Part 1 — CHAPTER III. THE ITALIAN SCHOOL.1

I.

C. Lombroso.

Chapter VI, bearing the title, “Subsistence (famine, price of bread)”, is the first in which we find any observations especially interesting to us. By the aid of data from von Oettingen, Starke, Corre, and Fornasari di Verce, which we treat separately, the author calls attention to the fact that the course of criminality is very little influenced by the price of provisions. He closes by drawing the following conclusion:

The circumstance that the thefts of food represent hardly 1% of the total cases of theft (according to Guerry), that in London bread occupies only the 43d place among 43 categories of articles stolen, and that Joly has shown that the cases of theft of money are much more numerous than those of meal, domestic animals, etc.—all of this leads the author to the conclusion that the proportion of crimes caused by lack of food and real misery is not so great as has been supposed.

In the second part of the chapter Professor Lombroso tries to show that the effect of hunger upon revolts is not very great. He cites a number of cases where there were no revolts although prices were high and work scarce. Thus, for example, in Strasburg from 1451 to 1500 and from 1601 to 1625, the price of beef rose 134% and that of pork 92%, and during many years wages fell 10%; and yet there was no insurrection.

—I must vigorously protest against any such argument, which, in my opinion, has no value. I will leave out of consideration the last example, which proves but little, since during these periods the price of bread may have been very low, neutralizing the effect of low wages (it is quite problematical whether the poorer classes of the population were great consumers of beef and pork!). But it is inaccurate to conclude from the fact “that prices were high and there was no insurrection” an absence of influence of the economic conditions. There may have been a number of factors working in the opposite direction, which prevented the manifestation of the economic factor. To cite but one example, it may be that during those times an excessively severe penal law was in force, threatening the least attempt at insurrection with cruel death.—

We shall next sum up Chapter IX, “Influence of Economic Conditions—Wealth.” After saying that it is difficult to estimate the wealth of a country at all accurately, the author produces the following data in the first section of the chapter. He divides the provinces of Italy into three groups according to the total wealth (estimated from taxes on consumption, direct taxes, and taxes on business), and compares the figures thus gained with some of the principal kinds of crimes, reaching the following results:

Another way of estimating the wealth of a country is by means of the inheritance tax. For different Italian provinces the following results are thus obtained:

(Indictments. Average to 100,000 Population, 1887–89.)

Average Wealth. Thefts. Frauds. Highway Robberies. Homicides. Assaults.

Latium 3333 639 116 18 25 513

Piedmont 2746 267 44 7 7 164

Liguria

Lombardy 2400 227 44 3 3 124

Tuscany 2164 211 34 6 7 165

Venice 1935 389 43 3 4 98

Reggio 1870 320 49 7 13 287

Emilia 1762 250 38 6 6 130

Sicily 1471 346 65 16 26 410

Naples 1333 435 47 6 21 531

Marches 1227 222 33 3 10 239

Umbria

Sardinia — 670 113 14 20 277

This table gives very little information as to the influence of wealth upon criminality, since we can draw from it the most contradictory conclusions. Note, for example, that the highest figures for theft are to be found in the regions of Latium and Sardinia, i.e. in the richest and the poorest provinces, etc., etc.

—I have more than once had occasion to show that the value of such researches is fictitious. It is not the total amount of wealth but its distribution that bears upon criminality. (See, for example, Quetelet and Colajanni)—

In the 3d section the author treats of the effect of involuntary unemployment. Wright tells us that in Massachusetts of every 220 persons convicted, 147 are without regular work, and that 68% of criminals have no occupation. According to Professor Lombroso this is easily explained by the fact that criminals do not like to work. According to Bosco there were only 18% of murderers in the United States without work (—the proportion not being given for non-criminals, these figures have little value—). Finally, Professor Lombroso mentions the opinion of Coghlan, who says that unemployment has no influence upon criminality in New South Wales (—upon what he bases his opinion, we do not know—).

—Such data as these (to a subject of such high importance as this the author gives but thirty lines) suffice for the conclusion that the phenomenon in question has little significance for criminality. I have only to recall the extensive studies of Mayr, Denis, Müller, Lafargue, and others, upon this subject, to prove the inaccuracy of this idea.—

Days of Work Equivalent to a Year’s Food. Number of Persons (to the 100,000 Inhabitants) convicted for:

Homicide. Assault. Sexual Offenses. Theft.

1 2 3 4 5

England and Wales 127 Scotland 0.51 England + Wales 2.67 Spain 1.03 Spain 59.63

Scotland England + Wales 0.56 Ireland 6.24 Ireland 0.85 Belgium 110.44

Ireland Ireland 1.06 Scotland 11.59 Scotland 1.41 France 110.95

Belgium 130 Germany 1.11 Spain 43.17 England + Wales 1.66 Italy 165.89

France 132 Belgium 1.44 France 63.40 Italy 4.01 Ireland 65.81

Germany 148 France 1.53 Germany 126.40 Austria 9.33 England + Wales 165.63

Austria 152 Austria 2.43 Italy 155.35 France 10.26 Scotland 208.39

Italy 153 Spain 8.25 Belgium 175.39 Belgium 13.83 Germany 226.02

Spain 154 Italy 9.53 Austria 230.45 Germany 14.87

Note.—Column 1 is taken from Mulhall’s Dictionary of Statistics (quoted by Coghlan, op. cit.); and columns 2–5 are figured from the data published by the Director of Italian Statistics (“Movimento della Delinquenza secondo le Statistiche degli Anni 1873–83”, Rome, 1886).

In the table on the preceding page the figures for criminality of different countries are compared with the number of days’ wages equivalent to the annual cost of food for one individual. These figures give us a composite picture of the price of food and the wage-scale.

In another way Lombroso attempts to compare the economic conditions of different countries and their criminality, namely, by means of the number of savings-bank books. For Europe the figures are as follows (taken from Coghlan):

Persons to Each Savings-bank Book. Crimes to 100,000 Inhabitants.

Homicide. Theft.

Switzerland 4 .5 16 114

Denmark 5 13 114

Sweden 7 13 —

England 10 5 .6 163

Prussia 10 5 .7 246

France 12 18 103

Austria 14 25 103

Italy 25 96 150

These figures show how homicides move in inverse ratio to the number of savings-bank books, while the contrary is the case with thefts. The author forgets to point out that there are five exceptions to this rule.

In Italy the greatest number of accounts corresponds to the smallest number of homicides, as the following table shows:

Average Number of Crimes in 20 Provinces in which the Wealth (According to the Number of Savings-Bank Books) is:

Maximum. Intermediate. Minimum.

Fraudulent crimes 57 45 45

Sexual crimes 11 12 .6 20

Thefts 132 133 160

Homicides 10 12 .6 27 .4

There are several exceptions to this rule; for example, the richest, like Palermo, Rome, Naples, and Leghorn, give very high figures for homicides. According to Professor Lombroso the explanation in the case of Palermo and Naples is to be found in the geographical situation; in the case of Palermo, in race and the abuse of alcohol; and in the case of Rome, in race, the abuse of alcohol, and in the political situation.

For France we get the following results:

In Departments where the Degree of Wealth is: Average Number of:

Homicides. Thefts. Rapes.

Minimum 64 83 17

Medium 86 99 26

Maximum 89 186 29

Percentage of departments exceeding the average of all France in:

Rapes. Crimes against Persons.

Agricultural Departments (42) 33% 48%

Mixed (26) 39% 39%

Manufacturing (17) 52% 59%

Not only poverty, but often wealth as well may cause crime. This is why some very wealthy districts show a figure for criminality as high as do the very poor. “The cause of all this is only too clear. On the one side poverty and the lack of absolute necessities impel toward the theft of indispensable things for the satisfaction of the individuals’ own needs. This is the first cord binding poverty and assaults upon property. On the other hand, poverty makes men impulsive through the cortical irritation following the abuse of wine and alcohol, that terrible poison to which so many of the poor resort to still the pangs of hunger. Account must be taken also of the degeneration produced by scurvy, scrofula, anemia, and alcoholism in the parents, which often transforms itself into epilepsy and moral insanity. Poverty also drives men to commit brutal eliminations of individuals who are an unwelcome burden upon the family, … Poverty is indirectly a cause of sexual crimes, on account of the difficulty which the poor have of obtaining satisfaction through prostitution; on account of precocious promiscuity in factories and mines; etc., … On the other hand, when a slight temptation toward evil is presented to an individual in comfortable circumstances, he is rendered physically and morally stronger by sufficient nutrition and a sounder moral training, and is less pressed by need, so that while he feels the impulsion to do evil, he can more easily resist it.

II.

R. Garofalo.

It may be that a workman, i.e. a person who can only provide for his own needs and those of his family by selling his labor, can find no work, and for that reason falls into theft; but the author is of the opinion that in our days this almost never happens (leaving aside periods of crisis), and that if it happens the worker will generally find some one ready to help him, and that crime is therefore not a necessity. There is, indeed, absolute poverty, but it is almost always the result of a lack of courage and energy, and not due to a lack of work. It is not hunger, but a desire to procure the same pleasures as those enjoyed by the favored of fortune, that impels the working-man to commit crime. But this is not only the case with the working class but with other classes as well. For this desire belongs to every man; the millionaire envies the multimillionaire, etc. In order that this desire should lead to crime, it is not necessary that there should be a particular economic situation, but only a particular psychic condition—the individual must have his sense of honesty weakened or wanting. Desire will cease to lead to crime only when there is no longer any advantage to be gained by it, and since this is inconceivable, crime will always exist. This explains why the number of crimes committed by the proletariat is very great, but at the same time why the cases of forgery, bankruptcy, etc. are very numerous among the other classes. In 1880 the figure for crimes against property (and analogous crimes) committed in Italy by proletarians, compared with those committed by property-owners, was as 88 to 12, while the ratio of the number of proletarians to that of property-owners was as 90 to 10. These proportions are nearly the same, which proves that as regards these crimes the proletarian class is no more criminal than the others.

Some authors are of the opinion that crimes against persons are equally caused in large measure by bad economic conditions, since bad education, lack of discretion, etc. are consequences of these conditions. In Garofalo’s opinion this idea is inaccurate, since the bad conditions in which the proletariat live lead indeed to roughness, i.e. make them insensible to the suffering of others, but it does not follow that the proletarians are totally deprived of moral sentiments. The criminal statistics of Italy show that 16% of the correctional criminality was committed by property-owners, though they form but 10% to 11% of the population. Garofalo attempts to prove the truth of his thesis also by a classification of criminals by trades. The agricultural class in Italy, the poorest and most ignorant, form 25.39% of those brought before the correctional tribunals, while those engaged in manufacturing, commerce, the army, etc., those with some education, therefore, who are much less numerous in the population, form 13.58%. In 1881 the Italian population included 67.25% of illiterates, and in 1880 68.09% of those correctionally convicted were illiterate. Further it has been proved many times that an improvement in economic conditions is accompanied by an increase of crime. In France, for example, wages have risen, the consumption of cereals, like that of meat, has increased, and the number of children enjoying the advantages of a primary education is more extensive and yet criminality has grown greatly in the same period. To the possible objection “that many authors, like Mayr, have proved that the rise in the price of grain is accompanied by an increase of crimes against property, and vice versa, and that economic conditions are consequently an important cause of crime”, Garofalo responds that crimes against persons increase with the fall in the price of grain, and that consequently, by the changes in the economic life there has been brought about a change in the kind, but not in the extent, of criminality. Exceptional occurrences, such as famines, commercial crises, etc., increase crime only in appearance. If the question is probed to the bottom (the author appears not to have done so himself, at least he does not record any results) it is probable that it will be discovered that what happens is only that the form of crime becomes more serious, that the vagrant, for example, becomes a highway-man, etc.

The conclusions that the author draws are the following:

“First. The present economic order, that is to say, the distribution of wealth as it exists today, is not a cause of criminality in general.

—My criticism of what has gone before will be limited to some principal points only.

First. The author dodges the question when he includes under economic conditions poverty only, and this in the very limited sense of the lack of the absolute necessities. He who writes upon the connection between crime and economic conditions must analyze the whole present economic system, and not stop with one of the consequences of that system, the poverty in which the proletarians find themselves. Consequently Garofalo’s whole argument, tending to show that the bourgeoisie have a great part in the crimes against property, is beside the mark, for capitalism results in great uncertainty of existence for the bourgeoisie also. It is then quite comprehensible that this class should be guilty of crimes of this kind. According to Fornasari di Verce, however, the Italian statistics show that the well-to-do class take less part in crime than the poor. According to him 13% of all those convicted in 1887 were well-to-do, a class which, roughly speaking, forms 40% of the whole population. (See also Colajanni, “La Sociologia Criminale”, II, pp. 536 ff.)

In consequence of this arbitrary restriction of the subject the author’s remarks are of little value. But aside from this there are still serious charges to be made against his manner of treating the subject.

Second. The assertion of Garofalo that in general in our present society he who wishes to work can find work, is not worth combating in a serious book. To say that machinery does not every day make some workers unnecessary, that there are no industrial crises causing an enormous amount of involuntary unemployment, is conclusive proof that one does not know the present mode of production. The existence of a group of the population, the so-called lower proletariat (“bas-prolétariat”, “Lumpen-proletariat”) cannot be a natural phenomenon, since it has not been always and everywhere present; it is strictly bound up with certain modes of production.

Third. As I have had occasion to show already in more than one place, the increase of crimes against persons during periods of prosperity has a very great, though indirect, connection with economic conditions.

Fourth. That poverty in the strict sense of the word is not the sole cause of economic criminality, that cupidity plays also an important rôle, I do not wish to deny. Only, this cupidity is not an innate quality of man, present everywhere and always, but is awakened only under certain economic conditions. This is especially the case in our present society.

Fifth. According to the author there are certain circumstances which may lead to the commission of a crime, but the true cause of crime is to be found in the absence or weakness of the instinct of honesty. That there exists such an “instinct of honesty” is one of numerous assertions made by Garofalo for which he produces no proof, and, in accordance with the general opinion of sociologists, I class it among the most profound errors. A moral disposition is innate in man, and varies greatly with individuals, but moral concepts—for example, that it is forbidden to steal—are certainly not innate. The very way in which Garofalo puts the question is wrong; we must not set the circumstances that have influenced a man at a certain moment over against an innate quality of honesty (fictitious besides) but must examine all the conditions which have influenced his innate moral disposition through the whole of his life, as well as his environment at a given moment.

To say that the influence of environment cannot be great, because persons well brought up sometimes commit crimes, is very superficial. Upon this point there is something deeper and more important to be said.—

III.

E. Ferri.

“Socialismo e criminalità” is a polemic work directed in part against “Il delitto e la questione sociale” of Turati, and in part as Professor Ferri himself says in “Socialismo e scienza positiva”, against socialism as far as that involves the revolutionary method and the concomitant “nebulous romanticism.”

“I. The origin of the phenomenon of crime is to be found in society as at present constituted.

“II. More especially, the economic disorder of the population caused by the unjust inequality of individuals and classes, is the cause of every other disorder, moral or intellectual, and therefore of crime also.

“III. When the social transformation or revolution which the socialists desire has taken place, the social atmosphere will be most favorable.

“IV. In the socialistic order the individual also will be much superior to the man corrupted or demoralized by present conditions.

“V. And then crime, like poverty, ignorance, prostitution, and immorality in general, will have ended its unhappy tyranny over the human race.”

—It is not certain that an adherent of scientific socialism would agree that these theses are entirely accurate; for example, the second, that the bad economic condition of the population is the cause of crime—for the expression “economic condition” has here too limited a meaning, namely that of poverty, misery, etc. In place of this he would rather make use of the expression, “mode of production.” It is this which, in the last analysis, rules the whole social life, according to the Marxists.—

The first chapter of Professor Ferri’s work, bearing the title of “la genesi sociale e individuale del delitto”, begins by remarking that the socialists blame society as the cause of all evils, including poverty and crime. On the one hand, they do this because of their “strategy of propaganda”, on the other hand it is a reaction against the extreme individualism which sprang from the French Revolution. They generally pay no attention to individual factors, or perhaps recognize them in part, but attribute their origin to society also. Between these two extremes is to be found criminal sociology, which says that the causes of crime are manifold.

According to the author there are three groups of the factors of crime: the anthropological or individual factors, the cosmic or physical factors, and the social factors. Since many authors, wholly or partially, share this view, which constitutes an attack against the very foundation of the idea of the social origin of crime, we will examine it here fully.

“The anthropological factors, inherent in the person of the criminal, are the first condition of crime, and divide themselves into three subclasses, according as the person of the criminal is looked at from an organic, psychic, or social point of view.

“The organic constitution of the criminal constitutes the first subclass of anthropological factors and includes all the anomalies of the skull, brain, viscera, sensibility, reflex activity, and all bodily characteristics in general, such as physiognomy, tattooing, etc.

“The psychical constitution of the criminal includes anomalies of intelligence and feeling, especially of the moral sense and the peculiarities of the criminal dialect and literature.

“The personal characteristics of the criminal include the purely biological features of his condition, such as race, age, sex; and the bio-social features, such as civil status, profession, residence, social class, and education, which have been up to this time the almost exclusive subject of criminal statistics.

“The physical factors of crime are the climate, nature of the soil, length of nights and days, the seasons, the annual temperature, meteorological conditions, and agricultural production.

ANTHROPOLOGICAL FACTORS.

—It seems to me that there are many objections to be made to this rather carelessly drawn conclusion. In the first place, Professor Ferri is of the opinion that it may be assumed that it will be easy to find groups of persons only a quarter of whom become criminal, though they all live in the same bad environment. Leaving out of account the individuals who, because of their physical condition are incapable of crime, I do not believe that there are, for example, 60% who have never been convicted. However, even admitting that this assertion is accurate, then, that out of 100 persons living in the same environment, only one part will fall into crime, I believe that it is impossible to find even two persons who live, and have lived, in an environment exactly similar, and whose parents also have always lived in the same surroundings. In this way only can the question be clearly put. It is not only present conditions that influence a man; all past conditions have their part in the motives of present acts. It cannot be denied that the present includes the past. Nor ought the conditions which have influenced the parents to be excluded. Let us put the following case: A, B, and C live in the same very bad surroundings. A commits suicide, B becomes crazy, C commits a crime. The parents of A were well-to-do, gave their child a good education, and accustomed him to consider many things as necessities. Fallen into poverty, then weakened and become incapable of good work, A believes that it is impossible for him to restore himself. His moral ideas, acquired in his youth, are opposed to his engaging in crime. And then the few francs that he would be able to steal would not be sufficient to maintain him in the life to which he has been accustomed. Consequently he commits suicide. B is the child of a father who became an alcoholic from actual poverty. Inferior on this account, B cannot keep up the struggle for existence and becomes insane. The parents of C were indigent. He received no education; moral ideas are totally unknown to him; he has never lived in anything but poverty, and commits a theft when the opportunity presents itself without any hesitation. In these three cases, which occur daily, circumstances are the only factor that enters into consideration.

I have said above that there are no two persons who live in exactly the same circumstances. This word “exactly” is not used by Professor Ferri, and in this, in my opinion, he is wrong. In ordinary life we speak of great and small causes. But in treating of scientific questions this is surely forbidden. For no one is ignorant that what is apparently the least important occurrence may have the most extensive consequences.

May I here be permitted to make a quotation from an interesting page of Professor Manouvrier upon this question: “That the effect of environment is generally understood in too limited a way, we see proved every day in the appreciation expressed, of the causes that have determined certain differences of productive power or moral conduct. It is a question, perhaps, of two brothers. It is said that they have been brought up exactly in the same manner, that they have received exactly the same education, and that the question of environment is thus settled. Immediately the doctors begin to call in atavism, to feel the bumps of the head, to study facial asymmetry, etc. Anatomy must be appealed to, since the influence of environment has been eliminated. It can be put down to bad luck if some bump, some depression, some asymmetry is not found that will serve, whether or no, to account for a solution of the question. There remains always, further, the resource of invoking invisible, hypothetical vices of the internal constitution. The phrenologists were in a relatively difficult situation; they had to find a fixed anatomical character, a bump for a function specified in advance, or they were obliged to imagine a conflict of bump with bump. The present method is less exacting; it is enough to find no matter what deviation from morphological perfection, without its being necessary to show the connection between this deviation and the physiological inferiority to be explained. But what am I saying? The question is often of an inferiority of a sociological order, and trouble is not even taken to make sure, to begin with, that this corresponds to a psychological inferiority. Yet however indispensable this may be as a preliminary, it is not enough; it must be ascertained that this inferiority implies a functional trouble before calling in pathological anatomy at all hazards.

“The statement is made that the two brothers have been subjected to the same environmental influences merely because they have been brought up in the same house, taught in the same school, fed and clothed alike. Yet the mere fact of having been born first or second is not without importance. To have been reared with an older or with a younger brother constitutes a difference of environment that may contribute powerfully to differentiate character. Add to this the differences of environment proceeding from nurses, servants, diseases, games, etc., and you will have opened headings under which may be classed differences innumerable. There are no small things in such a matter. Biographies as now written are no more than outlines when one thinks of what truly psychological biographies ought to be. To have been taught in the same college in the case of two brothers is a similarity that may, and certainly does, conceal the greatest differences. They have not had the same teachers, the same fellow-pupils, nor, above all, the same comrades. Between the education given, and that actually received, the difference may be great.…

In consequence of what has been said, I believe that the conclusion of Professor Ferri that there are anthropological factors of crime, is too hasty. But there are still other objections to be urged to it.

Let us suppose that two persons who live, and have lived, in the same circumstances are in a position to commit a very advantageous crime, and their morality does not prevent. At the moment when the time comes to act, one commits the crime and the other does not—he lacks the courage. Courage, then, is a factor of crime, and the lack of it a factor of virtue! Not so, that depends upon circumstances. In another case, he who commits a crime is stupid, and does not consider the risk, and he who does not commit it is a crafty man. Stupidity, then, is a factor of crime, and craft of virtue! Not so, that depends upon circumstances. The reverse is also true, probably more true still. Thousands of great criminals so far from being stupid have had something of the genius in them.

The reasoning of Professor Ferri, that there is in every crime, besides others, an anthropological factor, is only the statement of the fact, known long before the rise of modern criminology, that the predisposition to crime is not the same with all men. This predisposition, as we have seen, considered by itself, has nothing to do with crime as such. So much the more is the conclusion of Professor Ferri and the Italian school in general absolutely false, when they deduce from the undeniable fact that the predisposition is not the same for all, the notion that this predisposition is by nature pathological.

Although the doctrine of Lombroso and his school is in general abandoned by anthropologists, it still persists in the acceptance of one fact, to which it is its immortal merit to have called attention, namely that there are a number of criminals (though a very limited number) who show a truly pathological nature, and whose criminal character can only be explained by this pathological nature. For example, when someone in an epileptic condition commits a murder, without any motive; or the case in which a well-to-do individual steals continually useless articles, of little value, etc., etc. Even in most of these instances, which are a small minority in the colossal mass of criminality, the social environment plays its part; but it must be recognized without reserve that here we have to do with true individual factors, peculiar to certain individuals. The hypothesis of the Italian school is, then, accurate for the exception, but false as a rule.—

PHYSICAL FACTORS.

It is easily understood why those who inhabit the regions of Siberia covered with snow have not become agriculturists; and why Holland, without mines of iron and coal has not become a great manufacturing country, but instead, situated upon the sea and traversed by great rivers, has become commercial. But these physical factors have remained constant or nearly constant during historical periods, while the organization of society has undergone changes that have great effects. We cannot explain these changes by a constant factor.

Plechanow formulates this very well in his “Beiträge der Geschichte des Materialismus.” He says: “The character of man’s natural environment determines the character of his productive activity, of his means of production. The means of production, however, determines the reciprocal relationships of men in the process of production as inevitably as the equipment of an army determines its entire organization, and all the relationships of the individuals of which it is made up. Now the reciprocal relations of men in the social process of production determine the entire structure of society. The influence of the natural environment upon this structure is therefore incontestable. The character of the natural environment determines that of the social environment. For example: ‘The necessity of computing the time of the rising of the Nile, created Egyptian astronomy and with it the domination of the priestly caste as guides in agriculture.’

“But this is only one side of the matter. Another side must also be considered if one is not to draw entirely false conclusions. The circumstances of production are the result, the productive forces are the cause. But the effect becomes a cause in its turn; the circumstances of production become a new source of the development of the productive forces. This leads to a double result.

“1. The mutual influence of the circumstances of production and the productive forces causes a social movement, which has its own logic and a law of its own, independent of the natural environment. For example: Private property in the primitive phase of its development is always the fruit of the labor of the property-holder himself, as may be very well observed in the Russian villages. There necessarily comes a time, however, when it becomes the reverse of what it was before: it supposes the work of another, and becomes capitalistic private property, as we can likewise see any day in the Russian villages. This phenomenon is the effect of the immanent law of the evolution of private property. All that the natural environment can accomplish in this case consists in accelerating this movement through favoring the development of the productive forces.

Crime being a social phenomenon, and society being influenced, as we have seen, by the physical environment, one might say that this environment is a factor in criminality. He who reasons thus would have to grant that the physical environment is only an indirect factor, and therefore a very remote cause. It would be as fair to say that the invention of gunpowder was one of the causes of all murders committed with fire-arms. However, in reasoning thus I believe we forget that crime is an historic phenomenon, modifying itself according to the condition of society, and consequently regulated by laws that are independent of the physical environment. In other words, the environment is the reason why a people provides for its needs by working the material that nature has furnished; but the manner in which this work is done is independent of this environment. And it is upon this manner of working that criminality depends. An example taken from practice will make clear what I have been saying.

It is plain from what has gone before that I have not wished to deny the direct influence of the physical environment upon man. Indeed, it is a fact which the whole world has observed. According to many persons, then—and a number of scientific researches have proved it—a high degree of criminality against persons proceeds from a hot temperature, while a low temperature, on the other hand, leads to many crimes against property. This implies not only that the kind of crime is different in hot countries from that in cold, but also that the change of the seasons with their variations in temperature have the corresponding effects.

In the first place, as to the assertion that cold increases the number of crimes against property it is unnecessary to speak at length, for nearly all authors are agreed that not physical but economic causes come into play here. Cold increases men’s needs; they must have warmer clothing and a well heated dwelling. But it is clear that all this is no motive for stealing. For the person of means gets what he wants with his own money. It is the present social organization that, during the severe weather, does not permit people to provide for the needs that are more numerous then, for the opportunity to work is more often lacking in winter than in summer.

Before taking up our analysis of “Socialismo e criminalità”, I would remark that this division of the factors into three groups has to do exclusively with the individual criminal, and thus loses sight of the question why such an action in any place whatever, at any time whatever, is regarded as criminal? Such a query brings out the fact that we are here concerned with social factors only.

Let us take up now the exposition of Chapter I of “Socialismo e criminalità.” Turati, in his “Il delitto e la questione sociale” has made the following objections to Professor Ferri’s theses. Professor Ferri distinguishes five categories of criminals: insane criminals, incorrigible born-criminals, habitual criminals, criminals from passion, and occasional criminals. In the first two categories individual factors play a very important rôle; however, according to Professor Ferri’s investigations these two groups include but 20% to 25% of the whole number of criminals, and deducting the insane, only 10% remain. Since criminals form only the minority of the population, and physical factors have only a slight influence, it follows that these factors influence rather the form than the cause of the crime. The three factors work nearly all the time. It is clear, therefore, that the two other factors alone will not be strong enough to produce crime at a time when the social factor is eliminated, as has been proved by the socialistic colony at New Lanark, which preserved an exemplary morality for four years. Then, without taking account of the crimes that are the consequence of viciousness of life or of the abnormal economic condition, the authors of great crimes (except technical and professional ones) are less numerous among the well-to-do than among the lower classes, where the anthropological elements are nearly the same. And if the different classes show anthropological differences, this is not because these differences are innate in individuals on account of being born in the lower classes, but because they are produced and brought about by poverty, bad education, etc. The true causes of crime are consequently social conditions, and in the last analysis economic conditions.

Professor Ferri’s argument against what has just been said may be summed up as follows: Will there be no social atmosphere in a socialistic state? Or rather, will this atmosphere be so perfect that the germ of the smallest social factor of crime will be absent? Do we suppose that when poverty is suppressed, jealousy will disappear at the same time? If legal marriage is abolished will that prevent an ugly man from violating or killing a beautiful woman who refuses to accept him? It may be objected that in this case the man is not an habitual or an occasional criminal, but a born-criminal, or an insane criminal, or a criminal from passion. Well and good, but then in this future state we shall still be far removed from an earthly paradise.

Turati commits the following errors in his reasoning: First, he sets aside the insane criminals; wrongly, according to Professor Ferri, for, although insane, they are criminals. Second, 20%, the figure to which born and insane criminals count up, is a very large number out of 60,000 prisoners. Third, Professor Ferri claims that it is incorrect to say that the other causes are reduced to zero the moment the social factors of crime are suppressed. For even with occasional criminals, where the environment plays a very important part, an individual factor must make its effect felt, or the individual would not become criminal.

Professor Ferri asks, on the other hand: How does it happen that out of a hundred working-men living in the same environment, only a very few fall into crime? This can be explained only by admitting individual and physical causes. When socialists say that these individual differences are innate simply in consequence of the poverty in which ancestors of the persons in question have lived for thousands of years, the author admits this reasoning in great part, but thinks nevertheless that he is right in maintaining that these qualities are innate in certain individuals at the present time.

With regard to the fact that a very high morality was maintained in New Lanark, the author says: first, that he would very much like to convince himself with his own eyes, especially since he has read that in this colony the habit of celebrating Christmas eve with excessive drinking was kept up; second, that he knows that crimes were committed in a communistic colony of that time; further we are not to forget that difficulties are increased in a great city.

The following chapter is entitled: “Benessere e criminalità.” To the unproved assertion of the socialists that bad economic conditions are the principal if not the only cause of crime, the author opposes some facts to prove that this statement is largely incorrect. To this end he divides crimes into three groups: first, crimes against property, second, crimes against persons or crimes of blood, and third, crimes against morals. Besides these three categories there are many crimes which have neither directly nor indirectly any connection with bad economic conditions; for example, crimes against honor, insults, or abuse of power.

First, then, the crimes against property. The author recognizes that most of these crimes are caused by bad economic conditions. But it is an exaggeration, he says, to say that all these crimes result from such conditions. This is to overlook crimes against property committed out of revenge. However, in a communistic society there would necessarily be cases of theft still, without taking into account kleptomania, etc. For the articles of consumption would still remain private property; and why should one not rob his fellow-citizen from jealousy? Or is it not probable that someone would prefer to take from his neighbor the thing he needs rather than make a trip of some miles to get it from a central store? But if we admit that the bad economic conditions of the time are the cause of the crimes against property, it remains to find the causes of the crimes of the other groups. Though he recognizes that economic conditions occupy a place in the etiology of these last crimes, as, for example, murder from cupidity, the author does not believe that this can be made a general rule. When socialists object that the man of the future will be morally improved, Professor Ferri is of the opinion that at the present moment we have to do with the men of today and not with the men of the future.

The study of criminality in France during the years 1825–80 has shown an extraordinary increase in crimes against persons and against morals during the years 1848–52. A minute examination shows the author that it was due to the great increase in the consumption of meat and wine, both very cheap at this time, and also to a rise in wages. The result of the betterment in economic conditions was, therefore, an increase in the crimes mentioned.

Professor Ferri finds another proof in the following table:

Number of Persons Arraigned to 100,000 of Each Class (France).

Crimes. Agricultural Class. Manufacturing Class. Arts and Trades. Other Professions. Without Occupation, Vagrants, Etc.

Thefts 6.6 12.9 18.1 11.1 136.3

Forgery 0.7 1.3 2.1 3.4 8.3

Arson 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.3 5.2

Infanticide 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.4 4.1

Serious assaults 1.0 1.2 1.8 0.8 2.7

Homicide 0.5 0.4 0.6 0.5 2.4

Murder 0.9 0.7 1.1 0.9 5.8

Sexual crimes with violence 0.4 0.7 1.0 0.4 1.9

Sexual,, crimes,, against children 0.7 1.4 2.1 1.1 5.5

Average of all crimes 13.9 23.0 32.5 22.4 193.0

It follows from this table that the farming class, which, if you except vagabonds, is the class with the least means, shows the figure relatively lowest, and that the assertion of the socialists, that those who are brought to the bar of justice are almost all from the proletariat, is inaccurate.

—I shall not discuss the question, whether the proletariat furnishes a disproportionately large contingent of criminals. The arguments of Professor Ferri do not seem very strong to me. “Agricultural class”, for example, is too vague a distinction. What an enormous distinction between the rich farmer and the poor day-laborer, who earns only a few francs a week! Yet both are included in the first group.—

When we examine the course of crime in France during the period 1826–80, we see a considerable increase in the crimes against property, morals, and persons, while the economic conditions have improved during these years even for the proletariat. To what cause is this increase to be ascribed? It is impossible to attribute it to a relaxation of the strictness of the police and the courts, for the activity of these has become greater. Further, where it is evident that there are such strong causes of crime, it would be madness to think that a greater severity of penalties leads to a diminution of criminality. It is for this reason that the school to which the author belongs insists not upon the increase of penalties, but rather upon the elimination of causes. Hence the doctrine of “penal substitutes.”

The true cause is the following: The more abundantly a man is nourished, the more his organic forces are developed; there is, therefore, a greater activity which may express itself in more acts of honest labor, but may also express itself in an increased number of unlawful acts. And then we must not lose sight, especially with regard to sexual crimes, of the existence of a biological and of a sociological law, namely, first, that the generative force of animals and of man increases in proportion to the abundance and ease of nutrition; second, that by a continual development of foresight, the nations which follow the advice of Malthus are more and more giving the lie to the law that he formulated, since with them population shows a tendency to increase less rapidly than the means of existence, and almost in inverse proportion to wealth. This is why criminality is increasing in France, where the system of foresight is greatly developed, and where the population enjoys better nutrition than formerly.

Professor Ferri is of the opinion that we can derive from the observed facts the following rules: first, criminality increases in extent but diminishes in violence; second, scarcity makes crimes against property increase, and decreases those against persons, while abundance has the opposite effect; third, civilization decreases the number of homicides, but increases that of suicides; fourth, a development of foresight with regard to births prevents an excessive increase of the population, and consequently an excessive increase of pauperism, but increases the figures for sexual crimes.

Turati makes the following objections to these statements: In the first place, in civilized countries, crimes against persons are much less numerous than crimes against property, and just in proportion to the degree of civilization. Why is it not likely that in the end the criminogenous influence of nutrition will disappear in consequence of the law in accordance with which crimes increase in number, but decrease in grossness and intensity? Further, it is doubtful whether this influence is so strong. The true cause is not good nutrition but the Malthusian check, and it is this last which leads to crime, precisely in the proletariat, since in this class prostitution cannot act as a safety valve; and bad economic conditions are the cause of the “moral restraint.”

Professor Ferri recognizes that there is a partial truth in this reasoning, but makes the following objections: that crimes of blood are more numerous than crimes against morals and yet have no relation to the Malthusian check; that, as regards crimes against morals, it is not correct to say that the proletariat are driven to them by economic causes; that it is the proletarians that multiply the fastest, and the well-to-do classes who do not wish to have many children; and that the individual and biological factors would always remain, and lead to crimes against persons, even if the aforesaid cause of sexual crimes were to disappear. In the following chapters the author treats of the assertion of Turati that an improvement in education and the new “social atmosphere” will bring about a change.

—The criticism of the chapter of which I have just been speaking may be summed up as follows: Like so many other authors, Professor Ferri understands the expression, “economic conditions”, in a very limited sense. He includes only direct influences, and in this way it is very easy to prove that they explain only a part of criminality. But this interpretation is very incomplete, since all social life is influenced by economic conditions. In proving, therefore, like many other authors, that while an improvement in the economic condition of the working-class is accompanied by a decrease in crimes against property, it is also accompanied by an increase of sexual crimes and crimes against persons, Professor Ferri forgets not only that the lack of education leads to crimes of violence, but also that in our present society the possibility of satisfying the sexual appetites depends upon the social position of the individual. The argument, in opposition to Turati, “that Malthusianism is applied chiefly by persons of some means” is not a happy one for one who wants to prove that economic conditions have not a considerable influence. For the reason of this is just the difficulty of procuring a good position for many children, and, in the case of landholders, the desire to avoid a too great division of the land. These are purely economic causes.—

“Educazione e criminalità” is the title of the third chapter. The human brain is an organic mechanism, similar (but with numerous exceptions) to an inorganic mechanism in this, that it is subject to the great law of the conservation of energy, which manifests itself, among other ways, in inertia. From which it comes that man at all times has had an irresistible tendency to make use of a general principle as a basis for his logical structures. Without this he would always be forced to build each new structure from the ground up, which would involve the waste of too much cerebral energy. Opposed to this law is another which teaches us that life is impossible in a state of absolute repose, but that it requires a perpetual changing of the organic and physio-psychic materials. Hence it comes that eternal and absolute truths change at different epochs, and that they seem stable only when compared with the secondary truths, which are subject to the fashions of the time.

According to the author, then, there are truths that are more general and nearly inalterable, but there are others which, though general also, are more secondary, only retain their force during several generations, and end by being changed. Such, for example, are the views concerning human life, formulated by the great thinkers, then accepted by the majority, and finally supplanted by other truths. This is why science makes progress by dogmas. It is modern science that has made the great step in recognizing that these dogmas are relative and alterable.

Against this reasoning two objections can be alleged. First, that Spencer has given the name “hypothesis” to his doctrine of evolution, while Professor Ferri calls it a dogma. The author on the other hand thinks that his opinions and those of Spencer are exactly alike, for he calls the doctrine in question a relative and alterable dogma, and Spencer says of it: what I have given is an hypothesis; but so long as there is nothing better, that will explain a greater number of facts, I have a right to consider it as the image of the knowable truth, until the contrary is proved. In the second place, it may be asked: “Does man always oscillate between truth and error; will he never know an absolute and eternal truth?” According to Professor Ferri the answer to this question is not difficult. The origin as well as the aim of faith is the effort to give to men a relatively stable support, which they cannot find elsewhere. All discussion with the adherents of a theological opinion is excluded; and as for the others, ought they not to recognize that the life of human thought is just the constant proof of the continual modification of the so-called eternal verities?

After this introduction the author enters upon the subject itself. At the beginning of the 19th century the dogma was dominant, that instruction was the panacea for all crimes. Later many of the publicists, including the socialists, advanced the opinion that the true remedy for criminality was education. Just as the first theory was incorrect, Professor Ferri would show that the second is equally so.

The question is, can education lead man to good or to evil; and if it can, how far can it lead him? The scientific pedagogues have not treated this question, as far as the author knows. Without furnishing proofs the socialists admit that education can modify man in many respects. Owen, for example, says: “every child may be brought up to have in his later life only good habits, or bad, or a mixture of the two, according to his education.”

It is necessary to distinguish three kinds of education—physical, intellectual, and moral. First, a general observation applicable to all kinds of education. In his physical, intellectual, and moral make-up, each individual is the product of a countless number of ancestors, to whom he is bound by unchangeable laws of heredity. From this it is clear that the power of education, which acts only during a limited number of years, is small compared to that of the influences to which a man’s ancestors have been subjected for thousands of years. The question becomes, then: “what are the limits of such modification?” Further it is necessary to determine just how far this modification is due to education, and how far to environment. For education, properly so called, i.e. the direct and methodical influence of the educator upon his pupil, differs in many respects from that of the physical and social environment. This is why the author treats this latter in a special chapter, and limits himself now to education alone. The question is therefore reduced to this: “how far can a man (the educator) modify the constitution of another man (the pupil)?”

One more observation should precede the study of the question, namely that a force, or a complexus of forces, can be influenced only by other homogeneous forces. Now when we examine how far physical or biological education can make its influence felt, we see that this influence may be very great, though naturally limited, in proportion to the knowledge we have of the structure and functioning of the organs which it is attempted to modify. As to intellectual education, the results are much less, since the knowledge of the organs involved is much smaller. As to moral education, the following question is one to which pedagogues have given little attention: “how far do morality or immorality, good or bad character, depend upon the education received at home and in school?”

Spencer lays down the fundamental rule that the moral conduct of man can be studied scientifically only on condition of being considered as forming part of the conduct in general, and also of the activity in general, of all living beings. Sergi is of the same opinion. And this is correct, Professor Ferri thinks, if, as these two authors do, one studies the conduct and character of man in their constituent elements, in their genesis and development, without taking into consideration the variability of the character, and consequently of the conduct, of man because of his education. In our case, in studying the constituent elements, the genesis, the development, and the variability of the moral part of the character and conduct of man, it is necessary to separate these parts, and to limit ourselves to a special study of one of them.

All psychologists are agreed that the moral conduct of a man (including criminal conduct) although having naturally a certain relationship with his muscular and intellectual condition, depends directly and intimately upon the condition of his feelings, emotions, and passions in their moral aspect. Hence it is clear that the problem is: “how far can these feelings be modified by education?”

Let us first of all note that the expression, “a man of good (or bad) birth”, does not imply that there are persons who are totally good or totally bad, for these two qualities always appear in combination. It only indicates whether the good or the bad qualities predominate.

It is certain that some persons have become criminals from lack of moral education, added to bad surroundings. In this case this lack of education has favored the greater development of the bad germs, which, however, gives us no right to conclude that the converse would be true: that education can improve the moral character, strengthening the good germs to such a point that they have the mastery over the bad. For we must not lose sight of two things: first, that the bad germs that show themselves in our present society are the anti-social instincts, opposed to the sociability and sympathy upon which life is based, while the good germs are the social instincts; second, that, since individuals reproduce morphologically and physiologically during life the different phases that man and animal have gone through, it is in the lowest strata of his character that man preserves the savage and anti-social feelings that are the consequences of the condition in which the race has lived heretofore, while the germs of the modern social ideas are to be found in the higher and more recent parts. Hence it follows that the anti-social instincts, being of a more ancient date than the social instincts, are stronger than they and are not stifled by them. And then, the environment, the present civilization, is also partly the cause. This is why the author agrees with Sergi that in our present society there are individuals who are constantly driven to crime by their organic and psychical constitution, made up in great part of the deeper, anti-social strata (the born-criminals and incorrigibles), and that there are others whose constitution is formed primarily of the more recent, social strata, and who become criminal only under extraordinary impulses, in consequence of a volcanic eruption, as it were, from the deeper, anti-social strata (criminals from passion). While Sergi is of the opinion that the anti-social instincts will little by little become latent, lose their force, and cease to act, Professor Ferri thinks that this will be the case only with the minority of men.

Now in order to weaken the anti-social tendencies, it is, according to the author, necessary to know, first, their seat; second, their composition. Up to the present, psychology has made no study of the human passions, emotions, and feelings, and consequently cannot give us this information. It must therefore be considered as impossible that education should so stifle the existing bad germs and strengthen the good ones that these last should finally have the upper hand.

Moral education consists only of a series of auditory and visual sensations, impressed upon the individual by means of advice and example, which brings it about that it is more especially a moral instruction, which makes its mark in the intellect, but leaves intact the seat of the passions and feelings, which are the true motive forces of the moral conduct. Moral education becomes little by little more systematic, bases itself more than formerly upon the biological principle that each organ and function is developed by exercise, and consequently is improving. The author believes that we must nevertheless not deceive ourselves into fancying that too much has been accomplished, so long as the origin and condition of the moral and immoral germs are unknown. Further, he is of the opinion that the product of centuries is not to be destroyed in a few years.

In order to prove what has just been said the author cites the following example, which, according to him, is not uncommon. A family includes four or five children; all are reared with the greatest care, each in a different manner according to his character. The result is that three or four of them become more or less good and industrious citizens, while one becomes an incorrigible vagabond. This difference does not depend upon education.

Now it will be asked: is education, then, always and altogether useless? Here a distinction must be made. There is one small category of persons who are good and honorable and remain so under all circumstances, and this exclusively from their organic condition. Opposed to this is another group who are always bad and show anti-social instincts. These last are such from an innate organic and psychic anomaly. Between these two is to be found the very numerous class of individuals in whom the good and bad qualities are combined. For this last class education may be of some importance, but environment is still more so. Hence, in order to lower the number of occasional criminals, criminal sociology demands “penal substitutes.” For it is from this intermediate class that criminals are recruited. However, environment and education are of less importance for this category than heredity.

The conclusions drawn by the author are, then: first, that a development of the physiology and psychology of the human passions is very desirable, in order to improve the means at the disposal of education; and second, that the opinion of Owen, that education can make a bad man good, is incorrect.

—In my criticism I shall limit myself to the principal questions. In the first place I believe that the argument of Professor Ferri, based on the supposition that scientific socialists believe that “education is the omnipotent fact”, is futile. For scientific socialists do not hold this opinion. Owen (who belongs to the Utopists) might be thought to hold it, though he does not use the word education in the narrow sense given by Professor Ferri, but it will be very difficult to find such an opinion in Marx, or Engels, or any of their followers. Although holding that circumstances have a very great influence upon the individual, they do not attribute this to the systematic, conscious influence of one individual upon another, which is what is commonly meant by education. For the purposes of Professor Ferri’s argument it may be very useful to make a nice distinction between education and atmosphere, but this distinction is not therefore justified. The impressions gained by a child whether from the atmosphere in which he lives or deliberately impressed upon him by his teacher, are hardly distinguishable. Just out of class he plays with his comrades, and this easily makes him forget the moral lessons he has just received. A mother forbids her child to do a certain thing, and a little later he sees an older member of the family do with impunity what has been forbidden in his own case. It is because of this over-nice distinction that the argument of the author loses much of its value.

In the second place, as the author himself partly admits, the influence that education may exert cannot be exactly fixed, no matter what progress pedagogical science may make, for the following reasons. It is only in school that the scientific pedagogical method is applied, and plainly in an incomplete and imperfect manner. In order that children shall be taught and developed they must be well fed and well clothed. Without this the results will be very small, but pupils insufficiently fed and clothed are to be counted by thousands. It is also necessary that a class include as few pupils as possible, in order that the instructor may not have to divide his attention too much. Yet how many cases are there where this is found? For these reasons, to which might be added others, all of an exclusively economic nature, the school does not contribute as much as it might to moral education. The advantage of the education given in school over that furnished by the parents consists in its practical application, at least in part, according to pedagogical rules. The parents who set themselves to bring up their children on scientific principles are so few as to be easily counted. Almost all are novices in this very difficult trade; little attention is paid to whether parents are ignorant or educated, good or bad, patient or irascible, capable or incapable, in short, of bringing up their children. The present organization of society is based upon the fiction that the person who gives life to a child is also fitted to bring it up. Further, existing social conditions put many parents, however capable they might otherwise be, in a position where they cannot give their children any care, on account of the long working-day, the labor of married women, etc. These remarks, it seems to me, are in themselves enough to show that we cannot just now come to a definite conclusion, that the influence of education may extend to such and such a point, but no further.

In the third place, it remains to make valid objections to the principal thesis that forms the foundation of the chapter. Here it is in brief. There was a time when men lived in anti-social conditions; all were enemies one of another. This situation lasted for ages until the social sentiments grew up and civilization developed. But these anti-social germs having lasted for ages, while the social germs are only of recent date, it follows that the former are generally much stronger than the latter. This is why the tendency to evil has predominated in man, and why crime has such enormous dimensions.

I am of the opinion that this argument is based upon an error. In Part II of this work I shall attempt to show that the opinion of Professor Ferri (and other authors), that in the early ages all men were enemies and animated by anti-social feelings, is false. I shall endeavor also to show that the present constitution of society does not give rise to social feelings, but anti-social. Finally it is very problematical whether the hypothesis the author uses, namely that acquired characteristics may be inherited, is defensible; the contrary is coming more and more to be believed. But we cannot in any case admit the transmission of morality itself by heredity, as Professor Ferri does, when he speaks of men who remain good under all circumstances, and consequently of men who must have been born with innate moral prescriptions. A child is never born with positive knowledge; he is born with a brain more or less fitted for the reception and development of knowledge. There was never a child who, from his birth, knew the rules “thou shalt not steal”, “thou shalt not kill”, etc. But the organs destined to become the seat of morality differ with each individual like other organs. When the author says, then, that there are men who remain good under all circumstances, he says, in effect, that there are men whose moral organs are very susceptible, and who consequently remain better than men whose organs are less susceptible. Therefore the accumulation of anti-social feelings in man of the present day, through heredity, is imaginary. Finally, Professor Ferri neglects to note the difference in nature and intensity between the needs of different men. For this is the cause of the great inequality of results obtained from the same education given to persons of equal capacity for receiving moral impressions. If a man has great needs it takes a much more intense moral effort to keep him from satisfying them in an immoral manner, than is the case with a man whose needs are slight.—

The following chapter, “Ambiente e criminalità”, begins with the assertion of Professor Ferri that the thesis of the socialists concerning the influence of the social atmosphere upon all the manifestations of human activity, and consequently upon criminality, is in great measure correct. The difference between the views of socialism and of sociology, therefore, is here only a question of limits.

According to the author here is the thesis in question: as soon as the social revolution or transformation which the socialists desire has taken place, the social atmosphere will become excellent, and man will then be morally higher than he is at present. He then examines the parts of this statement one by one.

First, Professor Ferri gives the classic formula of historic materialism, set forth by Marx in his “Zur Kritik der politischen Oekonomie”, taken by the author, however, from Loria’s criticism of the work of Puviani in the “Rivista critica delle scienze giuridiche e sociali.” “In the memorable preface to the Kritik der politischen Oekonomie, published in 1859, Marx sets forth for the first time the daring theory that all the manifestations of mankind, in the juridic order as well as in the religious, philosophical, artistic, criminal, etc., are exclusively determined by economic relations, so that to each phase of these there corresponds a different form of human manifestations, as its necessary product.”

Just as in biology the phenomena of nutrition are related to the other vital phenomena, so is the economic aspect of human activity related to the other aspects. Economic conditions have, then, a great influence on the social life, but the author believes it an exaggeration to say that economic conditions fix it exclusively. Further, in this statement no attention is paid to the fact that the other phenomena react in their turn upon the economic conditions, and therefore become determining factors.

Then it is said that man will be morally better when he finds himself in a purified atmosphere. This the author admits in part—how far he admits it will be easily understood by one who knows his opinion with regard to the physical, individual, and social factors of crime, and his ideas about education.

Like most of the statements of the socialists, this has, according to Professor Ferri, the fault of being too simple and consequently too absolute. Human life is already so complicated (and social life still more so) that only very little can be explained by simple formulae. It is easy to say, “Abolish private property and all the cases of theft will disappear”; “abolish legal marriage, and adultery, uxoricide, infanticide, and the other crimes against morality will disappear.” But it is not therefore true. For, even in a communistic society a born-vagabond, who has a constitutional aversion to work, will commit thefts just the same. To all this it may be objected that these cases are pathological, and that these persons should be shut up in an insane asylum—but in reasoning thus one admits at the same time that such a society would not yet be an earthly paradise. Further it is pure metaphysics to believe that social institutions like property and the family are the consequences of a caprice of man or of a dominant class, and can therefore be abolished by a stroke of the pen. Everything that exists, in nature as in society, is the result of causes that are only the links in an infinite chain. Hence it is impossible to modify society at a stroke, in accordance with a plan drawn up by a theorist. This does not mean that every modification of society is excluded; but the situation predicted by the socialists is so much more beautiful than the present that it would not be a step, but a leap, forward. And by their prediction they deny evolution, for they constantly preach to the proletariat that the whole will be realized in the very near future.

We come now to the major premise of the socialistic thesis, namely the social revolution or transformation. The question which Professor Ferri puts to the socialists in regard to the matter is this: how long will it take you to realize your projects? There are two answers to be given according as one believes this realization possible by revolution or by evolution.

First, that by revolution. Leaving out of consideration the fact that a revolution could not take place without cruel acts being committed, with a consequent upsetting of the moral feelings, it must first of all be asked whether it is easy to bring about a revolution. The author is of the opinion that Laveleye is perfectly right when he says: “that a revolution has become an easy thing; that a social evolution is inevitable; but that a social revolution is impossible, since one cannot change by force in a single day the economic constitution of society.”

Neither the word nor the fact of revolution inspires the author with fear. He recognizes that it may be in the line of evolution, although it remains an exception and is in fact a pathological manifestation of evolution. Nevertheless the question arises, what does the revolution of a day, a month, or even a year signify in comparison with the evolution that goes on during thousands of years? Does not a revolution always lead to a reaction? Suppose, however, that this reaction does not happen; will the whole people have become more moral at a single shock? What did the great French Revolution accomplish? Much, in appearance; in reality, little. It follows from what has gone before that we can modify the environment in a way and with a rapidity that will seem great to one generation but not at all great to the whole of humanity.

Now the solution by evolution. As we have already remarked, Professor Ferri recognizes that criminality will be diminished by an improvement of the environment. However, since it is impossible to make all at once general and substantial changes, it is necessary to make every effort to obtain partial improvements. This is why the positive penal school defends the doctrine of “penal substitutes.” In his “Il delitto, etc.”, Turati calls them palliatives; he says that it is impossible to find a specific remedy for each crime; that there is only one universal remedy: the equal distribution of wealth, education, and the happiness coming from love and knowledge, in so far as this will be socially possible. Professor Ferri thinks that Turati’s objections are not based upon good reasons, because, first, the theory of penal substitutes is not limited to the designation of special means of treating special crimes, but it gives also universal means for all kinds of crimes; second, the improvements suggested by the author and his adherents have the great advantage of having been drawn up according to scientific researches, and of being immediately practicable. How could the desired transformation ever be reached if the whole system of penal substitutes were only a useless palliative?

There are only two roads leading to success; that of a violent revolution—which Turati rejects—and that of successive improvements. But it is just this which the positive penal school desires, and this is why the difference between this school and the scientific socialists has entirely disappeared. However, the error of the socialists is always that they want to get everything at one blow, and they attach too little value to what is within reach. There are many socialists who fear that the bourgeoisie will never give up their privileges without force, and who consequently have still much sympathy with revolution. However, this fear is not well founded. For most social improvements have been made by the dominant class without being compelled by revolutionary force.

Professor Ferri draws the conclusion that the social environment is circumscribed by economic conditions for the most part, and that these have a very great influence upon criminality. The socialists and the evolutionary sociologists differ, then, in this, that the first believe they can make themselves useful by protesting and prophesying, while the others think that it is more practical and more scientific to apply themselves to partial improvements.

—One cannot read this chapter without being astonished at the decided tone with which the author declares himself against a theory which he only knows from what he has heard said about it. The classic formula of historic materialism is quoted at second hand from a criticism of Professor Loria upon a work of Puviani, who says that the economic evolution is in its turn determined by the constant increase of the population (a theory entirely opposed to that of Marx).

Among the reproaches that Professor Ferri throws at the head of the socialists there is also that they wrongly believe it possible to change society at a single stroke. The author adds here some observations upon revolution and evolution. It is necessary to take up this question, since again Professor Ferri does not correctly represent the opinions of the Marxists. There is no question that Marx and his adherents do not suppose that they can change society at a stroke. Although evolutionists, Marx and his followers call themselves revolutionists. Many of their adversaries consider this a contradiction. I think that they are wrong, and that on the contrary the opposite is true, that every evolutionist in social matters who is not a revolutionist, has not the courage to support the consequences of his doctrine. For he who believes that society constantly undergoes quantitative changes ought to recognize that these must lead in the long run to a qualitative difference, in which case a revolution has taken place. The Marxists are consequently at once evolutionists and revolutionists, since, recognizing that there are continual quantitative changes, they strive for the total overturning of society as based upon the capitalistic system, and consequently for the foundation of the socialistic order. All this relates, then, only to an economic and social revolution. It follows, then, logically from what has gone before that the scientific socialists do not aspire primarily to a political revolution; on the contrary they wish to attain their ends as far as possible by legal means; as far as possible, which means, if the ruling classes do not prevent them from obtaining by legal means what they want. But in the contrary case they do not dread undertaking even a political revolution as soon as the proletariat shall be sufficiently prepared and organized. Professor Ferri is further of the opinion that there is no longer any difference between the socialists who are at the same time evolutionists, and the sociologists, since all reach out toward quantitative changes. However, Professor Ferri forgets to say that the abolition of the private ownership of the means of production is not one of his “penal substitutes”, and that there is consequently a fundamental difference, since socialists advocate only the modifications which accord with the tendencies of collectivism.

Finally, Professor Ferri is of the opinion that the bourgeoisie will voluntarily relinquish their privileges, as the ruling classes have often already done. For this tremendous assertion he does not give any proofs, and would find it difficult to do so.—

The title of the fifth chapter is: “L’avvenire morale dell’umanità.” The socialists—so the author begins—believe that there is a great difference between them and the positivist sociologists, in that the latter consider crime as an inevitable social evil, while the socialists see in it only a passing phenomenon. Professor Ferri, on the contrary, claims that crime, that is, the act which endangers the conditions of existence, as well as the penalty, the corresponding reaction, defensive or preventive, both have their roots in the animal kingdom, and are consequently phenomena more or less inseparable from humanity. However, this sociological induction is not to be taken in an absolute, but in this relative sense: first, that in criminality it is necessary to distinguish two divisions, of which the one is determined by the normal saturation, and the second by the abnormal super-saturation; second, that the author and his adherents do not understand by the “absolute necessity” of crime that crime will always exist, but only that it will exist in the immediate future (19th and 20th centuries), and that they retain this expression because they regard it as useless and impossible to make predictions concerning times more remote than this.

With regard to future morality Professor Ferri considers in this chapter the two following socialistic theses:

I. The struggle for existence which has hitherto reigned among men, will find no place in the socialistic society.

II. In the socialistic society, egoism, which has been the basis of the moral and social life, will have to give place to altruism.

First, then, the question of the permanence of the struggle for existence. Professor Ferri cites here the opinions of Labusquière (“Rivista internazionale del socialismo,” 1880) and of Professor Loria (“Discorso sur Carlo Darwin,” 1882). Abridged, Labusquière says as follows: Is the struggle for existence, an integral part of the evolution of animals, also a “conditio sine qua non” of the development of humanity? No, since it prevents the total development by putting the majority of men in a most precarious situation. We cannot picture man as living all alone. He has always lived and will always live in a society. This demands a certain solidarity, without which a society is not imaginable. We cannot admit, then, the necessity of a continual struggle—at least we cannot admit the necessity, on the part of some, of receiving the fruits of the labor of others. The struggle for existence is necessary among animals, since they are not able to produce, and consequently must live upon such fruits as nature gives. But man can produce, and the productive forces increase just as men support one another more.

The opinion of Professor Loria is summed up as follows: the thesis that the Darwinian theory is entirely applicable to political economy is false. It is said that it justifies social inequality; nature being aristocratic, in society also the aristocracy occupies the place that belongs to it. According to Professor Loria this argument is as without sense as the argument that, since nature is a murderess, murder is justifiable. The view in question is not a legitimate conclusion from the theory as advanced by Darwin, but is simply a false interpretation made by some of his followers. There are no reasons why this struggle should always exist, but we are quite justified in supposing that it will disappear, having been but a transitory stage. For as long as egoism was the sole human motive, the struggle for existence was a necessary condition of initiative and progress. But altruism is more and more developing, and it is not Utopian to believe that some day man will reach out after physical and moral perfection, not with the aim of conquering his less-favored fellows, but with the higher aim of self-development. We forget too much how different is the struggle for existence among animals and among men. While in nature it is the strongest, hardiest, and most skilful who come out of the contest victorious, and consequently survive, in the present contest it is not the best (the workers and the capitalists who introduce improved methods of work), but those who are enriched by the labor of others, who are the conquerors. In the social struggle we perceive three phenomena which do not appear in the struggle in nature: military selection (which is an obstacle to the perfection of the human race); sexual selection (in which not strength and beauty, but money and class-prejudice determine the choice); and the economic system (which by the accumulation of capital in the hands of a few, forces the workers to lead a life that exhausts them, and is the reason why the ill-nourished classes form the majority). This is why the results of the struggle for existence are so different for man from those of the combat in nature.

Professor Ferri makes the following objections to what has been said above: In treating questions like these it is necessary not to confuse two theories, that of Spencer and that of Darwin. For the latter is connected with the former as a part with the whole. Darwinism is expressed in the law of natural selection, while the theory of Spencer is that of evolution, a law which rules not only the animal and human world, but also the whole knowable universe.

After this introductory observation he attacks the theses that Labusquière and Loria have developed. The great error committed by Labusquière and by most of the socialists is their failing to grasp the idea of the continuity and naturalness of social phenomena. There results in such cases an erroneous distinction between societies of man and those of animals; hence they do not see that the combat, proved as always existing in the case of animals and men as well, is a natural law. And then Labusquière and his followers forget that while the sociologists explain this combat, that is not at all saying that they justify it. In any case the assertion of the socialists that it will be possible to make this combat cease at once, after only a very brief delay, is false. As to the question of knowing whether it will ever cease, this will be examined later.

Then Professor Ferri remarks that we must not confuse the principle of a natural law with its manifestations. In the case in question this would be saying that in recognizing that the struggle for existence is a law which rules in the animal kingdom and among men, it is necessary also to think that the forms of the combat have been, and remain, the same. The author believes, for example, that it would be desirable to mitigate the present economic combat and to carry it to a higher plane, without therefore being an adherent of the maxim, “each one according to his needs”, the application of which would ruin the human race entirely.

In criticising the law of the struggle for existence, we very often forget that it does not stand alone, but that there is another beside it, which in the long run levels all the inequalities produced by this conflict. We see thus that individuals, families, and races raise themselves above the general plane, reach the maximum of power, wealth, and intelligence, to fall again below the average.

We cannot admit that the struggle for existence, which is a principle of life, and the cause of human and animal evolution, will disappear some day because men, animated by humanitarian ideas, ardently desire it. The opinion that in the course of time this struggle is becoming and will become less and less violent and brutal, is scientifically more correct and humanitarian as well. It may be that after centuries and centuries a day will come when every individual will have his material existence assured. But the struggle for moral existence will not yet disappear on that account. For every need satisfied causes in its turn new needs to spring up, and rekindles the conflict. The socialists evince great one-sidedness in understanding by the struggle for existence only the struggle for food, forgetting that there is a struggle in every sphere.

It is claimed that there is a great difference between the struggle for existence among men and that among animals, and that consequently the results differ; that in the animal kingdom it is the strongest who remain victorious, while among men it is only a small minority of the weaker and less industrious who rule over the majority making up the ill-nourished classes. According to Professor Ferri this opinion also is incorrect; otherwise the consequences of the conflict would have a result entirely contrary to that in the animal kingdom; the human race would deteriorate instead of advancing. And the facts prove that the human race has made progress, organic, mental, social, and economic. The survival of the weaker, the less industrious, is only partial and apparent. Malon says that in our present society it is not those who are individually superior who conquer, but those who have the exclusive disposition of the social forces. But how have these forces fallen into the hands of these few? Only because in this phase of human evolution, they were the stronger, the best fitted. It is forgotten that there is not only a struggle between classes, but also between individuals, and that, by the greater and greater increase of altruism it is also the more altruistic workmen and employers who conquer. For an altruistic workman, who works with zeal and has his employer’s interests at heart, and an altruistic employer who treats his employes well, will be more able to maintain themselves than those who act differently. It is only in appearance, then, that the less strong and industrious property-owners are the victors; if this were the case it would soon cease to be so.

The conclusion of the author, then, is that the struggle for existence, which is a normal aspect of honorable activity, and an abnormal aspect in criminal activity, is the supreme law of the human race in the past and in the present, and consequently in the future; but this struggle will be carried on by means less and less rude and bloody.

The second part of the chapter treats of egoism and altruism. The individual, considered as such, is only egoistic; but considered as a member of a community he is also altruistic. We must therefore interpret the subject in the following manner: that a gradual evolution is taking place from egoism to altruism, between which, accordingly, is found ego-altruism.

There are now two questions that must be answered, first, will man ever come to be purely altruistic? second, if so, how long will it take to bring it about?

According to the author every evolutionist must answer affirmatively to the first question (at least if we exclude the absolute form in which it is put by many socialists, namely that egoism will disappear entirely), for the slow and continual evolution of morality teaches us that egoism is always decreasing and altruism increasing. But how much time is needed to realize this moral paradise? The answers made to this question by the socialists and by the sociologists differ greatly. The former are of the opinion that this will be possible almost immediately, or at least in a little while, while the latter think that it is impossible that it should take place so quickly. Since the author has busied himself in the preceding chapters with the influence of education upon morality he limits himself now to treating the question, how much time is needed for this moral progress?

It is therefore impossible that the predictions of the socialists should come true in a short time, and that crime, poverty, ignorance, and immorality should disappear as soon as society is transformed and revolutionized. It will only be the sublime end toward which the human race must always aspire.

—In order to avoid repetitions I will make no criticism of this chapter, since I should have to refute almost all the theses here laid down, but will treat of the questions of the struggle for existence, and egoism and altruism, in Part II of this work.—

—Having given my opinion after each chapter, a general criticism of “Socialismo e Criminalità” is superfluous. The impression that the book makes is strange. The author attacks the socialists as “excessively anti-scientific and sentimental”, while he vaunts the “great scientific character of the sociologists.” Yet these last, notwithstanding their great scientific character, combat a doctrine which they know only in part or not at all. Scientific socialism is left out of the discussion.

The best proof of the weakness of his attack against socialism is to be found in the fact that the author has for several years ranked himself among the socialists, of whom he has become one of the most fervent and intelligent chiefs.

IV.

H. Kurella.

This author gives some pages of his “Naturgeschichte des Verbrechers” to the subject we have in hand. What he says may be summed up as follows.

The attempts to draw parallels between the fluctuations of the price of grain and those of the figures for criminality, according to the author, prove nothing, inasmuch as it is impossible to compare them with the statistics of wages and of forced unemployment. In fact any one who tries to show in this way the correlation between criminality and economic conditions, begs the question, that poverty is the principal cause of crime. Further, the hypothesis that the regularity with which human acts occur is fixed by the condition of the society in which they take place, is little by little giving way. From personal examinations, and from the information given by Ferri and von Oettingen (this proves that the literature of our subject is little known to the author) Dr. Kurella thinks he can draw the conclusion that insufficient food, caused by scarcity or low wages, does not cause the commission of crimes. Malnutrition may perhaps influence criminality indirectly; that is it may cause degeneration after some successive generations, which in its turn predisposes to crime.

The necessity of the moment being consequently only rarely a cause of criminality, not only do the present social anomalies produce an increase of degeneracy, as has been said above, but also there are a number of persons who live in badly built and unsanitary dwellings, so that the family life is injured, and the development of feelings of honesty, modesty, etc., is interfered with. And it is also the social anomalies that strongly influence alcoholism, which is one of the important factors of crime.

—I will refrain from making any criticism. One does not argue with a man who gives convincing proofs that even the meaning of criminal sociology is unknown to him. Assertions, for example, that the character of man is invariable, that the distance between the honest man and the dishonest man is as great as that between the chimpanzee and the gorilla, are only absurdities. What author will deny at this time that the differences between men are, in the last analysis, only quantitative?

In general, Dr. Kurella still shares the opinions of the Italian school (cf., for example, “Anthropologie und Strafrecht”, which appeared in 1912); nevertheless he should have recognized, when he wrote “die Naturgeschichte des Verbrechers”, that he was not familiar with the social factors of crime. He has written the following remarkable words, which do him honor. “I do not hesitate to confess that deeper socio-political studies, which became possible to me only after the publication of that work [“Naturgeschichte des Verbrechers”] show me today the social factors of crime more plainly and sharply, than I was able to recognize them ten years ago” (Vorrede, “Zurechnungsfähigkeit, Kriminalanthropologie”).—

In the first chapter (on poverty and criminality in Italy) the author calls attention to the following facts. According to the statistics of 1881 there were in Italy to the thousand (of both sexes over nine years of age) 390.66 persons who were rich, well-to-do, moderately well-off, or with enough to live on, and 609.34 who had scarcely the necessities of life. Out of 100 persons convicted there were:

1887 1888 1889

56.34 57.45 56.00 Necessitous

22.99 30.77 32.15 Having only the bare necessities

11.54 9.98 10.13 Moderately well-off

2.13 1.80 1.72 Well-to-do or rich

Here the favorable influence of means comes out distinctly. For 40% of the population had some means and 60% were in need; but among those convicted there were 13% with means and nearly 87% who were poor.

Then the author gives a sketch of the influence of poverty in causing degeneracy among the proletariat and predisposing them to crime, for poverty is very destructive to men’s mental faculties. He cites in support of this many authors of weight.

By comparing the different Italian districts, grouped about the average figure for wealth per capita, with the number of prisoners to the 100,000 of the population, grouped according to the place from which they came, the following result is obtained.

Wealth. Prisoners according to the Place from which they Came.

(3.333) Latium. VII —

— VI —

— V —

(2.746) Piedmont-Liguria. IV —

(2.400) Lombardy. III Lombardy (43)

Piedmont-Liguria (51)

Venice (53)

— II Tuscany (76)

(2.164) Tuscany. I Emilia (95)

(1.935) Venice, Average. Kingdom (118)

(1.876) Kingdom.

(1.762) Emilia.

— 1st Marches-Umbria (137)

(1.471) Sicily. 2d Sardinia (167)

(1.333) Naples

(1.227) Marches-Umbria 3d Naples (173)

(?) Sardinia 4th —

5th Sicily (212)

6th —

7th Latium (250)

According to the author this table shows that wealth and criminality present a certain symmetry, to this extent, that the wealthy regions have in general a lower criminality than the poor ones. It is only Latium that forms an exception, which is explained, according to Dr. Fornasari di Verce, first, by the circumstance that the capital is situated in that district, second, by the climate, and third, chiefly by the fact that the absolute wealth of a country gives no indication of the distribution of wealth. We can properly expect to find that where great wealth is heaped up there will also be considerable pauperism.