SECOND CONGRESS.—FIRST SESSION. (continued 3)

But did the submission of a provision to defend the frontier authorize a system for the encouragement of manufactures, thereby placing the occupations and productive labor of our citizens under the direction of Government, and rendering the living of the artist and subsistence of the farmer, so far equally dependent on and subservient to the views of Administration? Did it authorize an entire provision for the public debt, past, present, and to come? Did it authorize a plan for supplying former deficiencies, which it is admitted do not exist? Lastly, did it authorize an extensive increase of the Sinking Fund, which we are informed is one of the principal objects? It would be an affront to common sense to answer one of these queries in the affirmative—it authorized none of them. And yet these are all its offspring; these are the great objects it produced. It is true there are in the bill two or three little clauses that were authorized, and which relate to the submission, and which might well have escaped my attention, and would probably never attract the observation of the public, but for the title—a bill for the protection of the frontiers. By these clauses five hundred and twenty-three thousand dollars of the whole moneys to be for ever raised from its perpetual revenue, are appropriated for this year's campaign. After that sum is expended, we must, even the next year, look out for new taxes, and upon the same principles, as long as the Indian war continues (and by the enlistments it is not contemplated to be of very short duration) new taxes must be provided, for the residue of these taxes are by this bill appropriated to other purposes, for ever, after five hundred and twenty-three thousand dollars are paid. This appropriation is unalterable even by the whole Legislature, unless by a breach of public faith, or providing other equal revenue. Should every year's Indian war, and every national disaster excuse Government for laying a perpetual tax, equal to the increased annual demand, it will be selling us defeats at a very high price; and if Government are paid so well, they may be tempted to repeat the tragical representation.

But what is the reflection that naturally arises from a contemplation of this bill. That Administration will not even permit us to defend the helpless women and children of the frontier from the brutal ferocity of a savage foe, but on condition that the Representatives surrender up for ever the sacred trust of the constitution, and place in the power and under the control of the Executive and Senate, a perpetual tax. Unless they throw the power of regulating the labor and industry of their fellow-citizens into the hands of Government, and into a mean dependence on Administration; and unless they furnish a large sum of money, under the denomination of a Sinking Fund, for the purposes of speculation, in order to raise and lower the price of stocks at pleasure, or as may suit the views and interest of the band of favorites that are in the secret.

Hard and oppressive conditions! Was this the object of the reference to the Secretary? It was not the avowed one, nor could it have been suspected, from a simple proposition to devise ways and means to defend the frontier. A mighty fabric has been erected on this slight foundation, to hurry us into its adoption. We have been officially, I suppose, informed that the money for the War Department is almost expended; that the preparations for the Western expedition must stop, unless we pass the bill immediately; and thus, with the tomahawk suspended over our heads, we must give up to Administration the dearest interests of the people, and sacrifice the most sacred rights of the constitution.

Monday, January 30.

Protection of the Frontiers.

The House again resolved itself into a Committee of the whole House on the bill making farther and more effectual provision for the protection of the frontiers of the United States; and, after some time spent therein, the Chairman reported that the committee had again had the said bill under consideration, and made several amendments thereto; when the same being read, some were agreed to, and others disagreed to.

And then the said bill being before the House, a motion was made, and the question being put to amend the same, by striking out the second section thereof, in the words following:

"And be it further enacted, That there shall be raised three additional regiments of infantry, each of which, exclusively of the commissioned officers, shall consist of nine hundred and twelve non-commissioned officers, privates, and musicians:"

It passed in the negative—yeas 18, nays 34, as follows:

Yeas.—John Baptist Ashe, Elias Boudinot, Shearjashub Bourne, Benjamin Bourne, Nicholas Gilman, Benjamin Goodhue, William Barry Grove, Samuel Livermore, Nathaniel Macon, Nathaniel Niles, Josiah Parker, Israel Smith, John Steele, Thomas Sumter, George Thatcher, Artemas Ward, Hugh Williamson, and Francis Willis.

Nays.—Fisher Ames, Abraham Baldwin, Robert Barnwell, Egbert Benson, John Brown, Jonathan Dayton, William Findlay, Thomas Fitzsimons, William B. Giles, Andrew Gregg, Thomas Hartley, Daniel Huger, Philip Key, Aaron Kitchell, John W. Kittera, John Laurance, Amasa Learned, James Madison, Andrew Moore, Frederick Augustus Muhlenberg, William Vans Murray, John Page, Cornelius C. Schoonmaker, Joshua Seney, William Smith, Samuel Sterrett, Jonathan Sturges, Peter Sylvester, Thomas Tredwell, Thomas Tudor Tucker, Abraham Venable, Jeremiah Wadsworth, Anthony Wayne, and Alexander White.

The farther consideration of the said bill was then postponed until to-morrow.

Tuesday, January 31.

The Speaker laid before the House a letter from the Secretary of War, covering his report on the petitions of James Swaine, Abraham Springer, Timothy Mountford, sundry seamen, Samuel Wail, for himself and servant, John Carnaghan, James Shields, Henry Skinner, and William Loring; which were read, and ordered to lie on the table.

Protection of the Frontiers.

The House resumed the consideration of the bill for making farther and more effectual provision for the protection of the frontiers of the United States; and the same being further amended, was

Ordered, To be engrossed, and read the third time to-morrow.

Wednesday, February 1.

Mr. Page, from the committee to whom was referred the petition of John Churchman, made a report; which was read, and ordered to lie on the table.

Protection of the Frontiers.

An engrossed bill for making farther and more effectual provision for the protection of the frontiers of the United States, was read the third time, and the blanks therein filled up; and on the question that the said bill do pass,

It was resolved in the affirmative—yeas 29, nays 19.

Friday, February 3.

A message from the Senate informed the House that the Senate recede from their amendments, disagreed to by this House, to the bill to establish Post Offices and Post Roads within the United States, and do agree to the amendments proposed by the House to their amendment to the said bill.

The Cod Fisheries.

The House resolved itself into a Committee of the whole House on the bill sent from the Senate, entitled, "An act for the encouragement of the Bank and other Cod Fisheries, and for the regulation and government of the fishermen employed therein."

The first section being read as follows:

"Be it enacted, &c., That the bounty, now allowed upon the exportation of dried fish of the fisheries of the United States, shall cease on all dried fish exported after the tenth day of June next; and in lieu thereof, and for the more immediate encouragement of the said fisheries, there shall be afterwards paid, on the last day of December annually, to the owner of every vessel or his agent, by the collector of the district where such vessel may belong, that shall be qualified agreeably to law, for carrying on the Bank and other cod fisheries, and that shall actually have been employed therein at sea, for the term of four months at least, of the fishing season next preceding (which season is accounted to be from the last day of February, to the last day of November in every year) for each and every ton of such vessel's burden, according to her admeasurement, as licensed or enrolled; if of twenty tons and not exceeding thirty tons, one and a half dollars, and if above thirty tons, two and a half dollars, of which bounty three-eighth parts shall accrue and belong to the owner of such fishing vessel, and the other five-eighths thereof shall be divided by him, his agent or lawful representative, to and among the several fishermen who shall have been employed in such vessel, during the season aforesaid, or a part thereof, as the case may be, in such proportions as the fish they shall respectively have taken may bear to the whole quantity of fish taken on board such vessel during such season. Provided, That the bounty, to be allowed, and paid on any vessel for one season, shall not exceed one hundred and seventy dollars."

Mr. Giles expressed some doubt respecting the principle of the bill; and for the purpose of collecting the sense of the committee on the subject, he thought the most effectual means would be a motion to amend the bill, by striking out the whole section. He accordingly made the motion, observing at the same time, that he could not positively assert, whether the reasons which determined him against the principle of the bill, were well founded or not; that, in matters where a local preference is given, it is necessary to accommodate; and he would be happy if his objections could be removed. The present section of the bill appears to contain a direct bounty on occupations; and if that be its object, it is the first attempt as yet made by this Government to exercise such authority; and its constitutionality struck him in a doubtful point of view; for in no part of the constitution could he, in express terms, find a power given to Congress to grant bounties on occupations: the power is neither directly granted, nor (by any reasonable construction that he could give) annexed to any other power specified in the constitution. It might perhaps be brought in under a mode of construction already adopted by the House, viz: that of "ways and ends," by which any power whatever might be equally implied; but he wished ever to see some connection between a specified power, and the means adopted for carrying it into execution. There is a great difference between giving encouragement, and granting a direct bounty. Congress have a right to regulate commerce; and any advantage thereby resulting to a particular occupation connected with commerce, comes within that authority; but when a bounty is proposed to a particular employment or occupation, this is stepping beyond the circle of commerce; and such a measure will affect the whole manufacturing and agricultural system. In all cases, the revenue, to be employed in this bounty, is drawn from all the sources of revenue in the United States, and confined to a particular object. He was averse to bounties in almost every shape, as derogations from the common right; and he thought there would be no great difficulty in proving, that a government is both unjust and oppressive in establishing exclusive rights, monopolies, &c., without some very substantial merit in the persons to whom they are granted; although even in that case, the propriety of such grants is still questionable. Under a just and equal government, every individual is entitled to protection in the enjoyment of the whole product of his labor, except such portion of it as is necessary to enable Government to protect the rest; this is given only in consideration of the protection offered. In every bounty, exclusive right, or monopoly, Government violates the stipulation on her part; for, by such a regulation, the product of one man's labor is transferred to the use and enjoyment of another. The exercise of such a right on the part of Government can be justified on no other principle, than that the whole product of the labor of every individual is the real property of Government, and may be distributed among the several parts of the community by governmental discretion; such a supposition would directly involve the idea that every individual in the community is merely a slave and bondman to Government, who, although he may labor, is not to expect protection in the product of his labor. An authority given to any government to exercise such a principle, would lead to a complete system of tyranny.

He entertained fewer doubts, respecting the principle, as it regards political economy. All occupations that stand in need of bounties, instead of increasing the real wealth of a country, rather tend to lessen it; the real wealth of every country consisting in the active product of useful labor employed in it. It is therefore bad policy to encourage any occupation that would diminish, instead of increasing the aggregate wealth of the community; and if an occupation is really productive, and augments the general wealth, bounties are unnecessary for its support; for when it reimburses the capital employed, and yields a profit besides, it may be said to support itself. When it fails in these points, any forced advantage that is given to it by the Government, only tends to decrease the wealth of the country. The subject, however, might be considered in a more favorable point of view: and that is, whether the provision be essential to the defence of the United States, and whether the bounties proposed in the bill were more than equivalent to the portion of defence that would be procured by them. The bill does not (in his opinion) contain that kind of encouragement, which is essential to the national defence. Any man who takes a view of this country, must be convinced that its real support rises from the land, and not from the sea; and the opposite mistake must have arisen merely from a servile imitation of the conduct of Great Britain: the inhabitants of this country heretofore thought favorably of her Government, and the Revolution has not yet altered their former ideas respecting it. But the circumstances of the two countries will, on examination, be found widely different; Britain, surrounded by the sea on every side, finds a navy necessary to support her commerce; whilst America, possessed of an immense territory, and having yet ample room to cultivate that territory, has no occasion to contend by sea with any European power: her strength and her resources are all to be found within the United States; and if she but attends to her internal resources, the object of national defence will be much better answered.

Mr. G. next proceeded to consider whether that portion of the national defence which might be derived from the fisheries, would not be purchased at too high a price. Although the apparent intention of the bill is only to convert the present existing drawbacks into a bounty; yet the drawbacks being allowed only to the actual exportation of the fish, and the bounty being granted on the tonnage of the fishing vessels, there can be no comparative value between the drawback and the bounty; they have no necessary relation to each other, and the latter may exceed the former, or the former exceed the latter. He had made a calculation, and upon the most favorable principles, grounded on the Reports of the Secretary of the Treasury and the Secretary of State. Here he produced a calculation, tending to show that the proposed bounty on the tonnage of the fishing vessels, would considerably exceed the amount of the present drawbacks. From a comparison between the bounty, and the number of sailors employed in the fisheries, he showed what an expense each man would be to the United States; and, after other remarks, observed, that even Great Britain, whose whole national support and defence depends on her navy, had found, that the men employed in the fisheries, though so necessary for that defence, had cost her too much; that America, whose consequence, as a nation, does not depend on a navy, ought to take a lesson from the experience of Britain: that he did not wish to enter into a competition with Britain and France, in supplying the different markets with fish; that, as those nations are able to hold out greater encouragement to their fishermen, than we can to ours, we would, by such a competition, only exhaust the Treasury of the United States to no purpose; and upon this principle alone, he thought there was some reason to doubt the policy of the measure proposed in the section under consideration, which therefore he hoped the committee would agree to strike out, unless his objection could be obviated.

Mr. Murray observed, that in order to demonstrate the propriety of the measure, it would be incumbent on the friends of the bill, first, to prove that the fishery trade is in a state of decay, that the stock employed in it does not yield the ordinary profits, so as to justify the merchants in embarking their capital in this branch of trade: that there is a system of defence in contemplation, which the circumstances of the country call for, and which this trade is calculated to furnish; that other branches of trade, which do not stand in need of encouragement, are not equally capable of furnishing seamen for the purpose: that this particular object so peculiarly claims the attention and encouragement of the United States, as to leave far behind every consideration of the manufacturing interest, the agricultural, &c. All this he thought necessary for gentlemen to prove, and to show some very strong necessity for encouraging one particular class of men, in preference to all others.

Mr. Goodhue.—It happens that the fisheries of the United States are almost entirely confined to the State of Massachusetts; and they furnish a considerable, a principal portion of our export trade. As we are a part of the United States, the United States in general are interested in the prosperity of that branch of business, so far at least as it contributes to the national defence: it furnishes a copious nursery of hardy seamen, and offers a never-failing source of protection to the commerce of the United States. If we engage in a war with any European power, those seamen will be excluded from their ordinary employment, and must have recourse to privateering. During the late war with Great Britain, we annoyed the enemy more in that line than in all others; and had it not been for privateering, it would often have been impossible to keep together our armies, who frequently, in the hour of need, were supplied by the privateers with ammunition and clothing, of which they were wholly destitute. All that we wish to obtain by this bill is, that we may not be burdened with duties. An opinion has been entertained, that no drawbacks ought to be allowed on the re-exportation of articles imported from foreign countries; but if this opinion were to obtain in practice, and no drawbacks were to be admitted, we must confine our importation to articles for our own consumption. The drawback allowed by the existing law, on the exportation of salt fish, was calculated to be only equal to the duty beforehand paid on the quantity of salt used in curing the fish; but the fishermen complain that, as the act now stands, they are wholly excluded from any participation in the benefit, which centres entirely in the coffers of the merchants. The object of the present bill is, only to repay the same money into the hands of those persons who are immediately concerned in catching the fish; and there can no reasonable objection be made to such a transfer of the drawback, as Government will not lose a single dollar by the change. The gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Giles) talks of the unconstitutionality of granting bounties; but no bounty is required. We only ask, in another mode, the usual drawback for the salt used on the fish. If we can make it appear that the bill does not contemplate any greater sums to be drawn from the Treasury, than are already allowed, it is to be hoped that no further opposition will be made to the measure; and that this is really the case, can be proved by documents from the Treasury office. Here he read a statement and calculation to prove his assertion; and to show that the United States will probably pay one thousand dollars per annum less in the proposed bounties on the tonnage of the fishing vessels, than they would in the drawbacks on the exportation of the fish. The fishermen, he continued, are now under no control; and in consequence of this want of a proper restraint, they often take whims into their heads and quit the vessels during the fishing season. To prevent the inconveniences of this practice, the bill contemplates their exclusion from the bounty, unless they enter into such contracts and regulations, as may be found necessary for the proper and successful conducting of the business, which, from our advantageous situation, would be entirely in our hands, if we did not meet with such opposition and discouragement from foreign nations, whose bounties to their own fishermen, together with the duties laid upon our fish, would, to persons less advantageously situated than us, amount almost to a total prohibition.

In the Report from the Secretary of State, a drawback is contemplated of the duties on all foreign articles, used by the seamen employed in the fishing trade, such as coffee, rum, &c.; but we ask it on the salt alone; nor is it asked as a bounty, but merely as a transfer from the hand of the merchant to that of the fishermen.

Mr. White had no objection to give the trade a proper degree of encouragement; but he did not relish the idea of granting bounties; if any gentleman would prepare an amendment, so as to make them drawbacks in fact, as well as in words, he would consent to the measure.

Mr. Ames, after some introductory observations, adverted to the necessity of fixing some point in which both sides would agree. Disputes, he said, could not be terminated—or, more properly, they could not be managed at all, if some first principles were not conceded. The parties would want weapons for the controversy.

Law is in some countries the yoke of government, which bends or breaks the necks of the people; but, thank Heaven, in this country, it is a man's shield—his coat of mail—his castle of safety. It is more than his defence: it is his weapon to punish those who invade his rights—it is the instrument which assists—it is the price that rewards his industry.

If I say that fishermen have equal rights with other men, every gentleman feels in his own bosom a principle of assent. If I say that no man shall pay a tax on sending his property out of the country, the constitution will confirm it; for the constitution says, no duty shall be laid on exports. If I say, that on exporting dried fish, the exporter is entitled to drawback the duty paid on the salt, I say no more than the law of the land has confirmed. Plain and short as these principles are, they include the whole controversy. For I consider the law allowing the drawback as the right of the fishery, the defects of that law as the wrong suffered, and the bill before us as the remedy. The defects of the law are many and grievous. Supposing 340,000 quintals exported——

The salt duty is$42,744

The drawback is only34,000

————

Loss to the fishery8,744

Whereas Government pays $45,900, at

13-1/2 cents, including charges, which are

3-1/2 cents on a quintal: which is beyond

what the fishery receives11,900

————

Being a clear loss to the Government of3,156

So that, though the whole is intended for the benefit of the fishery, about one-fourth of what is paid is not so applied: there is a heavy loss both to Government and the fishery. Even what is paid on the export is nearly lost money; the bounty is not paid till the exportation, nor then, till six months have elapsed; whereas the duty on salt is paid before the fish is taken: it is paid to the exporter, not to the fisherman. The bounty is so indirect, that the poor fisherman loses sight of it. It is paid to such persons, in such places, and at such periods, as to disappoint its good effects; passing through so many hands, and paying so many profits to each, it is almost absorbed. The encouragement, too, is greatest in successful years, when least needed; and is least in bad fishing seasons, when it is most needed. It is a very perplexed, embarrassing regulation to the officers of Government and to the exporter; hence the great charge: and, with all this charge and trouble, it is liable to many frauds. Four hundred miles of coast, little towns, no officer. All these defects the bill remedies; and, besides, gives the money on condition that certain regulations are submitted to, which are worth almost as much as the money.

The bill is defended on three grounds. First, it will promote the national wealth; second, the national safety; third, justice requires it: the last is fully relied on.

To show that the fishery will increase the wealth of the nation, it cannot be improper to mention its great value. The export before the war brought more than a million of dollars into this country; probably it is not less at present, and no small part in gold and silver. It is computed that thirty thousand persons, including four thousand seamen, subsist by it. Many say, very composedly, if it will not maintain itself, let it fall. But we should not only lose the annual million of dollars which it brings us; an immense capital would be lost. The fishing towns are built on the naked rocks, or barren sands, on the side of the sea. Those spots, however, where trade would sicken and die—which husbandry scorns to till—and which nature seems to have devoted to eternal barrenness, are selected by industry to work miracles on. Houses, stores, and wharves, are erected, and a vast property created, all depending on this business. Before you think it a light thing to consign them to ruin, see if you can compute what they cost; if they outrun your figures, then confess that it would be bad economy, as well as bad policy, to suffer rival nations to ruin our fishery. The regulations of foreign nations tend to bring this ruin about. France and England equally endeavor, in the language of the Secretary of State, to mount their marine on the destruction of our fishery. The fishers at Newfoundland are allowed liberal bounties by the English Government; and, in the French West Indies, we meet bounties on their fish and duties on our own, and these amount to the price of the fish. From the English islands we are quite shut out; yet such is the force of our natural advantages, that we have not yielded to these rivals. The Secretary of State has made these statements in his Report.

The more fish we catch, the cheaper; the English fish will need a greater bounty: whereas if we should yield, the English would probably need no bounty at all; they would have the monopoly. For example; suppose the English can fish at two dollars the quintal—we catch so much that we sell at one dollar and two-thirds: the loss to them is one-third of a dollar on each quintal. They must have that sum as a bounty. Whereas, if we increase our fishery, a greater and a greater bounty is needed by foreign nations. The contest so painfully sustained by them must be yielded at last, and we shall enjoy alone an immense fund of wealth to the nation, which nature has made ours; and though foreigners disturb the possession, we shall finally enjoy it peaceably and exclusively. If the lands of Kentucky are invaded, you drive off the invader; and so you ought. Why not protect this property as well? These opinions are supported by no common authority. The State of Massachusetts having represented the discouragements of the fishery, the subject has received the sanction of the Secretary of State; he confirms the facts stated in the petition; he says it is too poor a business to pay any thing to Government.

Yet, instead of asking bounties, or a remission of the duties on the articles consumed, we ask nothing but to give us our own money back, which you received under an engagement to pay it back, in case the article should be exported. If nothing was in view, therefore, but to promote national wealth, it seems plain that this branch ought to be protected and preserved; because, under all the discouragements it suffers, it increases, and every year more and more enriches the country, and promises to become an inexhaustible fund of wealth.

Another view has been taken of the subject, which is drawn from the naval protection afforded, in time of war, by a fishery. Our coasting and foreign trade are increasing rapidly; but the richer our trade becomes, the better prize to the enemy: so far from protecting us, it would be the very thing that would tempt him to go to war with us. As the rice and the tobacco planter cheerfully pay for armies, and turn out in the militia to protect their property on shore, they cannot be so much deceived as to wish to have it left unprotected when it is afloat; especially when it is known that this protection, though more effectual than the whole revenue expended on a navy could procure, will not cost a farthing; on the contrary, it will enrich while it protects the nation. The coasters and other seamen, in the event of a war, would be doubly in demand, and could neither protect themselves nor annoy the enemy to any considerable degree; but the fishermen, thrown out of business by a war, would be instantly in action. They would, as they formerly did, embark in privateers; having nothing to lose, and every thing to hope, they would not dishonor their former fame. Their mode of life makes them expert and hardy seamen. Nothing can be more adventurous. They cast anchor on the banks, three hundred leagues from land, and with a great length of cable ride out the storms of winter. If the gale proves too strong they often sink at their anchors, and are food for fish which they came to take: for ever wet, the sea almost becomes their element. Cold and labor in that region of frost, brace their bodies, and they become as hardy as the bears on the islands of ice: their skill and spirit are not inferior: familiar with danger, they despise it. If I were to recite their exploits, the theme would find every American heart already glowing with the recollection of them; it would kindle more enthusiasm than the subject has need of. My view is only to appeal to facts, to evince the importance of the fishery as a means of naval protection. It is proper to pass over Bunker's Hill, though memorable by the valor of a regiment of fishermen; nor is it necessary to mention, further, that five hundred fishermen fought at Trenton.

It is known, that the privateers manned by fishermen, in want of every thing, not excepting arms, which they depended on taking from their enemies, brought into port warlike stores of every kind, as well as every kind of merchandise sufficient for the army and country: the war could not have been carried on without them. Among other exploits almost beyond belief, one instance is worth relating: these people, in a privateer of sixteen guns, and one hundred and fifty men, in one cruise took more than twenty ships, with upwards of two hundred guns, and nearly four hundred men. The privateers from a single district of Massachusetts, where the fishery is chiefly seated, took more than two thousand vessels, being one third of the British merchant vessels, and brought in near one thousand two hundred. A hundred sail of privateers, manned by fishermen, would scour every sea in case of a war.

The first question is, how much does Government receive by the duty on the salt used in curing the fish which is exported? The quantity of fish must be known. Several ways of information are to be explored. The Secretary of State supposes the fish of 1790 to be 354,276 quintals. A Treasury return of fish exported from August 20, 1789, to September 30, 1790, which is thirteen and one-third months, is 378,721 quintals. For a year, equal to 340,849 quintals.

Foreign dried fish imported from August 15, 1789, to August, 1790, 3,701 quintals; five per cent. drawback thereon is only three hundred and ten dollars, at one dollar and sixty-six cents per quintal. Mr. Giles is mistaken in supposing that foreign fish deducts $16,000 from our estimate. Return of fish in seven months, from May 30, to December, 1790, exported, all fish of the United States, 197,278 quintals: which, for a year, is 338,184 quintals. The medium may be fairly taken for the time past at 340,000 quintals a year.

Six gentlemen of Marblehead certify, that 5,043 hogsheads, or 40,344 bushels of salt, were used on 38,497-1/2 quintals; which, for 340,000 quintals, gives 356,200 bushels. The duty, at twelve cents, is $42,744, which Government receives. But the charge to the United States, is, at thirteen and a half cents per quintal

$45,900

Whereof the fishery receives ten cents

on each quintal exported34,000

———

Charges as the law stands11,900

Further, this is but an estimate made up from what the last year proved. The next may be very different, and probably it will be. If more money should be demanded than $44,000, we must not be accused of misleading Congress. But in that case an increase would be made by law; for the more fish is exported, the more thirteen and a half cents must be paid; so that the bill creates no burden in that way. But the increase of the export of fish will probably operate in favor of Government. For it is known that the economy, skill, and activity of the fishery are making progress. Its success has progressed. The more fish to a vessel, the cheaper the allowance on the tonnage. Therefore, the tonnage of vessels will not increase in a ratio with the increase of the fish.

The very objections prove this. For they deem the encouragement too great. But any encouragement must have the effect.

The difference of the agreements for distributing the fish according to the present practice, or by this bill, makes a great one in the quantity taken. The bill reforms the practice in this point. Marblehead vessels take less than those from Beverly. The former throw the fish into a common stock, which is afterwards divided upon a plan very unfriendly to exertion. A man works for the whole—perhaps twelve hours, and they take about eight hundred quintals to a vessel. But in Beverly, the exertion is as great as can be made; eighteen hours a day, because each man has what he catches, and they catch eleven hundred quintals.

Marblehead seamen sailing from other towns, and dividing as last mentioned, which the bill establishes, seldom fail to catch two or three hundred quintals more than vessels and men from Marblehead on the first plan. Accordingly, I assert on good authority, that the increase in Marblehead only may be computed at fifteen thousand quintals, merely in consequence of the reform by the bill. The best informed persons whom I have consulted, entertain no doubt that the export, in case the bill should pass, would not be less than four hundred thousand quintals, probably more; but at four hundred thousand quintals, it would add seven thousand two hundred dollars more to the salt duty; a sum more than equal to any estimate of the actual tonnage, or any probable increase of it

$42,744

7,200

———

Salt duty on 400,000 quintals49,944

Other facts confirm the theory, that skill and exertion are increasing in this business.

In 1775, 25,000 tons, 4,405 seaman. Fish sold for $1,071,000. In 1790, three-fourths of the seamen and three-fourths of the tonnage take as much fish. It is owing to this that our fishery stood the competition with foreign nations.

Finally, the average in future may be relied on not to be less than 350,000 quintals.

Salt duty on which$43,944

Bounties44,000

———

Wanted56

The calculations first made will answer the purpose,

340,000 quintals pay salt duty$42,744

Tonnage bounty44,000

———

Wanted1,256

This is the mighty defect. Observe the authentic return of the export of fish may be, and we can almost prove it to be, below the future export. Whereas, to banish all doubt, we go to the top of the scale for the tonnage, we take what we know to be the utmost. This we might have represented more favorably if we had chosen to conceal any thing. But even this will answer our purpose.

For two hundred tons are wanting in the estimate of the bounties, being nineteen thousand eight hundred, not twenty thousand, which will take off one-third of the deficient sum.

The tonnage over sixty-eight, which receives nothing, is not mentioned; and which probably is not less than another third.

The boats under five tons, though trifling, are to be noticed—they receive nothing.

But, above all, the chances of non-compliance with the regulations are in favor of the remainder of the twelve hundred and fifty-six dollars being stopped. Boats may not get twelve quintals to the ton, or vessels may have their voyages broken up, and not stay four months on the fishing ground; in either case they would receive nothing. Take all these together, is it not to be doubted that twelve hundred and fifty-six dollars will remain of the forty-four thousand in the Treasury?

But these are trifles which I cannot believe gentlemen are anxious about.

For the event cannot be reduced to a certainty. What quantity of fish will be exported, no man can tell now. But as Government may receive more than it will pay, the chance may turn the other way, and it may have to pay a few hundred dollars more than it will have received. We have seen that the chance is most in favor of Government. But one chance must balance the other. This answer is sincerely relied on as a good one.

I barely mention that the wear of cordage, cables, sails, and anchors, is very great. These articles, on being imported, pay duties. So that it is probable the extra duty paid by the fishery on their extra consumption, will overbalance any little sums supposed to exceed in the bounty.

It has been asked, as if some cunning was detected, why if the money received in the Treasury to pay the drawbacks is equal to the proposed bounties, a further appropriation should be made? This cunning question admits of several very simple answers.

The bill being for seven years, the average product is the proper sum to be calculated. But the three first years may fall short of the bounties, say two thousand dollars a year, which is six thousand dollars.

The four last may exceed two thousand dollars, say eight thousand dollars.

Shall a poor fisherman wait for the whole, or if he takes his part according to the money in the Treasury—for a twenty-fourth part of the bounty on his vessel, from 1792 to 1795?

2d. This delay would happen after a bad year, the very time when he would most need prompt pay.

3d. But fish taken this year will not be exported till December next. Therefore the money will not be stopped by the drawback as the law stands, till six months after.

A substitute has been proposed for the clause, to appropriate the drawback only.

This is absolutely improper. For the ten cents allowed as drawback is but a part of the duty paid on salt. It is not easy to see any reason why a part stopped at the Treasury should be equal to the whole paid there long before. The drawback falls near nine thousand dollars short of the salt duty received by the Government. The expense of the drawback would be very heavy and useless.

Nor may gentlemen apprehend that Government, by paying next December, will advance money to the fishery. The salt duty will have been paid, and Government will have the use of the money many months before the fishermen will have a right to call for the bounties.

It is left to the candor of the gentlemen who have urged this objection, whether a better or further answer is desired.

After having laboriously gone through the estimate of the probable export of fish, it will not be necessary to be equally minute as to the quantity or kind of vessels which are to receive the bounty.

The estimate we believe to be very high. That it is high enough, we suppose very probable from the estimate of the Secretary of State, which is only nineteen thousand one hundred and eighty-five tons.

This mode of paying the bounty on the tonnage is very simple and safe. The measurement is already made and costs nothing; and as it was made to pay a duty on tonnage, we are very sure that Government will not be cheated by an over-measure. The mode of paying the drawback, as the law now stands, is expensive, perplexed and embarrassing; liable to frauds and delays.

This intricate and disgusting detail of calculations was necessary to satisfy the committee that each of the three grounds of defence on which the bill rests, is tenable.

Instead of impoverishing the nation by scattering the treasures of the whole to benefit a part, it appears that we are preserving a mine of treasure. In point of naval protection, we can scarcely estimate the fishery too highly. It is always ready, always equal to the object; it is almost the only sufficient source of security by sea. Our navigation is certainly a precious interest of the country. But no part of our navigation can vie with the fishery in respect to the protection it affords. There is no point which regards our national wealth or national safety, in respect to which it seems practicable to do so much with so little.

We rely on the evidence before you, that the public will not sustain the charge of a dollar. Those ought not to doubt the evidence who cannot invalidate it. If then the fishermen ask you to restore only their own money, will you deny them? Will you return to every other person exporting dutied goods the money he has paid, and will you refuse the poor fisherman?

If there must be an instance of the kind, will you single out for this oppressive partiality, that branch which is described by the Secretary of State as too poor even to bear its own part of the common burden; that branch which nevertheless has borne the neglect of our nation, and the persecution of foreign prohibitions and duties; a branch which, though we have received much and expect more, both of money and services, urges no claims but such as common justice has sanctioned?

Mr. Gerry having moved to strike out the words "bounty allowed" in order to insert allowance made, by way of accommodation,

Mr. Murray observed, that the question was, whether a bounty should be given for the encouragement of the fishery: the amendment proposed by the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. Gerry) did not alter the principle—it was still "the old cocked hat" on the one hand, and on the other, "the cocked old hat:" the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Fitzsimons) had asserted, that Congress have a right to alter the drawbacks, and allow them in any other mode, by which the citizens may receive back their own money; but this is not a case of that nature; for the bill says, "in case the moneys appropriated (for the payment of the duties) shall be inadequate, the deficiency shall be supplied from the Treasury;" here the Treasury is pledged for the payment of the bounties; and the question is, not on the principle of changing the drawback, but the giving encouragement to a particular branch, at the expense of the community at large.

Mr. Barnwell observed, that those who are best acquainted with the fisheries, look on the proposed mode of encouragement as the best; and that they ought to be allowed to use the gifts of the public in the most advantageous manner: that, if he were himself concerned in the cultivation of any particular commodity, for the encouragement of which a sum were granted, he would be much surprised to meet a refusal, in case he should come forward and propose some more effectual mode of applying that grant: that even if the bounties should happen to exceed the drawbacks, by eight or ten thousand dollars, the number of seamen to be maintained would be well worth that sum: that whenever the two Houses of Congress and the President of the United States are of opinion that the general welfare will be promoted by raising any sum of money, they have undoubted right to raise it, provided that the taxes be uniform; that although it may not at present be an object of great consequence to America to become a maritime power, yet it is of some importance to have constantly at hand a nursery of seamen, to furnish our merchants with the means of transporting their commodities across the sea; that, whatever allowance or bounty is granted upon any particular commodity, must ever be paid by the whole, for the advantage of a part, whether it be upon cotton to the Southward, upon fish to the Eastward, or upon other commodities to the Middle States; that if the people cannot have so much confidence in their Representatives, as to trust them with the power of granting bounties, the Government must be a very paltry one indeed. The object of the bill was only to allow to the fishermen, in the manner that would be most beneficial to them, the same sum that would otherwise be allowed. If, however, from time and experience, it should appear that this bounty proved an imposition on Government, he would not hesitate to revoke it.

Mr. Gerry.—The State of Massachusetts asks nothing more than equal justice. We do not come forward to request favors from the United States, we only wish that the same system which is applied to other parts of the Union, may be applied to us. But, in examining this question, we wish that gentlemen would not make distinctions which will not admit of a difference.

The proposed allowance has been called a bounty on occupation, and is said to be very different from that encouragement, which is the incidental result of a general commercial system; but in reality it is no bounty: a bounty is a grant, made without any consideration whatever, as an equivalent; and I have no idea of a bounty, which admits of receiving from the person, on whom it is conferred, the amount of what is granted. We have imposed a duty on salt, and thereby draw a certain sum of money from the fishermen; the drawback is, in all instances, the amount of the money received; this is all we ask; and we ask it for a set of men who are as well entitled to the regard of Government as any other class of citizens.

It has been supposed, that the allowance made to the fishermen, will amount to a greater sum than the drawback on the exportation of the fish; but I think it has been clearly shown that this will not be the case: on the contrary, it is presumable, that the drawback on the fish would on the whole exceed the sum which is proposed to be allowed to the fishermen; sometimes it might be more, sometimes less. The calculation is made on general principles; and it is impossible to calculate to a single cent: the quantity of salt to be expended on the fish, cannot be minutely ascertained; but this was not heretofore considered as a sufficient reason why Congress should refuse to allow the drawback; they allowed it, though in a different shape. It is now proposed to make a further commutation: gentlemen call this a bounty on occupation; but is there any proposition made for paying to the fishermen, or other persons concerned in the fishery, any sums which we have not previously received from them? If this were the case, it would indeed be a bounty; but if we beforehand receive from them as much as the allowance amounts to, there is no bounty granted at all.

If, however, it really was a bounty on occupation, it would after all be only an indulgence similar to what has been granted to the landed and agricultural interest. We have laid on hemp a duty of fifty-four cents per hundredweight; and on beer, ale, and porter, five cents per gallon. Now, I ask gentlemen, whether the professed design of those duties was to raise a revenue, or to prevent the importation of those articles? They were laid for no other purpose, than to prevent foreigners from importing them, and thereby to encourage our own manufactures; and was not that encouragement a bounty to the persons concerned in producing such articles in this country? If the duties had not been laid, the importer could sell much cheaper than he now can; and the landed interest would be under a necessity of selling cheaper in proportion. If those prohibitory duties operate as a bounty in favor of raising hemp, and of brewing beer, ale, and porter, I ask, whether, if a bounty were proposed on every quintal of fish, it might not, with the same propriety, be granted? If we have not a right to grant a bounty in the one case, we have as little right to grant it in the other.

A calculation has been offered to show that the proposed allowance will exceed the amount of the present drawbacks, by ten thousand dollars a year; but that calculation has been proved to be erroneous. Suppose, however, that this was the fact, what comparison is there between such a tax on the citizens of the United States, and the tax borne by the citizens of Massachusetts, for the defence of the Western frontier? A commercial war is waged against the American fisheries, by foreign nations, who lay heavy duties on the American fish, and apply the produce of those duties in bounties to their own fishermen; and their fisheries being less extensive than ours, the duty thus imposed on our fish, and bestowed in bounties to their vessels, operate in a twofold proportion to the discouragement of our fishermen, and the encouragement of theirs.

I wish to know on what principle gentlemen can expect, that the citizens of Massachusetts should contribute two hundred thousand dollars, or perhaps a greater sum, for the protection of the Western frontier against the Indians, when no contribution is made to support the commerce of Massachusetts, which, without this support, will be as effectually ruined, as if their vessels were captured by an enemy. The principle is carried farther with respect to the protection of the frontier: we have voted large sums as presents to the savages, to keep them friends to the frontier settlers; there is, however, no clause in the constitution that will authorize a measure of this kind: it is true, indeed, we have a power to regulate trade and commerce with the Indian tribes; but does that give us a power to render the United States tributary to the savages? and if we make them such grants every year, do we not in fact become tributary to them?

The gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Giles) says that although this plan of encouraging the fisheries may be wise policy in Britain, as being on all sides surrounded by the sea, yet the United States will not equally find their account in pursuing the same plan. The State of Virginia is, in point of exposure from the sea, very differently circumstanced from the State of Massachusetts: we have a vast extent of country four hundred and fifty miles of sea-coast, exposed; the citizens of all the towns along the coast are obliged to pursue marine occupations and I hope the gentleman does not wish that the country should be depopulated, and the inhabitants driven off to settle the Western territory.

The State of Virginia is very happily circumstanced with respect to a marine war: should such an event take place, that State is pretty secure from depredations; but when we consider how much the inhabitants of Massachusetts are exposed in a case of that kind, we ought to look forward, and make some provision for their defence: they have as good a right to expect that Government will make some arrangements for their protection, as that they shall be obliged to contribute for the defence of the Western frontier.

But their commerce, it seems, must not be supported! Taxes however must be laid; and those taxes applied to encourage the former, and to bribe the Indians into peace! Is this fair? Is this pursuing a liberal system of politics? Will this reconcile the minds of our people to the General Government? If so reasonable a proposition be neglected by the House, it will convince the citizens of that State, that it is the object of Government to destroy their commerce, and to make them entirely dependent on the agricultural interest.

Here Mr. Gerry read a statement, to show the diminution of the revenue in consequence of the failure of the fisheries; and added,

To support the fisheries, is to support the revenue: by that staple, the citizens of Massachusetts are enabled to pay the revenue that is expected from them; and, by an attempt to save ten thousand dollars, Government will probably sacrifice a hundred thousand; and besides, lose the confidence of the citizens of that State.

The only question now is, whether this be a direct bounty, or simply a commutation of the allowance already granted by Congress? If the latter be the case, I can see no reason why we should refuse our assent to a proposition, which is only calculated to do justice to the people concerned, and to give encouragement to a very important branch in the United States; especially as the proposition will even have a tendency to increase the revenue.

Mr. Williamson.—It has been urged with great propriety, in favor of the bill now submitted to our consideration, that the operation of our laws should in all cases tend to encourage useful industry; that while we are giving back the duties on all other foreign goods which are exported, it would be unjust and cruel to refuse a full drawback of the duties on salt which may be exported, especially when the circumstances of its exportation are attended with an increase of riches and strength to the nation. Impressed as I am with the force of these arguments, and desirous as I am to protect and encourage the native seamen of America, by all prudent, practicable, and constitutional means, I shall nevertheless find it my duty to vote for striking out the first section of the bill, because it proposes to give a bounty for the encouragement of the vessels employed in the fisheries.

We have been told that the name is improper; that it is simply a drawback of the duty upon salt; and gentlemen have produced a very ingenious calculation, by which they attempt to prove, that in some years it may happen that the whole duty on the salt will not be repaid; but they admit that in some years the drawback or bounty will exceed the duty. It is certainly their opinion—and in this we are perfectly agreed—that the money to be paid will be more than that received, else there had been no use for so large an appropriation. We shall not trouble the committee with calculations on this subject. It is conceded, that the encouragement to be given, probably will exceed the full drawback of the duty on salt. In other words, a douceur or a proper bounty is to be given: let us call it one thousand dollars per annum. Is it within the powers of this Congress to grant bounties? I think not; and on this single position I would rest the argument.

In the constitution of this Government there are two or three remarkable provisions, which seem to be in point. It is provided, that direct taxes shall be apportioned among the several States according to their respective numbers. It is also provided, that all duties, imposts, and excises, shall be uniform throughout the United States; and it is provided, that no preference shall be given, by any regulation of commerce or revenue, to the ports of one State over those of another. The clear and obvious intention of the articles mentioned was, that Congress might not have the power of imposing unequal burdens; that it might not be in their power to gratify one part of the Union by oppressing another. It appeared possible, and not very improbable, that the time might come, when, by greater cohesion, by more unanimity, by more address, the Representatives of one part of the Union might attempt to impose unequal taxes, or to relieve their constituents at the expense of other people. To prevent the possibility of such a combination, the articles that I have mentioned were inserted in the constitution. Suppose a poll-tax should be attempted; suppose it should be enacted that every poll in the Eastern States shall pay a tax of half a dollar, and every poll in the Southern States should pay a tax of one dollar. Do you think we should pay the tax? No certainly. We should plead the constitution, and tell you that the law was impotent and void.

But we have been told, that Congress may give bounties for useful purposes; that is to say, they may give bounties for all imaginable purposes; because the same majority that votes the bounty will not fail to call the purpose a good one. Establish the doctrine of bounties, and let us see what may follow. Uniform taxes are laid to raise money, and that money is distributed—not uniformly; the whole of it may be given to the people in one end of the Union. Could we say, in such a case, that the tax had been uniform? I think not. There is certainly a majority in this House who think that the nation would be stronger and more independent, if all our labor was performed by free men. This object might be promoted by a bounty. Let a poll-tax be laid, according to the constitution, of one dollar per poll: in this case, sixty cents must be paid for each slave; and the number of slaves being 680,186, their tax would amount to $334,911. To encourage the labor of citizens, let Congress then give an annual bounty of one dollar to every free man who is a mechanic, or who labors in the field. We might be told that the bounty was small, and the object was good; but the measure would be most oppressive, for it would be a clear tax of rather more than three hundred thousand dollars on the Southern States.

Perhaps the case I have put is too strong—Congress can never do a thing that is so palpably unjust—but this, sir, is the very mark at which the theory of bounties seems to point. The certain operation of that measure is the oppression of the Southern States, by superior numbers in the Northern interest. This was to be feared at the formation of this Government, and you find many articles in the constitution, besides those I have quoted, which were certainly intended to guard us against the dangerous bias of interest, and the power of numbers. Wherefore was it provided that no duty should be laid on exports? Was it not to defend the great staples of the Southern States—tobacco, rice, and indigo—from the operation of unequal regulations of commerce, or unequal indirect taxes, as another article had defended us from unequal direct taxes?

I do not hazard much in saying, that the present constitution had never been adopted without those preliminary guards in it. Establish the general doctrine of bounties, and all the provisions I have mentioned become useless. They vanish into air, and like the baseless fabric of a vision, leave not a trace behind. The common defence and general welfare, in the hands of a good politician, may supersede every part of our constitution, and leave us in the hands of time and chance. Manufactures, in general, are useful to the nation; they promote the public good and general welfare. How many of them are springing up in the Northern States? Let them be properly supported by bounties, and you will find no occasion for unequal taxes. The tax may be equal in the beginning—it will be sufficiently unequal in the end.

We are told, that a nursery of seamen may be of great use to the nation, and the bounty proposed is a very small one. These, sir, are the reasons why I have marked this as a dangerous bill; the most dangerous innovations are made under these circumstances. To begin with a great bounty would be imprudent, and to give a small bounty for a doubtful purpose, might deserve a worse epithet. Half a million of dollars per annum would have been too much for a beginning, and perhaps a bounty on the use of sleighs, though they are convenient for travelling in winter; or a bounty on stone fences, though they are durable, would not at this time be prudent. The object of the bounty, and the amount of it, are equally to be disregarded in the present case; we are simply to consider whether bounties may safely be given under the present constitution. For myself, I would rather begin with a bounty of one million per annum than one thousand. I wish that my constituents may know whether they are to put any confidence in that paper called the constitution.

You will suffer me to say, that the Southern States have much to fear from the progress of this Government, unless your strength is governed by prudence. The operation of the funding system has translated at least two millions of dollars from the Southern States, that is to say, from Georgia, the Carolinas, and Virginia, to the Northern States. The interest of that sum, when it shall be six per cent., will be $120,000; but the quota of those States is at least one-third of the whole; whence it follows, that they must pay forty thousand dollars every year, in the form of interest to the Northern States. This, it seems, is not sufficient, and other measures are to be adopted for draining the Southern States. Bounties to promote the general welfare are already brought forward. We shall not hear of a bounty for raising rice, or preparing naval stores. If that was the question, the general welfare would not have such prominent features. Unless the Southern States are protected by the constitution, their valuable staples, and their visionary wealth, must occasion their destruction. Three short years has this Government existed—it is not three years—but we have already given serious alarms to many of our fellow-citizens. Establish the doctrine of bounties, set aside that part of the constitution which requires equal taxes and demands similar distributions, destroy this barrier, and it is not a few fishermen that will enter, claiming ten or twelve thousand dollars, but all manner of persons—people of every trade and occupation—may enter at the breach, until they have eaten up the bread of our children.

Perhaps I have viewed this project in too serious a light; but if I am particularly solicitous on the subject of finance, that we do not even seem to depart from the spirit of the constitution, it is because I wish that the Union may be perpetual. The several States are now pretty well relieved from their debts, and our fellow-citizens in the Southern States have very little interest in the national funds; press them a little with unequal taxes, and the remedy is plain.

While I would shun bounties, as leading to dangerous measures, I am not inattentive to every argument that has been advanced by the honorable member who first rose in defence of the bill. That gentleman tells us, that more than a bushel of salt is used in curing a quintal of fish. If this fact be established, the former act should be amended, by giving a greater drawback. He says the drawback, as it is now paid to the merchant, does not operate so as to encourage the seamen, who have most need of such assistance. This is very probable, and the parties may be relieved by dividing the drawback in the very manner that is proposed by the bill. If it is true that the proposed bounties will not exceed the average of the drawback that should be paid on salt, why do they contend about names, unless they are solicitous about the precedent? If our object is to encourage industry, and to increase our commerce, by sending fish to a foreign market, we must adhere to the drawback; for, according to the terms of the bill, the bounty is to be paid, though every fish that is caught should be consumed in the country; in which case we should be paying a visionary drawback, when nothing was exported. According to the terms of the bill, there is no proportion between the labor and the reward, so far as the bank fishery is concerned; the bounty in all cases being the same.

Having exercised your patience in objecting to this new system of bounties, and having hinted on some objections to the general operations of the bill, so far as industry and enterprise may be desired, I shall, in a few words, submit the outline of a plan that seems to comprehend all the useful parts of the bill, without any speculation upon bounties.

If the drawback on dried fish exported, is not equal to the duty on the salt used in curing such fish, let the drawback be increased to eleven cents or twelve cents, as the case may be. Let us suppose that the drawback for the next year will be equal to the drawback on the last year; and let that sum of money, being the expected drawback, be divided between the seamen and owners, according to the terms of the bill. The accounts must be made up annually. If the drawback exceeds the allowance that had been made, the difference will be considered as advanced to the fishery, and the allowance for the next year must be somewhat reduced, according to the actual amount of the drawback. If the fishermen are more fortunate or more active, and the exports are increased, the allowance for the next year must be raised. The rule being fixed by law, all that remains, being pure calculation, may be done from year to year by the Executive. Every important object of this bill, that has been presented to our view, may be obtained by safe and constitutional steps. Why should a man take a dangerous and a doubtful path, when a safe one presents itself? If nothing more is desired than to regulate and protect the fishery, the bill may be altered and accommodated to that purpose. If the theory of bounties is to be established, by which the Southern States must suffer while others gain, the bill informs us what we are to expect.

The committee now rose, without taking any question.

Monday, February 6.

A member from Maryland, to wit, John Francis Mercer, returned to serve in the room of William Pinkney, resigned, appeared, and took his seat in the House.

A petition of the tanners of the town of Newark, in the State of New Jersey, was presented to the House and read, stating the inconveniences they suffer from the erection of mills for the purpose of grinding tanners' bark for exportation, and praying that Congress will adopt such measures for their relief as may appear just and right. Ordered to lie on the table.

The Cod Fisheries.

The House again resolved itself into a Committee of the whole House on the bill sent from the Senate, entitled "An act for the encouragement of the Bank and other Cod Fisheries, and for the regulation and government of the fishermen employed therein."

Mr. Goodhue.—The gentleman last up (Mr. Williamson) says, that an appropriation of money being made by the bill now before us, and the Treasury standing pledged for the payment, therefore a direct bounty is granted. At present, we pay in drawbacks about $45,000; but we cannot say that this sum will be adequate to the payment of the drawbacks next year; for, if a greater quantity of fish be taken, a greater sum, of course, must be allowed; and, as the sum depends entirely on the quantity of fish, it is impossible to ascertain beforehand the precise amount. There is not, however, in the whole bill, any thing of a bounty except the bare name. The gentleman allows that we may commute the present drawbacks, and give them to the fisherman instead of the merchant; but it is impossible to do this with safety in any other mode than that pointed out in the bill. Shall we leave it to the fisherman, to be determined by his oath? This would not be advisable.

The plan proposed is a much less exceptionable one. It is founded on a calculation that a certain quantity of tonnage is employed in taking a certain quantity of fish. On this calculation the allowance is apportioned to the tonnage. If gentlemen think the allowance too high, let the sum be reduced; but let it not be stigmatized as a bounty. It is no such thing. The word "bounty" is an unfortunate expression, and I wish it were entirely out of the bill.

Mr. Livermore.—The bill now under consideration has two important objects in view. The one is, to give encouragement to our fishermen, and, by that encouragement, to increase their numbers; the other is to govern those fishermen by certain laws, by which they will be kept under due restraint. Both these objects are of great importance to such persons as choose to employ their capitals in the fishery business. And I believe it will not be disputed that the business itself is of considerable importance to the United States, insomuch as it affords a certain proportion of remittance or exportation to foreign countries, and does not impoverish the country, but enriches it by the addition of so much wealth drawn from the sea.

It is the object of those gentlemen who favor the bill that the fishermen should have some encouragement, not given to them at the expense of the United States, but directed to them out of what was in the former law called a drawback of the duty on salt. The calculation, as I understand it, has been made as nearly as possible to give that drawback, not to the merchants who export the fish, but to the fishermen who take it, in order to increase that description of men, without whose assistance it is vain to expect any benefit from the fisheries; for, if the merchants at present engaged in that branch possessed the whole capital of the United States, yet, if they cannot get fishermen, they cannot carry on the fishery. This is done by a particular class of men, who must be not only expert seamen, but also accustomed to taking the fish and curing it. If these men cannot be had, the capital cannot be employed, and those who undertake the business cannot carry it on, or reap any profit from it.

Whilst the drawback is payable only to the merchant who exports the fish, it is impossible to convince the fishermen that they reap from it any advantage whatever; or, if the more discerning among them do perceive any advantage in it, the others who are not so clear-sighted cannot discern it, and are therefore not disposed to undertake the business. It is, however, of considerable importance to the merchants that the fisherman should receive a proper encouragement, even if they were obliged to allow him a bounty out of their own pocket.

The government of the fishermen, after their engagement in this business, is also necessary to be provided for; otherwise, frequent instances may occur among that class of men of quitting one vessel to embark on board another, or of shipping themselves for a foreign voyage, before the expiration of the fishing season. In the latter case, the vessel lies useless on the owner's hands, and he, together with the whole expense of the outfit, loses all his prospects of future gain.

The two objects here mentioned are fully provided for in the bill. Still, however, it is objected to. But what is the objection? It is, that the word "bounty" is twice used in this clause. Let us now see what advantage will result from striking out this obnoxious "bounty." None at all. The bill says it shall cease; and have gentlemen any objection to the bounty's ceasing? Since the bounty is to cease by this bill, what advantage in striking it out? The sense would still remain the same; and I do not know why we should make a law expressly to strike out the word "bounty," but to strike out the bounty itself.

It is strange to me that any gentleman, whether he is for giving a great bounty or no bounty at all, should quarrel with this unfortunate word. There is, indeed, one part of the section which I will readily consent to strike out, and I believe every other gentleman who is in favor of the bill will consent to it likewise; and that is the clause which provides that the bounty to be allowed and paid on every vessel for one season, shall not exceed one hundred and seventy dollars. If, when the vote is taken on the section, there does not appear a majority of the House in favor of striking out the whole, we may then move for striking out the proviso, if it be offensive to any gentleman. If it be not offensive, it may remain.

If gentlemen are disputing only because the word "bounty" is in the bill, they may be perfectly relieved from their uneasiness on that score; for the bill expressly says, "that the bounty now allowed upon the exportation of dried fish of the fisheries of the United States shall cease, and in lieu thereof," a different kind of encouragement is to be given. Here is no reason to dispute about a word. If gentlemen are disposed to consent to the principle of the bill, that the drawback of the duties on salt shall be commuted for a certain sum, to encourage the fishermen, they will vote in favor of the bill; if not, they will vote against it. But it is impossible for me to conceive why any gentleman under heaven should be against it. It is only fixing, for the merchants engaged in this branch, a clear and equitable ratio for distributing among the fishermen that encouragement which they think necessary in order to attach those people to the business, and to prevent them from going to other occupations on land. The bill is an important one, and will increase that branch of business, which is very useful to the community. It does not lay a farthing of bounty or duty on any other persons than those who are immediately concerned in it. It will serve them, and will not injure any body.

Mr. Laurance said, from examining the section, he conceived it contemplated no more than what the merchant is entitled to by existing laws. The merchant is now entitled to the drawback; but it is found by experience that the effect has not been to produce that encouragement to the fishermen which was expected; and he presumed the way was perfectly clear to give a new direction to the drawback, and this is all that is aimed at in the bill. He supposed that the clause had no necessary connection with the question which had been started respecting the right of the Government to grant bounties; but, since the question has been brought forward, it may be proper to consider it. In discussing the question, he inquired, What has Congress already done? Have we not laid extra duties on various articles, expressly for the purpose of encouraging various branches of our own manufactures? These duties are bounties to all intents and purposes, and are founded on the idea only of their conducing to the general interest. Similar objections to those now advanced were not made to these duties. They were advocated, some of them, by gentlemen from the Southward. He traced the effects of these duties, and showed that they operated fully as indirect bounties.

Mr. L. then adverted particularly to the constitution, and observed that it contains general principles and powers only. These powers depend on particular laws for their operation; and on this idea, he contended that the powers of the Government must, in various circumstances, extend to the granting bounties. He instanced, in case of a war with a foreign power, will any gentleman say that the General Government has not a power to grant a bounty on arms, ammunition, &c., should the general welfare require it? The general welfare is inseparably connected with any object or pursuit which in its effects adds to the riches of the country. He conceived that the argument was given up by gentlemen in opposition to the bill, when they admit of encouragement to the fishermen in any possible modification of it. He then adverted particularly to the fisheries, stated the number of men employed, the tons of shipping necessary to export the fish taken, and inferred the sound policy of encouraging so important a branch of business.

Gentlemen say that we do not want a navy. Grant it; but can they say that we shall never have a war with any European power? May not the time arrive when the protection to the commerce of this country, derived from this source, may be of the utmost necessity to its existence? Adverting to Mr. Williamson's objection from the unequal operation of bounties, and who had referred to the article of the constitution which says that taxes shall be equal in all the States, Mr. L. observed, that this article in the constitution could only respect the rates of the duties, and that the same duties should be paid in Virginia that are paid in New York—at the Northward as at the Southward. It surely could not mean that every individual should pay exactly the same sum in every part of the Union. This was a provision that no law could possible contemplate.

He concluded by a summary recapitulation of his arguments, and saying he hoped the section would be retained.

Mr. Madison.—In the conflict I feel between my disposition on one hand to afford every constitutional encouragement to the fisheries, and my dislike, on the other, of the consequences apprehended from some clauses of the bill, I should have forborne to enter into this discussion, if I had not found, that over and above such arguments as appear to be natural and pertinent to the subject, others have been introduced which are, in my judgment, contrary to the true meaning, and even strike at the characteristic principles of the existing constitution. Let me premise, however, to the remarks which I shall briefly offer, on the doctrine maintained by these gentlemen, that I make a material distinction, in the present case, between an allowance as a mere commutation and modification of a drawback, and an allowance in the nature of a real and positive bounty. I make a distinction also, as a subject of fair consideration at least, between a bounty granted under the particular terms in the constitution, "a power to regulate trade," and one granted under the indefinite terms which have been cited as authority on this occasion. I think, however, that the term "bounty," is in every point of view improper as it is here applied, not only because it may be offensive to some, and in the opinion of others carries a dangerous implication, but also because it does not express the true intention of the bill, as avowed and advocated by its patrons themselves. For if, in the allowance, nothing more is proposed than a mere reimbursement of the sum advanced, it is only paying a debt; and when we pay a debt, we ought not to claim the merit of granting a bounty.

It is supposed by some gentlemen, that Congress have authority not only to grant bounties in the sense here used, merely as a commutation for drawbacks, but even to grant them under a power by virtue of which they may do any thing which they may think conducive to the "general welfare." This, sir, in my mind, raises the important and fundamental question, whether the general terms which had been cited, are to be considered as a sort of caption or general description of the specified powers, and as having no further meaning, and giving no further power than what is found in that specification; or as an abstract and indefinite delegation of power extending to all cases whatever; to all such, at least, as will admit the application of money, which is giving as much latitude as any government could well desire.

I, sir, have always conceived—I believe those who proposed the constitution conceived, and it is still more fully known, and more material to observe that those who ratified the constitution conceived—that this is not an indefinite Government, deriving its powers from the general terms prefixed to the specified powers, but a limited Government, tied down to the specified powers which explain and define the general terms. The gentlemen who contend for a contrary doctrine are surely not aware of the consequences which flow from it, and which they must either admit or give up their doctrine.

It will follow, in the first place, that if the terms be taken in the broad sense they maintain, the particular powers afterwards so carefully and distinctly enumerated would be without any meaning, and must go for nothing. It would be absurd to say, first, that Congress may do what they please, and then that they may do this or that particular thing; after giving Congress power to raise money, and apply it to all purposes which they may pronounce necessary to the general welfare, it would be absurd, to say the least, to superadd a power to raise armies, to provide fleets, &c. In fact, the meaning of the general terms in question must either be sought in the subsequent enumeration which limits and details them, or they convert the Government from one limited, as hitherto supposed, to the enumerated powers, into a Government without any limits at all.

It is to be recollected, that the terms "common defence and general welfare," as here used, are not novel terms, first introduced into this constitution. They are terms familiar in their construction, and well known to the people of America. They are repeatedly found in the old Articles of Confederation, where, although they are susceptible of as great latitude as can be given them by the context here, it was never supposed or pretended that they conveyed any such power as is now assigned to them. On the contrary, it was always considered as clear and certain, that the old Congress was limited to the enumerated powers, and that the enumeration limited and explained the general terms. I ask the gentlemen themselves, whether it ever was supposed or suspected that the old Congress could give away the moneys of the States in bounties, to encourage agriculture, or for any other purpose they pleased? If such a power had been possessed by that body, it would have been much less impotent, or have borne a very different character from that universally ascribed to it.

The novel idea now annexed to these terms, and never before entertained by the friends or enemies of the Government, will have a further consequence, which cannot have been taken into the view of the gentlemen. Their construction would not only give Congress the complete Legislative power I have stated—it would do more—it would supersede all the restrictions understood at present to lie on their power with respect to the Judiciary. It would put it in the power of Congress to establish courts throughout the United States, with cognizance of suits between citizen and citizen, and in all cases whatsoever. This, sir, seems to be demonstrable; for if the clause in question really authorizes Congress to do whatever they think fit, provided it be for the general welfare, of which they are to judge, and money can be applied to it, Congress must have power to create and support a Judiciary Establishment, with a jurisdiction extending to all cases favorable, in their opinion, to the general welfare, in the same manner as they have power to pass laws and apply money, providing in any other way for the general welfare. I shall be reminded, perhaps, that according to the terms of the constitution, the Judicial Power is to extend to certain cases only, not to all cases. But this circumstance can have no effect in the argument, it being presupposed by the gentlemen that the specification of certain objects does not limit the import of general terms. Taking these terms as an abstract and indefinite grant of power, they comprise all the objects of Legislative regulation, as well such as fall under the Judiciary article in the constitution, as those falling immediately under the Legislative article; and if the partial enumeration of objects in the Legislative article does not, as these gentlemen contend, limit the general power, neither will it be limited by the partial enumeration of objects in the Judiciary article.

There are consequences, sir, still more extensive, which, as they follow clearly from the doctrine combated, must either be admitted, or the doctrine must be given up. If Congress can apply money indefinitely to the general welfare, and are the sole and supreme judges of the general welfare, they may take the care of religion into their own hands; they may establish teachers in every State, county, and parish, and pay them out of the public Treasury; they may take into their own hands the education of children, establishing in like manner schools throughout the Union; they may undertake the regulation of all roads, other than post roads. In short, every thing, from the highest object of State legislation, down to the most minute object of police, would be thrown under the power of Congress; for every object I have mentioned would admit the application of money, and might be called, if Congress pleased, provisions for the general welfare.

The language held in various discussions of this House, is a proof that the doctrine in question was never entertained by this body. Arguments, wherever the subject would permit, have constantly been drawn from the peculiar nature of this Government, as limited to certain enumerated powers, instead of extending, like other Governments, to all cases not particularly excepted. In a very late instance—I mean the debate on the Representation bill—it must be remembered, that an argument much urged, particularly by a gentleman from Massachusetts, against the ratio of one for thirty thousand, was, that this Government was unlike the State Governments, which had an indefinite variety of objects within their power; that it had a small number of objects only to attend to, and therefore that a smaller number of Representatives would be sufficient to administer it.

Several arguments have been advanced to show, that because, in the regulation of trade, indirect and eventual encouragement is given to manufactures, therefore Congress have power to give money in direct bounties, or to grant it in any other way that would answer the same purpose. But surely, sir, there is a great and obvious difference, which it cannot be necessary to enlarge upon. A duty laid on imported implements of husbandry, would, in its operation, be an indirect tax on exported produce; but will any one say, that by virtue of a mere power to lay duties on imports, Congress might go directly to the produce or implements of agriculture, or to the articles exported? It is true, duties on exports are expressly prohibited; but if there were no article forbidding them, a power directly to tax exports could never be deduced from a power to tax imports, although such a power might directly and incidentally affect exports.

In short, sir, without going further into the subject, which I should not have here touched on at all but for the reasons already mentioned, I venture to declare it as my opinion, that were the power of Congress to be established in the latitude contended for, it would subvert the very foundation, and transmute the very nature of the limited Government established by the people of America; and what inferences might be drawn, or what consequences ensue from such a step, it is incumbent on us all well to consider.

With respect to the question before the House, for striking out the clause, it is immaterial whether it be struck out, or so amended as to rest on the avowed principle of a commutation for the drawback; but as a clause has been drawn up by my colleague, in order to be substituted, I shall concur in a vote for striking out, reserving to myself a freedom to be governed in my final vote by the modification which may prevail.

Mr. Bourne, of Massachusetts—

Mr. Chairman: I think little can be added after so full a discussion of the subject before you. The object of the first section in this bill is intended for the relief of the fishermen and their owners. They complain that the law now in force was meant for their benefit, by granting a drawback on the fish exported; this they find by experience is not the case, for they say, that neither the fishermen who catch the fish, nor the importer of the salt, receive the drawback; and I rather suppose, sir, it is the case. The owners of the greater part of the fishing vessels are not merchants, neither do they import the salt they consume; but when the fish they take are cured for market, they are sold at the market price; and it frequently happens that those persons who purchase the fish are not the exporters of them, or the importers of the salt, but a third person, who purchases with a prospect of selling them at a profit, is the exporter; and when it so happens, neither the fisherman who catches the fish, nor the importer of the salt, receives any benefit from the drawback, unless the purchaser (the third person) give a greater price in contemplation of the drawback, which I think is not to be supposed.

Is it worthy the attention of Government that the cod fishery should be preserved? It appears to me that it is. When we consider the labor and assiduity bestowed on this object by our Ministers, at the settlement of peace between us and Great Britain, and the care then taken to secure this privilege, as appears by the treaty—[here Mr. B. read that part of the treaty which secures to us the fishery, he then proceeded]—and consider the struggle made to deprive us of this inestimable branch of commerce, I cannot suppose that any one would, at this day, voluntarily relinquish it, and suffer Great Britain to monopolize this branch, and supply the Mediterranean, French, and other markets. Great Britain, at present, enjoys a sufficient portion of this commerce, while France is confined to the narrow limits of St. Peters and Miquelon. If we relinquish this branch of the cod fishery, what is left us? Our whale fishery is nearly at an end, and unless Government speedily interpose, by granting relief, we shall totally lose it. Does not the British Government wish to deprive us of this branch also? Have not letters of agents been sent to the island of Nantucket, as well as New Bedford, where this branch of business is principally prosecuted, inviting the whale fishermen to remove, and offering them permanent settlements at Milford-Haven, at the expense of their Government? This must be viewed as a great encouragement, in addition to their bounties on oil, to a class of poor men employed in that business. If the cod fishery is relinquished, the fishermen have only to remove to the opposite shore of Nova Scotia, where they will find encouragement fully adequate to their services—of all which they are not unapprised. By encouraging this class of men, your revenue will be increased; for in return for the fish exported, you will receive sugar, coffee, cocoa, indigo, molasses, pimento, cotton, dye-woods, rum, wine, salt, fruit, and other articles subject to duty, and consumed in the country. And again, your Treasury will receive an excess by the provision in this bill; for I presume the greater proportion of vessels employed in this business are from twenty to forty tons; the town of Marblehead, perhaps, has principally large ones. Suppose, then, a vessel of thirty tons obtains, in a season, six hundred quintals of fish? (a very moderate voyage indeed,) her tonnage is seventy-five dollars; the drawback on exportation would be seventy-eight dollars; so that your Treasury retains three dollars gain by this bill, which would be a loss on the drawback.

Mr. Chairman, I think, upon the whole, that granting the encouragement to the fishermen and their owners, held out in the bill, would prove very beneficial to the United States; I hope, therefore, the section before you will not be struck out.

At this point, the committee rose, and had leave to sit again.

Tuesday, February 7.

Ordered, That the petitions of the tanners of the town of Newark, in the State of New Jersey, which was presented yesterday, be referred to Mr. Boudinot, Mr. White, Mr. Thatcher, Mr. Bourne, of Rhode Island, and Mr. Niles; that they do examine the matter thereof, and report the same, with their opinion thereupon, to the House.

Mr. Benson, from the committee appointed, presented a bill for an apportionment of Representatives among the several States, according to the first enumeration, and making provision for another enumeration, and apportionment of Representatives thereon, to compose the House of Representatives after the third day of March, 1797; which was received and read the first time.