Book 4 — CONCERNING THAT WHICH PRODUCES.

PROPOSITION XXVI.

Every cause productive of other things, abiding in itself produces natures posterior and subsequent to itself.

For if it imitates the one itself, but that immoveably generates natures posterior to itself, hence every productive nature will in a similar manner possess the cause of producing. But that the one itself immoveable generates, is evident from hence. For if he generates through motion, either motion will be resident or non-resident in his nature, and that which is moved will be no longer one; because it will be changed and moved from one. Hence the one will either produce in infinitum[106], or immoveably. And every producing nature will imitate the one productive cause of the universe. For from that which is first, that which is not first every where emanates. And hence from that which is productive of all things, that which is productive of some things will proceed. Every producing cause, therefore, produces subsequent natures, abiding in itself: and while productive natures abide in themselves undiminished, secondary natures are produced from them. For that which is in any respect diminished, cannot abide such as it is.

PROPOSITION XXVII.

Every producing nature, on account of its perfection, and abundance of power is productive of secondary natures.

For if it produces, not on account of its perfection, but through a defect of power, it cannot preserve its own proper order immovable. For that which affords being to another, through its defect and imbecillity, confers on it essence by a mutation and alteration of itself: but every producing nature abides such as it is, and while it abides, that which is posterior to itself proceeds into being. Hence existing full and perfect, it procreates secondary natures immovably, and without diminution: at the same time existing such as it is, neither changing itself into its progeny, nor diminishing its nature. For the thing produced is not a dissection of the parts of the producing cause: since this is neither proper to generated natures, nor to generating causes. Nor is it a transition; since it is not the matter of that which proceeds to generation. For the producing cause abides such as it is, and the production is different from itself. That which generates therefore abides without alteration, and without diminution, multiplying itself through its prolific power, and supplying from itself secondary subsistencies.

PROPOSITION XXVIII.

Every producing nature generates things similar to itself, prior to such as are dissimilar.

For since the producing cause is necessarily more excellent than the thing produced, these can never be mutually the same simply considered, or equal according to power. But if they are not the same and equal, but different and unequal; they are either entirely separated from each other, or they are both united and separate. But if they are entirely separate, they cannot be conciliated with each other, and the thing produced will not sympathize with its cause. Hence the one will not participate of the other, because they are entirely different. For that which is participated, imparts a communication to its participant, with respect to that of which it participates. But it is necessary that the thing caused should participate of the cause, as that from which its essence is derived. But if that which is produced is in one respect separated, and in another united to its producing cause; if it equally suffers both, it equally participates and does not participate of its producing cause. It will therefore both possess and not possess an essence from it, after the same manner. But if it should be more separated, the thing generated will be more foreign from its generating cause than is proper, and will be to itself more inelegant than elegant, and more deprived than endued with sympathy of nature. If then generated natures, are both allied according to essence, and in sympathy with their causes, naturally depending upon, and desiring a contact with them, pursuing good and obtaining the object of desire through cause, it is evident that things produced are more united with their producing causes than separated from them. And things which are more united are more similar than dissimilar to the natures with which they are especially united. Every productive cause therefore generates things similar prior to such as are dissimilar.

PROPOSITION XXIX.

Every progression is accomplished by a similitude of things secondary to such as are first.

For if a producing cause generates similars prior to dissimilars, similitude generates things produced from their producing causes. For similars become similar through similitude, and not through dissimilitude. If, therefore, progression in its diminution preserves the identity of the thing generated to its generator, and exhibits that which is posterior to itself secondarily, such as itself is primarily, it will possess its essence through similitude.

PROPOSITION XXX.

Every thing immediately produced from another, both abides in its producing cause, and proceeds from it.

For if every progression is effected while things first abide, and is perfected through similitude, things similar subsisting prior to the dissimilar, the thing produced will abide in a certain respect in its producing cause: since that which has entirely proceeded from its cause, possesses nothing the same with that which abides, but is perfectly separated. But if it possesses any thing in common, and united with its abiding cause, it will also abide in its cause, in the same manner as that abides in itself. But if it abides only without proceeding, it differs nothing from its cause, nor will it while that abides, be effected something different: for if it is something else, it will be distinct and separate. But if separate, and its cause abides, it proceeds from its cause that it may be separated from its abiding generator. So far, therefore, as the thing produced possesses any thing the same with its producing cause, it abides in this cause: but so far as it possesses something different, it proceeds from its cause. But on account of its similitude, it is at the same time in a certain respect both the same with, and different from its producing cause. It abides therefore, and at the same time proceeds with its cause, and neither is separate from the other.

PROPOSITION XXXI.

Every thing proceeding from another essentially, is converted to that from which it proceeds.

For if it should indeed proceed, without being converted to the cause of its progression, it will not desire this cause: since every desiderative nature (τὸ ὀρεγόμενον) is converted to the object of its desire. But every being desires good; and its acquisition takes place through a cause proximate to particulars. Hence particulars desire their cause. For well-being is distributed to any particular being, through the same cause as being itself. But desire is primarily directed to that cause from which well-being proceeds: and conversion is directed to that, to which desire primarily tends.

PROPOSITION XXXII.

Every conversion is effected by a similitude of the converted natures to the object of their conversion.

For every thing converting itself to another, hastens to conjoin itself with the object of its conversion, and desires its communion and conjunction. But similitude collects all things, in the same manner as dissimilitude separates and divides. Conversion therefore is a certain communion and contact. But every communion and every contract is caused by similitude. And hence every conversion is effected by similitude.

PROPOSITION XXXIII.

[107]Every thing proceeding from, and returning to another, has a circular energy.

For if it is converted to that from which it proceeds, it conjoins the beginning with the end. And there is one and a continued motion: this commencing from, and that proceeding to the abiding nature. Hence all things proceed circularly, from causes to causes. But these circles of regression are greater and less: since some conversions proceed to things proximately placed above them, but others to things more superior, and so on to the principle of all. For all things proceed from this, and to this finally return.

PROPOSITION XXXIV.

Every thing which is naturally converted, converts itself to that from which it derives the progression of its peculiar subsistence.

For if it is naturally converted, it possesses an essential desire towards that to which it is converted, and it directs all its being towards that to which it makes an essential conversion. And it is also essentially similar to the object of its conversion; and on this account, is in sympathy with it according to nature, because allied to it by essence. But if this be the case; either the essence of both is the same; or the one proceeds from the other; or both derive their similitude from some other one. But if the essence of both is the same, how can the one be naturally converted to the other? And if both proceed from one; both will be naturally converted to this one. It remains therefore that the one must derive its essence from the other. But if this be the case, progression also must originate from that to which there is a conversion according to nature.

COROLLARY.

From hence it is evident that intellect is the object of desire to all things: that all things proceed from intellect; and that the whole world, though eternal, derives its essence from intellect. For it is not because eternal excluded from proceeding from intellect. Nor is it because established in perpetual order, excluded from conversion. But it both perpetually advances and is eternal according to essence; and it is perpetually converted and indissoluble according to its invariable order.

PROPOSITION XXXV.

Every thing caused (or produced by a cause), both abides in its cause, proceeds from, and is converted to it.

For if it alone abides, it will differ in nothing from its cause; from which it will be indistinct. For progression subsists together with distinction. But if it alone proceeds, it will be unconjoined with its cause, and in no respect communicate with it according to a sympathetic affection. But if it is alone converted, how can that which does not derive its essence from its cause, be naturally converted to that which is foreign from its nature? But if it abides and proceeds, and is not converted, how can the natural desire of every thing to well-being, and to good, and an excitation to its generator, arise? But if it proceeds indeed, and is converted, but does not abide, how, since it is distant from its cause, can it hasten to be conjoined with it? Since it would be unconjoined prior to its departure. For if it was conjoined, according to this conjunction it would entirely abide. But if it should abide and be converted, but should not proceed, how, since not separated, can it be converted? For every thing returning to its cause, in the act of returning is assimilated to that from which it is essentially divided. But it is necessary that the thing caused, should either alone abide, or be alone converted, or alone proceed; or that the extremes should be conjoined with each other; or that the medium between these, should be united with each extreme; or that all these should take place together. It remains, therefore, that every thing caused must abide in, proceed from, and be converted to its cause.

PROPOSITION XXXVI.

Of all things which are multiplied in progression, such as are first are more perfect than such as are second, and such as are second than those of a posterior order, and so on in continual succession.

For if progressions distinguish things produced from their causes, and are the subordinations of secondary natures to such as are first; first progressions will be more conjoined with their causes, from which they are produced, and of which they may be considered as the blossoms. But secondary progressions are more remote from their causes; and this will be the case in a continual succession. But things nearer, and more allied to their causes, are more perfect: for causes are more perfect than things caused. But such as are more remote are more imperfect, because on this account dissimilar to their causes.

PROPOSITION XXXVII.

Of all things which subsist according to conversion, the first are more imperfect than the second; and the second than those in succession. But the last are the most perfect.

For if conversions are produced in a circle, and conversion tends to that from which the progression began; but progression is from the most perfect, conversion also will tend to the most perfect. And if that to which progression tends is the last, the first conversion will originate from this. But progression to the last is the most imperfect; and conversion commences from the most imperfect. In things, therefore, subsisting according to conversion, the first are the most imperfect, but the last the most perfect.

PROPOSITION XXXVIII.

Every thing proceeding from a certain number of causes, is converted to them by the same number as it proceeds from them; and every conversion subsists through the same cause as progression.

For since both are produced through similitude, that which immediately proceeds from any cause, is immediately converted to it: for the similitude was immediate. But that which requires a medium in its progression, requires also a medium in its conversion. For it is requisite that both progression and conversion should subsist about the same. It will, therefore, be first converted to the medium, and afterwards to that which is more excellent than the medium. Hence well-being is distributed to every thing through the same number of causes as being; and the contrary of this is likewise true.

PROPOSITION XXXIX.

Every being is either alone essentially converted, or vitally, or according to a gnostic mode (γνωϛικῶς).

For it either possesses being alone from its cause, or life together with being, or it receives from thence a gnostic power. So far, therefore, as it is being alone, it makes an essential conversion. But so far as it likewise lives, a vital conversion. And so far as it knows, a gnostic conversion. For according to its progression, such is its conversion; and the measures of its conversion are defined by the measures of its progression. Hence some are endued with desire according to being alone; this desire being adapted to the participation of causes. But others according to life; and this vital desire is a motion to more excellent natures. And others according to cognition, which desire is a perception of the goodness of causes.

PROPOSITION XL.

Self-subsistent natures antecede all things proceeding from another cause.

For if every thing sufficient, is more excellent, either according to essence, or according to energy, than that which depends on another cause, but that which produces itself, because productive of its own being, is sufficient to itself. But that which is alone produced from another is not sufficient. Likewise since that which is sufficient is more allied to good; and things more allied and similar to causes, subsist from cause prior to dissimilars: hence things self-productive, and self-subsistent, are more ancient, than such as proceed to being from another alone. For either nothing is self-subsistent; or the good itself is such; or things which are the first subsistents from the good. But if nothing is self-subsistent, there will not be a true sufficiency in any thing. For this cannot reside in the good, since that is more excellent than sufficiency, subsisting as the one; and being the good, but not possessing good. But neither on this hypothesis can sufficiency reside in natures posterior to the good. For all things will be indigent of that which is prior to their nature. But if the good is self-subsistent, because it produces itself, it will not be one. For that which proceeds from one, is not one: and it will proceed from itself, if it subsists by itself. And hence the one itself will be at the same time one, and not one. It is necessary, therefore, that a self-subsistent nature should be posterior to the first: and it is evident, that it must likewise be prior to things alone proceeding from another cause. For it is more principal than these, and, as we have demonstrated, is more allied to the good.

PROPOSITION XLI.

Every thing residing in another is alone produced by another. But every thing residing in itself, is self-subsistent.

For that which abides in another, and is indigent of a subject, can never be generative of itself. For that which naturally generates itself, does not require a foreign seat, since it is contained by itself, and is preserved in itself separate from a superior. But that which is capable of abiding, and of being established in itself, is productive of itself: since it proceeds into itself, and contains its own nature; and abides in itself; as a thing caused in its cause. For it does not abide as in place, nor as in a subject. For place is different from that which subsists in place, and that which resides in a subject is different from its subject. But this is the same with itself. For it is self-subsistent, and abides in itself, as the thing caused in its cause.

PROPOSITION XLII.

Every thing self-subsistent is converted to itself.

For if it proceeds from itself, it will also return to itself. For that which is the source of progression to particulars, is likewise the end of a conversion co-ordinate to the progression. For if it should alone proceed from itself, but should not be converted by a progression into itself, it will never desire its own proper good, and that which it is able to afford itself. But every cause is capable of conferring on its progeny, together with the essence it affords, well-being, which is conjoined to the essence which it distributes. Hence it can confer this on itself. And, therefore, this is the proper good of a self-subsistent nature. But this, according to the hypothesis, will not be desired by that which is converted to itself: and because it does not desire this, neither will it pursue it; and in consequence of not pursuing, it will be imperfect and insufficient. But if sufficiency and perfection belong to any thing, they must be proper to a self-subsistent nature. And hence it will pursue and desire its own proper good, and will be converted to itself.

PROPOSITION XLIII.

Every thing converted to itself, is self-subsistent.

For if it be naturally converted to itself, and is perfect in its self-conversion, it will also possess essence from itself. For that to which conversion according to nature tends; from this also the essential progression of every thing proceeds. If, therefore, it affords to itself well-being, it will also indeed afford to itself being; and it will be the lord of its own subsistence. Hence that which is capable of being converted to itself, is self-subsistent.

PROPOSITION XLIV.

Every thing converted to itself according to energy, is also converted to itself according to essence.

For if it can be converted to itself according to energy, but is not converted essentially, it will be more excellent according to energy than according to essence; since the former is convertible, and not the latter. For that which depends on itself, is more excellent than that which depends on another. And that which preserves itself, is more perfect than that which is only preserved by another. If, therefore, it is converted to itself, according to that energy which proceeds from essence, it will likewise be allotted a convertive essence; so that it will not only energize to itself, but will likewise depend on itself, and will be contained and perfected by itself.

PROPOSITION XLV.

Every thing self-subsistent is without generation.

For if it be generated, because generated it will be essentially imperfect, and indigent of that perfection which proceeds from another. But because it produces itself, it is perfect and sufficient. For every thing generated is perfected by another, which brings it into existence from a non-existent state. Since generation is the passage from that which is imperfect to its contrary, the perfect. But if any thing produces itself, it is always perfect; because it always coheres to its own cause, or rather inheres in that which is perfective of its essence.

PROPOSITION XLVI.

Every thing self-subsistent, is incorruptible.

For if it may be corrupted, it may desert itself, and exist separate from itself. But this is impossible. For, on account of the unity of its nature, it is at the same time both a cause and the thing caused. But every thing which is corrupted, is corrupted by a departure from its cause. For so far as any thing depends on that which contains and preserves it, so far it is contained and preserved. But that which is self-subsistent will never desert its cause, because it will not desert itself. For it is its own cause. And hence every thing self-subsistent is incorruptible.

PROPOSITION XLVII.

Every thing self-subsistent is impartible (i.e. without parts) and simple.

For if that which is self-subsistent is partible, it will constitute itself partible, and the whole will be converted to itself[108], and all will be in all itself. But this is impossible. Hence that which is self-subsistent is impartible. But it is likewise simple. For if composite, it will contain both that which is excellent, and that which is base[109]; and the more excellent will proceed from the more base, and the more base from the more excellent, since, according to hypothesis, the whole proceeds from the whole itself. Besides it will not be sufficient to itself, because it requires the elements of itself, from which it is composed. Every thing therefore which is self-subsistent is simple.