SECOND CONGRESS.—FIRST SESSION.

PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES

IN

THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES.

Monday, October 24, 1791.

This being the day appointed by law for the meeting of the present Congress, the following members appeared, produced their credentials, and took their seats:

From New Hampshire, Nicholas Gilman, Samuel Livermore, and Jeremiah Smith.

From Massachusetts, Fisher Ames, Shearjashub Bourne, Elbridge Gerry, Benjamin Goodhue, George Thatcher, and Artemas Ward.

From Rhode Island, Benjamin Bourne.

From Connecticut, James Hillhouse, Jonathan Sturges, Jonathan Trumbull, Jeremiah Wadsworth, and Amasa Learned.

From New York, James Gordon, John Laurance, Peter Sylvester, and Thomas Tredwell.

From New Jersey, Elias Boudinot.

From Pennsylvania, Thomas Fitzsimons, Daniel Heister, and Frederick Augustus Muhlenberg.

From Delaware, John Vining.

From Maryland, Joshua Seney, and Samuel Sterrett.

From Virginia, John Brown, William B. Giles, Samuel Griffin, James Madison, Andrew Moore, and Alexander White.

From North Carolina, John Steele, and Hugh Williamson.

From South Carolina, Daniel Huger, William Smith, and Thomas Tudor Tucker.

From Georgia, Francis Willis.

A quorum of the members being present, the House proceeded to ballot for Speaker, when it appeared that Jonathan Trumbull, from Connecticut, was elected.

On being conducted to the chair, Mr. Trumbull addressed the House as follows:

Gentlemen: I find myself unable to express to you the full sense I have of the distinguished honor you have done me in the choice of your Speaker.

The diffidence I feel in my abilities to discharge, with propriety, the duties of the chair, is almost insuperable in my own mind. But, encouraged by the known candor of this honorable body, and depending, as I think I may confidently do, on the kind assistance of each individual in it, I shall enter on its duties, with full assurances to you, gentlemen, that I shall endeavor to conduct myself with that impartiality, integrity, and assiduity, which become the conspicuous station in which you have been pleased to place me.

The House then proceeded to ballot for a Clerk, when there appeared a unanimous vote for John Beckley.

The oath to support the constitution was then administered to the members present, and the oath of office to the Speaker and Clerk.

Ordered, That the Speaker appoint committees until the House shall otherwise determine.

A message was received from the Senate, informing the House that a quorum of that body is assembled and ready to proceed to business; and that the Senate have informed the President of the United States that they are ready to receive any communications he may be pleased to make to them.

Resolved, That Mr. Smith, of South Carolina, Mr. Laurance, and Mr. White, be a committee on the part of this House, to act jointly with the committee from the Senate, to wait on the President.

Ordered, That a committee be appointed to prepare and report Standing Rules and Orders of proceeding for the House. Messrs. Muhlenberg, Tucker, Williamson, Ames, and Smith, of New Hampshire, were named.

Joseph Wheaton was appointed Sergeant-at-Arms; and Gifford Dalley, Doorkeeper, and Thomas Claxton, assistant Doorkeeper.

Resolved, That two Chaplains, of different denominations, be appointed to Congress for the present session, to interchange weekly.

Mr. Smith, from the joint committee appointed to wait on the President of the United States, reported that the President would make a communication to both Houses to-morrow at twelve o'clock, in the Senate Chamber.

A message from the Senate announced the agreement of that body to the resolution of this House for the appointment of two Chaplains, and had elected the Right Reverend Bishop White, on their part.

Tuesday, October 25.

The following members appeared, presented their credentials, and took their seats: Abraham Clark, Jonathan Dayton, and Aaron Kitchell, from New Jersey; and Israel Jacobs, from Pennsylvania.

The House proceeded to ballot for a Chaplain, when a majority of the votes were found in favor of the Rev. Mr. Blair.

A message being received from the Senate, stating that they were ready to receive the communication from the President of the United States, the Speaker, attended by the members of the House, withdrew to the Senate Chamber for the purpose of receiving the same.

On the return of the members, the Speaker laid before the House a copy of the Speech delivered by the President, (which will be found in the proceedings of the Senate.)

The Speech was committed to a Committee of the Whole to-morrow.

Wednesday, October 26.

President's Speech.

The House then went into Committee of the Whole, on the President's Speech, Mr. Muhlenberg in the chair.

The Speech being read, Mr. Vining moved a resolution, of which the following is the purport:

"Resolved, That it is the opinion of this committee that an Address should be presented to the President of the United States by the House of Representatives, in answer to his Speech, to congratulate him on the prosperous situation of the United States, expressive of the approbation of the House of the wise and prudent measures he has pursued during their recess, in the execution of the duties committed to his charge: promising speedy attention to the important and momentous objects recommended to their consideration, and expressing their approbation of the humane and effectual steps taken, under his direction, for the defence of the Western frontiers."

This resolution was objected to by Messrs. Laurance, Sedgwick, Smith, (of South Carolina,) and Livermore, upon the principle, that it expressed the sense of the House upon points which required further information and investigation before the House could, with propriety, determine. It was difficult to say, before proper documents were laid before the House, whether the measures adopted for the defence of the Western frontiers were the most prudent that could be adopted. It was impossible positively to assert, that the President, in the execution of the duties assigned him in carrying into effect the excise act, had done all for the best. Every member that spoke agreed in expressing his individual opinion, that no doubt the President had acted with his wonted prudence and wisdom in the execution of the trusts reposed in him; but also agreed that it was improper, indeed, it was no compliment paid to the President, to approve, before a formal examination.

In answer to these objections it was observed, that so far as circumstances had been made known to the members, relative to the steps taken by the President during the recess of the Federal Legislature, so far they claimed the approbation of the House; and that the opinion of the House was only meant to be given as far as they were informed. It was urged, that the answer of the House should be a candid expression of their feelings; feelings which the prosperous situation of the country undoubtedly called forth, and which the issue of the measures adopted could not fail to excite.

Several modifications were proposed to the resolution, which was finally agreed to, as follows:

"Resolved, That it is the opinion of this committee that a respectful Address ought to be presented by the House of Representatives to the President of the United States, in answer to his Speech to both Houses of Congress at the commencement of this session, containing assurances that this House will take into consideration the various and important matters recommended to their attention."

Mr. Madison, Mr. Laurance, and Mr. Smith, (of South Carolina,) were appointed a committee to prepare an Address, pursuant to the resolution.

Thursday, October 27.

Mr. Madison, from the committee appointed, reported an Address to the President of the United States, in answer to his Speech to both Houses of Congress; which was read, and ordered to be committed to a Committee of the whole House immediately.

Address to the President.

The House accordingly resolved itself into a Committee of the whole House on the said Address; and, after some time spent therein, Mr. Muhlenberg reported that the committee had had the said Address under consideration, and made no amendment thereto. Whereupon, it was

Resolved, unanimously, That this House doth agree to the said Address, in the words following:

Sir: In receiving your Address, at the opening of the present session, the House of Representatives have taken an ample share in the feelings inspired by the actual prosperity and flattering prospects of our country; and whilst, with becoming gratitude to Heaven, we ascribe this happiness to the true source from which it flows, we behold with an animating pleasure the degree in which the Constitution and laws of the United States have been instrumental in dispensing it.

It yields us particular satisfaction to learn the success with which the different important measures of the Government have proceeded; as well those specially provided for the last session, as those of preceding date. The safety of our Western frontier, in which the lives and repose of so many of our fellow-citizens are involved, being peculiarly interesting, your communications on that subject are proportionally grateful to us. The gallantry and good conduct of the militia, whose services were called for, is an honorable confirmation of the efficacy of that precious resource of a free State. And we anxiously wish that the consequences of their successful enterprises, and of the other proceedings to which you have referred, may leave the United States free to pursue the most benevolent policy towards the unhappy and deluded race of people in our neighborhood.

The amount of the population of the United States, determined by the returns of the census, is a source of the most pleasing reflections, whether it be viewed in relation to our national safety and respectability, or as a proof of that felicity in the situation of our country, which favors so unexampled a rapidity in its growth. Nor ought any to be insensible to the additional motive suggested by this important fact to perpetuate the free Government established with a wise administration of it, to a portion of the earth which promises such an increase of the number which is to enjoy those blessings within the limits of the United States.

We shall proceed with all the respect due to your patriotic recommendations, and with a deep sense of the trust committed to us by our fellow-citizens, to take into consideration the various and important matters falling within the present session; and, in discussing and deciding each, we shall feel every disposition, whilst we are pursuing the public welfare, which must be the supreme object with all our constituents, to accommodate, as far as possible, the means of attaining it to the sentiments and wishes of every part of them.

Mr. Madison, from the committee appointed to wait on the President of the United States, to know when and where it will be convenient for him to receive the Address of this House, in answer to his Speech to both Houses of Congress, reported that the committee had waited on the President, who signified to them that it would be convenient to him to receive the said Address at twelve o'clock to-morrow, at his own house.

Friday, October 28.

The Speaker, attended by the House, then withdrew to the house of the President of the United States, and there presented to him the Address of this House, in answer to his Speech to both Houses of Congress; to which the President made the following reply:

Gentlemen:

The pleasure I derive from an assurance of your attention to the objects I have recommended to you is doubled by your concurrence in the testimony I have borne to the prosperous condition of our public affairs.

Relying on the sanctions of your enlightened judgment, and on your patriotic aid, I shall be the more encouraged in all my endeavors for the public weal, and particularly in those which may be required on my part for executing the salutary measures I anticipate from your present deliberations.

G. WASHINGTON.

Monday, October 31.

Several other members, to wit: from Vermont, Nathaniel Niles and Israel Smith; from Maryland, Upton Sheridine; from North Carolina, William Barry Grove; and from South Carolina, Robert Barnwell; appeared, produced their credentials, and took their seats in the House.

Tuesday, November 1.

Anthony Wayne, member from Georgia, and Josiah Parker, from Virginia, took their seats this day.

Thursday, November 3.

Two other members, to wit, Richard Bland Lee and John Page, from Virginia, appeared, produced their credentials, and took their seats in the House.

Friday, November 4.

Another member, to wit, Egbert Benson, from New York, appeared, produced his credentials, and took his seat in the House.

Monday, November 7.

Several other members, to wit: from Pennsylvania, William Findlay; from North Carolina, John Baptist Ashe; and from Georgia, Abraham Baldwin; appeared, produced their credentials, and took their seats in the House.

Tuesday, November 8.

Another member, to wit, Andrew Gregg, from Pennsylvania, appeared, produced his credentials, and took his seat in the House.

John Torrey.

The House resolved itself into a Committee of the whole House on the Report of the Secretary of War on the petition of John Torrey, administrator of Major Joseph Torrey, deceased.

Mr. Ames objected to the motion for accepting the Report of the Secretary of War. He said, it must be apparent that he was placed by accident in a relation to the subject in debate, which he should not have adopted of choice. With very little knowledge of the parties and their connections, and the interests that would be involved by the decision, he seemed to be considered as standing sponsor for the petitioner. He might justify this active support of the petition, by assigning motives which were common to other gentlemen; but as they have continued silent, I will assign a reason for speaking, which is peculiar to myself. Nothing excites a person to a more fervid defence of his opinions, than the supposed discovery that they are misunderstood, and the force of the reasons on which he had formed them unduly estimated.

Congress promised half-pay to the officers who should continue in service to the end of the war. This was afterwards made a commutation for half-pay. Major Torrey continued in service till September, 1783, when he died. The question is, did he continue in service to the end of the war? The provisional articles of peace were signed on the 30th November, 1782; but they were to remain without force till terms of peace should be agreed upon between Great Britain and France. This took place on the 30th January, 1783, and the ratifications were exchanged on the 3d February, 1783, at Paris. The provisional treaty between Great Britain and America was then a treaty of peace, and according to the words of that treaty was concluded. Accordingly, on the 11th April, 1783, Congress by a proclamation made known those facts, and the stipulations made, in regard to the periods when hostilities should cease, by the contracting parties to the treaty. Hostilities did cease, and before the end of April, 1783, all America was in perfect peace. The late hostile nations shook hands, our vessels sailed in safety, and by sea and land reconciliation succeeded to hostility.

But did all this put an end to the war? The children in the street would answer this question: they would say, it is peace when it is not war. Of all facts, the most notorious seems to be the state of war; and it is the fact that the war was at an end, (and not any after resolve of Congress,) that the commutation of Major Torrey was made to hinge upon. When the meaning of a bargain is disputed, it is usual to search out the intention of the contracting parties when it was made. Supposing, instead of interpreting a resolve of Congress, any twelve of this body had to try a case between two private persons; suppose that a man had given his note of hand for a sum to be paid at the end of the war. Would twelve of this House, or would any jury in the country say that the war continued longer than hostilities? In private life, a man would think it touched his character to refuse paying his note in such case. Surely a government ought to perform its promise with as much delicacy and exactness. Congress did not promise the half-pay, and afterward the commutation, on the condition that a man should serve till they should think proper to say the war was at an end. He depended on the stubborn fact that it did end, which no resolution of Congress could change; and not on the refining opinion when the officers might safely be discharged—for that we see might be differently formed, according to the different views of policy and safety at the time. An officer having this promise of Congress, has a right to this commutation on the cessation of hostilities, in pursuance of the treaty. If this is disputed, the meaning of the words, "the end of the war," should be decided as it was understood at the time of the promise. Will any one believe that the 3d November, 1783, was the term, after the state of war and all the treaties which put an end to it, had been long passed? If any doubt still remains, writers on the law of nations should be consulted. For the officer may justly claim an execution of the promise according to law; that is the umpire between Government and the people. On appealing to the law of nations, we find that war is defined to be "the state in which a nation prosecutes its right by force." "Peace is opposed to the state of war—an accommodation is proposed and conditions agreed on, and thus peace puts an end to war." "When the powers at war agree to lay down their arms, the agreement is the treaty of peace." "The general and necessary effects of peace, are the reconciliation of enemies and the cessation of hostilities; it restores the two nations to their natural state." Would any jury in this country say, that the matter of fact and the principles of law were not in favor of the petition? Apply these maxims of law to the case. The provisional articles of November, 1782, were of themselves nothing, it is true, but they were to constitute the treaty of peace, whenever Great Britain and France had agreed on the terms of peace. As these two powers did agree on the 30th January, and ratified the terms on the 3d February, 1783, then the provisional articles, to use the very words of the preamble, did constitute the treaty of peace; it was then a concluded thing; and peace in fact took place in the several parts of the world on the appointed days.

It has been said, that the preliminaries were no more than a suspension of arms—that the state of war still continues, until a definitive treaty. To this it is answered, that preliminaries bind the national faith; if violated, the perjured faithless nation would kindle a new war. By the law of nations there is not such a distinction as that which is alleged, between preliminary and definitive treaties. Let the authorities for such a distinction be produced by those who make it. But they do not exist—a truce does not put an end to a war—a truce is, however, a suspension of war for a specified term. At the end of this term, the war begins again, of course, without any fresh declaration. But a suspension of hostilities for an indefinite period, is not a truce, but a peace; especially if it is added, that it is agreed upon by the belligerent nations in consequence of a settlement of their disputes, and if it happens in fact that the war is not revived. Those who make so much of a definitive treaty, and so light of preliminaries, should consider that, on their own system, the former is a kind of defeasance which annuls the latter. But when the definitive treaty is signed, the preliminaries, which before were liable to be annulled, now become of force, and the treaty, now become indefeasible, takes its date from the preliminaries. Though this mode of reasoning has not much weight on my mind, it ought to have some with those who have set up the distinction which it is adduced to overthrow.

These are the reasons on which I have formed my opinion that the war ended in fact in April, 1783, when hostilities ceased by mutual agreement of the powers at war. My opinion is supported by authority much more reputable than any I can give to it. The law courts in this country have decided it judicially; cases of captured vessels, and the question of interest on British debts, have produced decisions in every State of the Union, unless I am misinformed, that the war ended in March or April, 1783. The courts in England, and in every country where the war spread, on trials of property, have made similar decisions. Major Torrey died in September, 1783; shall this body decide against the settled rule of all the law courts?

It remains to remove some objections:

It is alleged, that Congress have by various resolves fixed the period of the war, and have declared that the 3d November, 1783, is the term. If they had declared that it should be computed from the end of the world, it would not alter the truth of the fact. After declarations ought not to be received to change their own promises. But a declaration, or a dozen of them, made for another purpose, and not to declare the meaning of the contract, cannot on any principle be received to interpret it. It is not necessary, however, to contend against those resolves of Congress. They are irreconcilable with the former engagement to Major Torrey. In undertaking to reconcile them, I feel that I impose a task on myself, which is made heavy by the prepossessions of many of my friends; I believe the minds of gentlemen are perfectly fair, and well-disposed to doing the petitioner justice. But I hope I shall not be thought to intend any offence, when I remark that certain ideas, such as that this claim is cut off by resolves of Congress, and that on allowing it, confusion would take place in the business of the public offices, were started with the discussion, and they have remained so woven into the texture of the debate, that I think it hard to unravel them. It was soon manifested that there was a general disposition to vote against the petition. This opportunity for debate seems to have been accorded as of grace, rather than as a means of removing any existing doubts of their own. Having adopted these opinions, this is rather a form of refusal than a mode of inquiring; and it seems to have been chosen with every circumstance of decency, and with all possible steadfastness of purpose. Yet I will proceed to state, that the point whether the war was at an end when hostilities ended in April, 1783, being already considered fully, we are to look for other reasons than such as relate to the commutation, to explain the resolves of Congress which continued the service of the officers beyond the end of the war, and as late as November, 1783. A mistake seems to have crept in here. It seems to be supposed that the officers were engaged to serve to the end of the war, just long enough to secure their commutation. But the commutation depended on one thing—the term of their service on another. The former was their right at the end of the war; but they were to remain in service till dismissed, unless they should think fit sooner to resign. They held their commissions during the pleasure of Congress. Though when the war ended they had a right to the commutation, they had no right to say their service was at an end. They did not choose to resign: Congress, for wise reasons, did not choose to dismiss them. A foreign army was still in New York. They were sent home on furlough, but drawing pay, and liable to be called into the field. Congress, in their resolves, did not say that it was not peace, but in effect that it was unsafe to disarm. Gentlemen are not well agreed among themselves as to the end of the war. Some fix it at the definitive treaty of September 3, 1783; others at November 3. Their conclusions agree as illy with their principles; for if the definitive treaty put an end to the war, how can the same gentlemen say that the war was kept alive, on the journals of Congress, till November, 1783? Here, then, were Peace and War subsisting quietly together during two months.

The fears of making confusion by opening a door to many applications, seem to be groundless. A man must have died between the end of hostilities and November, 1783, to place a claim on the like footing. The living have had their commutations; they cannot come: and no other officer died in that period, as far as I can learn. I have inquired, and cannot find at the office of the Secretary of War any precedent which militates with this claim, or any reason to suppose that any similar one will be offered. The case is a new one; it stands alone, and probably ever will, and it must be decided on its own merits. Believing the fact to be indisputable that Major Torrey served to the end of the war, confiding in the principles of the law of nations, and the settled decisions of the Judicial Courts, I have endeavored to explain my ideas with perspicuity, and to impress them with force. I have said more than questions touching an individual will often be found to merit; but when public principles are construed to the prejudice of private rights, the debate cannot be treated too seriously.

Mr. Boudinot said, he differed in opinion from the gentleman in his construction of the business. He did not coincide in the idea that the decision of the present question should be on a strictly judicial principle. The petition is founded on certain resolutions and laws of Congress; and as there are certain established rules which have been observed in settling with every other officer similarly circumstanced, Congress cannot now with propriety break through those rules; to these they ought to adhere, till by the decision of some judicial court it shall appear that they are contrary to the rules of justice. [Here Mr. Ames requested Mr. Boudinot to point out the rules to which he referred.] Mr. B. referred to the report now under consideration, which was founded on a resolution of Congress, that the time for which the army was engaged should expire in November, 1783. This has been made a rule in all the settlements with the officers of the army.

The terms of the contract, between the officers and the United States, depended, he said, on the decision of the sovereign power; that was authorized alone to determine when the war should cease. That power was vested in the then existing Congress, who, although they entered into provisional articles in November, 1783, did not, however, think proper immediately to disband their armies or put an end to the war, as it was yet uncertain whether those provisional articles would be ratified by Great Britain, or a treaty of peace concluded between Great Britain and France; a circumstance which was necessary before those articles could be definitively binding. It was only when the definitive treaty was made, that Congress determined the period of the war. The army, when finally disbanded and paid up to that day, acknowledged, by accepting their pay, that it was then only the war ended; and, as far as was in their power, assented to the principle which he maintained, that the provisional articles had not before put an end to the war. Suppose that, on the arrival of the definitive treaty, Congress had not agreed to the terms, would the war have then been considered as at an end? Would not Congress have been in the same situation as before the signing of the provisional articles? It was necessary that Congress should, by a definitive act, determine when the war ceased. Congress had passed such an act; and the House at present cannot with propriety enter into a resolution to alter the period. The argument of inconvenience ought also to have some weight with the House; for if any alteration were now to be made in the law, it must have a retrospect to all the widows and children of deceased officers, who have received half pay for years past. Besides, many officers who have not hitherto considered themselves as entitled to half pay, would, in consequence of such an alteration, have a right to apply for it.

Mr. Laurance said, he doubted not the gentleman who supported the petition was fully satisfied as to the justice of the claim which he advocated with so much ardor; he begged leave to state his opinion, however, on the subject, in which he should differ from that gentleman.

The contract with the officers of the late army was, that those should be entitled to certain benefits who served to the end of the war. But Major Torrey was not thus circumstanced, as he died previous to the period when the war ceased, and left neither widow nor orphan to receive the benefit of the provisions allowed by law; his case is not contemplated by any existing resolution of Congress.

It is well known that hostilities ceased at the time of publishing the provisional articles which formed the basis for the treaty of peace; but can any man say that every soldier had a right on that event to demand a discharge? Surely not. The provisional articles had the peace in contemplation, but the army was not to be discharged till the articles of the definitive treaty were ratified by the belligerent powers. The army of the United States was, therefore, only furloughed, and Congress retained the power of recalling them into service; and had the officers and soldiers been recalled from their furloughs to take the field, it would have been a continuance of the same war; but if the definitive treaty had been signed, and hostilities had commenced the very next day, it would have been a new war, and would have been prosecuted on entirely new principles. The second article of the provisional treaty looks forward to a future period for a conclusion of the war; and he inferred, that the definitive articles being ratified, and the ratifications exchanged, alone constituted a termination of the war. Mr. L. added some observations on the legal ideas of Mr. Ames, in which he also differed from that gentleman; and concluded by expressing his approbation of the Report of the Secretary of War.

Mr. Ames's remarks were further combated by Mr. Williamson, Mr. Dayton, Mr. Hillhouse, Mr. Wadsworth, Mr. Clark, and Mr. White.

Mr. Wayne was opposed to the report, and stated certain particulars to show that the army was not furloughed by Congress because it was apprehended there would be any further demand for their services, but because it was inconvenient to give them an absolute discharge at that period.

The motion for accepting the Secretary's Report was carried by a large majority.

Wednesday, November 9.

Two other members, to wit: from Maryland, William Vans Murray; and from South Carolina, Thomas Sumter; appeared, produced their credentials, and took their seats in the House.

The Speaker laid before the House a letter from the Governor of Maryland, enclosing a letter to him from William Pinkney, a member returned to serve in this House for the said State, containing his resignation of that appointment; also a return of John Francis Mercer, elected a member to serve in this House, in the room of the said William Pinkney: which were read, and ordered to be referred to the standing Committee of Elections.

Thursday, November 10.

The Census.

The House again resolved itself into a Committee of the whole House on the Schedule of the Enumeration of the Inhabitants of the United States.

Mr. Laurance had previously moved, that until the next enumeration the number of Representatives should be one for every thirty thousand persons.

Mr. Dayton moved to strike out "thirty," before "thousand." This amendment was under consideration.

Mr. Gerry observed, that in all the decisions of the Legislature, we ought to follow as far as possible the opinion of the great body of the people. If this opinion should be found to be against the ratio of thirty thousand, the amendment ought to be adopted; but if we refer to the amendments, proposed by the Conventions to the constitution, we shall find that five States are in favor of one Representative to every thirty thousand persons, till the number should amount to two hundred. None of the propositions now moved as amendments to the motion of the gentleman from New York, amount to that number. Several others of the Conventions were of opinion that the representation was too small to secure the liberties of this country. This Government, said he, is a Government of representation; the people may control their Representatives, but their influence is small in respect to the Senate and the Executive, and still less over the officers of Government. On what then do the people depend for checking encroachments, or preventing abuses? On their Representatives? If these should be too few, or if they should fail them, they never can redress their grievances without having recourse to violence. If the number is small, a majority may be the more easily corrupted. On the other hand, too large a number will be attended with difficulties; a medium then is most eligible. An adequate number is absolutely necessary; and to show that one to thirty thousand would not produce more than an adequate number, he referred to the ratio of representation in England and France, in which there was a greater proportion of Representatives than in the Legislature of the United States.

He then adverted to the objection arising from the additional expense; but, he observed, after Congress shall have passed a few more of the most important acts, it is not probable that the public business will in future require that the sessions should be for more than four months annually; this would reduce the expense greatly, in the first instance; and, agreeably to a calculation, an addition of forty-seven members to the present number, would make the aggregate expense but about one-eighteenth part more than at present, supposing the sessions to be four months long. But he considered the objection on account of the expense as merely speculative.

Although Congress is not positively bound by the constitution to give one member for every thirty thousand inhabitants, yet he would ask, whether the citizens of the United States did not expect that this ratio would be adopted? and whether they would not consider it as an abuse of power, if Congress, instead of one to thirty thousand, should settle the representation at one to forty thousand? Eight States have already adopted the first article of the proposed amendments to the constitution: and if the House should either settle the number of the Representative body, as it now stands, or reduce it, or establish it at one hundred, perhaps they might, before the end of the session, be obliged to repeal their act—as they would be bound by the amendment, as soon as it is ratified by a sufficient number of States. If gentlemen thought it probable that the proposed amendment would be ratified by the several States, they ought already to consider it as a rule for their conduct, and be restrained by it, from giving less than one Representative for thirty thousand inhabitants. After the representation amounts to one hundred, Congress will, no doubt, have a right to fix it there, until it is increased by the ratio of one to forty thousand: but that is a power which, he presumed, Congress will not exercise; but that they then will establish some ratio, by which the increase of representation shall keep pace with the increase of population, until the House consists of two hundred members.

Mr. Boudinot was convinced of the propriety of striking out the word "thirty." The House ought to consider what would be an adequate number for doing the business of the Union; and that number ought not to be exceeded, except to answer some very valuable purpose. Business would proceed with difficulty, if the representation was so numerous as it would become by the ratio of one to thirty thousand. The present representation of the United States is in a ratio very different from that of one to thirty thousand; and yet he thought it fully adequate. From a rough calculation, the ratio of thirty thousand would produce one hundred and thirteen members; thirty-five thousand would give ninety-seven; and forty thousand would produce eighty-one. If the number once settled was to rest there, he would not be over anxious to oppose the increase; but if gentlemen would take into view the increase consequent on the next enumeration, they would find that the number will by far exceed the due bounds.

He thought the people of the United States would be duly represented, and to their entire satisfaction, if the ratio was set higher than thirty thousand; nor could he imagine that such an exact proportion, between the Representatives and the represented, was at all requisite to secure their liberties, or to do the necessary business of Government. This indeed might be the case, if the power vested in Congress was proportionate to their number; but, since the House would possess the same powers, whether it consisted of a greater or a smaller number, he thought the people equally secure in either case. The ratio of thirty-five thousand, which would produce ninety-seven members, would, in his opinion, be a very proper one. If, however, the people should think otherwise, they had it in their power to correct the mistake, by ratifying the proposed amendment. Their not having as yet ratified it, was to him an argument that they thought the ratio too low; or, at least, that they considered the question as doubtful. Some of the States, he observed, have postponed the consideration of the amendment; and eight only have as yet agreed to it. On the whole, the House might safely adopt the ratio of one to thirty-five thousand; for that the increasing population of the United States would ever supply a representation sufficiently numerous to answer every good purpose.

Mr. Clark observed, that his objection was not merely on account of the pay of the members, but an increase in the representation would bring an additional expense on the people, by increasing the number of public officers; as almost every man would wish to see his friend provided for. The liberties of America could be in no danger from the present ratio of representation. The doors of the House are open, and the people know what their Representatives are doing.

Mr. Steele was in favor of the motion for striking out thirty. In discussing the important subject before the committee, he observed that there were two inquiries to be attended to: What is the proper number to constitute a Representative body for the United States, and what ratio will leave the fewest fractions in the respective States? One member to thirty thousand, he conceived, would give too numerous a representation. According to the present number of inhabitants, it will almost double the present number; it will divide and diminish the responsibility, make the House too unwieldy, retard public business, and increase the public expenses unnecessarily. An adequate representation, he thought, would be comprised within a much smaller number.

Gentlemen have called our attention to the House of Commons of Great Britain, and the National Assembly of France; but God forbid that we should draw our precedents from such examples as may be cited from European representation.

He was opposed to thirty thousand as the ratio: it would, in fractions, throughout the United States, leave above three hundred and sixty-nine thousand citizens unrepresented. Thirty-five thousand he thought the most eligible number, as it would leave the fewest fractions.

Mr. Laurance agreed that an adequate number was the great object to be attended to; but he contended that the original motion would give this number more completely than a larger ratio: and it ought to be considered, that, before the next enumeration, it will not be probably more than one to fifty thousand. As to the increase of expense, he observed that the great objects being accomplished, the future sessions will be short; besides which, the compensation of the members may be diminished. But he considered a necessary increase in the expense to be fully counterbalanced by affording greater security to the liberties of the people. The firmness of a government depends on a strong Executive; but this Executive should be founded on a broad bottom; and the broader the basis, the more secure is the public freedom under a vigorous Executive.

The existence of the Union may depend on the fullness of the representation. The inequality in the proportional increase of the number of inhabitants in different States, ought also to be taken into consideration; for it is very probable that in a short time, while some of the smaller States had a Representative for every thirty thousand, others would not have one to forty thousand. He was governed by general principles, and not by any calculations of fractional numbers: the constitution contemplates the ratio he had proposed, and therefore he hoped the motion for striking out would not obtain.

Mr. Goodhue observed, that the situation and circumstances of the Government of the United States are so different from those of France or Great Britain, that no parallel could be drawn respecting them. Nor is there an absolute similarity between this Government and those of the State Governments. The objects of legislation which come under the cognizance of Congress, are but few compared with those which engage the British House of Commons and the National Assembly of France. A much larger representation for them, and in our State Legislatures, is therefore more proper, than is necessary for us in the General Government. He doubted the opinion that a large representation was less liable to corruption than a small one: some facts appear to confirm the former sentiment. He did not consider the expense as a material objection, if an increase of the number be necessary to doing more ample justice, or for the greater security of the liberties of the people; but, as he thought this was by no means the case, he was in favor of striking out "thirty," in order to insert a larger number.

Mr. Barnwell agreed with the gentleman last up. He should vote for striking out "thirty," in order to substitute the largest number that had been mentioned. Mr. B. entered into an abstract and philosophical discussion of the principle of representation in Government. The leading sentiment was, that a large proportion of Representatives is not necessary to obtain the best objects of legislation, in expressing the will of the people, or to secure the liberties of the constituent body. The great point, he observed, was, to combine the greatest portion of honesty with a due degree of activity. That number which would comprise a due proportion of these, would be competent to all the purposes of legislation, whether the number for which it legislates is ten thousand, or five hundred thousand. On this principle, he was decidedly against a large number, and in favor of a small one. Adverting to the British House of Commons and the National Assembly of France, with respect to the former, he said, their corruption is, in a great degree, owing to their numbers: as to the latter, he observed, that the National Assembly had acted, in his opinion, politically and wisely. They set out with a large representation, in conformity to the sentiments of the people at the moment; but, on experience, finding the number too great, they have reduced it from twelve hundred to about two hundred and fifty. He believed that the general sense of the people was against a large representation in Congress; the inconveniences experienced from numerous bodies in the State Legislatures have led several of the States to lessen the number. He instanced Georgia, South Carolina, and Pennsylvania.

Mr. Baldwin was opposed to the motion. One Representative for thirty thousand appeared to him by no means a great representation. The opinion that, of late, had been so often advanced from the press, and in public discussion, for reducing the Representative branch in Government to a small number, he held to be full of dangerous error. He was sensible that the terms great and small were so merely relative in their signification, that it was difficult precisely to understand each other in the use of them. Perhaps they may most properly, both of them, be considered as extremes. No doubt representation, which of late seems to be used as the character of Republican Government, is a great improvement upon Democracy, or legislation by the whole body of the people. He could conceive that a representation might be so large as to partake of the evils of assembling the whole body of the people; but it was a very improbable and not a dangerous extreme: the other extreme was full of danger. These observations acquire much force, when applied particularly to the Governments of this country: enfeeble the representative part of them, and you sap the very principles of life. They stand on a different basis from the Governments which have gone before them, and may justly be said to be new experiments in government; time, as yet, has scarcely given room to judge of the probable issue; but this we may pronounce with much certainty—Let the principles of representation languish, and they have no chance of success.

It had not been found practicable to ground representation in the Federal Constitution upon any other principle than that of numbers; but extent of territory is unquestionably one of the natural principles on which it rests, and should if possible be regarded. One for thirty-four or thirty-five thousand may be deemed a proper representation in the Kingdom of France, or of Great Britain. The four millions which compose the United States, compactly settled where there was great sameness in the country, and pretty equally distant from a common centre, would be properly represented by a smaller number than in their present sparse settlement. But still further: the settlement of the United States is a fillet stretched along the sea-coast for seventeen hundred miles, comprehending as great a variety of climate and interests as one of the other quarters of the globe. It is difficult to conceive of a situation which calls for a greater extension of the principle of representation.

It has been said, that one for thirty thousand will make too large and unwieldy a body. He was sensible that was a point that did not admit of being determined by any conclusive reasoning; it was a mere matter of opinion; sound judgment only is to be used, time and experience will come on and confirm or correct the opinion. In such a case, it is wise to inquire how this has been judged of by others who have had a Representative body. In France, one thousand two hundred was not thought too great a representation in forming their National Assembly; and the number established by their new constitution for their stated Legislature was not two hundred and fifty, as the member last up had stated, but, if he had not been misinformed by the publications in this country, it was nearly seven hundred and fifty.

In the Kingdom of Great Britain, five hundred is not thought too great a representation: and can one hundred and thirteen, which is the greatest number contended for, be considered in this country as a huge and impracticable mass of representation?

It had ever appeared to him to be among the strongest marks of our youth and inexperience, that we grow wise too suddenly. He was afraid this instantaneous wisdom which sprung up so at once, and set at nought, or removed to the extreme of absurdity and folly, the deliberate and tried opinions of the most profound and enlightened among men, in circumstances peculiarly favorable to honest decision, will itself be left by time on that extreme.

The Federal Government, it must be admitted, is in fact pretty highly seasoned with prerogative; practice has already evinced the necessity, in many instances, of increasing it, by devolving much of the Legislative power upon the Executive Department, arising from the difficulty of making particular provisions and details in our laws, and accommodating them to the various interests of so extensive a country.

The other branch of the Legislature has many traits of a perpetual—at least of a very solid constituent part of the Government. He did not mention these as imperfections in the Government; they are perfections, if the other parts can be in due proportion: but it is surely a sound reason against taking positive measures at this time to diminish the Representative branch. For his own part, he was not well satisfied as to the intention. If there is any reason to apprehend that the Government will depart from the point on which it was first placed, he could scarcely suppose that any one could be honestly alarmed with the fear that the departure would be towards Democracy. He concluded, by expressing his hopes that the representation to the next Congress would be fixed at one for thirty thousand, as it had hitherto been, and that the motion for striking out would not prevail.

Friday, November 11.

John W. Kittera, from Pennsylvania, appeared, produced his credentials, and took his seat in the House to-day.

Monday, November 14.

A petition of James Jackson, of the State of Georgia, was presented to the House and read, complaining of the undue election and return of Anthony Wayne, one of the members returned to serve in this House for the said State.

Ratio of Representation.

The House again resolved itself into a Committee of the whole House on the Schedule of the Enumeration of the Inhabitants of the United States.

Mr. Findlay declared himself to be in favor of one Representative for every thirty thousand persons. The opinion of the people should be the guide of the committee; that opinion, he conceived, to be in favor of the ratio he had mentioned.

The representation ought as nearly as possible to express not only the will, but to participate in the wishes and interests of the people. A large representation embraces these interests more fully, and is more competent to giving and receiving information. The objects of legislation are such as come home to the doors, to the feelings of every man; the Government ought therefore to secure the confidence of the people by a large representation. The expense he considered as trifling compared to the benefits—and the people expect and are willing to pay for being well governed, and having their liberties secured. An increased representation is an additional security against corruption. As to delays occasioned by a numerous body, he observed that the Representatives were chosen to deliberate and to mature every subject before decision; he instanced the advantages derived from the numerous representations in France and in Ireland; the former had framed a constitution in two years for twenty-six millions of citizens, and provided for securing the liberties of their country—and the latter had proved a successful barrier against the encroachments of the arbitrary power of England. He concluded, by asserting that the voice of the people was in favor of the amendment proposed to the constitution, which would give one Representative to every thirty thousand persons.

Mr. Giles said this subject had struck him in two points of view: whether Congress are not precluded from exercising any discretion on the subject? and whether, if they are not, it is expedient for them to exercise this discretion at this time? The ratio of representation is a constitutional, and not a Legislative act. He referred to the constitution, in which it is said that there shall be one Representative to every State; and, secondly, that until the enumeration, the number should be as therein appointed to each State. After the enumeration, the number is mentioned below which it shall not be placed; but there is a negative power to increase the ratio, and from this negative power, a positive discretionary power is inferred. But, he observed that Congress had precluded itself from a right to exercise this discretionary power, by sending out to the several State Legislatures an amendment on this very subject. This amendment he considered in a serious point of view; and had this idea been attended to at the commencement of the discussion, he conceived that it would have prevented the opinion from being brought forward whether it was expedient that any change in the ratio of the representation should take place. The idea of one to thirty thousand, he considered as fully settled in the minds of the people; and a change on the part of the Government would indicate a changeable disposition, and a mutability of counsels, which is but another name for weakness.

Mr. G. then took a view of the objects of legislation to the State Assemblies, and of those of the General Government. In the former, above one thousand persons are employed, though their attention is confined to their internal police. Those of the General Government, on the other hand, are on the great objects of the whole finance of the Union, a sum of more than eighty millions of dollars, &c., &c.

It is said that we shall want abilities, but I should be sorry if a representation of ten times the present number of this House should comprise the abilities of a single State.

He assigned different causes than numbers, for the corruption in the British House of Commons; among these were the frequent mortgages of the funds, and the immense appropriations at the disposal of the Executive, the mode of their elections, &c. A large number is not so easily corrupted as a small body.

An inequality of circumstances, he then observed, produces revolutions in Government, from Democracy to Aristocracy and Monarchy. Great wealth produces a desire of distinctions, rank, and titles. The revolutions in property in this country have created a prodigious inequality of circumstances. Government has contributed to this inequality; the Bank of the United States is a most important machine in promoting the objects of this moneyed interest. This bank will be the most powerful engine to corrupt this House. Some of the members are directors of this institution; and it will only be by increasing the representation that an adequate barrier can be opposed to this moneyed interest. He next adverted to certain ideas which he said had been disseminated through the United States; and here he took occasion to observe, that the Legislature ought to express some public disapprobation of these opinions. The strong Executive of this Government ought to be balanced by a full representation in this House. He hoped the motion to strike out thirty thousand would not obtain.

Mr. Boudinot closed the debate of this day by a few remarks, reinforcing his former observations in favor of an increased ratio.

Tuesday, November 15.

Ratio of Representation.

The House again resolved itself into a committee of the whole House on the Schedule of the Enumeration of the Inhabitants of the United States.

Mr. Page addressed the Chair as follows:

Mr. Chairman: I can no longer refrain from expressing my sentiments respecting the question before the committee; not only because I wish if possible to remove the error which I think several members, for whom I have the highest respect, have fallen into, but because I feel myself more interested in the question than I ever was in any one I have had to decide on.

Sir, it gave me pain to find those worthy members calculating and coldly applying the rules of arithmetic to a subject beyond the power of numbers to express the degree of its importance to their fellow-citizens. I was distressed, sir, to find that, in their honest zeal for securing order, despatch of business, and dignity in respectability of members in the General Legislature, they used arguments which have been applied in other countries to the establishment of insolent aristocracies—in some, tyrannical despotisms—and in others, kings; those countries which were most on their guard with a semblance of a free Government.

Sir, the errors I wish to correct are these. They think that because it is proposed, by a proposed amendment to the constitution, to authorize them to interfere in the business of ascertaining and fixing the ratio of representation to the population of the States, that Congress ought, without any hesitation, to enter on that business; but I humbly conceive that Congress, as this is a delicate question in which their own weight and importance must unite with the weight and substantial interest of their constituents, ought to listen to the suggestions of delicacy, and leave its discussion to a disinterested convention of the States. I say it appears to me no small error to quit the plain path of legislation, marked out for us by the constitution, needlessly to wander into the field of political speculation respecting its supposed defects.

Let me, therefore, advise to leave the restriction of the numbers of members of this House to the people, or to some future Congress, which can see more plainly than can now be descried, the evils of a too numerous representation. By so doing, we shall avoid, if not an improper measure, at least a rash step—at least we shall stand clear of a charge of indelicacy, and deprive our enemies of the triumph they expected in the completion of their predictions, that Congress would never propose any amendments to the constitution but such as would be subservient to their own views and aggrandizement. Let us not give the enemies of our new Government cause to exult, and its friends to sigh and mourn. Let us not give our friends occasion to repeat what many have said, that so many of our citizens have been led away by theoretical writers on government, as to render it problematical whether the American States are not at this time as much indebted to the National Assembly for its remains of Republican principles, as France was to Congress, in 1776, for their first ideas of that liberty which they now enjoy. Let us not, in this moment of general exultation of the friends to the rights of man, take a step which may damp their joy, and lead them to fear that Americans, who were foremost in the glorious career of liberty, have stopped short.

But, not to take up the precious time of this House with relations of facts to show what was and is the opinion of our fellow-citizens on this interesting subject, I will only state a few arguments which have weight with me as being in themselves evident truths, viz: Our constitution being framed by the people, and introduced to us in their name, and Congress being the creatures of their will, spoken into existence by the word of their power, for Congress to lessen their weight, to diminish their importance, and to exclude them from as full a share in their own Government as can be consistent with the nature of it, and indeed from that share which they claim, must be impolitic and dangerous.

But, granting that the people wished not a greater share in the General Government than is proposed by the amendment, as it is impossible, in a country like the United States, that one man can be sufficiently informed of the opinions, wishes, and real interests of thirty-five thousand of his fellow-citizens, and therefore laws might be enacted contrary to the opinions, wishes, and interests of the people, in which they might nevertheless acquiesce, sacrificing their interests for the sake of peace and quiet to the wills of their Representatives, one thirty-five-thousandth part of their own number, what friend to his country would wish to see such a dangerous influence on the one hand, and such a blind submission on the other? How long could an enlightened people remain in such a state of insensibility and torpor? And what might not be the consequence of their awakening from their lethargy? If not an expensive revolution, an expensive repeal of laws. And here I will remark, that the smallest number of Legislators, and they, too, well selected for their wisdom and respectability, if unacquainted with their constituents, might pass well-framed laws, founded on the wisdom of other countries, and yet find them disagreeable to their constituents, and be under a necessity of repealing them; but this could not be the case, if the people had in that Legislature a sufficient number of Representatives on whose fidelity, attachment, and disinterestedness they could rely. This, sir, is a truth worthy of our attention—an ignorance of which, or inattention thereto, I suspect has been the occasion of much political evil in the world. Happily for France, the people had such a number of Representatives in the National Assembly as could engage their feeling, inform their judgment, attach their interest, and establish their confidence in their fidelity and disinterestedness; had that number been much smaller, it is probable France would never have been delivered from oppression by their exertions.

I know, sir, that many friends of our constitution thought that the convention did not pay a sufficient attention to the interests of their constituents, when they restrained them from having more than one Representative for every thirty thousand citizens. I know that there is a report that the people are indebted to their President, even for this share in their Government; and I believe, sir, if this report be true, that whatever has been so justly said of him, as compared to Fabius, to Hannibal, to Alexander, may be forgotten, when this instance of his wisdom, disinterestedness, and attachment to the interests of his fellow-citizens, will be more and more known and applauded, and be for ever engraved on the hearts of their posterity. Shall we, then, Mr. Chairman, the direct Representatives of the people, be less attentive to their interest, and that too respecting their share in the deliberations of their own House of Representatives, than the President of their convention was? I trust not.

I will not pretend to say, however, whether in an Assembly where attempts are frequently made to carry into effect the projects of monarchical or aristocratical juntos, the virtuous struggles of patriotic members may not produce mob-like disorders; but in an Assembly like Congress, where I should suppose no such question can be agitated; none which may not be discussed with temper and decency, such disorder need not be apprehended. I should suppose there would be less clanger of animosities and disorderly debates in Congress, amongst twelve hundred members, than in the British Parliament, if it consisted but of one hundred. Where we have all but one and the same great object in view, the happiness of our country, (not the interests of a particular body of men born with privileges insulting to the feelings and rights of freemen, nor the whims of an individual, born to trample on his fellow-creatures,) we can have no cause to be dissatisfied with one another.

Surely, sir, unless these gentlemen suppose the members of Congress void of sense, or of every idea of decency and propriety, they cannot suppose that even five hundred members would not be easily restrained within the bounds of order.

Mr. Clark said, he did not rise to trouble the House with a lengthy discourse, for he had always believed that long speeches answer no valuable purpose. He meant only to offer a few remarks on what had been said in opposition to his former observations, and he hoped that, although the gentlemen contend for the ratio of 30,000 as the only basis whereon to found the liberties of the people, he should not be stigmatized with the name of an aristocrat for voting in favor of a large ratio. Hitherto he had not borne that character, and he could not suppose himself yet infected, unless he had caught the disorder since he became a member of the present House. Much has been said about the influence of the bank, and that bank directors are members of the House of Representatives. The bank (said he) is public property, and therefore he could not see the force of the gentleman's arguments respecting the dangerous influence of that institution, unless it was that he was displeased at the distribution of the shares, so much of the stock being held at New York and to the eastward, and so little at Conococheague. In the same predicament he viewed the other objections respecting the influence of speculators; for he did not know that any members of the House were speculators, neither could he see any danger from bribery.

In reply to Mr. Findlay's observation, that more wisdom would be brought into the House by increasing the ratio, he asked whether this would not also bring in more folly? For the probability is, that the ratio of both wisdom and folly will increase with the increase of numbers, and likewise of honesty and dishonesty; and with respect to the smallness of the district, or that it was safer for a small number to send a member than a greater, he was of a different opinion, as he believed that if ever the practice of bribery should come into play in America, it would be easier for a Representative to purchase a small district than a large one. If ever the liberties of the people are endangered, it will not be by the smallness of the representation, but by the corruption of electors and elections. This is the door which Congress should guard in the strictest manner, and that will secure the people against corruption in the House.

A gentleman from Georgia has observed, that the disposition of a great many millions of dollars has been in the hands of a quorum of this House, of whom it requires only seventeen to form a majority. On this Mr. C. observed, that the old Congress, which was composed of a much smaller number, were intrusted with the disposal of larger sums, although there were sometimes only two members from the largest State, Virginia, and no complaints were heard of their conduct.

But there is an argument which ought to have weight in the present question. The Senate, although a much smaller body than this House, are fully competent to judge of our proceedings, and of the safety of the country. Indeed, (said Mr. C.,) it appears very evident to me that we are not in want of a larger number in the House of Representatives to debate any question, if it be considered how much has already been said on the subject now before us.

Mr. Vining expressed much surprise that the subject, which to him appeared perfectly definable, should have occasioned the debate to travel so widely from the line marked out by the constitution. The pendulum seems to vibrate between the numbers 81, 96, and 113; and should that pendulum rest on any one of them in preference to the others, he could not suppose that it would affect the liberties of America. Why, therefore, all this extraneous argument about a point of so easy decision? We are sent here to administer the Government, the first principles of which are already fixed, so that neither branch can encroach on the other. The Senate, the House of Representatives, the President, have each defined powers; and whilst those remain, I shall always believe the liberties of America are invulnerable.

Under this impression, Mr. Chairman, I shall vote for striking out 30,000, in order to accommodate the question to a medium. But I shall do this on different principles from some other gentlemen; notwithstanding, I at the same time confess that the ratification of the first amendment to the constitution ought to govern us in deciding this question. The spirit of the amendment appears to me clearly to imply that we should not suffer the number of Representatives to exceed one for 30,000. I am here, not as a person who shall exercise discretionary opinions, but judge by the letter of the constitution. And in this case we may increase the number, but we cannot make it less after the enumeration. In the mean time, until that enumeration is complete, the representation remains as it has been hitherto, which I believe may be about one member to every 40,000 or 41,000.

If we go upon theory only, I would enlarge the representation to its greatest extent, and hand down the principle to futurity, in letters of gold, that a very great representation—that Democracy is the very best Government that can possibly be devised, provided it were practicable to give it stability. Next to a government as free as theory could extend, we have the freest in the world—a Government of representation, which will increase with the population of the country, and the ten new States will always preserve an equilibrium; but if you increase it to an extreme, you may render it tumultuous, although it may be safe.

I cannot, however, see the propriety of comparing this to the Government of Great Britain, although that is called a Government of Representation, consisting of two Houses of Parliament, one of which is elective, the Lords are hereditary, and the King can do no wrong; and it has hitherto been, I believe, the next best Government, after our own, in the world. And yet we know with how much reluctance Ireland obtained a participation of the trade and commerce of Great Britain; although a Flood bellowed forth with the voice of liberty like a Demosthenes, still nothing could induce the British Ministry to give way, until the volunteers effected it. And have we not the volunteers, sir, in this country to protect our rights? Yes, sir, the American volunteers are perfectly competent to this service.

I am under no apprehensions from the stockholders of the bank, or the speculators in the funds; for it is their interest to have a wise and good representation. The people who are employed in the more simple path of agriculture, removed at a great distance, are not more interested in the security of the Government than the more informed stockholder. As an example of the discernment of the great commercial people of London and Bristol, I need only mention their choice of a Fox and a Burke, for until a late day Mr. Burke was the champion of the people and the friend of liberty.

If our Senate should take any unwarrantable stride towards aristocracy, have we not the power to check them? No President can very well attempt it at any time hereafter; and we are perfectly secure in the present time from all suspicion of corruption.

Mr. Hillhouse said he had ever been a friend to a Republican form of Government, and God forbid, that he should ever give his vote for any measure that should endanger the liberties of his country. He was in favor of an energetic government, as that alone can secure the blessings of liberty. As to the dread of corruption in this House, which some gentlemen appeared to entertain, he thought there was no foundation for such an apprehension; at least as the idea refers to one or two hundred Representatives—two hundred he contended, were as easily corrupted as one. But the corruption contemplated was a mere matter of opinion; no facts, he presumed, existed in this country to justify a positive assertion; and as to foreign countries, it seems to be conceded that a larger number than any that has been mentioned is susceptible of undue influence. He then adverted to the restrictions on the President of the United States, and the Senate, in respect to the means of corrupting the Legislature. The constitution has also made provision to secure the independence of the members, &c. He then urged some difficulties which would be occasioned by a small ratio. He observed that the population of some of the States is nearly stationary: if a small ratio is now established, the consequence will be, when it is augmented, that the representation of those States must be diminished. This would be a measure that would be greatly disliked. With respect to the proposed amendment, he thought it was entirely out of the question, till it was ratified by three-fourths of the States. A very numerous representation would tend to weaken, if not destroy the State Governments, and, in the issue, would destroy the General Government. For, said he, they mutually depend on each other for support.

Mr. Kitchell was in favor of a numerous representation. He thought the amendment proposed to the constitution ought to be the guide to the House on this occasion. He did not draw his ideas of what should constitute a proper representation, from the examples cited from foreign countries; nor was he actuated by an apprehension of corruption, as more applicable to a small number than to a large one; but when he considered the various objects, views, denominations, professions, callings and interests of the citizens of the United States, he was fully convinced that a large representation was necessary to embrace the wishes and answer the expectations of the people. He should, therefore, vote against the motion for striking out thirty thousand.

Mr. Gerry took a general survey of the arguments against the proposed ratio of one to thirty thousand. In noticing the objection from the instability of the State Legislatures, he said it was not owing to their numbers, but to the mode in which they are elected. Were the Senates and Executives of the several States chosen as those of the General Government, there would have been as much stability and consistency in their transactions, as in those of the Government of the Union. A gentleman had said that the proposed amendments to the constitution had been adopted with reluctance by some of the States which had accepted them. He called on the gentleman to produce his authorities for this assertion. A relative proportion between the members of the House and the Senate had been suggested; this idea had no foundation in the constitution. And he further observed, that the constitution has so completely guarded and secured the rights and independence of the Senate, that he could not conceive of the apprehensions of gentlemen, who appear to think that an increase of the members of this House will overwhelm that branch of the Legislature. In all events, the privileges of that body will remain the same. The States, it is said, have reduced their Representative Assemblies. This, so far from being an argument against the proposed ratio, was directly in favor of it. The diminution of the State Legislatures has been occasioned by the idea which the people entertain of the increasing importance of the General Government. The objects of legislation to both Governments are nearly similar; they relate to those important concerns which interest the feelings of every citizen of the United States; all the difference lies in the magnitude of their respective spheres of action. Hence, it must evidently be the wish and expectation of the people, that their interests in every point of view, should be fully and adequately represented in this House.

The resolution being again read, in the following words:

"Resolved, That the number of Representatives shall, until the next enumeration, be one for thirty thousand."

The question was taken thereupon and agreed to by the House; yeas 35, nays 23, as follows:

Yeas.—Abraham Baldwin, Egbert Benson, John Brown, William Findlay, Thomas Fitzsimons, Elbridge Gerry, William B. Giles, James Gordon, Andrew Gregg, Samuel Griffin, Daniel Heister, Daniel Huger, Israel Jacobs, Aaron Kitchell, John W. Kittera, John Laurance, Amasa Learned, Richard Bland Lee, James Madison, Andrew Moore, Frederick Augustus Muhlenberg, William Vans Murray, John Page, Josiah Parker, Joshua Seney, Upton Sheridine, Thomas Sumter, Peter Sylvester, Thomas Tredwell, Thomas Tudor Tucker, Abraham Venable, Jeremiah Wadsworth, Anthony Wayne, Alexander White, and Francis Willis.

Nays.—Fisher Ames, John Baptist Ashe, Robert Barnwell, Elias Boudinot, Shearjashub Bourne, Benjamin Bourne, Abraham Clark, Nicholas Gilman, Benjamin Goodhue, William Barry Grove, James Hillhouse, Samuel Livermore, Nathaniel Macon, Nathaniel Niles, Theodore Sedgwick, Jeremiah Smith, Israel Smith, William Smith, John Steele, Jonathan Sturges, George Thatcher, John Vining, and Artemas Ward.

Ordered, That a bill or bills be brought in pursuant to the said resolution; and that Mr. Page, Mr. Murray, and Mr. Macon do prepare and bring in the same.

Tuesday, November 22.

A memorial of the committee of the counties of Washington, Westmoreland, Fayette, and Alleghany, in the State of Pennsylvania, was presented to the House and read, stating their objections to an act, passed at the last session, imposing a duty on spirits distilled within the United States, and praying that the same may be repealed. Referred to the Secretary of the Treasury for his information.

Representative from Maryland.

The House resolved itself into a Committee of the whole House on the report of the standing Committee of Elections, to whom was referred the Letter from the Executive of the State of Maryland, containing the resignation of William Pinkney, a member returned to serve in this House for the said State; and also a certificate of the election of John Francis Mercer, in the room of the said William Pinkney.

The law of the State of Maryland regulating elections being called for, was produced and read; by which it appeared that the Governor and Council of that State were authorized to fill up vacancies in the representation of that State in Congress.

Some objections having been offered against accepting the report,

Mr. Seney observed, that the case appeared to him to be so plain that he was surprised to find gentlemen objecting to an acceptation of the report of the committee. He then stated the whole process of the business, in the resignation of Mr. Pinkney and the election of Mr. Mercer, in which the law of the State had been strictly adhered to. He concluded by saying, that two cases in point had already occurred in the State of Connecticut, and no difficulty respecting them had taken place in the House.

Mr. Giles said, that he was a member of the select committee which had made the report; and from an accurate attention to all the circumstances of the case, he was led to think the report a very improper one. From recurring to the constitution, he was of opinion that a resignation did not constitute a vacancy. The constitution speaks only of vacancies in general, and does not contemplate one as resulting from a resignation. Adverting to the British House of Commons, he observed that in that body there could be no resignation. This is an established principle. The people having once chosen their representatives, their power ceases, and consequently the body to which the resignation ought to be made no longer exists. From the experience of the British Government in this respect, he argued against a deviation from this rule. He showed from the constitution, that the Executives of the States who are empowered to fill vacancies, are not at all authorized to declare the existence of such vacancies; for, if they are to judge in the case, the whole power is invested in them of determining the whole business of vacancies—an idea that materially and essentially affects the privileges of the members of the House. He remarked that, even by the law of Maryland, the requisite steps had not been pursued by the Executive of that State. He concluded by saying that, if the principles he had advanced were just, he hoped the report would not be accepted.

Mr. Smith (S. C.) had had his doubts on the report; but on more mature consideration he was convinced that on account of the inconvenience which would result from rejecting it, and from other considerations, it was proper to adopt it, but not without a full discussion. He then stated some particulars to show that the vacancy which had occurred on this occasion could not properly be called a resignation. Mr. Pinkney had never taken his seat, nor the requisite oath. He said that there was no analogy between the Parliament of Great Britain and this House; the mode of issuing the writs originally, and of filling up vacancies, is essentially different. No part of the constitution prohibits a member from resigning, and for convenience it ought to be concluded that he may resign. The public interest may suffer extremely in cases of sickness or embarrassments, which may prevent a member from attending. This argument from the body's not existing to whom the resignation ought to be made, will apply to the President of the United States, whose resignation is expressly mentioned in the constitution. The objection urged from the Executives of the States judging of vacancies, he conceived had no great force, for Congress would finally judge in every case of election. It is uncertain how the practice of the British Parliament originated. Blackstone says nothing of resignations. When a member wants to resign in that Legislature, he gets appointed to some fictitious office which disqualifies him from sitting in the House. He thought it best to establish some precedent, rather than oblige members who may wish to resign to have recourse to some familiar method, by accepting of some appointment in the State which is incompatible with a seat.

Mr. Murray said he was in favor of accepting the report, both on account of propriety and conveniency. Vacancies may happen from various causes—by resignation, by death, or by expulsion—the Executive of the State is the proper judge in the first case. He stated certain differences between a resignation after a person has taken his seat, and a resignation before that event. In the former case Congress will of course give notice to the Executive of the State; in the latter, the Executive alone can take cognizance of the resignation. He stated the extreme inconveniency which would result from the ideas of the gentleman from Virginia, as it would respect the State of Georgia. He then stated several particulars to show that Mr. Pinkney was not a member of the House agreeably to the constitution, and therefore the House cannot proceed with him as one. He said that we ought to be willing to derive information from the experience of every country; but he conceived that no precedents could be drawn that would apply in the present case from a country which had none, to one which had a constitution that so clearly defined and guarded the rights of the citizens. The custom which had been mentioned as obtaining in that country, arose from a wish to prevent a frequency of elections. From what had been offered by the gentleman from South Carolina, and the ideas he had suggested, he hoped the committee would be induced to accept the report.

Mr. Williamson said, that it appeared to him that the constitution contemplates that a member may resign. He read the clause, which says that no member of the Legislature shall accept of an office made during the time for which he was chosen—from hence he inferred that resignations were clearly contemplated.

Mr. Gerry said that he had heard nothing to show that Mr. Pinkney had ever accepted of his appointment, and therefore it ought to have been expressed that he had declined; but, granting he had resigned after accepting his appointment, he asserted that nothing had been offered to prove that resignations might not take place in one House as well as in the other; and the constitution plainly expresses that a Senator may resign. The House of Commons originated with the Kings, who formed that body to control the Lords; and hence arose the prohibition against resignations, as they would weaken the body, and the expense of a new election would fall on the King. With respect to the Executive declaring improper vacancies, he observed that Congress was invested with full power to control the Executives of the States in respect to such declarations.

Mr. Seney observed upon a distinction made by Mr. Giles between a resignation on the part of a Senator and a Member of the House, he supposed a resignation in either would equally vacate a seat, and that no difference did really exist.

Mr. Sedgwick observed that, if a power of adjudication was vested in the Executives of the States to determine on a vacancy in cases of resignation, it would involve this consequence, that a power of judging of vacancies in all possible cases would be the necessary result. He thought the proposition involved the most serious effects with respect to the privileges and independency of this House.

This subject was further discussed the next day, and ended in an acceptation of the report of the committee, which was in favor of Mr. Mercer's election.

Monday, December 5.

The House again resolved itself into a Committee of the whole House on the bill making appropriations for the support of Government, for the year one thousand seven hundred and ninety-two; and, after some time spent therein,

Ordered, That the said bill, with amendments, be recommitted to Mr. Laurance, Mr. Baldwin, and Mr. Ashe.

The Speaker laid before the House a letter from the Secretary of the Treasury, accompanying his report on the subject of manufactures, made pursuant to an order of the House of the fifteenth of January, one thousand seven hundred and ninety; which was read, and ordered to lie on the table.

The Speaker laid before the House a letter from the Treasury of the United States, accompanying his account of receipts and expenditures of the public moneys between the first of July, and the thirtieth of September, one thousand seven hundred and ninety-one; which were read and ordered to lie on the table.

Mr. Benson laid on the table a resolution for the appointment of a committee to join a committee of the Senate, to consider and report the most eligible manner of carrying into effect a former resolution of Congress respecting the erection of an Equestrian Statue, in honor of General Washington.

Appropriation Bill.

The House then, pursuant to the order of the day, resolved itself into a Committee of the Whole, and resumed the consideration of the appropriation bill, Mr. Muhlenberg in the chair.

In proceeding through the bill, the several items were separately considered and agreed to. Some occasional remarks were made; but no material debate took place. One amendment was proposed, by which the bill is made to express the several purposes for which the moneys are appropriated, instead of appropriating sums in gross, with a reference to the Secretary's estimate, for particulars.

The committee having reported the bill and the amendment, the House adopted the same, and recommitted the bill to the select committee, who had originally framed it, with instructions to new-model it pursuant to the sense of the House.

Mr. Gerry presented a resolution in lieu of one which he laid on the table on Friday last, making it the duty of the Secretary of the Treasury to report to the House, on the third Monday of every session, an account of the receipts and expenditures of the public money appropriated during the preceding session, so far as he shall then have it in his power to state particulars; and if he be unable to give an accurate statement of the whole, at the time appointed, he is to complete it as soon afterwards as may be.

Tuesday, December 6.

Resolved, That Mr. Benson, Mr. Gerry, and Mr. Smith, (of South Carolina,) be appointed a committee on the part of this House, jointly, with such committee as shall be appointed on the part of the Senate, to consider and report to Congress the most eligible manner for carrying into effect the resolution of the United States in Congress assembled, of the seventh of August, 1783, directing that an Equestrian Statue of General Washington should be erected.

Monday, December 12.

The following Message was received from the President of the United States.

Gentlemen of the Senate, and of the House of Representatives:

It is with great concern that I communicate to you the information received from Major General St. Clair, of the misfortune which has befallen the troops under his command.

Although the national loss is considerable, according to the scale of the event, yet it may be repaired without great difficulty, excepting as to the brave men who have fallen on the occasion, and who are a subject of public as well as private regret.

A farther communication will shortly be made of all such matters as shall be necessary to enable the Legislature to judge of the future measures which it may be proper to pursue.

GEORGE WASHINGTON.

United States, December 12, 1791.

Friday, December 16.

The Post Office Bill.

The House again resolved itself into a Committee of the whole House, on the bill "for establishing the Post Office and Post Roads within the United States."

[The following is a condensed view of the arguments made on striking out the section which gives to members the privilege of franking.]

When the bill under consideration is once passed into a law, it is presumable that no gentleman will ever ask a member to frank for him, as he cannot grant the request consistently with his honor; the apprehension entertained of the existence of abuses, and of their increasing with the increase of numbers, would be an argument equally valid against every law; for no law can be framed, as that the people will not find means to evade it. But still the Legislature will have the power of correcting the abuses, as soon as discovered, by passing new laws to check them. The committee who drafted the bill, had before them all the acts of the British Legislature, respecting the post office; they saw the abuses and how they had been remedied; and with such light to guide their steps, they had proceeded in the execution of their task. The privilege of franking they had introduced into the bill, upon mature considerations; to take it away would be leveling a deadly stroke at the liberty of the press; the information conveyed by franks, may be considered as the vital juices, and the channels of the post office as the veins; and if these are stopped, the body must be destroyed; it is treading on dangerous ground, to take any measures that may stop the channels of public information, especially of that which relates to matters in which the people are interested; to check the circulation even of foreign intelligence may be dangerous; but it is highly so, to deprive the people of information respecting the measures of the General Government; nor ought the members to complain of being obliged to read so many letters and petitions as come to their hands in consequence of the exemption from postage. If any gentleman thought this a heavy task, he ought to remember that it was only his duty, and a task which every member had undertaken when he accepted a seat in the House.

The privilege of franking was granted to the members, not as a personal advantage, (for in fact it proved rather a burden), but as a benefit to their constituents, who, by means of it, derive information from those who are best qualified to give it, as they are the persons chosen to administer the General Government. The members also receive useful information through the same channel. When the impost law and the excise law were under consideration, many persons who were better acquainted with the operation of such laws, transmitted to the House much valuable information on those subjects; and to such information the House ought ever to be open; as, on the other hand, the motives for adopting certain measures, ought always to be explained to influential characters in the different parts of the Union. Such conduct will produce the most salutary effects in reconciling the people to the measures of Government, when the principles upon which every law is framed, are explained to them, as well by the correspondence of the members, as by their debates, published in the newspapers. It is the duty of the members to disperse the newspapers among those people who cannot, perhaps, otherwise obtain them, under the protection of franks. Even along the post roads, the common packets of newspapers are not safe from depredation; but when once they get into the interior parts of the country, there is hardly any chance of their escaping; whereas, under the cover of a frank, they are sure to reach their destination in safety.

If the privilege were confined, during the session, to letters sent from and received at the seat of Government, and the members limited to their own letters, and obliged to write the whole superscription, the increase of the apprehended abuses would be prevented; if it were further restricted, by limiting to those letters only what are sent to or come from the State to which the member belongs, this would convince the people, that the privilege was intended for the benefit, not of the members, but of their constituents.

Further, it was observed, that every argument, which might be adduced in favor of withdrawing the privilege from the members of Congress, might be used with equal force in the cases of President, Vice President, and every other public officer, mentioned in the same section. If the allowance of six dollars per day was a reason for subjecting the members to the payment of postage, every public officer ought also, on the same principle, to pay for his letters, as they were all compensated with equal liberality. If abuses were apprehended from the members, others were as likely to introduce them as they; if an increase of revenue was contemplated, the postage of all letters to and from the President, the Vice President, the Secretaries of State, of the Treasury, of the Department of War, &c., would contribute to that increase; but, on the other hand, those gentlemen must have their compensations increased, if their letters were to be taxed; for they could not be expected to pay for them at their own expense. If the privilege can be guarded against abuse, with respect to those officers, it can also be guarded in the case of members of Congress.

The establishment of the post office is agreed to be for no other purpose than the conveyance of information into every part of the Union; and a greater portion of that had been conveyed into many of the interior parts of the country, by the newspapers sent by the members of the House, than could be conveyed by other means, excepting on the main roads on which stages go. That information had proved highly serviceable to the present Government; for wherever the newspapers had extended, or even the correspondence of the members, no opposition has been made to the laws; whereas, the contrary was experienced in those parts to which the information had not penetrated; and even there, the opposition ceased, as soon as the principles on which the laws had been passed, were made known to the people.