TWELFTH CONGRESS.—SECOND SESSION. PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES. (continued 7)

If this right, or claim of right, however, is made a mere pretext by any nation to seize and detain our seamen, I am willing to allow that it would be a cause of war. But even in this case, war ought not to be waged until we have done our duty to our seamen and the offending nation, by making suitable regulations to prevent the employment of the seamen of such nation. Have we done this, as respects Great Britain? Perhaps some such regulation is to be found in the law which defines what vessel is an American vessel, and which, as such, is entitled to hoist our flag. Look at it, sir. According to the act of December, 1792, an American ship is one wholly owned by an American citizen, and commanded by a person also a citizen. The crew may be all foreigners—all Englishmen, if you please—all English deserters. In this, therefore, we find no security to the British Government.

But, we have also the law of May, 1796, which provides, that the collectors may register seamen calling themselves American, and grant certificates of citizenship. Out of this law, it is presumed, has grown the practice of granting protections, as they are called—papers procured from notaries and magistrates, ofttimes on the most barefaced perjuries, and always considered as a species of negotiable property for value received. Sir, these protections, in their abuse, are a scandal to the nation. It has made false swearing an employment, and the granting of false papers a business. The price of such a paper is as well known in the great seaport towns as is that of your stocks. All ages and complexions and tongues may have this badge of citizenship, by paying the charges in such cases provided. If this, however, was not so; if protections were only granted to real Americans; it is difficult to see how this is to prevent the employment of British sailors. It is not necessary that the persons navigating an American vessel should have them.

This act of ours was presented to the British Government by Mr. King, in January, 1797, and Lord Grenville, on the 27th of March following, in a manner highly conciliatory, and certainly with much force, stated specific objections to the law. The Executive, when in July last he answered the call of the Senate for papers relative to impressments, omitted this letter of Lord Grenville, but he gives a letter from the then Secretary of State, to our Minister at the British Court, of the third of October, 1797, in which the force of the objections seems to be admitted: "Lord Grenville's observations on the act of Congress for the relief and protection of American seamen, present difficulties which demand consideration at the ensuing session." Nothing was, however, done at that or any future session. In truth, we have done nothing to prevent the employment of British seamen in our public or private ships; and they are to be found in both. And yet, with this fact staring us in the face, we are called upon to say that the war is altogether just on our part!

It will probably be urged that the British practice under this claim, in its application to us, was sufficient to prove that the reclamation of their seamen was not so much the object of the British Government, as the seizure of our seafaring citizens: that it had become so outrageous as not only to justify, but to require war. Without, sir, meaning to excuse or to palliate the taking even the cabin boy, if done knowingly and wittingly; and being willing to admit, that about the period of the attack on the Chesapeake, we had much and serious cause to complain on the subject, I must be permitted to say that I have not evidence to satisfy me, that when we declared war, the practice of the British was such as to prove that the claim on their part was a mere pretext to take our sailors. In truth, I believe, if the Administration have not deceived themselves on this subject, that they have attempted a gross deception on the public.

The instructions given at this day, by the British Admiralty to a naval commander, on this subject, directs him, "when he meets with any foreign ship or vessel, to send a lieutenant to inquire whether there may be on board of her any seamen who are the subjects of His Majesty; and if there be, to demand them, provided it does not distress the ship; he is to demand their wages up to the day; but he is to do this without detaining the vessel longer than shall be necessary, or offering any violence to, or in any way ill-treating the master or his crew." Mr. Monroe may perhaps recognize in this, the instructions shown to him after his arrangement, and of which he declared himself satisfied; but whether he does or not, it must be conceded that it provides for a moderate exercise of the right. The person who is to make the search is an officer of some standing; he is only to take seamen who are British subjects, excluding thereby, not merely our citizens, but all foreigners; and he is not to take even British seamen, if, by it, he destroys the crew, or endangers the vessel. Allowing the right to exist, it is difficult more fairly to regulate its exercise.

But it may be urged that the practice of the British commanders does not correspond with these instructions; that they search and seize at large, according to their will and pleasure. I know, sir, that the habits and education of a military man, not unfrequently make him act as if power and right meant the same thing: and I, therefore, have no doubt that there have been abuses. But I do most conscientiously believe that these abuses have been greatly magnified, and are, even by the well meaning, vastly overrated. I am aware that I shall be referred to the impressment document of last session. This document, sir, is so illy understood, and has been the source of so much misrepresentation, that I must be allowed slightly to review it.

The Secretary, in the report says, that the list transmitted had been received from our agent at London, and "contains the names of American seamen and citizens who have been impressed and held in bondage in His Britannic Majesty's ships of war, for the several quarters of 1809 and 1810." The list is headed, "A return or list of American seamen and citizens who have been impressed and held on board of His Britannic Majesty's ships of war, from 1st of April to the 30th of June, inclusively," and so of the other quarters. Now the plain meaning of this is, if any meaning it has, that the persons whose names were thus sent to us were impressed and made to serve on board British armed ships, at some period in the years 1809 and 1810. Indeed, this has been so stated in this House, and in the Administration prints. And yet the most superficial examination will show that this is not true. Let me read to you one or two names: "4868. David Wiley." In the column of the "result of applications and remarks," we have this explanation of his case: "Impressed on shore at New Brunswick, and taken on board the Plumper, was detained two days, when the commander put him on board a vessel bound to Aberdeen, from thence worked his passage to London, and appeared at this office 29th August, 1805; is evidently an American. Discharged." Here, then, we have a man who was not on board a British ship in 1809, and whose "bondage" did not probably continue more than two days.

Again, "4936. Richard Butler, representing himself of Petersburg, Pennsylvania. Impressed 1797 at the Cape of Good Hope, from the Mercury of Baltimore, and detained on board the Garland." Remark: "Remained on board the Garland two months, then draughted to the Tremendous, in which he served two and a half years, was then discharged; has never received his wages or prize-money; says he was well used on board both ships. Was discharged as an American citizen at the Cape of Good Hope; his pay and prize-money lists were given to the consul at the Cape. Discharged." This man, therefore, according to the statement of our Consul, so far from having been impressed and held on board a British ship in 1809, had been impressed in 1797, and discharged in 1799. I might, sir, give you many other cases equally strong, but these are sufficient to prove that, by design or mistake, the document is wrongly headed; that the persons named in the list were not all on board British ships in 1809 and 1810; and, therefore, that, in its general results, it does not show the state of the British practice in those years.

In truth, the list is nothing more than the return of the names of persons who, within the year, had applied to Mr. Lyman, our Consul and agent for seamen, for protections against future, or for his aid in getting released from present impressment. It was his duty, as I do not doubt it was made his interest, to receive all applications, and when necessary, to lay them before the proper British authority. Jew and Greek, Turk and Christian, the growth of our own soil, and the produce of other countries, all threw themselves upon Mr. Lyman, and he, laboring in his vocation, granted patents of citizenship, or made his claim on the British Admiralty. Sir, there is not a man who, in practice or by inquiry, has made himself acquainted with the manner in which this business is transacted, but knows that many foreigners who never saw this country, or sailed under its flag, have attempted, by application to our agents abroad, to shield themselves against British impressment. The Secretary of State, Mr. Monroe, needs no information on this subject, having himself resided in London as our Minister. It was the duty of our agent to send home some account of his proceedings, and I have no objection to his making such a list as we have before us. But I do object to its being palmed on the American nation as a true history of British impressments affecting our people and nation. I pray you look at this list. In the year commencing in April, 1809, and ending in March, 1810, we have about nine hundred and forty names; and of these, about seven hundred are given with blanks in the columns for the "towns and States of which they represent themselves to be citizens"—"when impressed"—"where impressed"—"ships from whence taken"—"nations"—"masters." The time and the result of the application are only given. And from these entries in Mr. Lyman's book you are called upon to admit that the applicant was an American, and that he was impressed in the year 1809 by the British, on the high seas, out of an American vessel. Really, this is asking too much.

Mr. Chairman, I have examined the list from April, 1809, to April, 1810, with great attention, for the purpose of ascertaining the number of impressments which took place in that year, and I will now make to you one or two statements, which may cast some light on the subject of the British practice. The number which, by the list, appears to have been impressed in that year, is one hundred. It will be understood that in this number I do not include those whose names are carried out in blank, as has been stated. It is uncertain whether such persons ever were impressed; and, at all events, it is fair to presume, that their service on board British ships had commenced before 1809, or otherwise there could be no difficulty in giving dates. Of the one hundred, seventy-six were discharged, and six had deserted, leaving less than twenty to be accounted for.

Another result: Of the persons thus taken, fifty-seven were impressed on shore, and forty-three at sea. Again: Thirty of these seamen, when impressed, made part of the crews of British vessels, and thirty-four American vessels; and of the thirty-four, twelve were taken on land; leaving about twenty-two persons taken from American vessels on the high seas. It is possible, sir, that in these statements I may not be perfectly accurate; I am certain, however, that I am substantially so.

I do not mean to represent that this is a full account of all the impressments which took place in 1809; on the contrary, I admit that it is not. Many impressments were certainly made of persons undeniably British subjects, who would scarcely think of applying to Mr. Lyman, and will not, therefore, be found in his book. Many persons, also, having a right to his interference, were not then known to him. My object in making these explanations, was to show that the 6,057 document does not furnish such strong evidence of British aggression as has been supposed.

The number of our seamen impressed by the British has been so variously represented, that I have, from motives of curiosity as well as duty, been desirous to arrive at something like a reasonable certainty on the subject. We hear of ten, twenty, nay, forty thousand of our citizens, confined in the floating dungeons of Great Britain, fighting her battles against their will. The evidence of this, however, is only to be found in the imagination of gentlemen. It is the old story over again, of the "six men in buckram." In part representing the greatest commercial State in the Union, it may be expected that I have some personal knowledge on this subject, but indeed I have none such to give. Is there not in this some proof that the evil has been magnified? I have sought for information in quarters where only it is to be found, among the shipping merchants and ship owners of the country. I will now furnish you with the opinion of an intelligent gentleman from Marblehead, whose means of information are ample, and whose veracity will not be doubted. I mean my friend from Massachusetts, who sits before me. (Mr. Reed.) He has favored me with this statement.

"In answer to your inquiry relative to the seamen of Marblehead, I have to remark that the average shipping of that port, for the last twenty years, may be estimated at about 19,006 tons, of which it is fair to calculate ten thousand tons were employed in foreign commerce, and the residue in the fisheries and in the coasting trade. Allowing six men to every hundred tons, which is the usual estimate, it gives an average of eleven hundred and seventy-six seamen in all, and six hundred in our foreign trade, each year; the number of seamen, therefore, employed from Marblehead for the last twenty years, must have been considerable, say five thousand. I have resided at that place nearly twenty years, and, during the greater part of the time, have been actively engaged in commerce. According to my own recollection, aided by that of others who have the best means of information, I do not believe that twenty of the seamen of Marblehead, native or naturalized, have been impressed by the British within the twenty years, and it is not known that one has been demanded without being released."

As there is no reason to suppose that Marblehead has been more fortunate with respect to impressments than other places, we have here something whereby to form an estimate of the number of our seamen taken by the British. My own conviction is, that the American seamen, impressed and held by the British, at the commencement of this war, did not much exceed five hundred in all, and certainly did not amount to one thousand. Permit me, sir, to mention one circumstance which speaks loudly on this subject. If the practice of impressment had been as outrageous as has been represented, it must have fallen with great force on the Eastern States, as it is there the mass of our seamen are found. We are then to expect much feeling and passion on this account. The war must be popular when the cause of it is brought home to every man's door. No such thing, sir. The war is confessedly odious there. It is in States where seamen never grew that the war has its strongest advocates. It is there that you principally find the dark pictures of sailors' sufferings, and hear the loud and long appeals to the sympathies and passions of the people about seamen's rights and seamen's injuries.

I have now, sir, finished the remarks which I intended to make on the British claim and practice of impressment. We have for years past had so much idle declamation on the subject, that a dispassionate investigation of it appeared to me to be called for. In the course of these remarks, I have attempted to show that the claim was neither novel nor peculiar, and it is not wholly unsupported by reason; that our true interest calls more for a fair regulation of the practice than an abandonment of the rights; and that the conduct of the British, of late, has been such as to warrant an opinion, that an arrangement may be made, having for its object a proper regulation of the practice, leaving the rights of both nations, whatever they may be, untouched. Sir, with this view of the subject, it is not possible for me to consent to the adoption of measures, having for their object the further prosecution of the war offensively on our part; and I cannot, therefore, vote for the bill on your table. The war has not yet assumed a character. We have, indeed, added much, and are about to add more, to the public debt. Already a portion of our citizens are burdened with oppressive exactions in the form of duties, and heavy taxes are staring all in the face. But yet our homes and altars remain safe and unpolluted. Let us seize this moment to give the nation peace, and the people happiness. This is the appointed time, and if we do not improve it, I fear my country is to suffer in its prosperity and its institutions. For Heaven's sake let us pause!

Mr. Macon said after failing in his attempt to amend the bill, he had considered it of very little importance; indeed, in its present form, he was not anxious whether it passed or not; and he had intended not to have troubled the committee on the subject, but the strange course which the debate had taken had called him up almost against his own consent. He could truly say that he would not have offered a word to the committee, had not those who oppose the bill have brought into the discussion French influence, operating by a sort of magic on every act of the Executive. The conduct of the Executive had undergone the strictest scrutiny by these gentlemen, and their own arguments would, in his opinion, convince every impartial man, that it had been perfectly fair and upright to all foreign nations; the least attention to the documents, which have from time to time been published, would also convince every man of it, and satisfy all that the great object of the Government had been peace, and that peace was maintained until it could no longer be done without surrendering almost every national right worth preserving. Mr. M. said he would endeavor in his observations to follow the example which had been set the last two days: not to utter a word to wound the feelings of any one; nor would he refer to the documents, because every member possessed them, and they had been published for the information of the people; and he was sure that the committee must be tired with hearing a sentence here, and a paragraph there, read from them. The true way to understand them was to read the whole. But he had never been in the practice of making many quotations from books or documents, and he thought it unnecessary to make any now. He was clearly of opinion that the gentlemen who were opposed to the Administration had the right to say whatever they thought of it, and to select the subject on which they would speak; and as they had made the selection, he hoped they would have an opportunity now to deliver their sentiments. He, however, regretted that they had selected this bill; because, of all the bills which may be brought before the House the present session, not one, he thought, would require despatch more than this. The loss of a day now may be the loss of the next campaign. He had expected that this general debate, which seems to include every thing but the bill, would have been delayed until the loan should be under discussion.

The points made in the debate seem to be: impressment; the right to expatriate; the right to naturalize; and French influence; neither of which have any connection with the bill, which is to raise troops for one year. Sir, said Mr. M., I will not retort a charge of British influence, and so balance one assertion against the other, because I do not believe that there is much of either in the nation; but if I was to say there was none, I should not say what I believe. People may honestly differ in opinion as to the effect which the success of England or France over the other might have on the interests of the United States, without being under the influence of either; and this, no doubt, is the case with thousands.

I will, before I proceed further, notice some of the observations made by the gentleman from New York, (Mr. Emott.) If I have not understood him or any other gentleman correctly, I hope that I shall be corrected; because it is my sincere desire to state their statements fairly; and it is not always possible to take down their own words. He said, if there was any English influence, it was the influence of Locke and Sidney. As well might he have spoken of the influence of any other patriots who lived before us. Their influence will be respected wherever their works shall be read; but that sort of influence is not the influence of which we have heard so much, and which I intend hereafter to notice. He also mentioned the influence which drove the first settlers to Plymouth. Yes, sir, that influence was truly British, and that sort of influence Great Britain has been exercising ever since the first settlers, by their own industry and exertions, got into a situation to be useful to her; and that influence, or rather that persecution, compelled the first settlers of Carolina to leave the other provinces, and to settle a second time in the woods, and, as soon as they were able, to pay taxes. That same influence followed them, and made their condition much worse. It pursued the people in every part of the continent, until they declared themselves independent; and, from that day to this, she has not treated the United States as she has treated other independent nations.

Mr. Chairman, I was astonished when the gentleman told us he was not a friend to standing armies; and, almost in the same breath, said that, at the last session, he voted for raising the twenty-five thousand men, and that he did not mean to go to war when he gave the vote. For what purpose, then, could they be wanted? Experience had already shown that the old establishment was quite sufficient in time of peace. Indeed, a very considerable part of that was raised soon after the affair of the Chesapeake, and under an expectation that war would follow, and not for a regular peace establishment.

The same gentleman told us, that impressment by the British Government was no new thing. This is certainly true as far as regards her own subjects, and from her own vessels; but the systematic impressment of foreigners from foreign ships, is a new thing; and that, too, when the men and the ships both belong to the same nation. That Government never attempted to impress Spaniards, Dutch, French, Swedes, or Danes, from vessels belonging to the same nation with the person; and it is this new doctrine, which operates solely on us, of which we complain. The question between us and England has nothing to do with the doctrine that free ships shall make free goods, or free men, if gentlemen please. And why draw that into the debate on the impressment of American citizens from American vessels? No law or precedent can be produced for this abominable and wicked practice. It was never attempted to be justified, notwithstanding impressment is no new thing with her. Every Sovereign, said the gentleman, has a right to the service of all his subjects in time of war. But this right is like some others which Sovereigns claim; it is without a remedy. Of what avail is the proclamation of the Prince Regent in this country, ordering the British subjects home? None. Many of them are still here, and, probably, will remain until the termination of the war, and the British Government will never dream of punishing one of them for disobedience. But, admit this right in Sovereigns to its fullest extent, and it does not give one Sovereign the right to impress the citizens or subjects of another; nor does it justify such an act; of course it does not touch the act of which we complain; that is, the impressing of American seamen from American vessels.

It is curious that, throughout this whole debate, there seems to have been drawn a distinction between the rights of a man who cultivates the soil, and of him who follows the sea, and that this distinction should have been drawn by those who claim to be the champions of commerce and of a navy, and who have told us that agriculture and commerce were inseparable. Ought it not, then, to follow, that the rights of those employed on land or water should also be inseparable? This strange doctrine, as was observed by the gentleman from Louisiana, (Mr. Robertson,) may dust the eye, but cannot stagger the understanding of any one.

The same gentleman said, that we had taken no measures to exclude British seamen from American vessels. For what purpose were protections given to American seamen? Surely to protect them against impressment, and to show that we had no desire to protect others; and what more ought to have been done, he did not tell us. I ask, did any nation ever do more? Besides, has not the United States, over and over again, offered to make an arrangement with England on the subject of sailors, which should be satisfactory to both, by securing to each the use of their own sailors? and has she not always refused to make any arrangement about them? And it may be fairly asked here, what measures Great Britain has taken to prevent her officers from impressing our seamen? None that I have heard of, and she is the aggressor. We have not injured her, while she has been impressing our sailors whenever she wanted and could find them. If the United States wanted sailors ever so much, they could not impress one of hers, and she knows this; and she would not suffer one of them to be impressed by any foreign power; and we must determine to defend the rights of ours, or it will be idle to talk about navigation, commerce, and a navy. Indeed, if commerce and agriculture be inseparable, you must defend the rights of the persons concerned in both, or both must be injured. There are no neutrals able to carry our products to market, and if you will not protect your seamen, they will not carry them.

It is worthy of remark, that, for twenty years past, the Government of the United States has been trying to settle the question of sailors with Great Britain, and that every attempt has failed, and that it is just now discovered that we have always begun wrong. My colleague (Mr. Pearson) and the gentleman from Connecticut, (Mr. Pitkin,) it appears, could settle this great question without much difficulty. If they can, I wish most sincerely they would. I am, however, apprehensive that they are a little mistaken, because General Washington, when President, having Major Pinckney, now Major General Pinckney, for Minister at London, tried without effect. Mr. Adams renewed it with Mr. King for Minister; Mr. Jefferson with Colonel Monroe and Mr. Pinkney, now the Attorney General; and Mr. Madison, with the last named Pinkney. All these Presidents and Ministers, with the aid of every Cabinet, have failed. Every description of political opinion, with the greatest talents, have been employed and done nothing. At the end of twenty years we have gained nothing, and lost our labor; the question is as unsettled as ever; and we have been worsted in this way, that, while we were negotiating, they were impressing seamen.

We have been told by my colleague, that it is not the right, but the abuse of impressment of which we complain. It is true, sir, that we do not complain of Great Britain impressing her own subjects; she may do as she pleases with them; that is no concern of ours; all we ask of her is to keep her hands off our people; and we deny her right to impress American citizens; and if the abuse be the impressing them, of that we do complain, and not without just cause, because she has impressed many of them, and compelled them to fight her battles; and I have understood, after we had declared that war existed between her and us, that she detained those she had before impressed as prisoners of war, and this may be a part of her public law. Indeed, we have heard much about universal law and public law, neither of which, from the statements made, seem to have much regard to right or justice, which ought to be the foundation of all law. One universal law seems to be, that Sovereigns can command their subjects to return home in case of war; another, that no person can expatriate himself; and Great Britain is no doubt willing to acknowledge another, by which she might impress sailors from all the world. As to the first, we need not trouble ourselves about it; and the second, the United States have not acknowledged; and we are now contending against impressment; and permit me here to observe, that the republicans have always considered the impressment of citizens a more serious injury than the spoliation of property.

I must return to Porcupine's paper,[33] which, as well as I now recollect, never contained a sentence in favor of the Revolution, or much in praise of the constitution, if it was praised at all; no outrage was committed which it did not approbate; a few of the outrages of that time shall be stated: The Rogue's March was played under the window of the man who drew the Declaration of Independence, The man who first took up arms after the fall of Charleston, and whose body had been almost riddled in defence of his country, was a member of Congress, and was insulted at the circus. Another member, of no common cast of mind, was insulted at the theatre; a man who will do his duty in whatever situation he may be placed. Another, returning home with his family, was insulted and almost mobbed; he is now one of the Cabinet, mentioned by the gentleman from Massachusetts, (Mr. Quincy.) If I was not almost exhausted I would give some of the details of these then fashionable transactions. I will only add, it was nothing in those days for a few men to whip a printer whose publications they did not like. All these outrages and violations of law, it is believed, were not only approved by the editor of the before-named paper, but other Federal papers also. This same editor claimed to have more subscribers for his paper than any other editor in the Union. And after he returned to Europe, he wrote and published about some of his former supporters. Had this have been a French editor, and acted toward the Federal party as he did toward the Republican, and the subscribers to his paper Republicans, could not those who look at every thing now done to find French influence, have had as good a field to hunt in as any they have yet found? At the very time these events took place, the majority talked as much about French influence as the minority now does; they had clues, sub-plots, ocean massacres, and a hundred other equally ridiculous and unfounded tales, which circulated for a day. I have mentioned these things not with an intent to wound the feelings of any man living, but with a view of trying to persuade those who talk so much about French influence, to look at both sides of the question about foreign influence; and if they will, I hope we shall never hear of it again in this House.

Mr. Genet, when he was Minister of France, began to intrigue, for which he was dismissed. Mr. Liston, when he was Minister of England, began the same work, for which he was not dismissed. If the Republicans had then been in power, and Liston a French Minister, could not a strict examination of the documents have placed it as easily as many other acts have been to French influence?

While all these things were doing, and many others quite as strange, the gentlemen call themselves the followers of General Washington. If they be truly his followers, they ought to adhere to his principles, and attend to his last advice. Every act of his went to perpetuate the Union and to attach the States to each other. I fear the sentiments contained in his farewell address to the nation are getting out of fashion with those who claim to be his exclusive followers; or why do we hear within these walls, the foundation of which he laid for union, union, union; disunion spoken of, "peaceably if we can, forcibly if we must;" and why listen to idle and unfounded tales about foreign influence, which can never injure us as long as we stick to the old maxim—united we stand, divided we fall? Straws show which way the wind blows! What has become of the newspaper called the Washington Federalist? The name was, I have understood, changed to the Independent American; out of that, I believe, was raised the Federal Republican—all good names; but why lose the name of Washington to a paper supported by his exclusive followers? And this is the first time to my recollection that they have adopted Republican in their calendar.

I have heard that Federalism is not now the same that it was when Mr. Adams was President: we shall know more about this if ever they get into power again; be this as it may, every man has a right to change his opinion; it is a right which no Government can take from him, and when convinced that he is wrong, it is his duty to change. But I had thought, when Mr. Adams was President, we were told that he followed the plan of General Washington, and that he was then a favorite with the party who elected him, but a great change has taken place in regard to him. I always thought him an honest man, and I think so still. After Mr. Adams got out of fashion, Colonel Burr became so great a favorite with the Federal gentlemen who were then in Congress, that they voted thirty-five times for him to be President, when they must have known that not one elector who voted for him intended him for President. Afterward, Mr. Madison was a favorite; but, after the refusal of the British Government to ratify the arrangement made with Mr. Erskine, they examined the matter, and discovered he had not done right, and he got out of fashion. Then the late worthy and venerable Vice President and Colonel Monroe became favorites; Colonel Monroe got out of fashion about the time he was appointed Secretary of State; and, lastly, Mr. De Witt Clinton became a favorite. I hope he will not be injured by it, but he seems to be losing ground, as we have been told it was not his merit that induced the Federalists to support him for President, but the demerit of Mr. Madison. This does not appear to be a good reason, because they might have selected a man from their own party, who they thought had merit. But all these things may be the doings of those who, a former member of this House called ultra-Federalists; and it will be recollected that all these men became favorites, on the old doctrine of, "divide and conquer;" and it ought not to be forgotten that, when Messrs. Ellsworth and Davie returned from France, their political friends were a little shy of them; indeed, I should not be surprised if Messrs. Jay, King, Walcott, and Dexter, should not much longer be favorites. If we may judge from the public prints, Commodore Rodgers is no longer one, though he, like the others, is understood to be a Federalist; but these men will never say, "peaceably if we can, forcibly if we must." I would really thank any gentleman to tell me what is now meant by the party name, Federalist.

It is a fact on record, that General Washington did not approve of self-created societies, and I have understood that some of the people who claim to be his exclusive followers, have their self-created Washington Benevolent Societies, wherever they can establish them, and that they are political societies, and they were intended to oppose some other society; perhaps the Tammany. This could not justify the proceeding. As to myself, I do not care if there was one in every three miles square in the nation, so that I am left free not to be a member.

We naturalize, without hearing a complaint from any quarter, emigrants from Great Britain, of every trade and profession, merchants, lawyers, doctors, and even divines; to which may be added tradesmen and mechanics; they all go where they please, live among us, and take part in the politics of the day. If foreign influence could be introduced into the country by naturalizing, we should have more of British than of French; but naturalizing seems well enough for every body but a sailor, but do not permit him to become a citizen; he will be in the way of native sailors, who want encouragement; besides, we know that Great Britain will impress him, and we know as well, when her officers want men, they care not whether they are American or English. The native American has never complained that the naturalizing of foreigners of his trade or profession, injured him; nor has a complaint been heard from a native seaman against naturalizing foreign sailors; and we have had experience enough to know that our merchants could complain, and complain almost against their own complaint. Let their property be captured, or expected to be captured, under a new order in France or England, and more complaints will be made about it, than the impressing of a dozen citizens. The situation of the merchant, when plundered, is bad enough, but his property is not taken away without a trial of some sort before a judge learned in the law, whose duty it ought to be to decide according to law; he also employs lawyers to have justice done him. Not so with the sailor; when impressed, there is no learned judge to decide his case, or lawyer to have justice done; force is law to him, and his oppressor judge; he is put on board ships, and compelled to fight battles, in which neither he nor his country have any concern: deprived of the right to complain or petition; he is poor, friendless—Great God! can it be possible, that we shall yield the point of impressment, for the sake of carrying on a little trifling trade by hook or by crook!

All agree that we ought to fight for the rights of native seamen, and all agree that some of them have been impressed; why not all, then, join, heart in hand, to maintain their rights? Is it because the British officers impress from our vessels others besides natives? This cannot lessen their just claim to the protection of their country. We have, however, been told that only ninety-three persons were impressed in one year from American vessels; if only three of them had been the sons of the gentleman (Mr. Emott) who gave the information, I ask, would he have been contented with the long investigation of documents, to ascertain if any of the diplomatic meanders turned towards French influence? No, sir, he would not; he would have demanded of the National Government to have his children restored to his arms; he could demand this in a way to be heard. Far different is the case with these unfortunate parents who have had their sons impressed; they are too poor and friendless to be heard; the rights of the nation may be abandoned by little and little, until none be left; exactly as you may take a cent at a time from one thousand dollars, until none be left. All must determine to protect American seamen on board American vessels, or not hereafter pretend to claim any jurisdiction over the vessels when they are out of the limits of the United States. If a single citizen should be impressed on American land, the whole nation would be in a flame; the right to protection is the same, whether on American land or an American vessel.

It has been said that we do not act justly; that we encourage British seamen to run away, because we do not apprehend them and send them back, when they have run away from their vessels; they run away before our people see them, of course there is no encouragement to the running away. As to the sending them back, we are not bound to do it; and if it depended on me one should never be sent back, until the British ceased impressing and plundering our citizens, and I would agree that every man who engaged in the war on our side should have the right to be naturalized, though he fled from British naval tyranny.

It is remarkable that, while we hear not a word said to justify England for impressing and plundering the people of the United States, that so much should have been said to prove that we ought not to have gone to war with her, and that we were wrong in doing so. This is the best way that could have been devised to keep her aggressions out of view; not to say a word about them, and talk a great deal about the hardships of war, and the taxes which must be imposed to carry it on, winding up all their lamentations for the state of the country, with, if it was not for the war, a little trade could be carried on. Impressment, then, is a mere trifle, compared with this trade, and it may be that Great Britain understands it so, and is willing to gratify us with this trade for kin-sake, as long as we are contented to be impressed for kin-sake. The citizens who are impressed would tell her, if telling would release them, that nations are no kin.

This surely has been the most unfortunate Government from its establishment to the present time that ever existed; almost every thing that has been done is wrong: it was wrong to fix the seat of Government here; it was wrong to place this House and the houses for the offices so far from each other; it was wrong to give paper protections to American seamen; it was wrong to have a little mercy in the revenue laws; it was wrong to repeal the internal taxes; I believe that was called oppression—though I am no prophet, I venture to predict, that to lay them to carry the war on will be wrong also; to take Canada would be wrong;—indeed, it would be difficult to find any thing which has been done right, according to the modern Federal creed. How are we to get things right? Give up the chair you are in to one, the White House to another, and they will soon give you a sedition law which will put all right. The great discovery which these gentlemen have made, that so much has been wrong under every Administration, would surprise the people, were they not this moment astonished at the discovery of perpetual motion by Redheffer—two such great discoveries must add vastly to the character of the nation.

The attempt to take Canada is so wicked that some of the gentlemen are quite alarmed at it. We hear of the unoffending Canadians, but not of the unoffending sailor; at one time they are the most unoffending and loyal people in the world, at another they are French, and not fit to be united in our Government. We have heard much of the same sort formerly said about the people of Louisiana, and they have become a State, without any trouble to themselves or the Union. What has become of that high Federal spirit which disdained to buy Louisiana? Where is it when Canada is mentioned? The Federalism which desired to conquer Louisiana and keep it by force of arms, is changed when Canada is the question. The outrageous conduct of Great Britain is as much worse than that of Spain, as her impressment and plundering were worse than the refusal of the right of deposit. For one, I am willing to have Canada and Florida, and have them you must before many years. The situation of Mobile is such as to compel you before very long to take possession of it. Canada and Florida would rid us of bad neighbors, and make us more happy.

The committee then rose and reported the bill.

The several amendments made in Committee of the Whole were agreed to by the House.

Mr. Fitch again moved to strike out the 4th section, giving the President exclusively the appointment of all officers under the rank of field officers.

The question was decided in the negative by yeas and nays. For the motion 34, against it 74.

And the bill was then (half past six o'clock) ordered to be engrossed for a third reading, without a division.

And on motion, the House adjourned until to-morrow.

Wednesday, January 13.

Additional Military Force.

The bill, in addition to the act passed at the last session "to raise an additional military force"—the object of which is to raise twenty regiments of men for one year, if deemed necessary by the President to the public service—was read a third time, and the question stated, "Shall the bill pass?"

Mr. Kent.—Mr. Speaker, it is with great reluctance I rise to trouble the House with any remarks of mine, at a time when their patience must be so completely exhausted, by the unusual length of the debate which has already taken place upon the subject before you. The bill on your table proposes to raise an additional military force of twenty thousand men, and it has been objected to on account of its expense, and the consequent danger growing out of it to the liberties of our country. We are, sir, in a state of war; and what is evidently the course which we should pursue whilst in that situation? We should advocate and support such measures as are calculated to bring that war, justly made on our part, to a speedy, honorable, and successful conclusion. Viewing the bill on your table as a measure of that description, I shall give it my support, regardless of that additional expense which gentlemen so emphatically dwell upon. Nay, sir, it is better to expend the thirty millions of dollars (even if that sum was necessary) so repeatedly spoken of on the other side of the House as the cost of the war for two years, to accomplish our object, than to expend the same sum in five years, even if we could effect our object with equal certainty.

However commendable economy may be in every other situation in life, in war it is inadmissible; it loses its character; it becomes parsimony: you might as well attempt to unite profusion and avarice as war and economy. All that the utmost prudence can require of you when in a state of war, is to make your means ample; lay your plans well; and to the judgment and the skill in these particulars only can you look for economy or for savings; for the want of an inconsiderable supply of men or money, a campaign might prove disastrous, to recover which would require an immense sacrifice of blood and treasure.

The Army has been represented as dangerous to the liberties of the country. At one moment we are told that, when it shall be completed, it will be unequal to the conquest of a petty province adjoining us, and not exceeding in population the State of Maryland; the next moment we are told that it will endanger the liberties of seven millions of freemen. Arguments thus paradoxical need no refutation. Sir, I do not pretend to have any military experience, and I am willing to concede the point to those possessing it, that men enlisted for three or five years are preferable to those enlisted for one year as proposed by the bill; yet I feel confident that every object will be accomplished by this bill that is intended. It is not proposed to rely solely on an army of this description to carry on the war; you have nearly a sufficient military force authorized for five years, and you want the men to be raised by this bill only as auxiliaries, till the ranks of that army can be filled. With these observations on the bill before you, I shall proceed to make a few remarks upon what has fallen from gentlemen on the other side of the House; in doing which I shall endeavor to confine myself to what has not been noticed by others, or, if attended to, not sufficiently so.

If I understood an honorable gentleman from Connecticut correctly, who addressed you the other day, (Mr. Pitkin,) he said we were contending for the employment of foreigners. We contend, sir, for nothing which, as an independent nation, we are not entitled to, and which the laws of nations do not guarantee to us. What have been the propositions heretofore made by our Government to Great Britain upon this subject? I find, by a recurrence to the correspondence of Messrs. Monroe and Pinkney with that Government, in 1806, that we made the following propositions, the most material of which were omitted yesterday (not intentionally I hope) by the gentleman from New York, (Mr. Emott.) Here Mr. K. read the following proposals from the public documents of 1807 and 1808. We offered—

1. To afford no refuge or protection to British seamen.

2. To deliver them up if they took refuge among us.

3. To make laws for restoring them.

4. To aid in searching for, seizing, and restoring them.

5. To keep them in our prisons when requested.

6. To prohibit our citizens from carrying them off.

7. To prohibit their employment.

8. To make penal laws for punishing their employers.

9. To make it our duty to restore them.

10. To extend the foregoing provisions, not only to deserters, but to all seafaring people.

These propositions went completely to secure to Great Britain the services of all her seafaring subjects, except such as were naturalized under our laws, which amounted to but few, indeed; thirteen hundred British seamen only having been naturalized since the commencement of our Government, and, in all probability, an equal number of our seamen have been naturalized by Great Britain during the same period. Yet, to my astonishment, have I heard it stated, during this debate, that our Government had made no serious propositions to secure to Great Britain the services of her seamen.

But equitable as these propositions were, they were rejected. Notwithstanding, sir, our Government, anxious in their pursuit after peace, have gone still further; they have, through our late Chargé d'Affaires in London, (Mr. Russell,) proposed to Great Britain to exclude from our naval service, as well public as private, all her seamen, including those which may hereafter be naturalized; and notwithstanding the liberality and justice of this proposal, it, like all others, has been made without producing the desired effect. And what more, sir, could have been asked of us, required, or granted, than is contained in these offers? Nothing more, unless, indeed, they had asked for our independence, and, yielding to the requisition, we had granted it. When an American vessel is at sea, it is amenable to no laws but those of its own country and the laws of nations; and where, in either of these, will the advocates for impressment find their justification? Sir, had not the practice of impressment been treated as a casual, a trivial circumstance, during this debate, I should not have presumed to trouble the House with my desultory remarks; and my principal object in addressing the House, was to ask their attention to a document which appears to have been overlooked, and which, if necessary, will place the abomination of that practice in colors too strong to be mistaken.

Here Mr. K. read the following extract of a letter from the Secretary of State to Mr. Monroe, dated January 4th, 1804—

"The whole number of applications made by impressed seamen to our Consul in London, between the month of June, 1797, and September, 1804, were two thousand and fifty-nine. Of this number, one hundred and two seamen only were detained as British subjects, which is less than one-twentieth of the whole number impressed. Eleven hundred and forty-two were discharged, or ordered to be so, and eight hundred and five were detained for further proof, with the strongest presumption that the greater part, if not the whole, were Americans, or other aliens, whose proof of citizenship had been lost or destroyed."

It is, then, evident, from this document, that, for every British seamen obtained by this violent proceeding, a number of Americans, or other aliens, with whom Great Britain has no right to meddle, not less than twenty for one have been the victims to it. Sir, have we become so lost to the real independence and sovereignty of the country, that we are prepared to yield to this degrading, debasing, and humiliating badge of vassalage?

The Romans, of old, had a practice of making the governors of those countries they conquered pass annually beneath their yoke, as a mark of submission; but we, doomed to humiliation far greater, are made to pass daily, nay, hourly, beneath one much more galling. Some gentlemen object to the propositions made by Mr. Russell, and assert that he was not authorized. They should recollect that Mr. Russell's letter, containing this final offer to the British Government, was communicated to this House by the President, and, had it not met with his concurrence, it is presumable he would, in his communication, have expressed his disapprobation towards it. Nay, a similar offer has been made by the Secretary of State to Admiral Warren.

I know not whether the feelings of shame or indignation predominate in my breast, when I see gentlemen constantly laboring to place their own Government in the wrong; and, in contradiction to the official records of this House, insist that we are contending for the employment of foreigners.

The language of our Government upon that subject, is this, sir: that, if the oppressed and unfortunate inhabitants of Europe, escaping from their tyranny and panting after their long-lost liberty, seek a refuge in our happy country, upon their compliance with our naturalization laws, we are willing to extend to them those blessings we enjoy; but should they become dissatisfied with the advantages which the interior of the country affords them, and they think proper to depart from our shores, we say to them, we will not risk our peace for their protection beyond our territorial limits. So far from our contest with Great Britain being for the employment of her subjects, it is a contest for shielding a large and valuable portion of our fellow-citizens from British thraldom, under the lash of which they have too long labored; and who will dare discriminate in that protection which is equally due to all, that is due to the meanest individual in the community, and withhold it from a class of men who have done honor to the American character, and covered themselves with glory?

Mr. Randolph rose, apparently laboring under the effects of a serious indisposition, and addressed the Chair.

I rise (said he) with a heart saddened by the disgrace of our common country, and sickened by the way in which the business of the State has been managed.

Of the temper and virulence which have manifested themselves in this debate, I shall not have any occasion to divest myself in the course of the very few remarks which I fear I shall be enabled to make, because towards them I have no purpose. Indeed, when I look around me, I am exceedingly sad; and I know not now if it will be in my power to go on.

I had intended, if time and health permitted, to address to this Assembly some few observations, confined principally to the change which has taken place in the relations of our country since the declaration of war, not only respecting that belligerent with whom we are engaged in hostilities, but her adversary also. But the course that this debate has taken imposes upon me a painful duty, which I trust God will give me strength to discharge: the duty of reviewing past transactions in the Government, which, from my heart, I would, instead of bringing them up on the present occasion, gladly discharge from my memory. But self-defence is the first law of nature. The merest reptile, the worm itself, will turn when trod upon. Nor is the force of the blow lessened by its being dealt, as in the present case, by the hand—I will not say under the garb and circumstances—of Friendship.

It was my lot, sir, and I may assuredly say my misfortune, to take some little share in those transactions which brought about a civil revolution in the Government of this country. I hope that I am understood. I feel I shall be understood, when I speak of this, by all wise and good men; and it is with them only that I wish to hold intercourse—to commune. It is of their good opinion alone that I am ambitious, if indeed ambition dwell any where in my heart.

Let me endeavor to recall to recollection the state of things about the period when I had the unhappiness to dedicate myself to political life.

Through the opposition, bold but just, which was made by myself, and those associated with me, to the measures of that Administration, an entire change was effected in the control of the Government. One Administration was ejected from power, and another took its place. Is it necessary for me to descant upon the topics of difference which then separated the two great parties in the Government? Is it necessary for me at this time of day to make a declaration of the principles of the Republican party? Is it possible that such a declaration could be deemed orthodox when proceeding from lips so unholy as those of an excommunicant from that church? It is not necessary. Those principles are on record; they are engraved upon it indelibly by the press, and will live as long as the art of printing is suffered to exist. It is not for any man at this day to undertake to change them. It is not for any man who then professed them, by any guise or circumlocution, to conceal apostacy from them, for they are there—there in the book. What are they? They have been delivered to you by my honorable colleague—what are they? Love of peace, hatred of offensive war; jealousy of the State Governments towards the General Government, and of the influence of the Executive Government over the co-ordinate branches of that Government; a dread of standing armies; a loathing of public debt, taxes, and excises; tenderness for the liberty of the citizen; jealousy, Argus-eyed jealousy, of the patronage of the President. From these principles what desertions have we not witnessed? Will you have a list of them? I shall not undertake it.

Principle does not consist in names. Federalism is a real thing—not a spectre, a shadow, a phantom. It is a living addition to the power of the General Government, in preference to the power of the States; partiality for the Executive power, in distinction to that of the co-ordinate Departments of the Government; the support of great military and naval force, and of an "energetic" administration of the Government. That is what is called Federalism. Yes, an energetic Administration, not in its real, but technical sense; for it has a sense as technical as any in our laws. That is Federalism. And, when I am opposing the course which looks toward the rearing up of great Military and Naval Establishments, of an extent not only incommensurate with the necessity but the ability of my country, I care not with whom I vote; I will be true to my principles. Let any man lay his finger upon a vote in which, since I have had the honor (if, indeed, it be an honor) of a seat in this House, I have departed from those principles, and I will consent that, quoad hoc, I am a Federalist. But it will be in vain to search for such a vote.

So strenuous, sir, had been the contest—so hot the spirit of rivalship between the two contending parties—that, after the Revolution of 1801, a curious spectacle was presented to this nation and to the world—a spectacle which, I am bold to say, never did before make its appearance in any Government, and never will appear again. It was this: that, as if the character that each party had borne when in collision with one another was indelible, the two parties, after power was transferred from one to the other, did actually maintain the same character which they had derived from impressions received during their late conflict: and the admiring world saw with astonishment the case of an opposition minority attempting to force upon a reluctant Administration patronage and power, which that Administration put by, and sternly refused to accept. Yes, sir; for a time so completely had the Republicans been imbued with the principles which they professed whilst in a minority, that, after becoming the majority, the Federalists pressed on their old adversaries power and patronage, to which they absolutely opposed themselves, repelling, for a season, every project of the kind. Is it necessary for me to allude to the reduction of the Army—to say by whom it was made? Sir, the proposition for it was originally made by the personage now addressing you; it came from what was then considered the Governmental side of the House. And by whom was it opposed? By gentlemen who had so long fought under the banners of a Government of "energy," that they were not content to submit to the diminution of its patronage or its power, even in the hands of their political opponents. I speak of facts. Such a case will never occur again. Nay, indeed, in a little time, the sweets of power had their effect on one side of the House, as the frowns of adversity had upon the other; and after awhile, the court and country parties as easily changed sides as right and left do when a man turns upon his heel.

Yes, sir, the tone of this House was soon changed. We succeeded, however, in the reduction of the Army; but I will trust to the recollection of gentlemen, upon all sides of the House, by what instrumentality this change was effected. The Commander of that Army was retained in his position. I have not leisure, health, or strength, to go into the details; gentlemen will remember them. Meanwhile, peace with this country was negotiated in France by the commissioners sent by Mr. Adams, and was followed up very soon afterwards by the short respite that the truce of Amiens gave to European combatants, wearied rather than satiated with slaughter. These events placed this country in the happiest condition. Of the proceeds of the direct and internal taxes voted by the predecessors of the administration of Mr. Jefferson, one moiety at least came into the Treasury after their dismissal from office. But these proceeds were not necessary to give an overflow of money into the Treasury, which we never ceased to have until we departed from those principles of government and that policy which brought us into power. We sailed on for some time in the full tide of successful experiment, unobstructed by squalls or adverse gales, if we except only the Yazoo breeze. That question was, if I forget not, the first cause of a breach between those persons who had a direct lead in the Government of the country. There were men who did not hesitate, in opposition to all the heads of your Departments, to throw themselves into the breach at that time attempted in the constitution of the country, to defend it, and to defend it with success. It appears, from some documents that have lately been laid upon our table, that errors of that day have been perceived, and that tender consciences which at that time revolted, are now entirely reconciled to the compromise which was then stamped with the reprobation of almost every honest man from Georgia to Virginia. There were considerations of personal feeling which gave to other parts of the Union, and to certain individuals therein, a bias on that subject; and I should be extremely sorry to be considered as passing any thing like general censure upon the advocates of that measure in or out of this House. I refer only, of course, to those who were not parties concerned in the fraud.

At that time, sir, all was prosperity and joy. At that time were accumulated in the Treasury those surpluses which, in one year, nearly equalled the sum for which, in the present year, the revenue is deficient, notwithstanding the loan of last year, and to make up which deficiency the head of the Treasury has been able to devise no other means than a resort to new loans. Yes, sir, there were then those surpluses in the Treasury, the ghosts of which lingered along its vaults for a time after their corporeal bodies departed, and were then heard of no more.

But to proceed. The expenditures of the Government, during the first four years of the Jefferson Administration, exclusive of payments on account of the public debt, averaged only eight millions of dollars a year. In the four last years of the Jefferson Administration, those expenditures were very greatly increased, amounting in the year 1808, (the last of the four,) without any increase of Army and Navy expenditures, to upwards of sixteen millions of dollars—rivalling the expenditures of any one year of Mr. Adams's war, and amounting to one-half as much as was expended by the Father of his Country in his eight years of the Presidency, during which he was called upon to establish public credit, to maintain a bloody Indian war, and to lay the foundation of that character of integrity which the Government has so long sustained abroad, notwithstanding the misconduct of its rulers. Yes, sir, it is a curious but notorious fact, that in 1808 and 1809—and I speak of 1809, for, although the present incumbent came into office on the 3d of March of that year, expenses were incurred and voted in his predecessor's time—the expenditures of the Government outraged all belief when compared with the objects on which they were lavished. And here, Mr. Chairman, let me put to you, and to the gentleman on my right, if it be within the compass of any man's powers to detract more from the merit of an administration of the Government of the United States in managing at least one branch of the revenue than has been done by that honorable gentleman? What has he said? I will not repeat his words; to do so would be odious, invidious; but I well know if what he did say had come from the other side of the House, it would have been set down to the rancor of party spirit; to personal spleen; or to want of respect for the White house, or the Red house, or some other house. What has become of that vast amount of money? No man knows; and to the best of my knowledge and belief, so help me God, no man will ever know.

I find, as I anticipated, a difficulty in dragging along my miserable body, and my feeble mind, in this discussion; a difficulty not less, perhaps, than that of dragging along with me the attention of members of this House. I ask its patience, its pardon, and its pity.

But to continue. In this prosperous state of our country, the war in Europe was renewed, or about to be renewed. The Government of the United States would naturally, from the situation of affairs in that quarter of the world, experience a temporary diminution in its revenue, which it need not feel or regard, because it had been enabled to make that noble provision for a sinking fund, for lessening the national debt, for paying off the mortgages on the estate of every man in the country and of those who are unborn. It had made that noble provision, which was attempted to be diverted to the necessities created by the policy of the last four years of Jefferson's Administration, and the actual diversion of which, I believe, was the first act of this Administration. It had made that appropriation of eight millions of dollars for a sinking fund, not to be touched for any other purpose, and which, at the time of the appropriation, no man dared to believe would be gambled away.

The war in Europe brought to this country, among other birds of passage, a ravenous flock of neutralized carriers, which interposed the flag of neutrality, not only between the property, but even between the persons of the two belligerent powers; and it was their clamor principally, aided by the representations of those of our merchants who saw and wished to participate in the gains of such a commerce, that the first step was taken in that policy of restriction, which it was then foreseen would lead to the disastrous condition in which we now find ourselves. Yes, it was then foreseen and foretold. What was then prophesied is now history. It is so. "You," said the prophet, "are prospering beyond all human example. You, favorites of Almighty God, while all the rest of the world are scourged, and ravaged, and desolated by war, are about to enter into a policy called preventive of war; a policy which comes into this House in the garb of peace, but which must end in war." And in war it has ended. Yes, sir, we have been tortured, fretted, goaded, until at last, like some poor man driven from his family by discord at home, who says to himself, "any thing, even exile, is better than this," we have said that we will take war; we will take any thing for a change. And when war came, what said the people? They said, "any thing for a change!"

At that time circumstances occurred, and I hope the House will pardon me for alluding to them. It is absolutely necessary that I should do so. They have been spoken of by others before me; they were at the time, and have been since, detailed in the most solemn manner on the floor of this body. A denial of them has been challenged and never received. At that time, I repeat, circumstances occurred which made it my duty to oppose the projects of the Executive Government of this country in its relations with foreign powers.

At that time nothing that the Spanish Government could do, not even the invasion of our own territory, not even the capture and carrying off, not from our decks, but our soil, a portion of our citizens, could rouse this House to a spirit which would, in my judgment, have comported not only with its honor, but was absolutely indispensable to its dignity. We were wanting in the assertion of the rights of our own country over its soil and jurisdiction, by which assertion, then, we might have averted the calamities which have since befallen us; but a project for that purpose, recommended by the committee to whom that subject was referred, did not meet the approbation of the House. And from that day and date, the black cloud has thickened over us; has become more and more dense. From that day and date, have we departed from those counsels—in my humble judgment, at least—from those principles, adherence to which had induced the people of the United States to clothe us with their power and confidence.

What have we done since? From that day, with a short interruption, the policy of this Government has actually subserved, as far as it could, the purposes of France. I speak of facts; of facts susceptible of proof, which may be felt, seen, touched, heard, and understood by all except those too indolent to examine them, or too ignorant for the light of truth to have any effect upon their understandings. I say, sir, that the policy of this Government has, from that time, subserved the purposes of France. And how do I prove it? Why, sir, by way of meeting the French decrees, which prohibit to us all intercourse with Great Britain, we cut off the intercourse between us and the whole world. We virtually held out to our great commercial cities—to Boston, New York, Philadelphia, Baltimore, and Charleston—the same language as Bonaparte had held to his own cities: "I know that you are suffering, and unhappy; that the grass is growing in your streets; that the ships at your wharves are rotting, until they are fit only for fuel; that your trade is dwindling only to nothing; but what is all that to my continental system? What are a few seaport towns—enterprising, wealthy, and prosperous, as indeed they are—what are they, compared to my continental system?" And, sir, what was our "restrictive" system? Similar in point of effect—certainly cotemporaneous in point of time—to Bonaparte's "continental system." Sir, it is a matter susceptible of demonstration, if I possessed the physical power to go through with it, that the system recommended by the then President of the United States, of laying an embargo on all ships and vessels in our ports, for the purpose of "keeping in safety these essential resources," took place in consequence of a communication from our Minister in Paris to this Government, transmitting certain correspondence of his with the French Government. And although in the message to both Houses of Congress, recommending the measure, the President does use the term "belligerent powers," I do attest the fact, and I call upon other gentlemen, who know it, to attest it also, that, while the message purposely referred to both "belligerents," not one scrip of manuscript relating to the other "belligerent" accompanied that message; nor was there any thing contained in that message relating to that "belligerent," but a scrap from an English paper, about the size of a square of its columns, containing some speculations of a London editor; and I say that there did not exist in this House, nor in this nation—if there did, let the evidence be produced—any knowledge of the existence of the orders in council, which have been put forward as justifying the embargo. If their existence had been known at the time, would the President in his message recommending an embargo have failed to notice the fact? Would he not have used it as one of the strongest inducements to the adoption of this system? Would those "orders" not have been published in the National Intelligencer, which is considered—and certainly not without cause, in view of certain things which we have lately seen in it—to be the Court paper? Produce the National Intelligencer of that date; there is not one syllable to be found in it concerning the Orders in Council. No, sir, in his message on the occasion referred to, the President did not produce any acts of the "belligerents" referred to, but only the correspondence between General Armstrong, our Minister at Paris, and that Government, on the subject of the construction of one of its first decrees. It was in consequence of the more recent decrees of France, and not of the British Orders in Council, that the embargo was recommended and laid. And yet, in the discussion which came off on that measure, it was represented as a weapon against England, which would be more efficient than any war, and must bring her to our feet: it would give effect to the object which Bonaparte had in view, of destroying her by consumption, by cutting her off from the commerce of the world. Although I state these facts, I know that it may be proven—and I am sorry that it can—by reference to the journals of this House, and by a report, too, of an honorable and respectable committee of this House, that the embargo was designed to obviate the effects of the Orders in Council.

But, sir, it is indisputably true, that there was no mention in the embargo message of those Orders in Council—no allusion to them in debate upon it—no knowledge of them at the time that the embargo law was passed, that can be proven by any document whatsoever entitled to the least respect; and I will even go so far as to allow as evidence the authority of any newspaper. The members of that committee had heard so much of the Orders in Council, and the effect that it was pretended that the embargo would have upon them, that in their report, speaking of them, they absolutely transposed cause and effect. It is unfortunate that it should be so; but it is nevertheless true. Events subsequent to the period to which I have now brought myself have been detailed in this debate in a manner so clear, so lucid, so convincing, by two honorable gentlemen from New York, that there is no need of my repeating the narrative: but I must be permitted to say that the statement made yesterday by a gentleman from New York, (Mr. Emott,) will be refuted when Euclid shall come to be considered a shallow sophist, and not before. My honorable friend from the same State, who spoke a few days ago, called upon gentlemen to handle that part of the subject—the revocation of the Berlin and Milan decrees, and the inveiglement thereby of this country into a war with England—in a manner more able than, he was pleased to say, he himself had done it. The attempt to do this would, indeed, be to gild refined gold, to paint the lily, to add to the perfume of the violet—in all cases a most ridiculous and wasteful excess. And yet, sir, the situation in which I unhappily stand, and in which it was my lot to stand at the conclusion of the last session of Congress, compels me to say a word on this subject. You will remember, sir, that it was my misfortune, during the first session of this Congress, to oppose the attempt to impress upon this House and the nation certain most preposterous, absurd, and false propositions; for the temerity of which effort I came under the censure—implied, at least, if not to say direct—of this honorable body. The contrary propositions, which I undertook to maintain, were, first, that the Berlin and Milan decrees were not repealed on the first of November, 1810, and that the only evidence of any such repeal, up to that date, was the President's Proclamation of the second of that month; and secondly, that the British Orders in Council did, in point of fact, establish no serious insurmountable obstacle to negotiation between that Government and the United States. Why, sir, I shall not here go into any argument on this point; if I had the ability, I have not the will; and, if I had the will, I have not the ability. Nor can it be necessary, when the Emperor of France himself comes into court, and cannot reject his own authority, as borne in his own laws. Yes, sir, he did come forth, and, in his antedated decree of the 28th of April, 1811—though it unquestionably ought to bear date full twelve months later—does, in the most offensive of all possible ways, establish the fact, not only that the Berlin and Milan decrees were not repealed (as all the world knew except the President of the United States) on the first of November, 1810, but that they were in his mind when he issued his decree, dated 28th April, 1811. They were repealed, finally, in consequence—of what? Of your doing that which for years he had been attempting, by menace and blandishment, to induce you to do—that is to say, embark in war with England, taking sides with France, "causing," as the phrase was, "our flag to be respected:" And this, too, after your having posted up in the ledger of this House that war with one of the "belligerents" was equivalent to submission to the other!

My other proposition was, that the Orders in Council constituted no insurmountable obstacle to negotiation between this country and Great Britain. And what was the fact in regard to them? Why, that almost at the time that this position was taken on this floor—a few weeks only thereafter—the Orders in Council were repealed.

I put it to you, sir, and to the great mass of the people of this country—to the honest, laborious, unsuspecting, kind-hearted, confiding, generous, and just people—had the fact been known that the French decrees were not repealed, and that the Orders in Council were repealed, whether any man, in any station, would have had the confidence to propose a declaration of war against England, taking part against her, and siding with France in the conflict in which those nations are engaged?

And, whilst I am upon this subject, permit me to say, suppose the proposition which was repeatedly made—in more than one instance by the person who is now addressing you, and supported with the greatest ability by gentlemen on the other side of the House—to postpone our declaration of war against Great Britain until the autumn, when we might be in some state of preparation and readiness for it—had succeeded, what would have been the consequence? At this time we should have been at peace; we should have been lying secure in that snug safe haven of neutrality, in which the good sense of the greatest and best men of this country have always attempted to moor the public ship. Now, where are we? And shall this war be called a popular war; a war of the people; a war called for by the public voice, into which this country has been plunged, not more by the agency of the friends of Government than of its enemies, in the hope of the latter that this Administration would sink and founder in it, and they rise to power thereupon? Is it possible that that can be deemed a war of the people, a popular war, which has enabled a gentleman known to be of the most respectable connections, and possessed, I believe, of considerable talent—but who, put in competition with the veteran politician now at the helm of Government, is but a boy in politics—a person whose pretensions are so extremely inferior, to rival the present Chief Magistrate in the confidence of the people, and for a time, as you know, make him tremble for his re-election? It is, however, some consolation to reflect that, in all free Governments, the public voice will sooner or later be heard upon all their measures, and in condemnation of those which the opinion of that public detests and execrates. This is a great law of politics; it is to the political what gravitation is to the physical world; it cannot be counteracted. Statesmen know it, feel it; they do not reason to it, but from it; they never lose sight of it, but are guided by it in all their measures. And those of us who live to see the next Congress, will live to see the effects of that law in this House.

Sir, we have passed so many laws, we have had so many objects for enticing the belligerents on the one hand and coercing them on the other, and enticing and coercing them together, that I feel some little difficulty, in the present state of my brain, in referring to them by title or date; but it is the law passed on this subject, in consequence of which the celebrated letter of the 1st of August of the Duc de Cadore was written, to which I desire most particularly to refer. If, after the proclamation of the President of the United States of the 1st of November thereafter, issued in consequence of that letter, revoking so much of our non-intercourse law as related to France, an unbroken warfare being kept up by France on our commerce—a fact as notorious as the existence of any fact in nature—was it not good cause for reinstating the law in relation to France, and putting her on her ancient ground? Then I would be glad to know, for one, whether our continuing at war with England was any better cause for keeping up the interdiction in relation to her, after she had revoked her Orders in Council? In other words, it being admitted by gentlemen on one side, as it has been contended by gentlemen on the other, that the revocation of the Orders in Council by Great Britain was such a one as did satisfy the terms of the non-intercourse act, what was the reason that the proclamation required by our law in such case did not issue? Why, sir, the state of war between the United States and Great Britain being offensive on our part—being of our own making—was held to be a cause why we cannot execute our law as relates to her. Now, whilst the continued war upon us by France, by seizures of our merchant vessels and their cargoes, is not considered an obstacle to its execution in regard to her, is it not as clear as the noon-day sun, that if the making of war by France on the United States did not constitute any good cause for withholding the revocation as to her, when she professed to have repealed her Berlin and Milan decrees, there was no reason why it should not have been extended to Great Britain also, when she actually repealed her Orders in Council?

I am extremely at a loss to say whether my judgment, my memory, my imagination, or my command of words, fit me for the expression of the few scattered ideas I have on this subject; I fear that they may fail me. But I believe it will be conceded, on all hands, that if, after the revocation of the British Orders in Council, the President of the United States had, as he honorably might have done, made that repeal the basis of negotiation with Great Britain, there is not a man in this country—certainly there is none among his admirers and adherents—who would not have hailed him as the restorer of the peace and prosperity of the country, which had been so idly (I had almost said so wickedly) disturbed. But, regardless of every consequence, we went into war with England as an inconsiderate couple go into matrimony, without considering whether they have the means of sustaining their own existence, much less that of any unfortunate progeny that should happen to be born of them. The sacrifice was made. The blood of Christians enjoying the privileges of jury trial, of the writ of habeas corpus, of the freedom of conscience, of the blessings of civil liberty, citizens of the last Republic that ambition has left upon the face of a desolate earth—the blood of such a people was poured out as an atonement to the Moloch of France. The Juggernaut of India is said to smile when it sees the blood flow from the human sacrifice which its worship exacts; the Emperor of France might now smile upon us. But no, sir, our miserable offering is spurned. The French monarch turns his nose and his eyes another way. He snuffs on the plains of Moscow a thousand hecatombs, waiting to be sacrificed on the shrine of his ambition; and the city of the Czars, the largest in the world, is to be at once the altar and the fire of sacrifice to his miserable ambition. And what injury has the Emperor of Russia done to him? For what was he contending? For national existence; for a bare existence; for himself and the people who are subject to his sway. And what, sir, are you doing? Virtually fighting the battles of his foes; surrendering yourself to the views of his adversary, without a plea—without any thing to justify your becoming the victims of his blasting ambition.

Yes, sir, after having for years attempted to drive us by menace into war with England, when he has seen us fairly embarked in it, and the champions of human rights bleeding in his cause, the Ruler of France has turned with contempt from your reclamations; he has left your Minister, who was charged with those reclamations, to follow him in his Russian campaign, to whip up his jaded Pegasus, and, travelling at his heels, to overtake him if he can.[34]

For these injuries and insults what atonement has been made? What satisfaction has been received for your plundered property? And what is the relation in which you stand to France? At this moment, when it is well known that it would not require one additional man in the army or navy to make good, in the eye of nations, your character as an independent and high-spirited people, you are prostrate at the feet of your's and the world's undoer. Is there any thing yet wanting to fill up the full measure of injustice you have sustained? Gentlemen on all sides are obliged to admit that the provocation which we have received from France is ample; that the cup of it is overflowing. And yet, what is our situation in relation to that destroyer of mankind—him who, devising death to all that live, sits like a cormorant on the tree of life; who cannot be glutted, nor tired, with human carnage; the impersonation of death; himself an incarnate death?

All this, I say, does prove—and if it does not I call on gentlemen to disprove the fact—that there is a difference in the standard by which we measure French aggressions and the aggressions of any other people under the sun. When Spain was the ally of France she was—what? She was secure from our indignation. There was not a murderer, a barbarian, in all our Western wilderness that was not safe under the Spanish cloak. For why? Because the King of Spain, such as he was—for he wore only the semblance of a crown—was in alliance with France; and he must not be touched.

But what has Revolutionary Spain done? What offence has she committed against France? That she is not only helpless, destitute of resources, unable to return a blow, but, above all, is coveted by France, are considerations which cannot justify, on the part of France, conduct towards her more infamous than that of the English at Copenhagen—conduct cowardly as it is unprincipled. But, sir, I forewarn gentlemen of the Southern country—I do beseech them, with a sincerity which no man can have a right to question—to beware how they transfer the theatre of war from the rocks and snows of Canada to the sandhills, the rice-fields, the tobacco plantations of the Southern States. For them to think of voluntarily consenting to make that region the theatre of the war, would compel me to believe that they are on the verge of that madness which precedes the destruction of all doomed by Heaven to perish.

Sir, I have just touched, with trembling and faltering hand, some of the preliminary observations which I had intended, at some time or other, to make, into which I have now been prematurely forced to enter, not more unexpectedly than unavoidably, by the strange turn which this debate has taken.

There are two other points—for, in respect to the Orders of Council, I shall not say a word about them—upon which I am very anxious to offer myself to your attention: the one the celebrated point of impressment, which, though it has been very ably handled, is not yet exhausted: the other the Indian war on our Western border. And I also wish to say something on the subject of negotiation. In the midst of a war with one of the greatest powers of Europe, why should the gleam of the tomahawk and the scalping-knife, the cries of massacred women and children reaching our ears—why should these fright us from our propriety? Why, we are told the Indians of the West have been stirred up to war with us by British agents. But what is the fact? That we have no Indian war, but a war of our own seeking, as I have already, in the course of this session, read to you certain proofs; and I will now give you another. It is this: It is agreed on all hands—no man has attempted to dispute it—that, in the affair of the battle of Tippecanoe, the commander and the officers distinguished themselves by the greatest gallantry. How has it happened, then, that while we have been freely voting medals to those gallant officers of our navy who have distinguished themselves on the ocean—and I hope we shall vote them something more substantial—not a whisper has been heard in relation to those who have been engaged in this expedition against the Indians? The subject has not been even inquired into.