A German View of Germany's Effort
Reading edition
The Recent Offensive
[By the Cologne Gazette Editor at German Headquarters]
The task confronting us before the offensive seemed monstrous. What the combined and many times superior armies of the Napoleonic School and Kitchener's Army, young indeed but drawing its supplies from the resources of a world empire, had failed to accomplish against a force of almost Frederickian inferiority in numbers, this task was to be performed by the German Army, which, even after the absorption of the eastern units, was scarcely equal in strength, much less superior to the enemy. The big hammer had failed to beat down the little hammer; it was now the turn of the little hammer to pit itself against the big hammer. The German hinterland, diminutive in comparison with the continents working for the coalition, was not only to hold its own, but also to help to conquer in battle against the raw materials and industries of half Europe, America, Africa, and Asia. The German victory at Cambrai, which in a sense represented a transition from the old to a new era in the history of the war in the west, had already illuminated the difficulties that a brave and numerically superior enemy could oppose to our attack.
In contrast with the victorious confidence of our veteran defense troops—a confidence that at times excited the amazement of their own leaders—the enemy continued to contemplate the German undertaking with inveterate skepticism. British and French prisoners captured during the Winter months indeed held out to us the prospect of achieving an initial success similar to that which their own offensive had achieved. But nowhere in the world did any one reckon upon more than the customary initial success for our enterprise.
The German High Command decided from the very outset not to fight a "battle of matériel," but to build up success upon a more ideal foundation. Numerical inferiority was to be compensated by the warlike and moral qualities peculiar to the German Army organism. The same virtues that had proved the essential cause of the enemy's defeat were to form the surest guarantees of German victory. To the undeniable bravery of the English and French storming troops was to be opposed the utmost bravery of the German tribes; the good quality of the enemy leaders was to be met by better leading on the German side, and the thorough preparation of our adversaries by one still more thorough.
As the Supreme Command could confidently reckon upon the two first as given quantities, there remained as the chief task the preparation of the attack. Unity of command and of forces, the latter non-German only in respect of a valuable group of Austrian batteries that had been placed in the line, facilitated the tremendous work. Frictions and impediments that are inherent even in the best organized coalition armies were spared us. It is impossible to picture what was accomplished in the map rooms of the German staffs by experienced specialists in defensive warfare, who worked in silence for months, at the highest nervous pressure, in the face of the confident expectation of the homeland and growing tension and impatience abroad. But it is certain that an altogether enormous expenditure of organizing energy was required in order to impart the method of attack; to ascertain and control the situation of the enemy; to supply the striking force with munitions and provisions; and finally to produce that masterpiece, the veiled march into line.