British Official Statement Issued in 1915

The German press in 1915 made certain incorrect allegations regarding the Haldane Mission, whereupon on Aug. 31, 1915, the British Government issued the following official statement:

The Foreign Office Issued the Following Statement Respecting the Anglo-German Negotiations of 1912:

An account of the 1912 Anglo-German negotiations was published in the semi-official Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung last month. This account was misleading, and was no doubt intended to mislead, and made it appear that the British Government had at that time rejected what would be regarded in many quarters as a reasonable offer of friendship from Germany.

In these circumstances it may be as well to publish a statement of the facts compiled from official records here. Early in 1912 the German Chancellor sketched to Lord Haldane the following formula as one which would meet the views of the Imperial Government:

1. The high contracting parties assure each other mutually of their desire of peace and friendship.

2. They will not either of them make or prepare to make any (unprovoked) attack upon the other, or join in any combination or design against the other for purposes of aggression, or become party to any plan or naval or military enterprise alone or in combination with any other power directed to such an end, and declare not to be bound by any such engagement.

3. If either of the high contracting parties become entangled in a war with one or more powers in which it cannot be said to be the aggressor, the other party will at least observe toward the power so entangled a benevolent neutrality, and will use its utmost endeavor for the localization of the conflict. If either of the high contracting parties is forced to go to war by obvious provocation from a third party, they bind themselves to enter into an exchange of views concerning their attitude in such a conflict.

4. The duty of neutrality which arises out of the preceding article has no application in so far as it may not be reconcilable with existing agreements which the high contracting parties have already made.

5. The making of new agreements which render it impossible for either of the parties to observe neutrality toward the other beyond what is provided by the preceding limitation is excluded in conformity with the provisions in Article 2.

6. The high contracting parties declare that they will do all in their power to prevent differences and misunderstandings arising between either of them and other powers.

GERMAN PLAN ONE-SIDED

These conditions, although in appearance fair as between the parties, would have been grossly unfair and one-sided in their operation. Owing to the general position of the European powers and the treaty engagements by which they were bound, the result of Articles 4 and 5 would have been that, while Germany in the case of a European conflict would have remained free to support her friends, this country would have been forbidden to raise a finger in defense of hers.

Germany could arrange without difficulty that the formal inception of hostilities should rest with Austria. If Austria and Russia were at war, Germany would support Austria, as is evident from what occurred at the end of July, 1914; while as soon as Russia was attacked by two powers France was bound to come to her assistance. In other words, the pledge of neutrality offered by Germany would have been absolutely valueless, because she could always plead the necessity of fulfilling her existing obligations under the Triple Alliance as an excuse for departing from neutrality. On the other hand, no such departure, however serious the provocation, would have been possible for this country, which was bound by no alliances with the exception of those with Japan and Portugal, while the making of fresh alliances was prohibited by Article 5. In a word, as appeared still more evident later, there was to be a guarantee of absolute neutrality on one side but not on the other.

It was impossible for us to enter into a contract so obviously inequitable, and the formula was accordingly rejected by Sir Edward Grey.

Count Metternich upon this pressed for counter proposals, which he stated would be without prejudice and not binding unless we were satisfied that our wishes were met on the naval question. On this understanding Sir Edward Grey on the 14th of March, 1912, gave Count Metternich the following draft formula, which had been approved by the Cabinet:

England will make no unprovoked attack upon Germany, and pursue no aggressive policy toward her.

Aggression upon Germany is not the subject, and forms no part of any treaty, understanding, or combination to which England is now a party, nor will she become a party to anything that has such an object.

Count Metternich thought this formula inadequate, and suggested two alternative additional clauses:

England will therefore observe at least a benevolent neutrality should war be forced upon Germany; or

England will therefore, as a matter of course, remain neutral if a war is forced upon Germany.

This, he added, would not be binding unless our wishes were met with regard to the naval program.

SIR EDWARD GREY'S VIEW

Sir Edward Grey considered that the British proposals were sufficient. He explained that, if Germany desired to crush France, England might not be able to sit still, though, if France were aggressive or attacked Germany, no support would be given by his Majesty's Government or approved by England. It is obvious that the real object of the German proposal was to obtain the neutrality of England in all eventualities, since, should a war break out, Germany would certainly contend that it had been forced upon her, and would claim that England should remain neutral. An admirable example of this is the present war, in which, in spite of the facts, Germany contends that war has been forced upon her. Even the third member of the Triple Alliance, who had sources of information not open to us, did not share this view, but regarded it as an aggressive war.

Sir Edward Grey eventually proposed the following formula:

The two powers being mutually desirous of securing peace and friendship between them, England declares that she will neither make nor join in any unprovoked attack upon Germany. Aggression upon Germany is not the subject, and forms no part of, any treaty, understanding, or combination to which England is now a party, nor will she become a party to anything that has such an object.

Sir Edward Grey when he handed this formula to Count Metternich said that the use of the word "neutrality" would convey the impression that more was meant than was warranted by the text; he suggested that the substance of what was required would be obtained and more accurately expressed by the words "will neither make nor join in any unprovoked attack."

Count Metternich thereupon received instructions to make it quite clear that the Chancellor could recommend the Emperor to give up the essential parts of the Novelle (the bill then pending for the increase of the German Navy) only if we could conclude an agreement guaranteeing neutrality of a far-reaching character and leaving no doubt as to any interpretation. He admitted that the Chancellor's wish amounted to a guarantee of absolute neutrality, failing which the Novelle must proceed.

Count Metternich stated that there was no chance of the withdrawal of the Novelle, but said that it might be modified; it would be disappointing to the Chancellor if we did not go beyond the formula we had suggested.

Sir Edward Grey said that he could understand that there would be disappointment if his Majesty's Government were to state that the carrying out of the Novelle would put an end to the negotiations and form an insurmountable obstacle to better relations. His Majesty's Government did not say this, and it hoped that the formula which it had suggested might be considered in connection with the discussion of territorial arrangements, even if it did not prove effective in preventing the increase of naval expenditure.

Sir Edward Grey added that if some arrangement could be made between the two Governments it would have a favorable though indirect effect upon naval expenditure as time went on; it would have, moreover, a favorable and direct effect upon public opinion in both countries.

A few days afterward Count Metternich communicated to Sir Edward Grey the substance of a letter from the Chancellor, in which the latter said that, as the formula suggested by his Majesty's Government was from the German point of view insufficient, and as his Majesty's Government could not agree to the larger formula for which he had asked, the Novelle must proceed on the lines on which it had been presented to the Federal Council. The negotiations then came to an end, and with them the hope of a mutual reduction in the expenditure on armaments of the two countries.