never can be mine.

The merits of the Treaty have been ably and accurately discussed. I will make but a few remarks on it. I must disagree with the gentleman from Connecticut, who mentioned, as a well-known principle in judging of Treaties, that all property, (by fair construction, and by the established law of nations,) if not excepted particularly in a Treaty, remains in the same state in which it was found when the Treaty was made. Those in possession retain the possession. From this he has concluded, that negroes, taken during the war, had become the property of the captors, or rather, were emancipated. The words of the Treaty of Peace are, "negroes and other property."

This plainly shows, in his opinion, that, by negroes, was not meant those taken during the war; they were not American property. The property was changed. It could only be intended, such negroes as were taken after the peace. I will ask, was it ever known in a Treaty, that a stipulation was made to give up property plundered after the peace? Is it not an established principle amongst all civilized nations, that plundered property shall be given up? Is it necessary, or was it ever thought so, to make it a stipulation by Treaty? I believe, if his construction is a just one, it is a new case, the provision was at least nugatory.

But if the principle he lays down is a just one, how does it happen that debts due to British subjects, paid by the debtors into the Treasury under the sanction of a law, and appropriated to the use of the State, are now recoverable by the British creditor? An important case of this kind has been decided in the Federal Court, and judgment given for the British creditor. Was the property less changed by the law of a sovereign and independent State, than by the proclamation of a British commander? This cannot be. The fact is, however, that in two cases, found in the same instrument, there are claims founded on the same principle; the one, a British claim, is established, the other, a claim of the United States, is rejected. This involves in it an absurdity. By those opposed modes of construction, an important claim of the citizens of the United States is given up by the Treaty, a claim against them to a great amount is established.

The claim as against us is admitted; our claim is rejected, in cases where the same principle fairly applies, and where, by gentlemen's own showing, there is no dissimilarity which can justify such opposite constructions. There is another provision of the Treaty, by which an important interest has been sacrificed. British subjects held lands within the United States before the war; many of those claims were barred; the claimant being an alien could not recover; his being an alien was the only bar. It was effectual—such has been the decision of the Courts. But by the Treaty, being aliens shall not bar the claim of British subjects—thus, many of the extensive claims are restored. In some of the States more than half their territory will be revested in proprietors. What could induce this grant? What equivalent do we receive for this sacrifice? Sir, I am constrained to think the Treaty a bad one, in those instances I have mentioned, more so than in any others. And when I connect with the Treaty itself the important constitutional question which has been discussed, I cannot vote for the resolution before you.

Mr. Kittera.—Since the 4th of July, 1776, the Councils of America have not been agitated by so momentous a question as that at present before the committee. At the period to which I allude, the question was, whether we should tamely submit to an abject and disgraceful slavery, with all its concomitant evils, or, by a Declaration of Independence, an exertion of our internal strength, with the advantages of foreign aid, make a bold and manly effort to obtain the blessings of freedom—the solid rewards of well-earned liberty. The present question is, whether we shall supply the means of carrying into execution a Treaty of Commerce and Amity with a powerful nation, entered into by a Minister of the United States, and solemnly ratified by the authorities constituted by the people for such purposes; or, by refusing, perhaps unconstitutionally refusing those means, hazard the peace, interrupt the prosperity, and tarnish the honor of the country? In a question of such magnitude, prudence calls me to pause, duty to reflect. My country's faith is plighted, a solemn contract is made; it would therefore be unwise and impolitic, as it concerns the interest, and dishonorable, as it regards the character, of this nation, in the infancy of its existence, to violate so solemn a contract.

Two causes have contributed much to prejudice the American mind against the Treaty. 1st. An enthusiasm for France, struggling in the cause of liberty, against the combined Monarchs of Europe, in which combination, the very power with whom the Treaty was made, formed a prominent part. 2dly. Strong resentment against Britain, for injuries received during a tedious and cruel war, and those injuries renewed by a detention of our Western posts, exciting and aiding the savage Indian tribes in the commission of hostilities on our frontiers, with strong indication of a design to contract our boundaries, and their lawless depredations on our commerce. I will not add, that there are amongst us some irreconcilable enemies to this Government, who opposed its adoption, predicted its downfall, and whose pride and political consequence are suspended on the fulfilment of this prediction. For the honor of human nature, and for the character of my country, I hope there are few to answer this description; if, however, there are any, the poet's execration is to them peculiarly applicable: "Cursed be the man who owes his greatness to his country's ruin?"

There are some things in which the candid part of those who hear me will not disagree. 1st. That our Envoy was a wise and honest man; he was a tried patriot, skilled in diplomatic life, and rendered to his country important services during the late war. The tale of his receiving British gold was made for children and fools, and need only to be told, to be disbelieved. 2dly. He made the best bargain he could. I will not mention, in proof of this, the ratification of the contract, eight months afterwards, by the President, (in whom this country has certainly an unbounded confidence,) with the advice of two-thirds of the Senate; but I have proof positive. The letter of Mr. Pinckney, our Minister resident at London, and conversant with every part of the negotiation, in strong and decided terms advises Mr. Jay to accept the contract as the best that could be procured, and as one that would promote the interests of this country. 3dly. If negotiations had been unsuccessful; if the Treaty, on the terms offered, had been rejected, war must have ensued. Our national honor would have forbidden a tame submission under so many insults and injuries; such submission would have invited new insults, and our own safety would have made resistance and retaliation necessary.

The Treaty naturally presents itself under two general heads: 1st. Such parts of it as are permanent, to wit, the first ten articles. 2dly. Such parts of it as are temporary, to continue for two years after the expiration of the war in which Great Britain is now engaged. Three great points are embraced under the first arrangement: a surrender of our Western posts, compensation for the spoliations committed on our commerce, and the payment of British debts. However lightly my colleague from the western part of Pennsylvania (Mr. Findlay) spoke yesterday of the Western posts, I consider the acquisition as an important treasure to this country. It will not only increase the value of our Western lands, and open to us a new source of commerce, but it will relieve us from the expense and horrors of an Indian war. Those were the sentiments of the gentleman himself, on this floor, two years ago. The spoliation on our commerce has generally been estimated at five millions of dollars. On a rejection of the Treaty, I wish the gentlemen in the opposition to point out how the American merchants are to be reimbursed for their loss. Nothing can be expected from new negotiations. It would be a solemn mockery of justice to the claim of those citizens. Payment out of the Treasury has been talked of, and a resolution to that effect is now on your table. This can never be done. It would be without a precedent, and Congress has heretofore refused the claim. And how can you discriminate such claims from those rising from savage depredations on your frontier settlers? The protection of the Government was, at least, as much due to the peaceable farmer as the speculating merchant; and if losses have arisen for want of such protection, compensation is as justly due in the one case as in the other. But why are we to subject the Government to this payment, or our citizens to this loss, when compensation is offered by the nation that has done the wrong? As to British debts, the committee have had various calculations of their amount.

I believe some of the estimates have been exceedingly exaggerated. If they are even half the enormous sum that has been stated on the other side, we have not much difficulty in accounting for the extraordinary opposition to the administration of this Government that has appeared in a certain quarter of the Union. Whatever may be the amount, the nation is bound by the strongest ties of justice and national honor to secure the payment.

Mr. Holland said, he would submit some considerations to the committee, that, together with those which had been given, would influence his vote upon the resolution on the table; a subject, as had been said by all who advocated the resolution, of the first importance—an issue on which depended peace or war. He said, he considered the question of some importance, particularly as it related to their constitutional powers; but the conceptions of gentlemen had exaggerated the result of the present question. It was nothing more or less than, would they or would they not now appropriate moneys to carry the British Treaty into effect? He said, he had ever felt a disposition to that purpose; not because the faith of the nation, as had often been said, was pledged; not because they were under moral obligations, as had been contended for—neither of which he could admit; but because a respect was due to the negotiator, to the Senate who advised, and to the President who ratified it; for, it was to be presumed, until the contrary appeared, that they exercised their judgments for the good of the nation. But it was possible the means they have adopted may not produce the end intended; they may have been mistaken.

When he first examined the instrument, he was in hopes that there was something extrinsic existing, which, when communicated to him, would do away the exceptions on the face of the instrument, and therefore he was silent and suspended his judgment. It was for that purpose he had voted for the papers relative to the negotiation to be laid on the table, in hopes of obtaining further information, previous to his being called upon to carry it into effect. But, unfortunately for him, no further information was to be obtained. The useful papers, an innocent and humble request, were not granted. He was not possessed of any other information than could be drawn from the instrument, from the writers on that subject, and the arguments that had been advanced by the gentlemen who had advocated the resolution; to the whole of which he had with candor attended, and with regret informed the committee, that nothing had been advanced, that had convinced him of the reason, propriety, necessity, or fitness, of the stipulations contained in the instrument.

Those gentlemen, instead of reasoning, have endeavored to alarm. They have said that, if we do not carry this Treaty into effect, that we shall be plunged in a war; that Britain is a proud and haughty nation; that they will lay their hands upon all our property, &c. This was an address to our fears and not our reason, and were our fears once on the wreck, there is no knowing the result, or where we should land. But, in this instance, we would not be governed by panic, or dread of the power of that haughty nation, as they had been called; but as the Representative of a free and independent nation, he felt himself perfectly at liberty to exercise his reason in the most cool and deliberate manner. Not apprehending any danger, the time has been, and now is, that we are perfectly secure in asserting our equal and reciprocal rights with that nation. We have done it in a state of infancy and inexperience, at a time much more unfavorable, taking each side of the question into view, than the present. And shall we now hesitate, and tamely suffer them to dictate to us? And are we bound to accept the Treaty, lest they should be offended and treat us with contempt for not accepting, as it is said, a more favorable offer than they have given to other nations? Are we not the sole judges; have we not a right to determine for ourselves? And as this is a mere naked stipulation, they can receive no damage, nor, on this early notice, can they charge with deception, or have any right to complain. One thing is certain; so long as Great Britain finds it for her interest to be pacific, she will adopt measures calculated to preserve peace; but when interest dictates the contrary, her invention will not seek a pretext for a different conduct. The history of that nation gives abundant proof of this.

Mr. Swanwick objected that his colleague (Mr. Kittera) had charged him with a want of candor. He was liable to mistake, he said, equally with any other man; but he trusted he should not be charged with knowingly misstating any thing with respect to the East India trade; he had reserved to himself a future opportunity of speaking on that subject, which, however, the length of debate seemed likely to prevent. He had said that the American vessels were permitted to trade to the East Indies as all other nations were, but that they were obliged to land their goods in the United States, whilst the Danes, Swedes, &c., could go there and carry the goods which they purchased from thence to any part of the world, except to the British dominions; and that was the situation of America antecedent to the present Treaty. A ship of his, some time ago, earned a good freight from Bengal to Ostend, and another he knew had lately made one to Hamburg; but, by the Treaty before the House, whatever advantages might be made by going to a foreign port their vessels were deprived of, and must return direct to the ports of the United States. These, he said, were stipulations which no other nation lay under; and though, perhaps, no nation had special leave stipulated by Treaty to go there, yet they all, nevertheless, did go, and never met with any opposition.

Friday, April 22.

Execution of British Treaty.

After the presentation of several petitions on this subject, the House resolved itself into a Committee of the Whole on the state of the Union, when the resolution for carrying into effect the British Treaty being under consideration—

Mr. Coit said, that the importance of the resolution before the committee would preclude all necessity of analogy for any member's asking their attention to his observations. He should only add to it, that he should endeavor not to repeat what had been already said.

He observed, that the discussion of the merits of the Treaty came before the committee under peculiar disadvantages, for, besides the prejudices against it that might be supposed to have been caused by extraneous circumstances, the agitation of the important constitutional question relative to the right of the Legislature to concur in giving validity to this Treaty, which was claimed to be valid and complete without that concurrence, and the refusal of a call for papers had very naturally a tendency to give a bias to the minds of some gentlemen against the Treaty; for himself, he was fully satisfied the Legislature had no constitutional connection with the business of making Treaties.

Mr. C. said he should attempt to run through the objections which had been made to the Treaty, and consider its merits independently of the peculiar circumstances under which it was now presented to the committee, and then give his own view of it as relative to those peculiar circumstances.

The objects of the negotiation, he said, very naturally were divided into three parts—the inexecution of the Treaty of 1783; mutual complaints between the United States and Great Britain relative to transactions independent of the Treaty; and arrangements for the intercourse between the two nations, commercial and political. But as gentlemen had made their objections generally in the order in which the several articles of the Treaty had been arranged, he should follow the same order in his observations in answer to them.

The first objection which had been made was, that no compensation had been stipulated to the United States for the supposed breach of the Treaty of 1783, in carrying off the negroes. This objection, he had supposed, was so completely answered by his colleague, (Mr. Hillhouse,) who had been up the day before, that he should not have added on that head, but that he had since found gentlemen still insisting on that objection. He was particularly surprised to hear the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Findlay) stating that he conceived the negro article to have been put into the Treaty expressly as a compensation or set-off for the engagement to pay the British debts. This pretension, he thought, had been fully refuted by the extract from Mr. Adams's journal, quoted by Mr. Jefferson in his correspondence with Mr. Hamilton, and which had been read by his colleague. From that extract, it appeared that a claim for negroes and other property which had been plundered, carried off, and destroyed by the British, was made by our commissioners, as a set-off against a claim made by the British commissioners for restoration of confiscated estates; and that the one of those claims was abandoned with the other. Had the gentleman from Pennsylvania taken the pains to examine the journal of Mr. Adams, which might be seen by any member of the committee at the office of the Secretary of State, he would have found how the article came to be inserted.

Before the signing of the Treaties with which the extract made by Mr. Jefferson is closed, stands in the original the history of this article in these words:

"Mr. Laurens said, there ought to be a stipulation that the British troops should carry off no negroes or other property; we all agreed. Mr. Oswald consented, and then the Treaties were signed," &c.

This, Mr. Coit said, was all the mention he could find respecting this article, except in a subsequent part of the same letter, in which Mr. Adams observes:

"I was very happy that Mr. L. came in, although it was the last day of the conferences, and wish he could have been sooner. His apprehension, notwithstanding his deplorable affliction under the recent loss of so excellent a son, is as quick, his judgment as sound, and his heart as firm as ever. He had an opportunity of examining the whole, and judging and approving; and the article which he caused to be inserted at the very last, that no property should be carried off, which would most probably, in the multiplicity and hurry of affairs, have escaped us, was worth a longer journey, if that had been all, but his name and weight is added, which is of much greater consequence."

From these extracts, it appeared, the article was not a subject of negotiation, but inserted at the close of the transaction, without discussion, as a matter of course, and which Mr. Adams supposes might, in the multiplicity and hurry of affairs, have been omitted, if Mr. Laurens had not suggested it.

Mr. C. said, he would candidly acknowledge that it was very extraordinary to him, that the construction which had been generally put on the article in America, should have so universally prevailed, if it was not the true one, that Congress should have adopted it; and that such should have been the idea of the commissioners appointed to superintend the embarkation at New York, in the year 1783. Still more extraordinary was it to him, to find Mr. Jay himself, when Secretary for Foreign Affairs, in the year 1786, in a report he then made to Congress on the subject, considering the carrying off of those negroes as a violation of the Treaty, and saying further, that he understood from Mr. Adams, then at the Court of London, that the British Minister had no objections to making compensation for them. Still he believed, the true construction of the article was, that it was designed only to prevent plunder by the British troops, and carrying off of American property, according to the ordinary agreements in Treaties, which stipulate for the giving up of conquered countries. True, it might be asked, why say negroes or other property? The expression, he agreed, was not correct, unless a doubt might have been entertained whether negroes were property; but the word negroes must be qualified by other property, with which it is connected, and could operate only as if it had said horses or other property, which no person would contend amounted to a stipulation not to carry off what had once been, but by the laws of war and nations, before the close of the war, had ceased to be the property of American inhabitants. Four gentlemen from Virginia had insisted on this objection, and not one of them had deigned to remark on the construction of the article itself. They had all relied upon the common understanding of it. That this understanding could not change the sense of the article, if it was not doubtful, could not be denied. Their leaving the article and resorting to the common understanding of it, he conceived to be a tacit acknowledgment of the gentlemen, that the instrument itself would not bear the construction they wished to give it.

Whether the negotiator had urged this construction of the article, and found he could not obtain its admission, or even an arbitration upon it, he did not know; from his opinion of the good sense and understanding of Mr. Jay, however, he was for himself satisfied that, whatever might have been his former opinions, on attending to the subject, he had found what had been called the American construction was not the just one, and had therefore abandoned it.

Mr. C. said, he was aware that the construction he contended for had been called the British construction, and Camillus's construction; that he had himself, however, adopted more than two years ago, the first time he had paid any attention to the article, upon no other impulse or authority than his own judgment, on the perusal of it, and even before he had ever heard of any other construction of it than that he contended against, he was aware that there was a kind of patriotism which claimed every thing for one's country, whether consistently with truth, justice, and candor, or not; for himself, he had no pretensions to such patriotism. He believed Mr. Jay had none, and if he was convinced that the American construction of this article was unfounded, he thought it for his honor, and the honor of this country, that he had abandoned it.

When Mr. Coit had concluded—

Mr. S. Smith rose and said, the subject then before the committee appeared to him to be of an importance at least equal to the great constitutional question which agitated the House during the present session; it has had, and he trusted would continue to have, the same calm attention paid to its discussion. He hoped and expected that it would ultimately be determined with a view to the real interest of the nation, under the existing state of things.

When the Treaty was first published he had read it with attention, and although he had not seen all those faults with which it has since been charged, yet there was, to his view, so little good contained in it, and so much of evil to be apprehended from it, that he had felt a hope that the President would not have ratified it. He had been disappointed, yet he had not a doubt but the President, after the most mature consideration, had given his signature; being possessed, as he was, of every information relative to a subject so very important, he could better determine on the policy of its adoption than those who were less informed. Still there were many articles, particularly the commercial, which every man might judge of from the face of the instrument. On these he did not hesitate to give an opinion: which was, that they promise not one solitary advantage, and shackle our commerce in many important points. He would not trouble the committee with going deeply into a subject that has already been so ably discussed. He, however, could not refrain from a few remarks on the right to countervail our extra duties on tonnage of goods imported in foreign bottoms. He asked what would this countervail be? Could any man tell? It was not specified in the article; it was then discretionary with the British; discretionary with a nation whose rule of right has always been the measure of its power, whose conduct has invariably been to cramp and distress the commerce of all other nations. To such a nation was it proper to trust a latitude of that extent? Will she make her countervail oppressive and unjust? It is more than probable she will, and if she should, what remedy have we? None: for we are forbidden by the same article to legislate further on the subject.