REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE APPOINTED TO INVESTIGATE THE Railroad Riots IN JULY, 1877. (continued 32)

A. Yes, sir; verbatim.

The testimony of John E. Wootten, taken at the coroner's inquest, offered in evidence, and is as follows:

John E. Wootten, General Manager Philadelphia and Reading Railroad Company, sworn:

I called at Sheriff Yorgey's office at about nine and a half o'clock on Monday morning, 23d July, and said to the sheriff that I had come to see him for the purpose of asking him to take some means for the protection of the property of the railroad company, and for the suppression of the mob then threatening to destroy not only the railroad company's property but that of the citizens of Reading. The sheriff said, "Well, what can I do?" I asked him if he had learned of the destruction of the Lebanon Valley bridge and of the burning of the company's cars. He said that he had. I replied that he should issue his proclamation, and call out a force for the suppression of violence and incendiarism. "Yes, I know that, but the men when called upon would not come." I then told him that in such an event I would engage to furnish him with a sufficient force to suppress the mob, and if he wished it, the force would be well armed. He replied "Yes, but the rioters also have arms?" I then said, "Do I understand you to say that nothing can be done by you to check the riotous and incendiary spirit that now threatens to destroy so much property, and for which damage the county is liable?" He replied by saying that he did not see that he could do anything. I said, "Suppose you advise with counsel in relation to the matter." He replied that he had had a talk with Judge Sassaman about it. I asked what he said. The sheriff replied that he did not know what course would be taken.

I then left the office, and in the corridor I met Reverend B. R. Miller, who said that the existing condition of affairs at Reading required immediate action, and that he, for one, was ready for any call that might be made upon him to assist in the suppression of the mob. I replied that I was very glad to hear him say so, and told him that I had just called upon the sheriff, who was disinclined to act, and that I would make another appeal to the sheriff if he would accompany me to his office, which he did. I then told the sheriff that Mr. Miller had made a tender of his services for the suppression of disorder, and that I thought there would be no difficulty in getting as many more of our citizens as he might want. To which he replied that he didn't know yet what he would do in the matter, and after somewhat of a repetition of my previous conversation with him, in the presence of Mr. Miller, I left the sheriff's office and proceeded to the office of Chief of Police Cullen. Immediately after the interview with the sheriff I went to Philadelphia and conferred with President Gowen. At the time of my interview with the sheriff, so far as I knew, no one had any intimation that any troops were coming. The troops were sent at the order of General W. J. Bolton. After my arrival in Philadelphia, I telegraphed General Bolton that Reading was entirely without protection.

Q. State whether this is the testimony of Reverend B. R. Miller, as taken down by you, at the time? [Indicating paper.]

A. It is so.

Testimony of Reverend B. R. Miller offered in evidence, and is as follows:

Reverend B. R. Miller, affirmed, said:

My story is a short one. Coming from my home, on Monday morning, July 23, I saw an unsettled state of affairs at Seventh and Penn. Of course, I knew what had been going on the night before, and I stopped, and then passed on about my business. I saw Mr. Wootten enter the sheriff's office, and followed him, and I said, when he came out, "This is a great scare, and if the sheriff will give me arms and ammunition, I will raise fifty men, and quell the riot before night," and he said, "Come in, and we will see him." Mr. Wootten said to the sheriff, "Here is a volunteer, will raise men for you." The sheriff said, "I would rather not do anything about that," and wouldn't entertain the proposition at all, and Mr. Wootten turned around on his heels, perfectly disgusted, and left the office. This was between nine and ten o'clock in the morning. I didn't know the soldiers were coming until I met them on the platform. Don't know who ordered them through the cut. When I offered to raise men, I thought that was the time to work, but the sheriff wouldn't do anything.

Q. State whether this is the testimony of Sheriff George R. Yorgey, as taken down by you?

A. It is.

Testimony of George R. Yorgey offered in evidence, and is as follows:

George R. Yorgey, sworn:

I am the high sheriff of Berks county. Noticed no collision between the militia and citizens or disorderly persons on Monday night. Was in my office at the time, and remained in the office until eleven o'clock that night—Monday night. No officer of the militia, nor any person called upon me between those hours at my office to quell this riot. I had no notice, whatever, that any troops would arrive on that night. Was not aware that any troops were here until I heard the firing, and after they told me. I was never consulted in reference to the military at all. I never ordered them nor knew nothing about them being ordered. They never formed any part of my posse. Daniel Francis and the watchman of the court-house were with me in my office. I was waiting for orders which detained me until eleven o'clock. After the firing, I inquired to know the result and what had been done. Was told that the crowd had dispersed. I did not visit the scene of disaster. I was there once on Monday, saw the crowded condition of the streets, and witnessed the riotous proceedings. Saw this when I posted up my proclamations on the four corners. I should have been informed of the coming of the troops, but was not informed. I do not know whose business it was to tell me. I informed the railroad officials where they might find me if they wanted me to call out the posse comitatus. I telegraphed this to Mr. Gowen, Monday afternoon about four o'clock, shortly before I issued my proclamation, and I received no answer from Mr. Gowen. The militia came here without my knowledge, and I had nothing to do with them after they were here. In the forenoon things were middling quiet, and in the afternoon I had my proclamations struck off. I was not in the city on Sunday night, and came up from my Douglass township farm Monday morning at five o'clock. I heard the news Monday morning, and in the evening at five issued my proclamation. I did not think I should have issued my proclamation early on Monday morning instead of waiting until nearly night. In the forenoon of Monday, Mr. Wootten called on me and offered to furnish me with men. I did not issue my proclamation sooner because I could not get ready any sooner.

Peter Cullen, re-called:

By Mr. Lindsey:

Q. State what the conduct of the militia under the command of General Reeder was during their stay in Reading, so far as you are able to judge.

A. Well, the conduct of General Reeder and his troops was good, so far as I know. They behaved well, and obeyed the commands of the officers, I know. Immediately after the firing, he marched his command right in front of the Mansion house; and he asked me what was best to be done, or something to that effect, in a general way to inquire about things, and I told him that the Philadelphia and Reading Company seemed to be the property in danger, and I suggested to him that it would be a good idea to go to the new depot, and I furnished a guide to escort his command to the depot. It was then dark, probably half past eight o'clock in the evening, and a great many of the mob followed down. The streets were filled with people at that time, and, undoubtedly, there were a great many of the rioters there—I know there were—and he had his command formed here in front of the Mansion house, Fifth and Penn, and there were some of the men going to attack the soldiers with their sleeves rolled up, and some had brickbats in their hands. One man I had requested one officer to arrest, and he was locked up, and he was going to attack the soldiers of Reeder's command, but Reeder's command was all soldierly, and had a good line of battle when they formed in front of the Mansion house, after their fight in the cut; they seemed to have perfect discipline all throughout.

Q. Were there any other troops here whose conduct was not as good as General Reeder's?

A. The Sixteenth regiment was here. I saw some of the members of the Sixteenth regiment on the streets, walking about loosely, and one of the members I asked him where he was going to, and got into a conversation with him, and I saw he was away from his command, and I asked him why he did not stay with his command, and he told me, he was not going to fire on his fellow workmen—that he didn't come here to do that. He showed me his hand, and says he, "Do you see that I am a workingman myself? I am not going to fire on any workingman."

Q. Who commanded the Sixteenth regiment?

A. I can't say positively about that. I believe Colonel Good is commander, or was the commander.

Q. Did you meet him, or have any conversation with him?

A. I did not come in contact with any of the officers of the Sixteenth regiment then.

Q. Knew nothing of his conduct but what was soldierly?

A. Never heard anything but what was right on the part of the officers of the regiment; and, undoubtedly, a large portion of the Sixteenth regiment was right. And I had received positive information that members of the Sixteenth regiment had been dealing out ammunition amongst the rioters in the crowds on the street during the day time.

Q. Of what day?

A. That was on Tuesday, the 24th of July.

Q. Did you have any conversation with more than one of the regiments?

A. Yes; I spoke to several, as they were walking about, and they did not seem to care about being connected with the military at all. They were walking round independent—didn't seem to care whether they had any duty to perform as soldiers. I did not see very many of them. I saw, probably, five or six in that way; but I heard a number of reports in regard to their giving out ammunition. I have that from worthy sources.

Q. Did you call the attention of the commanding officer to that fact?

A. I had word sent to that effect to the officer at the depot, but whether it was communicated to him, I am unable to say. But I did send word out to the depot that some of the men had been in amongst the crowd of rioters dealing out ammunition. That made the worst feeling of all that occurred—the soldiers giving their ammunition away, and mingling around with the rioters, and being away from their command. I cannot tell whether they were away from their command with leave. I suppose, certainly, they ought not to have leave given in a crisis of this kind, and I judge they must have been absent without leave.

Q. How long was the regiment here?

A. The Sixteenth were here, I believe, about a day and a half, to the best of my knowledge.

By Mr. Means:

Q. I would like to know from whom you received the fire—or if you did receive any—at the cut at Penn street, I believe you call it?

A. Seventh and Penn.

Q. You received a volley of musketry, or pistol shots, or something there. Whom did you receive it from?

A. From the military. I had a police force right on our tracks.

Q. It was at Seventh and Penn, if I am rightly informed?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. That is a part I had already forgotten, but it came into my mind a while ago, that while you had that police force there, you received a volley fired by somebody there at that point. I would like to know who it was from?

A. To the best of my knowledge, it was from the soldiers.

Q. Of what command?

A. General Reeder's command. The soldiers came down through the cut, and the first firing we heard, there were some parties said they are firing blank cartridges. The first firing I heard was pistol shots, that was the starting of the fire, but the crowd was very large on both sides of the cut, and the cut was pretty well filled with the rioters—with the mob, and the first I heard was pistol shots, and then I heard louder shots that seemed more like gun shots, and rifle shots. There were several of them, and immediately afterwards, there was a regular volley fired right down in the crowd.

Q. Have you ever been in active service in the army?

A. Yes; I have been three years and nine months.

Q. And from what you know of being there, did you consider that this shooting was musketry, or was it pistol shots?

A. It was musketry, it was rifle firing—there was pistol firing and rifle firing. The shots were sharp enough, that I knew they were minie balls.

Q. Could you tell whether there was a volley or skirmishing?

A. First, there were a few shots fired that went over our heads. Then a second volley was fired—a heavy volley, and just took a low range.

Q. You were there at that time, if I am rightly informed, endeavoring to clear that track, and keep that cut open?

A. Keep the crowd open, trying to disperse the crowd at that time.

Q. That is the time you received the volley?

A. That is the time we received the volley. The military did not see the police force, nor did the police force see the military. It was just dusk, and about that time the crowd was very large, and they came marching into the cut, and were at the corner of Seventh and Penn, right on the railroad tracks, and they got very close upon us before we knew it, owing to the large crowd.

Q. If I understand you, the military fired on the party, not knowing who they were firing on?

A. They were brick-batted and stoned, and pistol shots fired on the soldiers in the cut before they fired, and from the best information I have, and in that way I judge they did it in self-defense.

By Mr. Lindsey:

Q. You don't think that they knew, or had any intention of firing on the police?

A. No; I don't believe that. About the place where the military commenced firing was in the cut, between Court street and Washington street bridge, or about there, and the crowd or mob was all up along that place, from Walnut street, for two squares above in the street, and on the sidewalk, and all along the walls of the cut, and it appears the military came in through the cut, and when they got in they were attacked, and the pistol shots fired, and to the best of my knowledge the shots came from the wall of the cut, right above, over the soldiers' heads.

Q. That is what I wanted to know—if you believed that the firing was done in self-defense?

A. That is the way I looked at it. I looked at it in that light. They did it in self-defense, and the pistol shots seemed to come from the wall. That was pretty close—only half a square from the place where the firing took place.

At this point the committee adjourned, to meet at the call of the chairman.

Harrisburg, May 2, 1878.

The committee met at half past seven o'clock, P.M. Mr. Lindsey in the chair. All members present.

Colonel A. Wilson Norris, re-called:

Q. Colonel, you may state briefly the facts and details in reference to your visit to General Brinton, on Saturday morning, of July 22?

A. Well, I can only state the substance, probably, of what I stated before. When I discovered in the morning that General Brinton had escaped from the round-house, I believe the information was first brought by Captain Aull, of the Grays, and afterwards we ascertained through Captain Breck. There were no officers, I think, at the time, but Colonel Stewart and myself, and I volunteered to go to find—in fact, I was not an officer. I would like that stated. I volunteered to go and find General Brinton. I was moved to this action out of my regard for General Brinton, personally, and for his command, a great many of whom were my friends, and for public reasons, which I thought paramount to all. I thought it was very necessary to effect the junction with Colonel Guthrie and the other troops that were to join him, and I said to General Latta, that if he would procure me a carriage, I would endeavor to find him. At this time, or a little before, the order that is contained in the Adjutant General's report, and which closes, I believe, with an allusion to me, and with a suggestion to General Brinton to consult with me, was written and handed to Captain Aull, and at the same time was read to me, so that I could understand the purport of it. Captain Aull then left with the same purpose of reaching Brinton. When I volunteered to go, Colonel Stewart said he would accompany me, and rose off the bed where he was lying, and when the carriage came, we started and rode through the mob, which was chiefly on Liberty street—I believe it is called. We passed right up Liberty street, over the hose, and through the mob. There was no other way for us below them at that time, and after going a few squares we passed down to the street below. I do not know what the name of it is—I think Penn street; and we went in pursuit of General Stewart to the arsenal. By that time we had reached the skirts of the mob, and had gotten beyond it, we found numbers of men along the way, but no indications of any great crowd having been there. We then discovered Captain Aull, and he told us that General Brinton and his command had gone on before towards Sharpsburg, I believe, or in that direction. I do not remember distinctly where he said. We continued our pursuit of him; inquired here and there from little groups of men that were discovered along the way.

Q. What was Captain Aull doing at the arsenal?

A. Well, I don't know. He had his buggy there, and had evidently been making some inquiry, I suppose. I didn't know at the time what he was doing.

Q. Did you leave him at the arsenal?

A. Yes; left him near there. We drove on.

Q. Was he driving when you left him?

A. No, sir; I think when we saw him he was out of his buggy. His buggy was a short distance away from him—at least I thought it was his buggy. I don't know whether it was or not; I didn't ask him.

Q. Proceed?

A. We then followed General Brinton across the bridge, and inquired at the end of the bridge if anybody had followed him across the bridge. We thought perhaps the mob had pursued him. He stated that nobody crossed the bridge after him—the toll man. We followed through the town, where everything was peaceful, and there was no indications of any mob, and found General Brinton's command perhaps a half a mile beyond Sharpsburg. The carriage drove up, and I hallooed to some officer, I don't remember who he was, and he directed the command to be opened, and we drove through and I joined General Brinton. We got out of the carriage before he stopped his command, as my recollection is, and then I joined him and continued to walk with him. There were some of his officers around, of course. I couldn't swear positively as to whom were all there, and my first salutation to General Brinton was congratulating him upon his escape, and then made some remarks about where in the name of Heaven he was going, or something of the kind. He was going in the wrong direction, and then the conversation ensued about the order, in which I said that an order had been prepared, signed by Captain Aull. I may have said an officer. I may not have mentioned Captain Aull; but I think I did—pretty sure I did—because very likely when I knew he had gone with the order, and that he had it that, I did say so. General Brinton said that he couldn't take his command back in the condition they were in, and he wouldn't take his command back. He said perhaps if he had a positive order he might go, which implies at once—I don't think he will deny that—that he was pursuing the wrong direction. He then commenced to talk to me about his ammunition and provisions, and I suggested to him to levy mail on the country, to assess the provisions if his troops were in that condition. He said he wouldn't do that, he would have two hundred and fifty thousand people in the country down upon him. That I am positive he said. I then suggested that he should go back to Sharpsburg, saying that he could hold his position there. I didn't say this as an order, perhaps, but it was in our conversation. Of course, I had no right to give it as an order, and I did not. And he said he was not satisfied with the disposition of the people at Sharpsburg. That they were even worse there than they were at Pittsburgh. I thought that rather strange, because I had seen a train standing there, and people sitting in their yards, as we drove through. I am sure he said that. He said, further, that he had been fired on from that train—at least, I so understood it. It may have been from the cars in the city—I may have gotten the two mixed, so far as that is concerned. He said, too, that I told him where he first turned off to unite with Colonel Guthrie. And he said he had been followed by at least a thousand armed men to that point, and they had men over in the direction of Colonel Guthrie. I asked him whether I should go with his command, or go back. He said he would prefer that I would go back, and endeavor to get provisions and ammunition for him. Of course, there had been a running conversation about provisions and ammunition, and his men looked as though they needed it. The most of this conversation passed between us while we were walking along, and I am certain it couldn't have been heard by all of his officers, because Brinton and I went side by side—it could have been heard, a good deal of it. I have no doubt these gentlemen are perfectly honest in saying they didn't hear me say it. I am sure some of them know that what I have stated to-night they did hear. We then had a talk about whether I should stop there, or whether I should go back. And he said he would go on a short distance, and remain there—I think he said about a mile, on a hill. I forgot to say that when I first met him, in speaking about his designs in leaving the city, he said he wanted to get the river between him and the mob, and to reach the hills and entrench; and that was his object in going across the river, so that he could feed his troops and revive them. When I closed the conversation with him, he said then he would go a short distance beyond—and I think he said half a mile—and remain there. That he didn't remain, I only know, of course, from hearsay—that he was not there.

Q. Did you see Captain Aull when he started with the order?

A. Did I see him when he started?

Q. Yes?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. How long did he go prior to your starting?

A. Possibly half an hour, probably more—may have been more. I couldn't swear to that positively. He started before I did. When Captain Aull started, I suppose he went out with his buggy, and we, in the meantime, had to get a carriage. It simply was an effort to duplicate the attempt to reach Brinton, and I volunteered to go, as I said, simply for that reason. I had no other object in the world.

Q. You saw the order handed to him by General Latta, did you?

A. Yes; I did.

Q. Did you read the order?

A. The order was read to me, sir. The order, as you observe, contained a suggestion to General Brinton to consult with him in regard to the situation in Pittsburgh. Of course, we had a running general conversation about what had happened in Pittsburgh. The general asked him about the hotel—whether it had been burned, and, when I left, he handed me, and several of the officers handed me, their checks, which were afterwards delivered, I believe, by one of the officers of the staff or one of the gentlemen, over to Major Baugh.

Q. When you overtook Captain Aull, at the arsenal, did you have any conversation with him, as to where he was going then?

A. No; I didn't.

Q. Had you then learned where Brinton's troops were?

A. Nothing positive, sir. I don't know whether Captain Aull knew positively. He just, I supposed, had ascertained in some way from inquiries made along the road.

Q. When you reached General Brinton, you say you indicated to him the fact that Captain Aull had delivered an order, or an officer had delivered an order?

A. An officer had an order to effect this junction.

Q. You are not certain whether you named Captain Aull or you named an officer?

A. I am not positive about it, but I feel very sure that I did, because of the fact that Captain Aull had the order that had been read to me, and that he had started in advance of me, and all that, and it strikes me that I would say so. I cannot see why I should not. Of course I may not have done it.

Q. Did you communicate to him the fact of having seen Captain Aull at the arsenal?

A. I don't know that I did, sir.

Q. Or that you left an officer at the arsenal?

A. I don't know that I did that. I may have done so, without having any recollection of it.

Q. Was any other person with you in the carriage, except Mr. Stewart?

A. No, sir; nobody accompanied us except the driver. It was an ordinary cab, and the driver was on the outside.

Q. When you reached General Brinton's force, did the driver drive you to General Brinton?

A. I think not all the way. I think I got out before we reached him. I may not have done so. I wouldn't be sure about that, but am pretty sure we got out before we reached General Brinton and joined him, walking up to him.

Q. When you left the carriage, did Stewart leave the carriage with you?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Did he accompany you to General Brinton?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Did General Brinton stop himself?

A. He didn't stop. My recollection is that the general didn't stop his command until his surgeon came up and asked him to stop, to take a ball from the shoulder of one of the men. Then they stopped, and the place where we stopped was along a small ravine, where several of the officers and ourselves sat down.

Q. Then you walked beside him for some little distance before he stopped?

A. Yes; I think I must have walked three fourths of a mile or a mile. I say that, from the fact that we had to go back to find our carriage, and our carriage stopped about the place we left it, and I think it was fully three quarters of a mile or a mile before we joined it. I know we became a good deal alarmed about it, and were afraid that we had lost him, and it was during our walk back we met I think Dr. Mears.

Q. Did you and General Brinton walk side by side?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Where was Stewart during that time?

A. Stewart was walking by my side, and perhaps on the other side of General Brinton a portion of the time. I am pretty positive he was present during nearly everything that was said.

Q. Were there any officers walking with General Brinton when you overtook him?

A. Yes; I think there were.

Q. Did they continue to walk along?

A. Well, I think probably they did—some of them.

Q. Did you know the officers?

A. I remember General Loud being there. I remember Colonel Wilson being there; but whether they were around when everything was said I didn't know. I remember seeing Mr. Pettit. I remember seeing Dale Benson, but not with them. I think I met him on my way back. I know I shook hands with him.

Q. Do you remember of seeing Surgeon Mears?

A. I recollect about Surgeon Mears directly. I recollect him bringing up some bread, after we had left the command on our way back—that is, the person I took for Surgeon Mears. I have met him since, but I don't think I knew him then.

Q. After you had walked some distance, General Brinton halted, I understand you to say?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. How long did you remain standing there in conversation?

A. Well, I don't suppose we had a ten minutes' conversation there.

Q. Did you remain standing all the time?

A. No, sir; I think we sat down, or sort of lolled on a bank or something of the kind. I don't think we stood, because we were all pretty tired. I know I was dreadful tired. That was the chief cause of my alarm when we went back to find the carriage, because I was satisfied I could never reach Pittsburgh. I had been up for two nights, and was worn out. The ride was a dreadful one.

Q. In communicating to him that an officer had been sent out with an order, you communicated to him the substance of the order you saw?

A. Yes; it was as I explained to him. I didn't say it in those words, probably, simply the substance of those orders, and they were to effect a junction with Guthrie. The whole object was to have the troops concentrated, and it was with that purpose that I went out. There was no earthly purpose for me to go and find General Brinton, other than that.

Q. In communicating that to him, did you tell him that General Latta had requested you to communicate the order to him?

A. Yes; I think I did.

Q. Did you tell him you had been sent for that purpose?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Did he make any reply?

A. Yes; he said what I have said, that if he got a positive order, he would take his command back. I can say, too, without any reservation, that there was no reason under heaven why General Brinton should not have stopped with his command at Sharpsburg. There was not a symptom of the riot within two miles, after we left the skirts of it, at the arsenal. We rode on, and, of course, we met groups of men, but there were none of them that numbered thirty, and he was followed up by nobody from Sharpsburg but a small collection of boys, that were in the rear of his column, more out of curiosity than anything else, and that was the reason I suggested his taking up the position there, because I knew, and I said to him, we could have access to him there very easily, because the trains were then running, and I had seen a train standing there, and it moved off as we passed toward Allegheny, and my idea was, that if he wanted provisions and ammunition we could more easily get it there for him than at any other point, and I said that he could protect that bridge against any force. Any one who knows the bridge would be aware of that. It is an open bridge, and those two guns would have protected it against any force coming in that direction.

Q. Did you meet any officer of General Brinton's command on your return to Pittsburgh?

A. That had been with him?

Q. Any one that had remained in the city during the night?

A. Major Baugh.

Q. Where did you meet Major Baugh?

A. I saw Major Baugh at the Monongahela house.

Q. What time?

A. That night, sir.

Q. Did you meet him when you were returning to Pittsburgh anywheres about the arsenal, or on the way going to General Brinton's command?

A. I don't think I did. I met one officer, and I thought he was Doctor Mears—he had the bread in a bucket—and I don't think we met anybody else, because I cannot remember this circumstance, and if we had met them, I would have recollected it. We were followed, just after the doctor accosted us, by a man on horseback, who endeavored to have us intercepted three or four times—came up to the carriage—and when we got into Pittsburgh, evidently tried to have us intercepted by the mob, and we drove through the alleys to escape him, and we were more concerned about that than anything else at that time, and I think if we would have met anybody, it would have impressed itself upon my mind, and I don't recollect meeting anybody after we crossed the bridge. That I am quite sure. We didn't discover this man until we got across the bridge, and we discovered it by his coming up, and making inquiries, and making some remarks.

Q. After you crossed the bridge, you don't remember of meeting Major Baugh?

A. I don't, sir.

Q. Who made the inquiries of you?

A. Major Baugh?

Q. Yes, sir?

A. I don't have the slightest recollection of that. I think the one officer we took for Surgeon Mears. I think he was pretty nearly where this man accosted us.

Q. When Major Baugh came to the hotel in the evening, did you learn the object of his mission?

A. What—to General Latta?

Q. Yes?

A. No, sir; I couldn't say that I did.

Q. Did you hear any conversation between him and General Latta?

A. I may have heard it without having any recollection of it.

Q. Do you know whether General Latta gave him any orders or not?

A. I really don't know that, sir.

Q. That is all, unless you desire to state something further.

A. I have nothing to say, sir, I believe, except what I have said. I simply would ask these gentlemen to be called who heard me, because when I went back I made a statement which, in substance, is what I said here, and I may have said it a little different, but substantially the same, to Colonel Guthrie; and Captain Aull is here himself, and he knows that I was present when the order was given, and Colonel Stewart was present with me all the time, and I simply would like to have them called for that reason, to show that my two statements are consistent.

Colonel P. N. Guthrie, re-called:

By Mr. Lindsey:

Q. You may state what Colonel Norris stated to you on his return from General Brinton's command, in relation to his conversation with General Brinton?

A. Well, Mr. Chairman, I would like to start out a little further back than that, because Major Norris stated nothing to me of his own will, only at my request. I would like to state here that when Captain Aull left my regiment to enter the town, he was sent by me with instructions to General Latta, to this effect: that I didn't believe, at that hour, it was possible for the troops from Walls station to reach me; and that it was useless for me to remain at the stock-yards; and to report fully to General Latta the condition in which my regiment was placed; that we were doing nothing, and of no particular service to the railroad or to the public peace, and neither the railroad, at that hour, was threatened, nor the public peace. Captain Aull having gone in and witnessed the departure of General Brinton from the round-house, and conveyed that information to General Latta, receiving an order from General Latta, to be conveyed to General Brinton, one copy of which was to be conveyed to me, and reaching me at an hour of the day—I do not remember what—with the information that he had not reached General Brinton, I deemed it of the greatest importance that I should know, of my own knowledge, what was the intention of the Adjutant General, and what was the condition of the forces. I waited at the stock-yards until I was satisfied by the actual appearance of the troops from Walls station, and from knowledge that I had received by sending one of the men from my regiment out in search of General Brinton, that there was no possibility of that junction. I then came into town fully impressed with the necessity that there should be some understanding between General Brinton's troops and mine, which was the only regiment left in Allegheny county, or in the vicinity of Pittsburgh and Allegheny, after General Brinton had crossed the river at Sharpsburg. I came in there to ascertain information from General Latta. I met Colonel Norris, and I asked him the question. At first he gave me no particular information. Afterwards, when I asked him again, he told me that he and Major Stewart had gone out in search of General Brinton, and had reached him at a point, I understood, across the Sharpsburg bridge. That he had represented to General Brinton that an order had been issued by General Latta, which was an order to him, General Brinton, through Captain Aull, instructing General Brinton to form a junction with me. When that junction was formed, General Brinton was to judge himself of the circumstances, and govern himself accordingly. It was my belief, that if that junction had been formed, the troops could have come into Pittsburgh, and reached the vicinity of that disturbance in time to have saved property. I asked Major Norris, particularly, if he had seen General Brinton and had conversed with him. He said he had. I asked him what the reply was, and he said that General Brinton was not able to come in. I asked him again what General Brinton's reply was. He shrugged up his shoulders, and still did not give me the verbal reply of General Brinton. Sometime afterward, in conversation with Colonel Norris, he told me that General Brinton had refused to form that junction with him, that is, to return from the position that he was then in. There is no "ifs" and "ands" in the matter, in my mind. My impression is distinct and clear that Colonel Norris told me he had met General Brinton and he had had that conversation with General Brinton. He had urged upon General Brinton that he would comply with what were the instructions of this order, though General Brinton had not received it. That General Brinton had refused to comply with that order. I would further state to the committee here, that a copy of that order that was intended for General Brinton reached him on Sunday. I brought it back into the city on Sunday afternoon to General Latta, and I delivered it myself, personally, to General Brinton, at his head-quarters at the hospital, in Pittsburgh, after the return to Pittsburgh.

Q. What day?

A. Well, nearly a week—just a week. I gave it personally to General Brinton.

Q. The 31st of July, was it not?

A. I guess so. It was after General Brinton had gone back to the junction and then returned to Pittsburgh with the Governor. General Brinton told me at that time, that that was the first information he had of that order.

Q. The copy was delivered to you by Captain Aull, was it, colonel?

A. Captain Aull failed to reach General Brinton, for reasons which I will let Captain Aull state to you himself.

Q. I do not quite understand your statement, whether it was the original or a copy that was delivered?

A. The original order. There was one copy of that order, the original order is probably on file in the head-quarters. Copies of the order were given to Captain Aull, one for General Brinton and one for myself.

Q. You brought it into the city and kept it in your possession all the time, until you delivered it to General Brinton?

A. I kept it in my possession until I delivered it, personally, to General Brinton, at the hospital grounds, after the return to the city.

Q. Do you know whether General Latta was notified that General Brinton had not received the order?

A. I cannot say. I do not remember whether I stated that fact to General Latta or not. I do not believe I did. I went into town fully impressed that General Brinton would not join me, and that some other arrangement of troops must be made, and I do not know whether I stated to General Latta that General Brinton would not join me, and that he must make some other arrangement, or whether I stated to him that Captain Aull had been unable to reach General Brinton. At all events, the original order General Brinton never received until the 31st, I believe it was.

Captain W. F. Aull, re-called:

By Mr. Lindsey:

Q. Just state, if you please, what your conversation was with Colonel Norris, and why you did not reach General Brinton with the order given to you by General Latta Sunday morning, the 22d July?

A. Colonel Guthrie has stated that he sent me in for a personal conversation with General Latta, and I just state here that in passing Twenty-sixth street, I think it was, that as I approached Twenty-sixth street, I saw the people massed around the corners of the building, looking round up the street, as if something was going on, and I asked two or three parties what it was, and they said the troops were out. I drove across. They undertook to stop me, saying I had better look out, or I would get shot, that they had the Gatling guns up there, and they would shoot down street. I drove across the street and saw no indications of anybody shooting. I drove on and went around the square from there, where I could see the troops more closely, and they passed on out Penn street. I waited until I saw they had the Gatling guns along with them, and I drove then, as rapidly as possible, to the Union depot. I was not aware that General Latta had not yet received the information of their leaving the round-house, until I went in, and, I think General Latta will remember, I was a little slow to tell him, from the fact that I supposed he knew about it, and when I told him they had got out of the round-house, and after getting out upon the street with their Gatling guns, he jumped up and appeared very much pleased, said, "Thank God they are out." I knew then that that was the first information he had received. He then turned to some officers present, and they commenced to congratulate each other that they had got out, and he told me to take a seat and remain. I sat down. A few moments afterwards, a party that I didn't know at the time, but who afterwards turned out to be a man by the name Surgeon Wilson, who had been acting the part of a spy for General Latta, reported that they were out of the round-house, and, I think, reported that they were going to the arsenal. A few moments afterwards another party came in, and reported that they had gone to the arsenal, and were now quartered in the arsenal. That I am positive of. I heard that—that they were quartered in the arsenal. That appeared to afford a great deal of relief to the officers present, and General Latta immediately began to dictate an order to his clerk, Mr. Russell, I believe. I waited until he had written the order, and he either wrote out a duplicate or wrote out two orders, I don't remember which. I am not clear as to whether they were two different orders or duplicate orders. At any rate he gave me an order; but before he gave it to me he had a long talk with Colonel Norris, took him into a private room, or talked with him first. He then read the order in my presence, that he afterwards handed to me, giving Colonel Norris instructions to reach General Brinton. My instructions were to return to my regiment, and that General Brinton being quartered in the arsenal, I should take the order, which I received, to deliver it to him there, then deliver the other order to Colonel Guthrie. When I reached the arsenal, I found the troops were not quartered there, and I went to two or three different parties at the arsenal for fear that they were trying to deceive me, that probably they were in the arsenal. I walked round the fence, and looked in wherever I could see, wherever I had the opportunity to see in, to convince myself positively that they were not there, before I would go any further; but finally, I being convinced that they had gone out Butler street, as the sentinel informed me, I started back to my buggy, and just as I was approaching the street that crosses Butler street at right angles, Colonel Stewart and Major Norris came driving across the street, and I hailed them, and told Colonel Norris that they had gone on out Butler street, that I had information enough to convince me of that, and immediately turned round and started on, without asking for any further information. He drove on out Butler street. I got into my buggy and started after them. I drove on as far as Sharpsburg bridge, and made numerous inquiries of parties along the street how far they were ahead of me, and what the prospects would be of overtaking them. When I reached Sharpsburg bridge I was told they must be at least two miles ahead of me, and they had struck out into the country, towards Butler county. I supposed I stood or sat in the buggy for fully two or three minutes, meditating whether I would follow or take the other order to Colonel Guthrie first. I concluded, at last, that I would first take the order to Colonel Guthrie. I had two orders to deliver, and I concluded I would take the order to Colonel Guthrie, and if he advised me to, to strike across the country, and reach General Brinton with the other order. I drove straight to East Liberty, and reported to Colonel Guthrie what I had seen, and handed him the order that I had been authorized to deliver to him. I also stated to him that I had an order for General Brinton, and stated the circumstances under which I had not delivered it. I asked him the question if I should strike across the country from there, right directly across the river, the direction I knew they were in, or whether I would remain where I was. He replied, "Give me that order and I will go to the city and see General Latta myself," and I handed him the order and I never saw it afterwards. Colonel Guthrie then left the regiment and went to the city, as he has stated.

Q. When did you see Colonel Norris next after leaving him at the arsenal?

A. I am not exactly clear on that. I think I saw him Friday. I saw him at the Duquesne club-rooms.

Q. Well, did you see him within a week?

A. No, sir; it was some time afterwards before I saw him again.

Norman M. Smith re-called:

By Mr. Lindsey:

Q. You may state the facts in relation to the conversation that occurred between General Brinton and Colonel Norris, or what you know in relation to it?

A. Mr. Chairman, the only evidence I can give is corroborative. I met Colonel Norris immediately after his return from his trip to General Brinton's command. Met him in front of the Union Depot Hotel, immediately after he got out of his carriage, I think. He stated to me that he had carried the orders to General Brinton. That Colonel Norris has already said to you, that he carried, and also said that General Brinton had refused to obey them, and return to Pittsburgh.

Q. What time was it you met him?

A. Well, it is pretty hard for me to give the hour exactly. I had been up for three or four days and nights. I think, though, it was between nine and ten o'clock. I will not be positive about that. It might have been earlier, and it might have been later. I think, though, between nine and ten o'clock in the morning.

Q. Did he state exactly where he found him?

A. He said he had followed him beyond Sharpsburg, and dismounted from his carriage, and had marched on foot with him for some distance. Had communicated the order that he has stated. Had conversed with him for some time, and that General Brinton had refused to return to Pittsburgh.

Q. Did he say anything about his refusal to join Colonel Guthrie?

A. While I said return to Pittsburgh I meant to join Colonel Guthrie—that was implied. That after they joined, that is, it was in our minds, after they had united their commands, that they were to return to Pittsburgh; but when I said refused to return to Pittsburgh, I meant refused to join Colonel Guthrie, or rather to execute the order that Colonel Norris had to carry.

Q. Did he say anything about the condition of General Brinton's troops?

A. Perhaps he may have mentioned it in a general way, but 1 do not recollect that he specified it particularly.

Q. That was not spoken of?

A. I think not. At least that did not impress itself on my mind, if it was mentioned.

Q. Anything said about getting provisions to them?

A. Well, there probably was, but I am not prepared to say what it was—that was a matter that was paramount in all our minds, the matter of provisions for the troops had been concerning me, particularly, from the evening before, and continued to concern me until the next evening, until I secured some provisions and got them to the troops.

Q. Is that all that you know in relation to what occurred between Colonel Norris and General Brinton?

A. That is all, I believe, sir.

Colonel Norris: I would like to say, when I got back to the hotel, Mr. Cassatt was there, and I believe Mr. Bennett, of Allegheny, and we had a conversation then about supplying General Brinton's command with provisions and ammunition, and an arrangement was there made, I myself giving the directions where he was to convey the provisions to him, and that provisions did ultimately reach him. That conversation was heard, I believe, by Colonel Hassinger.

Colonel Smith: If I may be permitted—I was speaking of the time I met Colonel Norris. I was present at that conversation, at the Monongahela house, and can verify what the colonel said at that time.

Colonel D. L. Hassinger, sworn:

By Mr. Lindsey:

Q. You understand, I believe, the subject of evidence to-night. Will you go on and state what knowledge you have on the subject?

A. I was at the Monongahela house when Colonel Norris and Major Stewart returned, and I heard just about—he reported that he had caught up with General Brinton on his way out beyond Sharpsburg bridge, that he got out of the carriage and walked along, and had the conversation, and spoke about the order which had been sent to him through Captain Aull, and he said he gave him the substance of the order, and General Brinton had refused to obey him.

Q. Can you give the language of Colonel Norris—the exact words that Colonel Norris used?

A. Well, I don't know that I can, exactly. I do not recollect that part of it.

Q. You don't pretend now, in our statement, to give the language?

A. No. I have not heard any of the evidence at all that was before the committee, except sitting here for a few minutes.

Q. You are a member of the National Guard?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. What regiment?

A. Assistant Adjutant General of the State.

Q. Had you been at Pittsburgh during the riot—the entire progress of it?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Were you with General Latta?

A. I was with him most of the time that he was there. On that morning I had started out when I heard that the troops were out of the round-house. I went out as far as the arsenal, and when I got there I found that they had gone in another direction. I was afoot, and, I think, returned to the hotel.

Q. You were at the hotel when the colonel arrived?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Do you know whether Colonel Norris communicated that fact to General Latta that you have just related?

A. Yes; he did. General Latta was in the room at the time.

Q. In your presence?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. That is all you know in relation to the conversation that occurred between them, is it?

A. That is about all, sir; yes, sir.

General James W. Latta re-called:

By Mr. Lindsey:

Q. I would like you to state, general, just what Colonel Norris stated to you on his return from General Brinton's command?

A. I did detail that, sir, about as fully as I recollect it, describing the room and situation and surroundings. I will go over it again if you desire.

Q. I want to ask you one other question. Did you learn on Sunday that Captain Aull had not reached General Brinton with that order?

A. I did not find it out, sir, until nearly a week afterwards.

Q. When Major Baugh came to the hotel on Sunday, was anything said to him by you about whether Captain Aull had reached the command or not?

A. No, sir.

Q. And he did not communicate anything of the kind to you?

A. No, sir.

Q. When you gave the order to Major Baugh, you had no knowledge whatever of whether Captain Aull had reached General Brinton with the first order or not?

A. I had not, sir. I supposed he had. I took that for granted.

Captain Aull: Will General Latta add that he gave me no instructions to report back?

The witness: I did say that in my report.

Major General R. M. Brinton re-called:

By Mr. Lindsey:

Q. I wish you to state, general, whether at any time during your stay in Pittsburgh any attempt was made by any of the officials of the Pennsylvania Railroad Company to control your movements, or the movements of your troops in any way?

A. No, sir; there was no attempts made by any officers of the Pennsylvania Railroad Company, to my knowledge, to dictate or interfere in the slightest with the movements of the troops. I remember at one time, just after the firing occurred at Twenty-eight street, that General Pearson was in Mr. Pitcairn's office, and Mr. Cassatt was there, one of the vice presidents of the Pennsylvania railroad, and I asked permission of General Pearson to clear the streets, and to follow the crowd to the arsenal, and he, more in his manner than anything else, appealed to Mr. Cassatt, and Mr. Cassatt said I have nothing to do with the movements of the troops, I know nothing about that whatever. I can say that at no time did they attempt, to my knowledge, to interfere in any way with the movements of the troops.

Q. Will you state from whom, or by whom, the provisions were delivered to your troops, on the hill beyond Sharpsburg?

A. After our arrival in Pittsburgh, or previous to our arrival, I telegraphed to Pittsburgh for provisions, to General Pearson, and he procured them from the Union depot, that is, a sandwich and a cup of coffee. After that, we were in the round-house, and I made repeated appeals——

Q. I speak of the provisions that were brought after you went beyond Sharpsburg, on the hill, when you were encamped there—from whom you received, the provisions, that is, who delivered them to you?

A. I had a note from Mr. Cassatt, about, I should think, ten or eleven o'clock that night, that is, Sunday night, saying that he had procured for us a lot of hams and provisions, &c, and had sent them out. I thought, at the time, that Mr. Cassatt had left Pittsburgh, but I found that he had not, and he had also sent two parties from Sharpsburg, merchants there, who said that they had an order from Mr. Cassatt to give us whatever they had in their stores, and they gave me an inventory of it, and said it was at my disposal, and that Mr. Cassatt had given them orders, and that he would be responsible for it, and I might say the only provisions I did receive from the time we went to Pittsburgh, until we arrived at Blairsville, came through his energies.

Q. Who delivered the line from Mr. Cassatt to you?

A. My impression was, or is, it was Mr. Smith—Colonel Smith, I think—who brought it there that night. There is one point I should like to correct. I won't detail any of the conversation, further than to allude to my evidence, which I gave before. You have, with Colonel Norris, stated that I wanted to cross the river and intrench. That I did not say, and, moreover, it would have been impossible, because I had not any means of intrenching—no tools, or anything of the kind. He said he saw no crowd, at all, following to Sharpsburg, and that we should have remained there, in his idea. I merely refer to a dispatch which General Latta sent to the Governor at that time, and which he must have received information either from Captain Aull or Colonel Norris, as it was sent by telegram. It was directed to Governor Hartranft, dated July 22, p. 36, in which he says, among other things: "The first division, after stiff fighting for about fourteen hours, have retired to a point near Sharpsburg, pursued vigorously by a mob, to the high bridge at that point, under a hot fire pretty nearly all the way, but they effectually checked the attack." Colonel Norris returned, he said that there was no mob following us whatever.

Q. Go on, general?

A. In regard to our not stopping in Sharpsburg, and that ammunition, &c, could reach us, I want to state that we went on a point of the railroad below Sharpsburg, where we could procure provisions, and where we were in direct communication by rail with Pittsburgh, the same railroad which runs through Sharpsburg, and therefore we lost nothing by not stopping in Sharpsburg. In regard to receiving the provisions which Colonel Norris promised us if we would remain there, the provisions never came, except by the hands of the Pennsylvania Railroad Company. The evidence which Colonel Norris has given in regard to the situation we were in, &c., of course is entirely different from what I have already stated, and from what the officers who were immediately surrounding us when he joined us said. They being on the spot, it was not hearsay evidence on their part, but it was what they actually heard, and they have sworn that they were sufficiently near to hear every word that was passed at the time, but if it is necessary, I can produce those officers to corroborate it.

Q. We have had that.

Colonel Norris: I wish to ask Colonel Smith, whether the provisions were not sent in pursuance of the arrangements made after my conversation with Mr. Cassatt and Mr. Bennett?

By Mr. Lindsey:

You may state that, Colonel Smith.

Colonel Smith: As has already been stated, Mr. Cassatt and Mr. Bennett, and others, had a consultation at the Monongahela house, about noon of Sunday. Mr. Bennett and Mr. Cassatt left the hotel together, Mr. Cassatt, at least, and I think Mr. Bennett with him, went to Allegheny, to arrange with bakers, and other people there, to prepare sandwiches and other provisions to send out. I left the Monongahela house about three o'clock, and had this understanding with Mr. Cassatt, who was to take the road on the north side of the river, with the wagons of provisions. I was to move up on the south side, as stated in my examination in chief. I proceeded by certain routes across the Allegheny river, and at Aetna, I met Mr. Campbell Herron, and I stated the necessities of the troops, and asked him whether he could assist me in procuring provisions for them. I had in mind the conversation and action taken place at the Monongahela house, between Mr. Cassatt and others. Mr. Herron said that the store belonging to their furnace, their property, had some provisions in it, and he sent for his manager, Mr. Chalfant, and with him I arranged to load up whatever provisions they had, as soon as it became dark, and that they should be sent on to the camp of General Brinton's command. My arrangement with Cassatt, was to wait at General Brinton's camp until I heard from him—either saw him or heard from him. After that, I was to proceed to execute the orders I carried from General Latta, which has already been stated here to the committee. I waited there until about ten o'clock, when a man by the name of Bradley, a livery stable keeper—he had charge of hauling the provisions out there—came into camp, and reported two wagon loads within a short distance, and in the meantime, Mr. Chalfant had reported there, that a wagon containing hams, and some other provisions, which we turned over to the commissary of General Brinton's command. I believe there is no question about that, but all these arrangements were made in pursuance of the understanding arrived at between Mr. Cassatt, and Mr. Bennett and others, at the instigation of Colonel Norris, after his return from visiting General Brinton's command in the morning.

At this point the committee adjourned, to meet at the call of the chairman.

Explanatory Note by the Reporter of the Committee.

Owing to an urgent desire on the part of the committee to have the testimony—taken in shorthand—transcribed and printed as rapidly as possible after the order to print was made by the Legislature, a number of men were put to work on it, each man taking a portion, irrespective of dates. As fast as transcribed, these portions were printed. This will explain the mingling of dates. Furthermore and unfortunately, in the hurry and confusion of such quick work, some of the copy was mislaid or lost before reaching the printer's hands, necessitating a re-dictation by myself from the original notes. This will explain the consequent delay.

SAM'L B. COLLINS, Official Reporter of Legislature.

Philadelphia, September 30, 1878.

F. B. Gowen, sworn:

By Mr. Lindsey:

Q. State your residence and official connection with the Reading Railroad Company?

A. I reside at Mount Airey, in the city of Philadelphia, and am president of the Philadelphia and Reading Railroad Company, and have been so since the spring of 1869.

Q. We wish you to state now whether there was any difficulty on the Reading railroad during the riots last July; and if so, give us the circumstances?

A. There was a difficulty at Reading, on the line of the Reading railroad. We did not originate that, nor was it participated in by any one then in the employ of the company, so far as we have been able to ascertain. In other words the riotous attacks on property at Reading, which culminated in the burning of a large bridge over the Schuylkill river, in the city of Reading, were not the acts of any one of the then employés of the company, nor, so far as we have been able to learn, was there any single man then in the employ of the company absent from his post at that time, nor was there then any strike of any kind whatever among any of the then employés of the company.

Q. Did the road continue to run during the troubles?

A. The road was stopped for one day—absolutely for a little over twenty-four hours—the main line of the road was stopped—all the branches were running. The main line was stopped at Reading, by the tearing up of the track, and also the Lebanon Valley railroad was stopped for a long time, in consequence of the burning of the bridge, which took place on the night of the day on which the disturbance occurred elsewhere in Reading.

Q. Was this destruction of property caused by former employés of the road?

A. Almost entirely. It was caused by a mob that was composed principally, I believe, of former employés of the company, or led by them—organized by them—and, of course, participated in, or witnessed by a great crowd of people, many of whom may not have been at all active participants, but merely spectators.

Q. State whether you had reason to believe there would be any difficulty; and if so, what steps you took to prevent it?

A. Early in the spring of the year, as early as March, at least, we had reason to believe that the society called the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers was arranging to make some kind of an attack upon the company, somewhat similar to that one which occurred on the Boston and Maine railroad and the Central railroad of New Jersey, and we had also reason to believe that there was then being organized throughout the country, somewhat under the shadow of, or in some way connected with the Locomotive Brotherhood, another society, which was to embrace all the trainmen employed upon the railroads generally, and we thought that the proper way to prevent such action having a disastrous effect upon our company and its property would be to state to those who belonged to this society that they could no longer remain in our employ; and upon a demand being made upon us by a committee of the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers for an advance in wages of twenty per cent., which we believed to be the preliminary step for testing the question of power, we notified all the engineers and firemen, who belonged to the Brotherhood of Engineers, that they could not remain in the service of the company and be members of that organization at the same time; but, as we understood, that that organization had a beneficial fund from which the members derived some benefit, we proposed to give them a fund of the same kind to which the company also would be a contributor, as well as themselves, so that no man, in leaving that Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, would lose the money value of his membership. When we issued this circular, between three and four hundred men, principally engineers and firemen, and a few others who left in sympathy with them, left the service of the company. That was in the month of April. That has been spoken of as a strike, but it was no strike, because these people who joined it knew that they could not remain in the service of the company, and it was different from a strike where persons simply stop work for the purpose of enforcing a demand for higher wages. A great number of those persons who left the service of the company in April, still, I think, remained under the impression that they could force the company to take them back, and they organized themselves more closely at Reading, and had a series of meetings at which they took in a great many others that didn't belong to the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers. They had regular meetings in some hall there, and maintained a position or attitude of hostility to the company. Their object being to embarrass the company in the transaction of its business, so that the company would be forced to take them back; but as the company didn't take them back, as they desired, from day to day, and week to week, and month to month, they became very sore on the subject, and I believe that the riot at Reading—indeed, although I can only speak from hearsay evidence; but as I took part as a lawyer in the cases that grew out of it, I derived a great deal of information as to the reason of it. I believe that when the news came to Reading of the general outbreak upon the Baltimore and Ohio railroad at Martinsburg, a number of those former employés of the company assembled at a hall in one of their meetings, and determined that they would have to do something of the kind, such as the burning down of the bridge and the tearing up of the track, and, resulting from that, this attack was made upon the company, which I believe was confined entirely to such employés as had left the service of the company, and among them such followers or sympathizers as could be got into a crowd on such an occasion; but I believe that none of the employés of the company had anything to do with it, or took any part in it.

Q. Prior to the breaking out of the riot, had you filled the places of all those men who had left your services?

A. Yes; their places were filled within two or three or four days of the time. Indeed, there was no interruption in the business of the road resulting from those engineers leaving us in the month of April, except that we stopped the movement of the coal trade one day so that all the engineers who remained in our service connected with the coal trade might be on hand in case we didn't have enough new ones, so that all the trains we call schedule trains, that is passenger trains and freight trains, might be moved promptly. The whole thing was over in two or three days. The places of those who left were immediately supplied. We promoted a great many firemen competent to take the places of the engineers. I am sure that within a week or ten days after they commenced to leave, there was no longer any vacancy in our service not filled.

Q. Was there any difficulty in finding men?

A. None whatever. It was rather remarkable we had them so quickly, so rapidly. Of course, anticipating this disturbance, we were quietly on the lookout for men.

Q. Were the new men you employed experienced engineers?

A. Yes; and it was more remarkable still. Our business is a peculiar one. It is very much more difficult for an engineer from another road to take hold of a heavy coal train on a down grade, than to handle a passenger or a common freight train on an ordinary grade. But there were very few accidents. There were a few such as might result from the inexperience of men unaccustomed to that kind of business; but they were remarkably few. Of course we had to be very vigilant. The company went to some expense in order to guard against accident.

Q. Were any of those new men you got men who had been discharged from other roads?

A. I cannot answer that question positively, for the reason that I don't know it; but I should judge from the habit or custom of the company in that respect, that no new man was taken into the service of the company who didn't bring a certificate of good character. I am sure no one would have been taken that was discharged from any cause that affected his ability or knowledge as an engineer.

Q. Then I understand you to say that you had no difficulty in securing plenty of engineers?

A. None whatever. You will understand, of course, that while quite a number of firemen left our service, a great many other firemen in our service were competent to take an engine, and a number of those were promoted.

Q. Have you any knowledge of the number of new men employed?

A. I think the entire number of engineers and firemen could not have been more than about from three hundred to three hundred and fifty—probably not so many. I think about three hundred or three hundred and fifty would cover all of those two classes—engineers and firemen.

Q. What steps were taken by the company to punish the rioters at Reading?

A. We left that, to some extent, to the civil authorities of Reading. In connection with them, prosecutions were commenced against a great number. Two of them who were known to have actually set fire to the bridge, or participated in the actual burning, who ran away, were arrested at a distance, and plead guilty.

Q. Were they men who had been in the employ of the company?

A. One of them had been at one time.

Q. In what capacity?

A. I think as a brakeman, and he had left the service of the company, at the time the locomotive engineers left, and at this meeting I spoke of as taking place at the hall in Reading, he had been promised by the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers to be paid so much a month, if he left the service of the company. The other one had never been in the service of the company—not that I am aware of.

Q. Do you know what steps were taken by the civil authorities at Reading to suppress the riot at that time?

A. There was very little done at the time. I think that all disturbance at Reading could have been prevented, if the sheriff of the county had shown the slightest amount of pluck or appreciation of his position. He had full knowledge—in fact, he was informed that it was to take place, but he did nothing practically, except when it was too late, to issue a proclamation that amounted to nothing.

Q. Do you know how long before it took place that this information was communicated to him?

A. Information was communicated to him of the intended rising. He was told of the facts in the possession of the party informing him, and an offer was made to him of men to act as a posse comitatus, about eight or ten o'clock in the morning of the day in which the trouble culminated. He did nothing until late that afternoon. I am quite confident that a determined man, armed with the law, in the position of the sheriff of Berks, at Reading, with twenty men—ten times which number he could have gotten from the citizens—could have prevented the whole disturbance.

Q. Do you know whether he made any call for help from the State?

A. I am not aware that he did, nor am I really aware of the means used to bring the military to Reading, or who first made the call for them. I know the military were sent there by the orders of some one in the military department of the State, who had authority upon that subject, and the disturbance was finally quelled by the action of the military, which unfortunately led to the killing of several persons.

Q. Had there been any reduction of wages on your road prior to July?

A. I think there had been no reduction of wages on the road for months before that. There had been two reductions of wages within the last few years.

Q. Since 1873—the time of the panic?

A. Yes.

Q. How large?

A. Each, I think, was ten per cent. The engineers on the Reading railroad have been for a great number of years paid according to the length of service. We have four grades, the first year the men get the lowest grade, and after they have been in the service of the company four years, they get the highest grade. That was due entirely, not to his knowledge as an engineer, but to his length of service as an employé in the company. It was understood that the men's wages should increase with the length of time they remained with us. When any man left us, and came back, again he had to go down and come up, as the lowest men.

Q. Did that apply to any other employés but the engineers?

A. It applied to the firemen.

Q. Can you give the wages that the brakemen and firemen and engineers were getting per day.

A. I cannot give it exactly. I think at the time of this disturbance the highest grade engineers were paid $2 97 per day. I think the firemen were getting about $1 50 to $1 60 per day. In the coal trade on the Reading railroad there were opportunities for engineers, during the busy seasons, to earn more than six days per week. Since the strike, or shortly after this trouble occurred, in April, as a mark of our appreciation of the fidelity of those who remained with us and resisted the temptation to leave when the Brotherhood of Engineers left—a good many of them, indeed, were members of the Brotherhood that stayed with us—we made a new grade of engineers, which no new men thereafter could enter, except after five years of service, and we put all the faithful men who remained with us in that grade, and gave them $3 23. We have also that system among the conductors of the passenger trains. They are paid according to length of service, and there is an amount of their pay kept back from them, and invested for their benefit which increases with length of time.

Q. What were the wages of the brakemen?

A. I think from $1 50 to $1 60.

By Mr. Larrabee:

Q. Were you at Reading during the riots?

A. I was not there.

By Mr. Means:

Q. Did any of those firemen or engineers who left you at that time, ever make application to come back?

A. A great many, and it was a very sad thing.

Q. Was there a man by the name of Clarke who made that application to you personally?

A. I cannot give their names, but a great many have made application personally.

Q. Didn't you tell him that he had done wrong in being led away by the Brotherhood?

A. I know of a great many such cases. A great many I knew expressed a willingness to come back.

Q. And acknowledged to you that they had done wrong, and after their places had been filled by other parties, wanted to be again in the employ of the road?

A. A great many—I can hardly give you the number. The point with the company was this: we had taken on three hundred new men, and the first duty was to them. And most of those new men are excellent men. Some of them went to the expense of moving their families hundreds of miles. Many of the old men have written and asked to come back, saying that they did wrong, and saying that they were threatened. Many of them have been very seriously crippled, by reason of not receiving the pay promised them. I think that they promised sixty dollars a month to every man who quit the service of the company.

By Mr. Larrabee:

Q. From what source?

A. The Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers.

By Mr. Means:

Q. The money didn't come?

A. They got very little. From what I understand from a number of them, I don't think they got enough to make more than ten dollars a month—hardly that.

Adjourned, to meet at eight o'clock this evening.

SAME DAY.

Friday, March 22, 1878—8, P.M.

Pursuant to adjournment, the committee re-assembled at eight o'clock, P.M., and continued the taking of testimony.

Robert M. Brinton, sworn:

By Mr. Lindsey:

Q. Where do you reside?

A. I reside at 1301 South Broad street, Philadelphia.

Q. You are a member of the National Guard of Pennsylvania?

A. Commanding the First Division National Guard of Pennsylvania.

Q. What is your rank?

A. Major General.

Q. State where you were when the news of the troubles at Pittsburgh, on the Pennsylvania railroad, reached you, and what your movements were afterwards?

A. I was at my office in Washington avenue about six o'clock in the afternoon, when I received a note from Mr. Thompson, of the Pennsylvania railroad, saying that General Latta had telegraphed me some instructions in regard to the riot at Pittsburgh. I proceeded to my home, where I found a message asking—from Colonel Scott, of the Pennsylvania railroad, saying that he had a message asking me to come to the Pennsylvania railroad office to confer with him. I did so and found him there. He handed me a message from General Latta, saying that troops were needed, and wanted to know how soon I could have a regiment ready to proceed to Pittsburgh. I suggested to him that if any troops were needed the whole division should be sent. I afterwards received a communication from General Latta to put the division under arms and be ready to move at a moment's notice, to report to General Pearson, at Pittsburgh. I telegraphed to General Pearson my instructions from General Latta, and immediately ordered the division to assemble, sending out officers to notify the different commands. It was summer time, and a great many of the men were absent. It was nine o'clock before I received the last message from General Latta, ordering me to report, and about two o'clock we had some six hundred men at the Pennsylvania depot.

Q. On what day?

A. In the morning of Saturday. I received the message on Friday night. I kept up communication with General Pearson, informing him of the number of men I had, and where I was on the road. We had no ammunition with the exception of a few rounds that the First regiment had. At Harrisburg we received some ammunition and two Gatling guns, which we attached to our train. We went through to Pittsburgh in eleven hours, arriving there about one o'clock on Saturday afternoon. There I met General Pearson, who ordered me to disembark the troops. I reported to him and General Latta in the Union Depot Hotel. The troops were rested and given coffee and sandwiches, and I ordered an additional ten rounds of ammunition, making twenty in all.

Q. Distributed?

A. Yes, among the men. General Pearson ordered me to have the troops ready to move to Twenty-eighth street. At that time. I told them in coming up, I had seen the hills covered with people, and I asked them in the event of their ordering me out, to go out with me, and look over the ground. I was an entire stranger there, and I thought they must be misinformed in regard to having cleared the hill, as they said General Brown's brigade had. I also met Mr. Cassatt at the depot, and I said in the event of our going down and clearing the tracks, can you move your trains. He said we can; we have crews already engaged to take out double-headers. General Pearson then ordered me down to Twenty-eighth street. I ordered one brigade to go down Liberty street. General Pearson then told me to go down the railroad, which I did, dragging the Gatling guns. We arrived at the crossing near Twenty-eighth street, going through rows of men, who were hooting and howling at us. Previous to this, while I was yet in the Union depot, I had been approached by several parties, who wanted to know if I would fire on poor workingmen. I didn't give any decided answer, not desiring any conversation with them. I called the brigade companies and several of the regimental companies together, and told them no matter what was done to us—even if they spit in our faces—I didn't want a shot fired, but if they attempted any personal violence, we had the right to defend ourselves, and we should do it. That was the order from which the firing commenced. We got down near to the Twenty-eighth street crossing. There was a large concourse of people there, far back as you could see, back on the railroad, and we were stopped. Sheriff Fife and his posse were ahead of us, and I believe he attempted to read the riot act, at least I heard him saying something; but he disappeared, and I didn't see any more of him or his deputies. General Pearson was with us. We could not force our way through without using some force, and I asked General Pearson whether he had any instructions to give. He hesitated a moment, and then said that the tracks must be cleared. The crowd then had pressed in between the column of fours, and I ordered the fours put into lines backward, and face the rear rank, about to push the crowd back from either side, and form a hollow-square.

By Senator Yutzy:

Q. How did you march?

A. The right in front—the First regiment was in front. The crowd gave back. We had a little difficulty in getting them back to the line of the cars. Quite a number of cars were there—the Twenty-eighth street crossing was blocked. The men standing there had evidently made up their minds to stay, saying that the railroad company had nothing to do with it, that they were not occupying anything but public ground. I then ordered two small companies, but finding them insufficient, I ordered up another command with arms aport, and attempted to push the crowd back; but finding it impossible, I gave orders to charge bayonets, which they did, and I saw one or two men bayoneted. The crowd at that time commenced firing on us, not only stones but pistol balls, and the men, acting on the orders already given to defend themselves, commenced firing—firing a few shots at first, which gradually went along the whole line. At that time, I had not over three hundred men. The second brigade had been left back, to guard the yard where the engines were to start from.

Q. Give us the position of your men at that time?

A. At that time, the rear rank was faced about. The Washington Grays and the Weccacoe Legion were in double rank, and were occupying the space between the two ranks of the First regiment facing east, trying to force their way back along the railroad from the Twenty-eighth street crossing, and the First regiment was keeping the crowd back from the railroad from the hill, and also from the car-shops.

Q. Had you the front and rear ranks of any companies on each side of the railroad?

A. Yes.

Q. In open order, one facing to the rear and the other to the front?

A. Yes.

Q. And then a command in front of them in the direction of the railroad?

A. A command on their flank—the right flank—facing eastward.

By Mr. Means:

Q. On the railroad?

A. Yes. The firing lasted about a minute—not over that, and the crowd, the moment the firing commenced, or shortly afterwards, dispersed and went in every direction. I gave the order to cease firing, and my staff officers had the firing stopped, and the ranks, which were somewhat broken, were re-formed, and I sent a staff officer to report to General Pearson. I thought he was on the ground, because it was not certainly—my opinion is, that in three minutes after he gave me the order to clear the tracks, the firing commenced. In the meantime, the Pittsburgh troops on the hill—I had not discovered them before—quite a number of them threw down their arms and left. I went up the hill a very short distance, and I saw what was going on there, and I hunted for General Pearson; finally, I received a note from him, saying he was at Mr. Pitcairn's office at the outer depot, and, that if I wished to communicate with him, to send a staff officer, which I did—Colonel Wilson—and he came back and said that General Pearson desired to see me. I turned the command over to General Matthews, and reported to General Pearson at the office of the Pennsylvania railroad at the outer depot—Mr. Pitcairn's office. I said to General Pearson at the time, that I thought we ought to continue to drive the crowd. I understood that they had gone to the arsenal. Several men came up to me and said that the crowd had gone to the United States arsenal to arm themselves, and I thought, when I found that they had gone away, that they would probably get arms and ammunition, and I proposed to General Pearson that we should follow the crowd. He hesitated some time about it, and finally I grew more imperative in my question, and I said, you must do something, I cannot allow my men to stand on the track with the crowd pushing around me, and not be allowed to fire. We will either have to move from there or attack the crowd. Finally, he said that the Second brigade had been moved into the round-house and machine shops, because he was afraid that they would be burned, and then he told me to move my whole force in, amounting to six hundred men, which I did just at dusk in the evening. We moved in there. They told me to occupy one round-house and the machine and upholstery shops and the lumber-yard, and that General Brown would move into the other round-house at Twenty-eighth street, and I was not aware he was not there until I saw the flames. As soon as I went there, the crowd commenced trying to get into the yard, and I had a guard detailed and put out, and two of them were shot, one through the arm and one other through the leg, while on their beats. I then got down the Gatling guns and prepared to fire them, but thought it would be courtesy to communicate with General Pearson, and tell him what I was going to do; which I did, and he prohibited me from doing so. The crowd were firing pistol balls in at us, and a few rifle balls and a considerable number of stones. I went to General Pearson, and said, "I cannot stand it, we must defend ourselves." He said he would go to the mayor and see him, which would do more good than our bullets would, as he had a great deal of influence over the elements predominant then, and said that he did not want to take life unnecessarily, &c., at the same time we were short of ammunition and rations, only having twenty rounds, and if we were going to be in a state of siege, I thought we ought to have a sufficient amount. General Pearson said he would go and see that we got provisions and also ammunition, and left, saying he would be back in an hour. He went through the lumber-yard, and left us. At the same time he told me to open any dispatches that came for him, and I asked if he had any new instructions. He said, "I want you to hold the place," and after he left I proposed to hold it in the way I thought proper, by firing into the mob at the gates, which drove them away from there, so that presently there were only pistol bullets and a few straggling musket balls. We continued to hold it in that way without receiving any communications from the other world. I expected General Pearson back every moment. I didn't want to take it on myself to move out there, or do anything. About two o'clock in the morning Colonel Snowden, of the Third regiment, called into the round-house, and directed my attention to what he considered a piece of artillery. It was quite dark at the time. We watched it for probably fifteen minutes, when a cloud cleared away, and we decided it was a piece of artillery, around which were quite a number of men who were training the piece. I immediately ordered Colonel Snowden to get fifty men out, and told him to lower their pieces and fire low, and I gave the order. They had got the piece finally into a position to suit themselves, and a man had hold of the lanyard. I gave the order to fire, and when the smoke cleared away eleven of them were lying there.

By Mr. Lindsey:

Q. The mob had it?

A. Yes; it was a brass field-piece that they had captured from Hutchinson's battery, I believe. During the whole night we had a skirmish with those people. They ran cars down loaded with oil, and attempted to set fire to the building, but fortunately some jumped the track and blocked the others. The next morning they ran down cars from the Allegheny side, which came down with their own gravity, but we finally threw a pile of car wheels on the track, and upset the cars. They were burning. They were loaded with whisky, or the most of them with high wines. We put out those fires by fire extinguishers, and also by a hose that we had there. We finally discovered that the building part of the Sixth division was on fire, and it communicated with the building we were in by the oil sheds. They got on fire, and the building we were in got on fire. During the night I had communication with General Latta, finding General Pearson did not return, and told him my situation, and received orders from him—or suggestions they were afterwards styled—in the first place to hold on vigorously, but in case I was obliged to leave there, to go out Penn avenue east towards Torrens station, and that there would be reinforcements sent to us not later than six o'clock in the morning; that part of the command—three hundred—who had failed to join, were at Walls station, and would join Colonel Guthrie at Torrens, and that they would join us. We waited until ten minutes of eight o'clock, when the smoke got so great that the men could scarcely breathe, and we went through the machine shops. We couldn't go out of the gate, the regular gate, on account of the cars that had been upset there and were burning, and I went out, I think, Twenty-third street—I am not very familiar with the streets—with the intention not to leave Pittsburgh, but to go to the United States arsenal, where I certainly could get ammunition and possibly something to eat, as we had nothing but a sandwich and a cup of coffee since leaving Philadelphia, and through the excitement and the loss of two nights' sleep, the men were very much fatigued and thoroughly worn out. We went out towards the arsenal, and probably had gone a quarter of a mile out Penn avenue, when we were attacked. I was at the head of the column, and didn't see the force that was attacking us, but I sent a staff officer immediately to the rear. The firing was all at the rear, and I think four men were killed and some ten or twelve wounded.