FIRST CONGRESS.—FIRST SESSION. (continued 5)

Mr. Benson withdrew his motion, and Mr. Madison moved, that it is the opinion of this committee, that there shall be established an Executive Department, to be denominated the Department of Foreign Affairs, at the head of which there shall be an officer, to be called the Secretary to the Department of Foreign Affairs, who shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate; and to be removable by the President.

That there shall be a Treasury Department, &c.

That there shall be a War Department, &c.

Mr. Vining seconded the motion, and offered to amend it, by adding the Domestic Department, mutatis mutandis. He said this department, in his opinion, was of absolute necessity, more requisite than either of the other three, except the Department of Finance; the present and increasing duties of such a department will oblige them to make the establishment.

Mr. Livermore was not prepared to decide on the question even as now brought forward, nor did he see a reason why the Department of Foreign Affairs was placed at the head of the list. He thought the Treasury Department of more importance, and consequently deserved the precedence.

As to the Domestic Department just mentioned by the gentleman from Delaware, he thought its duties might be blended with the others, and thereby save the United States the expense of one grand department. If the gentleman, therefore, would wait to see what were the duties assigned to them severally, he would be able to judge respecting his motion with greater propriety.

Mr. Vining withdrew his motion for the present.

And the committee agreed to the establishment of the Department of Foreign Affairs, and placing at the head thereof an officer to be called the Secretary of Foreign Affairs; but when they came to the mode of appointing the officer,

Mr. Smith (of South Carolina) moved to strike out the words "who shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate." He conceived the words to be unnecessary; besides, it looked as if they were conferring power, which was not the case, for the constitution had expressly given the power of appointment in the words there used. He also objected to the subsequent part of this paragraph, because it declared the President alone to have the power of removal.

Mr. Page saw no impropriety in passing an act to carry into execution the views of the constitution, and therefore had no objection to repeat those words in the resolution. He thought if the committee stopped there, they would be under no difficulty respecting the propriety of their measure, but if they went further they might meet with considerable embarrassment.

Mr. Madison remarked, that as there was a discretionary power in the Legislature to give the privilege to the President alone of appointing inferior officers, there could be no injury in declaring in the resolution the constitutional mode of appointing the heads of departments; however, if gentlemen were uneasy, he would not object to strike it out.

Mr. Lee thought this officer was an inferior officer; the President was the great and responsible officer of the Government; this was only to aid him in performing his executive duties; hence he conceived the power of appointing to be in the gift of the Legislature, and therefore the words were proper.

Mr. Smith (of South Carolina.)—This officer is at the head of a department, and one of those who are to advise the President; the inferior officers mentioned in the constitution are clerks and other subordinate persons. The words are only a repetition of the words in the constitution, and are consequently superfluous.

The question was taken on striking out those words, and carried in the affirmative.

The committee proceeded to the discussion of the power of the President to remove this officer.

Mr. Smith said, he had doubts whether the officer could be removed by the President. He apprehended he could only be removed by an impeachment before the Senate, and that, being once in office, he must remain there until convicted upon impeachment. He wished gentlemen would consider this point well before they decided it.

Mr. Madison did not concur with the gentleman in his interpretation of the constitution. What, said he, would be the consequence of such construction? It would in effect establish every officer of the Government on the firm tenure of good behavior; not the heads of departments only, but all the inferior officers of those departments, would hold their offices during good behavior, and that to be judged of by one branch of the Legislature only on the impeachment of the other. If the constitution means this by its declarations to be the case, we must submit; but I should lament it as a fatal error interwoven in the system, and one that would ultimately prove its destruction. I think the inference would not arise from a fair construction of the words of that instrument.

It is very possible that an officer who may not incur the displeasure of the President, may be guilty of actions that ought to forfeit his place. The power of this House may reach him by the means of an impeachment, and he may be removed even against the will of the President; so that the declaration in the constitution was intended as a supplemental security for the good behavior of the public officers. It is possible the case I have stated may happen. Indeed, it may, perhaps, on some occasion, be found necessary to impeach the President himself; surely, therefore, it may happen to a subordinate officer, whose bad actions may be connived at or overlooked by the President. Hence the people have an additional security in this constitutional provision.

I think it absolutely necessary that the President should have the power of removing from office; it will make him, in a peculiar manner, responsible for their conduct, and subject him to impeachment himself, if he suffers them to perpetrate with impunity high crimes or misdemeanors against the United States, or neglects to superintend their conduct, so as to check their excesses. On the constitutionality of the declaration I have no manner of doubt.

Mr. Benson.—If we refer to the constitution for light on this subject, it will appear evident that the objection is not well founded. The objection is this, that an officer ought not to be removed but by impeachment; then every officer is appointed during good behavior. Now, the constitution expressly declares, that the Judges, both of the Supreme and Inferior Courts, shall hold their offices during good behavior. If it is declared, that they are to hold their offices by this particular tenure, it follows that the other officers of the Government should hold them only at pleasure. He thought this an important question, and one in which they were obliged to take the constitution by construction. For although it detailed the mode of appointing to office, it was not explicit as to the supersedure; this clause, therefore, would be a mere declaration of the legislative construction on this point. He thought the importance and necessity of making the declaration, that the Chief Magistrate might supersede any civil officer was evident, and he should therefore vote in favor of the clause as it stood.

Mr. Vining said, there were no negative words in the constitution to preclude the President from the exercise of this power; but there was a strong presumption that he was invested with it: because it was declared, that all executive power should be vested in him, except in cases where it is otherwise qualified; as, for example, he could not fully exercise his executive power in making treaties, unless with the advice and consent of the Senate—the same in appointing to office.

He viewed the power of removal, by impeachment, as a supplementary security to the people against the continuance of improper persons in office; but it did not consist with the nature of things, that this should be the only mode of removal; it was attended with circumstances that would render it insufficient to secure the public safety, which was a primary object in every Government. Witness a transatlantic instance of its incompetency—he meant the famous case of Mr. Hastings. With what difficulty was that prosecution carried on! What a length of time did it take to determine! What is to be done while the impeachment is depending? For, according to the ideas of the gentleman from South Carolina, (Mr. Smith,) he cannot be removed but on conviction. If he cannot be removed, I should suppose he cannot be suspended; and what security have the people against the machinations of a bad man in office? He had no doubt but the constitution gave this power to the President; but if doubts were entertained, he thought it prudent to make a legislative declaration of the sentiments of Congress on this point. He was therefore in favor of the clause.

Mr. Bland thought the power given by the constitution to the Senate, respecting the appointment to office, would be rendered almost nugatory if the President had the power of removal. If the first nomination of the President should be disapproved by the Senate, and the second agreed to, he had nothing to do but wait the adjournment of Congress, and then fill the vacancy with his favorite; who, by thus getting into the possession of the office, would have a considerable chance of permanency in it. He thought it consistent with the nature of things, that the power which appointed should remove; and would not object to a declaration in the resolution, if the words were added, that the President shall remove from office, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. He agreed that the removal by impeachment was a supplementary aid favorable to the people; but he was clearly of opinion, that the same power that appointed had, or ought to have, the power of removal.

Mr. Jackson wished the motion had been referred to a sub-committee to digest: it seemed to him they were building the house before the plan was drawn. He wished to see the system reduced to writing, that he might leisurely judge of the necessity and propriety of each office and its particular duties.

With respect to the question before the House he was of opinion that if the House had the power of removal by the constitution, they could not give it out of their hands; because every power recognized by the constitution must remain where it was placed by that instrument. But the words in the constitution declare, in positive terms, that all civil officers shall be removed from office on impeachment for, and conviction of, high crimes and misdemeanors; and however long it may take to decide, in this way it must be done. He did not think the case of Mr. Hastings ought to be brought forward as a precedent for conducting such business in the United States. He believed, whenever an impeachment was brought before the Senate, they would proceed with all imaginable speed to its termination. He should, in case of impeachment, be willing to go so far as to give the power of suspension to the President, and he thought this all the security which the public safety required; it would prevent the party from doing further mischief. He agreed with the gentleman in the general principle, that the body who appointed ought to have the power of removal, as the body which enacts laws can repeal them; but if the power is deposited in any particular department by the constitution, it is out of the power of the House to alter it.

Mr. Madison did not conceive it was a proper construction of the constitution to say, that there was no other mode of removing from office than that by impeachment; he believed this, as applied to the Judges, might be the case, but he could never imagine it extended in the manner which gentlemen contended for. He believed they would not assert, that any part of the constitution declared, that the only way to remove should be by impeachment; the contrary might be inferred, because Congress may establish offices by law; therefore, most certainly, it is in the discretion of the Legislature to say upon what terms the office shall be held, either during good behavior or during pleasure. Under this construction, the principles of the constitution would be reconcilable in every part; but under that of the gentleman from South Carolina, it would be incongruous and faulty. He wondered how the gentleman from Georgia (Mr. Jackson) would reconcile his principles so far as to permit the President to suspend the officer. He begged his colleague (Mr. Bland) to consider the inconvenience his doctrine would occasion, by keeping the Senate constantly sitting, in order to give their assent to the removal of an officer; they might see there would be a constant probability of the Senate being called upon to exercise this power, consequently they could not be a moment absent. Now, he did not believe the constitution imposed any such duty upon them; why, then, said he, shall we enjoin it, especially at such an expense of the public treasure?

Mr. Boudinot would by no means infringe the constitution by any act of his, for if he thought this motion would lead the committee beyond the powers assigned to the Legislature, he would give it a decided negative; but, on an impartial examination of that instrument, he could not see the least foundation for such an objection; however, he was glad the question had come forward, because he wished to give a legislative construction to this part of the constitution.

The gentlemen who denied the power of the President to remove from office, founded their opinion upon the fourth section of the second article of the constitution, where it is declared, that all officers shall be removed from office on impeachment for, and conviction of, treason or bribery. If their construction is admissible, and no officer whatever is to be removed in any other way than by impeachment, we shall be in a deplorable situation indeed. Consider the extent of the United States, and the difficulty of conducting a prosecution against an officer, who, with the witnesses, resides a thousand miles from the seat of Government. But suppose the officer should, by sickness, or some other accident, be rendered incapable of performing the functions of the office, must he be continued? And yet it is to be apprehended, that such a disability would not furnish any good ground for impeachment; it could not be laid as treason or bribery, nor perhaps as a high crime or misdemeanor. Would gentlemen narrow the operation of the constitution in this manner, and render it impossible to be executed?

Mr. White thought no office under the Government was to be held during pleasure, except those which are to be constituted by law; but all the heads of departments are to be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. He conceived that, in all cases, the party who appointed ought to judge of the removal, except in those cases which by the constitution are excepted; and in those cases impeachment and conviction are the only mode by which they can be removed.

Mr. Thatcher asked, why the Judges were particularly mentioned in the constitution as holding their offices during good behavior, if it was not supposed that, without this express declaration in their favor, they, in common with all other officers not immediately chosen by the State Legislatures and the people, would hold them during pleasure? The clause respecting impeachments was particularly calculated for removing unworthy officers of the other description. Holding this construction of the constitution to be right, he was in favor of the clause as it stood.

Mr. Sylvester thought the constitution ought to have a liberal construction, and therefore was of opinion that the clause relative to the removal by impeachment was intended as a check upon the President, as already mentioned by some gentlemen, and to secure to the people, by means of their representatives, a constitutional mode of obtaining justice against peculators and defaulters in office, who might be protected by the persons appointing them. He apprehended the doctrine held out by the gentleman from South Carolina would involve the Government in great difficulties, if not in ruin, and he did not see it was a necessary construction of the constitution. Why, then, should the House search for a meaning, to make the constitution inconsistent with itself, when a more rational one is at hand? He, however, inclined at present to the sentiments of the gentleman from Virginia, (Mr. Bland,) who thought the Senate ought to be joined with the President in the removal, as they were joined by the constitution in the appointment to office.

Mr. Goodhue was decidedly against combining the Senate in this business. He wished to make the President as responsible as possible for the conduct of the officers who were to execute the duties of his own branch of the Government. If the removal and appointment were placed in the hands of a numerous body, the responsibility would be lessened. He admitted there was a propriety in allowing the Senate to advise the President in the choice of officers; this the constitution had ordained for wise purposes; but there could be no real advantage arising from the concurrence of the Senate to the removal, but great disadvantages. It might beget faction and party, which would prevent the Senate from paying proper attention to the public business. Upon the whole, he concluded the community would be served by the best men when the Senate concurred with the President in the appointment; but if any oversight was committed, it could best be corrected by the superintending agent. It was the peculiar duty of the President to watch over the executive officers; but of what avail would be his inspection, unless he had a power to correct the abuses he might discover.

Mr. Gerry.—The constitution provides for the appointment of the public officers in this manner: The President shall nominate, and by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, shall appoint ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, judges of the Supreme Court, and all other officers of the United States, whose appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by law. Now, if there be no other clause respecting the appointment, I shall be glad to see how the heads of departments are to be removed by the President alone. What clause is it that gives this power in express terms? I believe there is none such. If there is a power of removal, besides that by impeachment, it must vest somewhere. It must vest in the President, or in the President and Senate, or in the President, Senate, and House of Representatives. Now, there is no clause which expressly vests it in the President. I believe no gentleman contends it is in this House, because that would be that mingling of the executive and legislative powers gentlemen deprecate. I presume, then, gentlemen will grant, that if there is such a power, it vests with the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, who are the body that appoints. I think we ought to be cautious how we step in between the President and the Senate, to abridge the power of the one, or increase the other. If the power of removal vests where I suppose, we, by this declaration, undertake to transfer it to the President alone.

It has been mentioned, that it is proper to give this power to the President, in order to make him more fully responsible for this officer. I am for supporting the President to the utmost of my power, and making him as responsible as possible. I would therefore vest every gift of office, in the power of the Legislature, in the President alone; but I cannot think we ought to attempt to give him authority to remove from office, in cases where the constitution has placed it in other hands.

Mr. Livermore considered this as a constitutional question, and was of opinion, that the same power which appointed an officer, had the right of removal also, unless it was restrained by an express declaration to the contrary. As the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, is empowered to appoint ambassadors, certainly they have a right to remove them and appoint others. In the case of the judges, they must be appointed for life, or during good behavior. He had no idea, that it could ever enter into the heart of any man living, that all officers appointed under the constitution were to have a perpetuity in office. The judges themselves would not have had this right, if it had not been expressly given by the constitution, but would be removable in like manner with ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls. He took it, therefore, in the present case, that the President and the Senate would have the power of removing the Secretary of Foreign Affairs. The only question, therefore, which appears to be before the committee is, whether we shall give this power to the President alone? And with that he thought they had nothing to do. He supposed, if the clause was left out, the President and the Senate would proceed, as directed by the constitution, to appoint the officer; and hereafter, if they judged it necessary, would remove him; but if they neglected to do so, when it was necessary, by reason of his misdemeanors, this House would impeach him, and so get rid of him on conviction.

Mr. Bland.—It seems to be agreed on all hands, that there does exist a power of removal; the contrary doctrine would be a solecism in Government. If an officer embezzles the public money, or neglects or refuses to do the duties of his appointment, can it be supposed there is no way of getting rid of such a person? He was certain it was essentially necessary such a power should be lodged somewhere, or it would be impossible to carry the Government into execution. Their inquiries were therefore reduced to this point: Does it reside, agreeably to the constitution, in the President, or in the President and the Senate? The constitution declares, that the President and the Senate shall appoint, and it naturally follows, that the power which appoints shall remove also. What would be the consequence of the removal by the President alone, he had already mentioned, and need not repeat. A new President might, by turning out the great officers, bring about a change of the ministry, and throw the affairs of the Union into disorder: would not this, in fact, make the President a monarch, and give him absolute power over all the great departments of Government? It signifies nothing that the Senate have a check over the appointment, because he can remove, and tire out the good disposition of the Senate.

Mr. Clymer said, the power of removal was an executive power, and as such belonged to the President alone, by the express words of the constitution: "the executive power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America." The Senate were not an executive body; they were a legislative one. It was true, in some instances, they held a qualified check over the executive power, but that was in consequence of an express declaration in the constitution; without such declaration, they would not have been called upon for advice and consent in the case of appointment. Why, then, shall we extend their power to control the removal which is naturally in the Executive, unless it is likewise expressly declared in the constitution?

The question on adding the words "by and with the advice and consent of the Senate," as moved by Mr. Bland, was put and lost.

The question was now taken, and carried by a considerable majority, in favor of declaring the power of removal to be in the President.

Wednesday, May 20.

Treasury Department.

The House again resolved itself into a Committee of the Whole on the state of the Union, Mr. Trumbull in the chair. The resolution for establishing the Treasury Department being under consideration:

Mr. Gerry.—We are now called upon, Mr. Speaker, to deliberate, whether we shall place this all-important department in the hands of a single individual, or in a Board of Commissioners. I presume the gentleman, who has brought forward this string of propositions, means, that this officer shall have power to examine into the state of the public debt and expenses, to receive and disburse the revenue, to devise plans for its improvement and expansion, and, in short, to superintend and direct the receipts and expenditure, and govern the finances of the United States; having under him officers to do the subordinate business of registering and recording his transactions, and a Comptroller to control his operations with respect to the accounts and vouchers.

Before this committee proceed one step farther in this business, they ought seriously to consider the situation of this country, and what will be the consequence of appointing such an officer; consider how it will affect the public in general, the revenue, and even the Government itself. He is declared, in the list of duties assigned him in the paper read yesterday by the gentleman from New York, (Mr. Benson,) to have the power to form and digest the accounts, and to control all the officers of the department. It is evident, that we put his integrity to the trial, by such an arrangement. If he is disposed to embezzle the public money, it will be out of the power of the Executive itself to check or control him in his nefarious practices. The extension of his business to the collectors of at least fifty seaports, (over whom the naval officer can have no control, with respect to the money received,) will furnish abundant opportunities for peculation. In addition to the moneys arising from the impost, he may have to do with large sums derived from other quarters, from the sale of the vacant lands, the money of defaulters now due to the United States, and the revenue arising from taxes and excises. Admit these innumerable opportunities for defrauding the revenue, without check or control, and it is next to impossible he should remain unsullied in his reputation, or innoxious with respect to misapplying his trust.

Other great opportunities may arise in case of an anticipation of the public revenue; or, if it is necessary to prevent the injury which a rapid depreciation of the securities would occasion to public credit, he may be employed in purchasing them, in order to advance the credit of the Union. But what is to prevent the greatest imposition in this business? Charging them to the public at their nominal value, it is not in the power of the Government to check this species of speculation; what then is the situation of your officer? He must subject himself to suspicion: indeed, it is as much as his reputation is worth to come into a place of this kind; he can hardly preserve his integrity. His honor, credit, and character, must inevitably be injured. He cannot prove himself innocent of the suspicion, because it is the negative side of the question. He can offer nothing more in his defence than a mere denial of the crime.

There is another point which ought to be well considered: This officer is to digest and form the accounts. He can consequently give the business such complexity, as to render it impossible to detect his impositions; and as the inferior officers, who might discover the fraud, are to be appointed by the principal, will they not consequently be men after his own heart?

Taking these circumstances together, it must be very disagreeable to the person appointed, provided he is an honest, upright man; it will be disagreeable also to the people of the Union, who will always have reason to suspect, that a partiality is shown to the collectors, and other officers of the State to which he belonged. This has absolutely been the case, and was productive of very great dissatisfaction. I would be glad to know of the gentlemen, who are for vesting these powers in a single person, where they will find the man who is capable of performing the duties of a financier? For it is not the mere calling him a financier, and giving him a large salary, that will enable him to perform his functions in such a manner as to give satisfaction. We had once a gentleman who filled such a department, and I believe the only one in the United States who had knowledge and abilities by any means competent to the business; but that gentleman is now employed in another branch of the Government, and cannot be called to this trust. During the late war, Congress thinking it necessary to employ a financier, were led to inquire for a proper character to fill such an office; but not being able to discover such a one in this country, in whose abilities they had sufficient confidence, they wrote to Doctor Price a letter, to induce him to come to America, and accept of an appointment under them, for the superintendence of their finances. He wrote, in answer, that he felt with gratitude the honor which they had done him by their application, and signified, that he was desirous of rendering every service in his power to aid the glorious cause in which America was embarked; but, from his advanced situation in life, and infirmities of body, he was under the necessity of declining. This circumstance serves to show how difficult it is to get a proper person for so arduous an undertaking. But it appears to me, that if we could fix upon a person equal to the office, involving him in forming accounts, and such trifling business, would divert his attention from the more important duties he is called upon to perform. The proper business of finance, I take it, ought to be to consider of the means to improve the revenue, and introducing economy into the expenditures; to recommend general systems of finance, without having any thing to do with the actual administration of them, because, if he engages in the executive business, we shall be deprived of his talents in more important concerns. If it should be granted that there is a person of abilities to be found, adequate to the duties of the office, I want to know where the advantage arises of appointing him alone in preference to a Board? If you have commissioners, you have an opportunity of taking one from each grand division of the United States, namely, the Eastern, the Middle, and Southern Districts. If this person is a member of the Board, is it not evident you will have every advantage from his abilities in such a situation, as you would if he were placed in office without control? If he was possessed of such genius, he could employ it more usefully as a Commissioner of the Board of Treasury, than when left to perform all the drudgery of the executive part; because while his fine imagination was busied in reducing a chaos to a beautiful system, his colleagues might perform those parts which required less elevation of thought; by dividing the burthen, the business would be done with more regularity and facility. Surely no advantage to the public would arise from giving him the sole management of the business, but much inconvenience might; besides, it must unavoidably, as I said before, subject him to suspicions unfavorable to his reputation. This has absolutely been realized; it is not a mere chimera, a matter of speculation. We have had a Board of Treasury, and we have had a Financier. Have not express charges, as well as vague rumors, been brought against him at the bar of the public? They may be unfounded, it is true; but it shows that a man cannot serve in such a station without exciting popular clamor. It is very well known, I dare say, to many gentlemen in this House, that the noise and commotion were such as obliged Congress once more to alter their Treasury Department, and place it under the management of a Board of Commissioners. We have seen speculations excited from this quarter against the Government itself, and painful insinuations of design by his appointment to the Senate. I mention these circumstances to exhibit to your view the inconveniencies to which an officer is subjected by constituting an office of this nature. If the gentleman I have alluded to had been a member of the Board of Treasury, he would not have been subjected to the charges which were brought against him. In such a situation, he could have rendered the services his great abilities enabled him to do, without exposing his character to be torn to pieces by malevolence or detraction.

I am desirous of supporting the President; but the Senate requires to be supported also in their constitutional rights. To this body belongs the confidence of the States; while the President rests his support upon them he will be secure. They, with this House, can give him proper information of what is for the public interest, and, by pursuing their advice, he will continue to himself that good opinion which is justly entertained of him. If we are to establish a number of such grand officers as these, the consequences appear to me pretty plain. These officers, bearing the titles of minister at war, minister of state, minister for the finances, minister of foreign affairs, and how many more ministers I cannot say, will be made necessary to the President. If by this establishment we make them more respectable than the other branches of the Government, the President will be induced to place more confidence in them than in the Senate; the people will also be led to consider them as more consequential persons. But all high officers of this kind must have confidence placed in them; they will in fact be the chancellors, the ministers of the nation. It will lead to the establishment of a system of favoritism, and the principal magistrate will be governed by these men. An oligarchy will be confirmed upon the ruin of the democracy; a Government most hateful will descend to our posterity, and all our exertions in the glorious cause of freedom will be frustrated: we shall go on till we reduce the powers of the President and Senate to nothing but a name. This surely, sir, does not comport with the conduct of the House. We have been very tenacious of giving a title to the President, lest it should be implied we desired to increase his power. We would call him by no other appellation than merely President of the United States. I confess I was not such a stickler about titles as all this, because I did not consider that the liberties of the people could be hurt by such means; but I am not clear that the constitution authorizes us to bestow titles; it is not among the enumerated powers of Congress. But if the constitution did authorize it—[A call to order was made by some of the members, and Mr. Gerry was desired to confine himself to the point; the subject of titles was not before the House.][25] Mr. Gerry proceeded, and said the Senate were constitutionally the highest officers of Government, except the President and Vice President; that the House was about to supersede them, and place over their heads a set of ministers who were to hold the reins of Government, and all this to answer no good purpose whatever; because the same services could be obtained from subordinate officers.

In short, a Board of Treasury would conduct the business of finance with greater security and satisfaction than a single officer. He had a very good opinion of the gentleman who formerly administered the finances of the United States, and doubted if another of equal qualities could be found; but it was impossible for any person to give satisfaction in such a station. Jealousy would unavoidably be entertained; besides, no inconvenience resulted from the present arrangement of that department; therefore, there could be no good reason to induce a change. If the House was truly republican and consistent, they would not admit officers, with or without titles, to possess such amazing powers as would eventually end in the ruin of the Government. Under these impressions, he moved to amend the resolution so as to read, "there shall be established a Treasury Department, at the head of which there shall be three commissioners, to be denominated the Board of Treasury."

Mr. Wadsworth.—My official duty has led me often to attend at the treasury of the United States, and, from my experience, I venture to pronounce that a Board of Treasury is the worst of all institutions. They have doubled our national debt. (I do not mean by this observation to censure any man who has been in that office: I presume they were honest men, and did as well as could be done under such a system.) But I do not remember a single instance, in any one board, that I found them to have a system that would give even tolerable satisfaction; there appeared a want of confidence in the members of them all: they seemed to have no fixed principles to guide them, nor responsibility for their conduct.

I have had also transactions at the treasury whilst it was managed by a Superintendent of Finance. As to what fell from the gentleman last up, (though without intention, I dare say, to affect or prejudice the character of that officer, it may possibly have such an effect,) I think it necessary to state my sentiments, which are formed from my own experience as well as from report. I had great transactions with him, and must say that there did appear to be system in his management, and responsibility in his negotiations. I dare risk my fortune and character with him, because there was unity in the officer, and somebody in whom I could confide. The nature of the office is better calculated to give satisfaction than the other. I will not pretend to enumerate the savings he made, by introducing economy throughout the whole departments under Congress, because I do not know them all; but they were very considerable. The administration of the finances was clear to the meanest capacity. Receipts and expenditures were stated simply; they were published to the world. The heads of the Treasury Department, the Board of Commissioners, I do not believe have closed their accounts to this very day. I do not say it is for want of ability, will, or honesty, that this event has not taken place. I conceive it to be owing to their want of system in conducting their business. I wish the committee had before them the transactions of the board for one single month; they would find what I have remarked to be too well founded. Instead of system and responsibility, they would find nothing but confusion and disorder, without a possibility of checking their accounts. I know I am heard by one gentleman who is acquainted with these truths by experience.[26]

I beg leave to repeat once more, that under boards of treasury, there never was a possibility of the public knowing their situation; there is no possibility of getting on with the public accounts and closing them; there have not been the transactions of more than one of the great departments completely settled, owing to a radical defect in their constitution; they cannot proceed with that unity and decision necessary to insure justice. As to what the gentleman said, with respect to the difficulty of getting a proper officer to fill the department, I will just observe, that I do not believe it impossible, and am therefore prepared to attempt it.

Mr. Benson stated, that in the year 1781, from the very great derangement of public affairs, Congress were induced to place the Treasury Department under the superintendence of an individual. It is true, after the conclusion of the war, in the latter end of 1783, or beginning of 1784, Congress again changed their system, and placed the department in the hands of three commissioners, to be taken, as the gentleman has said, one from the Eastern, one from the Middle, and one from the Southern district; which regulation I think induced above twenty applications. Some gentlemen on this floor will doubtless recollect an observation that was made at that time, that if this trust had been to be reposed in one responsible individual, not perhaps more than three of the candidates would have had confidence to come forward as applicants for the office.

For his part, he conceived, that it required the same abilities in every individual of the commissioners, as was necessary if a single person was placed at the head of the department. If men competent to the undertaking are so difficult to be found, you will increase the embarrassment of the President threefold by making the arrangement the gentleman contends for. The principle upon which the gentleman advocates the appointment of a Board of Treasury, would apply in favor of a change in the constitution, and we ought to have three Presidents of the United States instead of one, because their business might be done with more regularity and facility; but he did not think the argument to be well founded.

Mr. Baldwin thought that there were very few gentlemen who had much to do with public business, but had turned their attention to this question. He had employed his reflection upon the subject for some time, and his sentiments were against the establishment of a Board of Treasury. He was persuaded there was not so much responsibility in boards as there was in individuals, nor is there such good ground for the exercise of the talents of a financier in that way. Boards were generally more destitute of energy than was an individual placed at the head of a department. The observations of the gentleman from Massachusetts were of great weight, so far as they inferred the necessity of proper checks in the department having care of the public money; if they had system, energy, and responsibility, he should be in favor of them; but his experience had convinced him of the contrary. He was not an advocate for an unlimited authority in this officer. He hoped to see proper checks provided; a Comptroller, Auditors, Register, and Treasurer. He would not suffer the Secretary to touch a farthing of the public money beyond his salary. The settling of the accounts should be in the Auditors and Comptroller; the registering them to be in another officer, and the cash in the hands of one unconnected with either. He was satisfied that in this way the treasury might be safe, and great improvements made in the business of revenue.

Mr. Madison had intended to have given his sentiments on this subject; but he was anticipated in some things by the gentleman last up. He wished, in all cases of an executive nature, that the committee should consider the powers that were to be exercised, and where that power was too great to be trusted to an individual, proper care should be taken so to regulate and check the exercise, as would give indubitable security for the perfect preservation of the public interest, and to prevent that suspicion which men of integrity were ever desirous of avoiding. This was his intention in the present case. If the committee agreed to his proposition, he intended to introduce principles of caution, which he supposed would give satisfaction on that point. As far as was practicable, he would have the various business of this important branch of the Government divided and modified, so as to lull at least the jealousy expressed by the gentleman from Massachusetts; indeed, he supposed, with the assistance of the committee, it might be formed so as to give satisfaction. He had no doubt but that the offices might be so constituted as to restrain and check each other; and unless an unbounded combination took place, which he could by no means suppose was likely to be the case, that the public would be safe and secure under the administration. He would favor the arrangement mentioned by the worthy gentleman from South Carolina, (Mr. Baldwin,) and after that was separated from the Secretary's duties, he believed the officer would find sufficient business to employ his time and talents in rendering essential services to his country. This arrangement he considered would answer most of the objections which had been urged.

If a board is established, the independent officers of Comptroller and Auditor are unknown; you then give the aggregate of these powers to the board, the members of which are equal; therefore you give more power to each individual than is proposed to be trusted in the Secretary; and if apprehensions are to be entertained of a combination, they apply as forcibly in the case of two or three commissioners combining, as they do in the case of the Secretary, Comptroller, and other officers. If gentlemen permit these sentiments to have their full weight, and consider the advantages arising from energy, system, and responsibility, which were all in favor of his motion, he had no doubt of their according with him on this question.

Mr. Boudinot considered the question to be, whether the department should be under the direction of one or more officers. He was against boards, because he was convinced by experience that they are liable to all the objections which gentlemen had stated. He wished the committee had it in their power to turn to the transactions of this department since the revolution, to examine the expenditures under former boards of treasury, and under the Superintendent of Finance; it would so confound them, that he was sure no gentleman would offer another argument in favor of boards. He was not acquainted with the management under the present board. He had not been in the habit of doing business with them. But between the administration of the former and the Superintendent of Finance, there was an intolerable comparison. He was far from being astonished at the jealousy and suspicion entertained of that valuable officer; he rather wondered that the clamor was not more loud and tremendous. He could not repeat all the causes there were for accusation against him, but surely they were not inconsiderable. He remembered one hundred and forty-six supernumerary officers were brushed off in one day, who had long been sucking the vital blood and spirit of the nation. Was it to be wondered at, if this swarm should raise a buzz about him? The reform which daily took place made him no inconsiderable number of enemies. The expenditures under the Board of Treasury had been enormous. They were curtailed in the quartermasters, commissaries of provision and military stores, in the hospital, and every great department established by Congress; so that, besides those who were offended by a removal, every one who was affected by this economy, or parsimony, if they will call it so, were incensed against him. It was impossible to gain friends among those people by a practice of this kind. He would state a circumstance which might give the committee some small idea of what the savings under the Superintendent were. The expenditure of hay at a certain post was one hundred and forty tons; such was the estimate laid before him; yet twelve tons carried the post through the year, and the supply was abundant, and the post was as fully and usefully occupied as it had ever been before.

The question on the amendment proposed by Mr. Gerry was taken and lost; after which the resolutions respecting the Treasury and War Department, as proposed by Mr. Madison, were both agreed to.

Mr. Vining then proposed the establishment of the Domestic Department upon the same principles; but, on motion of Mr. Boudinot, the committee rose and reported the resolutions agreed to.—Adjourned.

Thursday, May 21.

Executive Departments.

The House proceeded to consider the resolution reported yesterday from the Committee of the whole House on the state of the Union, and the same being amended to read as follows:

Resolved, That it is the opinion of this committee that there ought to be established the following executive departments, viz: A Department of Foreign Affairs, at the head of which shall be an officer to be called Secretary to the United States for the Department of Foreign Affairs, removable by the President. A Treasury Department, at the head of which shall be an officer to be called Secretary to the United States for the Treasury Department, removable by the President. A Department of War, at the head of which shall be an officer to be called Secretary to the United States for the Department of War, removable by the President.

Resolved, That this House doth concur with the committee in the said resolution; and that a committee, to consist of eleven members, be appointed to prepare and bring in a bill or bills pursuant thereto.

The members elected were, Mr. Baldwin, Mr. Vining, Mr. Livermore, Mr. Madison, Mr. Benson, Mr. Burke, Mr. Fitzsimons, Mr. Boudinot, Mr. Wadsworth, Mr. Gerry, and Mr. Cadwalader.

Friday, May 22.

Contested Election.[27]

The House resumed the consideration of the report on Mr. Smith's case.

After some desultory conversation on the recommitment and mode of proceeding, it was agreed to examine the evidence in favor of Mr. Smith, the facts alleged by Doctor Ramsay, in proof that Mr. Smith was not seven years a citizen of the United States, being admitted. Whereupon, it being moved and seconded, that the House do agree to the following resolution:

Resolved, That it appears to this House, upon full and mature consideration, that the said William Smith had been seven years a citizen of the United States, at the time of his election.

Mr. Smith.—As the House are inclined to hear the observations I have to make, I shall begin with admitting the facts stated in the memorial of Doctor Ramsay, hoping the House will excuse the egotism into which I am unavoidably drawn. I was born in Charleston, South Carolina, of a family whose ancestors were among the first settlers of that colony, and was sent to England for my education when I was but twelve years of age. In 1774, I was sent to Geneva, to pursue my studies, where I resided until 1778. In November, that year, I went to Paris, where I resided upwards of two months in the character of an American gentleman. Immediately on my arrival there, I waited on Doctor Franklin, Mr. Adams, and Mr. A. Lee, the Commissioners from Congress to the court of France, as a citizen of America, and was received as such by them. In January, 1779, I left Paris for London, whither I went to procure the means of embarking for America, from the gentleman who had been appointed my guardian by my father when I was first sent to Europe in 1770, and from whom alone I had any hope of obtaining such means. But in this endeavor, I was disappointed, and remained some time in England, with the hope of receiving remittances from Charleston. Here again my expectation was defeated. The rapid depreciation of the continental money rendered the negotiation of money transactions extremely difficult, and thus I remained till the fall of Charleston. I took this opportunity of studying the law, but could not be called to the bar, because I had not taken the oath of allegiance to Great Britain, which is a necessary qualification. After the surrender of Charleston, the whole State of South Carolina fell into the hands of the enemy, and it was impossible at that time to return. No sooner, however, did I acquire the means, and an opportunity offered, than I prepared myself to go back to America. I quitted London for that purpose, in October or November, 1782, not in a vessel bound to Charleston, then a British garrison, and which I certainly should have done, had I considered myself a British subject, and which would have been most convenient, as there were vessels constantly going from London to Charleston; but I travelled to Ostend, and there embarked in a neutral vessel bound to St. Kitt's, from whence it was my intention to proceed to a Danish island, and thence to some American port in North Carolina or Georgia, from whence I could reach the American camp. In the beginning of January, 1783, I sailed from Ostend, but was detained a considerable time by contrary winds, and in the middle of the month of February, was shipwrecked on the coast of England, and was obliged to return to London in order to procure another passage. These circumstances unavoidably prevented my return to Charleston, until some time in November, 1783.

On my arrival at Charleston, I was received by my countrymen as a citizen of the State of South Carolina, and elected by their free suffrage a member of the Legislature in November, 1784. In the August following I was chosen, by the Governor and Council, a member of the Privy Council, and this election was confirmed by the Legislature the October following. In September, the same year, I was elected one of the Wardens of the City of Charleston. In November, 1786, I was again elected into the Legislature; again in November, 1788; I was elected at the same time that I was elected to the House of Representatives of the United States, the September preceding having been chosen again a Warden of the city.

After having stated these facts, he went on adverting to the laws referred to in the report of the committee, which, he said, he conceived to be applicable to the present case.

In September, 1779, a question was discussed in the Legislature of South Carolina, respecting the young men who were sent abroad for their education, and it was determined that it was most for the interest of the State, that they should be allowed to continue in Europe till they were twenty-two years of age; after which the law provided they should be doubly taxed if they did not return. This law might fairly be supposed to recognize the citizenship of all the young men in a similar predicament with himself. It allowed them all to be absent until they were twenty-two years of age; but even after that period it did not deprive them of the right of citizenship; it only subjected them to the penalty of a double tax. This he contended was a sort of compact with him, that if he chose to be absent after that time, he should suffer a certain penalty, which, in its own nature, implied that his citizenship remained; but before he attained that age, South Carolina was in such a situation that her best friends were compelled to be absent, and take refuge in distant countries. It was not till some time after that the friends of the American cause began to assemble in that State; the absentee law, therefore, never operated on him, and he never was doubly taxed.

In February, 1782, the Legislature met at Jacksonburg, and discriminated between friend and foe, between American and British subjects, by disposing of the estates of the latter, and banishing them; from an inspection of the law passed at that time, it would be evident in what light they viewed him. He had landed property in the State, but was himself in England; yet they did not attempt to confiscate his property, or subject him to an amercement. The absentee law was his safeguard, he had the permission of the State to be abroad.

If the Legislature in 1782 recognized as citizens some of those persons whose estates were confiscated for adhering to Great Britain, and for being disaffected to America a fortiori, did it not recognize as a citizen one whose estate was not forfeited, who had not been deemed worthy of punishment, and who had been absent under the sanction of the law?

By the constitution of South Carolina it appears, that no person was eligible to a seat in the Legislature until he had resided three years, nor to a seat in the Privy Council until he had resided five years in the State. He had a seat in both those bodies before he had resided two years in the State of South Carolina, and no objection was ever made on that score. He could not have been qualified for either, had not the people of South Carolina deemed his residence in that State, such a residence as gained him a qualification; or had they not supposed the qualification required in the constitution applied only to new comers and new citizens, for whom that residence was necessary to wean them from their local prejudices and national habits, and to attach them to the commonwealth. Had they not, in short, supposed him to have been a citizen during the revolution, and attached to his native State by every tie which could bind an individual to any country. Three years' residence was either not required of him, or his former residence was deemed within the meaning of the constitution.

An act to confer the right of citizenship on aliens was passed March 26, 1784. For the purpose of possessing the subordinate rights of citizenship, such as an exemption from the alien duty, a residence of one year, and taking the oath of allegiance, was sufficient. To confer a right of voting at elections, a person must have been admitted a citizen two years prior to his voting; but for the higher privileges of a citizen, being eligible to offices of trust, to a seat in the Legislature and Privy Council, the alien must have been naturalized by law. Now, in November, 1784, he was elected into the Legislature, and took his seat without objection in January, 1785, and was elected into the Privy Council, October, 1785; all without being naturalized by law.

In October, 1785, when he was elected to the Council, his election was opposed, but the objection now brought forward was not then made; and the memorialist himself, who was a member of the Legislature, voted in favor of the choice; though, unquestionably, unless he was considered by the Legislature as a citizen before he returned to Charleston, nothing had afterwards occurred to make him so, and the alien act of 1784 positively required a naturalization by act of Assembly to give him a qualification.

The constitution of South Carolina is silent as to citizenship, but allowed any person to vote at elections who had resided a year in the State, and paid a certain tax; to be a member of the Assembly he must have resided three, and to be a Privy Councillor five years previous to his election, but nothing was said about citizenship. The act of 1784, however, expressly defined who should and who should not be deemed citizens; and, consequently, all persons who did not become citizens must have been held to be aliens, and considered so, till they had conformed to the alien act of 1784. Now, as he was admitted to offices of trust, to which aliens were not admissible, and as he was admitted to them without having the rights of citizenship conferred upon him, in pursuance of that act, it followed clearly, that the people of South Carolina and the Legislature acknowledged him to be a citizen by virtue of the revolution.

He went on to observe, that, from the doctrine laid down by the memorialist, it was difficult to ascertain when he did become a citizen of South Carolina. When he was admitted to the bar in 1784, he did no act which made him a citizen, the bare act of taking an oath of qualification to an office could not convert an alien to a citizen. The constitution seemed to imply a mere residence of a year, by giving a right to vote, gave a right of citizenship; if that were the case, and if his residence prior to the revolution was considered such a residence as the constitution required, then he was a citizen, by virtue of the constitution, after having resided a year in Carolina. Now, it was clear, his residence prior to the war was deemed such a residence as the constitution required; because he was admitted to vote and admitted to a seat in the Legislature and Council by right of such residence, not having had the requisite residence since the war, and yet being deemed qualified. If, therefore, that part of the constitution which gave a right of voting, in consequence of a year's residence and paying a certain tax, virtually conferred citizenship, by giving a right to vote, (and it appeared absurd that a right to vote should be given to persons not citizens,) and if, also, his residence, prior to the revolution, was deemed a sufficient residence, then he was a citizen by virtue of the constitution.

The points that seemed most to be relied upon by the memorialist were:

1st. That residence was actually necessary to confer citizenship, or, in other words, that a person could not become a citizen of a country, till he has resided in it.

2d. That a person could not become a citizen till he was of age to choose his country.

In answer to the first, he denied that residence in the country was absolutely necessary. Was it to be supposed, he asked, that when a man sent his son into another country for his education and improvement, the son was thereby to lose any political benefits which might, during such temporary absence, accrue to his country? If his father had lived a few years longer, would there have arisen any question on this subject? Would he not, though absent, have acquired, according to the petitioner's own positions, a right of citizenship? And should his death, at such an early period, not be deemed a sufficient misfortune for him, without using that as a pretence for making him an alien? Those who represented him in Carolina as his guardians, who were in loco parentis, were residents in Carolina at the declaration of independence.

His property was in Carolina, his money in the treasury, assisting to carry on the war. The declaration of independence affected him as much, though at Geneva, as it did those in Carolina; his happiness, that of his dearest connections, his property, were deeply interested in it: his fate was so closely connected with that of Carolina, that any revolution in Carolina was a revolution to him. Though a minor, as soon as he heard of the independence of America, he considered himself an American citizen.

If a person could not become a citizen of a country without residing in it, what should be said of those gentlemen who had been in Europe during the war, and were now in high office in America? Several of them went to Europe before the war, were there at the declaration of independence, and did not return to America till after the war, or about the close of it. When did their citizenship commence? According to the petitioner, they could not become citizens of America until they returned to America, and took an oath of allegiance to the States; but Congress employed them in offices of great confidence, before they had returned to America, or taken such oath. Congress, therefore, considered them citizens, by virtue of the revolution.

It had been said, that Carolina had called on her young men to come to her assistance. This was not the true state of the case. Carolina thought that her young men who were abroad for their education, should not be taken from their studies till they were twenty-two years of age, and doubly taxed them after that. His guardian wrote to him that he had permission of the Legislature to be absent till he was twenty-two, and that he should be doubly taxed after that age.

It has been also said, that Carolina tendered an oath, to discover who were friends, and who were enemies. In March, 1778, the Legislature of South Carolina passed an act to oblige every free male inhabitant of that State, above sixteen years of age, to take an oath of allegiance to the State. As there were notoriously many persons then in the State who were inimical to its liberties, such a step was necessary to give a reasonable cause for obliging them to quit the country. With that view, the oath was generally tendered only to those who were suspected or known not to be friendly to the cause. He had been informed by several persons, who were zealous partisans, and then in Carolina, that they had never taken any oath of allegiance, and that it had not been required of them on this occasion.

The act directed, that those who did not take it, should quit the State; and, if they returned, should be dealt with as traitors, and suffer death. Let us examine whether this act can, in any respect, apply to the present question. 1st. It particularly mentioned "inhabitants of the State of South Carolina." It could not, therefore, apply to persons who were abroad. 2dly. It directed that the oath should be taken before a justice of peace in Carolina; this could not, therefore, extend to a person then at Geneva. 3dly. It was directed to be taken in one month after the passing of the act; and it was not possible that I should hear of the existence of such an act in less than three months. 4thly. It was directed, that if the persons refused to take it, they should quit the State; but I was already out of it. 5thly. Those who refused to take it, were prevented from acquiring or conveying property, and rendered incapable of exercising any profession. But on my return to Carolina, I took peaceable possession of my estate, part of which consisted of lands and houses, which had been mine since the year 1770; and I was immediately admitted to the exercise of the profession for which I was educated. 6thly. The act directed, that if any person returned to Carolina, after having refused to take the oath, he should be put to death as a traitor; and, yet, on my return, never having taken the oath, I was elected a member of the Legislature, and a Privy Councillor; and, instead of being deemed a criminal myself, I acted as Attorney General to punish others; and yet the petitioner, in one of his late publications, lays great stress on the applicability of this act.

2dly. There could be no doubt that a minor might be a citizen, from the very words of the constitution, which admitted a person to be a member of the House of Representatives at twenty-five, and yet required a citizenship of seven years. This was of itself a sufficient refutation of every thing contained in the petition on this head. The constitution acknowledged that a person might be a citizen at eighteen; if so, there was no reason why a person might not be one at sixteen or fourteen.

Mr. Lee said, the committee had now to determine, whether Mr. Smith was a citizen of South Carolina during his absence from home, or not. If the laws of that State recognized him as such, the question was determined, because this House could not dispute a fact of that kind. From the reference that has been made to the constitution and laws of South Carolina, and the circumstances which took place under them, with respect to Mr. Smith, it was convincing that he was acknowledged there to be a citizen in consequence of the revolution.

Mr. Madison.—I think the merit of the question is now to be decided, whether the gentleman is eligible to a seat in this House or not; but it will depend on the decision of a previous question, whether he has been seven years a citizen of the United States or not.

From an attention to the facts which have been adduced, and from a consideration of the principles established by the revolution, the conclusion I have drawn is, that Mr. Smith was, on the declaration of independence, a citizen of the United States; and unless it appears that he has forfeited his right, by some neglect or overt act, he had continued a citizen until the day of his election to a seat in this House. I take it to be a clear point, that we are to be guided, in our decision, by the laws and constitution of South Carolina, so far as they can guide us; and where the laws do not expressly guide us, we must be guided by principles of a general nature, so far as they are applicable to the present case.

It were to be wished, that we had some law adduced, more precisely defining the qualities of a citizen or an alien; particular laws of this kind have obtained in some of the States; if such a law existed in South Carolina, it might have prevented this question from ever coming before us; but since this has not been the case, let us settle some general principle before we proceed to the presumptive proof arising from public measures under the law, which tend to give support to the inference drawn from such principles.

It is an established maxim, that birth is a criterion of allegiance. Birth, however, derives its force sometimes from place, and sometimes from parentage; but, in general, place is the most certain criterion; it is what applies in the United States; it will, therefore, be unnecessary to investigate any other. Mr. Smith founds his claim upon his birthright; his ancestors were among the first settlers of that colony.

It is well known to many gentlemen on this floor, as well as to the public, that the petitioner is a man of talents, one who would not lightly hazard his reputation in support of visionary principles: yet I cannot but think he has erred in one of the principles upon which he grounds his charge. He supposes, when this country separated from Great Britain, the tie of allegiance subsisted between the inhabitants of America and the king of that nation, unless, by some adventitious circumstance, the allegiance was transferred to one of the United States. I think there is a distinction which will invalidate his doctrine in this particular, a distinction between that primary allegiance which we owe to that particular society of which we are members, and the secondary allegiance we owe to the sovereign established by that society. This distinction will be illustrated by the doctrine established by the laws of Great Britain, which were the laws of this country before the revolution. The sovereign cannot make a citizen by any act of his own; he can confer denizenship; but this does not make a man either a citizen or subject. In order to make a citizen or subject, it is established, that allegiance shall first be due to the whole nation; it is necessary that a national act should pass to admit an individual member. In order to become a member of the British Empire, where birth has not endowed the person with that privilege, he must be naturalized by an act of Parliament.

What was the situation of the people of America, when the dissolution of their allegiance took place by the declaration of independence? I conceive that every person who owed this primary allegiance to the particular community in which he was born, retained his right of birth, as a member of a new community; that he was consequently absolved from the secondary allegiance he had owed to the British sovereign. If he were not a minor, he became bound, by his own act, as a member of the society who separated with him from a submission to a foreign country. If he were a minor, his consent was involved in the decision of that society to which he belonged by the ties of nature. What was the allegiance, as a citizen of South Carolina, he owed to the King of Great Britain? He owed his allegiance to him as a king of that society to which, as a society, he owed his primary allegiance. When that society separated from Great Britain, he was bound by that act, and his allegiance transferred to that society, or the sovereign which that society should set up; because it was through his membership of the society of South Carolina that he owed allegiance to Great Britain.

This reasoning will hold good, unless it is supposed that the separation which took place between these States and Great Britain, not only dissolved the union between those countries, but dissolved the union among the citizens themselves: that the original compact, which made them altogether one society, being dissolved, they could not fall into pieces, each part making an independent society; but must individually revert into a state of nature; but I do not conceive that this was, of necessity, to be the case; I believe such a revolution did not absolutely take place. But in supposing that this was the case, lies the error of the memorialist. I conceive the colonies remained as a political society, detached from their former connection with another society, without dissolving into a state of nature; but capable of substituting a new form of government in the place of the old one, which they had, for special considerations, abolished. Suppose the State of South Carolina should think proper to revise her constitution, abolish that which now exists, and establish another form of government: surely this would not dissolve the social compact. It would not throw them back into a state of nature. It would not dissolve the union between the individual members of that society. It would leave them in perfect society, changing only the mode of action, which they are always at liberty to arrange. Mr. Smith being then, at the declaration of independence, a minor, but being a member of that particular society, he became, in my opinion, bound by the decision of the society, with respect to the question of independence and change of Government; and if afterwards he had taken part with the enemies of his country, he would have been guilty of treason against that Government to which he owed allegiance, and would have been liable to be prosecuted as a traitor.

So far as we can judge by the laws of Carolina, and the practice and decision of that State, the principles I have adduced are supported; and I must own, that I feel myself at liberty to decide, that Mr. Smith was a citizen at the declaration of independence, a citizen at the time of his election, and, consequently, entitled to a seat in this Legislature.

Mr. Jackson.—I differ widely from the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Madison) on the subject of allegiance and the social compact, and hold the principles advanced by him exceedingly dangerous to many of the States, and in particular to the one I have the honor to represent. The situation of America, at the time of the revolution, was not properly to be compared to a people altering their mode or form of government. Nor were there two allegiances due, one to the community here, another to that of Great Britain. We were all on a footing; and I contend the principle is right, in some degree, of a total reversion to a state of nature amongst individuals, and to a mere parental or patriarchal authority, where the heads had families dependent on them; the former, or individual pursued that line which appeared right in his own eyes, and the cause which he thought just; and, in the latter case, the children followed the will of the father, who chose for them, as the person who brought them into life, and whose fortunes they were to inherit. I conceive the whole allegiance or compact to have been dissolved. Many of the States were a considerable period without establishing constitutions or forms of government, and during that period we were in a little better state than that of nature; and then it was that every man made his election for an original compact, or tie, which, by his own act, or that of his father for him, he became bound to submit to. And what, sir, would otherwise be the result? And if the gentleman's doctrines of birth were to be supported, those minors, who, with British bayonets, have plundered and ravaged, nay, cruelly butchered their more virtuous neighbors—the sons of the most inveterate traitors, whose names deservedly sounded in every bill of confiscation; and the minors, sons of those who sheltered themselves under the shade of the British King, and supported his armies, if not with arms, with the resources of war, until the hour of danger was over—those, I say, after the blood of thousands has been spilt in the establishment of our government, can now come forward and sneer at the foolish patriots who endured every hardship of a seven years' war, to secure to them the freedom and property they had no hand in defending. Sir, did we fight for this? Was it for this the soldier watched his numerous nights, and braved the inclemency of the seasons? Will he submit, after having gained his point at the expense of property and the loss of constitution, to have those sentiments established? If he will, he has fought to little purpose indeed.

Sir, I again contend, that when the revolution came on we were all alike with respect to allegiances, and all under the same social tie. An Englishman born did not conceive himself more liable to be condemned for treason than an American, had the enemy succeeded; nor would there have been any distinction in the laws on coming to a trial. But, sir, how should this primary allegiance be known to belong to the less, or American community, where the majority did not prevail. In Georgia, the majority were opposed to American measures; agreeably to the gentleman's reasoning, the minors must have been all on the British side; and yet many of them, on arriving to years of discretion, behaved well and valiantly with us. To corroborate this, sir, I will remark, that, for a considerable period, we had no general or federal government, or form of constitution, and yet were in arms. I would ask what state we were in then? Neighbor was against neighbor, and brother against brother. But, sir, the gentleman says the hardened minor will not return. Sir, experience has proved the contrary. The Middle and Eastern States, except Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and New York, never had the enemy long with them; there was not the same trial of men, and they knew not the audacity of those villains. After having received their equivalent for, in many cases, feigned losses, from the British crown, they are daily returning and pushing into office. It is necessary we should guard against them. Britain, although humiliated, yet has a longing eye upon this country; she has yet posts in it. Although it is improbable that so many of these people will get into Congress as to form a corrupt majority, yet they have ambition and resentment enough to attempt it. At this moment, sir, in Georgia, are some of the most daring, bringing ejectments for estates which their fathers had deservedly forfeited, although themselves had imbrued their hands in the blood of their fellow-citizens.

Now, to the present case: Highly as I regard the gentleman (Mr. Smith) as a valuable member, and esteem his abilities, I can only form my opinion on the leave given him by the State to be absent. If that principle is introduced into the resolution, I will vote in favor of Mr. Smith's eligibility; but if not, I must decline voting.

Which he accordingly did when the question was put.

Mr. Tucker hoped that the yeas and nays would be taken on this question, not because he had any doubt in his own mind of Mr. Smith's right to a seat, but because he had been solicited by Dr. Ramsay to have the yeas and nays taken.

The yeas and nays were taken as follows:

Yeas.—Messrs. Baldwin, Benson, Boudinot, Cadwalader, Carroll, Clymer, Coles, Contee, Fitzsimons, Floyd, Gilman, Goodhue, Heister, Huntington, Lawrence, Lee, Leonard, Livermore, Madison, Moore, Muhlenberg, Page, Van Rensselaer, Seney, Schureman, Scott, Sinnickson, Smith, (of Maryland,) Sturgis, Sylvester, Thatcher, Trumbull, Tucker, Vining, White, and Wynkoop.

Jonathan Grout voted in the negative.

Adjourned until Monday.

Thursday, May 28.

Western Lands.

The House, on motion of Mr. Scott, went into a Committee of the Whole on the State of the Union, for the purpose of considering certain resolutions he had prepared respecting the disposal of the land in the Western Territory. Mr. Trumbull in the chair.

Mr. Scott presumed there was little need of argument to prove to the Committee the necessity of taking speedy measures with respect to the unsettled lands in the Western Territory. The dissolution of the Board of Treasury, and the death of the late Geographer of the United States, are adventitious circumstances, which tend to increase the necessity. Gentlemen are acquainted with the number of sales which have been made to some of the citizens of the United States; they consequently know that the United States are under an obligation to complete the surveys of those lands which they have made sale of. They know, also, that until this is done, they cannot receive a farthing of the millions of dollars due on those contracts; they will not only be unable to receive the principal, but will be paying interest for the same. Besides this, there are other considerations for putting the business on a new footing. The mode hitherto pursued of selling lands has been very expensive to the United States. Perhaps, on inquiry, we shall find, that the specie it has cost us in getting the land surveyed and sales completed, would have purchased as many certificates as we get for the sale of the land. The lands are also proposed to be sold in too great quantities. It is very difficult to form a company for the purchase of a million acres. It ought to be sold in small quantities, to make the sales more certain and numerous; and, consequently, increase the public income. On this principle, it will be well to open a land office, and grant the soil in such quantities as may suit the applications. By this means more may be expected for the purchase, than when it is struck off, at a wholesale price, by the million acres; and in this way the land office will be conducted without expense, which will be fixed on the purchaser, so that the whole money the lands may bring will come into the treasury without deduction.

There are other considerations why a land office should be opened for the sale of that territory in the way just mentioned. There are, at this moment, a great number of people on the ground, who are willing to acquire by purchase a right to the soil they are seated upon. Allured by its fertility, the agreeableness of the climate, and the prospect of future ease to themselves and families, they would not seek a change. Kentucky, already full, at least there are no more valuable lands to be got there with a clear title, can receive no more emigrants. They, therefore, turn their wishful eyes upon the lands of the Union. They hope to get them of Congress upon as good terms as they can procure them of the speculators. What will these men think, who have placed themselves on a vacant spot, anxiously waiting its disposition by the Government, to find their pre-emption right engrossed by the purchaser of a million of acres? Will they expose themselves to be preyed upon by these men? They might submit to this, but they have other offers.

There are seven thousand souls waiting for lands; they will have them here or elsewhere; but there is some danger, if they cannot be accommodated within the boundaries of the United States, they will do one of two things: either move into the Spanish territory, where they are not altogether uninvited, and become an accession of power to a foreign nation, forming to us a dangerous frontier; or they will take this course, move on the United States territory, and take possession without your leave. What then will be the case? They will not pay you money. Will you then raise a force to drive them off? That has been tried: troops were raised, and sent under General Harmer, to effect that purpose. They burnt the cabins, broke down the fences, and tore up the potato patches; but three hours after the troops were gone, these people returned again, repaired the damage, and are now settled upon the lands in open defiance of the authority of the Union. But, nevertheless, they are willing to pay an equitable price for those lands; and if they may be indulged with a pre-emption to the purchase, no men will be better friends to the Government. They went on the ground with an intention of purchasing, and are kept there by a hope that the Government will see their interest, and dispose of the land upon reasonable terms. But if you do not listen to their request, if you neglect or despise their offers, and they prove too weak to resist the omnipotent arm of Government, they will have recourse to a neighboring Power for protection. Hopes of that protection are now held out to them; it is my duty to inform you of the fact. They will be led to think their interest is separate from yours on the Atlantic shores. It will take prudent management to prevent the fatal effects of a commotion in that country. One of the most unhappy things we could do, would be to refuse selling those lands in less quantities than by the million of acres: it would certainly be a cause of disgust, if not of separation. If the object was to prevent the settlement of the country, it would be another thing; but that cannot be accomplished, it is not in the power of any force on earth to prevent the increase of the population now begun; it is therefore much better that we should incline them to friendship, than oblige them to become our enemies. The emigrants who reach the Western country will not stop until they find a place where they can securely seat themselves. Your lands first offer: their fertility and agreeableness will tempt them to pitch there; but to secure them, they must have a well-grounded hope that the lands they cultivate may become their own. To encourage this, you must open that territory to them, and let them have lands for pay. You must go further, you must open the land office in that country, because it will be impossible for the indigent persons to travel for an office-right. You can then establish a government among them, and derive advantages from them which are now totally lost. They wish for your government and laws, and will be gratified with the indulgence; but they wish also to acquire property under them; they wish for your lands, and what good reason can be offered to warrant a denial? If they cannot get your land, they must go further, and obtain it of foreigners, who are desirous of having them at any rate, who will give them lands without pay.

These observations are sufficient, no doubt, to evince the necessity of doing something with respect to the Western territory, and something different from what has hitherto been done. In order that the Committee may have a full view of my ideas, I will read the plan I have in my hand, upon which a law may be founded.

He here read a previous resolution, to be followed by the plan, which was to this effect:

Resolved, That it is the opinion of this committee, that an act of Congress ought to pass for establishing and regulating a land-office, for the sale of the vacant and unappropriated land in the Western territory.

[Here, by way of separate resolutions, followed in detail the constituent parts of this office, and the routine in which the business should be conducted, directing the expense of the office to be supported by the fees payable before the warrants and patents were delivered.]

Mr. Clymer did not believe the committee were prepared for a decision at this time. He considered the subject to be as intricate and difficult as it was interesting; and therefore hoped full time would be given for investigation. Many persons had purchased large quantities of lands of the late Congress, with a view to sell them out in small lots, to accommodate the people who are inclined to settle upon them. If Congress now open a land office for the sale of small quantities, it will no doubt overcast the prospect of advantage which induced the former, and may induce future purchasers to apply for large grants. These observations, and others which would readily occur to every gentleman, would satisfy the committee that they ought not to precipitate the business. For this reason, he moved the rising of the committee.

Mr. Madison had no objection to the rising of the committee, as the means of obtaining information; but he thought the business deserving of the earliest attention. The clear and full manner in which the gentleman from Pennsylvania had opened the subject to the view of the committee, left no doubt on his mind of the propriety of taking some early measures to accomplish the business in the manner suggested by that gentleman. The facts and intelligence mentioned were too important to be passed lightly over. He should, for the present, agree to rise, but hoped the subject would be resumed in the House.

The question was taken on the first resolution moved by Mr. Scott, and passed in the affirmative; the others remaining on the table.

The committee then rose and reported progress.

Friday, June 5.

Admission of Rhode Island into the Union.

Mr. Benson presented for consideration, the resolution which he yesterday gave notice of his intention of introducing in relation to the admission of Rhode Island into the Union, and moved that the House immediately go into a Committee of the Whole on the state of the Union, for the purpose of discussing his proposition.

The resolution is in the following words:

The Congress of the United States do resolve and declare it to be their most earnest desire, that the Legislature of the State of Rhode Island and Providence Plantations, do recommend to the people of that State to choose delegates to meet in convention and to whom the constitution of the United States is to be submitted, conformably to the unanimous resolution of the United States in Congress assembled, of the 28th of September, 1787.

Mr. Page.—I think of Rhode Island as the worthy gentleman from New York does; but, as a member of Congress, I doubt the propriety of this body interfering in the business. If I put myself, for a moment, into the situation of a citizen of a State that has refused to accede to the constitution of the United States, I must admit that I should watch your actions with a jealous eye; I should be apprehensive of undue influence, if I were to see you throw your weight into the scale. But what occasion is there for adopting such a resolution? Are gentlemen afraid to leave them to their own unbiased judgment? For my part I am not: it will demonstrate the goodness of the constitution, if it be adopted upon mature consideration, without any aid but its own intrinsic value. As to amendments, when we come to consider of them, I dare say they will be such as to make the constitution more agreeable; but, for the present, I think it improper to have any thing to do with the gentleman's motion; I hope he may be prevailed upon to withdraw it; he has done his duty by bringing it forward; but if it does not meet the approbation of the House, it will be a useless waste of time to give it any further discussion. The gentleman has shown sufficiently his attachment to the Federal Government, by the earnestness he shows to have it adopted throughout the United States. But, in addition to this, let him consider where such measures may lead us. Because the Legislature of Rhode Island have neglected or refused to submit the consideration of the constitution to a convention, we are to recommend it, and express a most earnest desire that they will comply. But suppose they decline doing what you require, what is next to be done? I hope gentlemen will hesitate before they go any further. I think we should be employed more in the line of our duty, by attending to the interests of our constituents, and completing the organization of a Government they ordered, than to spend our time about business which is not within our powers. Why should we interfere with the concerns of our sister States who have not yet joined the new Government? I trust the gentleman will see the impropriety of his motion, and agree to withdraw it.

Mr. Smith, (of South Carolina.)—I think we ought to go into committee, and hear what the gentleman has to say on the subject. Though I must acknowledge I am at present against the adoption of the resolution he has proposed; yet it is possible, when he has stated his reasons, and pointed out the necessity of it, that I may alter my opinion; but I wonder why the gentleman has omitted North Carolina.

Mr. Sherman.—I think Rhode Island stands in a different situation from North Carolina. When this constitution was formed in the convention, North Carolina was represented there; she, as well as the adopting States, submitted that instrument to a convention of the people; but not having adopted it, she has again called a convention, and is proceeding to reconsider it as fast as convenient; so that such a request as is now proposed would be unnecessary with respect to them. As Rhode Island did not send members to the first convention, there was a delicacy in transmitting the proceedings to them, and Congress could not, perhaps, apply to them with the same propriety as to another. But all we are now to consider, I believe, is, that we invite the State of Rhode Island to join our confederacy; what will be the effect of such a measure we cannot tell till we try it.

Mr. Madison.—I believe, Mr. Speaker, there are cases in which it is prudent to avoid coming to a decision at all, and cases where it is desirable to evade debate; if there were not cases of this kind, it would be unnecessary to guard our discussions with the previous question.[28] My idea on the subject now before the House is, that it would be improper in this body to expose themselves to have such a proposition rejected by the Legislature of the State of Rhode Island. It would likewise be improper to express a desire on an occasion where a free agency ought to be employed, which would carry with it all the force of a command. How far this is contemplated on the present occasion, I cannot tell; but I heartily wish that as little may be said about it as possible. I conceive this to be one of the cases to which the previous question is applicable; and, if the gentleman means to call the House to a direct decision on this motion, I shall step between, and interpose the previous question.