REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE APPOINTED TO INVESTIGATE THE Railroad Riots IN JULY, 1877. (continued 13)
Reading edition
By Senator Yutzy:
Q. Did you know at that time that the adjutant general was in the Union depot?
A. I had an impression that he was.
Q. Did you make any effort before you disbanded to see him?
A. No, sir.
Q. Knowing him to be there, or believing him to be there?
A. No, sir; I did not make any effort to see him. At this time I suppose that the mob was gathered in such great crowds it would be advisable for the military to be out of the road of the mob so as not to get their ill will.
Q. In your military experience, in your judgment, could you have taken a position and intrenched yourself and held your ground against the mob during the night?
A. Oh, no.
Q. Nowhere in the vicinity?
A. No, sir; unless I had been in the round-house.
Q. Could you not have marched out away from there and held your body?
A. They would have suffered great loss to have marched away.
Q. You did march to the depot, did you not, the Union depot?
A. Oh, yes.
Q. Were you interfered with in any way?
A. No, sir; not much.
Q. Marched all the way down the track?
A. Yes, sir. It would not have been advisable to march down the street.
By Senator Yutzy:
Q. Could you have taken a position in the Union depot, and used it as a fortification to defend yourself against the mob?
A. There was no mob at the Union depot.
Q. Why could you not have held the position then?
A. At the Union depot, the idea was to get away so as we would not get the ill will of these men; that they would probably disperse at this time.
Q. Did I understand you, that you disbanded for fear of exasperating the mob?
A. Yes—with this number of troops that I had.
Q. Was it your opinion that that was the way to disperse the mob, by the military disbanding?
A. I thought it was probably the best way.
By Mr. Lindsey:
Q. Did you receive any order from. General Pearson, after the firing at Twenty-eighth street?
A. I received one order.
Q. What was that?
A. For to adjourn these two regiments to this depot.
Q. The transfer depot?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Were you to take your regiments to the transfer depot?
A. Yes, sir. The colonels of the regiments had already received the orders sometime previous, and they did not want to move until they saw me, and they showed me the order.
Q. In that order, did he tell you to hold your position?
A. As long as possible, I believe.
Q. To take your regiments to the transfer depot, and to hold that?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And at eleven o'clock you marched down?
A. We marched down as a command down there.
Q. You disbanded at the transfer depot?
A. We disbanded, and the men got away the best they could.
Q. Left the transfer depot?
A. Yes, sir.
By Mr. Engelbert:
Q. Were these orders addressed to you, or to the colonel?
A. Addressed to me, and the orders addressed to the colonels of the regiments, too.
Q. Of the same purport?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Did you consider that they had superceded you by the order?
A. I did not know what was the matter.
Q. Did it not look to you like it?
A. Yes; it did look to me very strange for them to receive a written order.
Q. You, as a military man, of course, felt aggrieved at that?
A. No, sir. I said that they could obey the order cheerfully, and I marched down to the depot with them.
Q. You did not consider that under your order?
A. Things were mixed up so I did not know.
Q. Which way which?
A. Which way which, and I obeyed the order. Afterwards I received this order.
By Mr. Larrabee:
Q. Received by the same order?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. When you left the transfer depot, did your men go in a body, together, or did they strike out?
A. Each came away by himself.
By Mr. Lindsey:
Q. Were you called—did you call your men together after that?
A. Yes; we did on Monday morning, and I reported to the mayor whatever he wished me to do. I took one company up on Second avenue, and dispersed a crowd that were coming here on boats in large crowds. There must have been towards three hundred.
Q. How long did you remain in service?
A. I remained in service then half a month, or three weeks. On Wednesday night Governor Hartranft passed through here, and he gave me an order to assume command of the troops here, and I did so. I went over to the Union depot in Allegheny, and I had them turn over the property to me at the Fort Wayne road.
Q. Maintained order there, did you?
A. I had no troops there. I only went over as a citizen, and I put on my citizen's clothes, and went over there and talked to them. The second—I believe they turned over their property to me. I called out Mr. Cassatt, I think—not Mr. Cassatt, but the agent of the Fort Wayne road.
Q. Pitcairn?
A. Not Pitcairn. The agent of the Fort Wayne road—I forget his name now. I told him the cars and property were there, and he could do as he pleased with them. That the crowd had given them to me. That I turned them over to him.
Q. There was no further trouble here about the city?
A. No, sir; there was no further trouble.
Henry King being duly affirmed, testified as follows:
By Mr. Lindsey:
Q. Where is your residence?
A. In Allegheny City.
Q. And what is your business?
A. Furnace man, engaged in the manufacture of pig iron, interested in the manufacture of pig iron.
Q. I wish you would state, Mr. King, all the facts in relation to the riot here, that came under your observation—that you know personally yourself?
A. On this side of the river I do not know so much about what was going on. I was over here, of course, every day attending to my business, and I got glimpses of this matter once in a while. I think probably that I had better first state as to the origin. I think that is what my testimony probably would have the most weight in.
Q. That is what we called you to find out about?
A. At one time, from 1849 to 1855, I was engaged in railroading. First as a civil engineer; next as a mechanical engineer; and had made acquaintance of many railroad men—pretty extended—a great many were of the men who are railroading at the present day, and were railroading previous to this strike and during the strike, and for a length of time previous to the strike were men I was acquainted with, and I, perhaps, knew as much about their grievances as they did themselves, or what they considered their grievances. They talked to me very freely, most of them, and I told several of my acquaintances in the city here that I thought there would be a great deal of trouble amongst railroad men; that there seemed to me to be a great deal of dissatisfaction.
Q. When was that?
A. This was in the early part of last summer, commencing in May perhaps. These men talked to me a great deal. I traveled a great deal on the railroad, and these men talked freely to me. I felt pretty confident from what they told me that there would be a great deal of trouble; there appeared to be a great amount of dissatisfaction.
Q. You communicated that to your acquaintances in the city?
A. Yes; my business connections.
Q. Business men?
A. Yes; business men. Some believed and some didn't believe, of course. I felt very confident there would be a great deal of trouble, and was satisfied, too, that it was not going to be a local matter, but would be very general, and it proved so.
Q. On what did you base your opinion, if anything?
A. As to whether it would be general?
Q. Yes?
A. From the manner in which these men spoke about what they considered grievances. I didn't wholly agree with them on that.
Q. What did they consider as their grievances?
A. Reduction of pay; that seemed to be the chief complaint.
Q. They complained of the reduction?
A. Complained very bitterly about that.
Q. Did you talk with the men on different roads—did you converse with men on different roads?
A. Yes; on several different roads.
Q. What roads?
A. There were some on the Pennsylvania railroad; some on the Pittsburgh and Fort Wayne road; some on the Cleveland and Pittsburgh run, and also some men on the Atlantic and Great Western road.
Q. Did you ever converse with any of the employés on the Baltimore and Ohio road?
A. No, sir; I had no acquaintances amongst these men. That is a road I travel on very little. Didn't go out of my way to hunt up any information; it all came to me incidentally.
Q. Were all these roads reducing the wages of their employés?
A. It was so reported to me—it was so talked among the men.
Q. How was it throughout the country? Did you know, of your own knowledge, that the leading railroads throughout the whole country were reducing the wages of the employés?
A. Speaking of it in a general way, I have no authority, except newspaper account, that wages were being very generally reduced.
Q. Speaking then of your own knowledge, you simply speak of roads leading in and out of Pittsburgh?
A. My knowledge in this particular is from the employés of the road.
Q. And your conversation was with the employés of the roads leading in and out of Pittsburgh?
A. Mostly roads leading in and out of Pittsburgh. I may say wholly so, with the exception of the Atlantic and Great Western.
Q. In conversation with these men did they mention, or did you find out from them, that there was any organization among them?
A. Oh! yes; I knew of an organization—the Trainmen's Union—I knew there was such an organization as that.
Q. As the Trainmen's Union?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Did you know the object and purpose of that organization?
A. Yes; they talked to me that there were several objects they wished to accomplish by that organization. We had a great many discussions about the thing. The only object they had, of course, was to make an organization that they thought would be sufficiently strong to enable them to have something to say about the rate of pay. Another was to re-instate some men who had been discharge for cause.
Q. Did you gather from these conversations that their object was to force the railroads to pay them the wages which they demanded?
A. They expected to put it to that as a finality. They expected to resort to that before giving it up.
Q. Did you talk with them—did they state to you how they intended to force the railroad?
A. Well, by stopping work and stopping business.
Q. Themselves only?
A. They talked about it, that they would stop themselves, and they would stop others. Of course, I expressed my opinions. Everybody said what they pleased. I told them it was every persons right to stop work. If the work did not suit them they had a perfect right to quit, and to go off; but whatever they did, not to do anything they would be sorry for afterwards, because the matter would be settled, undoubtedly, sooner or later, and they had better not do anything they would afterwards have cause to regret. As I said before, they would have a perfect right to stop work, but they had no right to interfere with others.
Q. Did they claim that they had the right to interfere with others?
A. They did not claim they had a right, but they claimed the ability to do that.
Q. And their purpose of doing it?
A. Well, they expected to do that.
Q. Did they say anything to you or did they expect to ally other classes of laboring men with them?
A. No; they did not care about having any help from outside parties; at least if they did, there was no intimation of that kind to me. They expected to accomplish it themselves. I have no knowledge of their making any effort whatever to induce other trades unions—I do not know that they made any effort to have others coöperate with them; if they did, I do not know of it.
Q. This intercourse you had with the men, and from talking, led you to be apprehensive of the results?
A. Yes; I felt very confident——
Q. Did you communicate that very freely to your acquaintances here?
A. With my more intimate business acquaintances the matter was talked over pretty freely.
Q. Did you have any communication with the railroad officials in regard to it?
A. No; I supposed them capable of taking care of their own business. I fortified myself in regard to the strike. I have occasion to have a great deal of freight moved, and I put myself in a condition against any strike.
Q. In what way?
A. In getting in a good supply. If the strike had continued a month it would not have hurt me, anything more than I could not have shipped anything away. I had plenty of raw material on hand—it answered a very good purpose, too.
Q. Did you communicate these facts and your apprehensions to the city officials, any of them, of Pittsburgh?
A. No, sir.
Q. Or the county officials?
A. No, sir; I only talked with parties who were interested in the same manner that I am myself and others, perhaps, I am well acquainted with, in the same line of business, by fortifying in the way of getting in plenty of raw material. I was so certain it would come to pass, that I advised it all the time.
Q. Did you gather facts enough to enable you to determine when this strike would probably take place?
A. Yes; I had a very good idea when it would come. I do not know that I could see that my idea was so clear upon that, that I could fix the hour or perhaps the day, but I think I could have named a time of ten days that it would have occurred within that time. I could have done that, perhaps, twenty days before the strike occurred.
Q. Did you, in any conversation with these railroad men, have any talk with them about the wages they were receiving, and whether it was adequate for their support?
A. Yes; that was talked about considerably.
Q. In the business that you are engaged in you employed a large number of laborers?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. How did their wages compare with the wages of your men?
A. If they had steady employment—if they had been employed each and every day—the wages they had would have been sufficient, and would have compared very favorably with the employment in other lines of business—in other departments. As I looked upon it, the prime cause of the trouble was that there were more men than there was work for, and they undertook to make a little work divide around amongst a great many men, and that, of course, made a small amount of pay for each one. In many other businesses, an employer so situated would have—I know I should have discharged my men down until I had full employment for those that were retained.
By Senator Yutzy:
Q. From that I would infer that it was not the pay, but it was the time they were making?
A. They did not make enough time.
Q. Had they made full time they would have made ample pay?
A. Perhaps satisfactory.
By Mr. Englebert:
Q. Has not that been the case in all business for the last year?
A. I think that some employers have made the same mistake as the railroad men. It was out of the goodness of their hearts that they kept men about that they had not employment for. I would either give them work or not give them work.
By Mr. Lindsey:
Q. In your opinion, it is bad policy to keep men working on half time?
A. It is very bad policy.
Q. That was the policy adopted by the railroad company?
A. It seems to have been.
By Mr. Means:
Q. I simply want to know this: Did the railroad officials believe that half a loaf was better than no bread?
A. I have heard them talk that way. I think the railroad officials took that view.
Q. That half a loaf was better than no bread?
A. Yes, sir; but as opinions are going, I would say, a man had better go and try to make a whole loaf somewhere else, than hang around and make a half loaf.
Q. Suppose he could not get the work?
A. There is a way where there is a will. I never kept a man half employed.
By Mr. Lindsey:
Q. Did you visit the scene of the riot at any time during its progress?
A. Yes, sir; Sunday I was up in that part of the city. I did not go up to where it was said to be the worst, but far enough to see all that I cared about seeing.
Q. What class of men were engaged in the actual burning and pillage so far as——
A. So far as I observed, and judging by appearance, it was about the class of men you see going backwards and forwards on the railroads and thoroughfares, known as tramps.
Q. Did you see any of the railroad employés with whom you had conversations before and were acquainted?
A. I saw some there; yes, sir. They appeared to be lookers-on only.
Q. Not engaged in the actual arson and riot?
A. No, sir; I did not see one of them that had anything except what appeared to belong to him.
Q. Were any engaged in burning and setting afire?
A. Not that I saw—none that I had any acquaintance with.
Q. Did you meet any of them to have conversation with them on that day?
A. Yes; Sunday I saw a great many of them.
Q. How did they talk then?
A. They appeared to regret very much that there was any destruction of property.
Q. Have you talked with them since any?
A. Yes: I talked—I believe three days out of six I am more or less on the railroads, and acquainted with a great many railroad men. It has pretty much ceased to be the subject of conversation now, but for a time afterwards it was the principal topic.
Q. Did you ascertain from them, or from any reliable source, whether they had anything to do with the attack that was made on the Philadelphia troops at Twenty-eighth street on Sunday, when the firing took place?
A. I have never seen any of them that acknowledged having anything to do with making that attack on the troops. They spoke of it as the attack having been made by—well, tramps and roughs they called them. There was a pretty strong organization among the men on the north side of the river to prevent any force coming over to shoot the Pennsylvania boys, or, as they termed them, P.R.R. boys. That is the way they talked about it. They did not propose to have anybody coming in there to shoot them down. That was a pretty thoroughly organized force.
Q. That is, to stop the trains having troops in?
A. Yes; and they were expected in with troops. That occurred in the immediate neighborhood where I live. The whole region was patrolled.
Q. Patrolled by the railroad men?
A. By the railroad men; yes, sir.
Q. Did you learn from these men where the first strike was to be made?
A. No. They talked of it as though it would be a general uprising throughout the whole country. They did not designate any particular place.
Q. You did not get the particulars?
A. I never heard the particular place designated as to how it would start, but simply it would be a strike; that they would all quit work; not work themselves nor allow others to work, and block travel and traffic in that way, expecting as the result it would bring the managers of railroads to their terms.
Q. You travel on the roads a great deal you say, and have a great deal of shipping?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. From your knowledge was there a less amount of work to be done on the railroads by the men than there had been formerly?
A. There appeared to be a very decided falling off in through traffic; the local traffic is holding its own, perhaps; furnace work and mineral traffic appeared to be about the same as it had been.
Q. It was in the through traffic that there was a falling off?
A. Principally in the through traffic.
By Senator Yutzy:
Q. Who was in command of this armed force you speak of that was on the other side of the river?
A. I never heard the commander's name mentioned. Those men whom I met in the street in my neighborhood said that their commander says so and so, and requested citizens to keep away—that the trains were about due—that the commander says so and so. I do not know who the commander was.
Q. They had apparently an organization?
A. They had apparently an organization, and obeyed instructions, perhaps, as well as the soldiers on this side.
Q. What train had that reference to?
A. The Erie train.
Q. With troops?
A. The train that was expected to arrive with troops.
Q. What steps did this armed force take to prevent trains from coming from Erie to assist the military?
A. The plan that they had proposed was to give the signal to that train and stop it.
Q. But if that was not heeded?
A. They had a rifle pit shortly above there, and if the train had not heeded the signals they would have undoubtedly fired into it.
By Mr. Lindsey:
Q. Was the man who was called Boss Ammon—was he in command of that force?
A. I did not hear Ammon's name mentioned in connection with the matter to any extent until the day following. I know that Ammon was not installed in the dispatcher's office on that side until the Sunday. This attempt to stop the Erie train was on Saturday night, and Sunday afternoon Ammon was installed as head man in the dispatcher's office. I did not hear that name. I have no recollection of hearing his name mentioned in connection with the matter at all, until some time during the forenoon of Sunday. I had heard of a man of that name; but did not know he was in this part of the country at all. I did not know who their commander was Saturday night. The name was not mentioned, except as I spoke of, as our commander says so and so, and requested people to keep out of the way in a certain locality in the immediate vicinity of the station.
Q. What time did that organization first show itself in Allegheny to stop trains with troops?
A. That was on Saturday night.
Q. When was the first freight train stopped?
A. Friday; I think it was Friday morning.
By Mr. Dewees:
Q. Did you see any trenches dug along the road?
A. Strawberry lane; yes, sir.
Q. What was the object of that?
A. To intercept the Erie train in the event of their disobeying the signal.
Q. Were they along the road, or across the road?
A. Parallel with the road.
Q. Where is Strawberry lane?
A. It is in the Ninth ward of Allegheny City—one of the lower wards.
Q. Who put in the rifle pits?
A. The railroaders—strikers.
Q. This mob?
A. It did not partake of the nature of a mob over there. It was a very thoroughly organized force—armed and equipped.
By Mr. Lindsey:
Q. How many railroad men did you converse with, do you think, that led you to form your conclusions?
A. On the different roads, perhaps fifty men.
Q. What class of men principally?
A. They were conductors and engineers, chiefly, I talked with.
Q. Any brakemen?
A. With many brakemen.
Q. Fifty men on the different roads that you have mentioned before—you mentioned the roads?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. When did that restlessness begin to show itself among the men?
A. Began to manifest itself in the latter part of May.
By Mr. Dewees:
Q. The persons that dug that trench, were they Allegheny railroad men or were they tramps? What do you suppose they were?
A. Most of them were railroad men. There did not seem to be many tramps connected with those men over there. These men were acting on their own account, and did not ask anybody to help them. They said they were working for the right, and appeared to be very earnest. They were very orderly.
Q. Things were done systematically?
A. Things were done very systematically.
By Mr. Engelbert:
Q. Were these men in the employ of the railroad company or were they discharged men?
A. There were a few discharged men. Of course I do not know how many of them were discharged, but from their talk I got the impression that there were some six or eight that had been discharged.
Q. That was a part of the grievances?
A. Yes; that was the object—to have them re-instated. They made that one of the conditions—of those men going to work again. I was amongst these men a great deal during the time that they were discharging them and reducing the work. I was very desirous that they should go to work, for as long as they were not at work it brought a class of people in our part of the city that I did not want to have around there. I knew if they went to work, and the trains were moved—I talked with them whenever I could—they would all gather about me.
By Mr. Larrabee:
Q. You say you thought you could have named within ten days of when the strike would take place. Did you hear anything about the proposed strike of the 27th of June that was talked about by the Trainmen's Union?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. You heard them talk about that?
A. I heard them talk about that.
Q. Did you hear the railroad men fix that time or talk about that time as there would likely be a strike?
A. There seemed to be a difference of opinion in their views as to that being the right time. They would talk of it in that way—some thought it would be a good time, and others did not.
Q. Did you ever hear them name any special day, or any particular time when there would likely be a strike, or when there would probably be a strike?
A. After the 27th of June they felt pretty certain that it would be sometime not far from the middle of July. They talked like this. They wanted the money for the work that had been done during the month of June before they struck. If they had their money in their pocket it would be fortifying themselves.
Q. What time was the pay day of the railroad company?
A. I believe the usual pay day—of course it varies along the line of the road—I think on most of the roads they commence paying sometime from the seventh to the tenth, and go along various places until they get paid.
Q. You supposed from that that probably if the strike occurred it would probably occur pretty soon after they got their pay?
A. As soon as the men along the line of the road had been paid off.
Q. Was there anything done by the railroad men on your side of the river that you know of towards organizing for the strike, or committing any overt act until after the strike occurred here?
A. I think the trains had been moving regularly up to that time.
Q. It did not really break out there—no overt act was done nor any trains prevented from going out until the Saturday after the Thursday it broke out on this side?
A. It broke out here on Thursday, and I think the first there was Friday morning.
Q. Were you talking or did you talk on this Thursday or Friday with those classes of railroad men you had previously had conversation with, in regard to what was going on?
A. On Friday I had some talk. I went out on a train that leaves here at nine o'clock in the morning, on the Fort Wayne road, and had considerable talk with some of the freight train conductors.
Q. What did they say about the difficulties that had occurred here?
A. There is a schedule of quite a number of freights following immediately after that passenger train, and of course they talked about the strike being in fact over here, and talked with some of the men at the station before the train left there. I was on the lookout to see whether the trains were moving out, and the trains appeared to be ready to go out. When I got some thirty-five or forty miles up the road, the conductor on the train I was on told me that the freights that would follow immediately after the nine o'clock train, had been intercepted, and that the strike had organized.
Q. As this strike finally did take place, there was no general understanding on all the roads that it should take place on each railroad on a certain day, that you found out. It did not actually take place on the different roads on the same day?
A. No; I do not think the strike became general throughout the country until, perhaps, three—it may have been four—days after its first commencement. The first general demonstration was on the Baltimore and Ohio road.
Q. You heard nothing in any of these conversations of any fixed day after the 27th of June—any date named?
A. As I said early in my testimony here, I do not know that I could fix the hour or the day, but I think I could have named the time within ten days, from the information I had in talking with the various employés, and that was, to wait until the payments had been pretty generally made on all the roads throughout the country—that seemed to be the time.
By Senator Yutzy:
Q. Did the railroad strikers in Allegheny City, on the Fort Wayne and Chicago railroad, show any disposition to destroy property or commit any violence or illegal acts except stopping the trains?
A. No, sir; there was a great effort made upon their part to preserve all property—railroad property and private property.
Q. They made efforts to prevent the destruction of property?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Private property and railroad property?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. In what way or what efforts did they make?
A. On Sunday afternoon the report became current over there that these destructionists—I do not know what else to call them—were coming to Allegheny, and the railroad men talked amongst themselves like this: That this is the employment we are living on, and it shall not be destroyed; we will take care of it. The trade of the road is such there that from the upper end, or what is known as the outer depot, cars and locomotives and everything—I suppose they run twenty miles up—laying on the tracks, and within a very brief space of time there was some fourteen or fifteen miles of locomotives taken entirely out.
Q. By the strikers?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. To protect them?
A. Yes; and they did protect them most effectually. Many of those cars were loaded with very valuable merchandise, and there was an armed force of these strikers who protected these cars—regularly stood guard over them—fourteen or fifteen miles of cars—every day and every night, relieved regularly.
Q. Did you see them or any of them commit any illegal acts—railroad men?
A. I suppose that would have been an illegal—would have been considered an illegal act to stop that train.
Q. Didn't they stop other trains—freight trains?
A. The regular trains were stopped.
Q. Forcibly?
A. Not forcibly. They seemed to be stopped at the dispatcher's office. If they got a permit they would allow them to pass. If a train went out with a permit they would not trouble it.
Q. Did they take forcible possession of the dispatcher's office?
A. I do not know whether it was forcible or not, they seemed to have possession of it.
Q. Did they use any violence towards men that were willing to run trains?
A. I did not hear of an instance of intimidation.
Q. Do you know of any effort being made to have trainmen take out trains?
A. I do not think there was any effort made. They appeared to be all of one mind about that.
Q. Did the strikers say they would prevent them from going out by violence?
A. I think I heard some talk that would amount to about that. Passenger trains were allowed to come and go as they had done before. A good many of the passenger trains stopped at the dispatcher's office to get a permit that would enable them to pass other localities where the strikers were congregated.
Q. That would be called, in railroad parlance, orders?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Who was the dispatcher during the riots there?
A. Ammon was known as dispatcher.
Q. He took possession of the dispatcher's office?
A. Yes, sir.
By Mr. Lindsey:
Q. Was he the man that issued these orders?
A. I think the orders were signed with his name. I never saw any of the orders. I heard the passenger train conductor speaking of them.
By Senator Yutzy:
Q. He was general superintendent and dispatcher both?
A. Yes; he seemed to be the principal man on that side. I have thought of that matter frequently since then, and it appeared to me that it was a fortunate circumstance that these men were willing to recognize some man as a head, if they had not done that matters would have been worse than they were.
By Mr. Dewees:
Q. Did the mayor of Allegheny City send a relief guard?
A. I heard that he did. I do not know that I ever saw it.
Q. You do not know that as a fact?
A. No, sir.
By Senator Yutzy:
Q. Was not the force that he organized in other parts of Allegheny City at the bridges?
A. I suppose that is where his force was employed chiefly.
Q. Was there a general disposition manifested on the part of the citizens to quiet the troubles?
A. Yes; all the talk was with a view to get to work again.
Q. I am speaking of the citizens?
A. All the citizens desired to have these men go to work, so far as I talked with any of them.
Colonel P. N. Guthrie, being duly sworn, testified as follows:
By Mr. Lindsey:
Q. Where do you reside?
A. I reside at East Liberty, Pittsburgh.
Q. What is your business at the present time?
A. I am a book-keeper in the Exchange National Bank.
Q. How long have you held that position?
A. About twelve years.
Q. Are you a member of the National Guard?
A. I am Colonel of the Eighteenth regiment.
Q. How long have you held that position?
A. Since 1874. I think my commission dates 1874.
Q. Just state to us now what orders you received, and when you first received them, and from whom, in relation to the riot last summer?
A. Well, on Friday morning, about half past four o'clock, I was awakened by a knock, and received an order, a telegraphic order, from General Pearson, informing me that by orders of the Governor, my regiment was ordered out for service, and ordered me to report at seven o'clock, at the Union Depot hotel. I have one company whose head-quarters is at East Liberty, where I reside, some five miles out. I notified them by hunting up the captain, and then came into town, sent off, the best way I knew how, to get my officers together, and notified them. They notified their subordinate officers, and assembled the regiment. It was too late to get any orders in the newspapers, they had all gone to press. It was too early to find messengers, and the work had to be all done by carrying messages from man to man, by the corporals and sergeants of companies. My command was ready at half past eleven o'clock, and by a little after twelve I was at the Union Depot hotel.
Q. With how many men?
A. I had then about two hundred and twenty-five men.
Q. How many men have you in all the regiment?
A. I have about three hundred and twenty-six uniformed men. Well, the regiment was formed in my armory. There was present, Major General Pearson, commanding the division, and the sheriff of the county. When I deemed that I had sufficient men for service, I marched down to the Union Depot hotel, accompanied by the sheriff. At that time I thought that my regiment was the only regiment ordered into service, and had the direction of military affairs, and so far as my regiment was concerned was with me. I had my own ideas what should be done, but when I got to the Union Depot hotel, Major General Pearson had ordered out the division, which made me a subordinate officer. My regiment was then ordered out to the stock-yards, five miles and a half from here, where I remained until Sunday night on duty.
Q. What time did you arrive at the stock-yards?
A. Torrens station—that is the stock-yards. I arrived there about half past one o'clock. We remained at the Union Depot hotel, waiting there for a consultation between General Pearson, the railroad officials, and myself, as to what was the best course to be pursued. My regiment was finally ordered out to the stock-yards, with the understanding that the Fourteenth and Nineteenth regiments would soon report, and they be sent to Twenty-eighth street. Upon their arrival at Twenty-eighth street, trains were immediately to be started. Sending me to the stock-yards was to secure the passage of trains through and beyond the stock-yards.
Q. That was the result of your consultation there at the depot?
A. That was the result of the decision of Major General Pearson. My opinion was that I should go to Twenty-eighth street, and the Fourteenth and Nineteenth go to the stock-yards. I believe no interference with the trains had been made at the stock-yards, and up to that time. If there had been, I don't know it, and there certainly had been interference at Twenty-eighth street.
Q. You desired to stop at Twenty-eighth street?
A. I desired to stop at Twenty-eighth street. I could have taken possession there without any trouble, I think, at that time.
Q. In going out to Torrens, were you interfered with on the route?
A. Not at all. There were about two hundred or three hundred men at Twenty-eighth street—I guess twelve hundred or thirteen hundred when I got there.
Q. You went out on the train, did you?
A. Went out on the train.
Q. Did you have any trouble or meet with any resistance in disembarking your command?
A. I had one company at East Liberty that I had ordered at once to Torrens station, and they had taken possession of the platforms there, and we disembarked from the cars without any trouble whatever, or any demonstration of any kind—not even noise. Everything was quiet and still.
At this point the committee adjourned until three o'clock, this afternoon.
AFTERNOON SESSION.
Pittsburgh, Thursday, February 21, 1878.
The committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at three o'clock, P.M. Mr. Lindsey in the chair, and continued the taking of testimony. All members present except Senator Reyburn.
Colonel P. N. Guthrie, resumed:
Q. When we adjourned you had got at Torrens station. I wish you would state to us how large a crowd you found there, what the appearance of the crowd was, and so on, and give your movements from that time?
A. When I got to Torrens station I found at least twelve hundred men there, composed of strikers, and the crowd and mob—not a mob—lookers on. I had no trouble in getting into position, no trouble of any kind. Was not greeted with hisses, noise, or demonstration of any kind whatever. As soon as I got my command in the position I wanted them in, I brought them to a rest. Then I went around on the tracks to see what the condition of affairs was. I found, as I stated before, that the mob contained two elements there—strikers and lookers on. I sent for the man who was represented to me to be a leader among the strikers, had him brought down to my position, and had a long conversation with him. I informed him that I had been sent out there with orders from General Pearson to see that all trains passed through the stock-yards. It was my duty to keep the tracks clear, and keep the crowd from interfering with the passage of trains, &c. I didn't want to have any trouble or any disturbance of any kind; but the moment a train approached there it was going to go through. He told me that the strikers had no intention, no disposition to interfere with the passage of the trains, that the Pennsylvania railroad might send all the trains through they had got. He said they could not send any through because they could not get the men to man them; but if they could, they could send them through; they didn't intend to interfere. I told him I was glad to hear that, that it would probably make things a great deal easier, because if the crowd interfered outside of the strikers a man would have less hesitation in dealing with them. This conversation with this leader of the strikers occurred immediately after I got there, as soon as I got my command into a position and gave the command rest. Almost immediately after, and during my conversation with this man, a train came up to the stock-yards from Pittsburgh. That was a freight train or a passenger train—I have forgotten. I did not probably look at that time; but I think it was a freight train; but that train was loaded down with roughs on the cars, and platforms of the cars, the engine, cow-catcher, and every available space. I think the train was crowded with the most infernal lot of scoundrels that a man ever saw. I do not think that they were strikers entirely, though. There were a great many men from Pittsburgh that I recognized; but there was a large element on that train I could not account for at all. They became very noisy and offensive. All of them got off that train and crowded on to any trains that were stationary there—cars standing on the track, which brought them within a very few feet of my regiment. Their remarks became so offensive to me that I was afraid that if it was allowed to continue it might bring about trouble. I had the bayonets fixed on my guns, and I charged bayonets on this crowd. They broke and fled away, and got some distance off. In the interval I formed my men in another position more satisfactory to me—got them on the street, and in what we call column of companies. Before, I was in line of battle. I remained in that position for some time. I would say here that the understanding between General Pearson and myself, when I went to the stock-yards, was that the trains would be sent out immediately. I urged it upon General Pearson. I believed it was the best thing then, and I believe so now, that a train should have been started, that if one train could have got through, all the rest would have followed, and even one train would have broken the force of the strike; but I waited and waited and waited in position there until the men could stand it no longer. The crowd three times during my stay at the stock-yards annoyed me, and crowded close on my lines, and became somewhat demonstrative, so much so that I was afraid to allow the thing to continue, and I charged bayonets. Every time I charged bayonets the crowd dispersed, and twice I loaded the guns in the presence of the mob, and the moment the guns were loaded the crowd fled and dispersed; but would return almost immediately after. As soon as the crowd would go away from my front I would take the cartridges out of the guns to prevent the men from recklessly firing and bringing about any conflict between the troops and the crowd. That continued time after time during my whole stay at the stock-yards. These men were easily driven away by me. At any appearance I would make of a disposition to fire upon them or use force against them, the mob would disperse—the crowd would disperse, because it was hardly a mob. I could not see that they were armed at all. If they were armed they had pistols—they had no guns of any kind.
Q. Had they thrown any missiles?
A. The second time I charged on them, they began throwing, but it didn't amount to anything—no more than five or six men were engaged. One man who stood on the top of the cars—a man known as Monkey John, a man who has since been tried by the courts here—was the most offensive in the whole crowd. He expressed a great desire on his part to split my head open, but he didn't try it. He was within a few feet of me, and I was strongly tempted to split his head open, but I thought I had better not. During the time I remained at the stock-yards, I was frequently visited by General Pearson, and to all of my inquiries, why trains had not started out, his answer was, the troops were not ready in the town, and hadn't been able to get possession of Twenty-eighth street, which brings me back to my original assertion, that, if the first troops had gone to Twenty-eighth street, we might have had the trains moving. General Pearson, every time he came out, was accompanied by some of the railroad officials, and all of them seemed to be very anxious with regard to my ability to hold that place; but I told them there was no mob in front of me, only a crowd, that might become a mob if they got the upper hand, and so long as they didn't have the upper hand they were a crowd. That was the state of affairs until the arrival of the troops from Philadelphia. At the time they arrived, General Pearson informed me that as soon as they got into the Union Depot hotel they would be disembarked, and brought out to Twenty-eighth street, and placed in position at Twenty-eighth street, and the Fourteenth, and Nineteenth, and Breck's battery would be sent out to me, and the trains moved. I waited until nearly two o'clock that night, (Saturday,) waiting for trains, and waiting for information. Not a train appeared, and not a word of official information reached me until Sunday morning. On Sunday morning, about half past two o'clock, I received a communication from James W. Latta, Adjutant General, which was the first information I had that General Pearson was not in command, and that General Latta was directing affairs—informing me that ammunition would be sent out to me by wagon, under the charge of an officer of the staff. Upon the arrival of that ammunition, I would be joined by troops from Walls station, and, when that junction was formed, I was to march into town to the relief of General Brinton, besieged in the round-house. I prepared my men for marching, and waited the arrival of the ammunition. Sometime after that the ammunition arrived, and I am not able to state the time exactly, because my watch had run down, and everybody else's around. When the ammunition reached me, an order also came with it, stating that the troops at Walls station were without ammunition, that the engineer was unable to bring the train in, and they could not make a movement until they had ammunition. That all the approaches to the city from Walls station were crowded by rioters. That all points along the railroad, suitable for their purpose, was in possession of the rioters—a fact which I demonstrated afterwards by sending men out of my own command to determine whether that was the case or not. I received orders also to send ammunition by wagon out to these men. As soon as that ammunition was received, they were directed to continue to march in to me, and, when they joined me, I was directed to complete the movement as ordered in my first dispatch. I hired a wagon, and sent a squad of men out with it. They had to take a roundabout way to get there. I sent, I think, five thousand rounds of ammunition out to these men. Time was passing away very rapidly, and it was nearly ten o'clock before these men got to Walls station with that ammunition.
Q. Ten o'clock on what day?
A. On Sunday morning. In the meantime I had made up my mind that the Walls station troops could not get in. About five o'clock I had made up my mind that the troops from Walls station could not get in to me in time to make the junction and march in to the relief of General Brinton, and I sent Captain Aull, of my regiment, in to General Latta, with instructions to tell him that, in my opinion, these forces couldn't join me, and to countermand the order so far as Walls station troops were concerned, and order me into the city. On the way in to General Latta, Captain Aull witnessed the leaving of the round-house by General Brinton's command. He conveyed that information to General Latta. General Latta then sat down and wrote an order to General Brinton, ordering him to unite with me at the stock-yards, and sent a copy of that order out to me. Of course that prevented me acting on my own responsibility, and I was compelled to remain at the stock-yards. The order reached General Brinton, and General Brinton refused to join me—at all events he didn't join me. I waited there until about twelve o'clock, and I was satisfied then that it was not General Brinton's intention to come to me—that he had left the city, and he didn't intend to return. I then made up my mind I would go into town and see myself what was going on. In all this time I hadn't one word of official information concerning what was going on in town. Colonel Smith came to my camp on Sunday morning, and gave me the first information of the state of affairs in Pittsburgh. Of course I could see a dim light in town, but the extent of what had occurred I didn't understand—I could hardly believe—and I could hardly believe that the large force of well drilled men under General Brinton could not control any mob that might be brought against them. At twelve o'clock and about ten minutes, these troops from Walls station came down to Torrens station.
Q. Twelve o'clock Sunday night?
A. Twelve o'clock noon on Sunday. At that time I knew, from the officers I had sent out after Brinton, that Brinton was not going to come back to Pittsburgh. I had official information from the staff of the Sixth division that the Fourteenth regiment and the Nineteenth had been disbanded by General Brown, and there was no military force in the city of Pittsburgh. I didn't deem that the troops from Walls station were of any assistance to me whatever, at that time. I thought they were a great hinderance to my efforts. I ordered them back to Walls station, and to go from there to Blairsville, which would be, I thought, almost necessary that Brinton should make a junction. 1 didn't see how he was to get home unless he did go to Blairsville in some way or another. I then came into town to see how affairs stood. I went to the Union Depot hotel; reached the Union Depot hotel just about the time it had been fired—it was then in a blaze, commencing to burn, though the fire was not thoroughly under way. I went to the end of the building, and I saw some fifty or sixty men on the tracks engaged in burning and pillaging. I think at that time that twenty-five good men could have checked that whole business. There was a large crowd in the open space in front of the Union Depot hotel, and a large crowd on Liberty street. I went through the crowd in front of the hotel, and went through the crowd on Liberty street, and I am satisfied there were not men enough in the Sixth division to stop that burning. The crowd on Liberty street and in the space in front of the Union Depot hotel was merely lookers-on, but it only needed a demonstration of some kind against them to have made every one of those men, or nearly every one of those men, part and parcel of that mob engaged in pillaging and burning. They would have gone to the defense of those men without any question. I satisfied myself of this matter pretty thoroughly. I was not hasty about it—calmly went through that crowd and heard them talk, and knew exactly what they meant. They were men that were not disposed to take upon themselves to burn or pillage, because there was no necessity, since they had other men to do it for them.
Q. Were you in military uniform?
A. No, sir; I was not. I could never have got into town with a military uniform on. I came into town not only disguised, but in a great measure hidden. I did that for the reason that men that joined my command, within a few moments of leaving, had told me of being stopped on the way themselves. They had to take a roundabout way to go out to the camp. I saw on my way in there were crowds of men everywhere who would have put a stop to any person coming into town in uniform. I went to the Union Depot hotel for the purpose of finding General Latta, and discover what was being done and what had been done. The moment I got there I saw for myself what had been done by the rioters, but what the military authorities were doing, of course, I couldn't ascertain until I had found General Latta. 1 hunted around through the town and found General Latta at the Monongahela House. He was regretting very much, at that time, that General Brinton had gone out of the city instead of going out to me or coming into the city. He was powerless to do anything, he had no troops under his command except my own regiment. I went to my armory, and I sent out to Colonel Smith and the adjutant general of the Fourth brigade instructions to my regiment to march into town. Through some delay on the part of Captain Aull, the regiment was delayed about two hours. They reached here about dark.
Q. By what route?
A. They came in on Fifth avenue, the only route they could have gotten into town. The crowd was very large on Penn avenue. Notwithstanding, they came into town, I believe, without any demonstrations of any kind against them whatever; marched down to the armory. We remained there on duty continually. Colonel Howard came in and he brought his regiment together. Colonel Gray, of the Fourteenth, got his regiment together. On Monday morning the three regiments were here in the city of Pittsburgh ready for duty, and on Monday morning, the three regiments, I believe, paraded through the streets. Colonel Howard's and my own regiment paraded together. I think I remember, after going back to the armory, seeing Colonel Gray's regiment return to the armory after their parade. I am not certain about that, but I think I did. Those two regiments returned to their armory, were ready, and could have been assembled had anybody taken the trouble to order them—could have been assembled in a very short time. On Monday morning, I believed that I was in command of the troops of the Sixth division. I certainly was in command of the Eighteenth and Nineteenth regiments, because Colonel Howard was then in my armory with his regiment and had agreed to obey orders under me. General Brown came in and assumed command on Monday morning, and I refused to recognize or obey any orders from him. He remonstrated, but I insisted that I wouldn't obey his orders. I was in command of the troops, and I intended to handle them, and he went out and various men came in and thought it was a very serious thing to have dissensions in the military at that time—the city was apparently in the hands of the mob, and it would be better for the military to proceed as a military body, without any dissensions in rank. After listening to them, I agreed to serve under General Brown, and I so notified him. From that time until the troops were ordered to Luzerne, and until we returned, I served immediately under the command of Brigadier General Brown. That is the outline of my service.
Q. Did you receive any orders from General Brown to disband your regiment at any time?
A. On the 31st of July, about one o'clock in the afternoon, General Brown sent an officer of his staff to my head-quarters, requesting my presence at his head-quarters. I think it was the 31st of July. I went up to General Brown's head-quarters, and he gave me a verbal order to dismiss my regiment. I asked him by what authority the regiment was disbanded. He said he had just come from the Governor's head-quarters, or he had received an official communication from the Governor's head-quarters, I have forgotten which. At all events, the orders were from his superior officers that my regiment, and also Colonel Gray's and Colonel Howard's were to be disbanded. I think he had sent to Colonel Howard and Colonel Gray also. I determined that I wouldn't disband my regiment, and I couldn't see why the Sixth division should be dismissed when the Governor was rapidly assembling all the troops of the State in this city. Could not understand it, and felt there was a mistake of some kind about it. I went back to the armory. That afternoon I paraded my regiment, and before I got through the parade I had official knowledge that the Sixth division was to go to the coal regions, which demonstrates fully to my mind that there had been a mistake made somewhere, or there never was a communication of the Governor's that the Sixth division should be dismissed at all. So far as official knowledge of what took place in the city of Pittsburgh on Friday after half-past one o'clock, and on Saturday until six o'clock, I know nothing at all. I was not present with my regiment and knew nothing at all about it, except on Sunday afternoon, when I came in myself. With the burning of the elevator on Sunday afternoon, I think all danger of a mob had passed. The men had got all the whisky they could get hold of, and the whisky had worked its effect on these men. The burning and pillaging of this city was stopped by the giving out of whisky, and with the natural working of the whisky on the human body. The men were dead drunk. On Monday morning there was no mob in the city of Pittsburgh that I could see, though the railroad property and trains were in the possession of the strikers, and remained so until the arrival of Governor Hartranft with the national guard.
Q. What day was that?
A. I do not remember what day that was; that was probably the 25th or 26th of July—it was later than that. I cannot state the date of his arrival. They were here on the 31st of July. I remember that, because I went to out to see General Brinton on that day.
Q. Did you have any trouble in assembling your regiment—in getting them together?
A. When they were first ordered out?
Q. Yes.
A. Oh, I had a great deal.
Q. What I mean is, were the men willing to serve?
A. Oh, yes; no trouble of that kind in my regiment whatever. The only trouble was in getting hold of the men.
Q. Was there any disposition among your men to aid or sympathize with the strikers?
A. Not a bit, sir.
Q. Could you have depended on them, do you think, for any emergency?
A. Depended on them for any emergency whatever. I had no trouble of that kind. I never gave a thought of trouble of that kind. I had no personal worry or annoyance with the men in my regiment. I do not believe there was much of that thing in any of the other regiments.
Q. How much, or under what circumstances, would you deem it proper for an officer under command, in the face of a mob, to give the order to fire. That is, how much resistance on the part of the mob, or demonstration on their part, before an officer would be justifiable in firing, or giving the word of command to his men to fire?
A. I would hesitate some before I would give an order to fire, unless there was a shot fired. The firing of a gun or pistol into the ranks of my men would, I believe, justify me in giving an order to fire, and I would at once do it. A man in command of troops has to judge a good deal of the disposition of the crowd, as he can see it. I can hardly tell you exactly what I mean. Sometimes you find a crowd in front of you good-natured, meaning no harm, and you generally find among the crowd a lot of men who are working the mischief—see an element of that kind in a crowd. I do not think an officer is justified in hesitating at all, because these men can soon influence a crowd to do as they want to. If a crowd attempted to seize hold of the guns of my command, I should certainly give an order to fire. I would not give the order recklessly to fire. I would give the crowd time to get out of the way, by simply announcing to them that I would fire if the crowd did not disperse. If they had been firing into me, and committing acts imperiling the lives of my men, I do not know that I would give them that warning. These are little things a man would have to judge of as they occurred. I believe an overt act committed by a mob justifies the officer who commands the troops to fire.
Q. Would the hurling of missiles into your men by the mob be a provocation sufficient to justify the commander giving an order to fire?
A. I believe it would, but the commander would consider the previous acts of the mob and all the conditions of it, the character of it, and the character of the people in it, &c. I believe whenever a mob in the presence of the military does damage to the military that the military are justified in doing damage to the mob, and doing it right quick.
Q. And use the necessary efforts to disperse the mob?
A. Yes; fire at them, and do it quickly, and do enough of it to prevent them ever coming back. I do not believe a man in command of troops has any right to act rashly, and would hesitate some before he would do a thing of that kind. My idea of the military has always been that they are subordinate until the sheriff is satisfied he can do nothing—that then they step in and act quickly. Probably there would be no demonstration against the military if the military officer would inform the mob that if they did not disperse within a certain time, he would fire upon them, and if necessary, load in the presence of the mob, and ninety-nine times out of one hundred, I believe, there would be no mob by the time they got loaded.
Q. Did the mob flee or disperse before your men every time you gave the order to load?
A. They scattered every time. I had no trouble at all with the mob—I did not consider that I had a mob in front of me. I simply had a large crowd, which I believe would have been a mob if they could have got the upper hand in any way.
Q. You ordered to charge bayonets once or twice?
A. Three times.
Q. In the charge bayonets, did the crowd stand until your men came close to them?
A. No, sir; they fled in a good natured way. Laughed—no trouble at all to get rid of them. My object only was to prevent them coming too close. If the men get close enough some men in the crowd might feel like taking a musket away, and that would bring about a disturbance. It is better to prevent anything of that kind than to allow it to come and then act afterwards.
Q. Your object was to preserve the military character of your regiment?
A. Yes, sir.
By Mr. Larrabee:
Q. Keep the troops and the mob separate?
A. Yes. I never let the mob in with my troops at all, sir.
By Senator Yutzy:
Q. You were in active service during the last war, were you not?
A. I was.
Q. In what capacity?
A. I went out in the service as second lieutenant, and came back a major—filled all the intermediate ranks.
Q. How long were you in the service?
A. Three years and seven months.
Q. You were speaking about taking command of the three regiments—the regiments commanded by Colonel Howard and Colonel Gray—did you take command by virtue of your seniority over them?
A. I would, but I do not think I spoke of taking command of the three regiments, as I had not seen Colonel Gray. I do not know what he would do if he had been dismissed by General Brown. I suppose he would think General Brown had his reasons for that. Colonel Howard had voluntarily offered to join with me, and I did assume command. I had no conversation with Colonel Gray at that time, nor for weeks afterwards. I did say that on Monday, when Colonel Gray and myself were parading the streets, that, to the best of my knowledge, as we were returning, I saw Colonel Gray out with his regiment doing the same thing. That continued during the time we remained in our armory afterwards. In other words, I am satisfied that the Fourteenth regiment was organized and ready for duty on Monday.
Q. After they had been dismissed by General Brown?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. You say you refused to receive orders from General Brown on Monday?
A. I did.
Q. Give us the reason for that?
A. My reason for that was, that General Brown had dismissed his command, and when he dismissed his command, his authority ceased over them until he re-organized. The act of re-organizing or bringing together the Nineteenth regiment, was a personal matter on the part of Colonel Howard; General Brown had nothing to do with that; it was between Colonel Howard and myself, until General Brown got a brigade together. He could not command me. One regiment does not need a brigadier general and a colonel to command it; there would be a conflict of authority at once; those were my reasons.
Q. Did you not regard him as your superior officer, if you were the only man in his brigade?
A. I would regard him as my superior officer. I believe I could have done better service than he. I was willing to take the responsibility. I think that is the trouble with all the National Guard—there are too many officers.
By Senator Yutzy:
Q. And not enough men?
A. And not enough men.
Q. Was there any reason you had for disobeying his orders or receiving orders from him?
A. There was. I believe that General Brown has been suffering from sickness more or less. He was physically weak, and I did not believe was fully equal to the fatigues and annoyance of the command. I had no disposition to ignore General Brown, but I did think that in the great excitement of that day I could have handled my regiments better without being hindered by orders from brigadier generals.
Q. In other words, you regarded him incapacitated for his position in consequence of his illness and mental distress?
A. I did.
Q. And that would justify you?
A. That would have been my defense if I had got into any trouble.
Q. If it had not been that, as a disciplinarian and a military man, you would have considered it your duty to obey?
A. I would. I considered General Brown, under ordinary circumstances, was fully competent for his command; a braver man, I know, never breathed than General Brown—possesses every quality for bravery. His military capacity can hardly be doubted, when a man has filled the various commands that he had in the army.
Q. That is, when he is in good health?
A. When he is in good health, he is a good man.
Q. Did you see anything of General Brinton's command during this trouble, up to the time the collision occurred at Twenty-eighth street?
A. I saw nothing of any troops, except my own regiment, until Sunday night or Monday morning, when I came to town. I saw the troops of General Brinton in the cars, as the passed the stock-yards on their way to Pittsburgh. That is all I saw of them.
Q. As an officer of experience in the army and active service, did you think it was prudent for General Brinton to retire to the round-house when he did?
A. I would not like to have done it. If I had had command enough to have guarded every approach to the round-house, and to have had a guard around the round-house, for the purpose of allowing one portion to sleep while the other was on duty, I might have taken the round-house.
Q. For the reserves?
A. Yes, for the reserves; but under no circumstances would I go into the round-house, without I was certain that every approach to the round-house was thoroughly and properly guarded, and, if it was going to take too many men to guard the approaches to the round-house, I would not go into it then.
Q. Where would you have stationed your men?
A. The hill side there furnished an excellent position. Men could have slept there, and with a small portion of them guarding it, and been free from attack. They could have been free from danger. I like to be out in the open air myself, where I can swing free and clear.
Q. Could you have intrenched yourself on the hill side, so as to make the position secure and safe?
A. I do not think it needed any—it is naturally a strong position. If it was necessary they could have gone to the top of the hill, and nothing could have come in there. A very small force would have guarded any approach. It would not be likely that anybody would have crawled up there.
Q. If there would have been an assault made, would not the troops have been exposed without entrenchments?
A. Not to any extent. Men could have hidden behind a house here and there, and might have taken advantage of the inequalities of the ground, and no large body could have got there.
Q. That hillside is terraced with ravines and wash-outs, which would have given your men as much protection as the enemy?
A. Just as much, and with the advantage that a man in command of the troops would have the selection of the ground. I never walked over the ground particularly—I walk by there twice a day, and I am familiar with the appearance of the hill. What the number of inequalities of the ground are, I do not know, but it is a hill, at all events, and the mob would come from below.
Q. The hill would have been the most eligible position for the force From your knowledge of the Union depot, would that have served as a fortification for General Brown's command to repel the mob, in case they had made an attack on the depot?
A. To go down to the Union depot?
Q. For instance, if they were in the depot?
A. Oh, no; I think not. I do not think that depot was a desirable place for any defense, because there was too much space between there and the transfer station, where General Brown was, but the Union depot was certainly the only place where these troops could get supplies, and it would have been a good thing to have kept that space open, between the Union depot and General Brown. I do not think that the force could have scattered them to the extent that you speak of, defending the Union Depot hotel and transfer station and the round-house. I do not think they had enough men for it.
Q. Was there any available position between the transfer station and the Union depot, where he could have entrenched himself and secured a position?
A. The hillside was there. I think there was too much space between Twenty-eighth street and the Union depot for General Brinton to have attempted to protect all that line of property. He had not enough for that.
By Mr. Lindsey:
Q. Could he, with his men stationed at the Union depot, have gone out and driven off any crowd of men that might attempt to set fire to the cars and thus keep the space clear by sallying from the Union depot.
A. I think he could; and, if it was necessary for him to go into any house, I would have preferred taking the whole command down to the Union depot, than going into the round-house and transfer station.
Q. And then guarded it as far out as you could?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. The reason for that would have been that the supplies were all at the Union depot?
A. All at the Union depot.
Q. And the ammunition?
A. The ammunition was there. However, I do not think that General Brinton knew anything about the ammunition, where that was, or anything about it, when he went into the round-house, and neither do I believe that General Brinton anticipated any trouble when he went into the round-house. Firing upon the mob and dispersing it, he was left without any disposition for some time, and then he went into the round-house.
By Senator Yutzy:
Q. Do you know whether General Brinton received the order from General Latta, to join you at the stock-yards?
A. No; I can only answer that by hearsay.
Q. Did he report that he received that order?
A. Yes, he does. The adjutant general in his report states that Colonel Norris and Colonel Stewart went out to deliver an order to General Brinton. General Brinton in his report states that at a certain time, Colonel Norris did join; he did not state whether Colonel Norris gave him, or what answer he gave Colonel Norris; but the two put together, demonstrate pretty clearly that he did receive an order.
Q. Was there anything to prevent General Brinton from joining you at the stock-yards?
A. Nothing at all, except, probably he might have not known the way out, but he could have found that by inquiring. There was not even that excuse, because he had an officer of the Sixth division with him, I believe, showing him the way.
Q. In his retreat or march from the city to Blairsville, how far did he pass from you, from the stock-yards, how near?
A. He was going away from me within fifteen minutes of the time he left the round-house—about fifteen minutes' march from the round-house he came to the junction of the Sharpsburg and East Liberty roads. The East Liberty led to the right and the Sharpsburg road to the left. He took the road to the left, so he was going away from me all the time after he got to where these two roads united. General Brinton did not get this order that General Latta speaks of in his report and that Colonel Norris carried to him—he did not get that order, and Colonel Norris did not join him until he got to the Sharpsburg bridge.
Q. Until he got to it—he received it before he crossed the river?
A. I think he did. This is only hearsay on my part. I do know that General Brinton had not received that order until he got to the Sharpsburg bridge, because Captain Aull of my regiment had a copy of the order. He had the written order. Colonel Norris had a verbal copy. Stewart and Norris reached General Brinton. Captain Aull did not. Captain Aull was in uniform, and had not the same facilities for passing through crowds that the other two men had who were in citizens' clothes.
By Mr. Lindsey:
Q. In the absence of the commander-in-chief, who is the senior?
A. The next officer of the line, the senior officer?
Q. Who is he—what person would be the next?
A. In these troops out here I believe General Pearson would be in command.
Q. Of the troops of the State who would be?
A. The Governor is the commander-in-chief. After the Governor, the next senior major general. I believe the senior major general was General Dobson or General Osborne. I have forgotten which. After him comes General Pearson in order of seniority, and after all the major generals had been exhausted the brigadier generals would come in; then the colonels.
Q. Is there any other person except the Governor as commander-in-chief who has authority to call out the militia?
A. I think not. That is a matter of law, and that I am not exactly able to give an opinion upon. My understanding as a military officer is that no one but the Governor can call the troops out. I certainly would hesitate a long time before I would obey an order from anybody else.
By Senator Yutzy:
Q. In the absence of the Governor from the State is there any one that could call out the troops?
A. Unless he left orders with his adjutant general.
Q. Can he delegate that power as commander-in-chief to any person?
A. That is another fine legal point. I will say this: That if the Governor is absent and an order came signed by order of the commander-in-chief, James W. Latta, Adjutant General, I should obey it. It is not my business to know whether the Governor is present or not. The order the official——
Q. He might exercise his powers as commander-in-chief out of the State, and without the exercise of the power from him, could any other person exercise that power of commander-in-chief?
A. No, sir; there is no power can order out the militia but the Governor.
Q. Is there such a thing as a Governor pro tem. in the absence of the Governor?
A. I do not think there is such a thing as a Governor pro tem.
Q. The Lieutenant Governor, would he exercise the functions of Governor in case of the death of the Governor?
A. Of course in event of his death he becomes Governor at once. I do not understand that anybody can exercise the functions of the Governor but the Governor. That is a little bit of teaching I learned in the Democratic party when I was a very little bit of a fellow, and never forgot it. We have a respect for law and authority in our party.
Q. Is there anything else you can enlighten us on in regard to the military movements of the mob that you can think of?
A. There is nothing that I can say, except to give an opinion about the character of this mob, and the sufficiency of the military, and civil authorities, &c. I looked around very closely into this matter, and I am perfectly satisfied, in my own mind, that this mob was not to be dealt with by a trifling force. I do not believe it was in the power of the civil authorities to have put it down. I do not believe it was within the power of the small military force that was first called out to have put it down. It ceased to be a riot and got to be an insurrection almost instantly. The time was very short that intervened between the mob and the insurrection.
By Mr. Lindsey:
Q. What distinction do you make between a mob and an insurrection?
A. I believe that a mob is an uprising in a locality, either here or anywhere else—a small uprising that is within the power of the sheriff to look after. The sheriff, with what posse he might get together, may attempt to restore peace, and, failing in that, call out the local military. I make the dividing line as to when it becomes an insurrection when the executive of the state is compelled to interfere. If the sheriff and the Eighteenth regiment and the Fourteenth regiment and the Nineteenth regiment had put down that thing and restored peace and order, and placed the cars of the railroad in the hands of the company, I would have called it a riot.
Q. And then the difference between a mob and an insurrection is in strength and power?
A. Strength and power. If they overcome the local authorities and the State authorities have to interfere, then it is an insurrection. The sheriff is one arm of the executive. If he cannot quell it, then the executive himself has to come in.
By Senator Yutzy:
Q. When you first arrived at the Union depot, that was on——
A. Friday, at noon.
Q. Would it have required a large force to disperse the mob then?
A. It would not—not at Twenty-eighth street. I did not get off the cars at Twenty-eighth street; and I did not go up to Twenty-eighth street; and I did not know what the disposition of the crowd was; and I do not know what was back there—what could be seen—but those that could be seen certainly did not appear over two hundred or two hundred and fifty men.
Q. If there had been active measures taken on Friday or Saturday, could not that mob have been dispersed and the rioting suppressed?
A. I believe it could on Friday. I do not believe it could on Saturday. On Friday it could, because the strikers were determined themselves not to go to work, and some of them were rioters. There is no doubt about it; because some of them had interfered with the civil authorities, and a great portion of them were simply determined that they would not work, and they would not furnish any assistance to the Pennsylvania railroad in running their trains. For that reason, I believe the trains ought to have been started at once. I believe if a train had been started, the backbone of the thing would have been broken. I believe so to-day; but it was impossible to move trains, because you could not get men to man them. They were afraid of the strikers. It was not necessary for a striker to go up and stick a pistol at a man's head, or say, "I will shoot you." Some of them would give a wink and lift a finger, which would be just as effectual as if they had shot at you. I saw one striker go on the back part of an engine tender of a locomotive and take hold of a brake that was there. The engineer attempted to start the train. He just lifted his finger and the engineer never moved that train.
Q. If these trainmen that were willing to run had received the protection either of the military or civil authorities, could they not have run out these trains, and do you not think they would have been run out?
A. I think everybody got all the protection it was possible to give them. The Pennsylvania railroad were not prepared to run these trains, and they knew what the riot was, and what it would amount to more than we did. I knew no reason why troops should be called out on the morning I was called out. Never heard of a disturbance of any kind. After the military had been called out, then affairs had progressed so far that to have started a train from Twenty-eighth street would have required to place upon that train a large force of military to protect it. You could have moved it, probably to the stock-yards, and through the stock-yards, because there was a military force to protect it there, but as soon as they got a little west, why something might be thrown upon the track—a demonstration made of some kind that would block the cars up. There was no certainty it could go very far after it had started. But for the reason that there had been no demonstration made at any point, I believe if the train had been started, it could have gone through; not that it was in the power of the small force, civil or military, to put down the strikers, had they determined to resist, because there were too many of those strikers and fellow helpers in the mob.
By Senator Yutzy:
Q. You think there was a necessity for calling on the military?
A. Oh, undoubtedly. There is no question about it in my mind. The only thing I find to regret was that the military did not have proper information as to what it meant. I am but an humble citizen of the city of Pittsburgh, and I know nothing about the strike on the Pennsylvania railroad, and what led to it, and what it meant. I went down to Union depot, and until I met General Pearson, or the sheriff, I knew no reason why the military should be called out. When I got back I could see why. There was a demonstration against law and order.
Q. There was a necessity?
A. There was a necessity, for the evidence proved that.
Colonel Joseph H. Gray, sworn:
By Mr. Lindsey:
Q. Where do you reside, Colonel?
A. I reside in Pittsburgh, East End.
Q. What is your official position in the National Guard?
A. I am colonel of the Fourteenth regiment.
Q. Were you in the war of the late rebellion?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. What rank did you hold?
A. I was orderly sergeant of a company in the One Hundred and Fifth Pennsylvania regiment.
Q. How long were you in the army?
A. I went in in 1861, and remained in the service until the battle of Fair Oaks, where I was laid up from service.
Q. State when you received the orders calling you into service in July last—what day it was and what time?
A. I was not present. I had left Thursday morning and gone to the country, fourteen miles, and on Friday the order reached head-quarters for Colonel Glenn to assemble the regiment, about noon or after dinner some time.
Q. Was he lieutenant colonel?
A. Yes; lieutenant colonel. About Friday evening I heard that there was trouble in the city, and that the military was called out, and I also heard that the men could not be depended on—that they were not going to respond. Citizens from East Liberty came up. I jumped in my buggy and started to the city, and I met one company at East Liberty. I stopped there and, to my astonishment, found that the company had been assembled, and that a large majority of the company had responded to the call, and were ready for service, in their armory. I spoke a few words to the captain and told him to remain there until I came from the city, and he requested me to telegraph him immediately, and send him some orders. I stopped at my home, and put on my fatigue uniform, and came to the city, and went to the central armory and found there my adjutant, and that Lieutenant Colonel Glenn had taken what men had assembled there—there are three companies who have their armories there—and he had taken them to the Union Depot hotel. I immediately went there and reported for duty to General Brown. I inquired of my officers as to the number of men that had reported for duty, and then I had six companies in the city and four in the country. I inquired whether Captain Shof had been ordered out at East Liberty—he told me not. I went to the dispatcher's office, at the end of the hotel, and telegraphed to those companies to report to me immediately, at the Union Depot hotel. However, at that time they could not very well get in, and I changed the order to report to me on the first morning train coming into the city. About 7 o'clock Captain Nesbitt came up and Captain Glenn, of Mansfield, reported with their companies. That was Friday evening. It was six o'clock when I came to the Union depot, and they arrived at seven. I went out to the dispatcher's office the second time, to order Captain Perchman in. I then met, for the first time, General Pearson and told him what I proposed doing, and he said that he preferred that Captain Perchman should remain in his armory there for the present, and Colonel Moore, as chief of staff, told me he had communicated with Captain Perchman to this effect, that he should go and get his men rations and remain there, so that I then turned my attention to having my men fed. I asked the gentleman in charge of the depot if he had any cars in the … he should run them down, so that I could put my men into them for the night, until further orders. He immediately had cars run down. I did that because I wanted to get my men—there was a great deal of talking on the platform around the depot about the future operations. General Latta had just come in, and there was a good deal of excitement, and I did not want my men to know anything about it. I put them in the cars and kept them there until three o'clock, in the morning. Then I received an order, about twelve or one o'clock, to take my command, at three o'clock, sharp, to Twenty-eighth street, by way of Webster avenue. I marched out of the Union depot precisely at three o'clock, and General Brown and Colonel Smith and another gentleman. We went to Twenty-eighth street by a circuitous route, and took a position on the hill side center, opposite Twenty-eighth street, in line. There we remained during the day. I should say about nine o'clock, perhaps between eight and nine o'clock, General Brown sent his adjutant to me, asking the detail of one or two companies—I think he said fifty men.
By Senator Yutzy:
Q. That was on Saturday?
A. That was on Saturday morning. I sent two companies to the foot of the hill, and they were on duty there for an hour, perhaps an hour and a half, and they were relieved by two other companies.
Q. From your regiment?
A. Yes, sir; during the forenoon I sent a request to General Brown that my two companies should be relieved. They had all been down, and I asked that they be relieved by the Nineteenth regiment. I thought we were doing more than our share of duty, and for other reasons I asked to be relieved.
Q. You speak here of Colonel Glenn?
A. Lieutenant Colonel Glenn. He assembled my regiment in the city, and reported to the Union depot.
Q. You say you were accompanied by Colonel Smith?
A. Colonel Smith.
Q. What regiment?
A. He is connected with another regiment.
Q. During the day, what companies were on duty at the foot of the hill?
A. They were not under my command. I never knew what orders they had that were detailed. I do not know to-day what their orders were. I know what duty they were performing. I was never down on the railroad myself until I was ordered off the hill. We were there when the Philadelphia troops came there, and we were witnesses of the conflict. About two o'clock in the afternoon I received an order—I think it was about that time—the only order I received from the time I had got an order to go to Twenty-eighth street—I received an order to have my command in readiness to move, at a moment's notice, on board a train. I immediately sent my commissary, Captain Wallace, to provide rations. While there was no explanation of that order, I understood his meaning that we should take charge of a freight train. I had the provisions there. The captain got the provisions at Twenty-eighth street, three days' rations, and we remained, momentarily expecting an order to move down the hill and get on board a train. At the time that the Philadelphia troops came out——