TWELFTH CONGRESS.—SECOND SESSION. PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES. (continued 5)

It had been said by a gentleman from Connecticut (Mr. Pitkin) that the nature of the war had been changed; the principal cause had been removed by the British Order in Council of June 23d, 1812, by which her previous orders were repealed; that it was a well-ascertained fact that war would not have taken place if this intelligence had reached the United States before its declaration; and that the Executive ought to have acceded to the terms proposed through Admiral Warren, and have terminated the contest. These were grounds which demanded some consideration, and he trusted that he would be able to show, from authentic documents, that his premises were erroneous, and that of course his conclusions did not follow. But he would now admit, for the sake of argument, (what he should hereafter prove incorrect,) that the Orders in Council were the principal cause of the war; he could not, for himself, see how, even then, the war ought in justice to have terminated. Did it follow that minor considerations should be placed out of view or yielded up entirely? Would it have been proper for the Government to have entered into no stipulations for the security of American seamen? Would it have been proper in them to have claimed on behalf of our citizens no indemnity for the vast amount of spoliations which have been made on the property of American merchants? Unquestionably not. Until these considerations, admitting them to be of minor importance, should have been satisfactorily adjusted, to have made a peace, in his opinion, would have been the height of impolicy. Sir, said he, it is not sufficient that the injury should cease, but that ample compensation should be made for the commission of the wrong. This was the case every day between individuals in civil society, and why ought not the rule to apply with equal force to States, in their relation to each other? Justice was its foundation, and that would operate upon the one as well as the other. These considerations alone, perhaps, ought to be deemed sufficient to show that the course the gentlemen would have taken would have been unwise. But, supposing them to have no weight, he thought it might be satisfactorily shown that, to have acceded to the terms proposed by the British Government, would have been an actual abandonment of the principal cause which had induced hostilities. To have negotiated without entering into an arrangement in relation to the important interest of impressment, would unquestionably have been a relinquishment of the right which we claimed, to be exempted from its exercise. But it was said that was a secondary consideration. From whence was this conclusion drawn? Were we more regardful of the property than the personal liberty of the citizen? Was it taken from an impression which had gone abroad in the country? or from the unofficial conversation of the members of the House? These opinions (if the expression were allowed) he would call extra judicial, and entitled to no consideration. But to show that impressment was the principal cause, he would resort to the best evidence of which the case was susceptible. He would appeal to the archives and records of the country, which, in his opinion, would be conclusive, to show what the opinions of Congress were upon that subject. And, in the first place, would call the attention of the House to the report of the committee to whom our foreign affairs were intrusted, which was made on the 29th of November, 1811. After commenting on the operation of the Orders in Council, they say:

"That they are not of that sect whose worship is at the shrine of a calculating avarice, and while they are laying before the House the just complaints of our merchants against the plunder of their ships and cargoes, they cannot refrain from presenting to the justice and humanity of their country the unhappy case of our impressed seamen. Although the groans of these victims of barbarity for the loss of (what would be dearer to Americans than life) their liberty; although the cries of their wives and children in the privation of protectors and parents have of late been drowned in the louder clamors at the loss of property; yet is the practice of forcing our mariners into the British navy, in violation of the rights of our flag, carried on with unabated rigor and severity. If it be our duty to encourage the fair and legitimate commerce of the country by protecting the property of the merchant, then, indeed, by as much as life and liberty are more estimable than ships and goods, so much more impressive is the duty to shield the persons of our seamen, whose hard and honest services are employed equally with those of the merchants, in advancing, under the mantle of its laws, the interests of their country."

Again, the same committee, in the report which they made to the House, detailing the causes which should induce the House to declare war, say, (after speaking of the evils flowing from the Orders in Council:)

"That they will proceed to the consideration of another wrong, which has been still more severely felt. This is the impressment of our seamen, a practice which has been unceasingly maintained by Great Britain in the wars to which she has been a party since our Revolution. That they cannot convey, in adequate terms, the deep sense which they entertain of the injustice and oppression of this proceeding. Under the pretext of impressing British seamen, Americans were seized in British ports, on the high seas, and in every other quarter to which the British power extends, were taken on board British men of war, and compelled to serve there as British subjects. In this mode our citizens were wantonly snatched from their own country and their families; deprived of their liberty, and doomed to an ignominious and slavish bondage; compelled to fight the battles of a foreign country, and often to perish in them. Our flag has given them no protection; it has been unceasingly violated, and our vessels exposed to danger by the loss of the men taken from them. That while this practice is continued, it is impossible for the United States to consider themselves an independent nation, for every case produces a new proof of their degradation."

These reports, by the adoption of the measures they recommended, were sanctioned by the Congress of the United States, and may be considered as furnishing strong, if not full and complete evidence, that the Legislative department of the Government considered the impressment of our seamen as the principal cause which impelled them to have recourse to the last resort of injured nations. The opinion of the Executive had been manifested in clear and explicit terms upon the subject, in the Message of the Chief Magistrate of the 1st of June, 1812. Thus we have these concurrent proofs against the assertions of the gentleman from Connecticut, (Mr. Pitkin.) If, then, as it appears clearly to have been, from the documents before alluded to, that impressment was the principal cause of the war, that it was an injury which no independent nation could submit to without surrendering a portion of its sovereignty, would it not be admitted, even on the ground which had been taken, that, to have terminated the war by acceding to the propositions alluded to, would have been degrading to the nation, and have manifested the incompetency of the Executive to have conducted with firmness the helm of State which had been submitted to his guidance and direction? And no doubt could be entertained had such an event taken place, but we should have heard denunciations against the Administration proceeding from the very quarter whence they now flow. Then they would have been made with infinitely more justice, because they would have been supported by reason and by truth. We should have then found the opposition appealing to the sympathies of the people, and proclaiming that their most inestimable rights had been surrendered by Government in the pacification; that although they were originally opposed to a war, when it had once been declared they would have prosecuted it until the claim had been abandoned by the British Government. For, it cannot be concealed that unless, in the present contest, Great Britain can be compelled to relinquish her claim to the right of impressment, unless it be made the sine qua non by the American Government, to any arrangement of the existing differences between the two nations, our claim to exemption from the practice must be forever given up, and Great Britain will feel herself at liberty to continue to exercise it with ten-fold rigor and severity.

Mr. A. declared that, notwithstanding the clamor of French influence and French alliance, he felt no apprehensions upon that subject, as he was well convinced it was not the intention or wish of our Government to engulf us in the unfathomable vortex of European warfare. One word to the gentleman from New York (Mr. Gold) and he had done. It had been considered by him as a most unfortunate circumstance that we should be engaged in a war with Great Britain when Russia was struggling for her independence. The most amicable relations existed, it was true, between Russia and the United States; but would the gentleman have us on that account to submit to every species of indignity from the ally of that power? He beheld with as much detestation and abhorrence the conduct of the French Emperor as any man could possibly do. His ambitious progress was everywhere marked with blood. The vengeance of Heaven, he trusted, would arrest him in his career to universal conquest and dominion. The present condition of Russia, although her people groaned under a despotism of the most unrelenting nature, must excite the sympathy of every man in this country, because she was contending for her independence, and he would wish her complete success in the war in which she was now engaged, but that her triumph would protract the restoration of peace to his own country.

Mr. Grundy.—Mr. Speaker, had this debate been confined to the bill before you, I should certainly not have troubled the House with any remarks of mine; but as the gentlemen opposed to the war in which we are engaged have selected this as a fit occasion to bring before this House and the nation a full view of all the relations which exist between this and other countries, an apology at least is furnished for a member of that committee, to whose examination these subjects have been confided, to give his ideas upon the various points suggested. This I shall endeavor to do with temper and moderation.

I will now proceed to state, as accurately and as concisely as I am able, the manner in which the points in difference between the two nations ought to be considered.

Upon some of the subjects in controversy, for instance, that of impressment, negotiation had been tried unsuccessfully for twenty years, as I will show before I sit down, from the public records of the country; on others it had been tried for a shorter period. At the last session of Congress, when every hope of obtaining justice in any other way was lost, the United States declared war, not to procure a repeal of the Orders in Council only, but to obtain redress for the unjust spoliations which had been committed on the property of American citizens, and to cause Great Britain to cease the practice of impressment. Other causes of irritation existed, but these were the prominent causes of the war. It may be taken as granted, in this discussion, that those orders are revoked, notwithstanding the objectionable manner of the revocation. You are now asked to lay down the sword before you have obtained any of the objects of the war, except the abolition of these obnoxious orders. I request gentlemen to reflect, whether this is not, in point of fact, an abandonment of the other points in dispute? Do you not, by ceasing to prosecute the war which is already commenced, declare, in the strongest possible terms, that you will not make war for the injuries which remain unredressed? Can any man persuade himself that you will obtain that by negotiation for which you have determined you will not fight! and that, too, from a nation at all times disposed to depress this growing country? That politician must have a very imperfect knowledge of the considerations which influence all Cabinets, who does not know that the strongest inducement which can be brought to operate in favor of an injured nation, is the apprehension of retaliation, or fear of war, entertained by the other party. I cannot, perhaps, establish this more clearly in any other way than by recurring to the history of a transaction which took place between the United States and Great Britain. Immediately after the attack on the Chesapeake, this Government demanded reparation. The terms proposed were reasonable, and such as a nation, inclined to act justly, would promptly have acceded to. For five years, or more, did the British Government refuse, or rather fail, to make that arrangement, which, at the last session, produced a satisfactory adjustment on that subject. Why, sir, was justice so long delayed, and why was it at last obtained? The British Minister discovered a determination in Congress to submit no longer. He saw that, unless something was done, friendly relations between the two countries must immediately cease. He saw that public sentiment called so loudly for an opportunity of obtaining that justice by force which had been refused to fair argument, that he granted us that reasonable satisfaction which had been so long withheld. Sir, had he not seen the approaching storm, no atonement for that wanton outrage on our national sovereignty had yet been made. If you now say that you will not prosecute the war, the enemy must view it as a decision pronounced by this Government, that war shall not be waged by the American nation for the impressment of her citizens, or for depredations committed on commerce. It might as well be said, in plain, intelligible language, that the ocean is to be abandoned by the people of the United States, except so far as depends on the will of Great Britain. If both the property and liberty of American citizens on the ocean are subject to her disposal, you cease to possess the rights of a sovereign and independent nation. For my own part, if we have the right to claim security for the liberty and property of our citizens against that nation, of which no man dare express a doubt, I am for asserting it until the object is attained, or the ability of this nation fails; of the latter I have no fear.

It is pretended that this Government is not desirous of peace, and that this is a war of conquest and ambition. I beg gentlemen to refrain from making statements which they themselves do not believe. After the declaration of war, what has been the conduct of the Executive? Through Mr. Russell, our Chargé des Affaires at London, they have offered to conclude an armistice on terms which would remove every pretext for complaint on the part of Great Britain. He proposed that this country should exclude from her service British seamen. It is true that Lord Castlereagh urged Mr. Russell's want of powers, and stated that the American Congress alone could make the necessary provisions on that subject. If, however, sincerity had existed with the British Ministry, a temporary arrangement could have been made, by which hostilities would have been suspended until the legitimate authorities of this country could have expressed an opinion. If Mr. R. had not adequate powers to conclude an armistice, the proposition made by Mr. Monroe to Admiral Warren was not liable to the same objection. In substance, both propositions were the same; to the latter, no offer of compliance has been tendered. If I have any objections to the late overtures made by the Executive, it is that too great an anxiety for peace is manifested; but when the nature of our institutions is consulted, a strong propensity for domestic quiet is discovered; and, therefore, the Administration should be indulged in any measure calculated to restore harmony between the two countries, provided the honor and interests of the nation are not compromitted.

I ask gentlemen in opposition to lay aside party feelings, and reflect whether, if we now recede, points are not conceded to the enemy, which they would not yield if in power. They affect to be the followers of Washington. I will show them what his opinions were on the subject of impressment. From them the pretended Washingtonians of the present day will discover their degeneracy. Yes, sir, the Father of his Country too well understood the value of liberty ever to consent that the most obscure individual of his country should be deprived of it by a foreign despot. So early as the year 1792, the British nation commenced the practice of impressment, as now exercised by it. On the 11th day of June, in that year, the then Secretary of State addressed a letter to Mr. Pinkney, the American Minister at London, in which the practice of impressment is strongly reprobated; and let it be remembered, that although this letter was written by the Secretary, it contained the sentiments of the President of the United States. In order that the House may more fully comprehend what were the sentiments of that man, whose memory we all venerate, I will read so much of the letter referred to, as relates to this subject:

"The peculiar custom in England of impressing seamen on every appearance of war will occasionally expose our seamen to peculiar oppressions and vexations. It will be expedient that you take proper opportunities in the mean time of conferring with the Minister on this subject, in order to form some arrangement for the protection of our seamen on those occasions. We entirely reject the mode which was the subject of a conversation between Mr. Morris and him; which was, that our seamen should always carry about them certificates of their citizenship. This is a condition never yet submitted to by any nation—one with which seamen would never have the precaution to comply. The casualties of their calling would expose them to the constant destruction or loss of this paper evidence; and thus the British Government would be armed with legal authority to impress the whole of our seamen. The simplest rule will be, that the vessel being American, shall be evidence that the seamen on board her are such."

If, at so early a period, the right of search for men was objected to by this Government, how much more forcible is the objection now? We were then a young nation; we have since increased in resources by which our rights can be maintained; whilst the violation of those rights have been augmented in a greater degree. On the 6th of November, 1792, the Secretary of State wrote to the American Minister at London a letter, in which, when speaking on the subject of impressment, the following language is used: "It is unnecessary to develop to you the inconveniences of this conduct, and the impossibility of letting it go on. I hope you will be able to make the British Ministry sensible of the necessity of punishing the past and preventing the future." I know, Mr. Speaker, that there is danger of fatiguing the House by recurring to documents of this sort, but my apology is a good one: those to which I refer have never been printed for the information of the members of this House, nor have the public had an opportunity of inspecting them. I hope, therefore, to be indulged in pursuing the sentiments of former Administrations further on a subject of so much interest. On the 20th of February, 1800, Mr. Pickering, Secretary of State, addressed the President of the United States on the subject of a proposed treaty between the two countries, upon which occasion he makes the following remark: "That he transmits Mr. Liston's note of the 4th of February, together with his project of a treaty for the reciprocal delivery of deserters; which appears to the Secretary utterly inadmissible, unless it would put an end to impressment; which Mr. Liston seemed to imagine, while the seventh paragraph of his project expressly recognizes the right of impressing British subjects, and consequently American citizens as at present." Mr. Wolcott, Secretary of the Treasury, when giving his opinion to the President, says—"That the project of a treaty proposed by His Britannic Majesty for the reciprocal delivery of deserters from the land and naval service, does not sufficiently provide against the impressment of American seamen, and is therefore deemed inadmissible."

Mr. Stoddert, who acted as Secretary of the Navy, at that period, when advising the President on the same subject, says—"That the Secretary is clearly of opinion that it is better to have no article, and meet all consequences, than not to enumerate merchant vessels, on the high seas, among the things not to be forcibly entered in search of deserters."

The letter of the present Chief Justice of the United States to Mr. King, Minister at London, dated on the 20th of September, 1800, places this subject in a strong light; he says—

"The impressment of our seamen is an injury of very serious magnitude, which deeply affects the feelings and the honor of the nation. This valuable class of men is composed of natives and foreigners, who engage voluntarily in our service. No right has been asserted to impress the natives of America. Yet they are impressed; they are dragged on board British ships of war, with the evidence of citizenship in their hand, and forced by violence then to serve until conclusive testimonials of their birth can be obtained. These must most generally be sought for on this side the Atlantic. In the mean time acknowledged violence is practised on a free citizen of the United States by compelling him to engage and to continue in foreign service. Although the Lords of the Admiralty uniformly direct their discharge on the production of this testimony, yet many must perish unrelieved, and all are detained a considerable time in lawless and injurious confinement. It is the duty as well as the right of a friendly nation to require that measures be taken by the British Government to prevent the continued repetition of such violence by its agents. This can only be done by punishing and frowning on those who perpetrate it. The mere release of the injured, after a long course of service and of suffering, is no compensation for the past and no security for the future. It is impossible not to believe that the decisive interference of the Government in this respect would prevent a practice, the continuance of which must inevitably produce discord between two nations which ought to be friends to each other."

In another part of the same letter, Mr. Marshall observes, "the United States require positively that their seamen who are not British subjects, whether born in America or elsewhere, shall be exempt from impressment."

From these documents we clearly collect what was the view which the first and second Presidents of the United States had on this subject, and that of the principal officers of the Government. It appears that this exemption from impressment is no new claim set up by men now in power. It is as old as the Government itself, and there never has been, nor can there be, an Administration in this country who dare surrender this point to any foreign power. Once relinquished, we had as well abandon the ocean altogether. If the liberty of American citizens is to be subject to the will, not of the English Government, but what is infinitely worse, of every petty officer that navigates a British ship, it is in vain that we boast of freedom; we do not possess it; and only let the British Government understand you distinctly on this point, and you need talk no more of American commerce.

It has been said, by a gentleman from North Carolina, (Mr. Pearson,) that, if we exclude British seamen from our service by law, one of two things must happen—either a peace would be the result, or the people of this country all unite in a vigorous prosecution of the war. If I have mistaken the meaning of the gentleman, I wish him to correct me at this time, and answer the question directly, if, in that event, he will support the war? [Mr. Pearson explained.] Mr. Grundy proceeded: Sir, from the explanation given, it will, I fear, be as difficult to come to an understanding with that gentleman, as it is to accommodate the points in dispute with the British Ministry; for, although the gentleman says he will not surrender an essential right of the country, a question might be made by him as to what were essential rights. I will, nevertheless, Mr. Speaker, make one more effort to elicit the opinion of the gentleman on this subject. I ask him whether he considers the impressment of American seamen "a violation of an essential right of this country?" [Mr. Pearson said he so considered it.] Then, said Mr. Grundy, from the gentleman's own declaration he is bound to support us in the war, if the principle of impressment is not relinquished by Great Britain. I have no hesitation in saying that, in a time of peace, I am willing British seamen, not naturalized in this country, should be excluded from our service. I believe that such a regulation would inflict no injury or inconvenience on the country. Whenever, therefore, a proposition to this effect is made, so as to take effect at the conclusion of the war, I shall vote for it. I consider it a direct encouragement to our own seamen, calculated to foster and cherish the enterprise and industry of that important class of our citizens.

Thursday, January 7.

Mr. Bleecker.—Mr. Chairman: I have a very few, very desultory, and I fear very unimportant observations to make on the subject now before the committee. They will be few, not because the subject does not abound with various fruitful and interesting topics, but because an indisposition of some days has unfitted me for any considerable effort of memory.

I was opposed to the war when it was declared, because I was confidently persuaded that the evils of which we complained were of a nature not to be remedied by war. I thought, too, sir, that by entering into war, we were plunging ourselves into evils a million fold greater than those from which we sought to be relieved. I was opposed to the war, because I thought that, notwithstanding all the decrees and orders of the belligerents affecting our neutral rights, we might enjoy a commerce more extensive and profitable than we could have in a time of European peace. The war in Europe was, in fact, a blessing to this country. I was opposed to the war, because I knew that the whole of one of the great political parties in the Northern and Eastern, the most commercial section of the country, which was most interested in the avowed objects of the war, openly condemned it; and I believed that a great portion of the other party was secretly opposed to it. This objection was to my mind perfectly conclusive. If there had been no other reason against the war, this was enough. What, sir, go to war when that part of the country which has most of its wealth, strength, and resources, is decidedly opposed to it! go to war for commercial and maritime rights, when the people of that part of the country which is principally interested in its commerce and navigation, openly execrate war!

It seemed to me that it became legislators who were disposed to exercise a paternal regard over the interests of the nation, to give up their own opinions, their prejudices and partialities, rather than go to war with a people thus divided. And permit me to say, sir, without any disparagement to the members of this House, that thousands and tens of thousands of the inhabitants of that part of the country of which I have been speaking, are as competent to understand the true interest and honor of the nation, as gentlemen who happen to be members of Congress.

I was opposed to the war, because I thought it might expose our happy form of Government—our excellent political institutions—to a dangerous trial. I was afraid, sir, that the war might produce a pressure upon the Government which it would not be able to sustain. I was opposed to the war, and this was the bitter draught, because it brought us into concert and co-operation with the great destroyer, the grand enemy of freedom and humanity throughout the world. I was opposed to the war, because I believed the state of things in Europe, out of which our difficulties arose—a state of things which the United States had no power to control—was in its nature transient. Rather than plunge ourselves into the vortex of European politics; rather than encounter the evils and dangers of war, I thought it would be wise and prudent to wait until "the troubled waters should subside, and the ancient landmarks of the world reappear above the flood;" with a living statesman, I thought I saw in the very cloud which blackened all our horizon, the bow which was set for a token, that the tempest would not be forever.

But, sir, war was declared, and the doctrine has since been promulgated, that it is now the duty of every man to support it; that all inquiry must be hushed, and all examination of its expediency and propriety cease. So far as this doctrine inculcates obedience to the laws, it has my cordial approbation; but inasmuch as it denies the right of the citizen to examine into the causes of the war, to express and publish his opinions respecting its policy, it is an insult to the understanding of an intelligent people, and inconsistent with the character and spirit of the constitution. War is declared by law. How shall the law be repealed? How can we get rid of the war, if we may not say that it is inexpedient, impolitic, and ruinous? How abominable the doctrine is, that the declaration of war shuts the door against all inquiry, is manifest from the consideration, that it would enable a wicked Administration to perpetuate its power by declaring war. Again, sir, I would ask the advocates of the doctrine I am reprobating, when will it be proper to show the folly and ruinous consequences of the war? Suppose the war to have continued five or ten years, and the country to be impoverished, its commerce annihilated, its resources exhausted, its best blood expended in wild and fruitless projects of conquest, the people oppressed by debts and taxes, will it then be deemed improper to expose the absurdity and mischief of continuing the war? Surely, sir, it will be patriotic and laudable to alarm the people, to entreat them to put an end to that which is the cause of their calamities. And if such conduct will then be proper, it must be laudable and patriotic now to show them their evils and dangers, and to point them to the means of escape.

But, sir, what has been the state of the country since the declaration of war? I speak again in reference to public opinion. The people of the North and East have poured out their feelings and opinions, their complaints and groans, in addresses, petitions, resolutions, and remonstrances against the war. Look, sir, at the Presidential election, and you see all the Northern and Eastern States; with the exception of Vermont, arrayed against the Administration. You see the people disregarding the old line of party division and distinction. Yes, sir, in spite of such division and distinction, "burying their mutual animosities," their ancient prejudices, "in their common detestation" of the policy of the Government, rising up in their might and strength to manifest their hostility to the course of measures it has pursued. This, Mr. Chairman, is a state of things which ought to arrest the attention, and engage the reflection of the National Legislature, for without that section of country our strength is weakness. I know how ungracious and invidious topics of this kind are to some gentlemen. But, sir, we cannot help it that the country is made up of sections. We are legislating for such a country, and it is our business and duty to regard the circumstances, the interests, and feelings of the people of different parts of the Union. We declared war for commerce; the people most interested in commerce were opposed to it. We continue the war for sailors' rights, and three-fourths of our native American seamen belong to New York and the Eastern States, the people of which are sighing for peace. It ought to be remembered, too, sir, that the war itself must have the effect of driving a vast portion of our sailors out of the country into foreign service.

But, Mr. Chairman, whatever may have been the reasons for declaring war, the question is not now what it was when war was declared. Our relations with the belligerents have materially and essentially changed. So much have they changed, that I declare, without fear of contradiction, that had they been on the 17th of June last what they now are, we should not have gone to war. I hope no gentleman of this committee will deny this. But if any gentleman should deny it, the nation will not believe him. Sir, we have received new, important, and interesting evidence of the true state of our foreign relations since the declaration of war. Facts which were then unknown, and which have shed a flood of light upon the situation and policy of the United States, have since been published to the world. The repeal of the Orders in Council itself, by removing the principal cause of the war, has produced a most material change; for had they been repealed before the war was declared, there would have been no war; and let it be remembered, that they were repealed before the war was known in England. But this is not all to which I refer. I mean to speak of the evidence we have received respecting our relations with France; and I hope gentlemen will not be startled or offended by what I am about to say. I declare confidently and boldly that Napoleon has inveigled us into the war. He has cajoled and deceived us. But for his arts, intrigues, and duplicity, the United States would not now have been at war with Great Britain. Yes, sir, he has led us on step by step, until he brought us to the edge of the precipice, and plunged us into the abyss. We have been humbled and mortified. He has triumphed over our character, our honor, our rights, our independence. I do not say these things hastily, carelessly, or lightly. And I will add, that after the discovery of the deceit and duplicity which the Emperor of France has practised upon us, it became the duty of this Government to go back to the ground it occupied before the President's proclamation of November, 1810, or to declare immediate war against France. A proper regard to the honor, the character, and independence of the country, demanded this of its Government.

Sir, the proof of what I have said is plain; and it is time that it be stated here, and spread before the nation. I beg the attention of the committee to the facts on which it rests. I need not go back farther than to the law of May, 1810, which provided that the non-intercourse act should cease, as to that belligerent which should first repeal its decrees violating our neutral rights, and that it should operate on the other, which should fail so to do, within three months after the President's proclamation of the fact of such repeal. This law, and the conduct of the President under it, are the immediate cause of the war, and the present unhappy state of the country. On the 5th of August, 1810, the Duke de Cadore wrote his famous letter to General Armstrong, the American Minister in Paris, stating that the Berlin and Milan decrees would, upon certain conditions, cease on the first of November then next. On the authority of this letter, the President of the United States issued his proclamation, declaring the fact, that the French decrees were repealed. But the British Government, not considering the letter of the Duke de Cadore sufficient evidence of their repeal, did not revoke their Orders in Council, and, in consequence, our non-intercourse act went into operation against Great Britain the February following. Notwithstanding the proclamation of the President, great doubts existed in this country, whether the French decrees were in fact repealed. To remove these doubts, to confirm the proclamation, to prevent inquiry and investigation in the judicial tribunals of the country, the act of March, 1811, was passed. Yet, sir, it has ever since been denied that the decrees of Berlin and Milan were repealed. The public prints have teemed, and the tables of this House have been loaded with the proofs of their existence and execution. You remember, sir, an impressive argument, in many respects original, an unanswered and unanswerable argument of the honorable gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Randolph) on this subject in this House, towards the close of the last session. But, sir, notwithstanding all this, this Government persisted in declaring that the French decrees were repealed. I do not mean to discuss that stale matter. The statement I make is necessary to my present purpose. The question of their repeal was the subject of a very voluminous and long-continued correspondence between Mr. Foster, the British Minister, and our Secretary of State. The discussion, I believe, was protracted to the last moment of peace. War was declared on the 18th of June. Some weeks afterwards, appeared in this country a decree of Napoleon, issued in May last, and bearing date the 28th of April, 1811. This is an extraordinary paper, and deserves some attention. I will read it:

"April 28, 1813.

"Napoleon, Emperor of the French, &c.

"On the report of our Minister of Foreign Relations:

"Seeing, by a law passed 2d March, 1811, the Congress has ordered the execution of the provisions of the act of non-intercourse, which prohibits the vessels and merchandise of Great Britain, her colonies and dependencies, from entering the ports of the United States.

"Considering that the said law is an act of resistance to the arbitrary pretensions consecrated by; the British Orders in Council, and a formal refusal to adhere to a system invading the independence of neutral powers and of their flag; we have ordered, and do decree, as follows:

"The decrees of Berlin and Milan are definitively, and to date, from 1st November last, considered as not existing in regard to American vessels."

Now, sir, did this decree exist at the time of its date? No, sir, the date is false. If the decree existed in April, 1811, why was it not communicated to this nation, the only one interested in the subject? Why was it not communicated to Mr. Russell, who so strongly urged upon the French Government the necessity of furnishing some evidence of the repeal of the decrees. For the purpose of communicating some satisfactory information on that subject to this country, he detained the John Adams in France, in July, 1811. You will remember Napoleon's decree is dated in April. Permit me here to read a passage of Mr. Russell's letter to Mr. Monroe, dated the 15th of July, 1811.

"On the 14th of June, Mr. Hamilton, of the John Adams, reached Paris, and informed me that this vessel had arrived at Cherbourg. Unwilling to close my despatches by her, without being able to communicate something of a more definite and satisfactory character than any thing which had hitherto transpired, I immediately called at the Office of Foreign Relations, but, the Minister being at St. Cloud, I was obliged to postpone the interview which I sought until the Tuesday following. At this interview, I stated to him the arrival of the frigate, and my solicitude to transmit by her to the United States some act of this Government, justifying the expectation with which the important law which she had brought hither had, undoubtedly, been passed."

After Mr. Russell had left Paris, he wrote from England to Mr. Barlow, who succeeded him, "for additional proofs of the removal of the decrees." Mr. Barlow seems to be very anxious "to get the treaty through, carrying an unequivocal stipulation, that shall lay that question to rest."

But it was all in vain; no authentic evidence of the repeal was furnished. This decree did not exist; and why was it not issued? Why was the evidence of the repeal of the decrees withheld? The answer is obvious. The United States were not yet committed to go to war with Great Britain. Napoleon knew very well that when proper evidence of the repeal of his decrees was furnished, the English Orders in Council would be repealed, and the United States would not go to war with Great Britain. For, sir, he knew very well, and we know very well, that for the subject of impressments alone, this country would not go to war. It cannot be denied, that for this cause we should not have declared war. This Government has never been disposed to go to war on that ground alone. The present President of the United States made an arrangement with Mr. Erskine, which gladdened the heart of every man in the nation, without any provision on that subject, without any mention of it; and there was not a murmur in the country, on account of its omission. Mr. Pinkney, too, as stated by the gentleman from Georgia, (Mr. Troup,) yesterday, again and again, offered to accommodate with England, on the rescinding of the Orders in council, without any reference to impressments.

Sir, this decree itself is an insult to this Government. It is issued expressly, because we had taken our stand against England; it is declared to be issued in consequence of our act of March, 1811, when, in fact, the President's proclamation and the act of March were founded on the repeal of the decrees. To show the correctness of my remarks on this part of the subject; to show that Napoleon has triumphed over our honor and character, I beg leave to call the attention of the committee to Mr. Russell's letter to Mr. Monroe, dated the 9th of June, 1811. His language does credit to his understanding and feelings:

"To have waited for the receipt of the proclamation, in order to make use of it for the liberation of the New Orleans Packet, appeared to me a preposterous and unworthy course of proceeding, and to be nothing better than absurdly and basely employing the declaration of the President, that the Berlin and Milan decrees had been revoked, as the means of obtaining their revocation. I believed it became me to take higher ground, and without confining myself to the mode best calculated to recover the property, to pursue that which the dignity of the American Government required.

"A crisis, in my opinion, presented itself, which, was to decide whether the French edicts were retracted as a preliminary to the execution of our law; or whether, by the non-performance of one party, and the prompt performance of the other, the order in which these measures ought to stand was to be reversed, and the American Government shuffled into the lead, where national honor and the law required it to follow."

It would have been base to have employed the President's proclamation, that the Berlin and Milan decrees had been revoked as the means of obtaining their revocation. But what, sir, is the price we have at length paid for the repeal? The President's proclamation was not enough; the act of March added to it was not enough; we could not procure the revocation till we went to war. For, sir, the Emperor would not issue this decree till he knew that we were pledged and committed to go to war with Great Britain. How he knew this, sir, it is not for me to say. We all know, however, that he had all the acts of this Government to satisfy him of the course we were pursuing—the step we were about to take. He had the President's Message, the report of the Committee on Foreign Relations, the war speeches of the members of this House, the laws for raising armies, and the embargo. In the month of May, then, when the policy of this country in relation to Great Britain was settled, he issued his decree, just in such time, too, sir, that it could not reach this country till we had plunged into the war. And well, in such a state, might he repeal his decrees, which, by the war itself, would be superseded—would become a nullity.

Thus, sir, believing the French decrees to be repealed, we departed from our neutral stand by enforcing the non-intercourse law against Great Britain. We have in vain waited for such evidence of their repeal as would have induced Great Britain to rescind her Orders in Council—the great cause of the war. Their revocation depended upon the repeal of the French decrees; and had they been revoked, there would have been no war between the United States and Great Britain. The decree, declaring the edicts of France to be revoked, is at length issued, when the Emperor knows it is too late to prevent the war. The decree is communicated to the English Government, the Orders in Council are revoked on the ground of the repeal of the French decrees, but the United States have declared war. How, sir, can I make this matter plainer? Our whole course against Great Britain has proceeded from the belief of the repeal of the Berlin and Milan decrees; but that evidence of their repeal, which would have stopped our course, by means of which the Orders in Council would have been revoked, and the war would have been avoided, is withheld till the Emperor knows that war is inevitable. Thus, sir, have we been duped, deceived, and inveigled.

I repeat it, sir, had we, on the 17th June, understood our foreign relations as we now understand them, we should not have declared war. And would it not have been just and magnanimous in this Government, when all doubt was removed on the subject of the French decrees, to have acknowledged its error? Did not the honor, the character, the independence of the country require of us to go back to our original neutral ground? I rose principally for the purpose of presenting this view of the arts and deceit of the French Emperor to the committee. I regret that I have not done it more fully and clearly; and I hope that some gentleman more competent to a proper examination of the subject will yet take it up before we get through this discussion.

Mr. Tallmadge said he felt a peculiar embarrassment in rising to offer to the consideration of the committee some of his own reflections on the important subject now under debate, from a twofold consideration. In the first place, the magnitude of the question might claim the aid of more exalted talents than he pretended to possess, and, therefore, to do it justice, he feared, would not be in his power. For, said Mr. T., in the extensive range of debate which has been permitted by the Chair, the whole field of our foreign relations has been open to examination, and the policy of our own Government in relation to Great Britain has been deemed fairly within the range of discussion.

In the second place, the gentlemen who had preceded have occupied the ground so ably, and discussed the subject so extensively, that it was somewhat difficult to present arguments entirely novel to arrest the attention of the committee. Having a belief, however, that there were some important considerations, in relation to the bill now under debate, which had not yet been brought into view, he begged the attention of the committee while he endeavored to lay before them the views which he had taken of the subject, and which constrained him most decidedly to oppose the passage of the bill.

Before I enter upon the merits of the subject, said Mr. T., I take occasion to express my hearty assent to declarations made by honorable gentlemen that this is no time to indulge the bickerings of party; and that it is greatly to be desired that all distinctions of this sort were entirely laid aside and forgotten. Sir, I should consider it the most auspicious event of my life if I could see every gentleman on this floor determined to take and maintain the true old American ground occupied by the patriots of '76. Although it may be painful to the feelings of an honorable mind to be assailed with odious appellations, and charged with duplicity and falsehood, yet the mind which has virtue for its basis, a conscious integrity for its support, and firmness sufficient to enable the man to do his duty, may hope to pass unhurt by such malicious darts.

Standing, as I do, in the highly-responsible situation of one of the legislators of this extensive country, I hope to have stability and integrity sufficient to enable me to discharge my duty to my constituents. If, after having passed through the Revolutionary war, and having never changed my political creed to the present day, an odious epithet could induce me to alter my course, I should be unworthy the confidence of my country. But whence, Mr. Chairman, proceeds this system of slander and abuse? From the foul presses of our country. To whom are some of the fairest characters which have ever adorned this or any other country indebted for the odious epithets of monarchists, foreign agents, tories, and the like? To your imported patriots, who, weary of the dull pursuits of industry on their native soil, or escaping from the justice of the laws of their own country, have fled to this happy land to instruct its inhabitants in the true principles of liberty and equality.

To this set of newly-fledged politicians, and men of a similar stamp, is this once happy country indebted for one-half the miseries and much of the disgrace which it suffers.

I have been led into this digression in consequence of remarks which have fallen from the other side of the House, but will now return to my subject.

A gentleman from New York, (Mr. Stow,) who addressed you early in this debate, told us that he reprobated the war, and had no confidence in the Administration to conduct it to a successful issue, but should vote for the bill to enable them to carry it on. This is strange political logic to my understanding. While I subscribe fully to his premises, the reasonings of my mind bring me to a very different result. Because I deprecate this war as pregnant with great evils, if not ruin to my country, I will, therefore, take all constitutional measures to bring it to a speedy and honorable close; and because I have no confidence in the Executive department of our Government, nor in the subordinate agents who have been appointed to vote for this bill, which, if adopted, will enlist still greater evils on this devoted country.

In presenting the subject to this honorable committee, in its most appropriate form, it may be proper to examine into the prominent causes of our dispute, which has terminated in open war with Great Britain. These I take to be three, viz:

1. The Orders in Council.

2. Impressment of our seamen.

3. The attack upon the Chesapeake.

That we may narrow the point in controversy as much as possible, I remark that ample and satisfactory atonement having been made for the violation of our rights by the attack on the Chesapeake, one cause of disquietude and a prominent one too, has been finally removed. It has indeed been frequently remarked on this floor, that the satisfaction offered for the unauthorized attack on the frigate Chesapeake was long delayed, and very reluctantly offered. However painful it may be to censure the conduct of our own Government, yet a sense of justice obliges me to say, that to every overture made by Great Britain to accommodate this unpleasant affair, our Administration attached some exceptionable condition which closed the door to an amicable adjustment. The committee cannot have forgotten the early disavowal of this wanton aggression on the honor of our flag by the British Government, and the tender of satisfaction which was made, but failed because our Minister was instructed to couple with this complaint the subject of impressment; nor can they have forgotten how indignant the Ministry and nation were when the President assumed the right of judging what would best comport with the honor of their King. Few, I believe, who read the offensive remark, expect a different result from that which ensued. And while I am upon this subject I take occasion to remark, that in all our attempts to negotiate with the British Government there seems to have been some untoward circumstance, some unfortunate condition, either accidentally or intentionally, attached to the question at issue, which has defeated the negotiation.

It would be within the scope of my present plan to take a particular review of the British Orders in Council, as well as the subject of impressments. But inasmuch as the documents relating to these two subjects have been laid on every gentleman's table; and more especially when I reflect that both topics have been very ably discussed by some gentlemen who have preceded me, and especially by the gentleman who has just sat down, (Mr. Bleecker,) I shall content myself with taking but a brief review of these prominent, and I may add, the only remaining causes for the present war. As to the Orders in Council, it ought not to be forgotten, that during several lengthy discussions to obtain their repeal, as well by our Ministers in London, as at this place, they have been considered as the prominent point in dispute. So, again, as to the origin of our restrictive system; it cannot be forgotten that the friends and abettors of those measures uniformly professed that they were adopted as retaliatory for the Orders in Council. From the first partial non-importation act, which passed on the eighteenth of April, 1806, down to the law of the second of March, 1811, the object has been, on the very face of the law, to procure a repeal of the Orders in Council, and of the Berlin and Milan decrees. If any doubt should remain on the mind of any member of this committee as to this fact, I beg him to turn his eye to the restrictive code, and I presume he will find the evidence to be abundant and complete. In this system of anti-commercial regulations, I find the origin and progress of our present political calamities. And here, Mr. Chairman, I shall readily admit, that we had grievances and complaints, great and heavy, against both of the belligerents; nor have I the least inclination to palliate or excuse them. My object is to show, what I have uniformly expressed on this floor, that our system of non-importation, non-intercourse, and embargo, have been directed against the Orders in Council, as to Great Britain, and nothing else; and finally, have brought this country into a ruinous war. Is there a man within these walls, who does not now believe (as was fully predicted when the law passed) that the conditions held out to the two great belligerents, to induce them to repeal their obnoxious edicts, violating the neutral commerce of the United States, placed the execution of our law in the hands of a foreign Government? Is there a man of ordinary capacity in the United States, having the means of information, who now believes that the Berlin and Milan decrees were repealed on the 1st of November, 1810, according to the proclamation of the President of the United States, solemnly announcing that fact; and that they thenceforward ceased to violate our neutral commerce? Does not candor constrain all to confess that, long after the pretended repeal of the aforesaid decrees, our commerce was harassed in every sea where French cruisers could reach it? Need I point you to the piratical seizures and burning of American property in the Baltic, the Mediterranean and the Atlantic seas, by the privateers and fleets of the French Empire; subsequent to this pretended repeal, and sanctioned expressly by its authority? If all other evidence should be deemed insufficient, I inquire whether the French Emperor himself has not sufficiently humbled this country (if indeed our cup of humiliation had not been full before) by his own formal antedated repeal of his Berlin and Milan decrees, long subsequent to the time imposed on the President by the Duke of Cadore?

It cannot have escaped the attention of the committee, or of the nation, that Napoleon's decree, respecting the Berlin and Milan decrees, bears date the 28th of April, 1811, and is explicitly bottomed on the law of Congress passed March 2, 1811; the sole object of which law was to confirm the proclamation of the President which had then been issued more than four months, and the legality of which had become very questionable. This decree may be found among the documents accompanying the President's Message of November 4th, 1812, and on the forty-sixth page of those printed papers.

If further evidence should be needed to prove the abominable fraud of this transaction, it may be found in the correspondence of our Minister at Paris, in the summer of 1811, wherein he remarks, that he had repeatedly demanded evidence of the repeal of the Berlin and Milan decrees, but none could be obtained. And yet, forsooth, we are now furnished with a decree dated in April preceding, but not issued until we are so entangled in French toils, that war with Great Britain was inevitable. If this fact alone had been understood, I put it to the candor of this honorable committee to say, whether they would have consented to the declaration of war against Great Britain at the time and for the reasons which were given? I say, without fear of contradiction, that they would not. If my premises are true, and the inference undisputed, since the Government has been grossly deceived and drawn into this war, for reasons and causes which did not then exist, most assuredly it becomes our duty as well as interest to relieve the country from its pressure as soon as possible.

In addition to all this, it is a singular fact in the history and progress of this war, that in five days after its declaration, (viz. on the 23d of June, 1812,) and as soon as the aforesaid decree of the French Emperor was made known to the British Ministry by Mr. Russell, an Order in Council was issued, repealing the former obnoxious orders, which had been ostensively the most prominent cause of the war; and yet the President has never issued his proclamation announcing that fact, as by the terms of the law of March 2d, 1811, he was expressly bound to do. On this failure of the President to do what the law enjoined on him to perform, as well as having issued his proclamation of November, 1810, without possessing the facts required by the law to support him, I make no comment. The account is still unsettled between him and this injured country.

The Orders in Council having thus been revoked, the continuance of the war seems to rest upon the impressment of our seamen alone. Give me leave then to inquire into the grounds of this practice, as claimed by Great Britain. Is it not bottomed on the ancient doctrine of perpetual allegiance—or in other words, that the native-born subject can never so expatriate, as that the mother country may not claim his service in time of war? Is this a novel doctrine, either as to time, or the nation who now attempts to enforce it? I venture to say that Great Britain has practised upon this principle ever since she has been a nation; and it is farther manifest that France, and all the maritime powers of Europe, have maintained the same doctrine. Nay, sir, we maintain the same doctrine in our own country; in proof of which, witness the President's proclamation at the commencement of this war; and notice also the recent case of Clark the spy, who was condemned to suffer death by a court martial, and was pardoned by the President on the ground of his owing allegiance to the United States, although residing in an enemy's territory, and having been naturalized or sworn allegiance to the King of Great Britain. Hence it would seem, that the principle set up was not novel nor singular. But what is the principle in contest between the two Governments? Great Britain claims the right to visit neutral merchant ships on the high seas; and if she finds any of her natural born subjects, to take them into her service. The Government of the United States denies to her this right, and asserts, that a foreigner naturalized in this country, is absolved from all allegiance to the parent State. The practice of Great Britain under her principle, has undoubtedly subjected some of our native citizens to capture and involuntary service, from causes which I need not here repeat. In all such cases, I take it to be admitted on all hands, that she sets up no claim, and therefore every abuse of this sort is capable of remedy. But on this head I have no hesitation in expressing my unqualified belief, founded on documents which have been laid on our tables, that the list of such impressed seamen is greatly exaggerated. Out of the number six thousand two hundred and fifty-seven of American citizens said to have been impressed, and forming a standing head piece to the list of our grievances, I very much question if five hundred native Americans can be found among them all. The documents lately furnished by the Secretary of State, if carefully examined, will serve very much to substantiate this fact. Many names are there returned who have only forwarded their claims to our Consul at London, and who, very probably, never set foot on American ground. Others again are continued on the list who have been discharged years ago, and others who have voluntarily engaged in her service.

The question then at issue, I take to be this—Shall the war with Great Britain be continued to oblige her to relinquish the practice of taking from our merchantmen her native British sailors? If we could obtain the principle by continuing the war, I think it can be demonstrated, that it would be injurious to the American seamen to have it so established, inasmuch as it would, by increasing the number of our seamen, necessarily diminish their wages. But, circumstanced as Great Britain is, contending for her existence against the most formidable power on earth, and resting her last hopes upon her navy, I presume she will never relinquish the principle.

The inquiry has been made, with some solicitude, what will you do with naturalized foreigners? I answer, treat them hospitably, and extend the arm of protection and all the blessings of government to them while they continue within your territorial jurisdiction; but if they leave your territory, and choose to go upon the great highway of nations, the risk and the choice are their own, as will be the peril. Put the case fairly to the yeomanry of our country, and let them understand the subject, that this war is to be carried on for the purpose of protecting foreigners while sailing on the high seas, and I very much incline to the opinion, that they would, dismiss the authors of this war from further service, or oblige them soon to bring it to a close. Sir, I will not consent to waste one drop of pure American blood, nor to expend a single dollar, to protect, on the high seas, all the vagabonds of Europe. Valuable as may have been the acquisition in obtaining many great and good men as emigrants from Europe, still I must maintain the opinion, that all the blessings of liberty and domestic government, which are secured to them in common with our native citizens, ought to be an ample compensation. I know it is no easy matter to draw the precise line where protection shall cease; but in a question of such moment as peace or war, the prosperity and happiness, perhaps the misery and ruin of our country, I cannot hesitate as to the course proper to be pursued.

With respect to protections, they have become so much a matter of bargain and sale, that having been counterfeited and sold in almost every port in Great Britain, as well as in America, they have long since ceased to answer any valuable purpose. It has been a fact long since well established, that a foreigner, who could scarcely speak our language, could procure a protection in Great Britain purporting to be evidence of his American citizenship. This then may account for the light and contemptuous treatment given to this species of evidence by the officers of the British navy.

Friday, January 8.

Mounted Rangers.

Mr. Jennings said that it must be recollected by the House, that the act which was passed at the last session of Congress, for the raising certain companies of rangers for the protection of the frontiers, had expired. Those rangers were raised under the apprehension of attacks from the savages; and these apprehensions have unfortunately been realized far beyond the general anticipation. When those companies were raised, Mr. Speaker, we expected long since to have taken possession of the British Province of Upper Canada, thereby to have intercepted the connection and communication between the British and the northwestern Indians. It will therefore readily be perceived, that in consequence of our disappointed expectations in that quarter, the northwestern frontier will be more exposed to the savage knife and tomahawk, at the opening of the approaching spring, than they have been heretofore. This description of force, if again organized, and stationed at suitable points without the frontier settlements, will render it more efficient, and in a better situation to range the woods and prevent the unapprised attack of the savage upon the helpless women and children. If we had to expect invasion from a civilized foe, our situation would not excite so much terror, but the savage character draws no distinction between the helpless infant and the prisoner of war. Under such circumstances, no calculation of expenditure ought to have any weight against a measure calculated to afford a necessary and proper protection to such an important and extensive frontier of the United States. The secrecy and facility with which the savages can assail that frontier, renders it improper that we should depend entirely for protection upon the volunteers and militia of an adjoining State. They carry with them their prejudices, and too often forget the sacred rights of private property. This fact has unfortunately been verified by a petition which I presented yesterday from the territory which I represent. But I cannot believe that such is the character of the citizens of Kentucky, although I do believe that the cause of that plundering, so far as it did take place in the western part of the territory of Indiana, by a portion of the Kentucky volunteers, may be found in the unhallowed exertions of local political purposes, to impress on the minds of at least some of those volunteers, that they were to defend British agents, British partisans, and persons having connection with the savages.

I shall now (said Mr. J.) present to the House the following resolutions which I have prepared, as well for the purpose of offering a bounty in lands to those who would volunteer their services as rangers for the protection of the northwestern frontier, as for the purpose of inquiring into the expediency of paying the militia and volunteers who have already rendered important services in shielding the helpless from savage cruelty:—

"Resolved, That the Committee on Military Affairs be, and they are hereby, directed to inquire into the expediency of authorizing the President of the United States to raise at least twelve companies of rangers, by the acceptance of volunteers or enlistment for one year, to be mounted or otherwise, as the service may require.

"Resolved, That the said committee inquire into the expediency of allowing a bounty in land to those who shall tender their services as rangers, and be accepted by the President of the United States.

"Resolved, That the said committee inquire likewise into the expediency of making provision for compensating the militia or volunteers, who may have been called out, or whose services may have been accepted by the Executives of either of the territories of the United States."

The resolutions were ordered to lie on the table.

Additional Military Force.

The House again resolved itself into a Committee of the Whole, on the bill from the Senate authorizing the raising of twenty thousand men, for one year, if in the opinion of the President of the United States the public service shall require it.

Mr. Wheaton said: Mr. Speaker, every intelligent man, whose age has given him an opportunity of combining experience with observation, must know that there are times when, on certain questions relating to the great interests of the nation, the sober remonstrances of truth and reason are of little or no avail against the misguided impetuosity of public prejudice. To such a crisis, if we have not already arrived, it is greatly to be feared that we are fast approaching. To float along the current of popular opinion requires very little exertion; but the man that is placed in a situation where the public safety demands that he should stem the torrent and buffet the storm, cannot but reflect, with peculiar sensibility, on the very unequal task he has to perform. The bill, now under consideration, has opened a field of discussion on the general policy of the war, in which its advocates and opponents seem to have given full range to their imaginations; and the arguments, on both sides, have apparently been attended with various success. There can, however, be little doubt on which side the victory will finally be declared. It is well known that the majority are determined, and the bill will pass. I had therefore resolved to take no part in the dispute, but to content myself with giving a simple vote. But, reflecting that I am called upon to act on a subject by me deemed important, not only for myself, but for the good of the people whom I have the honor to represent, who will be equally interested in the result, I have felt myself impelled, both by duty and inclination, to state some of the reasons on which that vote will be grounded.

The bill proposes giving authority to the President of the United States to raise twenty thousand regular troops, in addition to the thirty-five thousand already authorized by law. This may be right or wrong, proper or improper, according to times and circumstances, and the objects which the measure is contemplated to effect. Were the country invaded by a foreign foe, and a foe so powerful as to make this additional number of troops necessary for its defence, I should say it were right and proper to raise them, whatever expense it might be to the nation. But if, as the advocates of the bill profess, these men are to be enlisted, and, together with those heretofore authorized, are to form a powerful army for the purpose of foreign conquest, I have no hesitation in giving it, as my opinion, that it is improper and wrong, or, at least, as the President has told us respecting the French decree repealing those of Berlin and Milan, that "the proceeding is rendered, by the time and manner of it, liable to many objections." Objections, it is apprehended, may arise from want of powers given to Congress by the constitution, either expressed or implied, to do this thing, with its professed object in view—that is, foreign conquest. And if these are unavailing, common reason and common sense furnish objections, sufficiently strong, to the expediency of our undertaking such enterprises. Objections, for want of sufficient powers given by the constitution, may be considered as novel; but, if sound, they should nevertheless prevail. The war itself is novel, this being the first of the kind that ever we have undertaken since that instrument was formed, or since we became an independent nation. If the constitution gives Congress any power to carry on foreign wars, those powers must be collected from expressions it contains, or from some clear and necessary implication from something that is therein expressed. It will be very readily admitted, that our national Government is a Government of a very simple construction, and that it possesses very limited powers; being established by compact, not by conquest, it has not all the powers incident to the sovereignties of other countries; not produced by conquest, it was not made for conquest. "The enumeration of certain rights in the constitution shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people; and the powers not delegated to the United States by the constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States, respectively, or to the people." The framers of this constitution took particular care, not only to define the powers they intended to give, but the objects to which that power should be applied, and therefore, but for those defined objects, Congress have no powers at all. The objects are first pointed out clearly and plainly, and then the powers necessary to their attainment. The people of this country, after having effected the Revolution and established their independence, considering their great transmarine distance from the nations of the Old World, and all their jarring and rival interests, flattered themselves with the expectation of long peace. Unapprehensive of being attacked at home, they had no idea of making war for the purpose of conquest abroad. "Peace and friendship with all nations, entangling alliances with none," was their motto, and the same sentiment has been sanctioned by a man, whom the advocates of this war have never ceased to admire. An aversion to standing armies was among the causes that induced the Declaration of Independence; without standing armies, it was then believed, and we now know full well, foreign wars cannot be carried on. Foreign wars did not, therefore, come within the scope of that policy that dictated the constitution. I am not insensible, that, by the constitution, a power is given to Congress to declare war, (not to make it,) but their power is not to be exercised but in the spirit of that instrument, and for the attainment of some or all of the objects for which it was framed. And what are those objects? Why, and for what was the constitution made? Its authors have told us. It was for "the forming of a more perfect union, establishing justice, insuring domestic tranquillity, providing for the common defence, promoting the general welfare, and securing the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity," and all these benefits for the people that then did, or who thereafter should, belong to, or reside in the territory then embraced by the United States, and none other. The constitution was not made for any other, nor can it give jurisdiction over any other. If all or any of these objects are endangered, and it can be made to appear that raising the additional army proposed by this bill be necessary to the preservation and security of them, and can afford a rational prospect of producing such an effect, then my objections to the measure, so far as they arise from the apprehension of the want of constitutional authority, will be obviated. But here, permit me to ask, whether adding twenty thousand new troops to our present regular army, will be likely to have the effect of forming a more perfect union among the people of these States, or whether the little progress already made in the war has not produced fearful apprehensions of a sad reverse? If justice be not already established in our country, can there be any probability that a more formidable army will effect an object so desirable? No; for it is a well-known maxim, as true now as in those ancient times when it was written, that "Inter arma leges silent." So romantic an idea, as being able to establish justice through the world, could not have entered the heads of those that framed the constitution. Much has been said respecting the laws of nations; but they are now nowhere to be found, but in those books that treat on that subject; they were formed by the nations of the civilized world, and evidenced by the treaties, compacts, and agreements, entered into by them; but the Governments of Europe, in their struggle for power and dominion, seem to have disregarded or broken them down; and they being the majority in number, and superior in strength, it is not at present in our power to build up and enforce them. The unavoidable state of the world must be submitted to, until human nature shall, by its Great Author, be corrected. Nor can we, from what we have experienced, promise ourselves, from foreign war, an increase of tranquillity at home. But we are authorized, and are bound to provide for our common defence, and to raise armies, as well of regulars as militia, for that purpose, whenever the unfortunate situation of our country may render such a measure necessary; and our raising of a regular army could never have been contemplated by the framers of the constitution for any other purpose, and therefore give no authority so to do, and, as if conscious that this were the case, the committee that penned the act passed by Congress in June last, declaring war, made use of a form altogether unusual in other countries on similar occasions. The act declares that "war exists between the United Kingdoms of Great Britain and Ireland, and the United States;" going upon the idea, that hostilities had then been actually commenced against us by that Government, and our country invaded by a British armed force. Such a doctrine would have been very proper, and it might have been proper to raise armies in pursuance of it, had it been true. But such was not the fact. No hostile invasion of the country, by the British Government, had then been made, attempted or threatened. But some may say, and do say, that, if it were not a point then, it is now, and that, therefore, if we had no right to raise regular armies then, it being a time of peace, we may feel ourselves fully authorized now, since war has been declared, to raise new ones, or make additions to the old. This, indeed, would be contrary to a principle universally received and adopted, that no one should be permitted to take the advantage of his own wrong.

I know it is a doctrine, that the ruling party in this country, both in and out of this House, are every day zealously endeavoring to inculcate, that even admitting the war to have been wrong, at its commencement, it has now become the constitutional duty of its original opponents to afford every aid and encouragement to its prosecution. But this is a doctrine that I think no one can yield his assent to, till he is made to believe that two lines, constantly diverging, may finally meet in the same point. If our country has been in any degree invaded, and such invasion be in consequence of our having first invaded the territories of the invaders, it is proper for us, by withdrawing the cause, to put an end to the effect. The last, and not the least object of the powers given by the constitution, is "to secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity." Many arguments cannot be necessary to show the tendency of foreign wars to destroy liberty. I believe history does not furnish an instance of any people long free, after engaging in the mad projects of foreign conquest. While Rome was content with her ancient boundaries, her inhabitants were blessed with freedom; but, afterwards, jealousies, tumults, insurrections, and seditions, and those two great plagues and scourges of mankind—anarchy and tyranny—following in the train, destroyed every vestige of liberty among that people. Is there any liberty left among the people of France, or of those countries that France has conquered? Fortunate for them, if they are less enlightened than we are; for, in such case, though slaves, they may not be quite so miserable ones. "The very age and body of our constitution, its form and pressure," indicative of the genius and temper of the people that adopted it, are all opposed to the prosecution of wars for conquest. Such enterprises must not be undertaken, or the constitution must be destroyed. Gentlemen seem already inclined to attribute the disgrace and defeats that have hitherto marked our progress in this war, rather to the form and constitution of our Government, than to the weakness and folly of its Administration. The French Emperor has been extolled, and his mode of conducting wars has been more than intimated as being worth our imitation. If, in making foreign conquests, we would have his success, we must make use of his means, and then we may bid adieu to our former happy institutions, our laws, and our liberty. On this ground, therefore, I am opposed to the progress of this war. But if I had not a scruple left, as to the authority given to Congress by the constitution to make this war for conquest, (and perhaps I ought not to have,) my sense of its inexpediency, while I shall have any regard for the welfare and prosperity of my country, will forever forbid my giving it the smallest aid.

Mr. H. Clay (Speaker) said he was gratified yesterday by the recommitment of this bill to a Committee of the whole House, from two considerations: one, since it afforded to him a slight relaxation from a most fatiguing situation; and the other, because it furnished him with an opportunity of presenting to the committee his sentiments upon the important topics which had been mingled in the debate. He regretted, however, the necessity under which the Chairman had been placed of putting the question,[32] precluded him from an opportunity he had wished to have enjoyed of rendering more acceptable to the committee any thing he might have to offer on the interesting points it was his duty to touch. Unprepared, however, as he was to speak on this day, of which he was more sensible from the ill state of his health, he would solicit the attention of the committee for a few moments.

I was a little astonished, I confess, said Mr. C., when I found this bill permitted to pass silently through the Committee of the Whole, and that, not until the moment when the question was about to be put for its third reading, was it selected as that subject on which gentlemen in the opposition chose to lay before the House their views of the interesting attitude in which the nation stands. It did appear to me that the loan bill, which will soon come before us, would have afforded a much more proper occasion, it being more essential, as providing the ways and means for the prosecution of the war. But the gentlemen had the right of selection, and having exercised it, no matter how improperly, I am gratified, whatever I may think of the character of some part of the debate, at the latitude in which for once they have indulged. I claim only, in return, of gentlemen on the other side of the House, and of the committee, a like indulgence in expressing, with the same unrestrained freedom, my sentiments. Perhaps in the course of the remarks which I may feel myself called upon to make, said he, gentlemen may apprehend that they assume too harsh an aspect; I have only now to say that I shall speak of parties, measures, and things, as they strike my moral sense, protesting against the imputation of any intention on my part to wound the feelings of any gentleman.

Considering the situation in which this country is now placed, in a state of actual war with one of the most powerful nations on the earth, it may not be useless to take a view of the past, of various parties which have at different times appeared in this country, and to attend to the manner by which we have been driven from a peaceful posture. Such an inquiry may assist in guiding us to that result—an honorable peace—which must be the sincere desire of every friend to America. The course of that opposition, by which the administration of the Government had been unremittingly impeded for the last twelve years, was singular, and, I believe, unexampled in the history of any country. It has been alike the duty and the interest of the Administration to preserve peace. Their duty, because it is necessary to the growth of an infant people, their genius and their habits. Their interest, because a change of the condition of the nation brings along with it a danger of the loss of the affections of the people. The Administration has not been forgetful of these solemn obligations. No art has been left unessayed; no experiment, promising a favorable result, left untried to maintain the peaceful relations of the country. When, some six or seven years ago, the affairs of the nation assumed a threatening aspect, a partial non-importation was adopted. As they grew more alarming, an embargo was imposed. It would have attained its purpose, but it was sacrificed upon the altar of conciliation. Vain and fruitless attempt to propitiate! Then came a law of non-intercourse, and a general non-importation followed in the train. In the mean time, any indications of a return to the public law and the path of justice, on the part of either belligerent, are seized with avidity by the Administration—the arrangement with Mr. Erskine is concluded. It is first applauded, and then censured by the opposition. No matter with what sincerity the Administration cultivates peace, the opposition will insist that it alone is culpable for any breach between the two countries. Because the President thought proper, in accepting the proffered reparation for the attack on a national vessel, to intimate that it would have better comported with the justice of the King (and who does not think so?) to punish the offending officer, the opposition, entering into the royal feelings, sees in that imaginary insult abundant cause for rejecting Mr. Erskine's arrangement. On another occasion, you cannot have forgotten the hypercritical ingenuity which they displayed to divest Mr. Jackson's correspondence of a premeditated insult to this country. If gentlemen would only reserve for their own Government half the sensibility which is indulged for that of Great Britain, they would find much less to condemn. Restriction after restriction has been tried; negotiation has been resorted to, until longer to have negotiated would have been disgraceful. Whilst these peaceful experiments are undergoing a trial, what is the conduct of the opposition? They are the champions of war; the proud, the spirited, the sole repository of the nation's honor; the exclusive men of vigor and energy. The Administration, on the contrary, is weak, feeble, and pusillanimous—"incapable of being kicked into a war." The maxim, "not a cent for tribute, millions for defence," is loudly proclaimed. Is the Administration for negotiation? The opposition is tired, sick, disgusted with negotiation. They want to draw the sword and avenge the nation's wrongs. When, at length, foreign nations, perhaps, emboldened by the very opposition here made, refused to listen to the amicable appeals made, and repeated and reiterated by the Administration, to their justice and to their interests; when, in fact, war with one of them became identified with our independence and our sovereignty, and it was no longer possible to abstain from it, behold the opposition become the friends of peace and of commerce. They tell you of the calamities of war; its tragical events; the squandering away of your resources; the waste of the public treasure, and the spilling of innocent blood. They tell you that honor is an illusion! Now we see them exhibiting the terrific forms of the roaring king of the forest. Now the meekness and humility of the lamb! They are for war, and no restrictions, when the Administration is for peace; they are for peace and restrictions, when the Administration is for war. You find them, sir, tacking with every gale, displaying the colors of every party, and of all nations, steady only in one unalterable purpose: to steer, if possible, into the haven of power.

During all this time the parasites of opposition do not fail by cunning sarcasm or sly inuendo to throw out the idea of French influence, which is known to be false; which ought to be met in one manner only, and that is, by the lie direct. The Administration of this country devoted to foreign influence! The Administration of this country subservient to France! Great God! how is it so influenced? By what ligament, on what basis, on what possible foundation, does it rest? Is it on similarity of language? No! we speak different tongues; we speak the English language. On the resemblance of our laws! No! the sources of our jurisprudence spring from another and a different country. On commercial intercourse? No! we have comparatively none with France. Is it from the correspondence in the genius of the two governments? No! here alone is the liberty of man secure from the inexorable despotism which everywhere else tramples it under foot. Where, then, is the ground of such an influence? But, sir, I am insulting you by arguing on such a subject. Yet, preposterous and ridiculous as the insinuation is, it is propagated with so much industry, that there are persons found foolish and credulous enough to believe it. You will, no doubt, think it incredible (but I have nevertheless been told the fact) that an honorable member of this House, now in my eye, recently lost his election by the circulation of a story in his district, that he was the first cousin of the Emperor Napoleon. The proof of the charge was rested on a statement of facts which was undoubtedly true. The gentleman in question it was alleged had married a connection of the lady of the President of the United States, who was the intimate friend of Thomas Jefferson, late President of the United States, who some years ago was in the habit of wearing red French breeches. Now, taking these premises as established, you, Mr. Chairman, are too good a logician not to see that the conclusion necessarily followed!

Throughout the period he had been speaking of, the opposition had been distinguished, amidst all its veerings and changes, by another inflexible feature—the application of every vile epithet, which our rich language affords, to Bonaparte. He has been compared to every hideous monster and beast, from that of the Revelations to the most insignificant quadruped. He has been called the scourge of mankind, the destroyer of Europe, the great robber, the infidel, and—Heaven knows by what other names. Really, gentlemen remind me of an obscure lady in a city, not very far off, who also took it into her head, in conversation with an accomplished French gentleman, to talk of the affairs of Europe. She, too, spoke of the destruction of the balance of power, stormed and raged about the insatiable ambition of the Emperor; called him the curse of mankind—the destroyer of Europe. The Frenchman listened to her with perfect patience, and when she had ceased, said to her, with ineffable politeness: "Madam, it would give my master, the Emperor, infinite pain, if he knew how hardly you thought of him."

Sir, gentlemen appear to me to forget that they stand on American soil; that they are not in the British House of Commons, but in the Chamber of the House of Representatives of the United States; that we have nothing to do with the affairs of Europe—the partition of territory and sovereignty there—except in so far as these things affect the interests of our own country. Gentlemen transform themselves into the Burkes, Chathams, and Pitts, of another country, and forgetting, from honest zeal, the interests of America, engage, with European sensibility, in the discussion of European interests. If gentlemen ask me, if I do not view with regret and sorrow the concentration of such vast power in the hands of Bonaparte, I reply that I do. I regret to see the Emperor of China holding such immense sway over the fortunes of millions of our species. I regret to see Great Britain possessing so uncontrolled a command over all the waters of our globe. And if I had the ability to distribute among the nations of Europe their several portions of power and of sovereignty, I would say that Holland should be resuscitated, and given the weight she enjoyed in the days of her De Witts. I would confine France within her natural boundaries—the Alps, the Pyrenees, and the Rhine—and make her a secondary naval power only. I would abridge the British maritime power, raise Prussia and Austria to first-rate powers, and preserve the integrity of the Empire of Russia. But these are speculations. I look at the political transactions of Europe, with the single exception of their possible bearing upon us, as I do at the history of other countries or other times. I do not survey them with half the interest that I do the movements in South America. Our political relation is much less important than it is supposed to be. I have no fears of French or English subjugation. If we are united, we are too powerful for the mightiest nation in Europe, or all Europe combined. If we are separated, and torn asunder, we shall become an easy prey to the weakest of them. In the latter dreadful contingency, our country will not be worth preserving.

In one respect there is a remarkable difference between Administration and the Opposition—it is in a sacred regard for personal liberty. When out of power, my political friends condemned the surrender of Jonathan Robbins; they opposed the violation of the freedom of the press, in the sedition law; they opposed the more insidious attack upon the freedom of the person, under the imposing garb of an alien law. The party now in opposition, then in power, advocated the sacrifice of the unhappy Robbins, and passed those two laws. True to our principles, we are now struggling for the liberty of our seamen against foreign oppression. True to theirs, they oppose the war for this object. They have indeed lately affected tender solicitude for the liberties of the people, and talk of the danger of standing armies, and the burden of taxes. But it is evident to you, Mr. Chairman, that they speak in a foreign idiom. Their brogue betrays that it is not their vernacular tongue. What! the opposition, who in 1798 and 1799, could raise an useless army to fight an enemy three thousand miles distant from us, alarmed at the existence of one raised for a known specified object—the attack of the adjoining provinces of the enemy? The gentleman from Massachusetts, who assisted by his vote to raise the army of twenty-five thousand, alarmed at the danger of our liberties from this very army!