Chapter XIV · MARRIAGE RITES.

Marriage, or sexual union of a more or less permanent character, from the intimate connection which it creates, has obvious analogies to the admission of a new member into a clan. In early stages of culture it was not, however, deemed to constitute admission into the clan; and to the present day, in English law, husband and wife, though united by the closest of all ties, are not reckoned among the next of kin to one another. Still it inaugurates a new relationship, not only as between the immediate parties, but also as between their respective kindred. As doing so, it is an occasion on which the consent and concurrence of the kindred are required, and it is appropriately solemnised by rites bearing a close resemblance to the blood-covenant. An examination of some of these rites will be useful in strengthening our apprehension of the sacramental ideas of savages, and will help to complete our view of the savage conception of life.

Out of many other ceremonies expressive of union I select for illustration that familiar to us in the Roman law under the name of Confarreatio. This solemn form of marriage took its name from the central rite, in which the man and woman seem to have eaten together of the round sacrificial cake, called the panis farreus. At all events, in the corresponding Greek ceremony they partook together of a sesamum-cake. In one shape or other this rite is found in many lands, perhaps over the greater portion of the globe. It has been too often described to need an extended notice here; but a few of its various forms may be mentioned, before we pass on to consider some of the analogies between the effects of marriage and of the blood-covenant.

In considering these particulars we must remember that the constitution of society among the Australian aborigines is in process of transformation. They had a system of group-marriage, whereby every tribe consisted of certain classes, all exogamous. Their table of prohibited affinities is highly complex, and need not be here discussed. It is enough to say that the members of each class were looked upon among themselves as brothers and sisters; but towards the class into which they could marry they were husbands and wives; and they were entitled to act accordingly whenever they met any members of the latter class. No sexual relations were permitted with any other class. The system has been in a state of decadence—greater in some tribes, like the Kurnai, less in others—from a time probably anterior to the English settlement. A custom had arisen, it matters not from what causes, of appropriating one woman, or more, to one man. This custom, if not interfered with, would have issued in the evolution of a different idea of kinship, and ultimately of the true family. In group-marriage the wives were not regarded as akin to the husbands. Marriage was the status into which husbands and wives alike were born. The union required no ceremonies to its consummation, because no relationships were changed by it. But with the rise of monopoly by individuals of one another, the unappropriated women would be kept at a greater distance from the men, and the act of appropriation would gradually assume a ceremonial form. The kindred would be called upon to take part in it, both as assistants and as witnesses. From Mr. Howitt’s account it seems likely that the evolution would be in the direction of patriarchal clans. If so, the woman would be introduced by marriage into a special relation with her husband’s kin. The exogamous classes would ultimately be effaced; a new idea of the clan would supersede them; and the act of marriage would at length operate as admission into the clan.

When in the progress of culture group-marriage began to give way to individual appropriation, and inroads were made upon the totemistic clan, the clan-brethren would not immediately cease to be specially interested in the marriage of one of their number. Their rights would not be extinguished all at once; they would only become dormant. They might never be exercised during the continuance of the marriage. Probably they never would be, at all events without the individual husband’s assent. But, whether exercised or not, there the rights would be, ready to arise upon a favourable opportunity. Rights thus in abeyance would be likely to be exercised at the entrance upon marriage, prior to the husband’s sole ownership, if the assistance of the clan-brethren were required to obtain the bride. They might be exercised also during the marriage, if the wife ran away and the clan-brethren helped to recover her. The opportunity for asserting the rights would come with the call for assistance.

Turning now to the privileges themselves, it must be remembered that we have not to deal with cases in which polyandry is still open and avowed, but to customs which indicate its former existence. Group-marriage, like that of the Australians, the more limited polyandry of the Tibetan peoples, and the ruder polyandry like that of the Nairs, whether it be the remains of a more savage and unorganised society before the rise of the clan, or a sporadic degradation of clan-marriage, may be studied in the writings of MacLennan, Morgan, and Robertson Smith. Group-marriage and Tibetan polyandry, indeed, we must assume as the precursors of the state of barbarous culture where the marriage is primarily between individuals, but in which the kin still have certain rights over the spouse. And in dealing with the rights of the husband’s kin we are not required to take into account whether his marriage be polygynous or no.

When the consequences of marriage are the severance from the family or clan of one of its members, and the union of that member to another family or clan, so as to become one flesh with it, and hardly less where, though the member in question be not lost to the clan, a special relationship is about to be entered upon with the other clan for the purpose of producing new members for it to the exclusion of the former clan, it is obvious that each of the two families, or clans, has a very important interest in the transaction. The marriage would affect not only the two principals; it would extend to every member of the family, or clan, diminished, and every member of the family, or clan, thus enlarged and strengthened. Such an interest as this would entitle every member of both to be consulted; and their assent would be required to its validity. Such assent would be shown, as we have already noted, by the presence and assistance of the kindred at the act of marriage; or it might be signified by gifts. But, however shown, it would in many cases have to be purchased by gifts. I have already mentioned a number of instances where the price, or dowry, of the bride is contributed by the bridegroom’s kinsmen. We are about to deal with the converse case, wherein the price, however made up, is divided between the bride’s relatives.

Bride-purchase has been, at some time or other, practised almost all over the world; and where we do not find it still in all its ancient force we frequently find the relics of it. As, in the progress of civilisation, the bonds of the family are drawn tighter, the power of the father over his children increases, and that of the more distant kinsfolk decreases. The substantial price in such cases is paid to the parent; and the other kinsmen are recognised only by a smaller, frequently a nominal, present. Lastly, the gifts on both sides are transformed into a dowry for the bride, and into wedding presents intended for the behoof of the happy couple. In various nations the application of the marriage gifts is found in all stages of transition, from the rudest bargain and sale up to the settlements so dear to English lawyers, and the useless toys which the resources of the newest culture enable us to bestow upon our friends on these interesting occasions, to assist their early efforts in housekeeping. The examples following are drawn, of course, from conditions of barbarism when purchase prevails, or when survivals of its former practice have not yet been all swept away. Into the general question of the extent of the kindred whose assent is necessary in early stages of civilisation I have no space to go. But incidentally we shall find evidence that the entire clan must have had a voice in the matter. Inasmuch, however, as this chapter has already trespassed on the reader’s patience to so great a length, I shall confine myself to a few of the more indisputable and pertinent instances. To attempt more would be to travel over ground which it would be impossible to survey in a satisfactory manner, without a discussion interesting indeed to the student of institutions, but altogether disproportionate to the present work.

The subject of the ceremonies and institutions of marriage is one of profound interest. It has engrossed the attention of many anthropologists and filled many volumes. The sketch, therefore, that I have here attempted of only one aspect of the subject is obviously meagre and imperfect. Yet I venture to hope that I have succeeded in throwing some further light upon the savage conception of a kindred as an undivided entity—a conception which has survived in a more or less complete form into high planes of civilisation. Rites analogous to that of the blood-covenant are found not merely to bind together the individual husband and wife, but to unite the incoming member to the whole kindred. And although in the most archaic period whose remains are accessible to us it does not appear that these rites meant actual admission into the kin, their analogy easily lent itself to that construction as the organisation of society into clans drew closer and closer together, and especially as the patriarchal clan developed; and marriage at length came in many cases to operate as an actual severance from one kin and an entrance into another. The reason for the rights and privileges acquired by the whole kindred, alike whether marriage operated as a blood-covenant or not, is founded on, and springs directly from, the conception of the kin as one body whereof all the brethren were as literally members as the hand and the foot are members of the physical body of each man. To graft a new member upon such a body, or even to introduce a stranger into a special relation with a member of such a body, is to introduce him or her to a corresponding relation with all. Their rights may for the time be overridden by the paramount claim of the member for whose special behoof the stranger is introduced—a claim enforced often by strength, more often, perhaps, by custom; yet the moment the claim paramount is withdrawn, or suspended, the rights of the remaining members of the kindred arise and are capable of enforcement. They are sometimes also asserted on special occasions even against the claim paramount.

Society has developed, among almost all the higher races, into and through the patriarchal clan. Among many of the lower races who have not, when brought into contact with European culture, already thrown off their original social constitution, a marked tendency to develop in the same direction has been found. Consequently most of our illustrations have been drawn from a condition of things where the bride has been transferred to the bridegroom’s home and has entered into special relations with the bridegroom’s kin. Of the converse case many examples which might have been adduced are complicated by the developing patriarchalism. Inquiry into these complications would have necessitated a volume rather than a chapter. Hence I have been compelled to pass over many a problem not only interesting but important to solve. But wherever I have found it possible to deal within the limits at my command with the case of a bridegroom entering into special relations with the bride’s kin, the same general principles have been observed to govern it.