England and the War's Causes

Prince Lichnowsky's Memorandum a Document of Vital Importance to History

By VISCOUNT BRYCE

Former British Ambassador to the United States

[Copyright, 1918, by The New York Times Company]

The secret memorandum which Prince Lichnowsky wrote as a record and vindication of his conduct while German Ambassador in England is the most important single document which has come before the world since the first days of the war. It was not meant to become known during the war, perhaps not within his own lifetime. It was written not to justify England but to criticise the policy which tied Germany to Austria, and was published without, and indeed against, its author's will. It may have been composed partly to relieve the writer's own feelings, from an impulse which those will understand who are prevented by considerations of public duty from vindicating their conduct to the world. It may also be due to the sense, natural to men who have borne a part in great events, that they owe it to posterity to contribute what they can to the truth of history. Anyhow, it has exposed him to the anger and persecution of the German Government; and this persecution is evidence of the importance it attaches to it as a condemnation of its conduct. The truth of its contents has been confirmed, if indeed it needed confirmation, by the statements of Herr von Jagow, late German Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and of Herr Mühlon, one of the Krupp directors.

Prince Lichnowsky appears in this document as a man of clear vision and cool judgment, an acute observer of social as well as political phenomena, a good witness both to what he noted during his residence here and to what he knew of the action of his own Government. And now let us see what he records.

When the war began in August, 1914, the German Government entered on two campaigns, which it has ever since prosecuted with equal energy and an equal disregard of honor and humanity.

One of these was the campaign by arms. It suddenly invaded Belgium, a peaceful neutral country, whose neutrality it was pledged to respect, and which it has treated with the utmost cruelty, murdering, or reducing to the slavery of forced labor, its civilian and noncombatant inhabitants. It has similarly enslaved the inhabitants of Poland, and has encouraged its Turkish allies to massacre their innocent Armenian subjects.

A CAMPAIGN OF FALSEHOOD

The other campaign was one of falsehood, conducted by speeches and through the press, and intended to mislead public opinion. It was an effort to deceive both its own people and neutral nations by mendacious misrepresentations of German aims, purposes, and conduct, and by equally false descriptions of the aims, purposes, and conduct of Germany's antagonists, and especially of the British Government and the British people. It tried to represent the war as having been forced upon Germany by Britain. Germany, it said, was merely defending herself against an unprovoked attack. She desired to live at peace with her neighbors, developing her own resources, cherishing no aggressive designs. Her enormous army and navy had been created only to protect her against the jealous and malicious enemies by whom she was surrounded, and especially against Great Britain. Britain, it seems, was envious of Germany. Being herself "a decadent nation"—this was the prevailing German view—she feared the commercial competition of Germany, and tried to keep the latter out of all foreign markets. British policy—so they said—under the direction of King Edward VII., had formed alliances with France and Russia in order to hem in Germany, and after trying to block Germany's outlets in Africa and Asia, contrived this war to destroy by arms the rival whom she could not face up to in trade and manufacturing industry.

While these accusations were brought against Britain, attempts were made to excuse the invasion of Belgium by the false stories, dropped as soon as they had served their temporary purpose, that French officers had been sent into Belgium to help to organize the Belgian troops against Germany and that French aviators had been flying over German territory.

Grotesque as all these inventions were, they were repeated with such audacity as to produce some effect in neutral countries. But their chief and more lasting influence was on the German people. A large part of the German press, inspired and controlled by the German Government, had for some time past been holding up England as the persistent foe of Germany. It now redoubled its falsehoods, representing Sir Edward Grey as having plotted to bring about a war, and urged Russia to refuse a peaceful solution; and it added equally groundless charges that England had secretly planned with Belgium to attack Germany through Belgian territory. These fables, repeated incessantly by German politicians, as well as by the newspapers, found ready credence with the German people, easily led by their press, always docile to the orders of their Government, and now swept off their feet by a wave of patriotism and by the belief that they were about to achieve a victory as rapid and complete as that of 1870. It was this conviction of the malevolence and the grasping ambition of England that created that ferocious hatred of the English which has continued to display itself in the treatment of English prisoners and in the exultation over such crimes as the sinking of the Lusitania.

ORGANIZED HATE

This sudden outburst of hatred in a nation so intelligent startled and amazed us. It can be understood only when we remember that the German Government did everything in its power not only to create hatred, but also to stifle every voice that was raised to let the people know the truth. They never have been permitted to know the truth, and the disappointment that fell upon them when their march on Paris was arrested with the help of a British Army and their coasts strictly blockaded by a British fleet added fuel to their anger and has made it ever since an easier matter to keep the truth from them.

Now, what was the truth?

The British people bore no hatred whatever toward the German people. King Edward VII. meant no harm to Germany when he showed his liking for the French. Neither did his Ministers when they took steps to remove the differences that had been causing trouble between ourselves and France, and again when they came to a friendly understanding with Russia. These arrangements were made in the interests of European peace and good-will, not in order to damage Germany. British merchants and manufacturers never dreamed of fighting Germany to get rid of her commercial competition. Had such an idea occurred to them, they would have reflected that Germany was England's best foreign customer, not to add that two years of even a successful war would have inflicted far more loss upon them than the extension of German trade competition could have repaired in twenty years. British men of science and learning admired the immense contributions Germany had been making to the progress of knowledge, and they had many personal friends in Germany. British statesmen did not desire to add to British possessions abroad, feeling that we had already all we needed, and that the greatest interest of the British Empire was a universal peace.

No section of our people, neither traders, nor thinkers and writers, nor statesmen, had any idea of the dangers to the mind and the purpose of those who ruled Germany. We did not realize what the feudal aristocracy and military caste of Germany were pondering and planning, nor how little weight they attached to considerations either of good faith or of humanity. Hence, beyond maintaining a strong fleet, the indispensable protection of a country open to sea attack which did not maintain a large army, we had made no preparations for war, and had scarcely bethought ourselves of what action we should have to take on land if we became involved in war. In this belief and attitude there may have been less prudence than was needed. But our absence of suspicion is the best proof of how little we expected aggression. It is an absolute refutation of the calumny that Britain, with her tiny army, was planning an attack on the greatest military power in the world.

All this every Englishman knows. I repeat it only because it has now received not only a confirmation but also a valuable further proof in the Lichnowsky memorandum, a proof unsolicited and uncontemplated, and, moreover, unimpeachable, because it comes from one who bore a leading part in what it records, and who never meant to let it become known.

ENGLAND'S PACIFIC SPIRIT

First—The memorandum bears witness to the pacific spirit of the British people. Here are some of its words:

"The commercial jealousy about which we [in Germany] hear so much is based on a wrong conception of the circumstances. Certainly Germany's rise as a commercial power after 1870 and during the following decades was a menace to British commercial circles which with their industries and export houses had held a virtual monopoly. The increasing commerce with Germany, which was the leading country in Europe as regards British exports, had, however, given rise to the wish to maintain friendly relations with their best customer and business friend, and had driven all other considerations into the background. Notably, in commercial spirit and the effort to further our common commercial interests.

"At the English cities to which I was invited (by the Chambers of Commerce and municipalities) I was well received everywhere. * * * In all other circles I also met with the most friendly reception and co-operation—at Court, in society, and from the Government.

"On account of our fleet alone England would not have drawn the sword any more than on account of our trade, which has been alleged to have produced jealousy and finally war. * * * It was possible to arrive at an understanding in spite of the fleet, and without a 'naval holiday,' [intermission of naval shipbuilding.]"

Second—The memorandum shows that the attitude of the British Government, and in particular of Sir Edward Grey, then Foreign Minister, was entirely pacific. The admirable characterization of Sir Edward it contains is too long to quote, but it testifies to his perfect straightforwardness and constant wish to maintain good relations with Germany, and after describing how "the simplicity and honesty of his ways secured him the respect even of his opponents," it adds: "This is a true picture of the man who is decried [in Germany] as 'Liar Grey' and instigator of the world war."

The memorandum goes on to show how sincerely Sir Edward had worked for peace, first in 1913, during the Balkan troubles, when he went hand-in-hand with Germany, "hardly ever supporting the French or Russian claims. He conducted the negotiations with circumspection, calm, and tact." Frequently, when appealed to by Lichnowsky to use his influence with the Russian Government to arrange difficulties between it and Germany, "Sir Edward gladly did this, and his intervention contributed in no small degree to smooth the matter over."

Third—A still weightier evidence of the good-will of the British Government is supplied by the account given of the concessions made to German wishes in Asia and Africa. "Sir Edward Grey," says the memorandum, "after having outstanding points of difference with France and Russia, wished to make similar agreements with us. It was not his object to isolate us, but to the best of his power to make us partners in the existing association. As he had succeeded in overcoming Anglo-French and Anglo-Russian differences, so he also wished to do his best to eliminate the Anglo-German, and, by a network of treaties, which would no doubt have led in the end to an agreement on the troublesome question of naval armaments, to insure the peace of the world.

THE BAGDAD RAILWAY

"His plan was, in his own words, without interfering with England's existing friendship, which had no aggressive aims and does not entail any binding obligations, to arrive at a friendly rapprochement and understanding with Germany to bring the two groups [of powers] nearer." In pursuance of this policy, the British Government went a very long way to meet German wishes in respect to the Bagdad Railway. They agreed to let it be prolonged to El Basra; they included the whole of Mesopotamia as far as that town in the German sphere of influence, and also the whole district of the Bagdad and Anatolian railway, i. e., all the centre of Asia Minor.

Not less large were the concessions made in South Central Africa. "The new agreement [regarding the interests of Germany and England in the African possessions of Portugal] was fully in accord with German wishes and interests. For these the British Government showed the greatest consideration. Sir E. Grey intended to demonstrate his good-will toward us, but he also wished to assist our colonial development as a whole." These arrangements were embodied in two treaties highly advantageous to Germany, which, however, the German Government, for some reasons of its own, had postponed signing, so that they remained unpublished up till the outbreak of the war. Had we in the inner spirit of the German Government, and the use it would make of our concessions, British Ministers might well have hesitated to go so far as they did. But that they conceded so much is the completest proof of their good-will and the most convincing refutation of the charges which the German Ministers and press have brought against them.

It would take too long to follow out in this article the constant efforts of the British Government during the fateful days before the outbreak of the war to avoid a conflict by means of Sir E. Grey's repeated plans of mediation and adjustment. The memorandum shows how earnestly he labored for peace at Berlin, at Petersburg, at Vienna, and how all his attempts were baffled by the settled purpose of the German Government to force on war.

THE POTSDAM CONFERENCE

Britain may, like other nations, have in the past sometimes indulged her ambition, sometimes abused her strength, sometimes embarked in wars that might well have been avoided. But on this occasion at least she is blameless. Never in her long history has she had so perfectly clear a conscience as in the case of this war. Her people neither contemplated it nor desired it. They were driven into it by the action of the German Government, which persisted in pushing it on even when Austria seemed willing to draw back. All had evidently been settled at that famous Potsdam conference, when (as the German Ambassador at Constantinople, before Italy had declared war against Austria, told his Italian colleague) the Emperor had inquired of his military and naval chiefs whether they were ready for the conflict for which, during some months preceding, preparations had been in progress. Neither when the war began did Britain wish to do more than prevent Germany from destroying Belgium and mortally wounding France. Sir E. Grey spoke truly for the nation when, as the memorandum records, he said: "We don't want to crush Germany."