FOURTH CONGRESS.—FIRST SESSION. (continued 3)

Fisher Ames, of Massachusetts, appeared, was qualified, and took his seat.

Thursday, February 11.

Post Roads from Maine to Georgia.

Mr. Madison moved that the resolution laid upon the table some days ago be taken up, relative to the survey of the post roads between the province of Maine and Georgia; which, being read, he observed that two good effects would arise from carrying this resolution into effect; the shortest route from one place to another would be determined upon, and persons, having a certainty of the stability of the roads, would not hesitate to make improvements upon them.

Mr. Baldwin was glad to see this business brought forward; the sooner it could be carried into effect, the better. In many parts of the country, he said, there were no improved roads, nothing better than the original Indian track. Bridges and other improvements are always made with reluctance whilst roads remain in this state, because it is known as the country increases in population and wealth, better and shorter roads will be made. All expense of this sort, indeed, is lost. It was properly the business of the General Government, he said, to undertake the improvement of the roads, for the different States are incompetent to the business, their different designs clashing with each other. It is enough for them to make good roads to the different seaports; the cross roads should be left to the government of the whole. The expense, he thought, would not be very great. Let a surveyor point out the shortest and best track, and the money will soon be raised. There was nothing in this country, he said, of which we ought to be more ashamed than our public roads.

Mr. Bourne thought very valuable effects would arise from the carrying of this resolution into effect. The present roads may be much shortened. The Eastern States had made great improvements in their roads, and he trusted the best effects would arise from having regular mails from one end of the Union to the other.

Mr. Williams did not think it right for the revenues of the Post Office to be applied to this end. He acknowledged the propriety of extending the post roads to every part of the Union; he thought the House had better wait for the report of the committee to which business relative to the Post Office had been referred, which was preparing to be laid before the House.

Mr. Madison explained the nature and object of the resolution. He said it was the commencement of an extensive work. He wished not to extend it at present. The expense of the survey would be great. The Post Officer, he believed, would have no objection to the intended regulation.

After some observations from Mr. Thatcher, on the obtaining of the shortest distance from one place to another, and the comparing old with new roads, so as to come at the shortest and best, the resolution was agreed to, as follows:

Resolved, That a committee be appointed to report a bill authorizing the President of the United States to cause to be examined, and, where necessary, to be surveyed, the general route most proper for the transportation of the mail between ——, in Maine, and ——, in the State of Georgia, and to cause to be laid before Congress the result of such examination and survey, with an estimate of the expense of rendering such route fit, in all its parts, to be the established route of the post; the expense of such examination and survey to be defrayed out of the surplus revenues of the Post Office.[69]

Ordered, That Mr. Madison, Mr. Thatcher, Mr. Baldwin, Mr. Henderson, and Mr. Sherburne, be appointed a committee pursuant to the said resolution.

Monday, February 22.

Washington's Birth-Day.

Mr. W. Smith moved that the House adjourn for half an hour.

This motion occasioned a good deal of conversation upon its propriety. In favor of it, it was said, that it had been a practice ever since the commencement of the Government, for that House to make a short adjournment on that day in order to pay their compliments to the President, and that several members were absent, from an idea that the House would adjourn at 12 o'clock as usual. On the other hand, it was objected that it was the business of the members of that House first to do their duty, and then attend to the paying of compliments; that just at that time the house of the President was filled with militia and others; and that, therefore, it would be better, upon the whole, to wait upon the President after the business of the day was finished.

Mr. Gallatin moved that the words "half an hour" be struck out.

The sense of the House was first taken on the amendment, which was lost, without a division. The motion was then put and negatived, being 38 for it, and 50 against it.

Friday, February 26.

Compensation to Members.

Mr. Giles moved that the bill for allowing compensation to the members of the Senate and House of Representatives, and certain officers of both Houses, be taken up, which being agreed to, the House resolved itself into a Committee of the Whole; and the bill being read,

Mr. Swift wished to strike out the words making the Speaker a greater allowance than other members.

Mr. Giles thought a larger allowance ought to be made to the Speaker than to other members, as his duty was double that of any other member; but if gentlemen wished to do away the incidental expenses of the office, he had no objection.

Mr. Swift consented to vary his motion according to the ideas of the member from Virginia. If the Speaker had more duty to perform than other members, he should be willing to make him a greater allowance, but he doubted it.

Mr. W. Smith hoped no alteration would be made in the allowance heretofore made; he saw no reason for it.

Mr. Goodhue said, he voted against the additional pay allowed the Speaker when the act first passed, as he saw no necessity for the Speaker to give dinners to the members of that House; but though he objected to this, he was willing to allow him recompense for his additional services. He hoped, however, the gentleman who now so ably filled the office, would not consider any thing said on this subject as alluding personally to him.

Mr. Sedgwick was willing to give the money to the Speaker which had heretofore been paid him, and for the same purpose, although he and his colleague were both against the measure when it originally passed.

Mr. Dayton wished the business might be discussed without reference to him personally. Indeed he believed he should not be materially affected by any regulations which might be agreed to, as, if he might judge by his present feelings, his health would not permit him to remain in the chair after this session.

Mr. Giles was confident that no one meant to hurt the feelings of the gentleman who now filled the chair. The member from Massachusetts had said, when the measure passed, he was against it, but now he was in favor of it. He could see no ground for this change of sentiment. Mr. G. said, he was against the money being paid for incidental expenses, but not against making the Speaker ample allowance for his services.

Mr. Kitchell was also for striking out the words, but for making ample compensation to the Speaker.

Mr. Bourne did not suppose that the incidental expenses of the Speaker were confined to the dinners which he gave them; he was put to more expense in receiving company than other members. He did not think six dollars a day too much for this.

Mr. Madison said, it was customary in all the State Governments to make the Speaker a greater allowance than other members: his services were far greater; they were uninterrupted. Besides, it was necessary to do so to invite men of talents to accept of the office; and every one knew the advantages arising from having a man of talents as Speaker. Without inquiring whether the compensation was too large or too small, he doubted whether it was constitutional to make any alteration in it which might affect the present Speaker. To support his opinions he read a clause of the constitution.

Mr. Hillhouse was of opinion that nothing in the constitution extended to the present question. He hoped they should agree to strike out the words alluded to, as the sooner the practice of feasting was abolished, the better. If members wished to form social acquaintances, it was far preferable to visit each other at their lodgings. He said, this was the first time the law had come under review since it had passed, and it was proper to have the matter settled. He wished to allow a reasonable sum for the services of the Speaker, but no more. He did not think there was any weight in the observation, that a large compensation was necessary to induce men of talents to accept of the chair—he thought the honor was a sufficient inducement.

Mr. Williams said there was no office appertaining to the Speaker which included expense; the words ought therefore to be struck out.

Mr. Page was in favor of striking out the words, as he did not understand their meaning, but in favor of keeping the allowance of the Speaker the same as usual. The Speaker, he said, ought to be placed in an independent situation, by a handsome salary. His duties were fourfold to those of any other member. Indeed, said he, nothing but a sense of duty could induce a man to undertake such an office.

Mr. Giles said, if it was agreed to strike out the words for the incidental expenses of his office, he should move to introduce in their place, "on account of extra services annexed to his office."

Mr. Jeremiah Smith liked the words proposed better than those in the bill, but did not think it of the importance it was made.

The motion for striking out was put and carried.

Mr. Giles then proposed his motion.

Mr. Hillhouse was against the introduction of these words.

Mr. Varnum hoped the motion would prevail. The services of the Speaker are extraordinary and laborious. The State Legislatures, he said, always allowed their Speaker double the pay of other members.

Mr. Murray hoped the words would not obtain. He considered the Speakership of that House as a very elevated situation. In certain contingencies he believed he was the Chief Executive of the United States. He thought the calculation of pay too mechanical. The dignity of the office was sufficient, without extraordinary compensation; the duties of it were well known.

The question was put, and negatived.

Mr. Giles moved to fill up the blank for the daily allowance of members of the Senate with six dollars.

Mr. Page proposed seven; when, after a few observations from Mr. Williams in favor of six, the sense of the House was taken, which was in favor of six dollars—only twenty-one members rising in favor of seven.

The allowance of the Speaker again coming into consideration, Mr. Swift wished an inquiry might be made into the duties of the office. It was his opinion that many members upon committees performed greater services than he; and if the Speaker had an extra allowance, they ought to have an extra allowance also. Some gentlemen thought, on the score of dignity, a high salary ought to be paid. He thought differently. Can it be supposed it would be necessary, said he, to give any member of this House double pay to accept of the office? No such thing. Being now discharged from any obligation to treat members, he could not agree to allow him the usual sum. He should not object to two or three dollars a day extra, but no more.

Mr. Giles thought the duty of the Speaker three times as arduous as that of any other member of the House.

Mr. Crabb voted for striking out the words, but he was not for diminishing the salary of the Speaker.

The motion for the usual allowance was put and carried, and the other blanks of the bill were filled up with the same sums as heretofore allowed to the different officers. The committee rose; the bill then went through the House, and was ordered to be engrossed and read a third time on Monday.

Monday, March 7.

The Treaty with Great Britain.

[The debate on the subject of the Treaty with Great Britain, and of the constitutional powers of the House with respect to treaties, having occupied the time of the House nearly every day for a month, (commencing the 7th of March and ending on the 7th of April,) it is deemed preferable, and as being more acceptable to the reader, to present the whole in one body consecutively, rather than to spread it in detached parts intermixed with other subjects, through the general proceedings of each day. This debate, as here given, possesses a character for authenticity and correctness which does not belong to the newspaper reports of the day, it having undergone the careful revision of the Speakers themselves. The debate which took place on making the provision for carrying the Treaty into effect, will be found subsequently, in the proceedings of each day as the subject came up before the House.][70]

On the second of March, Mr. Livingston, after stating that the late British Treaty must give rise in the House to some very important and constitutional questions, to throw light upon which every information would be required, laid the following resolution upon the table.

"Resolved, That the President of the United States be requested to lay before this House a copy of the instructions to the Minister of the United States, who negotiated the Treaty with the King of Great Britain, communicated by his Message of the first of March, together with the correspondence and other documents relative to the said Treaty."

March 7.—Mr. Livingston said he wished to modify the resolution he had laid on the table, requesting the President to lay before the House sundry documents respecting the Treaty. It was calculated to meet the suggestions of gentlemen to whose opinions he paid the highest respect, and was founded in the reflection that the negotiations on the twelfth article were probably unfinished; and therefore, he said, a disclosure of papers relative to that or any other pending negotiation, might embarrass the Executive. He wished, therefore, to add, at the end of his former motion, the following words: "Excepting such of said papers as any existing negotiation may render improper to be disclosed."

The motion of Mr. Livingston was then taken up.

Mr. Tracy requested gentlemen in favor of the resolution to give their reasons why the application for papers was to be made.

Mr. Livingston said, he had no wish to conceal his intentions. The motives that impelled him to make the motion, were not such as to make him wish to conceal them, or such as he ought to blush at when discovered. The gentleman from Connecticut wished to know why he had brought this resolution before the House? He did it for the sake of information. That gentleman wished to know to what point this information was to apply? Possibly to all the points he had enumerated. It was impossible, however, to say to which or how many of these points without a recurrence to those very papers. He could not determine now, he said, that an impeachment would be deemed advisable; yet, when the papers are obtained, they may make such a step advisable. It was impossible to declare an impeachment advisable, without having the necessary lights as to the conduct of officers. The House were, on every occasion, the guardians of their country's rights. They are, by the constitution, the accusing organ of the officers employed. The information called for they ought to possess, as it would tend to elucidate the conduct of the officers. His principal reason, however, for proposing the measure, was a firm conviction that the House were vested with a discretionary power of carrying the Treaty into effect, or refusing it their sanction.

Mr. Murray said, that he was against the resolution for two reasons, which then struck his mind forcibly. The first was the want of a declared object within the acknowledged cognizance of the House; the other was because he believed it was designed as the groundwork of a very dangerous doctrine, that the House had a right to adjudge, to adopt, or to reject Treaties generally. Had the gentlemen stated the object for which they called for the papers to be an impeachment, or any inquiry into fraud, as a circumstance attending the making of the Treaty, the subject would be presented under an aspect very different from that which it has assumed. He considered a Treaty, constitutionally made, to be the supreme law of the land. The Treaty in view has been negotiated and ratified, he thought, agreeably to the constitution. It has been issued, by the President's proclamation, as an act obligatory upon the United States. If the House mean to go into the merits of that instrument, and the information be called for with that view, he should feel himself bound by the constitution to give it every opposition.

Mr. Baldwin thought the resolution so unexceptionable that he had expected it would have been agreed to without debate. The President has sent the House the Treaty; petitions have come forward on the subject; the House must act in the business. It is yet unaccompanied with any documents to throw light upon it. No person concerned in the negotiation has a seat on the floor of the House; so that no oral information can be expected. Implicit faith was not to be reposed, he imagined, in public officers. It would be unfair to take up the subject naked and unexplained.

Mr. Gallatin said, he should not now enter into the merits of the question, but merely state that pertain powers are delegated by the constitution to Congress. They possess the authority of regulating trade. The Treaty-making power delegated to the Executive may be considered as clashing with that. The question may arise, whether a Treaty made by the President and Senate, containing regulations touching objects delegated to Congress, can be considered binding, without Congress passing laws to carry it into effect. A difference of opinion may exist as to the proper construction of the several articles of the constitution, so as to reconcile those apparently contradictory provisions. But all those questions would occur in future discussions. What is now wanted is information on the subject, to elucidate the different views which may be taken of the Treaty. It must do good to obtain it, and could do no harm to ask for it. If it would be improper to communicate any part of the information on the subject, the President will say so. He had hoped, he said, that the resolution would have passed without objection. He concluded by observing, that the House were the grand inquest of the nation, and that they had the right to call for papers on which to ground an impeachment; but he believed, that if this was intended, it would be proper that the resolution should be predicated upon a declaration of that intention. At present, he did not contemplate the exercise of that right.

Mr. Madison admitted that every proposition, however distantly related to a question on the Treaty, drew from the importance of that subject considerable importance to itself. In a discussion of this subject, he felt strongly the obligation of proceeding with the utmost respect to the decorum and dignity of the House, with a proper delicacy to the other departments of Government, and, at the same time, with fidelity and responsibility for our constituents. The proposition now before the House, he conceived, might be considered as closely connected with this important question. It was to be decided whether the general power of making Treaties supersedes the powers of the House of Representatives, particularly specified in the constitution, so as to take to the Executive all deliberative will, and leave the House only an Executive and ministerial instrumental agency?

Mr. Smith (of South Carolina) said, that he had listened attentively to the reasons advanced in favor of this resolution, and that he had heard nothing to convince him of its propriety. The President and Senate have, by the constitution, the power of making Treaties, and the House have no agency in them, except to make laws necessary to carry them into operation; he considered the House as bound, in common with their fellow-citizens, to do every thing in their power to carry them into full execution. He recognized but one exception to this rule, and that was, when the instrument was clearly unconstitutional. In this case, he remarked, it had not been said that the Treaty was unconstitutional. When the resolution was first brought forward, it had indeed been observed, that the discussion might involve certain constitutional points, and, therefore, the papers called for by the resolution were necessary; but it was obvious, the question of constitutionality should be determined from the face of the instrument, and that a knowledge of the preparatory steps which led to its adoption, could throw no light upon it; that ground was therefore abandoned even by the friends of the resolution, and others were resorted to.

He was surprised that gentlemen who displayed such zeal for the constitution should support a proposition, the tendency of which went indirectly to break down the constitutional limits between the Executive and Legislative Departments. The constitution had assigned to the Executive the business of negotiation with foreign powers; this House can claim no right by the constitution to interfere in such negotiations; every movement of the kind must be considered as an attempt to usurp powers not delegated, and will be resisted by the Executive; for a concession would be a surrender of the powers specially delegated to him, and a violation of his trust. The proposition calls upon the President to lay before the House the instructions given to Mr. Jay, and the correspondence between him and Lord Grenville; and for what purpose? Is this House to negotiate the Treaty over again? Has the constitution made this House a diplomatic body, invested with the powers of negotiation? Is not this House excluded? for, if the maxim that "the expression of one is the exclusion of another," applies to this case, the assignment of the Treaty-making power to the President and Senate, is a manifest exclusion of this House. This call, then, on the President, is an attempt to obtain indirectly what the constitution has expressly assigned to others.

After Mr. S. had sat down, it was moved by Mr. Giles, to take the resolution up in Committee of the Whole for the purpose of more ample discussion.

This motion was agreed to; sixty-one members rising in the affirmative.

The House immediately resolved itself into a Committee of the Whole, on the resolution.

Mr. Nicholas remarked, that the member from Connecticut, first up, when inquiring for the reason of a call for papers, had suggested two. The one, relating to the merits of the instrument; the other, an inquiry into the conduct of officers concerned. On the latter ground, gentlemen conceded that the House had a right to require the papers, and yet seemed willing to adhere to that, on which they conceived a call could not be, with propriety, grounded, as the one that influenced the conduct of the friends to the resolution. All gentlemen admitted, that the House had the superintendence over the officers of Government, as the grand inquest of the nation; but persisted that the resolution calling for papers, if intended for the purpose of exercising that authority, must be predicated on an expression of the intention.

He took a view of the prominent features of the arguments of the members up before him. It had been said that, if the power of the President and Senate, as to Treaties, was complete, then the House had no right to claim a participation; this could not be denied; but the question was, whether the Executive had that right unqualifiedly, in all cases. In the present case, he contended, the House had a voice. To elucidate: Suppose that, in the constitution of the United States, which has been so guarded about the expenditure of money, a clause had been inserted, positively declaring that the House have a control over the money matters stipulated in a Treaty; would not this constitute a qualification of the powers of the President and Senate with respect to Treaties? The constitution, on this head, he contended, though less explicit than his supposed case would make it, was not the less positive, if tested by all the fair rules of construction; and if compared with the practice of the government from which we had borrowed, with many other matters, this part of our constitution. In England, the country alluded to, their House of Parliament had exercised a control over the moneyed articles of Treaties; and he contended, the House of Representatives had an equal authority here, as chief guardians of the purse-strings. It was unnecessary, at this time, he said, to touch on the other parts of the Treaty which clashed with the constitutional powers of the House.

He again adverted to the power of control that the House of Commons have over Treaties; and contended, that that provision of the British constitution had been accurately copied in our own with this deviation only, that the Senate have the power of making amendments to money bills here, which the House of Lords there have not. He could show, from the best authority, the acknowledgment of the British Crown officers themselves, that the Parliament has a right to discuss and decide on Treaties which involved moneyed stipulations.

The same power, he argued, resided in the House here; for shall it be said, that we have borrowed only the form from Great Britain, and not touched the substance? Shall it be said, that the House have a discretion as to appropriations, and yet they must make them as directed by a Treaty? If the House have no discretion to use in the business, they are the most unfit body to regulate money-matters; for complete regularity in so large a body must be one of the least of their valuable properties. But, with the power of appropriating money, the House have certainly the right to judge of the propriety of the appropriation. The constitution explains itself fully on this head. He instanced the specific power in the constitution, with respect to appropriations for the army, to explain from that instrument its meaning in other parts.

The constitution says, that no appropriations for the support of armies shall be for more than two years; this is, no doubt, that the House may periodically have before them the question of the propriety of supporting an armed force, with all its consequences, and that they may, by refusing or granting an appropriation, determine on its existence. The power thus cautiously lodged must have been for some purpose, and that he had suggested could alone explain this clause of the constitution. This will show what was expected of this House in appropriating money; that they should judge of the usefulness of the expenditure. In the case of the army, the constitution does not say that we may disband an army by withholding money; but for the purpose of investing us with the same power, only requires that the appropriation should recur every two years; taking it for granted, that in this as well as in every other Legislative act, we will duly weigh every consequence.

Having thus explained from the constitution itself the true meaning of this power of appropriation, he proceeded to elucidate it by a reference to the practice of the Government. He found an instance in the permanent appropriations made for the payment of the public debt. If the House in this and analogous cases, could exercise no discretion as to appropriations, why this permanent provision, in preference to an annual appropriation? The permanency of the provision took its rise from the idea, that the House possessed a discretionary power as to appropriations. Thus, he had shown that the practice of the Government, the provisions of the constitution, and the example of the British, from whom we had exactly copied the control over money transactions, all proved a discretion in the House as to appropriations. This must be considered as a sufficient answer to the gentleman from South Carolina, when he said, that the President and Senate possessed the Treaty-making power; for they possessed it with qualification, in matters of money; and unless the House chose to grant that money, it was so far no Treaty.

It was said, that if the Treaty was not the law of the land, the President should be impeached for declaring it as such. Parts of the Treaty the President and Senate had, no doubt, a right to make without any control of the House—those parts he might be considered as proclaiming; he proclaims it, limited as his authority, and under the qualifications provided by the constitution. It was said, that no instance of such a call as that now contemplated could be produced. No; nor of such a Treaty, he answered.

Mr. Swanwick expressed his sense of the importance of the subject before the House, and the pleasure which he experienced at observing the calmness and temper with which the discussion had been carried on. He had not conceived, however, that the decision of the present question involved the sense of the House as to the merits of the Treaty; the object of the resolution was only to obtain that knowledge necessary for an enlightened decision; it had been observed, that the Treaty had been censured by assemblages of people with precipitancy, and without proper information. They did this on the best information that could by them be obtained. But if the House should go into a Committee of the Whole, to take into consideration the Treaty, without obtaining all the information in their power, they would be justly to blame.

He adverted to the constitution; according to that instrument, the Legislative power is completely vested in Congress. By the 8th section of the 1st article, not only a certain specification of powers are granted to Congress, to lay and collect taxes, regulate commerce, &c., but the very extensive further power, not only to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers, but, also, all other powers vested by this constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any department or officer thereof. If, then, Congress have the power to pass laws to carry into execution all powers vested by the constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any department or officer thereof, how is it possible that there can be any authority out of the purview of this general and extensive Legislative control? Is the Treaty-making power not a power vested by the constitution in the Government of the United States, or in a department or officer thereof? If it is, is the conclusion not obvious, that Congress have power to pass laws for carrying these powers into effect? But in the power to pass laws, discretion is necessarily implied; of course, this House must judge when it is to act; whether it will, or will not, carry into effect the object in question. It is a power, it is true, of great delicacy and responsibility, but it is not less a power constitutionally given.

The member from South Carolina construed this part of the constitution in a different way, and insisted that, as the President and Senate had the power of making Treaties, the House were divested of the right of exercising their judgment upon the subject. If this doctrine prevails, to what a situation would the Representatives of a free people be reduced? The constitution especially gives them the power of originating money bills; but to what purpose would this power be granted, if another authority may make a contract, compelling the House to raise money? Suppose that authority were in this way to grant millions upon millions, must the House, at all events, be compelled to provide for their payment? In this case the House become mere automatons, mere mandarine members, like those who nod on a chimney-piece, as directed by a power foreign to themselves.

Great stress is laid upon the constitution declaring Treaties laws of the land. This article has often been quoted partially, but not at large. It is in these words: "This constitution, and the laws of the United States, which shall be made in pursuance thereof, and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land." Had the clause stopped here, there might have been some plea for the gentlemen's doctrine; but, unfortunately for them, the article goes on to say: "And the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any thing in the constitution or laws of any State, to the contrary notwithstanding." Hence, it is obvious that the supremacy of the law is over the constitution and laws of the separate States, which was necessary to prevent these interfering with those. But it does not affect the powers of this House, as a component part of the General Legislature, and authority of the United States. It is also worth while to notice the gradation in the article.

First. This constitution.

Secondly. The laws which shall be made in pursuance thereof, clothed with the highest sanction of the nation, the consent of the three branches.

Thirdly. Treaties. How absurd the doctrine, then, that these last, third in order, can repeal the second: at that rate, all power whatever would remain vested in two branches only of the Government; the third, with all its powers of originating bills for raising revenue, would be dwindled into a mere board of assessors.

The gentleman from Vermont said, yesterday, that if the President and Senate were to make a Treaty, and that House were to refuse to make due appropriations for carrying it into effect, it would become a nullity, and no foreign nation would in future treat with such an uncertain Government. Mr. S. observed, that that gentleman would probably be surprised, when he was told, that the British House of Commons possesses the same power which he reprobates in the Legislative Assembly of the United States. This, Mr. S. proved, by reading the King's Speech to both Houses of Parliament, in which he informs them of this Treaty, and promises to lay it before them when ratified, in order that they might judge of the propriety of making provision to carry it into effect. What, judge of the propriety of passing laws to carry into effect a Treaty ratified! And shall it be said, exclaimed he, that the Representative Assembly of the United States does not possess a privilege enjoyed by an English House of Commons! He hoped not.

Mr. Harper said, that it had not been his intention to trouble the committee, in this stage of the debate at least; nor should he now depart from his resolution on that head, had he not observed that the discussion was turning more and more on points, which it appeared to him unnecessary to decide. He did not conceive that the powers of the House respecting Treaties were necessary to be considered; the question appeared capable of a satisfactory decision on different grounds.

When the motion was first proposed, he thought it innocent at least, and was in doubt whether it might not be proper, because he was in doubt how far these papers might be necessary for enabling the House to exercise that discretion on the subject of Treaties, which he admitted it to possess; but on a more accurate and extensive view of the subject, and after carefully attending to the discussion which had already taken place, he was thoroughly persuaded that these papers were no way necessary, and, that being unnecessary, to call for them was an improper and unconstitutional interference with the Executive department. Could it be made to appear that these papers are necessary for directing or informing the House on any of those Legislative questions respecting the Treaty which came within its powers, he should propose to change the milk-and-water style of the present resolution. The House, in that case, would have a right to the papers; and he had no idea of requesting as a favor what should be demanded as a right. He would demand them, and insist on the demand. But, being persuaded that no discretion hitherto contended for, even by the supporters of the resolution themselves, made these papers necessary to the House, to call for them would be an unconstitutional intermeddling with the proper business of the Executive.

It had been said, that this motion was of little consequence; that it was only a request which might be refused, and that the privileges of that House were narrow indeed, if it could not request information from the Executive department. But it would be observed, he said, that requests from bodies like that, carry the force of demands, and imply a right to receive. Legislative bodies often make the most formidable expressions of their will in the shape of requests. It would be further observed, that an honorable member from Pennsylvania, (Mr. Gallatin,) after declaring that this indeed was only a request which might be refused, had added, that in case it were refused, it would then be proper to consider how far we ought to make the demand, and insist on receiving these papers as a matter of right. After this avowal of the system, after this notice that the present request is no more than a preliminary measure, a preparatory step, and in case of a refusal, is to be followed up by a demand, could it be wondered that they who think the measure improper, should oppose it in the threshold?

Mr. Gallatin conceived that, whether the House had a discretionary power with respect to Treaties, or whether they were absolutely bound by those instruments, and were obliged to pass laws to carry them fully into effect, still there was no impropriety in calling for the papers. Under the first view of the subject, if the House has a discretionary power, then no doubt could exist that the information called for is proper; and, under the second, if bound to pass laws, they must have a complete knowledge of the subject, to learn what laws ought to be passed. This latter view of the subject, even, must introduce a discussion of the Treaty, to know whether any law ought to be repealed, or to see what laws ought to be passed. If any article in the instrument should be found of doubtful import, the House would most naturally search for an explanation, in the documents which related to the steps which led to the Treaty. If one article of the Treaty only be doubtful, the House would not know how to legislate without the doubt being removed, and its explanation could certainly be found nowhere with so much propriety as in the correspondence between the negotiating parties.

Gentlemen had gone into an examination of an important constitutional question upon this motion. He hoped this would have been avoided in the present stage of the business; but as they had come forward on that ground, he had no objection to follow them in it, and to rest the decision of the constitutional powers of Congress on the fate of the present question. He would, therefore, state his opinion, that the House had a right to ask for the papers proposed to be called for, because their co-operation and sanction was necessary to carry the Treaty into full effect, to render it a binding instrument, and to make it, properly speaking, a law of the land; because they had a full discretion either to give or to refuse that co-operation; because they must be guided, in the exercise of that discretion, by the merits and expediency of the Treaty itself, and therefore had a right to ask for every information which could assist them in deciding that question.

One argument repeatedly used by every gentleman opposed to the present motion was, "That the Treaty was unconstitutional or not; if not, the House had no agency in the business, but must carry it into full effect; and if unconstitutional, the question could only be decided from the face of the instrument, and no papers could throw light upon the question." He wished gentlemen had defined what they understood by a constitutional Treaty; for, if the scope of their arguments was referred to, it would not be found possible to make an unconstitutional treaty. He would say what he conceived constituted the unconstitutionality of a treaty. A treaty is unconstitutional if it provides for doing such things, the doing of which is forbidden by the constitution; but if a treaty embraces objects within the sphere of the general powers delegated to the Federal Government, but which have been exclusively and specially granted to a particular branch of Government, say to the Legislative department, such a Treaty, though not unconstitutional, does not become the law of the land until it has obtained the sanction of that branch. In this case, and to this end, the Legislature have a right to demand the documents relative to the negotiation of the Treaty, because that Treaty operates on objects specially delegated to the Legislature. He turned to the constitution. It says that the President shall have the power to make Treaties, by and with the advice and consent of two-thirds of the Senate. It does not say what Treaties. If the clause be taken by itself, then it grants an authority altogether undefined. But the gentlemen quote another clause of the constitution, where it is said that the constitution, and the laws made in pursuance thereof, and all Treaties, are the supreme law of the land; and thence, they insist that Treaties made by the President and Senate are the supreme law of the land, and that the power of making Treaties is undefined and unlimited. He proceeded to controvert this opinion, and contended that it was limited by other parts of the constitution.

The power of making Treaties is contended to be undefined, then it might extend to all subjects which may properly become the subjects of national compacts. But, he contended, if any other specific powers were given to a different branch of the Government, they must limit the general powers; and, to make the compact valid, it was necessary that, as far as those powers clashed with the general, that the branch holding the specific should concur and give its sanction. If still it is insisted that Treaties are the supreme law of the land, the constitution and laws are also; and it may be asked, which shall have the preference? Shall a Treaty repeal a law or a law a Treaty? Neither can a law repeal a Treaty, because a Treaty is made with the concurrence of another party—a foreign nation—that has no participation in framing the law: nor can a Treaty made by the President and Senate repeal a law, for the same reason, because the House of Representatives have a participation in making the law. It is a sound maxim in Government, that it requires the same power to repeal a law that enacted it. If so, then it follows that laws and Treaties are not of the same nature; that both operate as the law of the land, but under certain limitations; both are subject to the control of the constitution; they are made not only by different powers, but those powers are distributed, under different modifications, among the several branches of the Government. Thus no law could be made by the Legislature giving themselves power to execute it; and no Treaty, by the Executive, embracing objects specifically assigned to the Legislature without their assent.

To what, he asked, would a contrary doctrine lead? If the power of making Treaties is to reside in the President and Senate unlimitedly: in other words, if, in the exercise of this power, the President and Senate are to be restrained by no other branch of the Government, the President and Senate may absorb all Legislative power—the Executive has, then, nothing to do but to substitute a foreign nation for the House of Representatives, and they may legislate to any extent. If the Treaty-making power is unlimited and undefined, it may extend to every object of legislation. Under it money may be borrowed, as well as commerce regulated; and why not money appropriated? For, arguing as the gentlemen do, they might say the constitution says that no money shall be drawn from the Treasury but in consequence of appropriations made by law. But Treaties, whatever provision they may contain, are law; appropriations, therefore, may be made by Treaties. Then it would have been the shortest way to have carried the late Treaty into effect by the instrument itself, by adding to it another article, appropriating the necessary sums. By what provision of the constitution is the Treaty-making power, agreeably to the construction of the gentlemen, limited? Is it limited by the provisions with respect to appropriations? Not more so than by the other specific powers granted to the Legislature. Is it limited by any law past? If not, it must embrace every thing, and all the objects of legislation. If not limited by existing laws, or if it repeals the laws that clash with it, or if the Legislature is obliged to repeal the laws so clashing, then the Legislative power in fact resides in the President and Senate, and they can, by employing an Indian tribe, pass any law under the color of Treaty. Unless it is allowed that either the power of the House over the purse-strings is a check, or the existing laws cannot be repealed by a Treaty, or that the special powers granted to Congress limit the general power of Treaty-making, there are no bounds to it, it must absorb all others, repeal all laws in contravention to it, and act without control.

To the construction he had given to this part of the constitution, no such formidable objections could be raised. He did not claim for the House a power of making Treaties, but a check upon the Treaty-making power—a mere negative power; whilst those who are in favor of a different construction advocate a positive and unlimited power.

He read a quotation from Blackstone, page 257, vol. i., to show that the power of Treaty-making in England is as extensively vested in the King, as it can possibly be said to be here in our Executive.

The following is the passage alluded to:

"II. It is also the King's prerogative to make Treaties, leagues, and alliances with foreign States and Princes. For it is, by the law of nations, essential to the goodness of a league, that it be made by the sovereign power, and then it is binding upon the whole community; and, in England, the sovereign power, quo ad hoc, is vested in the person of the King. Whatever contracts, therefore, he engages in, no other power in the kingdom can legally delay, resist, or annul."

After such a latitude as this clause gives, it would be supposed that there could be no check reserved upon this power; yet it will be found that Parliament have a participation in it. And the apparent inconsistency is easily reconciled, by observing that the power given generally to the Executive of making contracts with other nations, does not imply that of making Legislative regulations, but that when the contract happens to embrace Legislative objects, the assistance of the Legislature becomes necessary to give it effect.

He proceeded to show the operation of this limitation of the Treaty-making power in England by the practice of Parliament. It was always considered as discretionary with Parliament to grant money to carry Treaties into effect or not, and to repeal or not to repeal laws that interfere with them. In citing instances of the exercise of this power, he should not go further back than their Revolution.

He then read several extracts from Anderson's History of Commerce, vol. iii. pages 269, '70, '71, '72. They are so much in point that we transcribe the most material passages:

"But we could not omit our animadversions on the eighth and ninth articles, as they were so extraordinary in themselves, and as they occasioned so great a stir and uneasiness at that time, as to have brought the whole Treaty of Commerce to miscarry then and ever since.

"Art. IX. That within the space of two months after a law shall be made in Great Britain, whereby it shall be sufficiently provided that not more customs or duties be paid for goods and merchandise brought from France into Great Britain than what are payable for goods and merchandise of the like nature, imported into Great Britain from any other country in Europe; and that all laws made in Great Britain since the year 1664 for prohibiting the importation of any goods or merchandise coming from France, which were not prohibited before that time, be repealed, the general tariff in France, on the 18th of September, in the said year 1664, shall take place there again, and the duties payable in France by the subjects of Great Britain for goods imported and exported, shall be paid according to the tenor of the tariff above mentioned.

"When the said two articles came to be known by the merchants of Great Britain, they were received with the utmost surprise and indignation, and the clamor was loud and universal.

"That the complying with those two articles would effectually ruin the commerce we carried on to Portugal—the very best branch of all our European commerce. That the said eight articles did, in general terms, put France on an equal footing with Portugal or any other of our best allies, in point of commerce."

"This is, in brief, the sum of this mercantile controversy, which when brought into Parliament, it was so apparent that our trade to France had ever been a ruinous one, and that if, in consequence of accepting the said eighth and ninth articles, the British Parliament should consent to reduce the high duties and take off the prohibitions so prudently laid on French commodities, it would effectually ruin the very best branches of our commerce, and would thereby deprive many hundred thousand manufacturers of their subsistence; which was also supported by petitions from many parts of the kingdom: that, although a great majority of that House of Commons was in other respects closely attached to the ministry, the bill for agreeing to the purport of the said two articles was rejected by a majority of nine voices, after the most eminent merchants had been heard at the bar of that House, to the great joy of the whole trading part of the nation, and of all other impartial people."

Thus it must be clearly seen, that the consent of Parliament was not only deemed necessary to the completion of the Treaty, but that that consent was refused, and that in consequence the Treaty fell to the ground, and was not revived for a period of near eighty years, and all notwithstanding the plenitude of the Treaty-making power, said by the best English authority, Blackstone, to be vested in the King; which was, however, he repeated, necessarily checked by the special powers vested in Parliament; for none but they could grant money, or repeal the laws clashing with the provisions of Treaties.

He cited another instance of the exercise of this controlling power in Parliament of even a later date, viz: in the year 1739, in the case of a Treaty between Spain and Great Britain, which was sanctioned by a very small majority indeed in Parliament. He cited a third example from Anderson, vol. vi., page 828, in the case of the Treaty of Commerce between France and Great Britain, to show that the practice of the Parliament's interfering in Treaties is not obsolete.

The following is an article of the said Treaty, which Mr. Gallatin read:

"XIV. The advantages granted by the present Treaty to the subjects of His Britannic Majesty shall take effect, as far as relates to the kingdom of Great Britain, as soon as laws shall be passed there, for securing to the subjects of His Most Christian Majesty the reciprocal enjoyment of the advantages which are granted to them by the Treaty.

"And the advantages by all these articles, except the tariff, shall take effect with regard to the kingdom of Ireland, as soon as laws shall be passed there, for securing to the subjects of His Most Christian Majesty the reciprocal enjoyment of the advantages which are granted to them by this Treaty: and, in like manner, the advantages granted by the tariff shall take effect in what relates to the said kingdom, as soon as laws shall be passed there for giving effect to the said tariff."

Upon this principle, founded on almost immemorial practice in Great Britain, did the Minister of that kingdom, when introducing the late Treaty with Prussia into Parliament, tell the House that they will have to consider the Treaty and make provision for carrying it into effect. On the same principle, when the debate took place on that instrument, it was moved to strike out the sum proposed to be voted, which would have defeated it, and afterwards to strike out the appropriation clause, which would have rendered the bill a mere vote of credit, and would also have caused the Treaty to fall to the ground. On the same principle, the King of Great Britain, when he mentioned the American Treaty, promised to lay it before them in proper season, that they might judge of the propriety of enacting the necessary provisions to carry it into effect.

It remains to be examined, said Mr. G., whether we are to be in a worse situation than Great Britain; whether the House of Representatives of the United States, the substantial and immediate Representatives of the American people, shall be ranked below the British House of Commons; whether the Legislative power shall be swallowed up by the Treaty-making authority, as contended for here, though never claimed even in Great Britain?

In Great Britain, he remarked, the Treaty-making power is as undefined as in America. The constitution here, declares that the President and Senate shall make Treaties; there, custom says as loudly, that the King shall make them. In Great Britain, however, the power is limited, by immemorial custom, by the exercise of the Legislative authority by a branch distinct from the regal; in the same manner is it limited here, not however merely by custom and tradition, but by the words of the constitution, which gives specifically the Legislative power to Congress; and he hoped this authority would be exercised by the House with as much spirit and independence as any where.

If this doctrine is sanctioned, if it is allowed, that Treaties may regulate appropriations and repeal existing laws, and the House, by rejecting the present resolution declare, that they give up all control, all right to the exercise of discretion, it is tantamount to saying, that they abandon their share in legislation, and that they consent the whole power should be concentred in the other branches. He did not believe such a doctrine could be countenanced by the House. If gentlemen should insist upon maintaining this doctrine, should deny the free agency of the House, and their right to judge of the expediency of carrying the Treaty into effect, the friends to the independence of the House will be driven to the necessity to reject the Treaty, whether good or bad, to assert the contested right. If the gentlemen abandoned this ground, then the policy of the measure could be weighed on fair ground, and the Treaty carried into affect, if reconcilable to the interests of the United States.

March 10.—In Committee of the Whole, on Mr. Livingston's resolution, Mr. Hartley delivered his sentiments as follows:

As I was not present when this subject was first introduced, it cannot be expected that I should take any great share in the debate; but some observations I have heard, chiefly from the gentleman last up yesterday from Pennsylvania, have induced me to show a few grounds for my vote.

That gentleman has strongly combined this resolution with the Treaty, and wishes that every one who holds that there should be a co-operation of this House respecting that instrument, should vote for the resolution. I think differently.

The gentlemen who contend for the mighty power of the Executive and Senate, as well as those who argue for the great authority of this House, perhaps are on extremes; but the Treaty ought not now to be so largely under consideration. I am willing, if it is thought proper, to take it up at an early day, and, after a full hearing, will vote as I hold right.

The gentleman I referred to, from Pennsylvania, argued most strenuously that the laws and customs of Great Britain and the Constitution of the United States were analogous—nay, that the powers were precisely the same.

The gentlemen who hold this doctrine have made researches, and have quoted several authorities; but why have not those ingenious gentlemen discovered a single instance where the British House of Commons have had the instructions given by the Executive to the negotiating Minister laid before them. If there was such a power, no doubt that body would at some period have exercised it; for no men on earth have extended the power of privileges which they had further than the members of the House of Commons of Britain.

As those gentlemen who contend for the likeness—indeed, sameness of the Treaty-making powers of both countries—can show no precedent, it may be fairly contended, that no such right exists as is contemplated by the resolution.

Treaties are made under the Executive in almost all countries, and when the Ministers have gone through their part of the business, the Treaty is commonly laid before the nation. If any national act is further necessary, it would pass in conformity to the principles of good faith; if any thing is necessary (consistent with the constitution) on the part of the House, it will be the discussion of another day.

Mr. Griswold said, that the resolution on the table appeared at first view to be perfectly innocent, and, he might add, of very little importance. It amounted to no more than a request to the President to furnish the House with papers relating to the negotiation with Great Britain, which he might either satisfy or reject. But the discussion which had taken place in the committee, had given the subject a very serious aspect, and involved a question of the first importance; and although some gentlemen had thought that the committee had prematurely involved itself in the examination of the question, he could not see how the discussion could have been avoided. For gentlemen would not say that any resolution—more particularly a resolution calling on the President for documents belonging to the Executive Department—was to pass the House without a conclusive reason, much less without any reason for its passing. On this principle gentlemen had been called on at an early period for the reasons on which they grounded the resolution. They had attempted to assign reasons, but those reasons had been generally abandoned; and it could not at that time be seriously contended that the objects of general information or publicity, which had been first mentioned, could justify the House in calling on the President for papers relating to the British Treaty, or that those papers were necessary to enable the House to judge of the constitutionality of the Treaty. The friends of the resolution, aware of this, had at last come forward and assigned a new and a very important reason. It had been now said, that the House of Representatives have a right to judge over the heads of the President and Senate on the subject of Treaties; that no Treaty can become a law until sanctioned by the House; and, in fine, that the House of Representatives is a constitutional part of the Treaty-making power.

If these facts and the principles which grow out of them are true, he could not say that the resolution was improper; and although he did not know to what part of the Treaty the papers would particularly apply, yet, if the House were to take this extensive view of the Treaty, and ultimately to sanction or reject it, it would seem that the papers relating to the negotiation ought to be laid before them. But if these facts are not true, and the House is not a constitutional part of the Treaty-making power, and the Treaty is already a law without its sanction, then the reason falls to the ground, and the resolution ought to be rejected.

This inquiry into the powers of the House of Representatives must be confined, and the question arising out of it must be decided by a fair construction of the constitution. The powers of each branch of the Government are there limited and defined, and an accurate understanding of that instrument would enable gentlemen to decide the question.

In comparing these questions with the constitution, gentlemen were not, however, to inquire whether that constitution was a good or a bad one; whether too much power had been given to this or to that branch of the Government. The question will only be, what powers has the constitution given, and to what departments have the same been distributed?

To render the subject as clear and distinct as possible, he thought it would not be improper to take an abstract view of those two powers in all governments having foreign relations which are immediately connected with the inquiry, viz: the Legislative and the Treaty-making power. And if gentlemen can clearly fix in their minds the limits of each, they will become better enabled to see their operation, and to decide on the powers of the House in the exercise of them.

The Legislative power in all governments is extremely broad; it occupies the most extensive ground; it extends to every object which relates to the internal concerns of the nation; it regulates the life, the liberty, and the property of every individual living within its jurisdiction; it can control commerce within its jurisdiction; govern the conduct of the nation towards aliens, in whatever capacity they may appear; and, in short, as certain English writers have said of the British Government, its power is almost omnipotent. Thus broad and extensive are the general powers of legislation, subject, however, to such particular restrictions as are prescribed by forms of government, or which occasionally arise from the nature of government itself, and limit the objects of its operation.

It is easy to see, that in the exercise of these Legislative powers, it will frequently happen that laws are enacted, which, in their operation, will embarrass the intercourse of two nations. Such are always the effect of retaliating laws, and aliens within the limits of a foreign jurisdiction are frequently, by those regulations, subjected to great and unreasonable embarrassments.

The Treaty-making power operates in a very different manner; its power is limited and confined to the forming of Treaties with foreign nations; its objects are to facilitate the intercourse between nations; to remove by contract, those impediments which embarrass that intercourse, and to place the same on a fair and just foundation. In the exercise of this power, it will unavoidably happen that the laws of the Legislature are sometimes infracted. The Legislature, for certain causes,—perhaps to compel a foreign nation to form a treaty on terms of reciprocity,—may prohibit all intercourse, or embarrass that intercourse with regulations so burdensome as to produce the same effect; the foreign nation finally becomes willing to treat, and to establish an intercourse on equitable terms. If, in this case, the Treaty power cannot touch the laws of the Legislature, the object which gave rise to those very laws can never be attained; no Treaty can be formed, because it will oppose existing laws; those laws cannot be repealed, because the object for which they were enacted has not been attained. Such a construction of the Treaty power would defeat every object for which that power was established; and instead of possessing an authority to remove embarrassments in a foreign intercourse, it cannot touch them; and, although expressly created for the attainment of a single object, it can never attain it.

From these considerations, he contended that, in the exercise of that power which related to the intercourse with foreign nations, the Treaty-making was paramount to the Legislative power; and that the positive institutions of the Legislature must give place to compact.

On this construction, a perfect harmony is introduced into the departments of Government. Both the Legislative and the Treaty power are necessary, on many occasions, to accomplish the same objects. The Legislative power to establish regulations, or declare war, for the purpose of compelling a nation to agree to a reasonable compact; and the Treaty power, when that nation is compelled to agree to such reasonable compact, to remove by Treaty those very regulations, and the war itself, on fair and equitable terms.

Mr. Madison said, that the direct proposition before the House, had been so absorbed by the incidental question which had grown out of it, concerning the constitutional authority of Congress in the case of Treaties, that he should confine his present observations to the latter.

The true question, therefore, before the committee, was, not whether the will of the people expressed in the constitution was to be obeyed, but how that will was to be understood; in what manner it had actually divided the powers delegated to the Government; and what construction would best reconcile the several parts of the instrument with each other, and be most consistent with its general spirit and object.

On comparing the several passages in the constitution, which had been already cited to the committee, it appeared, that if taken literally, and without limit, they must necessarily clash with each other. Certain powers to regulate commerce, to declare war, to raise armies, to borrow money, &c., are first specially vested in Congress. The power of making Treaties, which may relate to the same subjects, is afterwards vested in the President and two-thirds of the Senate; and it is declared in another place, that the constitution and the Laws of the United States, made in pursuance thereof, and Treaties made, or to be made under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land. And the judges, in every State, shall be bound thereby, any thing in the constitution or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding.

The term supreme, as applied to Treaties, evidently meant a supremacy over the State constitutions and laws, and not over the Constitution and Laws of the United States. And it was observable, that the judicial authority, and the existing laws, alone of the States, fell within the supremacy expressly enjoined. The injunction was not extended to the Legislative authority of the States, or to laws requisite to be passed by the States for giving effect to Treaties; and it might be a problem worthy of the consideration, though not needing the decision of the committee, in what manner the requisite provisions were to be obtained from the States.

It was to be regretted, he observed, that on a question of such magnitude as the present, there should be any apparent inconsistency or inexplicitness in the constitution, that could leave room for different constructions. As the case, however, had happened, all that could be done was to examine the different constructions with accuracy and fairness, according to the rules established therefor, and to adhere to that which should be found most rational, consistent, and satisfactory.

He stated the five following, as all the constructions, worthy of notice, that had either been contended for, or were likely to occur:

I. The Treaty power, and the Congressional power, might be regarded as moving in such separate orbits, and operating on such separate objects, as to be incapable of interfering with, or touching each other.

II. As concurrent powers relating to the same objects; and operating like the power of Congress, and the power of the State Legislatures, in relation to taxes, on the same articles.

III. As each of them supreme over the other as it may be the last exercised; like the different assemblies of the people, under the Roman Government, in the form of centuries, and in the form of tribes.

IV. The Treaty power may be viewed, according to the doctrine maintained by the opponents of the proposition before the committee, as both unlimited in its objects, and completely paramount in its authority.

V. The Congressional power may be viewed as co-operative with the Treaty power, on the Legislative subjects submitted to Congress by the constitution, in the manner explained by the member from Pennsylvania (Mr. Gallatin) and exemplified in the British Government.

The objection to the first construction is, that it would narrow too much the Treaty power, to exclude from Treaties altogether the enumerated subjects submitted to the power of Congress; some or other of this class of regulations being generally comprised in the important compacts which take place between nations.

The objection to the second is, that a concurrent exercise of the Treaty and Legislative powers, on the same objects, would be evidently impracticable. In the case of taxes laid both by Congress and by the State Legislatures on the same articles, the constitution presumed, that the concurrent authorities might be exercised with such prudence and moderation as would avoid an interference between their respective regulations. But it was manifest that such an interference would be unavoidable between the Treaty power and the power of Congress. A Treaty of Commerce, for example, would rarely be made, that would not trench on existing legal regulations, as well as be a bar to future ones.

To the third, the objection was equally fatal. That it involved the absurdity of an imperium in imperio, of two powers, both of them supreme, yet each of them liable to be superseded by the other. There was, indeed, an instance of this kind found in the government of ancient Rome, where the two authorities of the comitia curiata, or meetings by centuries, and the comitia tributa, or meetings by tribes, were each possessed of the supreme Legislative power, and could each annul the proceedings of the other. For, although the people composed the body of the meetings in both cases, yet, as they voted in one, according to wealth, and in the other, according to numbers, the organizations were so distinct as to create, in fact, two distinct authorities. But it was not necessary to dwell on this political phenomenon, which had been celebrated as a subject of curious speculation only, and not as a model for the institutions of any other country.

The fourth construction, is that which is contended for by the opponents of the proposition depending; and which gives to the Treaty power all the latitude which is not necessarily prohibited by a regard to the general form and fundamental principles of the constitution.

In order to smooth the way for this doctrine, it had been said that the power to make Treaties was laid down in the most indefinite terms; and that the power to make laws, was no limitation to it, because the two powers were essentially different in their nature. If there was ingenuity in this distinction, it was all the merit it could have; for it must be obvious that it could neither be reduced to practice, nor be reconciled to principles. Treaties and laws, whatever the nature of them may be, must, in their operation, be often the same. Regulations by Treaty, if carried into effect, are laws. If Congress pass acts relating to provisions in a Treaty, so as to become incorporated with the Treaty, they are not the less laws on that account. A Legislative act is the same whether performed by this or that body, or whether it be grounded on the consideration, that a foreign nation agrees to pass a like act, or on any other consideration.

It must be objected to this construction, therefore, that it extends the power of the President and Senate too far, and cramps the powers of Congress too much.

He did not admit that the term "Treaty" had the extensive and unlimited meaning which some seemed to claim for it. It was to be considered as a technical term, and its meaning was to be sought for in the use of it, particularly in governments which bore most analogy to our own. In absolute governments, where the whole power of the nation is usurped by the governments, and all the departments of power are united in the same person, the Treaty power has no bounds; because the power of the sovereign to execute it has none. In limited governments, the case is different; the Treaty power, if undefined, is not understood to be unlimited. In Great Britain, it is positively restrained on the subjects of money and dismembering the empire. Nor could the Executive there, if his recollection was right, make an alien a subject by means of a Treaty.

But the question immediately under consideration, and which the context and spirit of the constitution must decide, turned on the extent of the Treaty power in relation to the objects; specifically and expressly submitted to the Legislative power of Congress.

It was an important, and appeared to him to be a decisive, view of the subject, that if the Treaty power alone could perform any one act for which the authority of Congress is required by the constitution, it may perform every act for which the authority of that part of the Government is required. Congress have power to regulate trade, to declare war, to raise armies, to levy, to borrow, and to appropriate money, &c. If, by Treaty, therefore, as paramount to the Legislative power, the President and Senate can regulate trade, they can also declare war, they can raise armies to carry on war, and they can procure money to support armies. These powers, however different in their nature or importance, are on the same footing in the constitution, and must share the same fate. A member from Connecticut (Mr. Griswold) had admitted that the power of war was exclusively vested in Congress; but he had not attempted, nor did it seem possible, to draw any line between that and the other enumerated powers. If any line could be drawn, it ought to be presented to the committee; and he should, for one, be ready to give it the most impartial consideration. He had not, however, any expectation that such an attempt could succeed; and, therefore, should submit to the serious consideration of the committee, that, although the constitution had carefully and jealously lodged the power of war, of armies, of the purse, &c. in Congress, of which the immediate Representatives of the people formed an integral part, yet, according to the construction maintained on the other side, the President and Senate, by means of a Treaty of Alliance with a nation at war, might make the United States parties in the war. They might stipulate subsidies, and even borrow money to pay them; they might furnish troops to be carried to Europe, Asia, or Africa; they might even attempt to keep up a standing army in time of peace, for the purpose of co-operating, on given contingencies, with an ally, for mutual safety or other common objects. Under this aspect the Treaty power would be tremendous indeed.

The force of this reasoning is not obviated by saying, that the President and Senate would only pledge the public faith, and that the agency of Congress would be necessary to carry it into operation. For, what difference does this make, if the obligation imposed be, as is alleged, a constitutional one; if Congress have no will but to obey, and if to disobey be treason and rebellion against the constituted authorities? Under a constitutional obligation with such sanctions to it, Congress, in case the President and Senate should enter into an alliance for war, would be nothing more than the mere heralds for proclaiming it. In fact, it had been said that they must obey the injunctions of a Treaty, as implicitly as a subordinate officer in the Executive line was bound to obey the Chief Magistrate, or as the Judges are bound to decide according to the laws.

As a further objection to the doctrine contended for, he called the attention of the committee to another very serious consequence from it. The specific powers, as vested in Congress by the constitution, are qualified by sundry exceptions, deemed of great importance to the safe exercise of them. These restrictions are contained in section 9 of the constitution, and in the articles of amendment which have been added to it. Thus, the "migration or importation of such persons as any of the States shall think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by Congress." He referred to several of the other restrictive paragraphs which followed, particularly the 5th, which says, that no tax shall be laid on exports, no preference given to ports of one State over those of another, &c. It was Congress, also, he observed, which was to make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof, or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or of the right of the people peaceably to assemble, &c. Now, if the Legislative powers, specifically vested in Congress, are to be no limitation or check to the Treaty power, it was evident that the exceptions to those powers could be no limitation or check to the Treaty power.

Returning to the powers particularly lodged in Congress, he took notice of those relating to war, and money, or the sword and the purse, as requiring a few additional observations, in order to show that the Treaty power could not be paramount over them.

It was well known that, with respect to the regulation of commerce, it had long remained under the jurisdiction of the States; and that in the establishment of the present Government the question was, whether, and how far, it should be transferred to the general jurisdiction. But with respect to the power of making war, it had, from the commencement of the Revolution, been judged and exercised as a branch of the general authority, essential to the public safety. The only question, therefore, that could arise, was whether the power should be lodged in this or that department of the Federal Government. And we find it expressly vested in the Legislative, and not in the Executive department; with a view, no doubt, to guard it against the abuses which might be apprehended, from placing the power of declaring war in those hands which would conduct it when declared; and which, therefore, in the ordinary course of things, would be most tempted to go into war. But, according to the doctrine now maintained, the United States, by means of an alliance with a foreign power, might be driven into a state of war by the President and Senate, contrary both to a sense of the Legislature, and to the letter and spirit of the constitution.

On the subject, also, of appropriating money, particularly to a military establishment, the provision of the constitution demanded the most severe attention. To prevent the continuance of a military force for a longer term than might be indispensable, it is expressly declared, that no appropriation for the support of armies shall be made for more than two years. So that, at the end of every two years, the question, whether a military force ought to be continued or not, must be open for consideration; and can be decided in the negative, by either the House of Representatives or the Senate's refusing to concur in the requisite appropriations. This is a most important check and security against the danger of standing armies, and against the prosecution of a war beyond its rational objects; and the efficacy of the precaution is the greater, as, at the end of every two years a re-election of the House of Representatives gives the people an opportunity of judging on the occasion for themselves. But if, as is contended, the House of Representatives have no right to deliberate on appropriations pledged by the President and Senate, and cannot refuse them, without a breach of the constitution and of their oaths, the case is precisely the same, and the same effects would follow, as if the appropriation were not limited to two years, but made for the whole period contemplated, at once. Where would be the check of a biennial appropriation for a military establishment raised for four years, if, at the end of two years, the appropriation was to be continued by a constitutional necessity for two years more? It is evident that no real difference can exist between an appropriation for four years at once, and two appropriations for two years each, the second of which, the two Houses would be constitutionally obliged to make.

It had been said that, in all cases, a law must either be repealed, or its execution provided for. Whatever respect might be due to this principle in general, he denied that it could be applicable to the case in question. By the provision of the constitution, limiting appropriations to two years, it was clearly intended to enable either branch of the Legislature to discontinue a military force at the end of every two years. If the law establishing it must be necessarily repealed before an appropriation could be withheld, it would be in the power of either branch to keep up an establishment by refusing to concur in repeal. The construction and reasoning, therefore, opposed to the rights of the House, would evidently defeat an essential provision of the constitution.

The constitution of the United States is a constitution of limitations and checks. The powers given up by the people for the purposes of Government, had been divided into two great classes. One of these formed the State Governments; the other, the Federal Government. The powers of the Government had been further divided into three great departments; and the Legislative department again subdivided into two independent branches. Around each of these portions of power were seen also exceptions and qualifications, as additional guards against the abuses to which power is liable. With a view to this policy of the constitution, it could not be unreasonable, if the clauses under discussion were thought doubtful, to lean towards a construction that would limit and control the Treaty-making power, rather than towards one that would make it omnipotent.

He came next to the fifth construction, which left with the President and Senate the power of making Treaties, but required at the same time the Legislative sanction and co-operation, in those cases where the constitution had given express and specific powers to the Legislature. It was to be presumed, that in all such cases the Legislature would exercise its authority with discretion, allowing due weight to the reasons which led to the Treaty, and to the circumstances of the existence of the Treaty. Still, however, this House, in its Legislative capacity, must exercise its reason: it must deliberate; for deliberation is implied in legislation. If it must carry all Treaties into effect, it would no longer exercise a Legislative power; it would be the mere instrument of the will of another department, and would have no will of its own. Where the constitution contains a specific and peremptory injunction on Congress to do a particular act, Congress must, of course, do the act, because the constitution, which is paramount over all the departments, has expressly taken away the Legislative discretion of Congress. The case is essentially different where the act of one department of Government interferes with a power expressly vested in another, and nowhere expressly taken away: here the latter power must be exercised according to its nature; and if it be a Legislative power, it must be exercised with that deliberation and discretion which is essential to the nature of Legislative power.

Mr. W. Smith (of South Carolina) said, he would not at that time go into an extensive review of the arguments of the gentleman from Virginia, (Mr. Madison,) but would only notice some points which he had dwelt on. Before he went into a consideration of the subject, he would call the attention of the committee to the true question now before them; for though it was originally only a call for papers, it had now assumed a very important shape, and was nothing less than this, Whether that House had a concurrent power with the President and Senate in making Treaties? The gentleman last up had followed others in referring to the practice under the British constitution; but had concluded his remarks on that argument with allowing, that, after all, our own constitution must be our sole guide. He heartily joined in that sentiment, and was satisfied that the merits of the question should be tested by that alone. In order to show that the Treaty power was solely delegated to the President and Senate by the constitution, Mr. S. said, he should not confine himself to a mere recital of the words, but he should appeal to the general sense of the whole nation at the time the constitution was formed, before any Treaty was made under it, which could, by exciting passion and discontent, warp the mind from a just and natural construction of the constitution. By referring to the contemporaneous expositions of that instrument, when the subject was viewed only in relation to the abstract power, and not to a particular Treaty, we should come at the truth. He would then confidently appeal to the opinions of those who, when the constitution was promulgated, were alarmed at the Treaty power, because it was by the constitution vested in the President and Senate, and to its advocates, who vindicated it by proving that the power was safely deposited with these branches of the Government. The discussions which took place at the time of its adoption by the Convention of the several States, proved, beyond a doubt, that the full extent of the power was then well understood, and thought, by those who approved of the constitution, to be sufficiently guarded. He would further appeal to the amendments which had been proposed by the discontented. The Convention of Virginia had proposed an amendment, which of itself overturned all the reasonings of the gentleman. It was, "that no commercial Treaty should be valid, unless ratified by two-thirds of all the Senators." This was the only check which that State required, and was a conclusive evidence of their opinions: had that State conceived that the check which is now contended for existed in the constitution, they could not have been guilty of such an absurdity as the amendment would involve. All the possible dangers which might ensue from the unlimited nature of the Treaty power were well considered before the constitution was adopted, and Virginia required no further check than the one above recited. All, therefore, that they required had, in the present case, been done, for the Treaty was ratified by two-thirds of all the Senators.

Mr. S. said, he could refer to many further proofs derived from a similar source. He would not, however, fatigue the committee at this time with reading them. He would only recall the recollection of some gentlemen present to the protest of the Pennsylvania minority, where the same ideas and amendments were contained, and to the proceedings of a meeting at Harrisburg, which the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Gallatin) must well remember, (having been one of the meeting,) where, after stating objections to the extensive powers delegated by the constitution, the following amendment was proposed, as necessary to limit and restrain the powers: "Provided always, that no Treaty which shall hereafter be made, shall be deemed or construed to alter or affect any law of the United States, or of any particular State, until such Treaty shall have been laid before and assented to by the House of Representatives in Congress." This amendment was the most satisfactory evidence that the proposers of it did then believe that, without that amendment, such Treaty would be valid and binding, although not assented to by this House, and that they had, at that day, no idea that there existed in the constitution the check which is now discovered by this ex post facto construction.

Having stated the general opinion of the public, as manifested by the friends as well as the enemies of the constitution, Mr. S. said he would proceed to show that the practice of Congress had, from the commencement of its existence, been conformable to that opinion. Several treaties had been concluded with Indian tribes under the present constitution. These Treaties embraced all the points which were now made a subject of contest—settlement of boundaries, grants of money, &c.; when ratified by the President and Senate, they had been proclaimed by the Executive as the law of the land; they had not even been communicated to the House; but the House, considering them as laws, had made the appropriations as matters of course, and as they did in respect to other laws. The Treaties were never discussed, but the requisite sums, as reported in the annual estimates, were included, as matters of course, in the general mass of moneys voted for the War Establishment in the item of Indian Department. It was not pretended that the constitution made any distinction between Treaties with foreign nations and Indian tribes; and the clause of the constitution which gives to Congress the power of regulating commerce with foreign nations, and on which the modern doctrine is founded, includes as well Indian tribes as foreign nations.

That this House considered a Treaty, when ratified by the President and Senate, as the law of the land, was further evident from a resolve of the House, of the 4th of June, 1790, in these words;

"Resolved, That all Treaties made, or which shall be made and promulged under the authority of the United States, shall from time to time be published and annexed to their code of laws, by the Secretary of State."

In consequence of this resolution, the several Secretaries of State had annexed the Treaties which had been made to the code of laws, as soon as they were ratified by the President and Senate, and promulged by the President.

Mr. S. repeated his former assertion, that there were cases where that House had not the right of withholding appropriations; if they had the power, indeed, they might stop the proceedings of Government altogether; and so, individuals had the power of resisting the laws. Gentlemen had said, that if this doctrine prevailed, the House would lose its capacity of judging. He denied it; they would still retain, in such cases, a discretion, guided by morality, good faith, and the constitution; the members were as much bound by the laws in their Legislative, as in their individual capacity; if an existing law (or Treaty, which was a law of the highest nature) prescribed a certain duty, they were bound to perform it, and their discretion could only be called in to regulate the mode and circumstances of discharging that duty; it could not be a matter of discretion whether or not they should perform that duty. Thus, unless they intended to arrest the operations of Government, their discretion could not be requisite to determine whether they should appropriate the moneys necessary for its support; but out of what fund, and when the moneys shall be paid, and other matters of detail. So, when a Treaty was concluded, and became a compact binding the nation, the discretion of the House (unless it was intended to violate our faith) could not determine whether the moneys contracted for should be paid, but the mode, the fund, and such questions of detail, would alone be considered. The distinction, which was an obvious one, between power and right, had not been attended to. The House had certainly the power to do many things which they had not the right to do; they had the power to do wrong, but they certainly had not the right to do wrong; and whether the wrong was committed by acting where they ought not to act, or refusing to act where they ought, was immaterial; both were equally reprehensible. It had been boldly said, that there was no case which could possibly come before them, where they would not be at liberty to answer aye or no: he would produce a case—by the constitution, on the application of a certain number of States, wishing for amendments, Congress must call a Convention; where is this boasted discretion, of which so much has been said? Could the House, in this case, exercise its discretion, whether or no a Convention should be called? Why not? Because the constitution says it must call a Convention: and does not the constitution say, "Treaties made by the President and Senate are laws, and that laws must be obeyed?" The same injunctions of the constitution are imposed in both cases; and as in the first, all this House could do, would be to regulate the time and place of holding the Convention; so, in the latter, their discretion would be limited to the mode, and fund, and other details. The gentleman had mentioned the article in the constitution respecting appropriations for military services—they were to be limited to two years; this article proved itself that appropriations might be unlimited in every other case. When a Military Establishment was instituted, it was known that an appropriation law for that purpose could not be in force more than two years; no inconvenience, then, could result. But there was no such limitation in respect to any other branch of expenditure; from custom, appropriations for the support of Government were annual; appropriations even for pensions were annual, and yet no one doubted that, as the pension was a contract, the appropriation for it was always a thing of course; no discretion could be exercised, in respect to the payment, without a breach of faith.

March 11.—In Committee of the Whole, on Mr. Livingston's resolution.

Mr. Giles said, he expected, when the present motion was made, that it would not be opposed. The expected agency of the House respecting the Treaty, or some subjects relating to it, made him imagine that the propriety of having the papers called for could not be denied. The Treaty has been referred to a Committee of the Whole, surely in order to act on it in some shape or other. Indeed, the President, in his Speech, at the opening of the session, expressly says, that he will lay the subject before them. This he considered as full evidence, that the President conceived it must come under the notice of the House. If the papers could serve to explain any point relative to that instrument, surely the possession of them was desirable.