Book 4 — CONCERNING CAUSE.

PROPOSITION XI.

All beings proceed from one first cause.

For either there is no cause of beings, or the causes of all terminated beings revolve in a circle, or there is an infinite ascent of causes; so that one thing is the cause of another, and the prior subsistence (προυπόϛασις) of essence, no where stops its progression. But if there be no cause of beings, neither will there be an order of things second and first; of the perfecting, and perfect; of the adorning, and adorned; of the generating, and generated; of the active and passive: nor will there be any science of beings. For the knowledge of causes is the employment of science: and we then assert that we know, when we know the causes of beings. But if causes revolve in a circle, the same causes will be both prior and posterior, more powerful and more debile. For every thing which produces is more excellent than the nature of the thing produced. But there is no difference, whether we conjoin the cause with the thing caused by many, or fewer mediums, and place the thing caused as subordinate. For the cause is more excellent than all the intervening natures of which it is the cause: and by how much the greater the number of mediums, by so much the more is it a cause. But if there be an addition of causes in infinitum, and one always proceeds from another; on this hypothesis likewise science cannot subsist: for there is no knowledge of infinites. But causes being unknown, neither can there be any science of things subsequent to causes. If, therefore, it is requisite that there should be a cause of beings, and causes are distinct from things caused, and there can be no infinite ascent; there will be a first cause of beings, from which as a root particulars proceed, some of which exist in propinquity, and others at a distance from his nature. For that it is necessary there should be one principle, is demonstrated; because all multitude is secondary to the one.

PROPOSITION XII.

The principle and first cause of all beings is the good.

For if all things proceed from one cause, it is requisite to call that cause, either the good, or more excellent than the good. But if it be more excellent than the good, we ask whether any thing emanates from this cause into beings, and into the nature of beings, or nothing? And indeed if nothing, it will be absurd: for we cannot, on this hypothesis, any longer preserve it in the order of a cause; since it is every where requisite that something should be present from the cause to the things caused, and especially from the first cause, from which all things depend, and through which every being exists. But if there is a participation of this first cause in beings, in the same manner as there is of the good, there will be something more excellent than goodness, penetrating into beings from the first cause. For since it is more excellent, and superior to the good, it cannot bestow on secondary natures any thing worse than the benefits distributed by that which is posterior to itself. But what can be more excellent than goodness itself? Since we apply the term more excellent to that which participates more of the good. If then that which is non-good, is not more excellent, it must be posterior to the good. But if, likewise, all beings desire good, how can any thing be prior to this cause? For if good also desires, how can it be good in the most eminent degree? But if it does not desire, must not all beings desire that cause of all, from which they proceed? And if it is the good itself, from which all beings depend, the good must be the principle and first cause of all.

PROPOSITION XIII.

Every Good is endued with a power of uniting its participants, and every union is good; and the good itself, is the same with the one.

For if the good itself is the preserver of all beings, and on this account is desirable by all, but the one itself, preserves and contains the essence of each: (for all things are preserved by the one, and dispersion removes every thing from essence) hence the good causes those things to be one, to which it is present, and contains them by union. But if the one is endued with a congregating and containing power, it perfects every being by its presence: and hence it is good to all things to be united. But if union is essentially good, and good is unific (or unifying), the simply good, and the simply one is the same: at the same time uniting, and benefiting beings. Hence it is, that things which in a certain respect fall from good, are also deprived of the participation of one: and that things which are destitute of the one, because they are replete with separation, are after the same manner likewise deprived of good.

COROLLARY.

Hence both goodness is union, and union is goodness; and the good is the one, and the one is the first good.