Book 4 — Concerning the imparticipable[105] (or that which is without participation), and that which participates.
Thomas Taylor translation
Concerning the imparticipable[105] (or that which is without participation), and that which participates.
PROPOSITION XXIII.
Every imparticipable produces from itself participants, and all participated hypostases, or subsistencies, are reduced to imparticipable essences.
For an imparticipable possessing the relation of unity, as depending on itself, and not on another, and as separated from participants, generates things able to participate. For either it remains in itself barren, and possesses nothing honourable; or it gives something from itself. And that which receives from this imparticipable participates, and that which is given subsists in a participated manner. But every thing participating of another by which it is generated, is posterior to that nature which is similarly present to all things, and which fills all things from itself. For that which subsists in one thing is not in others: and that which is similarly present to all things, that it may illustrate all is not in one thing, but before all. For it either subsists in all, or in one of all, or before all. But that which subsists in all, because distributed into all, again requires another, which may unite its divided nature: and all things will no longer participate of the same, but this will participate one thing, and that another, if the one is distributed into many. But if it subsists in one of all, it will no longer be common to all, but to one. If therefore it is common to things capable of participating powers, and is likewise common to all, it will be prior to all things. But this is imparticipable.
PROPOSITION XXIV.
Every participant is inferior to that which it participates, and that which is participated is subordinate to an imparticipable.
For the participant being imperfect prior to participation, but becoming perfect through participation, is entirely posterior to that which it participates; so far as it is perfect through participation. For so far as it was imperfect, it is inferior to that which it participates and which is the cause of its perfection. But that which is participated because common to some one, and not to all, is on this account allotted a subsistence inferior to that which is common to all, and not to some particular one: for the latter is more allied, but the former, less, to the cause of all things. Hence an imparticipable, precedes things participated; and these last precede participants. And in short that which is imparticipable is one prior to many; that which is participated is one in many; and every participant is at the same time non-one, and one.