FIRST CONGRESS.—FIRST SESSION. (continued 6)

Mr. Ames.—I am against the previous question being taken, because I wish the House to consider the motion made by the gentleman from New York; it is admitted to be a question of considerable importance; if it is, it ought to be considered; otherwise, we are shutting the door on information, and putting it out of our power to ascertain the propriety or impropriety of the motion.

I should be glad to know if any gentleman contemplates the State of Rhode Island dissevered from the Union; a maritime State, situated in the most convenient manner for the purpose of smuggling, and defrauding our revenue. Surely, a moment's reflection will induce the House to take measures to secure this object. Do gentlemen imagine that State will join the Union? If they do, what is the injury arising from the adoption of the resolution intended to be submitted to the committee? Is there any impropriety in desiring them to consider a question which they have not yet decided? It has been suggested by an honorable gentleman, that this desire will operate as a demand. If a wish of Congress can bring them into the Union, why should we decline to express such a wish?

The previous question being insisted upon, was put—"Shall the main question be now put?" and it was determined in the negative. Adjourned.

Monday, June 8.

Michael Jenifer Stone, from Maryland, appeared, and took his seat.

Tuesday, June 16.

Department of Foreign Affairs.

The House then resolved itself into a Committee of the Whole on the bill for establishing an executive department, to be denominated the Department of Foreign Affairs. Mr. Trumbull in the chair.

The first clause, after recapitulating the title of the officer and his duties, had these words: "To be removable from office by the President of the United States."

Mr. White.—The constitution gives the President the power of nominating, and, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, appointing to office. As I conceive the power of appointing and dismissing to be united in their natures, and a principle that never was called in question in any Government, I am averse to that part of the clause which subjects the Secretary of Foreign Affairs to be removed at the will of the President. In the constitution, special provision is made for the removal of the judges; that I acknowledge to be a deviation from my principle; but as it is a constitutional provision, it is to be admitted. In all cases not otherwise provided for in the constitution, I take it, that the principle I have laid down is the governing one. Now the constitution has associated the Senate with the President in appointing the heads of departments. The Secretary of Foreign Affairs is the head of a department; for the words of the law declare, that there shall be a department established, at the head of which shall be an officer to be so denominated. If, then, the Senate are associated with the President in the appointment, they ought also to be associated in the dismission from office. Upon the justness of this construction, I take the liberty of reviving the motion made in the Committee of the Whole, for striking out these words: "to be removable from office by the President of the United States."

Mr. Smith, (of South Carolina.)—The gentleman has anticipated me in his motion; I am clearly in sentiment with him that the words ought to go out. It is in the recollection of the committee, that when the subject was last before us, this power was excepted to; and although the words were then allowed to stand, it was generally understood that it should be further debated. I then was opposed to giving this power to the President, and am still of opinion that we ought not to make this declaration, even if he has the power by the constitution.

I would premise that one of these two ideas is just: either that the constitution has given the President the power of removal, and therefore it is nugatory to make the declaration here; or it has not given the power to him, and therefore it is improper to make an attempt to confer it upon him. If it is not given to him by the constitution, but belongs conjointly to the President and Senate, we have no right to deprive the Senate of their constitutional prerogative; and it has been the opinion of sensible men that the power was lodged in this manner. A publication of no inconsiderable eminence in the class of political writings on the constitution, has advanced this sentiment. The author, or authors, (for I have understood it to be the production of two gentlemen of great information,) of the work published under the signature of Publius, has these words:

"It has been mentioned as one of the advantages to be expected from the co-operation of the Senate in the business of appointments, that it would contribute to the stability of the administration. The consent of that body would be necessary to displace as well as appoint. A change of the Chief Magistrate, therefore, would not occasion so violent or so general a revolution in the officers of the Government, as might be expected if he were the sole disposer of offices. Where a man in any station has given satisfactory evidence of his fitness for it, a new President would be restrained from attempting a change in favor of a person more agreeable to him, by the apprehension that the discountenance of the Senate might frustrate the attempt, and bring some degree of discredit upon himself. Those who can best estimate the value of a steady administration, will be most disposed to prize a provision which connects the official existence of public men with the approbation or disapprobation of that body, which, from the greater permanency of its own composition, will, in all probability, be less subject to inconstancy than any other member of the Government."

Here this author lays it down, that there can be no doubt of the power of the Senate in the business of removal. Let this be as it may, I am clear that the President alone has not the power. Examine the constitution; the powers of the several branches of Government are there defined; the President has particular powers assigned him; the Judiciary have in like manner powers assigned them; but you will find no such power as removing from office given to the President. I call upon gentlemen to show me where it is said that the President shall remove from office. I know they cannot do it. Now, I infer from this, that, as the constitution has not given the President the power of removability, it meant that he should not have that power; and this inference is supported by that clause in the constitution which provides that all civil officers of the United States shall be removed from office on impeachment for, and on conviction of treason, bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors. Here is a particular mode described for removing; and if there is no other mode directed, I contend that the constitution contemplated only this mode.

I imagine, sir, we are declaring a power in the President which may hereafter be greatly abused; for we are not always to expect a Chief Magistrate in whom such entire confidence can be placed as in the present. Perhaps gentlemen are so much dazzled with the splendor of the virtues of the present President, as not to be able to see into futurity. The framers of the constitution did not confine their views to the first person who was looked up to to fill the Presidential chair. If they had, they might have omitted those checks and guards with which the powers of the Executive are surrounded. They knew, from the course of human events, that they could not expect to be so highly favored of heaven as to have the blessing of his administration more than seven or fourteen years; after which, they supposed a man might get into power, who, it was possible, might misbehave. We ought to follow their example, and contemplate this power in the hands of an ambitious man, who might apply it to dangerous purposes. If we give this power to the President, he may, from caprice, remove the most worthy men from office. His will and pleasure will be the slight tenure by which an office is to be held, and of consequence you render the officer the mere state-dependant, the abject slave of a person who may be disposed to abuse the confidence his fellow-citizens have placed in him.

Mr. Huntington.—I think the clause ought not to stand. It was well observed that the constitution was silent respecting the removal, otherwise than by impeachment. I would likewise add, that it mentions no other cause of removal than treason, bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors. It does not, I apprehend, extend to cases of infirmity or incapacity. Indeed, it appears hard to me, that after an officer has become old in an honorable service, he should be impeached for this infirmity. The constitution, I think, must be the only rule to guide us on this occasion; as it is silent with respect to the removal, Congress ought to say nothing about it, because it implies that we have a right to bestow it, and I believe this power is not to be found among the enumerated powers delegated by the constitution to Congress.

Mr. Sedgwick.—I wish the words to be struck out, because I conceive them to be unnecessary in this place. I do conceive, Mr. Speaker, that this officer will be the mere creature of the law; and that very little need be said to prove to you that of necessity this ought to be the case. I apprehend, likewise, that it requires but a small share of abilities to point out certain causes for which a person ought to be removed from office, without being guilty of treason, bribery, or malfeasance; and the nature of things demands that it should be so. Suppose, sir, a man becomes insane by the visitation of God, and is likely to ruin our affairs, are the hands of Government to be confined from warding off the evil? Suppose a person in office, not possessing the talents he was judged to have at the time of the appointment, is the error not to be corrected? Suppose he acquires vicious habits, an incurable indolence, or total neglect of the duties of his office, which forebode mischief to the public welfare, is there no way to arrest the threatened danger? Suppose he becomes odious and unpopular by reason of the measures which he pursues, (and this he may do without committing any positive offence against the law,) must he preserve his office in despite of the public will? Suppose him grasping at his own aggrandizement, and the elevation of his connections, by every means short of the treason defined by the constitution, hurrying your affairs to the precipice of destruction, endangering your domestic tranquillity, plundering you of the means of defence, by alienating the affections of your allies, and promoting the spirit of discord; is there no way suddenly to seize the worthless wretch, and hurl him from the pinnacle of power? Must the tardy, tedious, desultory road, by way of impeachment, be travelled to overtake the man who, barely confining himself within the letter of the law, is employed in drawing off the vital principle of the Government? Sir, the nature of things, the great objects of society, the express objects of this constitution, require that this thing should be otherwise. Well, sir, this is admitted by gentlemen; but they say the Senate is to be united with the President in the exercise of this power. I hope, sir, that is not the case; because it would involve us in the most serious difficulty. Suppose a discovery of any of those events which I have just enumerated were to take place when the Senate is not in session, how is the remedy to be applied? This is a serious consideration, and the evil could be avoided no other way than by the Senate's sitting always. Surely no gentleman of this House contemplates the necessity of incurring such an expense. I am sure it will be very objectionable to our constituents; and yet this must be done, or the public interest be endangered by keeping an unworthy officer in place until that body shall be assembled from the extremes of the Union. It has been said that there is a danger of this power being abused if exercised by one man. Certainly the danger is as great with respect to the Senate, who are assembled from various parts of the continent, with different impressions and opinions. It appears to me that such a body is more likely to misuse this power than the man whom the united voice of America calls to the Presidential chair. As the nature of the Government requires the power of removal, I think it is to be exercised in this way by a hand capable of exerting itself with effect, and, the power must be conferred upon the President by the constitution, as the executive officer of the Government.

Mr. Madison.—If the construction of the constitution is to be left to its natural course with respect to the executive powers of this Government, I own that the insertion of this sentiment in law may not be of material importance, though, if it is nothing more than a mere declaration of a clear grant made by the constitution, it can do no harm; but if it relates to a doubtful part of the constitution, I suppose an exposition of the constitution may come with as much propriety from the Legislature, as any other department of the Government. If the power naturally belongs to the Government, and the constitution is undecided as to the body which is to exercise it, it is likely that it is submitted to the discretion of the Legislature, and the question will depend upon its own merits.

I am clearly of opinion with the gentleman from South Carolina, (Mr. Smith,) that we ought in this, and every other case, to adhere to the constitution, so far as it will serve as a guide to us, and that we ought not to be swayed in our decisions by the splendor of the character of the present Chief Magistrate, but to consider it with respect to the merit of men who, in the ordinary course of things, may be supposed to fill the chair. I believe the power here declared is a high one, and, in some respects, a dangerous one; but, in order to come to a right decision on this point, we must consider both sides of the question: the possible abuses which may spring from the single will of the First Magistrate, and the abuse which may spring from the combined will of the Executive and the Senatorial disqualification.

When we consider that the First Magistrate is to be appointed at present by the suffrages of three millions of people, and in all human probability in a few years' time by double that number, it is not to be presumed that a vicious or bad character will be selected. If the Government of any country on the face of the earth was ever effectually guarded against the election of ambitious or designing characters to the first office of the State, I think it may with truth be said to be the case under the constitution of the United States. With all the infirmities incident to a popular election, corrected by the particular mode of conducting it, as directed under the present system, I think we may fairly calculate that the instances will be very rare in which an unworthy man will receive that mark of the public confidence which is required to designate the President of the United States. Where the people are disposed to give so great an elevation to one of their fellow-citizens, I own that I am not afraid to place my confidence in him, especially when I know he is impeachable for any crime or misdemeanor before the Senate, at all times; and that, at all events, he is impeachable before the community at large every four years, and liable to be displaced if his conduct shall have given umbrage during the time he has been in office. Under these circumstances, although the trust is a high one, and in some degree, perhaps, a dangerous one, I am not sure but it will be safer here than placed where some gentlemen suppose it ought to be.

Mr. Vining.—I hoped, Mr. Chairman, after the discussion this subject had received on a former occasion, that it would have been unnecessary to re-examine it. The arguments against the clause are reiterated: but, I trust, without a chance of success. They were fully answered before; and I expect the impressions made at that time are not already effaced. The House, as well as the Committee of the Whole, have determined that those words shall be inserted in the bill; the special committee could therefore do no less than place them where they are; a deference is due to the decision of the House.

The House has determined to make a declaration of their construction of the constitution. I am perfectly in sentiment with the majority on this occasion; and contend, that if this power is not in the President, it is not vested in any body whatever. It cannot be within the legislative power of the Senate, because it is of an adverse nature; it cannot be within the executive power of the Senate, because they possess none but what is expressly granted by the constitution. If gentlemen will point out where the constitution confers this power upon the Senate, I will read my recantation, and subscribe to the justness of their doctrine.

I am not satisfied that removability shall be acquired only by impeachment. Were the advocates of this doctrine aware of its consequences, when they advanced it? The Senate has the sole power of trying impeachments; the President is here out of the question. If no officer can be constitutionally removed but by impeachment, it applies to subordinate officers as well as heads of departments. For the constitution only gives power to Congress to establish officers by law, and vests the appointment in the President. If these officers are not removable but by impeachment, what is to become of our affairs, when any of the accidents occur which were enumerated by the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. Sedgwick)? Are we to take the circuitous route of impeachment? The dilatory and inefficient process by that mode, will not apply the remedy to the evil till it is too late to be of advantage. Experience has fixed an eternal stigma upon the system of impeachment; witness the case I mentioned, the other day, of Warren Hastings before the British Lords; what delays and uncertainty with the forms of trial, details of evidence, arguments of counsel, and deliberate decision! I ask gentlemen, can there be a greater evil than this in any Government? Why, then, will gentlemen advocate a doctrine so obnoxious to the principles of the constitution, when a more favorable construction is at hand?

Mr. White.—Mention has been made of impeachments, as the only mode of removing an officer. I will explain my ideas on this point, in order that the committee may be masters of my particular objections to the clause. I consider impeachments necessary to be employed in cases respecting an officer who is appointed during good behavior. Thus the judges can only be removed by impeachment. The President and Vice President hold their offices for the terms mentioned in the constitution, not liable to be removed from office in any other way. These circumstances are a deviation from my general principle; but have nevertheless a proper ground to be supported on. The electors who appoint the President, cannot assemble to exercise the authority which would naturally be in them. With respect to the judges, it is found necessary for the proper and uncorrupt administration of justice, and the security of freedom, to have them independent in their stations, so that they be not removable at pleasure. To them, therefore, the doctrine of impeachment is peculiarly applicable. It may properly be extended further, in cases where the President is desirous of retaining an officer who ought not to be retained. This House has the power of controlling him, and may impeach the officer before the Senate. In either of these three cases impeachments are necessary.

Mr. Boudinot.—This is a question, Mr. Speaker, that requires full consideration, and ought only to be settled on the most candid discussion. It certainly involves the right of the Senate to a very important power. At present, I am so impressed with the importance of the subject, that I dare not absolutely decide on any principle, although I am firmly persuaded we ought to retain the clause in the bill; and, so far as it has been examined, I agree that it is a legislative construction of the constitution, necessary to be settled for the direction of your officers. But if it is a deviation from the constitution, or in the least degree an infringement upon the authority of the other branch of the Legislature, I shall most decidedly be against it. But I think it will appear, on a full consideration of this business, that we can do no otherwise than agree to this construction, in order to preserve to each department the full exercise of its powers, and to give this House security for the proper conduct of the officers who are to execute the laws.

Mr. Smith, (of South Carolina.)—I have attended to the arguments of the gentlemen who oppose the motion for striking out, and I apprehend that their reasoning is not perfectly consistent. The construction of some gentlemen is, that the power of removal is given to the President by the constitution. Others are of opinion that the constitution is silent; and therefore the House ought to give it. To oppose these adverse arguments, I must return to my strong ground on which my opponents dare not venture. I state again, that if the constitution has given the power, it is unnecessary to give it here; or if it has not given it, we have no right to confer it, because it is not within the enumerated powers delegated to Congress.

Gentlemen have said that it is proper to give a legislative construction of the constitution. I differ with them on this point. I think it an infringement of the powers of the Judiciary. It is said, we ought not to blend the legislative, executive, or judiciary powers, further than is done by the constitution; and yet the advocates for preserving each department pure and untouched by the others, call upon this House to exercise the powers of the judges in expounding the constitution. What authority has this House to explain the law? But if it has this privilege, the Senate is also invested with it as part of the Legislature; and, in exercising it on the present question, we shall be likely to differ. If the constitution is silent, and gentlemen admit this, it is possible the Senate may view it with a favorable eye to their own right, and reject the bill on account of this clause. A great deal of mischief has arisen in the several States, by the Legislatures undertaking to decide constitutional questions. Sir, it is the duty of the Legislature to make laws; your judges are to expound them.

Mr. Gerry.—Some gentlemen consider this as a question of policy; but to me it appears a question of constitutionality, and I presume it will be determined on that point alone. The best arguments I have heard urged on this occasion came from the honorable gentleman from Virginia, (Mr. Madison.) He says the constitution has vested the executive power in the President; and that he has a right to exercise it under the qualifications therein made. He lays it down as a maxim, that the constitution vesting in the President the executive power, naturally vests him with the power of appointment and removal. Now I would be glad to know from that gentleman by what means we are to decide this question. Is his maxim supported by precedent drawn from the practice of the individual States? The direct contrary is established. In many cases the Executives are not in particular vested with the power of appointment; and do they exercise that power by virtue of their office? It will be found that other branches of the Government make appointments. How then can gentlemen assert that the powers of appointment and removal are incident to the Executive Department of Government? To me it appears at best but problematical. Neither is it clear to me that the power that appoints naturally possesses the power of removal. As we have no certainty on either of these points, I think we must consider it as established by the constitution.

It appears very clear to me, that however this power may be distributed by the constitution, the House of Representatives have nothing to do with it. Why then should we interfere in the business? Are we afraid that the President and Senate are not sufficiently informed to know their respective duties? Our interposition argues that they want judgment, and are not able to adjust their powers without the wisdom of this House to assist them; to say the least on this point, it must be deemed indelicate for us to intermeddle with them. If the fact is, as we seem to suspect, that they do not understand the constitution, let it go before the proper tribunal; the judges are the constitutional umpires on such questions. Why, let me ask gentlemen, shall we commit an infraction of the constitution for fear the Senate or President should not comply with its directions?

Mr. Ames.—When this question was agitated at a former period, I took no part in the debate. I believe it was then proposed, without any idea or intention of drawing on a lengthy discussion, and to me it appeared to be well understood and settled by the House; but since it has been reiterated and contested again, I feel it my bounden duty to deliver the reasons for voting in the manner I then did, and shall now do. Mr. Chairman, I look upon every question which touches the constitution as serious and important, and therefore worthy of the fullest discussion, and the most solemn decision. I believe, on the present occasion, we may come to something near certainty, by attending to the leading principles of the constitution. In order that the good purposes of a Federal Government should be answered, it was necessary to delegate considerable powers; and the principle upon which the grant was made, intended to give sufficient power to do all possible good, but to restrain the rulers from doing mischief.

The constitution places all executive power in the hands of the President, and could he personally execute all the laws, there would be no occasion for establishing auxiliaries; but the circumscribed powers of human nature in one man, demand the aid of others. When the objects are widely stretched out, or greatly diversified, meandering through such an extent of territory as that the United States possess, a minister cannot see with his own eyes every transaction, or feel with his hands the minutiæ that pass through his department. He must therefore have assistants. But in order that he may be responsible to his country, he must have a choice in selecting his assistants, a control over them, with power to remove them when he finds the qualifications which induced their appointment cease to exist. There are officers under the constitution who hold their office by a different tenure—your judges are appointed during good behavior; and from the delicacy and peculiar nature of their trust, it is right it should be so, in order that they may be independent and impartial in administering justice between the Government and its citizens. But the removability of the one class, or immovability of the other, is founded on the same principle, the security of the people against the abuse of power. Does any gentleman imagine that an officer is entitled to his office as to an estate? Or does the Legislature establish them for the convenience of an individual? For my part I conceive it intended to carry into effect the purposes for which the constitution was intended.

The executive powers are delegated to the President, with a view to have a responsible officer to superintend, control, inspect, and check the officers necessarily employed in administering the laws. The only bond between him and those he employs, is the confidence he has in their integrity and talents; when that confidence ceases, the principal ought to have power to remove those whom he can no longer trust with safety. If an officer shall be guilty of neglect or infidelity, there can be no doubt but he ought to be removed; yet there may be numerous causes for removal which do not amount to a crime. He may propose to do a mischief; but I believe the mere intention would not be cause of impeachment. He may lose the confidence of the people upon suspicion, in which case it would be improper to retain him in service; he ought to be removed at any time, when, instead of doing the greatest possible good, he is likely to do an injury to the public interest by being continued in the administration.

I presume gentlemen will generally admit that officers ought to be removed when they become obnoxious; but the question is, how shall this power be exercised? It will not, I apprehend, be contended, that all officers hold their offices during good behavior. If this be the case, it is a most singular Government. I believe there is not another in the universe that bears the least semblance to it in this particular; such a principle, I take it, is contrary to the nature of things. But the manner how to remove is the question. If the officer misbehaves, he can be removed by impeachment; but in this case is impeachment the only mode of removal? It would be found very inconvenient to have a man continued in office after being impeached, and when all confidence in him was suspended or lost. Would not the end of impeachment be defeated by this means? If Mr. Hastings, who was mentioned by the gentleman from Delaware (Mr. Vining) preserved his command in India, could he not defeat the impeachment now pending in Great Britain? If that doctrine obtains in America, we shall find impeachments come too late; while we are preparing the process, the mischief will be perpetrated, and the offender will escape. I apprehend it will be as frequently necessary to prevent crimes as to punish them; and it may often happen that the only prevention is by removal. The superintending power possessed by the President, will perhaps enable him to discover a base intention before it is ripe for execution. It may happen that the Treasurer may be disposed to betray the public chest to the enemy, and so injure the Government beyond the possibility of reparation; should the President be restrained from removing so dangerous an officer, until the slow formality of an impeachment was complied with, when the nature of the case rendered the application of a sudden and decisive remedy indispensable?

But it will, I say, be admitted, that an officer may be removed. The question then is, by whom? Some gentlemen say by the President alone; and others, by the President, by and with the advice of the Senate. By the advocates of the latter mode, it is alleged, that the constitution is in the way of the power of removal being by the President alone. If this is absolutely the case, there is an end to all further inquiry. But before we suffer this to be considered as an insuperable impediment, we ought to be clear that the constitution prohibits him the exercise of what, on a first view, appears to be a power incident to the executive branch of the Government. The gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Madison) has made so many observations to evince the constitutionality of the clause, that it is unnecessary to go over the ground again. I shall therefore confine myself to answer only some remarks made by the gentleman from South Carolina, (Mr. Smith.) The powers of the President are defined in the constitution; but it is said, that he is not expressly authorized to remove from office. If the constitution is silent also with respect to the Senate, the argument may be retorted. If this silence proves that the power cannot be exercised by the President, it certainly proves that it cannot be exercised by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. The power of removal is incident to Government; but not being distributed by the constitution, it will come before the Legislature, and, like every other omitted case, must be supplied by law.

Mr. Livermore.—I am for striking out this clause, Mr. Chairman, upon the principles of the constitution, from which we are not at liberty to deviate. The honorable gentleman from Massachusetts, (Mr. Sedgwick,) calls the Minister of Foreign Affairs the creature of the law, and that very properly; because the law establishes the office, and has the power of creating him in what shape the Legislature pleases. This being the case, we have a right to create the office under such limitations and restrictions as we think proper, provided we can obtain the consent of the Senate; but it is very improper to draw as a conclusion, from having the power of giving birth to a creature, that we should therefore bring forth a monster, merely to show we had such power. I call that creature a monster that has not the proper limbs and features of its species. I think the creature we are forming is unnatural in its proportions. It has been often said, that the constitution declares the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, shall appoint this officer. This, to be sure, is very true, and so is the conclusion which an honorable gentleman (Mr. White) from Virginia drew from it, that an officer must be discharged in the way he was appointed.

I believe, Mr. Chairman, this question depends upon a just construction of a short clause in the constitution. "The President shall have power, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to appoint ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, judges of Supreme Court, and all other officers of the United States." Here is no difference with respect to the power of the President to make treaties and appoint officers, only it requires in the one case a larger majority to concur than in the other. I will not by any means suppose that gentlemen mean, when they argue in favor of removal by the President alone, to contemplate the extension of the power to the repeal of treaties; because, if they do, there will be little occasion for us to sit here. But let me ask these gentlemen, as there is no real or imaginary distinction between the appointment of ambassadors and ministers, or Secretaries of Foreign Affairs, whether they mean that the President should have the power of recalling or discarding ambassadors and military officers, for the words in the constitution are "all other officers," as well as he can remove your Secretary of Foreign Affairs. To be sure, they cannot extend it to the judges; because they are secured under a subsequent article, which declares they shall hold their offices during good behavior; they have an inheritance which they cannot be divested of, but on conviction of some crime. But I presume gentlemen mean to apply it to all those who have not an inheritance in their offices. In this case, it takes the whole power of the President and Senate to create an officer, but half the power can uncreate him. Surely a law passed by the whole Legislature cannot be repealed by one branch of it; so I conceive, in the case of appointments, it requires the same force to supersede an officer as to put him in office.

I acknowledge, that the clause relative to impeachment is for the benefit of the people; it is intended to enable their representatives to bring a bad officer to justice who is screened by the President; but I do not conceive, with the honorable gentleman from South Carolina, (Mr. Smith,) that it by any means excludes the usual ways of superseding officers. It is said in the constitution, that the House shall have the power of choosing their own officers. We have chosen a clerk, and, I am satisfied, a very capable one; but will any gentleman contend we may not discharge him and choose another and another as often as we see cause? And so it is in every other instance; where they have the power to make, they have likewise the power to unmake. It will be said by gentlemen, that the power to make does not imply the power of unmaking; but I believe they will find very few exceptions in the United States.

Mr. Sherman.—I wish, Mr. Chairman, that the words may be left out of the bill, without giving up the question either way as to the propriety of the measure. Many of the honorable gentlemen who advocate this clause have labored to show that the President has, constitutionally, the power of removal. If this be a well-founded opinion, they ought not to let the words remain in the bill, because they are of such a nature as to imply that he had not the power before it was granted him by the law.

If gentlemen would consent to make a general law, declaring the proper mode of removal, I think we should acquire a greater degree of unanimity, which, on this occasion, must be better than carrying the question against a large minority.

The call for the question being now very general, it was put, shall the words "to be removable by the President," be struck out?

It was determined in the negative; being yeas 20, nays 34.

Wednesday, June 24.

Department of Foreign Affairs.

The engrossed bill "for establishing an Executive Department, to be denominated the Department of Foreign Affairs," was read the third time.

Mr. Sumter.—This bill appears to my mind so subversive of the constitution, and in its consequences so destructive to the liberties of the people, that I cannot consent to let it pass without expressing my detestation of the principle it contains. I do it in this public manner, in order to fulfil what I think to be my duty to my country, and to discharge myself of any concern in a matter that I do not approve.

Mr. Page discovered the fate of the bill; he knew it must pass, but, nevertheless, he would decidedly give it his negative, and he hoped the respectable minority which he had the honor of voting with hitherto on the question of removability, would unite with him firmly in their opposition; and in order to record to their constituents the sentiments they maintained, he moved to take the question by the yeas and nays.

One-fifth of the members present joined in requiring the yeas and nays; whereupon they were taken, and are,

Yeas.—Messrs. Ames, Benson, Boudinot, Brown, Burke, Cadwalader, Carroll, Clymer, Contee, Fitzsimons, Gilman, Goodhue, Griffin, Hartley, Heister, Huger, Lawrence, Lee, Madison, Moore, Muhlenberg, Schureman, Scott, Sedgwick, Seney, Sinnickson, Sylvester, Trumbull, and Vining.—29.

Nays.—Messrs. Coles, Gerry, Grout, Hathorn, Huntington, Jackson, Leonard, Livermore, Matthews, Page, Parker, Partridge, Van Rensselaer, Sherman, Smith, of Maryland, Smith, of South Carolina, Stone, Sturgis, Sumter, Thatcher, Tucker, and White.—22.

So the question was determined in the affirmative, and the clerk directed to carry the bill to the Senate, and desire their concurrence.

Department of War.

The House then went into a committee on the bill for establishing the Department of War. Mr. Trumbull in the chair.

Mr. Benson proposed, with respect to the Secretary's being removable by the President, a similar amendment to that which had been obtained in the bill establishing the Department of Foreign Affairs.

Mr. Sherman thought it unnecessary to load this bill with any words on that subject; he conceived the gentleman ought to be satisfied with having had the principle established in the other bill.

Mr. Page was of the same opinion, but further thought it argued a doubt, even in the mind of the majority, of the truth of their principles, and they wanted, by repetition, to force that upon the mind which was not impressed by right reason. The question on the amendment was taken without further debate, and carried in the affirmative, twenty-four to twenty-two.

Some other small alterations being made, the committee rose, and reported the bill as amended; which being partly considered, the House adjourned.

Thursday, June 25.

Department of War.

The House resumed the consideration of the amendments reported by the Committee of the Whole to the bill for establishing the War Department; which being agreed to, the bill was ordered to be engrossed.

Treasury Department.

The House then resolved itself into a Committee of the Whole on the bill for establishing the Treasury Department, Mr. Trumbull in the chair. The second clause being under consideration,

Mr. Page objected to the words making it the duty of the Secretary to "digest and report plans for the improvement and management of the revenue, and the support of the public credit;" observing that it might be well enough to enjoin upon him the duty of making out and preparing estimates; but to go any further would be a dangerous innovation upon the constitutional privilege of this House; it would create an undue influence within these walls, because members might be led, by the deference commonly paid to men of abilities, who give an opinion in a case they have thoroughly studied, to support the minister's plan, even against their own judgment. Nor would the mischief stop here; it would establish a precedent which might be extended, until we admitted all the ministers of the Government on the floor, to explain and support the plans they have digested and reported: thus laying a foundation for an aristocracy or a detestable monarchy.

Mr. Tucker.—The objection made by the gentleman near me is, undoubtedly, well founded. I think it proper to strike out all the words alluded to, because the following are sufficient to answer every valuable purpose, namely, "to prepare and report estimates of the public revenue and public expenditures." If we authorize him to prepare and report plans, it will create an interference of the executive with the legislative powers; it will abridge the particular privilege of this House; for the constitution expressly declares, that all bills for raising revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives. How can the business originate in this House, if we have it reported to us by the Minister of Finance? All the information that can be required, may be called for, without adopting a clause that may undermine the authority of this House, and the security of the people. The constitution has pointed out the proper method of communication between the executive and legislative departments; it is made the duty of the President to give, from time to time, information to Congress of the state of the Union, and to recommend to their consideration such measures as he shall judge necessary and expedient. If revenue plans are to be prepared and reported to Congress, here is the proper person to do it; he is responsible to the people for what he recommends, and will be more cautious than any other person to whom a less degree of responsibility is attached. Under this clause, you give the Secretary of the Treasury a right to obtrude upon you plans, not only undigested, but even improper to be taken up.

I hope the House is not already weary of executing and sustaining the powers vested in them by the constitution; and yet it would argue that we thought ourselves less adequate to determine than any individual what burthens our constituents are equal to bear. This is not answering the high expectations that were formed of our exertions for the general good, or of our vigilance in guarding our own and the people's rights. In short, Mr. Chairman, I can never agree to have money bills originated and forced upon this House by a man destitute of legislative authority, while the constitution gives such power solely to the House of Representatives; for this reason, I cheerfully second the motion for striking out the words.

Mr. Benson.—If the proposed amendment prevail, the bill will be nearly nugatory. The most important service that can be rendered by a gentleman who is at the head of the Department of Finance, is that of digesting and reporting plans for the improvement of the revenue, and supporting public credit; and, for my part, I shall despair of ever seeing your revenue improved, or the national credit supported, unless the business is submitted into the hands of an able individual. I thought this subject was well understood, from the debate on the original motion. It was then insisted upon by an honorable gentleman, Mr. Gerry, who opposed the appointment of a Secretary of the Treasury, that his important duties ought to be "to consider of the means of improving the revenue, and introducing economy into the expenditures, and to recommend general systems of revenue." Now, what more than this is required by the clause?

For my part, I am at a loss to see how the privilege of the House is infringed. Can any of the Secretary's plans be called bills? Will they be reported in such a form even? But admitting they were, they do not become bills, unless they are sanctioned by the House; much less is the danger that they will pass into laws without full examination by both Houses and the President. From this view of the subject, so far is the clause from appearing dangerous, that I believe it discovers itself to be not only perfectly safe, but essentially necessary; and without it is retained, the great object of the bill will be defeated.

Mr. Goodhue.—We certainly carry our dignity to the extreme, when we refuse to receive information from any but ourselves. It must be admitted, that the Secretary of the Treasury will, from the nature of his office, be better acquainted with the subject of improving the revenue or curtailing expense, than any other person; if he is thus capable of affording useful information, shall we reckon it hazardous to receive it? For my part, when I want to attain a particular object, I never shut my ears against information likely to enable me to secure it.

Mr. Page.—I can never consent to establish, by law, this interference of an executive officer in business of legislation; it may be well enough in an absolute monarchy, for a minister to come to a Parliament with his plans in his hands, and order them to be enregistered or enacted; but this practice does not obtain even in a limited monarchy like Britain. The minister there, who introduces his plans, must be a member of the House of Commons. The man would be treated with indignation, who should attempt in that country to bring his schemes before Parliament in any other way. Now, why we, in the free republic of the United States, should introduce such a novelty in legislation, I am at a loss to conceive. The constitution expressly delegates to us the business of the revenue; our constituents have confidence in us, because they suppose us acquainted with their circumstances; they expect, in consequence of this knowledge, we will not attempt to load them with injudicious or oppressive taxes; but they have no such security, if we are blindly to follow perhaps an unskilful minister. It does not answer me, Mr. Chairman, to say the House has a right of deliberating and deciding upon these plans, because we may be told, if you prune away this part or that part of the system, you destroy its efficiency. Therefore we must act with caution; we must either take or reject the whole; but if we reject the whole, sir, we are to depend upon ourselves for a substitute. How are we to form one? For my part, I should not despair, that the united wisdom of this House could procure one; but if we are to do this in the second instance, why cannot we attempt it in the first? I have no objection to our calling upon this or any other officer for information; but it is certainly improper to have him authorized by law to intrude upon us whatever he may think proper. I presume, sir, it is not supposed by the worthy gentleman from New York (Mr. Benson) that we shall be at a loss to conceive what information would be useful or proper for us to require, that we must have this officer to present us with what he chooses. When the President requires an opinion of him, the constitution demands him to give it; so under the law, let him send his opinion in here when it is asked for. If any further power is given him, it will come to this at last: we, like the Parliament of Paris, shall meet to register what he dictates. Either these reports of the Secretary are to have weight, or they are not; if they are to have weight, the House acts under a foreign influence, which is altogether improper and impolitic; if they are to have no weight, we impose a useless duty upon the officer, and such as is no mark of our wisdom.

Mr. Ames hoped the subject might be treated with candor and liberality; he supposed the objections were made on those principles, and therefore required a serious answer. The worthy gentleman who first expressed his aversion to the clause seemed to be apprehensive that the power of reporting plans by the Secretary would be improper, because it appeared to him to interfere with the legislative duty of the House, which the House ought not to relinquish.

Whenever it is a question, Mr. Speaker, said he, whether this House ought, or ought not, to establish offices to exercise a part of the power of either branch of the Government, there are two points which I take into consideration, in order to lead my mind to a just decision; first, whether the proposed disposition is useful; and, second, whether it can be safely guarded from abuse. Now I take it, sir, that the House by their order for bringing in a bill to establish the Treasury Department in this way, have determined the point of utility; or, have they erred in adopting that opinion, I will slightly make an inquiry, How does it tend to general utility? The Secretary is presumed to acquire the best knowledge of the subject of finance of any member of the community. Now, if this House is to act on the best knowledge of circumstances, it seems to follow logically that the House must obtain evidence from that officer; the best way of doing this will be publicly from the officer himself, by making it his duty to furnish us with it. It will not be denied, sir, that this officer will be better acquainted with his business than other people can be. It lies within his department to have a comprehensive view of the state of the public revenues and expenditures. He will, by his superintending power over the collection, be able to discover abuses, if any, in that department, and to form the most eligible plan to remedy or prevent the evil. From his information respecting money transactions, he may be able to point out the best mode for supporting the public credit; indeed, these seem to me to be the great objects of his appointment.

Mr. Livermore.—I shall vote for striking out the clause, because I conceive it essentially necessary so to do. The power of originating money bills within these walls, I look upon as a sacred deposit which we may neither violate nor divest ourselves of, although at first view it may appear of little importance who shall form a plan for the improvement of the revenue. Although every information tending to effect this great object may be gratefully received by this House, yet it behoves us to consider to what this clause may lead, and where it may terminate. Might it not, by construction, be said that the Secretary of the Treasury has the sole right of digesting and reporting plans for the improvement of the revenue? This construction may appear a little extraordinary, but it is not more so than some constructions heretofore put upon other words; but however extraordinary it may be, it may take place, and I think the best way to avoid it, will be to leave out the words altogether. It is certainly improper that any person, not expressly intrusted by our constituents with the privilege of taking their money, should direct the quantum and the manner in which to take it.

Mr. Sedgwick.—If the principle prevails for curtailing this part of the Secretary's duty, we shall lose the advantages which the proposed system was intended to acquire. The improvement and management of the revenue is a subject that must be investigated by a man of abilities and indefatigable industry, if we mean to have our business advantageously done. If honorable gentlemen will for a moment consider the peculiar circumstances of this country, the means of information attainable by the individual members of this House, and compare them with the object they have to pursue, they will plainly perceive the necessity of calling to their aid the advantages resulting from an establishment like the one contemplated in the bill; if they weigh these circumstances carefully, their objections, I trust, will vanish.

Mr. Boudinot.—A proper jealousy for the liberty of the people is commendable in those who are appointed and sworn to be its faithful guardians; but when this spirit is carried so far as to lose sight of its object, and instead of leading to avoid, urges on to the precipice of ruin, we ought to be careful how we receive its impressions. So far is the present measure from being injurious to liberty, that it is consistent with the true interest and prosperity of the community. Are gentlemen apprehensive we shall be led by this officer to adopt plans we should otherwise reject? For my part, I have a better opinion of the penetration of the representation of the people than to dread any such visionary phantom.

Let us consider whether this power is essentially necessary to the Government. I take it to be conceded by the gentlemen, that it is absolutely so. They say they are willing to receive the information because it may be serviceable, but do not choose to have it communicated in this way. If the Secretary of the Treasury is the proper person to give the information, I can see no other mode of obtaining it that would be so useful. Do gentlemen mean that he shall give it piecemeal, by way of question and answer? This will tend more to mislead than to inform us. If we would judge upon any subject, it would be better to have it in one clear and complete view, than to inspect it by detachments; we should lose the great whole in the minutiæ, and, instead of a system, should present our constituents with a structure composed of discordant parts, counteracting and defeating the operation of each other's properties.

Mr. Hartley rose to express his sentiments, as he did on every occasion, with diffidence in his own abilities; but he looked upon the clause as both unsafe and inconsistent with the constitution. He thought the gentleman last up proved too much by his arguments; he proved that the House of Representatives was, in fact, unnecessary and useless; that one person could be a better judge of the means to improve and manage the revenue, and support the national credit, than the whole body of Congress. This kind of doctrine, Mr. Chairman, is indelicate in a republic, and strikes at the root of all legislation founded upon the great democratic principle of representation. It is true, mistakes, and very injurious ones, have been made on the subject of finance by some State Legislatures; but I would rather submit to this evil, than, by my voice, establish tenets subversive of the liberties of my country.

Notwithstanding what I have said, I am clearly of opinion it is necessary and useful to take measures for obtaining other information than what members can acquire in their characters as citizens; therefore, I am in favor of the present bill; but I think these words too strong. If it was modified so as to oblige him to have his plans ready for this House when they are asked for, I should be satisfied; but to establish a legal right in an officer to obtrude his sentiments perpetually on this body is disagreeable, and it is dangerous, inasmuch as the right is conveyed in words of doubtful import, and conveying powers exclusively vested by the constitution in this House.

Mr. Gerry expressed himself in favor of the object of the clause; that was, to get all the information possible for the purpose of improving the revenue, because he thought this information would be much required, if he judged from the load of public debt, and the present inability of the people to contribute largely towards its reduction.

He could not help observing, however, the great degree of importance they were giving this, and the other executive officers. If the doctrine of having prime and great ministers of state was once well established, he did not doubt but we should soon see them distinguished by a green or red ribbon, or other insignia of court favor and patronage. He wished gentlemen were aware of what consequences these things lead to, that they might exert a greater degree of caution.

The practice of Parliament in Britain is first to determine the sum they will grant, and then refer the subject to a Committee of Ways and Means: this might be a proper mode to be pursued in this House.

Do gentlemen, said he, consider the importance of the power they give the officer by the clause? Is it not part of our legislative authority? And does not the constitution expressly declare that the House solely shall exercise the power of originating revenue bills? Now, what is meant by reporting plans? It surely includes the idea of originating money bills, that is, a bill for improving the revenue, or, in other words, for bringing revenue into the treasury. For if he is to report plans, they ought to be reported in a proper form, and complete. This is giving an indirect voice in legislative business to an executive officer. If this be not the meaning of the clause, let gentlemen say what is, and to what extent it shall go; but if my construction is true, we are giving up the most essential privilege vested in us by the constitution. But what does this signify? The officer is responsible, and we are secure. This responsibility is made an argument in favor of every extension of power. I should be glad to understand the term. Gentlemen say the Secretary of the Treasury is responsible for the information he gives the House—in what manner does this responsibility act? Suppose he reports a plan for improving the revenue, by a tax which he thinks judicious, and one that will be agreeable to the people of the United States; but he happens to be deceived in his opinion, that his tax is obnoxious, and excites a popular clamor against the minister—what is the advantage of his responsibility? Nothing. Few men deserve punishment for the error of opinion; all that could be done would be to repeal the law, and be more cautious in future in depending implicitly on the judgment of a man who had led us into an impolitic measure. Suppose the revenue should fall short of his estimate, is he responsible for the balance? This will be carrying the idea further than any Government hitherto has done. What then is the officer to be responsible for, which should induce the House to vest in him such extraordinary powers?

Mr. Lawrence.—I do not see consequences so dangerous as some gentlemen seem to apprehend; nor did they appear to them, I believe, when the subject was last under consideration. I recollect, Mr. Chairman, that some difficulty was made about establishing this office, because it was feared we could not find men of sufficient abilities to fill it. The duties were then properly deemed of a high and important nature, and enumerated as those proposed in the bill. It was supposed by an honorable gentleman, that the powers here expressed might be lodged in a board, because an individual was incompetent to undertake the whole. But now we have the wonderful sagacity of discovering, that if an individual is appointed, he will have capacity to form plans for improving the revenue in such an advantageous manner, as to supersede the necessity of having the representatives of the people consulted on the business: he will not only perform the usual duties of a Treasury Board, but be adequate to all purposes of legislation. I appeal to the gentleman for his usual candor on this occasion, which will assure us that he has wire-drawn his arguments.

Mr. Madison.—After hearing and weighing the various observations of gentlemen, I am at a loss to see where the danger lies. These are precisely the words used by the former Congress, on two occasions, one in 1783, the other in a subsequent ordinance, which established the Revenue Board. The same power was also annexed to the office of Superintendent of Finance, but I never yet heard that any inconvenience or danger was experienced from the regulation; perhaps, if the power had been more fully and frequently exercised, it might have contributed more to the public good.

There is a small probability, though it is but small, that an officer may derive a weight from this circumstance, and have some degree of influence upon the deliberations of the Legislature; but compare the danger likely to result from this clause, with the danger and inconvenience of not having well-formed and digested plans, and we shall find infinitely more to apprehend. Inconsistent, unproductive, and expensive schemes, will be more injurious to our constituents than the undue influence which the well-digested plans of a well-informed officer can have. From a bad administration of the Government, more detriment will arise than from any other source. The want of information has occasioned much inconvenience and unnecessary burthens under some of the State Governments. Let it be our care to avoid those rocks and shoals in our political voyage, which have injured, and nearly proved fatal to, many of our cotemporary navigators.

A gentleman has asked, what is meant by responsibility? I will answer him. There will be responsibility in point of reputation, at least a responsibility to the public opinion with respect to his abilities; and supposing there is no personal responsibility, yet we know that men of talents and ability take as much care for the preservation of their reputation as any other species of property of which they are possessed. If a superior degree of wisdom is expected to be displayed by them, they take pains to give proofs that they possess it in the most unequivocal manner; this of itself will ensure us no small degree of exertion.

With respect to originating money bills, the House has the sole right to do it; but if the power of reporting plans can be construed to imply the power of originating revenue bills, the constitution is inconsistent with itself, in giving the President authority to recommend such measures as he may think expedient or necessary; but the construction is too unnatural to require further investigation.

I have admitted there is a small probability of a small inconvenience, but I do not think it any more an argument against the clause, than it would be an argument against having windows in a house, that it is possible the wind and the rain may get in through the crevices.

Mr. Stone was not afraid of giving the officer the power of reporting plans, because he was sure Congress would, in every case, decide upon their own judgment. A future Congress would not pay such a deference, even to their predecessors, as to follow in their footsteps, unless they were convinced of the good policy of their measures. He thought if the House wanted to make use of the information acquired by the Secretary, they ought to give him notice of their intention; consequently, something of this kind was proper in the bill.

Mr. Sherman thought the principle held up by the clause, was absolutely necessary to be received. It was of such a nature as to force itself upon them; therefore it was in vain to attempt to elude it by subterfuge. It was owing to the great abilities of a financier, that France had been able to make the exertions we were witnesses of a few years ago, without embarrassing the nation. This able man, after considerably improving the national revenue, was displaced; but such was the importance of the officer, that he has been restored again.

Mr. Baldwin.—I do not see what we are guarding against by striking out the words, unless gentlemen mean to go so far as to introduce a prohibitory clause, and declare that the Secretary of the Treasury shall be restrained from digesting or preparing plans for the improvement of the revenue. If there is any evil in having him attend to this branch of the business, I cannot see how to avoid it. Suppose the officer is a bad man, and there are others like him in this House, (for this must be what the gentlemen are afraid of;) and suppose he has prepared a scheme for peculation, which he hopes to get adopted by making dupes of the honest part; how are you to hinder it from being brought forward? Cannot his friends introduce it as their own, by making and seconding a motion for that purpose? Will you restrain him from having access to the members out of doors? And cannot he infuse his dangerous and specious arguments and information into them as well in the closet, as by a public and official communication? But, Mr. Chairman, can this House, or if it can, will it prevent any of their constituents from bringing before them plans for the relief of grievances or oppressions? Every individual of the community can bring business before us by petition, memorial, or remonstrance, provided it be done in a decent manner. How then do you propose to restrain the Secretary of the Treasury?

I think the clause is very well as it stands, and shall therefore be against the amendment.

Mr. Page's motion for striking out the clause being put and negatived:

The question on Mr. Fitzsimon's motion to amend the bill, by striking out the word report, and inserting prepare, was taken and carried by a great majority.

After which the House adjourned.

Friday, June 26.

A number of the members attending the interesting conference which to-day took place with the Senate on the impost and tonnage bills, no business was done in this House.

Saturday, June 27.

Revenue Bill.

Mr. Boudinot, from the managers on the part of this House in the conference with the Senate on the subject of the amendments to the Impost Bill, reported that the conference had agreed to pass the bill as amended by the Senate, with some additional amendments, viz: the duty on distilled spirits of Jamaica proof, to be reduced from fifteen cents to ten cents per gallon. The duty on all other spirits, to be reduced from twelve to eight cents per gallon. The duty on beer, ale, porter, or cider, imported in casks, from eight to five cents per gallon. The duty on beer imported in bottles, from twenty-five to twenty cents per gallon. The duty on coal, from three to two cents per bushel.

Monday, July 13.

Western Lands.

The House resolved itself into a Committee of the Whole on the state of the Union. Mr. Boudinot in the chair.

Mr. Scott requested that the report of the committee on the Western Territory might be read, which was read accordingly, as follows:

Resolved, That it is the opinion of this committee, that an act of Congress should pass for establishing a Land Office, and to regulate the terms of granting vacant and unappropriated lands in the Western Territory.

Mr. Scott.—In endeavoring, sir, to open the interesting subject now before you, I shall avoid the repetition of those ideas which I threw out on a former occasion, as far as my memory will serve me, and the nature of the subject will permit.

This subject, sir, will appear of great magnitude in point of interest, if we consider the extent of the territory; I think I shall not be far beyond the mark, if I say it is one thousand miles long by five hundred broad; nor if I say it is sufficient to contain two millions of farms; nevertheless, for greater caution, say it will contain one million, (which is notoriously and greatly within the real contents,) and that each of these farms may be peopled by six souls, they will amount to six millions of inhabitants, double the number of the present inhabitants of the United States. From this view, it is an object of great concern. It will appear also an object of concern, if we contemplate the climate, the soil, and the waters of that country; consider that it lies in the heart of the temperate zone; its soil infinitely more rich and more fertile than any in the Atlantic States; its waters pure and good—in a word, it is such a territory as must command inhabitants, and will be peopled. Its situation in the middle of our continent, gives the climate a salubrity that accommodates it to the emigrants from both Northern and Southern States. It is meeting them on a middle ground, softening the harsh restrictions of the rugged North, and breathing bland the zephyr grateful to the sun-scorched South. In short, it is such as gives to all who have seen it the utmost satisfaction—it is both healthy and agreeable.

It may perhaps be objected, that the measure now proposed will lead or tend to a depopulation of the Atlantic States, and therefore ought not to be adopted. This is a circumstance I by no means wish. I am as far from desiring a depopulation of the Atlantic shores, as I am from fearing it on this ground. I am confident it will not operate in any considerable degree to bring about that event; but if it should be thought it would, that could be no solid objection against the measure. Whilst the desire of emigration continues, and lands are to be procured, settlers will find their way into that territory; nor is it in the power of Congress to withhold lands altogether, because they are to be got of others on better terms. There is superior encouragement held out to the people settling on the other side of the river Mississippi, where the soil is fertile, and the climate equally agreeable. In proof of this assertion, I will read to the committee the translation of a kind of proclamation issued by the Governor of the Spanish posts at the Illinois. [This paper contains an invitation to all persons inclined to settle in the Western country, offering as inducements, lands without charge, exemptions from taxes, protection in civil and religious liberties, besides provision and the implements of husbandry.] After this, Mr. S. proceeded: Now, sir, if Congress fear to sell their lands lest it tend to depopulate the Atlantic States, what must they apprehend from propositions like these? They will certainly have all the effect which encouragement from this quarter can have. It may be said, that Americans will not venture to live under the Spanish Government, or settle a Spanish colony. To this it may be replied, that when people, from their necessities or inclinations, are determined to emigrate, in order to mitigate their distresses, they think little of the form of government; all they care for is relief from their present or approaching wants and troubles.

Nobody will emigrate from the Atlantic States but a certain description of men, and they will go whether you hold out this encouragement to them or not; they will pay little regard to Congressional restrictions. And here let me make one remark, drawn from my own observation. The forming settlements in a wilderness upon the frontiers, between the savages and the least populated of the civilized parts of the United States, requires men of enterprising, violent, nay, discontented and turbulent spirits. Such always are our first settlers in the ruthless and savage wild; they serve as pioneers to clear the way for the more laborious and careful farmer. These characters are already in that country by thousands, and their number is daily increasing, and will continue to increase; for congenial spirits will assimilate maugre all our endeavors to the contrary. But how will you prevent them? I should be glad to see a plan for hemming in the emigration to that territory; I think the thing wholly impracticable, therefore it becomes the immediate interest of Congress, to direct the emigration to a proper point; direct it to their own territory, rather than be inactive spectators of its silent, though rapid course to the Spanish and British dependencies; rather sell your lands and get something for them, than let your citizens leave your dominions. By improving a part, you add to the value of the remainder; their population will produce a hardy race of husbandmen and warriors, always at the command of the United States, to support and defend your liberty and property. These being facts, I leave it to the wisdom of the House to draw the inference.

I will make one further remark, with respect to the encouragement or discouragement of emigration. Suppose it was in the power of Congress to stop the course of the impetuous current, which has already won its way through insuperable obstructions, and spread itself over the fertile lands of the Ohio. I ask, with perfect security, if it is not such an act of contumacy, and inconsistency with the fundamental principles of the Government, that Congress could not adopt it? Consider that many of your citizens are destitute of the comforts, nay, the common necessaries of life, without a prospect of providing for the subsistence of themselves and families: I ask, would Congress prevent the emigration of such persons if they could? I think not; they would not act as kind protecting fathers to their people if they did. I presume this would be too serious an objection for any man to face, with a restraining proposition. I question if any man would be hardy enough to point out a class of citizens by name, that ought to be the servants of the community; yet, unless that is done, to what class of the people could you direct such a law? But if you passed such an act, it would be tantamount to saying that there is some class which must remain here, and by law must be obliged to serve the others, for such wages as they please to give.

This being the case, let us make the best of liberty, our people, and our land. Your citizens, I tell you, are already there by thousands; they are going by thousands more, and are every hour growing up into consequence. They never expect to return into the Atlantic States; plant them in your soil, add this wealth of population to your own, and form an empire illustrious as it is extended. Remember, ye sages of my country, an historic truth recorded for your instruction, that empire has been slowly, but invariably, moving from East to West; emigration has uniformly receded in that direction, from the time that our common parents quitted the garden of Eden, till the present hour; nor doubt but it will continue to pursue that course, as long as there are lands to be inhabited.

Much will depend upon the energy and force of the Government established in that country; it ought to be such as will furnish sufficient power for its own internal purposes, and also to secure it to the Union. But that is not the only tie by which its union is held. That country is attached to the Atlantic States by its natural situation. To be convinced of this truth, nothing more is necessary than to look upon the chart: all the commerce of that country must come through the States upon the sea-coast. We know, at Pittsburg, that we are a thousand miles nearer to the market than settlers at the mouth of the Ohio river. When we export our produce by that and the Mississippi, we know we can get easier home with our returns by the way of Philadelphia, than the others can by turning up and stemming the current of the Mississippi. Therefore, the imports for all that territory must come through the United States. From these considerations, I conclude it would be madness in the extreme for them to think of a separation, unless they were driven to it by a fatal necessity; they will be too sensible of its ill effects ever to attempt it.

But suppose, for a moment, that they break off from the Union, and even become our enemies, it would be good policy in us to get as much as we can from them first, especially as they are disposed to give it us; let us make them extinguish part of our national debt before they leave us. The soil and climate of that country, as I said before, will be great inducements for emigrants to settle there. If they were to break off, they would know how to get money enough from the sale of the territory to support their Government, without any other resource whatever. If I, as a resident in that country, had the remotest view of a separation from the Atlantic States, I should be sorry to see Congress sell an acre of that land; for selling it, in that case, would be neither more nor less than preventing us from putting the money into our pockets when we became independent. If they meditate independency, the most likely way to make them so, will be to let their lands alone, in order to supply them with funds sufficient to support them in the measure. If they are sold, it will not be in their power.

I apprehend it will be found that a Land Office will effect these objects better than any other plan that can be devised. If this should be effectual, and no doubt can be entertained but it will, the inhabitants of the United States cannot, with a good grace, be called upon for heavy taxes in order to pay the interest on a debt which can be so easily and properly extinguished. Every individual who contemplates the subject, will see how much it is his interest to buy a few dollars in certificates, and purchase a piece of land with them, which will annihilate the debt, and prevent the demand for taxes to pay the interest; besides, it will remain as a security to reimburse the principal to the proprietor, as the population of the country extends; but, at all events, it would be but advancing four or five years' interest, and the whole debt would be absorbed.

If we mean to sell our lands for ready money, or mean to trust, we have a superior advantage. It is more probable that the necessitous person who wants the land for the subsistence of himself and family, will labor harder to procure a property of this kind, and secure it for himself, than the speculator who never means to pay a farthing until he has received it from the sale of the land; besides, the necessitous person is better able to buy of Government than of the speculator, because he can get it cheaper. The purchasers of large tracts retail out their land to this class of men, and certainly charge them something for their trouble. But if we sell on credit, as under the Proprietary Government was the practice in Pennsylvania, those who take out small quantities get their land surveyed, and set themselves down; they cultivate the ground, and erect buildings for their own accommodation. Land, in this improved state, furnishes a better security to Government for any arrearage of purchase money, than a large tract sold on speculation, and which lies in the same state of nature as it did when it was disposed of, perhaps adding thereto the expense of making the survey. If the land must revert to Congress at last for default of payment, we get nothing in the latter case; whereas, when sold in lots, if a man has settled himself down, and paid for his warrant and survey, which costs the Union nothing, but for the first price and interest thereon, it must strike every gentleman's mind that it would be disagreeable, after a man had made a settlement for three or four years, to have to turn out. Rather than do this, he would make every exertion to discharge the price: if his situation was so wretched as not to furnish the means, some of his neighbors, on such security, might befriend him; but at any rate Government would be secure. By this argument, I do not mean to insist that Congress should sell their lands on trust; they may do so, or sell for ready pay, as their wisdom may think eligible. I shall be satisfied either way.

I think the convenience of the people is a subject not unworthy of being taken into view. My plan proposes that they should be able to perfect their titles on the spot. I fear not the objection which has been raised. It may be said, the titles ought not to be completed until it was done immediately under the eye of Congress. Let this be as it may, I will make one remark: can we not have every tie, every check, and security upon these officers that we have upon the collectors of the revenue? I think there is as much room for confidence in the one case as in the other. We can take care that the Secretary of the Land Office shall send in his accounts of patents and warrants. I think we may depend here upon a true return.

The Receiver of the office shall take nothing but public securities, which are not quite so great a temptation to embezzlement or illicit practices as money. The Surveyor will be a check upon both. I think the gentlemen employed in this business cannot be of very trifling character. In short, this department may be as well checked and balanced as any other; the expense of it will be nothing, because the officer may be supported out of the fees. This being the case, I shall conclude with moving that the committee adopt the resolution reported by the committee, and recommend it to the House to appoint a select committee to bring in a bill accordingly.

Mr. Fitzsimons asked if it would not be better to settle all the principles of the bill first, that the select committee might not lose their labor, as had been once or twice experienced, for want of this precaution.

He was in favor of some measure of this kind, though he had some doubts of the necessity there was supposed to be of establishing a Land Office.

The question was now taken on the resolution, and agreed to.

Compensation of the President, &c.

Mr. Vining wished to call the attention of the House to a business he apprehended not very lengthy; it was the report of a committee on the subject of compensation to be made to the President, Vice President, the members of the Senate and House of Representatives, for their services; he wished gentlemen to consider the situation of every one concerned in this business, themselves, and the continent at large. He hoped they would consent to take it up, and he flattered himself the discussion would not last longer than a day.

Mr. White wished to go into a Committee of the Whole on the business.

Mr. Fitzsimons did not like to enter upon a lengthy discussion of a point that was incapable of much elucidation by reasoning; he therefore was against going into a committee at this stage of the business. He observed, that the committee had reported something, and the members had been pretty generally consulted on the same. He hoped the House would despatch the business without delay or loss of time, if they were at all inclined to take it up.

Mr. White thought it necessary to go into a committee, because there were a number of things mentioned, the reasons for which appeared to him very uncertain.

Mr. Vining said it was a subject of considerable delicacy, and he supposed very few gentlemen would be inclined to speak three or four times on a point; yet this was all the advantage gained by going into a committee. He was no more interested than others; every gentleman might judge of his own case, but after it had been before a committee of twelve, in order to get the fullest sense of the House upon the subject, he was inclined to receive it without so much circumlocution. He observed, that the business had originated in a Committee of the Whole, and it was unusual to recommit it without showing some reasons why.

Mr. White gave up his motion for a Committee of the Whole, and said, before he consented to the report, he should be glad to know in what style it was expected that the President would live. He observed there was provision for the expenses of a house, furniture, secretaries, clerks, carriages and horses. Perhaps the sum proposed might be too much or too little. He should like to see an estimate of how much was necessary for keeping the table, the equipage, &c. before he decided. He hoped the committee would elucidate this subject.

There was another thing he wished to inquire of them. The Vice President's salary was charged at five thousand dollars; he could not conceive upon what principle that sum was reported. Did it bear a proportion to his services, or was it in proportion to what the members of the Senate and this House were to be allowed? There is nothing which obliges him to be attentive to his business. No doubt but the gentleman who holds that office at present will be regardful and diligent in executing the business assigned him; yet there is nothing to prevent the Vice President from residing at home and receiving his salary, without coming within the walls of the Senate room. The Union is obliged to support him; but I, said he, would make that support conditional; he should have a liberal provision while in public life, but no longer. As to delicacy, I know of none, sir, that ought to be used while we are in pursuit of the public good. I speak therefore with candor what are my sentiments on this subject. Other gentlemen, no doubt, do the same; but I am clearly for examining into the principles before I agree to the conclusion.

Mr. Page was sorry to see gentlemen spinning out the time to little purpose; certainly, after having the subject under consideration for nearly three months, they might be able to decide.

If this business was fixed, and gentlemen knew they were to have but moderate salaries, it might perhaps tend to make them more expeditious; but at all events, they ought to know the rate at which they attend, in order to regulate their expenses. To some it might be a matter of no concern, because they could bear every thing of this kind for a twelvemonth, without inconvenience; but they ought to consider the situation of others. We are, said he, keeping the President here without any provision for his support; but in this we may think ourselves right, because, in his patriotic ardor, his love for his country, he told us he was willing to pursue that illustrious example which he set during the period of our calamity; he refused compensation for his services. But the constitution requires that he shall receive a compensation, and it is our duty to provide it. We must also provide something for our own expenses, or it may reduce gentlemen not better prepared than I am to depend upon a friend for what the public ought to furnish.

Mr. Vining had said the subject was delicate, but he did not conceive there was any indelicacy in asking or answering questions on this or any other occasion, where the good of his country was concerned.

Mr. Lawrence did not know, whether the sum proposed was enough for the President or not; but according to the terms of the constitution, it ought to be granted as one sum, because he is to receive no other emolument whatever from the United States, or either of them. Now, if it is declared he shall receive twenty thousand dollars, and, exclusive of that sum, we make him an allowance for furniture, horses, carriages, &c., such an allowance is an emolument beyond the compensation contemplated in the constitution; but I have no objection to blend these sums together, declaring the whole to be the compensation required by the constitution. Besides, if we establish salaries for his secretaries and clerks, we establish them officers of the Government; this will be improper, because it infringes his right to employ a confidential person in the management of those concerns, for which the constitution has made him responsible. For these reasons, Mr. L. moved to strike out all that related to horses, carriages, furniture, &c.

Mr. Sherman thought it much better to give a net sum, because the President would then have no accounts to settle with the United States.

Mr. Sedgwick considered this a constitutional question, and therefore thought it deserved serious investigation. The provision made in the report, for paying the expenses of enumerated articles, does not leave the President in the situation intended by the constitution, which was, that he should be independent of the Legislature, during his continuance in office; that he should have a compensation for his services, not to be increased or diminished during that period; but there is nothing that will prevent us from making further allowances, provided that the twenty thousand dollars is all that is given as a compensation. By this construction, one of the most salutary clauses in the constitution will be rendered nugatory. From these considerations, he was led to believe that the report was founded on unconstitutional principles.

Mr. Baldwin said, the Committee of the Whole, when the business was before them, had not determined any thing on this point; that, consequently, the select committee were to frame a report upon such principles as they judged proper. In order then to have every thing distinct and accurate, they had brought their opinion forward in the form it now appears. If it be deemed proper to grant an aggregate sum, the House would no doubt add to the twenty thousand dollars, what it was supposed these expenses would amount to.

However, he did not think the constitution was infringed; it was intended that the compensation should not be increased or diminished, during the President's continuance in office. Now it might be as well fixed, by making the allowance in part money, and part furniture, &c. as by declaring a precise sum; it will still be a stated compensation.

Mr. Tucker thought furniture and plate ought always to be provided by government, because, if it was necessary for every new President to buy these articles, it might put him to great inconvenience, unless he received a year's salary in advance; besides, when he retired from his situation, they would not sell for half the first cost. He therefore wished this part of the report to stand, together with the rent of a house; but would join in striking out all the rest.

Mr. Madison did not think the report interfered with either the spirit or letter of the constitution, and therefore was opposed to any alteration, especially with respect to the property of a fixed nature. He was sure, if the furniture and plate, and house rent, could be allowed, some of the other articles might also. The horses and carriages will cost money, and sell for little, after being used for four years; this will be a certain loss to the President, or his family; besides the House have already undertaken to defray expenses of this kind, and so set a precedent for the enumeration which had been reported.

Mr. White said, if a certain sum was assigned for the expenses, the report would be better; but as it now stood, there was no certainty in it. One President might circumscribe it to a quarter part of the expense another would; consequently, the compensation could not be fixed.

He admitted the propriety of paying the salary in advance for the first year, as mentioned by the gentleman from South Carolina. He expected this would be sufficient to defray the extra expenses, without subjecting the President to any inconvenience.

Mr. Boudinot.—If the Legislature may provide the house and furniture, they may go further on the same principle, and provide for the rest; he was satisfied it should be so, because it could be no infringement on the constitution.

Mr. Livermore hoped the words would be struck out; indeed he was sorry they had ever been put in. The clause in the constitution is intended to tie down the Legislature, as well as the President; they shall make him no compliments while in office, he shall receive nothing but a fixed compensation for his services. Give him then this compensation, let it be equal to his usefulness; but do not direct him to employ so much to one use, and so much to another; it cannot be called a compensation when you direct how it is to be expended; besides, it was wrong on another account; why should we pretend to direct him in the style in which he shall live? Let him have a salary, and expend it in the manner he shall think proper.