Book 4 — Concerning an INCORPOREAL ESSENCE, and its PROPERTIES.

PROPOSITION XV.

Every thing which is converted to itself, is incorporeal.

For no body is naturally adapted to be converted to itself. For if that which is converted to any thing, is conjoined to that to which it is converted, it is evident that all the parts of a body must be conjoined with all the parts of that which is converted to itself: since self-conversion then takes place, when that which is converted becomes one with that to which it is converted. But this is impossible in body, and in all partible natures. For the whole of that which is partible, is not conjoined with the whole, on account of the separation of the parts which are differently situated. No body therefore is naturally adapted to self-conversion, so that the whole may be converted to the whole. And hence whatever is self-convertive is incorporeal and impartible.

PROPOSITION XVI.

Every thing which is converted to itself, has an essence separate from all body.

For if it be inseparable from any body, it will not possess some action separable from body. For if essence is inseparable from body, it is impossible that an essential energy should be separable: since in this case energy would be more excellent than essence; because the latter would be indigent of bodies, but the former would be sufficient to itself, without requiring the assistance of body. If then any thing be inseparable according to essence, it must be so likewise according to energy, or indeed more inseparable. But if this be the case, it is not converted to itself. For that which is converted to itself, as it is different from body, has an energy separate from body, neither subsisting through body, nor in conjunction with its nature: since action, and that to which action is directed, is not indigent of body. Hence that which is converted to itself, is entirely separable from bodies.

PROPOSITION XVII.

Every thing which moves itself primarily, is endued with a self-convertive power.

For if it moves itself its motive energy also is resident in its nature, and the thing moving is at the same time one with the thing moved. For either it moves with a part, but is moved in a part, or the contrary. But if one part is motive, and another part is moved, it will not be essentially self-motive, because it will subsist from non-self-motive natures: and it will appear indeed self-motive, but will not be so essentially. But if the whole moves, and a part is moved, or the contrary, there will be some part in each, which, according to one, will be at the same time both moving and moved[102]: and this will be primarily self-motive. But if one and the same moves and is moved, it will possess with itself the energy of moving, because it is self-motive; but it will be converted to that in which it energises. Every thing therefore primarily self-motive is converted to itself.

PROPOSITION XVIII.

Every thing which supplies being to others, is that primarily which it bestows on the things supplied.

For if it gives being, it procures the communication from its own essence. But that which it gives is worse than its own essence: and that which it is, is more excellent and perfect. For every artificer of any thing, is more excellent than the nature of the thing fabricated: and hence that which pre-exists in the donor, is more sublime than the gift; for the one is primary, but the other secondary and subordinate. For it is necessary, either that both should be the same, and that there should be one reason of both; or that nothing should be common, or the same in both; or that this should be first, but that the second. But if there be, one and the same reason, or definition, the one will no longer be cause, and the other effect; nor this in itself, but that in the thing given; nor will this be the efficient, but that the effect. But if they have nothing the same, the remainder will not subsist, in consequence of the existence of the other, because it will communicate nothing to its being. It remains therefore, that this which bestows is first; but that which is bestowed is second; among which the being of the one is supplied from the other.

PROPOSITION XIX.

Every thing which is primarily inherent in any of the natures among beings, is present to all the beings distributed according to that nature, in one reason, and after the same manner.

For if it be not present to all after the same manner, but to these, and not to those; it is evident that it will not be primarily inherent in that nature. But it will be present with some primarily, and in others which participate sometimes but not always, secondarily. For that which sometimes subsists, and sometimes not, does not exist primarily, nor essentially, but is adventitious, and extrinsically accedes to the natures in which it resides.