TWELFTH CONGRESS.—SECOND SESSION. PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES. (continued 6)

I mean to speak of another subject, which I never think of but with the most awful considerations. The gentleman from Massachusetts, in imitation of his predecessors of 1799, has entertained us with Cabinet plots, Presidential plots, which are conjured up in the gentleman's own perturbed imagination. I wish, sir, that another plot of a much more serious kind—a plot that aims at the dismemberment of our Union—had only the same imaginary existence. But no man, who had paid any attention to the tone of certain prints, and to transactions in a particular quarter of the Union for several years past, can doubt the existence of such a plot. It was far, very far from my intention to charge the opposition with such a design. No, he believed them generally incapable of it. He could not say as much for some who were unworthily associated with them in that quarter of the Union to which he referred. The gentleman cannot have forgotten his own sentiment, uttered even on the floor of this House, "peaceably if we can, forcibly if we must;" in and about the same time Henry's mission to Boston was undertaken. The flagitiousness of that embassy had been attempted to be concealed by directing the public attention to the price which the gentleman says was given for the disclosure. As if any price could change the atrociousness of the attempt on the part of Great Britain, or could extenuate in the slightest degree the offence of those citizens who entertained and deliberated upon the infamous proposition! There was a most remarkable coincidence between some of the things which that man states, and certain events in the quarter alluded to. In the contingency of war with Great Britain, it will be recollected that the neutrality and eventual separation of that section of the Union was to be brought about. How, sir, has it happened, since the declaration of war, that British officers in Canada have asserted to American officers that this very neutrality would take place? That they have so asserted can be established beyond controversy. The project is not brought forward openly, with a direct avowal of the intention. No, the stock of good sense and patriotism in that portion of the country is too great to be undisguisedly encountered. It is assailed from the masked batteries of friendship to peace and commerce on the one side, and by the groundless imputation of opposite propensities on the other. The affections of the people are to be gradually undermined. The project is suggested or withdrawn; the diabolical parties, in this criminal tragedy, make their appearance or exit, as the audience to whom they address themselves are silent, applaud or hiss. I was astonished, sir, to have lately read a letter, or pretended letter, published in a prominent print in that quarter, written not in the fervor of party zeal, but coolly and deliberately, in which the writer affects to reason about a separation, and attempts to demonstrate its advantages to different sections of the Union, deploring the existence now of what he terms prejudices against it, but hoping for the arrival of the period when they shall be eradicated.

The war was declared because Great Britain arrogated to herself the pretension of regulating foreign trade, under the delusive name of retaliatory Orders in Council—a pretension by which she undertook to proclaim to American enterprise, "Thus far shalt thou go, and no farther." Orders which she refused to revoke after the alleged cause of their enactment had ceased; because she persisted in the act of impressing American seamen; because she had instigated the Indians to commit hostilities against us; and because she refused indemnity for her past injuries upon our commerce. I throw out of the question other wrongs. The war in fact was announced, on our part, to meet the war which she was waging on her part. So undeniable were the causes of the war; so powerfully did they address themselves to the feelings of the whole American people, that when the bill was pending before this House, gentlemen in the opposition, although provoked to debate, would not, or could not, utter one syllable against it. It is true they wrapped themselves up in sullen silence, pretending that they did not choose to debate such a question in secret session. Whilst speaking of the proceedings on that occasion, I beg to be permitted to advert to another fact that transpired—an important fact material for the nation to know, and which I have often regretted had not been spread upon our journals. My honorable colleague (Mr. McKee) moved, in Committee of the Whole, to comprehend France in the war; and when the question was taken upon the proposition, there appeared but ten votes in support of it, of whom seven belonged to this side of the House, and three only to the other.

It is said that we were inveigled into the war by the perfidy of France; and that had she furnished the document in time, which was first published in England, in May last, it would have been prevented. I will concede to gentlemen every thing they ask about the injustice of France towards this country. I wish to God that our ability was equal to our disposition to make her feel the sense of that injustice. The manner of the publication of the paper in question, was undoubtedly extremely exceptionable. But I maintain that, had it made its appearance earlier, it would not have had the effect supposed; and the proof lies in the unequivocal declarations of the British Government. I will trouble you, sir, with going no further back than to the letters of the British Minister, addressed to the Secretary of State, just before the expiration of his diplomatic functions. It will be recollected by the committee that he exhibited to this Government a despatch from Lord Castlereagh, in which the principle was distinctly avowed, that to produce the effect of the repeal of the Orders in Council, the French decrees must be absolutely and entirely revoked as to all the world, and not as to America alone. A copy of that despatch was demanded of him, and he very awkwardly evaded it. But, on the 10th of June, after the bill declaring war had actually passed this House, and was pending before the Senate, (and which, I have no doubt, was known to him,) in a letter to Mr. Monroe, he says: "I have no hesitation, sir, in stating that Great Britain, as the case has hitherto stood, never did, nor ever could engage, without the greatest injustice to herself and her allies, as well as to other neutral nations, to repeal her orders as affecting America alone, leaving them in force against other States, upon condition that France would except singly and specially America from the operation of her decrees." On the 14th of the same month, the bill still pending before the Senate, he repeats: "I will now say, that I feel entirely authorized to assure you, that if you can at any time produce a full and unconditional repeal of the French decrees, as you have a right to demand it in your character of a neutral nation, and that it be disengaged from any question concerning our maritime rights, we shall be ready to meet you with a revocation of the Orders in Council. Previously to your producing such an instrument, which I am sorry to see you regard as unnecessary, you cannot expect of us to give up our Orders in Council." Thus, sir, you see that the British Government would not be content with a repeal of the French decrees as to us only. But the French paper in question was such a repeal. It could not, therefore, satisfy the British Government. It could not, therefore, have induced that Government, had it been earlier promulgated, to repeal the Orders in Council. It could not, therefore, have averted the war. The withholding of it did not occasion the war, and the promulgation of it would not have prevented the war. But gentlemen have contended that, in point of fact, it did produce a repeal of the Orders in Council. This I deny. After it made its appearance in England, it was declared by one of the British Ministry, in Parliament, not to be satisfactory. And all the world knows, that the repeal of the Orders in Council resulted from the inquiry, reluctantly acceded to by the Ministry, into the effect upon their manufacturing establishments, of our non-importation law, or to the warlike attitude assumed by this Government, or to both. But it is said that the Orders in Council are done away, no matter from what cause; and that having been the sole motive for declaring the war, the relations of peace ought to be restored. This brings me into an examination of the grounds for continuing the war.

I am far from acknowledging that had the Orders in Council been repealed, as they have been, before the war was declared, the declaration would have been prevented. In a body so numerous as this, from which the declaration emanated, it is impossible to say with any degree of certainty what would have been the effect of such a repeal. Each member must answer for himself. I have no hesitation then, in saying, that I have always considered the impressment of American seamen as much the most serious aggression. But, sir, how have those orders at last been repealed? Great Britain, it is true, has intimated a willingness to suspend their practical operation, but she still arrogates to herself the right to revive them upon certain contingencies, of which she constitutes herself the sole judge. She waives the temporary use of the rod, but she suspends it in terrorem over our heads. Supposing it was conceded to gentlemen that such a repeal of the Orders in Council, as took place on the 23d of June last, exceptionable as it is, being known before the war, would have prevented the war, does it follow that it ought to induce us to lay down our arms without the redress of any other injury? Does it follow, in all cases, that that which would have prevented the war in the first instance should terminate the war? By no means. It requires a great struggle for a nation prone to peace as this is, to burst through its habits and encounter the difficulties of war. Such a nation ought but seldom to go to war. When it does, it should be for clear and essential rights alone, and it should firmly resolve to extort, at all hazards, their recognition. The war of the Revolution is an example of a war began for one object and prosecuted for another. It was waged in its commencement against the right asserted by the parent country to tax the colonies. Then no one thought of absolute independence. The idea of independence was repelled. But the British Government would have relinquished the principle of taxation. The founders of our liberties saw, however, that there was no security short of independence, and they achieved our independence. When nations are engaged in war, those rights in controversy, which are acknowledged by the Treaty of Peace, are abandoned. And who is prepared to say that American seamen shall be surrendered the victims to the British principle of impressment? And, sir, what is this principle? She contends that she has a right to the services of her own subjects: that, in the exercise of this right, she may lawfully impress them, even although she finds them in our vessels, upon the high seas, without her jurisdiction. Now, I deny that she has any right, without her jurisdiction, to come on board our vessels on the high seas, for any other purpose but in pursuit of enemies, or their goods, or goods contraband of war. But she further contends that her subjects cannot renounce their allegiance to her and contract a new obligation to other Sovereigns. I do not mean to go into the general question of the right of expatriation. If, as is contended, all nations deny it, all nations at the same time admit and practice the right of naturalization. Great Britain, in the very case of foreign seamen, imposes perhaps fewer restraints upon naturalization than any other nation. Then, if subjects cannot break their original allegiance, they may, according to universal usage, contract a new allegiance. What is the effect of this double obligation? Undoubtedly, that the Sovereign having possession of the subject would have a right to the services of the subject. If he return within the jurisdiction of his primitive Sovereign, he may resume his right to his services, of which the subject by his own act could not divest himself. But his primitive Sovereign can have no right to go in quest of him, out of his own jurisdiction into the jurisdiction of another Sovereign, or upon the high seas, where there exists either no jurisdiction, or it belongs to the nation owning the ship navigating them. But, sir, this discussion is altogether useless. It is not to the British principle, objectionable as it is, that we are alone to look; it is to her practice—no matter what guise she puts on. It is in vain to assert the inviolability of the obligation of allegiance. It is in vain to set up the plea of necessity, and to allege that she cannot exist without the impressment of her seamen. The truth is, she comes, by her press gangs, on board of our vessels, seizes our native seamen, as well as naturalized, and drags them into her service. It is the case, then, of the assertion of an erroneous principle, and a practice not conformable to the principle—a principle which, if it were theoretically right, must be forever practically wrong. We are told by gentlemen in the opposition that Government has not done all that was incumbent on it to do to avoid just cause of complaint on the part of Great Britain; that, in particular, the certificates of protection, authorized by the act of 1796, are fraudulently used. Sir, Government has done too much in granting those paper protections. I can never think of them without being shocked. They resemble the passes which the master grants to his negro slave: "Let the bearer, Mungo, pass and repass without molestation." What do they imply? That Great Britain has a right to take all who are not provided with them. From their very nature they must be liable to abuse on both sides. If Great Britain desires a mark by which she can know her own subjects, let her give them an ear mark. The colors that float from the mast head should be the credentials of our seamen. There is no safety to us, and the gentlemen have shown it, but in the rule that all who sail under the flag (not being enemies) are protected by the flag. It is impossible that this country should ever abandon the gallant tars who have won for us such splendid trophies. Let me suppose that the Genius of Columbia should visit one of them in his oppressor's prison and attempt to reconcile him to his wretched condition. She would say to him, in the. language of the gentlemen on the other side, "Great Britain intends you no harm; she did not mean to impress you, but one of her own subjects; having taken you by mistake, I will remonstrate, and try to prevail upon her by peaceable means to release you, but I cannot, my son, fight for you." If he did not consider this mockery, he would address her judgment, and say, "You owe me, my country, protection; I owe you in return obedience. I am no British subject, I am a native of old Massachusetts, where live my aged father, my wife and my children. I have faithfully discharged my duty. Will you refuse to do yours?" Appealing to her passions, he would continue, "I lost this eye in fighting under Truxton with the Insurgent; I got this scar before Tripoli; I broke this leg on board the Constitution when the Guerriere struck." If she remained still unmoved, he would break out, in the accents of mingled distress and despair,

I will not imagine the dreadful catastrophe to which he would be driven by an abandonment of him to his oppressor. It will not be, it cannot be, that his country will refuse him protection!

It is said that Great Britain has been always willing to make a satisfactory arrangement of the subject of impressment; and that Mr. King had nearly concluded one prior to his departure from that country. Let us hear what that Minister says upon his return to America. In his letter dated at New York, in July, 1803, after giving an account of his attempt to form an arrangement for the protection of our seamen, and his interviews to this end with Lords Hawkesbury and St. Vincent; and stating that, when he had supposed the terms of a convention were agreed upon, a new pretension was set up (the mare clausum,) he concludes: "I regret not to have been able to put this business on a satisfactory footing, knowing as I do its very great importance to both parties; but I flatter myself that I have not misjudged the interests of our own country, in refusing to sanction a principle that might be productive of more extensive evils than those it was our aim to prevent." The sequel of his negotiation, on this affair, is more fully given in the recent conversation between Mr. Russell and Lord Castlereagh, communicated to Congress during its present session. Lord Castlereagh says to Mr. Russell:

"Indeed there has evidently been much misapprehension on this subject, and an erroneous belief entertained that an arrangement in regard to it has been nearer an accomplishment than the facts will warrant. Even our friends in Congress—I mean those who were opposed to going to war with us—have been so confident in this mistake, that they have ascribed the failure of such an arrangement solely to the misconduct of the American Government. This error probably originated with Mr. King; for, being much esteemed here, and always well received by the persons in power, he seems to have misconstrued their readiness to listen to his representations, and their warm professions of a disposition to remove the complaints of America in relation to impressment, into a supposed conviction on their part of the propriety of adopting the plan which he had proposed. But Lord St. Vincent, whom he might have thought he had brought over to his opinions, appears never for a moment to have ceased to regard all arrangement on the subject to be attended with formidable, if not insurmountable obstacles. This is obvious from a letter which his Lordship addressed to Sir William Scott at the time."

Here Lord Castlereagh read a letter, contained in the records before him, in which Lord St. Vincent states to Sir William Scott the zeal with which Mr. King had assailed him on the subject of impressment, confesses his own perplexity, and total incompetency to discover any practical project for the safe discontinuance of that practice, and asks for counsel and advice. "Thus you see," proceeded Lord Castlereagh, "that the confidence of Mr. King on this subject was entirely unfounded."

Thus, continued Mr. Clay, it is apparent, that, at no time, has the enemy been willing to place this subject on a satisfactory footing. I will speak hereafter of the overtures made by the Administration since the war.

The disasters of the war admonish us, we are told, of the necessity of terminating the contest. If our achievements upon the land have been less splendid than those of our intrepid seamen, it is not because the American soldier is less brave. On the one element, organization, discipline, and a thorough knowledge of their duties, exist on the part of the officers and their men. On the other, almost every thing is yet to be acquired. We have, however, the consolation that our country abounds with the richest materials, and that, in no instance, when engaged in action, have our arms been tarnished. At Brownstown, and at Queenstown, the valor of veterans was displayed, and acts of the noblest heroism were performed. It is true, that the disgrace of Detroit remains to be wiped off. That is a subject on which I cannot trust my feelings, it is not fitting I should speak. But this much I will say, it was an event which no human foresight could have anticipated, and for which the Administration cannot be justly censured. It was the parent of all the misfortunes we have experienced on land. But for it the Indian war would have been in a great measure prevented or terminated, the ascendency on Lake Erie acquired, and the war pushed perhaps to Montreal. With the exception of that event, the war, even upon the land, had been attended by a series of the most brilliant exploits, which, whatever interest they may inspire on this side of the mountains, have given the greatest pleasure on the other. The expedition under the command of Governor Edwards and Colonel Russell, to Lake Peoria, on the Illinois, was completely successful. So was that of Captain Craig, who, it is said, ascended that river still higher. General Hopkins destroyed the Prophet's town. We have just received intelligence of the gallant enterprise of Colonel Campbell. In short, sir, the Indian towns have been swept from the mouth to the source of the Wabash, and a hostile country has been penetrated far beyond the most daring incursions of any campaign during the former Indian war. Never was more cool, deliberate bravery displayed than that by Newnan's party from Georgia. And the capture of the Detroit, and the destruction of the Caledonia, (whether placed to our maritime or land account,) for judgment, skill, and courage, on the part of Lieutenant Elliott, has never been surpassed.

What cause, Mr. Chairman, which existed for declaring the war has been removed? We sought indemnity for the past and security for the future. The Orders in Council are suspended, not revoked; no compensation for spoliations; Indian hostilities, which were before secretly instigated, now openly encouraged; and the practice of impressment unremittingly persevered in and insisted upon. Yet Administration has given the strongest demonstrations of its love of peace. On the 29th June, less than ten days after the declaration of war, the Secretary of State writes to Mr. Russell, authorizing him to agree to an armistice, upon two conditions only; and what are they? That the Orders in Council should be repealed, and the practice of impressing American seamen cease, those already impressed being released. The proposition was for nothing more than a real truce; that the war should in fact cease on both sides. Again, on the 27th July, one month later, anticipating a possible objection to these terms, reasonable as they are, Mr. Monroe empowers Mr. Russell to stipulate in general terms for an armistice, having only an informal understanding on these points. In return, the enemy is offered a prohibition of the employment of his seamen in our service, thus removing entirely all pretext for the practice of impressment. The very proposition which the gentleman from Connecticut (Mr. Pitkin) contends ought to be made, has been made. How are these pacific advances met by the other party? Rejected as absolutely inadmissible; cavils are indulged about the inadequacy of Mr. Russell's powers, and the want of an act of Congress is intimated. And yet the constant usage of nations I believe is, where the legislation of one party is necessary to carry into effect a given stipulation, to leave it to the contracting party to provide the requisite laws. If he fails to do so, it is a breach of good faith, and a subject of subsequent remonstrance by the injured party. When Mr. Russell renews the overture, in what was intended as a more agreeable form to the British Government, Lord Castlereagh is not content with a simple rejection, but clothes it in the language of insult. Afterwards, in conversation with Mr. Russell, the moderation of our Government is misinterpreted and made the occasion of a sneer, that we are tired of the war. The proposition of Admiral Warren is submitted in a spirit not more pacific. He is instructed, he tells us, to propose that the Government of the United States shall instantly recall their letters of marque and reprisal against British ships, together with all orders and instructions for any acts of hostility whatever against the territories of His Majesty or the persons or property of his subjects. That small affair being settled, he is further authorized to arrange as to the revocation of the laws which interdict the commerce and ships of war of His Majesty from the harbors and waters of the United States. This messenger of peace comes with one qualified concession in his pocket, not made to the justice of our demands, and is fully empowered to receive our homage, the contrite retraction of all our measures adopted against his master! And in default, he does not fail to assure us, the Orders in Council are to be forthwith revived. Administration, still anxious to terminate the war, suppresses the indignation which such a proposal ought to have created, and in its answer concludes by informing Admiral Warren, "that if there be no objection to an accommodation of the difference relating to impressment, in the mode proposed, other than the suspension of the British claim to impressment during the armistice, there can be none to proceeding, without the armistice, to an immediate discussion and arrangement of an article on that subject." Thus it has left the door of negotiation unclosed, and it remains to be seen if the enemy will accept the invitation tendered to him. The honorable gentleman from North Carolina (Mr. Pearson) supposes, that if Congress would pass a law, prohibiting the employment of British seamen in our service, upon condition of a like prohibition on their part, and repeal the act of non-importation, peace would immediately follow. Sir, I have no doubt if such a law were passed, with all the requisite solemnities, and the repeal to take place, Lord Castlereagh would laugh at our simplicity. No, sir, Administration has erred in the steps which it has taken to restore peace, but its error has been not in doing too little, but in betraying too great a solicitude for that event. An honorable peace is attainable only by an efficient war. My plan would be to call out the ample resources of the country, give them a judicious direction, prosecute the war with the utmost vigor, strike wherever we can reach the enemy, at sea or on land, and negotiate the terms of a peace at Quebec or Halifax. We are told that England is a proud and lofty nation that, disdaining to wait for danger, meets it half way. Haughty as she is, we once triumphed over her, and if we do not listen to the counsels of timidity and despair we shall again prevail. In such a cause, with the aid of Providence, we must come out crowned with success; but if we fail, let us fail like men—lash ourselves to our gallant tars, and expire together in one common struggle, fighting for "seamen's rights and free trade."

Mr. McKee moved an amendment to the bill, going to place the appointment of the other field officers of each regiment, as well as the Colonels, in the President and Senate. The motion was agreed to.

Monday, January 11.

Additional Military Force.

The House again resolved itself into a Committee of the Whole, on the bill for raising an additional military force of twenty thousand men for one year.

Mr. Sheffey said he felt grateful for the opportunity which had been afforded him, to deliver his sentiments on the subject before the committee. It was now about a year ago, when he had stated his reasons at length on the question of the war then meditated against Great Britain. Since that time, he had been generally a silent, though not an inattentive spectator. Conscious that there had fallen to his share a full portion of the frailty common to man, he felt disposed to distrust his own opinion. He had even hoped he might be mistaken, he had hoped that experience would prove the fallacy of his apprehensions; that the predictions of gentlemen, who differed from him in sentiment, would be realized; that the rights of the country would be secured by arms, to which the majority had resorted; and that the evils anticipated would vanish before us. On a review, however, of the reasons which had then influenced him, aided by the experience of the last year, he found his opinions, not only unshaken, but strongly confirmed.

The bill before us, said Mr. S., contemplates an addition of twenty thousand men to the army heretofore authorized to be raised. By the measures preparatory to the war, upwards of thirty-six thousand men were directed to be enlisted; with the addition now contemplated, our regular army will amount to more than fifty-six thousand men. The question which at once presents itself to every mind disposed to inquire, is, what is the object of this vast military force? We are here not left to conjecture; this inquiry has been anticipated, and we have been directly told by the chairman of the Military Committee, (Mr. Williams,) that it is intended for offensive purposes; that the conquest of Canada, Nova Scotia, and New Brunswick, is to be achieved. If I have any right to deliberate on this subject, and to express the opinion which my view of the real interests of the country dictates, I at once say, that I cannot give my assent to raise such a force for such a purpose. Was an augmentation of the army required to defend us against any enemy, either on the maritime or inland frontier, no member of this House would more readily accord the means of defence and protection than myself. In such event, I shall not inquire how we got into the situation, or by whose temerity the enemy has been brought on our borders. I shall consider defence as a matter of imperious necessity, forbidding all calculation as to means and consequences. But, as it is admitted by all, that the force already authorized is more than sufficient for every defensive purpose; as it is expressly avowed that it is required for offensive operations in the territories of the enemy, the question assumes a different shape; it is stripped of the overruling influence which attends necessity; it becomes a mere question of expediency, controlled by the various considerations which reason and policy may dictate. So far as my conduct is concerned, before I can consent to the prosecution of the war, in the manner contemplated, I must be convinced that the objects in controversy are not only just, but of sufficient importance in their practical effect on the community to justify such an experiment, and not attainable in any other way; that there is a reasonable probability that such a war will secure to us those objects; and that we are not endangering the greater good, to obtain an exemption from the lesser evil; hazarding certain great rights, to secure others of far inferior importance.

I regret that I cannot, consistently with my sense of duty, yield the unlimited confidence in their measures, which the majority demand. My reason must be convinced, before my confidence can be bestowed. There are, indeed, cases where superior virtue and wisdom, tested by long and successful experience, have a strong claim to our confidence. But this, in my opinion, is not the case here. A retrospect of the transactions of the last eight years, will show how much gentlemen have been mistaken and disappointed in their views of our foreign policy; particularly that part which is connected with the difficulties in which we now find ourselves, and which may be said to be the groundwork of them. In making this declaration, and in leading your attention to the facts, it is not my object to give offence to any one. I believe gentlemen are actuated by the purest motives, and sincerely disposed to render essential service to the country. I speak of facts only, intending to show a mistaken, not a corrupt or vicious course.

Our difficulties with Great Britain commenced soon after the treaty of 1794 (generally called "Jay's Treaty") expired by its own limitation, in consequence of the peace of Amiens. About that time the British Government offered to our Minister, then resident in London, a renewal of the treaty. That instrument had been negotiated under the auspices, and received the sanction of Washington, the father and benefactor of his country. It is true, that its stipulations did not embrace every subject which we could have wished; and those that were embraced, were not so advantageously settled as might have been done, had we had it in our power to have dictated the terms. But it is equally true, that experience refuted all the speculations, and dissipated all the apprehensions, with which the country was filled at the time of its ratification. During its operation we enjoyed a degree of prosperity unexampled in this or any other country. Our leading interests flourished in a manner unknown before, and unexperienced since; our agriculture was encouraged by high prices and ready markets for its products; the freedom of navigation, and the enterprise of our people, carried our commerce to every part of the globe. I ask this House and this nation, whether their hopes or wishes extend beyond what we then enjoyed? If they do, they hope for that which is opposed by all human probability, and they wish for that which has scarcely ever fallen to the lot of man. We were, indeed, not exempt from every evil, or gratified by every possible good. What nation or individual ever reached that state? But the great essentials of national prosperity were in our possession. Our Government, however, was not satisfied. The overture of the British Government was rejected, under the impression, no doubt, that better terms could be obtained; that the situation of Great Britain would compel her to yield to our demands, however extensive.

Soon after the rejection of this overture, Great Britain assumed the right to interdict the trade in the products of her enemies' colonies, when taken directly from those colonies to the mother country, conformably, as she asserted, to the principles adopted in the war of 1756. In consequence of which, our Government, with a view to coerce her into a relinquishment of her pretensions, passed the partial non-importation act of 1806. It had not the intended and promised effect. They again resorted to negotiation, and repealed the restriction. About this time, a change happened in the British Cabinet, highly auspicious to our interests. "Our friends," yes, our old friends, who had espoused our cause in time of peril and danger, who had defended our rights during all the vicissitudes of the Revolution, and who had manifested their friendship for us on every occasion since, got into power. With these men, a negotiation was opened by our Government through the instrumentality of our Ministers, Messrs. Monroe and Pinkney, which resulted in a treaty, as our own Ministers declared, "both honorable and advantageous to the United States," and the best that could be obtained. It was not only "advantageous" as it respected our commerce, but the informal understanding which accompanied it, would have secured us against the abuses of impressments; so our own Ministers believed. But it was rejected without being even submitted to the Senate. The reasons have never been disclosed to the nation. I presume, however, that it was confidently expected that such was the situation of Great Britain, that any terms that we should dictate would be granted.

The terms which our Government demanded not being accorded on the part of Great Britain, a new policy was resorted to by our Government, which was held up to the nation as a sovereign remedy for all our difficulties, which were daily increasing. An embargo, not limited in its duration, was laid on our shipping. The prominent virtues of this remedy were supposed to be—that it would coerce the belligerents, but particularly Great Britain, into an abandonment of their injurious measures; and above all, that it would save us from being involved in war. The experience of one year, however, manifested how little its supporters understood of the means and resources of other nations, and of the character of our own. The privations to which a great portion of our people were subjected in consequence of this measure coerced our Government into a repeal, long before any sensible impression could be made on Great Britain. The embargo was abandoned, because the people would bear it no longer, and the non-intercourse system was adopted in its stead. This also had its day—but this, like the embargo, experience condemned as injurious and ruinous policy; and the public voice called for its repeal. It was succeeded by the act of the first of May, 1810, the source of our present difficulties.

When this act passed this House, we were told that its provisions held out the strongest inducement to each of the great belligerents, to precede its rival in the abrogation of the injurious edicts affecting the commerce of this country, and that whoever might lead the other would unquestionably follow. It required very little sagacity to penetrate this subject. It was easily foreseen that this measure would be employed to detach us from our neutral situation, which it was so much our interest, and had been so much our desire, to maintain. This apprehension experience has realized. We now feel the consequences in their fullest extent.

After we had become the dupes of French perfidy, by putting in force the non-importation system against Great Britain, under the belief, that on the first day of November, 1810, the decrees of Berlin and Milan were repealed, the falsehood of which has since been placed beyond all rational doubt, it happened as had been anticipated, that finding the inefficiency of the restrictive system against Great Britain, the nation was called on, about the commencement of last session, to assume a threatening attitude towards that power. We were then told by the supporters of our foreign policy, that war would not be necessary. That justice was withheld from us by the Government of that nation under the impression that force would not be used to maintain our rights, which impression it was only necessary to remove by manifesting a determined spirit in making warlike preparations. This prevailed with many, and the army was voted. But it did not intimidate our enemy. We were then told, that it was necessary to declare war, as affording conclusive evidence of our sincerity: but that it would not be necessary to continue it beyond a few weeks, when our objects would be attained by a just and honorable peace. We were also told, at the same time, that in six weeks after the declaration of war, we should be in possession of a great portion of the enemy's colonies. All these promises have been disappointed. We have effected nothing by commercial restrictions, nothing by arms, and nothing by negotiation; and, if there is not a change in our policy, the war promises to be perpetual.

Having detained you thus long with these preliminary topics, permit me to draw your attention to those that grow directly out of the bill before the committee. I have said, that the causes ought not only to be just, but important in their effect on the community, to justify a resort to arms. I will say more. A nation situated as this is, who has so much to lose, and so little to gain, ought not to relinquish its peaceful state but in the last extremity. Are the causes which existed at the time when this war was declared, of that character which, according to this idea, justified its commencement; and are those now remaining sufficient to sanction its continuance?

I exclude all consideration of the abstract justice of our complaints against Great Britain. Upon that subject I never had but one opinion. I always did believe that her conduct towards this country was not only unjust as it affected us, but impolitic as it affected herself.

Before the war commenced last Summer, the Orders in Council formed the principal ground of complaint against Great Britain. I venture to assert, without the dread of contradiction, that if the repeal which has since taken place had happened and been known here before we resorted to the sword, we should have remained at peace. I make this declaration on (what I deem) the most unquestionable authority. The proof is on record. In 1808, Mr. Jefferson, then President of the United States, through our Minister in London, proposed to the British Government to relinquish the embargo as to her, on condition the Orders in Council were revoked. In 1809, Mr. Madison entered into the arrangement with Mr. Erskine, which made the same condition the sole foundation for restoring amicable intercourse between the two nations. In 1810 and 1811, the discussions between our Government and that of Great Britain were confined almost exclusively to that subject. And in 1812, preceding the declaration of war, the Secretary of State informed the British Envoy, that if the Orders in Council were revoked, the non-importation act would cease immediately. During the whole of this period, our complaints were directed to the Orders in Council, and our measures, (I speak of our restrictive system,) so far as they affected Great Britain, were adopted with a single eye to their repeal. Until the war was declared, I did not suppose that it would be waged for any other object.

The Orders in Council, though a violation of our maritime rights in point of principle, were practically of very little injury to our commerce at the commencement of the war in which we are now engaged. The reasons are obvious. Our commerce to France, Holland, Italy, &c., never was of great importance. And the effect of the French "municipal regulations" had caused it to dwindle into insignificance. The exclusions, restrictions, impositions, and confiscations, so permanent in the commercial code (and practice) of Napoleon, had inspired our merchants with a due portion of caution, how they ventured their property into the power of a Government actuated by no liberal principle, and bound by no faith. From this state of things, it was not difficult to conjecture that the period was not distant when Great Britain must become convinced of the inefficiency of the Orders in Council, so far as respected their retaliatory object on her enemy. How could France be distressed by the British interdiction of her foreign commerce, when France herself was hostile to that commerce—when she adopted every measure to narrow, to shackle, and ultimately to exclude it? We had even strong evidence that British statesmen began to waver on the subject. The vote in the House of Commons, during the last Winter, showed a minority unusually strong, and indicated most clearly that before long the Orders in Council were doomed to perish. But, with this information before our eyes, we hurried on to war without waiting for the event, or even without waiting for preparation.

The Orders in Council have since been repealed. The manner has indeed been objected to by the honorable Speaker, (Mr. Clay,) because the right to secure them in certain events is reserved. But surely this cannot be and has not been considered by our Government a serious objection; for without such reservation the power to revive them existed to every possible extent. The only question is, do they cease to violate our neutral commerce? This is not doubted. The remaining obstacle, therefore, to a good understanding between the two nations, and the sole ostensible cause for persevering in the war, is the subject of impressments.

This is, indeed, a difficult and unquestionably an interesting subject. Not that I place entire confidence in the sympathetic descriptions of the magnitude of the evil, which we have so often heard and daily heard in this House. I am inclined to believe fancy has colored the picture too highly. There is one reason, above all others, which leads me to that conclusion. It is this: In that section of the United States of which two-thirds of our seamen are natives, there is a strong, overwhelming current of opinion against this war. Can it be possible that the country where dwells the kindred of those who are said to be incarcerated in great numbers in the "floating dungeons" of Great Britain is not only indifferent about the fate of its children, but opposes, as ruinous, the war waged for their protection? It is certainly a curious spectacle to see the defenders of seamen's rights come from those portions of the Union that have little commerce, and few, if any, seamen. I do not mean to insinuate that those gentlemen do wrong in espousing the cause of the oppressed, to whatever quarter they may belong; but I state the fact to show that their sympathies may possibly have magnified the evil—and to infer from it, that the opposition of those most immediately interested is to be ascribed, not to their insensibility, but to their apprehensions that this war, instead of securing seamen's rights, will banish their seamen into foreign service.

The controversy between this country and Great Britain seems to have been brought to a single point. She claims the service of her seafaring subjects in time of danger. Our Government admits this right. To give effect to the right thus claimed and admitted, she insists that her officers may go on board our merchant ships on the high seas, or in her ports—search for and take her subjects. This our Government deny, and claim the immunity of the flag so far as persons are concerned; because, under the pretext of taking British subjects, American citizens are frequently taken. It does, indeed, not distinctly appear in the late communication from our Executive to the British Government, that they mean by the terms American citizens, whether it includes naturalized persons as well as natives. With respect to those of the first description, I confess I feel no great interest for their immunity abroad or on the high seas; I am one of those who think that we act sufficiently liberal when we offer them any asylum from the oppression or poverty of their own country, receive them into our bosom, and extend to them all the advantages belonging to us; and so long as they remain within our territorial limits, they shall, with my consent, have the full benefit of the protection which our laws afford to all. But I cannot consent that the native blood of this country shall be profusely wasted to protect aliens born, wherever they may ramble. We all profess a deep solicitude for the interest of seamen. To describe their distresses and to eulogize their valor and patriotism, is one of the topics of the day. And yet we are contending for principles which, if successful, will bring a host of foreigners in competition with them to elbow them out of employment. But it is said that Great Britain does the same—that by the act passed during the reign of George II., foreign seamen are naturalized who have been in the King's service for two years, and that she has no right to object if we imitate her conduct. It is true she has adopted such a regulation. But I have never heard of any instance where she has contended that such a person is absolved from his natural allegiance, if he comes within the power of his original sovereign. I have understood that act to mean that such persons should become entitled to certain rights—not absolved from any duties towards others, should they leave the country. That they should have the right to hold lands—be admitted under the regulations of the navigation act as British seamen on board merchant ships, and participate in the pension and hospital provisions. Should I be mistaken, however, I am not inclined to relinquish my opinion, merely because the practice of Great Britain is opposed to it.

Sir, I do not find fault with the Administration for insisting on the immunity of our flag, as it respects the seamen. I approve of the principle. It is of that character which at a proper time and with proper means is (in effect and to all general purposes) attainable, if we do not by ill-timed and imprudent efforts frustrate it. It is supposed that the present is the auspicious moment to insist on our rights. That pressed as Great Britain is by the most powerful enemy the world ever saw, who threatens her very existence; the impression which we can make upon her by our arms, will be greater than at any other time. This very circumstance renders the attainment of our object more difficult, and makes our case hopeless. Her danger forbids a compliance with our demands. In her present struggle, her naval power constitutes her security. Without that she would long since have become a French province. This every man in England knows and feels. It is well known that four-fifths of her seamen on board her navy render not voluntary but compulsory service. Should this principle be established, which in all cases would afford a secure asylum in our merchant ships, it is dreaded by British statesmen and the British people, that their seamen, allured by higher wages and easier employment, would abandon their service, and thus render their country accessible to their enemy. Hence you see every Ministry, of whatever political party or distinction, tremblingly alive to this subject. They dare not touch it in the present state of that country. No man could maintain his power a moment after having hazarded the public safety by making an experiment, the effect of which could not be foreseen, and may be productive of such disastrous consequences. This spirit is manifest in all the communications from the British Cabinet to our Government. We have seen the sentiments of Lord Grenville, Lord Auckland, Lord Holland, and Mr. Fox, men whose prepossessions were in our favor, and who on almost every other subject supported our pretensions. On this subject they resisted our demands, because they dared not grant them. While I conceive the claims of our Government as not going too far, I doubt their prudence as to the time and manner of giving them effect. I fear that instead of realizing our wishes the measures pursued are calculated to deprive us of every hope hereafter. In the present unexampled state of the world, according to my limited conception of our true interest, we ought to have seriously avoided all hostile collision with foreign powers. We ought to have cherished the resources within our grasp. Nothing is more obvious than the remark made by the honorable gentleman from New York, (Mr. Bleecker,) that, with all the injuries which we received from the belligerents, our commerce was more extensive and more profitable in the aggregate than if Europe had been at peace. We might have obtained (and we ought not to have rejected) such temporary arrangements with England, (with whom our commerce was chiefly carried on,) which, though they did not embrace all our interests, would have secured those of first importance and kept us at peace. The benefits of such a policy are to my mind self-evident. Should Europe be restored to tranquillity and assume something like its former appearance, (and I do not believe the present state of things durable,) we should have been able to have effected every valuable object, because such a change will probably bring with it a respect for the rights of nations, which have now no existence but in name. And should an imposing attitude have been wanting to give effect to our claims, we should have exhibited an unbroken spirit and unexhausted resources.

An honorable member from Tennessee, (Mr. Grundy,) the other day, read some extracts from the instructions transmitted to our Minister in London, in 1792. His object was to show the deep interest which the great man who then presided over this nation felt on the subject of impressments. I sincerely wish that while gentlemen resort to his opinions to support theirs, they would consent to imitate his conduct. Nothing can be more strikingly different than his policy and that which is now pursued.

In 1793 the subject of impressments did not form the only complaint against Great Britain. The Treaty of Peace remained unexecuted on her part. To that was added the great injury which our commerce sustained by the extensive captures made by her cruisers during that year. The interest which was felt for the success of the French Revolution, against which Great Britain had arrayed herself, tended to excite the nation, even beyond the measure of its wrongs, and ripen it for war. But the wisdom of Washington saved us from being drawn into the vortex, which has since devoured all who approached it. His genius considered the true interests of his country to consist in the preservation of its peace; and he had firmness enough to preserve it, though opposed by the strong feelings of the people. Notwithstanding the accumulated wrongs which we had received, he sent a messenger of peace, and ultimately gave his assent to a treaty in which there was not one stipulation even to restrain the abuses of impressments, which the year before he had declared could not be longer tolerated. Why was this done by him, who, to say the least, had as much affection for his country's rights, as the politicians of the present day—whom fear never influenced—and who could safely calculate on the support of the people, should he resort to arms? The answer is obvious. Peace upon almost any terms was better than a hopeless, endless contest. What a contrast does his example present to the conduct of those who now direct the destinies of this nation, and who, while they reject his policy, resort to his opinions to support their own?

Upon the subject of foreign war, and the objects connected with it, the opinions of gentlemen of the majority have certainly undergone a strange revolution since they came into power. Little more than twelve years ago, they deprecated foreign war as inconsistent with the spirit of our institutions, and the genius of our Government. Nothing short of self-defence, when attacked in our own country, was considered as a justification for abandoning our peaceful pursuits, and mingling in hostility with European powers. Every other object was deemed subordinate to the preservation of peace, because with it was connected every benefit which it had pleased Providence to bestow upon us, and which our detached situation rendered secure. We now hear those very gentlemen talk of Rome and Greece in their proudest days, when they inspired terror into the inhabitants of distant climes and carried their arms to every quarter of the globe; and their example is held up for our imitation. The almost boundless extent of our territory is become too limited, and we hear of conquests in the North and South, as essential to our security and happiness. In taking a retrospect, and contrasting former opinions with present conduct, a person would almost be inclined to distrust his observation, was there not left on record monuments with sentiments of former times entertained by gentlemen in the days of humility, when they were struggling against power. Permit me to call your attention to a resolution of the Virginia Assembly, adopted in 1798, said to be draughted by Mr. Madison, now President of the United States, upon this subject. It was then considered the standard of Republican opinion, by all who professed to be of that party. It in substance declares, that though the General Assembly view with indignation the violations of our commerce, the impressment of our seamen, and other wrongs committed by foreign nations, yet detached as the United States are from European concerns, they should deprecate a war waged for any other object except self-defence, in cases of actual invasion. This resolution had an eye to our relations with France, from whom we had then received every injury and indignity she could inflict, and with whom we were in a state of partial hostility; but it explicitly declares, that we ought to engage in offensive war, for no object whatever. Let the sentiment be compared with the conduct of the same men now they are in power.

Sir, I am one of those who doubt our capacity to obtain the conquest of the British provinces. I believe that the opinion, that we are a very powerful nation abroad, is a fanciful delusion. To be powerful abroad, requires a Government of sufficient energy, not only to bring into action all the physical and pecuniary resources of the country, but to command them promptly. The very nature of our Government, where every thing depends immediately upon the people, forbids the idea that you can effect one or the other. The inconveniences and privations to which they must be subjected, are sufficient causes with the great body of the community, who do not perceive very distinctly how they are to be benefited by an offensive war, to turn their faces against it. Their Representatives, knowing their feelings, dare not press them with a heavy hand, which at once destroys every thing like energy. Besides, the want of promptitude, the characteristic defect of such a Government, whose powers are divided into many hands, prevents the resources even within their reach to be obtained and applied in time to insure success. The consequence of all this is—imbecility in obtaining, and want of celerity in applying the necessary means. This may be considered as a very great evil, particularly to those who have presented to us the example of Rome in her proudest days, when she was mistress of the world, for our imitation. Sir, I rejoice that such is the state of my country. It is the legitimate offspring of our free institutions. The people are strong and the Government is weak; whenever this state of things shall be reversed, then shall we be able to inspire terror into other nations. But until that period shall arrive, we shall exhibit weakness and slowness of action, as to all offensive and external purposes.

To retain the British provinces as an indemnity for our losses, is an event which I cannot wish, because I can see no possible benefit resulting from it. Have we not already territory enough? Is it desirable to incorporate with us a people composed of heterogeneous materials, who are not only unaccustomed to our institutions, but many of whom entertain an unconquerable hatred for them? I believe it would have been better had we never acquired any foreign territory at all. If we had been contented with the limits embraced by the old thirteen United States, the prospects of remaining a united people, and preserving our free institutions, would, in my conception, be much more flattering. I am, therefore, opposed to new acquisitions. But it is repeatedly urged that the possession of Canada is necessary to secure us from the hostilities of the savage tribes on our northwestern borders; was this the fact, I might yield my assent to prosecute the war to attain that object. But experience has shown that we can have peace with them, though Canada is in the possession of a foreign power. For seventeen years after the Treaty of Greenville we were entirely exempt from Indian hostilities; and not until we waged war ourselves, did they become troublesome upon our frontiers.

My apprehensions are not solely confined to the danger resulting from military power; there are other consequences equally to be dreaded, which I fear may overwhelm us, should we continue in this course. There is one peculiarly delicate, but equally important—so delicate, that gentlemen have supposed it ought not even to be mentioned. Sir, shall I not be permitted to point to the yawning gulf beneath? Shall I not attempt to arrest your progress in the path where lies a serpent that will sting you to death? I deprecate disunion as an event pregnant with every evil. The moment it happens, civil liberty is banished from this country. I feel deeply interested that it should not happen. Permit me, however, to observe, that a union is connected by a consciousness which is felt that the various interests of the different sections are consulted and protected, and not by force. If you wish to perpetuate the Union, you must preserve that opinion. The moment that it shall no longer exist, the ties that bind us together become feeble indeed. The present war, though ostensibly waged for principles in which the Northern and Eastern people have a deep interest, is considered by them—and they certainly understand their interest best—as calculated to prostrate it. They feel the evils of your measures daily, and they see no prospect that they ever will be benefited by them. The physical power of the country is in their hands, and it requires nothing but public sentiment, which quickly follows public interest, and you ripen them for a state of things most of all to be deprecated. I hope we shall avert the evil by banishing the cause of discontent.

Besides the immediate physical evils which present themselves as probably resulting from our measures, there are other moral evils which I must dread. Our Government was made to secure the happiness of the people, and every thing which even remotely is calculated to impair their moral sense, will have an effect upon their situation. When the people shall become attached to principles inconsistent with morality, or with their tranquil, civil pursuits, their prosperity and their freedom are at hazard. The spirit of conquest and of military glory, however fascinating, is baneful to the prosperity and liberty of every country. This spirit has shown itself in our country, of late, in an unusual degree. We have become tired of the peaceful character of our pursuits; and we want nothing but success on this first attempt to encourage us to become a great military nation, attempting conquest in every quarter. Whenever that happens, we shall share the destiny of other nations. When the same spirit and the same councils prevail, the misery of the mass of the people is the support of the national glory.

One of the evils which I dread, as attending the war, and in my opinion not the least, Mr. Chairman, is, that we have united our exertions with the efforts of the great destroyer of mankind, who, having prostrated the independence of almost every nation on the continent of Europe, has drawn us into our present situation, to assist him in humbling his remaining enemy, whose destruction is, above all others, nearest his heart. I do not believe that gentlemen are so far lost to all sense of their country's interest, as designedly to unite the destiny of this nation with him, who lives only to destroy. I believe them, when they declare that such is not their intention. But we are united in fact. His ostensible object is the liberty of the seas: so is ours. His successes are our successes, and his defeats are our defeats. Being thus associated in fact—having one common object—if the war continues any time, we shall be associated in name also. When pressed beyond our present expectation by our enemy, we shall not make any difficulty in submitting to arrangements which may appear to us advantageous, but which are calculated to fasten us to the car of the conqueror. We may want men to enable us to obtain the object of our offensive operations in the North; France can furnish them. We may want ships to defend our coast; we can obtain them from the same quarter. But, for these things, we must stipulate an equivalent; and what can that be, but to unite in striking England from the list of independent nations?

Mr. Robertson.—Mr. Chairman, I am well aware that the House will listen (if it listens at all) with much reluctance to a further discussion of the subject under consideration. Nevertheless, it is my intention explicitly, but concisely to state some of the reasons, which influence me to support the measure proposed; some of the views connected with them, which command my approbation, and induce my aid. Sir, I propose to make a few remarks on the bill itself, and subsequently, without following gentlemen in the wide and expansive range of argumentative, declamatory, and defamatory eloquence, in which they have thought fit to indulge, to reply to some of the observations which struck me with most force, and which my memory still retains.

The honorable Chairman of the Committee on Military Affairs is entitled to the thanks of this House, and of the nation, for the able and lucid exposition he has given, of the plan intended to be pursued by the Government in the prosecution of the war in which we are engaged, and of the objects for the attainment of which an increase of the Military Establishment is deemed necessary. What is that plan, and what are the objects in contemplation? The power of the nation is to be called out; a portion for a defence of our seacoast and extensive frontier; the residue to be sent forth to battle against our implacable foe, to drive him from the American continent, and thus to insure our future peace, if not our Union and independence. These objects are avowed, and efforts and energy are necessary to their success.

The propriety of defending our country can be denied by none. This proposition is clear. Even the gentlemen on the other side of the House (as it is fashionable to speak) do not oppose it. For myself I do not hesitate to say, it presses itself on my feelings with irresistible force. When I take into consideration the exposed situation of the people whom it is my pride and honor to represent, when I view them surrounded by numerous and warlike tribes of Indians, skirted by strongholds in the possession of a nation devoted to our foe, containing in the bosom of their country a class of beings always on the watch to overwhelm them in ruin, I lose sight of other considerations, and am compelled to urge, as I do most earnestly, that no obstacles may be thrown in the way of our complete protection. I have lived for some years in the country to which I have called your attention. I have not been altogether an inattentive observer, nor indifferent to its interests. The neglected state of the militia under the territorial government, its present unorganized and unarmed state, have not escaped my notice. But we must "blame the culture, not the soil." The inhabitants are brave, expert in the management of the horse and in the use of arms. The materials are good. It is unnecessary to dwell on these, or to mention other circumstances of an internal nature. Suffice it to be observed, our situation is insecure. I have stated, sir, that we are surrounded by numerous and warlike tribes of Indians. I will not recount their numbers, nor blazon their powers of doing mischief. Those facts are too notorious to require repetition. I have stated that strongholds in our immediate neighborhood are in the possession of a people devoted to our enemy. The Spaniards on our eastern frontier are under their perfect control. They considered the English as fighting for the independence of Spain, their native country, their religion, and their King. In their towns an extensive British trade is carried on, and from their ports, where they refit, issue forth the armed vessels of that nation to the annoyance of the commerce of our country. The Indians too are excited against us. On my journey from New Orleans to this place, passing through the Creek confederacy, I received certain information that the Spanish commandant at St. Marks had assured them that their friends the British were expected soon in considerable force at that place and at Pensacola, and that they should be furnished with arms and other munitions of war to be used against the Americans. Sir, humanity to that people, as well as the irresistible claims we have to protection, require that a force should be stationed on the Mobile and Mississippi sufficient to prevent the effect of British and Spanish machination, or to throw back on themselves the evils of hostility.

I now proceed to examine some of the objections which have been made, not to the bill, but to the further prosecution of the war. The war is denounced as unconstitutional, cruel, the effect of French influence, and as intended to place James II. on the throne of America. In making the first objection, gentlemen could not have been serious; they could not have expected that it would have been deemed worthy of an answer. The power to make war belongs to all nations; is of the essence of Government; but the Constitution of the United States gives it expressly, in so many words: "The Congress shall have power to declare war, to raise and support armies." Whether the war be defensive or offensive, depends on circumstance and accident, but cannot affect the right. If war be defensive and offensive, still the whole is equal to its parts. But to what does this doctrine lead? Do gentlemen believe it to be true? Then it becomes their duty to move for the appointment of a committee to inquire into the circumstances of the capture of the Macedonian, and if it be discovered that she was taken at more than a marine league from the shore, to cashier the American officer, declare the attack and capture unconstitutional, and restore the vessel to her former master. Then an enterprise, giving rise to a new era in maritime history, and entwining round the brows of the United States a wreath of imperishable laurel, turns out to be a violation of that instrument on the sacredness of which depends the Union and happiness of America. The war is not unconstitutional, nor can it, by any possibility, be so considered.

But it is said that, as the Orders in Council are repealed, the question of impressment is the only one in controversy between the United States and Great Britain; and, on the subject, the honorable gentleman from North Carolina, (Mr. Pearson,) has, without difficulty, settled principles about which jurists have differed in opinion. He contends that individuals cannot divest themselves of their allegiance; that the right of expatriation does not exist; that the practice of naturalization is wrong. These opinions are as erroneous as they are repugnant to every principle of human liberty, and owe their origin to feudal times and feudal States; times and States, the prolific sources of the vilest principles in politics and morals.

I believe that every civilized nation under the sun is in the practice of naturalizing foreigners. The omnipotent Parliament of Great Britain exercises this right. The rights of all independent nations are equal. Whatever course Great Britain pursues in relation to the subjects or citizens of other countries, these countries are authorized to pursue in relation to the subjects of Great Britain. Whatever her admirers may say to the contrary, if she does not acknowledge, she is compelled to act in conformity to this principle. Where is there in her history an example of her punishing as a traitor, a Briton naturalized by a foreign Government, although found in arms against her? If a subject could not divest himself of his natural allegiance; if once a subject always a subject, were true, how is it that Napper Tandy was suffered to escape punishment? Why was he not hanged as a traitor? He was born in Ireland, became a French citizen, served in war against his native country, was taken, tried, and found guilty of high treason; but when a terrible retaliation was threatened by France, in the event of his execution, that nation, which never yields to threats, restored him to his then adopted country.

But gentlemen are opposed to the further prosecution of the war. Do they contend that the causes which rendered it necessary have been removed? Have we obtained the objects for which it was commenced? Is the new and before unheard-of system of blockade abandoned? A system which, under the pretence of being a military measure, was converted into a commercial scheme beneficial to the belligerents, and destructive alone to the rights of the neutrals. Have our citizens been restored to their country? Is any disposition evidenced to omit tearing them from their homes and families in future? What will be the consequence of laying down our arms, of shrinking from our present attitude? We are at the feet of Great Britain: and after having for years attempted in vain to obtain justice, we are to recommence fruitless negotiation. Admit that we are unable to enforce our demands, to support our independence, that we cannot carry on war, that the friends of the British Government in this country (to use their own expression) will not permit us; in such a situation, with such admission, to expect justice would be folly in the extreme. England would return to her habitual spoliations, would re-establish that state precisely the most beneficial to herself, the most injurious to us: infinitely better to her than peace on fair terms, for then the opportunity would be lost of feeding and enriching her navy at our expense; better than war, as the numerous prizes brought into her ports of late very clearly prove. Formerly the losses were exclusively ours. Yes, sir, willingly would she return to, and forever continue, her former career of depredation; and the next ten years would add another thousand to the thousand American vessels already carried into her ports.

Too long did we suffer disgrace and degradation. Peace, with all its blessings, may be enjoyed at too dear a price. But yet, while it was possible to preserve it, we shut our eyes against the most flagrant injuries; we affected not to hear the loudest insults. Peace was congenial to our habits, favorable to the principles of our Government. It was not to be apprehended it would be, nor cannot be now believed that it was wantonly abandoned. Whilst tranquillity prevailed it was wise to dwell on its advantages. Now, that in spite of all our efforts we are at war, it is well to inquire whether circumstances may not grow out of it favorable to our future happiness and prosperity.

The British possessions in America present themselves to our view and invite a conquest. I am struck with the contrariety of opinion which prevails among gentlemen. Some of them speak of the country as barren, the climate as inclement, the inhabitants thereby scattered over the face of the territory. If this be true, it will not be considered as worth defending, and as by its loss Britain loses nothing, the sympathy which she seems to have excited, and the doleful jeremiads to which her anticipated disasters have given rise, are as unnecessary as they are misplaced. But others say, no doubt from its importance to its European sovereign it will be defended to the last extremity; that the United States cannot take it; that the army we propose to send into the field will prove insufficient. When gentlemen differ so widely, no satisfactory conclusion can be drawn from their opinions. Sir, Canada will be defended, and it is from a belief of that fact, and from a knowledge of the force which Great Britain may bring into the field, that the troops now demanded become necessary. We have heard an estimate of that force too often to be again repeated. It has lost nothing of its magnitude and importance. Its valor has received the highest praise, and we are triumphantly asked if we expect to intimidate Great Britain.

Sir, none but cowards calculate on the cowardice of their foe. We do not expect to intimidate her. We expect to meet her armies in the field and to vanquish them. The power of Britain must be extinguished in America. She must no longer be permitted to corrupt the principles and to disturb the peace and tranquillity of our citizens. Our frontier inhabitants must not be kept in dread and danger from her Indian allies. And never shall we be secure among ourselves, and exempt from the mischievous intrigues of Europeans, until European power is expelled across the Atlantic. The gentleman from Massachusetts says, that Canada entered into the scheme of the war. It certainly does now enter into the scheme of the war. Sir, no citizen of the United States would have given his consent to an unprovoked attack on that country merely for the purpose of getting possession of it. But I do, for one, rejoice that, under present circumstances, we thus have an opportunity afforded us, not only to make our enemy feel our power, but to drive him from this continent, and to remove one of the most frequent causes of war among nations—neighborhood and contiguity. The evils of peace, on the terms of gentlemen in opposition, cannot be borne. Let us then, with firmness, persevere in the contest in which we are engaged, until it can be terminated on principles compatible with the rights and honor of the nation.

The committee now rose, reported progress, and obtained leave to sit again.

Tuesday, January 12.

Additional Military Force.

The House again resolved itself into Committee of the Whole, on the bill to raise an additional army of twenty thousand men, for one year.

Mr. Emott addressed the Chair as follows:

Mr. Chairman: I mean no common-place remark, when I declare to you, that I address you on the subjects which have been brought into this debate, and as I think properly so brought, with great reluctance. My general deportment since I have been honored with a seat on this floor, is sufficient evidence to you and the committee that I feel an unwillingness to mingle in the war of words which is carried on here. There are causes which add to this repugnance on the present occasion. The debate has been continued for such a length of time, and in part has been conducted with so much asperity, that the minds of all have become fatigued, and the passions of many inflamed. I know, and I duly appreciate the difficulties which, under such circumstances, surround and face the speaker. But, sir, there are considerations of public duty, and individual propriety, which urge, nay, demand of me, to ask your patience, and the indulgence of the House, while I present to you and to them my view of the great subjects involved in this discussion.

Mr. Chairman, I am aware that, in the discussion I am about commencing, I shall render myself obnoxious to the wit of gentlemen who think that, to bring into view other topics than those which arise out of the details of the bill now on your table, is to go beyond the range of legitimate debate. The bill contemplates the raising an additional military force of twenty thousand men; thus increasing the Military Establishment, or the standing army of the country, to upwards of fifty-five thousand men. Now, sir, with the details of this bill I have nothing to do. Nay, I will confess to you that I like the bill as it stands, providing for enlistments for one year only, better than I should were it amended, as has been proposed, by prolonging the terms, precisely for the reason that the force will be less efficient and dangerous, and more under legislative control. I meddle not with the fitness of the instrument. That is the business of other men; but, being opposed to the continuance of the war offensively, as I was to its commencement, I cannot consent to grant any further force to carry it on. The only check, or control, which the Legislature can constitutionally have over a war after it is begun, is in withholding the means; and, in voting the means, either in men or money, every member of the Legislature ought to be satisfied of the necessity of prosecuting the war.

According to my best judgment, sir, this war was improperly commenced, and it is unnecessarily continued; and I shall now proceed to explain the grounds of that judgment by an examination of the causes of the war, as they existed at its commencement, and as they now remain. As this is the first time the subject has been brought into debate, and, indeed, the earliest opportunity which has been allowed, of an open discussion, I am sure I shall be pardoned for going into detail, if I even should be tedious, as I know I shall be uninteresting. It is a right which I think I may claim, to state distinctly my reasons and motives for the votes which I have given, and may give, in relation to the war, after what has been said in this House, and out of it, about the opposition to the views of the Administration.

In making this examination, I shall pass in review, in as brief a manner as possible, the three great subjects of complaint against Great Britain; her orders of blockade, her Orders in Council, and her practice of impressment. But for one or all of these, the war certainly would not have been declared; and I may assume that, for but one or all of these, the war ought not to be continued. I cannot, indeed, but recollect, that the gentleman from Louisiana has mentioned the conquest of Canada, and of the Floridas, as causes for the continuance of the war. As respects the Canadas, I have heretofore understood that their reduction might be a consequence of the war, but never until now did I know that it was to be shifted into a cause for carrying it on. And, in regard to the Floridas, I will not consent that their conquest should, in the existing relations of this country, be either a cause or consequence of war. I will confess to you, that an invasion of the colonies of Spain at this time, under the stale excuses of convenience or necessity, strikes me with abhorrence. It is not only against the genius of our Government, and, as I hope, the character of our people, but, if persisted in, will be a foul blot in our national history.

[Here the speaker entered into an elaborate documentary investigation to show that the Decree of Blockade, and the Orders in Council, were not adequate causes for war at the time it was declared—and that both these causes had since ceased to exist, the Orders in Council having been revoked, and the fictitious, or paper blockades, discontinued.]

Impressment of Seamen.—The injury done to our seamen under the British practice of impressment, was also made a cause of the war, and to the eye, at least, it is the only one which now remains.

Mr. Chairman, the discussion of this subject is attended with adventitious difficulties, growing out of the times and the state of the country. The public mind, in some sections of the Union, is in such a feverish state on this account, from tales oft told of bondage worse than negro slavery, and of condemnation without trial, that the person who is willing to "hear the other party," is at once branded with foreign partialities, and threatened with the trial by mob. Besides, sir, it is intimated that a negotiation is to be had, or may possibly be attempted, which may be affected by an open discussion of the topic. In point of duty, I feel myself called upon to take some notice of the subject, but my view of it will be less perfect than in a different situation I should think desirable.

The President, in the war Message, thus introduces the subject: "British cruisers have been in the continued practice of violating the American flag on the great highway of nations, and of seizing and carrying off persons sailing under it; not in the exercise of a belligerent right, founded on the law of nations against an enemy, but of a municipal prerogative over British subjects." As this does not present the case in its true light, I shall, for the purpose of fairly bringing to view the conflicting claims of the two nations, give you an extract from the letter of Mr. Madison to Mr. Monroe, of the 5th of January, 1804, containing instructions for a treaty with Great Britain: "With this exception, (persons in the military service of an enemy) we consider a neutral flag on the high seas, as a safeguard to those sailing under it. Great Britain, on the contrary, asserts a right to search for and seize her own subjects; and under that cover, as cannot but happen, are often seized and taken off, citizens of the United States, and citizens or subjects of other neutral countries, navigating the high seas, under the protection of the American flag."

The claim, then, on the part of the British is, that in time of war they have a right to enter neutral merchant vessels on the high seas, to search for and seize their subjects, being seamen. On our part it is, that on the high seas the flag shall cover and protect all sailing under it, whether British subjects or American citizens. These are distinctly the claims of right on the part of the two nations, and I shall so consider them, without regard to practice apart from right.

One or two remarks, sir, before I enter upon the subject. The first is, that I do not mean to moot the point, relative to the rights of our naturalized citizens, or the extent of our duties towards them. But this I will say, that I am willing to give them all the protection which the situation of the country and its true interests will justify. I know that the unruly passions and the meddling dispositions of some foreigners, have raised prejudices in the minds of many persons against all foreigners. But I know, also, and I speak without reference to political opinions or prejudices, that among our naturalized citizens are to be found men, and many men, too, of great worth and respectability, and who are extensively useful to the country. These men have my good will, and it is certainly my wish, that they should be fostered and protected, as far as it can be done, without putting at hazard the great interests and the permanent welfare of the country. But, sir, to this class of our citizens, the claim that they are to be protected on the high seas by our flag, is really of little importance. Our claim never was, and I am sure never will be, that they are to be protected, if they put themselves within the power of their former Sovereign, by going to his ports, or placing themselves on his territories. And yet such is the state of the commerce of the world, that it can scarcely happen in a mercantile voyage, in this or the other hemisphere, that the vessel will not at some time be in a British port, and the crew on British ground; our right of flag will not then save our adopted citizens from impressment. For the slight benefit, therefore, to our naturalized citizens, which can arise under our claim, if established, I am sure the well-meaning and reasonable part of them will not ask the country to continue the war on their account.

Another remark which I wish to make is, that I am most decidedly the friend, nay, sir, if you please, the partisan, of the seamen of the country. I have no doubt that this nation is destined to be a great maritime power; and that, in times not very far distant, we are to owe our prosperity, as a commercial people, and possibly, under Providence, our security, to our seamen. I am therefore a friend to "seamen's rights," properly understood and fairly enforced; but this shall not blind me to the rights of others. Besides, in a war to be carried on for seamen alone, and that, too, on the abstract question of the right of flag, I can see great danger to the seamen in their just claims to protection; and, I must beg their friends, in and out of this House, to reflect before they act. As surely as the war is continued on this ground alone, so surely will seamen become unpopular, and their rights be neglected. When the evils of the war press upon the country, and press they will; when the many lives sacrificed, and the countless millions expended, shall be brought to view, is it not to be apprehended that seamen and their claim will be remembered, only as the cause of the scenes of expense and blood through which we are to pass? It is not dealing fairly with our seamen, to make them the scape-goats of this war.

The British then claim the right, in time of war, to take their seamen out of neutral merchant vessels on the high seas.

Is this claim a novel one? That the claim is novel, is certainly intimated by the Committee of Foreign Relations, when they say that the impressment of which we complain, is "a practice which has been unceasingly maintained by Great Britain in the wars to which she has been a party since our Revolution." Indeed, it has been most roundly asserted, and by many it is believed, that the British claim was made for the first time after our war; that it originated in views hostile to our commerce and maritime rights; and that in practice it is only brought to bear upon us. In truth, however, whatever may be the justice of the claim, it is not a recent one. It has, in a greater or less degree, been practised on in all the wars in which England has been engaged for the two last centuries.

The instructions to armed ships are not frequently made public; but it so happens, that we have in print an instruction on this very point, given in 1646, by the Earl of Northumberland, Lord High Admiral of England, to Sir John Pennington, which goes beyond the present claim: "As you meet with any men of war, merchants, or other ships, belonging to any foreign Prince or State in any road where you, or any of His Majesty's fleet, may happen to come, you are to send to see whether there be any of His Majesty's subjects on board; and if any seamen, gunners, pilots, or marines, (whether English, Scotch, or Irish,) be found on board, you are to cause such of his Majesty's subjects to be taken forth, and so disposed of as they shall be forthcoming, to answer their contempt of His Majesty's proclamation in that kind." These instructions were modified in the reign of Charles the Second, so as to exclude public armed vessels, and with this modification they have come down to the present times. If it were at all necessary to the purposes of my argument, I might show that this right has been exercised both towards France and Holland, long before we had existence as a nation. Their vessels have been searched, and British seamen taken from them. But enough has been said to prove that the claim, if unjust, is not novel.

Is the claim peculiar to the British? I am justified in saying that this claim, in time of war, to search for and seize seamen in neutral merchant vessels, on the high seas, has been made and exercised by every maritime nation in Europe. To be more particular—I assert, and stand ready to prove, that it has been made and enforced by France as well as England, and is now. It would be a waste of time to go very much at large into the French usages on this subject. I propose to do little more than to refer to one or two French ordinances, and then show from our State papers their practical application to us.

By the French laws, and they are ancient laws, the seamen of the country are all classed, and enrolled, and licensed. In 1784, an edict was made which is still in force, declaring, that any classed seaman, who shall, in time of peace, be found serving in foreign ships, shall be sentenced to fifteen days' confinement, and reduced to the lowest wages, and serve two years extraordinary at the lowest rate; but those who, in time of war, shall be arrested in foreign ships, or passing into foreign countries, shall be sentenced to three years' service in the galleys. Under the authority of this, and similar ordinances, the French have taken their seamen out of our vessels, and in some instances our seamen with them.

Mr. Chairman, the first proof relative to the committee, is the impressment document of January last, known to the American people as the 6,057 document. The Secretary of State, Mr. Monroe, at the close of the introductory report, says, "it is equally impossible, from the want of precise returns, to make an accurate report of the names or number of citizens of the United States, who have been compelled to enter into the French service, or are held in captivity under the authority of that Government, whether taken from vessels captured on the high seas, or seized in rivers, ports, or harbors; the names of a few only, greatly below the number believed to be so detained, being within the knowledge of this Department. A detail therefore is not attempted, with respect to this part of the call of the House of Representatives." Yes, sir, it is known to the Administration, that some of our citizens have been compelled to enter into the service of the French Emperor, while others are held in captivity by him. Ask, however, for their names, and you have for answer, that all the persons detained are not known to the Government, and therefore it cannot be material that you should have the names of any. Say to gentlemen, here is a case of American rights violated, and you will be told, that the injury, in practice, is not of sufficient importance to justify strong measures against the French Government. Be it so. But attempt to prove to the same gentlemen, that the practical operation of British blockades and Orders in Council, is not such as to require war, you will then hear, that it is necessary to fight about the principle.

I have one other paper to lay before the committee, on this subject. For some years back, the information about French impressments has been general and vague, or altogether withheld. Formerly this was otherwise. In a report respecting the impressment of seamen in 1797, made by the Secretary of State to this House, on the 27th of February, 1798, we have the names of upwards of twenty American citizens, taken out of American vessels, on the high seas, by French privateers. We have more, sir. This same report states, that two French seamen named Lewis had been impressed from on board the American ship Bryseis by a French Commodore's ship; that Francis Gibbons, a native of France, but married and resident at New London in Connecticut, was impressed from the American ship Edward, at Rochefort, by authority of the French Republic, and put on board a French ship of war: and that Henry Doughty, an American, was impressed at sea from the American brig Elsa by the French frigates Lapancy and Thetis. I could instance other cases, but these are sufficient to show, that neither the claim nor the exercise of it is peculiar to the British.