Book 4 — Concerning that which is SUFFICIENT TO ITSELF.

PROPOSITION IX.

Every thing sufficient to itself, either according to essence, or according to energy, is more excellent than that which is insufficient, and the cause of whose perfection depends on another cause.

For if all beings, naturally desire good, and one thing supplies itself with good, but another is indigent of something else; the former, will indeed have the cause of good present, but the latter separate and apart. By how much the nearer, therefore, that is which affords the object of desire, by so much the more excellent will it be than that which requires a separate cause, and externally receives the perfection of its being or energy. Besides, that which is sufficient, is both similar and diminished, and more similar to the good itself. It is diminished, because it participates good, and because it is not the first good. Yet it is in some respect allied to the good, because it can possess good from itself. But that which participates, and participates through another, is more distant from the first good, which is nothing else than good.

PROPOSITION X.

Every thing sufficient to itself is worse than that which is simply good.

For what is that which is sufficient, than that which from itself, and in itself, possesses good? But this is now full of good, which also it participates: but it is not the simply good. For that, as has been demonstrated, is more excellent than the participation and repletion of good. If then that which is sufficient fills itself with good, that from which it fills itself will be more excellent than that which is sufficient, and will be superior to sufficiency: for that which is simply good is not indigent of any thing. For it does not desire any other; since by desire it would be imperfect; and thus would be full of good, and not the first good.