ELEVENTH CONGRESS.—SECOND SESSION. PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES. (continued 3)

The question which Mr. D. said he proposed, was, whether obstacles could not be interposed by naval men. As respected firing the harpoon-gun, he should suppose it a want of skill or attention in the experiment if it failed to take effect. That a harpoon might be fired into a vessel, that the torpedo would go under her, and that a vessel which could be bought for $5,000, might be blown up in this way, he had no doubt; but when all this is done, what does it ascertain? As respects making a torpedo, any person who is in the neighborhood of a good gun and locksmith, and has good powder, can construct one. Mr. D. said he did not see the necessity of spending this sum of money rather for amusement than for any thing else. He did not see the necessity of it, because he did not perceive any one thing to be learnt from an experiment. He was, therefore, against the bill.

Mr. Lyon said that the gentleman from Connecticut had shown his own conviction of the utility of torpedoes, and it would be worth while to give five thousand dollars to establish the same conviction in others. If I had the twentieth part of the certainty on the subject which that gentleman has, said Mr. L., I should not vote for the experiment. I have no desire, in voting for any thing of this kind, to give up any other kind of defence. I know it is all-important in us to defend our ports and harbors. If it was not for our extensive seacoast, I should not be so extremely averse to going to war. I would leave no means untried to protect this seacoast. However little the hope might be, if there was the least thing to hang hope on, I would give $5,000 for the experiment. I have voted for the highest sum ever called for, for the defence of New York; but still, when I look to the steeples of the fine churches, and to the banks, &c., of that city, exposed as it is and must be, I am struck with horror. Notwithstanding all the exertions which have ever been made for them, they must still be insecure. If $5,000 would carry conviction as far on the rest of the House as with the gentleman from Connecticut, the money would be well laid out to enable us to go on with a further experiment of this plan.

The gentleman from Connecticut read a long history of the torpedo experiment made many years ago. I believe, sir, Mr. Fulton has but little merit in originating the thing. Let gentlemen recollect what an alarm this thing made, and how uneasy the British were during the Revolutionary war, till they thought they had got rid of these machines. I cannot forget the alarm which they excited, and will take the liberty to quote Hopkinson on the subject, who was a witness to the transaction:

If a parcel of kegs, in those days, alarmed them so much, what will Fulton's torpedoes do now?

Mr. McKim said, that what had fallen from the gentleman from Connecticut had operated powerfully on his mind to satisfy him of the propriety of the appropriation. He says, observed Mr. McK., that he has no doubt they will produce the desired effect. Now, sir, when I am informed, from so respectable a source, of their effect when properly placed under the ship, I am induced to vote for this appropriation. If one of these machines in a hundred should take effect, the object would be perfectly gained. If we could only blow up one or two in a squadron, we should not hereafter be disturbed by British squadrons in our waters. I have listened with great pleasure to the lecture of the gentleman on pneumatics, hydraulics, &c., for I know not where I could have derived so much information as from that gentleman, and I take the opportunity of returning my thanks to him.

Mr. Fisk said he was against the bill, but from different reasons than other gentlemen were. I do believe, said he, that in some cases, the anchored torpedoes may be effectual; but I do not believe that any thing to result from this bill will be of service to the country. I do not entertain any doubt that a vessel may be blown up. The explosion will take place, the wreck will be left in the bed of the river, and it may cost $5,000 to raise it, or it may remain as an obstacle to the invasion of the capital. If Congress are at this time seriously to resort to the torpedo system of defence, let us do it in a more serious manner; let us make a respectable provision to purchase torpedo munition, and create a torpedo corps under certain regulations. We have got military and naval armaments; let us make a torpedo armament. At the same time, it was but justice to the inventor to say, that he considered the anchored torpedo as a very useful invention. Mr. F. moved to recommit the bill, to inquire into the propriety of appropriating such a sum of money as the Secretary of the Navy should deem adequate to the object, for the sum proposed certainly was not.

Mr. Quincy said he agreed with the gentleman from New York in his opposition to the bill, because, if a fair experiment was intended, the appropriation was totally insufficient. This morning, in a conversation with the Secretary of the Navy, I understood that this sum will not enable a vessel to be placed in that situation which will give a fair experiment. If we pass this bill, it will be utterly useless to the purpose proposed. If the object be to have gentlemen who never saw such a thing gratified with an explosion, that object will be attained, but no other. Let us have an estimate from the Secretary of the Navy of the probable expense, or the whole sum appropriated may be lost, and the law will prove utterly disgraceful to those who passed it.

Mr. Holland said he had understood from the torpedo inventor himself, that $5,000 would be amply sufficient.

Mr. Dana said he had no belief that any vessel could be purchased for five thousand dollars, on which a sufficient experiment could be made. He conceived that the experiment could only be made in hostile operations. We are told that these torpedoes would destroy the navy in the British channel. Do we doubt the inveteracy of the French hatred of the British navy when it has existed so many years? If this invention would command the British Channel—and millions are but dust in the balance for this object—to enable Bonaparte to strike at the British soil, why has not the invention been patronized by France? It has been rejected by France, and rejected by England after an expense of hundreds of thousands of dollars—and now are we to take it up? It is as a stationary resistance to be made to a naval force where there are fortresses also, that the torpedo may be made use of, if they can be used at all; where chains, or chevaux-de-frises are made use of, it may be made use of as auxiliary to other aids in terrifying the enemy. As to setting these machines afloat, firing harpoons into vessels, calculating the chance of boats getting away when a single shot may send them to the bottom, I have no opinion of it at all.

Mr. Lyon said he would not vote for recommitment, not that he had not rather that ten thousand dollars were appropriated than five thousand; but the House had the Senate's opinion on that point before them. He agreed with gentlemen entirely, that there never could be a complete experiment until time of war. But that was no reason why we should not, before war came, be in a fair state to try the experiment in war.

Mr. Fisk said he had not seen the experiment which had been made in New York, but he had conversed with hundreds who had. He had no doubt but the invention might be useful, but how was its utility to be ascertained, unless in the vessel to be attacked, there was a crew prepared to resist the approach of the boats, or prevent the operation of the torpedo? The nation would be no more convinced of their utility after an expenditure of five thousand dollars than they now are. It is because I have confidence in the effect of anchored torpedoes, that I am for recommitting the bill. By passing the bill as it is, we shall demonstrate nothing but the expenditure of money. I am for making an actual experiment on an enemy's vessel. To attack a well-manned frigate, is a very different thing from attacking an old hulk, perfectly at the disposal of the projectors. If we were to pass a bill constructing a torpedo corps, and offering a bounty on every ship blown up, it would be much better calculated to make an impression of our seriousness than this bill.

Mr. Tallmadge said, that having been absent from the House at the time this bill was first introduced, he knew not what arguments had been offered in favor of it. He said he was always ready to encourage inventions, &c., but when a measure was presented which had no novelty in it, he could not be satisfied to give a silent vote on the bill for encouraging it.

My honorable colleague stated fairly the principles on which the submarine boat was constructed; and I believe, said Mr. T., that there is no gentleman in this House who doubts the power of gunpowder, placed under the bottom of a vessel, to destroy it. I have seen it tried during the war in a great variety of ways. I became perfectly satisfied that the principle was just; the only difficulty was to place the magazine in such a situation that it should have the greatest possible effect.

I well recollect that, in 1777, when Bushnell was called on to make an experiment on a British brig of thirty-two guns, lying in North river, a detachment of troops was directed to proceed down the river to enable him to make the experiment free from interruption. I had the honor to command the detachment, and continued there one month. The object of the troops under my immediate command was to keep off all hostile persons, whether of the enemy or persons unfriendly to the invention, that he might have every opportunity to make his experiment with success. His object was at ebb tide to get into the river a boat constructed for the purpose, and pass down the river, and, if possible, fix his magazine of powder to the bottom of the enemy's vessel. He tried it over and over again. Sometimes he would entirely miss the vessel; sometimes he would come so near that he would get intimidated and retire again; till, sir, I became so heartily sick of the business, and of that sort of duty, that I wished the boat and men were both at the bottom of the ocean. I state this to show the difficulty, danger, and what I myself conceive to be the impossibility of placing the magazine under the vessel. So much for this; and I take Mr. Fulton's machine to be bottomed precisely on the same principle, the difference only being in the mode of application.

I have no idea of laughing the subject out of the House; but how can gentlemen see the least probability of success in the invention? Suppose a frigate at anchor, and a few boats endeavoring to harpoon this vessel. Do gentlemen suppose that boats can approach without the most imminent danger? And, granting that the harpoon strikes, where is all the nautical skill of the men when they see this, if they do not prevent it from taking effect. Suppose a perfectly sure shot, and that the harpoon should be fastened in the bow, is it possible that the rope to which the torpedo is attached would not be cut, and the torpedo left to float below perfectly harmless? Do gentlemen consider harpooning a vessel to be like harpooning a whale, which has no men on board of it to take out the harpoon? I cannot bring myself to believe it possible that a crew on board a ship could see all around her, and yet permit a torpedo to be attached to her and place her in such a condition as to be liable to be totally destroyed with every person on board.

It does seem to me that this sort of philosophical experiment ought not to be gone into by this House. If it be necessary to employ anything it would be vastly preferable that we should not go through all this solemn farce of passing a law for the purpose of exhibiting a sort of playful experiment, and there is probably a day of our time to be devoted to it, when, in truth, no solid advantages can accrue from it. I am unwilling on another ground, because the thing itself would expose the Government to a sort of ridicule. If we pass this bill, and the experiment be made; if a brig be bought for this money and totally destroyed, there will still be as much proof wanting to demonstrate that this is an experiment on which we can rely, as there was before. I am against it on another ground: that if we trust to this kind of doubtful defence, we shall get into the habit of giving up the more substantial defence of the country. This is my solid reason for voting against this bill. No one ever yet found any way of getting along in solid defence but by solid preparation. I should rather come into honorable combat than fight with this underhand explosion, when especially there is so much doubt in it. If an experiment could be made, however, without all this solemn farce, I do not, know that I should have any objection to it.

The motion for recommitment was lost—50 to 45.

The question on the passage of the bill was then taken by yeas and nays, and decided in the affirmative—yeas 65, nays 53.

Wednesday, March 28.

First Meridian.

Mr. Pitkin, from the committee to whom was referred, on the 25th of January last, the memorial of William Lambert, made the following report thereon:

That the memorialist states that, for the purpose of laying a foundation for the establishment of a first meridian for the United States of America, at the seat of Government, he has made calculations to determine the longitude of the Capitol, in the City of Washington, from Greenwich Observatory, in England; and that he submits the same, together with the data and elements on which his calculations are made, to the consideration and patronage of the National Legislature.

The committee have deemed the subject worthy the attention of Congress, and would, therefore, beg leave to observe, that the necessity of the establishment of a first meridian, or meridian which should pass through some particular place on the globe, from which geographers and navigators could compute or reckon longitude, is too obvious to need elucidation.

The ancient Greek geographers placed their first meridian to pass through one of the islands, which were by them called the Fortunate Islands, since called the Canaries. Those islands were situated as far west as any lands that had then been discovered, or were known by ancient navigators in that part of the world.

They reckoned their longitude east, from Heria or Junonia, one of these islands supposed to be the present Island of Teneriffe.

The Arabians, it is said, fixed their first meridian at the most westerly part of the continent of Africa. In the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, when Europe was emerging from the dark ages, and a spirit of enterprise and discovery had arisen in the South of Europe, and various plans were formed, and attempts made to find a new route to the East Indies, geographers and navigators continued to calculate longitude from Ferro, one of the same islands, though some of them extended their first meridian as far west as the Azores or Western islands.

In more modern times, however, most of the European nations, and particularly England and France, have established a first meridian to pass through the capital, or some place in their respective countries, and to which they have lately adapted their charts and astronomical tables.

It would perhaps have been fortunate for the science of geography and navigation, that all nations had agreed upon a first meridian, from which all geographers and navigators might have calculated longitude; but as this has not been done, and in all probability never will take place, the committee are of opinion that, situated as we are in this Western hemisphere, more than three thousand miles from any fixed or known meridian, it would be proper, in a national point of view, to establish a first meridian for ourselves; and that measures should be taken for the eventual establishment of such a meridian in the United States.

In examining the maps and charts of the United States, and the particular States, or their seacoasts, which have been published in this country, the committee find that the publishers have assumed different places in the United States, as first meridians.

This creates confusion, and renders it difficult, without considerable calculation, to ascertain the relative situation of places in this country. This difficulty is also increased, by the circumstance that, in Louisiana, our newly-acquired territory, longitude has heretofore been reckoned from Paris the capital of the French Empire.

The exact longitude of any place in the United States being ascertained from the meridian of the observatory at Greenwich, in England, a meridian with which we have been conversant, it would not be difficult to adapt all our maps, charts, and astronomical tables, to the meridian of such a place. And no place, perhaps, is more proper than the seat of Government.

It appears by the papers submitted to the consideration of the committee, that Mr. Lambert has calculated the longitude of the Capitol in the City of Washington, from the Royal observatory at Greenwich, by one of the most approved methods now in use for that purpose, viz: an occultation of a known fixed star by the moon.

His calculations are founded on an occultation of η pleiadum, (Alcyone,) one of the seven stars, on the night of the 20th of October, 1804. By these calculations it appears, that the longitude of the Capitol, in the city of Washington, as reduced according to the true figure of the earth, (being that of an oblate spheroid,) is 76° 53´ 6".920 degrees west. The committee would observe, that Mr. Lambert appears to be well acquainted with astronomical calculations; and that, so far as the committee have had time to examine them, they appear to be correct. In a question, however, of so much nicety, the correct decision of which depends so much on the accuracy of the observations made, and the goodness of the instruments used, and when the smallest error in the data will necessarily produce an erroneous result, full reliance ought not to be placed on calculations made from a single observation.

Indeed, in order to be certain of a correct result, it may be proper that more than one of the various methods of ascertaining longitude should be used; that calculations should be made from observations of the eclipses of Jupiter's satellites, of solar eclipses, of the angular distances between the sun and moon, or the moon and a fixed star, or other methods, as well as from observations on occultations of fixed stars.

The committee are, therefore, of opinion that, in order to lay a foundation for the establishment of a first meridian in this Western hemisphere, the President of the United States should be authorized to cause the longitude of the city of Washington, from the observatory at Greenwich, in England, to be ascertained with the greatest possible degree of accuracy; and that he also be authorized, for that purpose, to procure the necessary astronomical instruments.

They, therefore, beg leave to submit to the consideration of the House, the following resolution:

Resolved, That it is expedient to make provision, by law, authorizing the President of the United States to cause the longitude of the city of Washington from the observatory at Greenwich, in England, to be ascertained with the greatest degree of accuracy; and also authorizing him, for that purpose, to procure the necessary astronomical instruments.

In presenting the above report, Mr. Pitkin observed that the object of the committee was to have a first meridian established for the United States, from which computations of longitude might be generally made, that maps, charts, and nautical tables, might not, as heretofore, be calculated from the observatory at Greenwich, or from the varying points of Philadelphia, New York, Washington, or Charleston. Mr. P. dilated upon the advantages of such a measure. Congress would fix upon the place most proper for a first meridian; and, perhaps, as Washington was the seat of Government, it would be as proper a place as any. As the longitude must be taken very exactly, various instruments would be necessary for the purpose of making astronomical observations. As he was desirous that a bill should pass on the subject at this session, he did not move a reference of the report to a Committee of the Whole, but moved that it lie on the table, to give gentlemen time to consider it before he asked a decision on it.

The report was accordingly ordered to lie on the table.

Friday, March 30.

Batture at New Orleans.

The House resumed the consideration of the bill providing the means to ascertain the title to the batture near New Orleans.

Mr. Bibb's motion yet under consideration, and a division of the question being called for,

The question on striking out the sections of the present bill (providing for a judicial decision) was taken, and carried—yeas 95, nays 22.

The question now recurred on Mr. Bibb's amendment, to insert, in lieu of those stricken out, several new sections.

[Mr. Bibb's amendment proposes that the right of the United States shall be vested in the Corporation of New Orleans, so as to enable them to defend any suit which may be instituted for the recovery of the batture, and that the batture shall be used and enjoyed as a public highway and landing place, &c.; as well by citizens of the United States as by the inhabitants of New Orleans.]

This motion was decided by yeas and nays and lost—yeas 36, nays 84.

Saturday March 31.

The Batture at New Orleans.

The House resumed the consideration of the unfinished business of yesterday, on the bill providing the means to ascertain the title to the batture in front of the suburb St. Mary, in the city of New Orleans.

The question having recurred on the amendment of Mr. Pitkin, the said amendment was withdrawn by the mover.

The question was then taken on concurring with the Committee of the Whole in their first amendment to the said bill, and carried in the affirmative.

The question then recurred on concurring with the Committee of the Whole House in their second amendment to the said bill, amended in the House to read as follows:

"Sec. 4. And be it further enacted, That the President of the United States be, and he is hereby, authorized, at any time within one year, to make and execute such compromise with the parties, or any of them, who were removed from the said batture on the twenty-fifth day of January, one thousand eight hundred and eight, by order of the President of the United States, and to procure a cession of their claims thereto, or to any part thereof, for the use of the public, or to any body politic or corporate, on such terms as may be agreed on with the said parties, and deemed advisable by the President, and to stipulate for a compensation, either in money or public lands, in the city of New Orleans, or its territories, as he may think proper."

Messrs. Nelson, Smilie, Holland, and Bibb, opposed the amendment; and Messrs. Sheffey, Key, and Lyon, supported it.

The question being taken, it was determined in the negative—yeas 62, nays 55.

Monday, April 9.

Apportionment of Representation.

Mr. Fisk said he rose to offer a resolution, which he had for some time wished to present for the consideration of this House. It is to provide for fixing the apportionment of the Representatives of the several States according to the third census. The last ratio was one Representative for every thirty-three thousand souls; which, gave one hundred and forty-two members to this House—a number as large as may be considered necessary for the despatch of legislation, or to preserve the liberties of the people. It is estimated that the next census will give seven millions two hundred thousand souls, which, according to the present ratio of representation, would give to this House two hundred and eighteen members—a greater number than could be accommodated within these walls, and a greater body of men than could progress with the business of the House.

After the census shall be taken, the amount in each State ascertained, and the fractional numbers known, it will be much more difficult to fix the ratio than at this time. I therefore beg leave to submit the following resolution. And as it embraces a subject of great importance, I have no objection that it lay on the table a few days for the consideration of the members:

Resolved, That the apportionment of Representatives amongst the several States, according to the third enumeration of the people, ought to be in the ratio of one Representative for every forty-five thousand persons in each State, and that a committee be appointed to bring in a bill accordingly.

A motion was made that the resolution lie on the table.

A motion was also made to postpone it for a week.

Mr. Pickman moved to postpone the further consideration of the resolution indefinitely. He thought the question could be decided to much greater advantage in the two first months of the next session of Congress than in the two weeks remaining of the present session.

Mr. Macon was against indefinite postponement. Every one, on reflection, must be satisfied that it would be better to decide the ratio of apportionment now than after the result of the census was known. He thought the resolution had better have been in blank as to the ratio. The ratio might be settled either by fixing the number of Representatives of whom the House should consist after the next census, or by fixing the number of souls which should entitle a district to a Representative.

Mr. Gold said, however desirable it might be at this time to fix the ratio, he doubted very much whether a decision would now settle the question. If a law were now to be passed, and there should be several large fractions on any given ratio, there would be a strong disposition to alter the ratio at the next session. He thought it would be expedient also to postpone the apportionment, because it might be affected by the proportion in which the population of the United States may have increased since the last census, which could not be ascertained till after the census.

Mr. Quincy said he understood the object of the resolution to be to settle a principle before the facts were ascertained. Now it was his opinion that the House should know the facts first and settle the principle afterwards. Suppose the principle to be adopted—perhaps one or two States might be entitled to but one Representative, which, had the ratio been fixed at forty thousand, might have been entitled to two. This would appear to operate unjustly. The House must know the facts in order fairly to apportion representation. The apportionment ought to be made not merely in relation to population, but to the weight of the different States in the Union—and these considerations could not have their due weight till after the relative numbers were ascertained.

Mr. W. Alston was in favor of deciding on the subject at this session. He had no fear of difficulty resulting from fractions remaining unrepresented. It would be recollected that at the last apportionment, Delaware had a fraction of thirty-one thousand left, and Carolina twenty-nine thousand. The small States could not object to the course proposed; for if this question was postponed till after the census, and a particular ratio should appear to suit the returns of the three large States, they would support it and carry it too, notwithstanding the large fractions it might leave to smaller States. A disadvantage would therefore result to the small States from postponement rather than from a decision now.

Mr. Fisk said there was one other reason why an apportionment should be made at this session, viz: that it would enable the State Legislatures at their ordinary winter sessions to divide the States into districts, and not subject them to the necessity of an extra session for the purpose.

Mr. Livermore was against indefinite postponement, because he was inclined to the opinion that the subject ought to be acted on at this session, but wished the resolution to lie on the table a day or two. He said he was convinced, from his experience in the manner of doing business in this House, that it would take nearly the whole of the next session of Congress to make the apportionment, if it was postponed till after the census was taken. He had rather the resolution had been blank as to the ratio.

Mr. Fisk modified his motion, so as to leave it blank as to the ratio.

Mr. Burwell thought that the present was the proper time to fix the proportion; because, after the respective numbers of each State were received, it would be in the power of the larger States to fix the ratio as they pleased, and at present none of the State jealousies could be brought into action, which would, when the returns were actually made. To get over the difficulty said to exist in settling a principle before the facts were known, it was only necessary to say that so many members should compose the House. If the population was smaller than expected, there would still be the number deemed proper to constitute the House; and if it was larger there would be no great increase of members, to the detriment of public business. Mr. B. said he was fully impressed with the necessity of acting on the subject at the present session. If postponed till the result of the census was known, and the particular interest of each member of the House became implicated in the decision of it, there would be extreme difficulty in coming to a decision.

Mr. Smilie said he could not conceive any objection to passing the resolution in its present shape. In this question there was an inconvenience on one side and evil on the other. It was an inconvenience that the House could not with precision ascertain the population of the United States; but, from the increase in times past, the increase for the last ten years might be estimated. The evil of postponement on the other hand was great. Mr. S. said he had been in Congress when the ratio of representation had been settled heretofore, and he had never seen a more difficult question—and it ended at last in a bargain between the members of the different States; and from these bargains no good could arise. He much preferred deciding on the subject at the present session.

Mr. Rhea of Tennessee was anxious that the subject should lie on the table a day or two, the more especially as there was such a disagreement of opinion as to the operation of the measure of fixing the ratio beforehand. Coming from a small State himself, he feared lest the principle should operate to the injury of the small States. He said he had been much surprised at the declaration of the gentleman from Pennsylvania, that the question would be decided eventually (if postponed) by individual interest. If on such a question the House was to be governed by individual interests, what was the nation to expect from them? This suggestion was another reason in his mind for the resolution's lying on the table.

Mr. Smilie had spoken of human nature as he found it, even in the gentleman from Tennessee as well as all others—a degree of self-concern always influenced individual conduct. Whoever had assisted at settling the representation of a State would conceive the difficulty of deciding these questions.

The motion for indefinite postponement was negatived, ayes 23. The motion to postpone to Monday shared the same fate, ayes 33. The motion to lie on the table was carried—53 to 41.

Wednesday, April 11.

Colonel Washington.

Mr. Randolph said that the House was already apprised of the death of Colonel William Washington, in whom our country had lost one of her most illustrious sons. It is very far from my intention, sir, said he, by any amplification of mine to lessen the impression of that merit which the bare mention of his name is calculated to make on the mind of every man who hears me. It is not the least unequivocal proof of that worth that it was not extinguished by the effulgence of his great kinsman's glory, with which it was daily brought into comparison. The reputation which can stand such an ordeal as this, is far beyond the praise or blame of an humble individual like me. If, to the proposition which I am about to offer, an objection should arise in the breast of any man who hears me on the score of the rank which that gentleman bore in the late American army, permit me to suggest that it is a testimony to valor and not to rank. It is not a mere respect to rank which I wish the House to pay. It is not in rank to add to the infamy of an Arnold, or to the glory of a Washington. I will, therefore, move the following resolution:

Resolved, That the members of this House do wear crape on the left arm during the remainder of the session, as a testimony of respect for the memory of William Washington, late a Lieutenant Colonel in the Revolutionary army.

Mr. Smilie said he hoped there was no man who felt more respect or gratitude to those men who served their country during the Revolutionary war than he did, but this resolution appeared to be improper on several grounds. I agree, said Mr. S., with the gentleman from Virginia, that rank should have no effect on the opinions of the members of this House on such a subject as this. But, is it not singular that as to the many heroes who have served us during the Revolution, who have now gone to their long home, no notice has been taken of their merits by us, nor any step taken to confer upon them the honor now proposed to be conferred on this officer, whom I acknowledge to be meritorious? We have seen a Greene die, and certainly no man exceeded him in rank or merit, the General-in-chief excepted. We have seen a Wayne also die; and I do not recollect that such a tribute was proposed to any man who served us during the Revolution. Shall we, then, by passing this resolution, sanction an idea that Lieutenant-Colonel Washington was entitled to more respect than others? Would not the passage of this resolution be considered as an indirect censure on the other Revolutionary characters who have gone from us? When the other heroes fall that are still existing, we must, if we pass this resolution, pay the same respect to their merits, or suppose them to have been inferior. This would introduce into the Legislature invidious comparisons, and, instead of legislating, we shall be sitting as judges upon character. In every respect, I think the resolution objectionable.

The question was taken on the resolution without further debate, and passed in the negative—yeas 30.

Thursday, April 12.

The Convoy System.

Mr. Eppes said that, some time ago, a bill had been reported by him to the House, authorizing the President of the United States to employ the public armed vessels to convoy the lawful commerce of the United States. The motion to adjourn, which had been agreed to, would leave but a small portion of the time of the House for the discussion of the several subjects before them. As he was compelled by ill health to leave the city at an early day, having already obtained leave of absence, he was anxious to obtain a vote on this before he departed, and therefore asked to discharge the Committee of the Whole from the further consideration of the bill, in order to take the sense of the House whether it should go to a third reading or lie on the table for the present.

This motion was opposed by Messrs. Macon, Taylor, Pickman, Randolph, Livermore, and Wilson, on the ground of its being out of the usual course of proceedings; and it was objected to the more especially as this was a subject involving very important principles, and one which, of all others, ought to be discussed in Committee of the Whole.

Mr. Eppes expressed his willingness to take a silent vote on the subject, and thought a vote might be obtained on the bill without much debate.

Mr. Johnson expressed great anxiety to vote on the bill.

Mr. Livermore intimated that he was strongly against the bill, and, if it took every hour in the session, he was determined to expose what he believed to be its injurious features.

On the question, Mr. Eppes' motion was negatived—yeas 50, nays 61, as follows:

Yeas.—Willis Alston, jr., William Anderson, Ezekiel Bacon, David Bard, Adam Boyd, John Brown, Robert Brown, William A. Burwell, William Butler, Joseph Calhoun, Matthew Clay, John Clopton, Howell Cobb, James Cox, William Crawford, John Dawson, Joseph Desha, John W. Eppes, William Findlay, Meshack Franklin, David S. Garland, Thomas Gholson, Peterson Goodwyn, James Holland, Benjamin Howard, Jacob Hufty, Richard M. Johnson, Walter Jones, Aaron Lyle, Samuel McKee, Nicholas R. Moore, Jeremiah Morrow, Gurdon S. Mumford, Roger Nelson, John Porter, John Roane, Erastus Root, Ebenezer Sage, Thomas Sammons, Ebenezer Seaver, Adam Seybert, Samuel Shaw, Dennis Smelt, George Smith, John Smith, Henry Southard, Robert Weakley, Robert Whitehall, Robert Witherspoon, and Richard Wynn.

Nays.—William W. Bibb, Daniel Blaisdell, James Breckenridge, William Chamberlin, Epaphroditus Champion, James Cochran, Richard Cutts, John Davenport, junior, William Ely, James Emott, Jonathan Fisk, Barzillai Gannett, Thos. R. Gold, William Hale, Daniel Heister, Jonathan H. Hubbard, Richard Jackson, jr., Robert Jenkins, William Kennedy, Herman Knickerbacker, Joseph Lewis, jun., Edward St. Loe Livermore, Matthew Lyon, Nathaniel Macon, Robt. Marion, Vincent Matthews, Archibald McBryde, Pleasant M. Miller, William Milnor, Thomas Moore, Jonathan O. Mosely, Joseph Pearson, Benjamin Pickman, jun., Timothy Pitkin, jun., Elisha R. Potter, Josiah Quincy, John Randolph, John Rea of Pennsylvania, John Rhea of Tennessee, Matthias Richards, Daniel Sheffey, John Smilie, Samuel Smith, Richard Stanford, John Stanley, James Stephenson, Jacob Swoope, Samuel Taggart, John Taylor, John Thompson, Uri Tracy, George M. Troup, Charles Turner, jr., Jabez Upham, Nicholas Van Dyke, Archibald Van Horne, Killian K. Van Rensselaer, Laban Wheaton, Ezekiel Whitman, and James Wilson.

Friday, April 18.

Colonel Washington.

Mr. Quincy rose to move a resolution. He said he very deeply regretted the situation in which this House had been placed in relation to the memory of that distinguished officer of the Revolution, General William Washington, in consequence of the resolution moved on the 11th instant. He thought that the impression exhibited on the journals was not such as either did justice to that individual or to the feelings of every member of the House. He hoped that to the resolution which he was about to offer, and which had for its object an explanation of the grounds on which he knew a majority of the House had voted, would not find an objection. It would take away the appearance that this House had not that deep sense of the merits and services of that officer which he knew they possessed. He then read the following resolution:

Resolved, That the House of Representatives are deeply sensible of the loss this nation has sustained in the death of General William Washington, late Lieutenant-Colonel in the Army of the Revolution, and that the rejection of the resolution offered on the 11th instant, in relation to that distinguished officer, having been produced wholly by considerations of a general nature, cannot be deemed to derogate from the high sense which this House, in common with their fellow-citizens, entertain of his civil and military virtues and services.

The House agreed to consider the resolution—58 to 13.

The resolution passed—ayes 63; about seventy-five members were present.

Friday, April 20.

General Wilkinson.

The Speaker laid before the House the following letter, which was read:

Washington, April 19, 1810.

Sir: After a tedious passage from New Orleans I arrived at Baltimore on the 16th instant, and reached this city the next day. My absence has been necessarily protracted by the selection of papers, from a mass of twenty years' accumulation, for the establishment of facts, to refute the multifarious and diversified calumnies by which I have been assailed.

I now present myself to the Representative body of the nation, the guardians of the public weal and the protectors of individual rights, to express my earnest desire that they may constitute some impartial tribunal, which may be governed with strictness by the principles of the constitution and the laws of evidence, to investigate the conduct of my whole life, civil and military, whereby justice may be done, and my unexampled persecution be terminated.

I aver my innocence of the foul offences which are imputed to me, and declare my ability to support it before any unprejudiced court. Through you, sir, I appeal to my country, and I claim that right which is not refused to the most profligate—the right of confronting my accusers. The Representatives of the people will not, I am persuaded, suffer a fellow-citizen who has been devoted to the public service more than twenty-five years, and has nothing left him but conscious fidelity and attachment to his native country, to sue in vain for justice.

The enclosed letter to the Secretary of War was written anterior to the receipt of my notification of recall from the command on the Mississippi, and will evince my readiness and my desire for a full investigation of my conduct.

With perfect respect, I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

JAMES WILKINSON.

Hon. J. B. Varnum, Speaker, &c.

Naval Establishment.

Mr. Randolph, from the committee to whom was referred the resolution respecting the reduction of the Naval Establishment, reported the following bill; which was twice read, and referred to a Committee of the Whole:

[Here follows the Bill.]

Monday, April 23.

Loan Bill.

The House resolved itself into a Committee of the Whole, on the bill authorizing a loan for a sum of money not exceeding the amount of the principal of the public debt reimbursable during the year 1810.

[In the discussion which took place on this bill, there was no objection to the principle of it. Every gentleman who spoke assented to the propriety of placing at the disposal of the Government a sum of money fully adequate to meet the appropriations authorized by law for the present year.]

Mr. Dana wished to ascertain the precise amount of the principal of the debt reimbursable during the year 1810, with a view to inserting the sum in the body of the bill.

Some difference of opinion appeared to exist as to the exact amount of principal reimbursable. The sum annually applicable to the payment of the public debt is eight millions of dollars. The sum left, after paying the interest of it for the year, is annually applicable to the extinguishment of the principal. The exact amount of interest payable on the public debt during this year not being known, there was a difficulty in ascertaining the exact amount of principal reimbursable.

The sum of $4,800,000 was mentioned.

Mr. Dana moved to amend the bill so as to authorize a loan "not exceeding $4,800,000, being the amount of the principal reimbursable," &c. This motion was supported by the mover, and Messrs. Gold, Sheffey, Quincy, Upham, Tallmadge, and Pickman, and opposed by Messrs. Bacon, W. Alston, and Montgomery.

The arguments in favor of the motion were, generally, that it was improper to attempt to disguise any thing by giving to it a specious name; that borrowing money should not be called paying the public debt; that all authority given to borrow money should be express and specific as to the sum. It was said in reply, that there could be no objection that the truth should appear on the face of a bill; that this sum not being wanted to defray the ordinary expenses of the Government, but to pay debts heretofore contracted, the phraseology was perfectly correct; that it was as specific in fact as if expressed in so many figures.

Mr. Dana varied his motion, after debate, on account of the uncertainty which appeared to exist as to the sum reimbursable, and of course as to the sum to be loaned. He moved to amend the bill so as to give authority to borrow a sum of money "not exceeding four millions of dollars."

This motion was supported and opposed by the same gentlemen who debated the former motion. In support of the motion it was said, that this sum was all that the Secretary of the Treasury had asked for, and was therefore as much as ought to be given. The advocates of the amendment also said that they were averse to legislating blindfold, to voting millions without knowing for what, or to surrendering up their judgments to Executive discretion, under an idea that the President would not borrow more than was necessary.

In reply it was said, that since the Secretary of the Treasury had made the estimate in question, other expenses had been incurred; that it was impossible to tell the precise amount which was wanted until Congress should adjourn, as it was impossible to tell on one day what appropriations they would make the next day; that, if not necessary, the authority to borrow would not be used; as in the case of the loan authorized at the last session of Congress, not a cent of which had been actually borrowed. That law had granted an authority nearly similar to this in nearly the same language.

Mr. Dana's motion was negatived—52 to 29.

Mr. Quincy observed that he felt but one difficulty on this subject. He could not agree to borrow an amount greater than the Secretary of the Treasury had said was necessary. He, therefore, moved to amend the bill by adding to it the following proviso:

"Provided, That nothing in this act contained shall be construed to authorize any sum to be borrowed greater than four millions of dollars."

The motion was lost—ayes 28.

The bill was then ordered to be engrossed, and read the third time to-morrow.

Tuesday, April 24.

Reduction of the Navy.

The House in Committee of the Whole on the bill to reduce the Naval Establishment of the United States.

The bill having been read—

Mr. McKim moved to amend that part of the bill which directs the sale of all the gunboats, by adding the following words: "belonging to the United States, unfit for service, and unworthy of repairs."

This motion was agreed to without debate, ayes 56.

Mr. Key said he was friendly to the reduction of the Navy, but not to its annihilation. He therefore moved to strike out so much of the bill as provides that all the frigates but three shall be "sold," and to insert in lieu thereof, "laid up in ordinary."

Messrs. Dana and Mumford supported the motion.

Mr. Rhea of Tennessee made a motion, which superseded that made by Mr. Key, to strike out the whole of the section, except so much as related to gunboats. He was wholly opposed to the reduction of the Navy at present.

Mr. Smilie said he should vote for the motion with a view to inserting a substitute going to place the Navy now on the footing of the Peace Establishment of 1806.

Mr. Dana was in favor of Mr. Rhea's motion, but expressed himself very pointedly in favor of a reform in the expenditures and conduct of the Naval Establishment generally.

Mr. Bassett also was in favor of Mr. Rhea's motion. He supported the policy of a small navy, and vindicated the establishment generally from charges of waste or extravagance, though he was friendly to reform wherever necessary. Mr. B. spoke nearly an hour.

Mr. Cook and Mr. Rhea of Tennessee also spoke in favor of the motion to strike out the whole of the first section.

Mr. Macon spoke against the motion, and against the policy of a navy as applicable to the situation of this country.

Mr. Stanford followed Mr. Macon on the same side of the question, and particularly reprobated the extravagant expenditure of money incident to the naval system.

Mr. Dana spoke again on the subject of reform in the system.

Mr. Macon and Mr. Stanford explained.

Mr. Boyd was against the reduction of the Navy under present appearances.

The motion to strike out the remainder of the section was carried, 61 to 25.

Mr. Smilie moved to insert, in the place of that part which was stricken out, the following:

"And further, that the President of the United States be, and he is hereby, authorized to keep in actual service as many of the frigates and other armed vessels as in his judgment the nature of the service may require, and to cause the residue to be laid up in ordinary in convenient ports: Provided, the whole number of officers and seamen shall not exceed that fixed by the act 'in addition to the act, supplementary to the act, providing for the Naval Peace Establishment, and for other purposes;' passed the 21st day of April, 1806."

Mr. S. read the law alluded to in this amendment, which would go to retain in service thirteen captains, nine masters commandant, seventy-two lieutenants, one hundred and fifty midshipmen, and nine hundred and twenty-five able-bodied seamen, ordinary seamen and boys.

Mr. McKim opposed the amendment, because he was altogether opposed to a reduction of the Navy in the present state of the world.

Mr. Smilie replied. He said he had no apprehension of danger to his country from laying up a few frigates.

Mr. Bassett stated that the whole number of seamen now in service, was but two thousand seven hundred and twenty-three. If the number was reduced, the expense of reducing and re-enlisting them within a short period, would exceed the expense of keeping them in service during the interval.

Mr. Montgomery spoke in favor of the amendment, under the impression that there was no disposition in Congress to make use of the Navy. Although the number of seamen in service might not exceed two thousand seven hundred and twenty, as stated, yet the President now had power to authorize the employment of five thousand four hundred and ninety men. The adoption of the amendment, he said, would curtail the present annual expense, $778,000.

Mr. Mumford spoke against the amendment. He remarked that the counting-house calculation of pounds, shillings, and pence, heretofore imputed as a fault to the merchants, seemed to have been transferred to the planters of cotton and tobacco. He did not regard a little expense when put in competition with the national safety.

Mr. Smilie's amendment was negatived.

The section for disusing all the navy-yards except those at Boston, New York, and Norfolk, having been read—

Mr. Key moved to insert "Washington" after New York, and, speaking in support of his motion, expatiated on the advantages possessed by a navy-yard at the seat of Government.

Mr. Bassett concurred with Mr. Key in opinion; but, as he presumed the section was only meant as an accompaniment to that part of the bill already stricken out, he moved to strike out the whole section.

Mr. Dana opposed the amendment. Six navy-yards were certainly not necessary for the service of the United States, and he particularly opposed the retention of the yard at Washington.

Mr. Key spoke in reply to Mr. Dana, and in support of Mr. Bassett's motion. He defended the navy-yard at Washington against the imputations cast on it.

Messrs. Tallmadge and Dana spoke against the amendment.

Mr. Smilie spoke in favor of the amendment, and expressed his astonishment at the change which appeared to have taken place in the House since they had voted, 60 to 31, a few days ago, to reduce the Navy.

Mr. Key expressed his surprise that a gentleman having as much parliamentary experience as the gentleman who preceded him, should be surprised at the change of votes. A majority had voted to reduce, having different objects of reduction in view; but, when a reduction in any one branch of expenditure was proposed, it appeared that a majority could not agree in it. Mr. K. spoke again in favor of the amendment.

The motion to strike out the section was lost, 52 to 40.

Mr. Key renewed his motion to insert "Washington."

Mr. Randolph opposed the motion on the ground of the unfitness of the situation of Washington, compared with others, for a navy-yard.

Mr. Macon supported the motion; because he was utterly opposed to a navy, he said he wished that a navy-yard should be kept here, as members of Congress would be much sooner disgusted by seeing the expenditures of the Navy system, than by hearing of them.

Mr. Dana, as a friend to a navy, said he wished the amendment not to prevail. The gentleman from North Carolina, an enemy to navies, wished to retain the yard at this place; he, Mr. D., a friend to them generally, wished to dispose of or disuse it. They therefore thought alike, though they should vote differently.

The motion to insert "Washington" was carried—54 to 42.

The section for reducing the marines was struck out, without debate—ayes 59.

The committee rose, and reported the bill as amended.

The Speaker resumed the Chair, and the House resolved now to consider the report of the Committee of the Whole.

Mr. Milnor said the bill had been much amended in committee, and as the remnant left amounted to very little, and the discussion of that little would probably cost more than would be saved by passing it into a law, he moved to postpone the further consideration of the subject indefinitely.

Wednesday, April 25.

Loan Bill.

The engrossed bill authorizing a loan for a sum of money, not exceeding the amount of the principal of the public debt, reimbursable during the year 1810, was read a third time.

All the gentlemen who spoke against the bill professed to be willing in a proper manner to authorize a loan of any sum of money necessary to meet the appropriations made; but they contended that the bill was objectionable because the sum was not stated in the face of the bill, because the bill bore a deceptive appearance of borrowing money to pay the public debt, when, in fact, it was to meet the ordinary expenses of the Government; because the bill authorized a loan of five millions five hundred and sixty thousand dollars, more by one million one hundred and sixty thousand dollars than the Secretary of the Treasury had declared to be necessary, and because no loan ought to be authorized until bills now before the House were decided on, which involved a reduction of the annual expenditure.

In reply to the objections to this bill, it was urged that the amount authorized (not required) to be borrowed was as definitely expressed as though in figures; that there could be no deception on the face of the bill, for, if no debt heretofore contracted was now to be paid off, there would not only be no occasion to borrow, but there would be an immense annual surplus in the Treasury; that, since the estimate of four millions had been reported to the House, various appropriations had been made, and it was impossible yet to say how much might be wanted, and no more would be borrowed than actually was wanted; that if the passage of the bill was delayed but a day or two, it would be very easy for gentlemen to prevent its passage at all.

The bill was passed—yeas 77, nays 35.

Reduction of the Navy.

The House then resumed the consideration of the unfinished business of yesterday.

Mr. Milnor said when he had made the motion for the indefinite postponement of the bill, he had supposed that the sense of the House had been fully expressed on it; but as it appeared that the motion would occupy much time in debate, and as some gentlemen had thought proper to insinuate that the motion was made for the purpose of avoiding meeting a direct question on the bill, he now rose to withdraw the motion.

The question was then stated on the first amendment made in Committee of the Whole, viz: to strike out so much as requires the sale of all the gunboats.

Mr. Mumford hoped that the frigates would not be laid up in ordinary. He said he was no politician by profession; he had been called from mercantile pursuits against his inclination, but he had always understood that government was instituted for the protection of the citizen. He was chagrined when he saw the events unfolding in the Old World, and witnessed such a paralyzing system going on in his own country. He had hoped that some system would have been adopted for the protection of our commerce at sea. If gentlemen were determined to abandon the ocean altogether, he begged to know it in time before merchants were totally ruined, for it was impossible at present to carry on any commerce whatever. The part of the country which he represented (city of New York) felt it strongly; agriculture would feel it sooner or later. The enormous captures made of their property had reduced merchants to the alternative of staying at home, or having no commerce but with Great Britain. If gentlemen are disposed to surrender commerce to the discretion of the belligerents and retire from the ocean, it is time to know it. Mr. M. said he was no motive-monger; he never arraigned gentlemen for their motives. We have heard gentlemen say, "millions for defence and not a cent for tribute;" and a noble and popular sentiment it was. It seemed now to be reversed with them, and a plain translation of their speeches was, "millions for tribute; not a cent for defence." Various projects had been offered. Some gentlemen were for putting down the whole Army and Navy; others were for a sort of snail system, alarmed at the least apprehension of danger. Viewing the subject as he did, Mr. M. entreated that gentlemen would consent to protect commerce. The island of St. Domingo now possessed seventeen armed vessels. They were gaining strength daily, and what was the situation of our Southern borders? If our naval force was entirely withdrawn from the ocean, it was impossible for an army of militia to defend the mouth of the Chesapeake. He understood that two vessels were now building in Chesapeake Bay for St. Domingo. He knew that the Haytian agents had been in this country for the purpose of purchasing vessels. Under all these circumstances was it wise and prudent to discharge the Navy? He presumed the best course would be to put to sea what little navy we have to protect our own coasters, for they would be necessary without any view to commerce in the European seas. Under every view, instead of laying up those vessels in service, Mr. M. said he hoped that gentlemen would consent to fit out every vessel in the possession of the United States, and send them out to protect American commerce.

A motion having been made by Mr. Smilie to amend the bill so as to place the Navy on the footing on which it stood in 1806—

Mr. Dana said he was not for pausing with merely replacing the former system; he was also for guarding against the waste of public property and treasure which had taken place in the Naval Establishment. He believed that for the number of fighting men afloat the United States had been put to a much greater expense than was necessary. He was not speaking, he said, of our having few brave men on the water, nor of the great sums given anywhere to those who give us their blood; but the system of the navy-yards, he believed, required a thorough reform. If he was to judge of the general economy on board the frigates and smaller vessels from the little he had seen of them, he must set it down for certain that waste did not exist on board the vessels after they were fitted for service, and manned, and officered. As far as he had an opportunity to observe, he had marked a strong sense of subordination, and the practice of command at the same time sustained with gentleman-like propriety, without any unnecessary torture or rigor. In all this business, Mr. D. said, where you employ warriors, whether by land or water, that department called the staff, the agents, purveyors of supplies, &c., is the branch of the service to which you most look for waste. On merely casting the eye along the decks of our vessels, the conduct of the officers, and the manner in which the men behaved, indicated a sort of conduct which appeared to him incompatible with waste, laxity of discipline, or want of attention to duty. Generally speaking, the civil branch of the service was the reverse of this. Mr. D. adverted to the mode of equipping vessels, and reprobated the scrambling, which he had understood often took place for equipments, as incompatible with methodical arrangement, and correct distribution of supplies. It was wasteful and inconsistent with regular accountability. It was not the course pursued in the navy-yards of other nations. The commander of a man of war in other countries was not permitted to go into a navy-yard; he could not there claim to have every thing new on board his vessel. When every man was suffered to manage as he would, there was no security for the economical conduct of an establishment; for the more anxious was each commander to have his own vessel exclusively well equipped, the more would the public suffer. He was, therefore, for adopting some system of rigorous retrenchment—what it should be he did not know. In the nature of the thing he was confident it could be done; without it there must be much waste. At present, therefore, he was against striking out the frigates from the Naval Establishment. A reform in the expense was the great desideratum, not the abolition of the Navy.

Mr. D. said he would submit to the House one consideration: the appearance which the passage of such a bill would present to the world after the resolutions passed at the commencement of the present session. For his own part, indeed, he had deemed it useless to make declarations of national independence, or to resolve against submission; but at the commencement of the session a resolution had been passed respecting what had taken place between Executive and the British Minister, and then Congress had pledged themselves to call forth the whole force of the nation to stand by and support the President. He had supposed this unnecessary, improper, and exceptionable in some respects. But at the same session, when the controversy was chiefly respecting maritime privileges, if they should not only reduce but sell the Navy, what would the world say, when they had seen the beginning and end of the session? Would it be possible that foreign powers could look up with any reverence to their acts? We shall, said he, be reduced to such a situation that even the apprehension of our hatred could not insure respect from foreign Governments, if we suffer our conduct to be so completely at war with our own acts. In order to possess some appearance of respectability in the estimation of others, the most expedient course would be to establish economy and provide for a less profuse distribution of the public moneys, but to retain the public armed vessels, that we may be in the condition for effectual service whenever it is deemed expedient. By this course we may save more of property as well as character than by an abolition of the Navy; and if we save both it is better than to save the one and lose the other.

In allusion to a remark of Mr. Mumford against the bill, Mr. D. said that in regard to what was formerly said respecting millions for defence and not a cent for tribute, that doctrine was a very good one, but it had no connection with crawling within ourselves in time of danger—with the terrapin policy—with drawing in head and claws so that no part of the body should be exposed; and those who were for that course, (because really they had not provided any shell,) could not very well appeal for their justification to the doctrine of "millions for defence and not a cent for tribute," and yet he believed that the gentleman from New York himself had voted for that system of terrapin defence. Although, said Mr. D., I was against that thing, yet there were men distinguished for talents and worth, and who are eminent in the councils of their country, who entertained sentiments widely different. This policy was borrowed from the colonial system; we did not assume the spirit of a nation, perhaps; we recollected what we had done before when we were colonies, and perhaps gentlemen thought the efforts of children might succeed when they had attained to manhood. It was a delusion. If gentlemen, however, now see through their error, their desire to correct it ought not to be condemned.

Mr. Bassett was of opinion with Mr. D. that reform rather than reduction of the Naval Establishment ought to be their object. He was glad to find that when the Navy was brought into view, other ideas than those of mere commerce began to be associated with it. Heretofore it had only been advocated as a means for the protection of commerce. Mr. B. said he lived in a district which was sensibly alive to the benefits of a navy. The district which he represented had within it more water than land. It therefore became essential to the defence of his constituents that they should have a floating protection. It was impossible, in the nature of things, that they could be defended but by a floating defence. Surely there could be no gentleman in the House who was not sensible of the necessity of protection! It might be a favorite point in a monarchy to keep the country unprotected, and thus under the control of the Government, but the motto of Republics should be universal justice, equal rights, and common defence. He asked gentlemen to look at the magnitude of the object of defending our seacoasts, which could not be less than three thousand miles in extent, and, taking into consideration the sides of our navigable rivers, that extent would be doubled. If gentlemen would but for a moment consider the immense space which was exposed, they would see all the importance of securing an adequate defence. The House had been told, and certainly very truly, that there was a maritime force rising in our neighborhood. The House had been told, also, and told correctly, too, that at least two large vessels were building in their own waters for the use of that growing maritime power. At the very moment, said Mr. B., that we know that the blacks of St. Domingo are building vessels, shall we dispose of Our public armed vessels? Let me ask who will buy them when put into the market? Who but Christophe and Petion? It is reduced to a certainty that if we put them now to the hammer, they must go in that direction. I ask gentlemen seriously to weigh that consideration.

The situation of our Navy is at present sufficiently reduced. We have only five frigates in actual service. The Chesapeake, for want of repairs, is now in harbor. If gentlemen are anxious that she should be laid up in ordinary, I would accord in it; but I would prefer to leave this subject entirely to the discretion of the Executive. I know, sir, how apt a proposition of this sort is to be met by a suggestion of Presidential confidence; but when we come to consider our particular situation, that we are putting it into the power of the President, not to add to the burdens of the people, but to relieve them, that will be thought a sound argument to justify the course of leaving the whole matter to the discretion of the President. The wisdom of the last and of the present Congress has kept in service five frigates. We cannot remain in session at all times; and we are at this moment, extremely doubtful as to the aspect our affairs will assume as to foreign nations. I would ask gentlemen if former experience does not warn us that if we have an accommodation with one belligerent, it will but lead to a wider breach with the other? But if this occurrence does not take place, and every thing should turn out happily, my proposition would leave it in the power of the Executive to secure the public against loss. The expense is not drawn upon us by the Executive, but it is such as the wisdom of the National Legislature has thought proper to incur. Therefore I think it fair to consider the subject in this way. As we are about to separate, and as present appearances would not warrant our giving up any species of protection, we shall be justified in giving a discretionary power to the Executive to put down such part of the Naval Establishment as he may in future think it justifiable to part with.

I am not one of those who think the expense of the Navy a sufficient argument for disposing of it altogether. I have been asked what has the Navy done. I can answer for a large portion of my constituents, that it has kept them quiet in mind. Is it not important that the men who live on the seaboard should know that we have a force to repel attack? What sort of attack have we cause to expect? A serious invasion? Certainly not. The sort of attack which we ought to guard against is the predatory attack, made at small expense, to our great injury. If we do away the naval system entirely, our whole seacoast will be liable to be ravaged. A single frigate, a single privateer, a single pirate, might come into your waters and injure your citizens to a considerable amount. It has been mentioned, and I have seen an official intimation of it, that two or three vessels, in the shape of pirates, had stopped vessels at the mouth of the Mississippi. The force now embodied on the ocean is not more than adequate to the security of the nation against predatory warfare. I am willing, notwithstanding this, to leave it to the Executive discretion to lessen the burden.

I regret much that at this period of the session we cannot go into an examination of the expenditures the gentleman from Connecticut complains of. I think it proper to observe that for one I shall be willing to receive his assistance in detecting abuses. I believe the gentleman at present at the head of the Navy Department has every disposition to correct them. But at the same time that is not sufficient for us. I do not know of any unnecessary expenses, or I should bring them to public view; I do believe there is not that want of system which the gentleman seems to suppose. This much I know, that at all the navy-yards are proper officers for distributing stores. There all the rigging, ropes, &c., &c., are kept apart, and, as far as a landsman, a lubber like myself, can judge, appear in great order.

In relation to the smaller vessels it appears by the report of the Secretary of the Navy that they are in perfect repair. The expense of sailing them is the only expense. I cannot but again repeat, because I think it of the last importance, that the security which these small vessels gives us greatly outweighs all disadvantages of expense. If we can lessen the expense, let us do it, in the hope that at another session we shall be able to find out where the evil exists. It is generally said, when this subject is under consideration, that we cannot attempt to cope with Great Britain. Because we cannot, are we to succumb to others? To provide no protection against smaller powers? At this moment the master of an American merchant vessel is employed in the service of the Emperor of China, a country possessing the greatest population in the world, for the purpose of protecting the citizens of the Emperor against some small pirates. Is there a fact can speak more strongly to us, that, without some sort of naval defence, with such a seacoast as we have, (and let it be recollected, sir, that our seacoast is much greater in proportion to our population than the Chinese,) we shall be at the mercy of the worst of the human race?

It was asked what mighty good the Navy has done. Let me ask the gentleman who asked that question, what mighty good our Army has done by land? When we consider the point of expense, let us consider the evils of different sorts. Let me ask gentlemen if the evils depicted to exist in Peru, where gold abounds, do not equal any thing they can imagine to proceed from the want of money? We must forget the evils that force produces in the necessity which exists for having it. We cannot say, because some evil results from force, that we will not have it; for, if you have it not, others will. Our own experience should teach us the necessity of it. What was the effect of our eloquent addresses, when colonies, placed at the foot of the British throne? They (the British) sent a fleet and army to Boston. They did not tell you power was right; but they said it with their fleet and army. Reason will tell us the same now; it is impossible to meet force but by force. The effects of naval force are well remembered. It is well recollected that in the Revolution Cornwallis marched from Charleston to Virginia. When he got there, a French fleet was on the coast. The very moment the fleet advanced by water, Cornwallis surrendered. Here was evidence of the effect of naval force. And it is by its efficiency that we must balance the great objection of expense. I have heard it stated here how much more expense a sailor is than a soldier. If we look to the fact, and contrast the efficiency of the two, we shall find that the superior efficiency of the sailor greatly outweighs the additional expense. There is one fact, very strongly illustrative of this principle, drawn from British history. It is found, by the papers laid before Parliament, that the present naval establishment costs seventeen millions annually. The expense of the army is nearly the same. With seventeen millions of water force, the navy of Great Britain makes her mistress of the ocean; with seventeen millions, the land force of Great Britain is contemptible. As concerns ourselves, all the attack we can expect to receive is on the ocean or on the seacoast, and we can by this fact see demonstrably that we can procure more protection for a certain number of dollars expended on the water than we can from the same number of dollars expended on the land. History shows that Republics are always naval powers; and navies have preserved their existence. The history of England, instead of destroying this argument, is in favor of it; the celebrated exploits of the Dutch confirm it. England, though a monarchy, is the freest in Europe, and all nations have enjoyed the greatest naval celebrity when they have been most free. A navy has no great general at the head of it, wielding an immense body of armed men. The commanders of ships have a very different influence. The admiral himself cannot act on the land. History does not show an instance where an attack was made on the liberty of a nation from that quarter. I am therefore disposed to give my feeble aid to support an efficient force upon the water rather than upon the land; and I believe the present establishment is by no means beyond what ought to exist.

Mr. Randolph said, that as his objections to the Navy went to the whole system, he would make his observations at large, in preference to reserving them in detached parts on the various details of the bill. My object, said Mr. R., is to endeavor to persuade the House that they ought not to concur in the report of the Committee of the whole House. I have ever believed that the people of the United States were destined to become, at some period or other, a great naval power. The unerring indications of that fact were presented to us in a tonnage and number of seamen exceeding those of any other nation in the world, one only excepted. When, therefore, I proposed to reduce the Naval Establishment of the United States, it was not for the pitiful object of putting down some five or seven gunboats and two or three unimportant navy-yards, or of making the mighty reduction contemplated in the amendment of the gentleman from Pennsylvania. In other words, it was for the purpose of making barely such a retrenchment in the naval expenditure as might enable Government, after such retrenchment was effected, to go on with the aid of loans and taxes. We had two views of the probable state of the nation presented to us during this session. The first was a view of war, in which case it was agreed on all hands that loans and taxes would be necessary; the next was a view of peace, in which case it was believed that loans and taxes were unnecessary, and was so pronounced from the highest authority in the country on financial concerns. But now it seems to have a view of reduced military and naval expenditure which does not obviate the necessity of loans and taxes. My object in the proposed reduction was not to enable the Government to get on with the aid of loans and taxes, but to make such a reduction as would have enabled the Government to dispense with a recurrence to them.

I have said, sir, that the United States were, in my opinion, destined to become a great naval power; and I have read unerring indications of it in the commercial prosperity of our country, out of which alone it can grow. But I believe, if any thing could retard or eventually destroy it—if any thing could strangle in the cradle the infant Hercules of the American Navy—it would be the very injudicious mode in which that power has been attempted to be prematurely brought into action, and kept in action, during the two last administrations. Again, a naval power necessarily grows out of tonnage and seamen. We have not only driven away our tonnage, but have exerted ourselves with no little zeal, even at this very session, to prevent its ever coming back. We have not been willing to consent that vessels polluted by the unpardonable sin of a breach of the embargo should return. True it is, that we have not made the same provision in relation to seamen: we have conceived the guilt rather to reside in the wood or iron, than in the men who conducted it. But, although we have no provision for the express purpose that they should not return, unfortunately they have not returned; and the proof of this fact is evinced by another, viz: that landsmen are at this moment employed on board our few ships of war, because seamen cannot be procured. Our tonnage and seamen, then—the sinews of naval power—are wounded by our own measures, to a considerable degree. Again: it has always been understood, according to my view of the subject, that one of the principal uses of a navy was to protect commerce; but our political rule for some time past has been that of inverse proportion, and we have discovered that commerce is the natural protector of a navy. The proof of this is found, if not in every act of this House, certainly in most of the speeches delivered on this floor. I need only allude to a speech made by a colleague of mine, (Mr. Gholson,) who usually sits on my right hand, a few days ago, in which he stated that the power to regulate commerce was specially given by the constitution to the United States—not as a means of raising revenue, equalizing duties throughout the United States, and making all in fact one family—but, that it was put into the hands of Congress as a scorpion-whip to bring the other nations of the world to our terms; that, by turning away the light of our countenance—the sunshine of our commercial bounty—they might wither and decay.

I had always thought too, sir, that the revenue which a Naval Establishment naturally calls for was to be founded on commercial greatness; in other words, that commerce was to give us revenue, and revenue was to support a navy, which in return was to protect commerce. But, it seems we have changed all this—we have perverted the whole course of procedure—and why? Sir, shall we keep up an expensive Naval Establishment, necessarily driving us into loans and taxes, for the protection of a commerce which the Government itself says we shall not carry on; and when members of this House tell us that the natural protection of commerce is the annihilation of it? The Navy has now become a sort of fifth wheel to the political coach, and I am unwilling to keep it up, at this expense, on these grounds.

If, sir, the construction which I have taken of the sense of the House and of the Government be not correct, whence comes it that we have such cases before us as that of Daniel Buck? Whence comes it that we hear of Treasury instructions, not issued in the first instance for the purpose of expounding a law touching the clearances of vessels, that uniformity may prevail in the different districts, but supplementary instructions, becoming in practice the actual law of the land? In other words, if my construction be not correct, whence comes it that every principle formerly called federal—every principle of Executive energy and power—has been strained of late to an extent heretofore unparalleled? Whence comes it, that in the archives of this Assembly, we find copies of licenses given by the Executive power of the nation—to do what? To permit one part of this confederacy to supply another part with bread! We have had Executive licenses, graciously permitting that a portion of our citizens should not starve while the rest were revelling in plenty, and suffering for want of a market! Let us suppose, that in the fragments of history of the ancient nations of the earth, of those periods which are most involved in obscurity, we should find an Imperial rescript to this effect, what would be the inevitable conclusion of the historian? That, if the Chief Magistrate of the Government could at pleasure starve one part of the people while another was rioting in plenty, that the individual who held this power was the greatest despot on earth, and the Government a purely unmixed despotism. But, sir, it would be improper to draw any such conclusion here, because we are the most enlightened people on earth—I believe we have placed that on record. It was nothing but the protection of the Navy of the United States, and a desire of avenging the attack on the Chesapeake—for, among all the causes of the embargo, we hear of none oftener than the attack on the Chesapeake;—it was nothing but a defence, not only of the commercial interests, but of the naval strength of the nation, which created this dictatorship in the person of the Chief Magistrate. It was not that we are naturally more prone to slavery than others, but it was for the preservation of our national defence, (if that be not positively opposed to national defence which costs four millions, and which, when Greek meets Greek, and the tug of war comes, must take refuge under such measures as those I have mentioned.) No, sir; my object in the bill which I presented to the House was a great one: it was to enable us to dispense with a loan to the acknowledged amount of $5,150,000—to enable us to dispense with taxation, to an amount which no man can calculate, (if, indeed, the system which passed this House was constructed to bring in revenue at all). It was not a little, paltry affair of reducing a couple of navy-yards; not to bury the dead, who have been already interred in the marshes of the Mississippi; not twice to slay the slain: it was for a great public object. Really, sir, the reduction of the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Smilie) reminds me very forcibly of an incident which is said to have taken place at the discovery of the gunpowder plot. When commissioners were sent into the Parliament vaults, to examine into the situation of the gunpowder and combustibles collected together for the purpose of blowing up the King, the Parliament, and the whole constitution, they returned and reported that they had found fifty barrels of gunpowder; that they had removed five-and-twenty barrels, and humbly trusted that the remaining five-and-twenty would do no harm! This is precisely the reduction which the committee and the gentleman from Pennsylvania have agreed to make. It is a reduction which will not do any effectual service, and I therefore hope the House will not accord in it.

But, we are told that great and gigantic events in Europe are to be arrested. That which the British navy cannot do, I suppose, or that which the combined Continental forces opposed to her cannot effect, is to be decided here by three frigates; for that is precisely the extent to which, if I understand him, he is willing to go. It seems, we are also to suffer a total loss of the ships to be sold, they being unfit for every other purpose. Are they unfit for the East India trade? Was not the first vessel which ever doubled the Cape of Good Hope, under the flag of the United States, the old frigate Alliance? And would not these vessels, if sold, be purchased for that and for other purposes; more especially when we consider the immense loss of tonnage which the United States have sustained—I will not say how, but when—within the last two years? But this, if well founded, would be no objection with me to the reduction of the Navy. I am willing to put a clause in the bill to authorize the President to give the frigates away, if he cannot sell them. My objection to the expense is not merely to pounds, shillings, and pence—not merely to the counting-house calculation—but to expenses utterly incommensurate to the object to which those expenses profess to go, and to a system of organized public plunder. If we agree to make this reduction, however, according to the statement of the gentleman from Virginia, (Mr. Bassett,) foreigners will purchase from us ships of the best construction in the world, on the best terms. I believe, if the gentleman's knowledge on the state of our public ships was as accurate as perhaps it is on other subjects, he would hardly suspect foreigners of coming to our markets for the purpose of buying those ships to annoy our commerce. Who will become the purchasers—Great Britain? After having given her hundreds of thousands of tons of your shipping now sailing under the British flag, and manned her navy with your seamen driven from your employment, do you believe the Admiralty will send across the Atlantic to buy the hulks rotting at the navy-yard; or would it be a formidable accession to the British navy, especially when four of these vessels are absolutely unfit for any purpose whatever? I presume that even the Emperor of France, if it were an object with him to have these famous models of naval architecture at Antwerp, would hardly venture to purchase them, and run the risk of getting them across the ocean. I conceive you could hardly get insurance done on them at Philadelphia or Baltimore. The idea of keeping these vessels is absolutely idle, unless gentlemen are disposed to send their commerce on the ocean, and employ force in the protection of it.

Sir, I am extremely exhausted already—and I presume the House are fully as fatigued with me as I am with myself—but I will endeavor to go along with my loose remarks. The panegyric which the gentleman from Connecticut (Mr. Dana) has been pleased to bestow on the American naval officers, I have not the least indisposition to subscribe to, so far as my knowledge will permit me to go. As far as my information extends—as far as I have the pleasure, and I may add the honor, of being acquainted with those gentlemen—there is no class in society whom I think more highly deserving. And I did hope, when the gentleman went into this eulogium on the one hand, and inference at least of censure on that which he has been pleased to term "The Staff of the Navy"—but which I suppose I may as well call the civil branch, who have the control and management of the civil service; not the men who fight the battles, but who pocket the greatest part of the emolument—that he would have been more particular. Sir, I do know that comparisons are extremely unpleasant, and no consideration would induce me to go into them, especially after the observation of my friend before me, (Mr. Macon,) but the discharge of an imperious public duty. I can have no hopes of deriving any thing further than experience from the past Administrations. It is to make use of this experience that I call the attention of the House to the comparative expenses of the Navy under the several Administrations.

I find, from the Treasury statement in my hand, made on the 5th of this month, that the Navy under General Washington's administration, cost $1,100,000; that during the four years of Mr. Adams's administration, it cost $9,700,000, in round numbers; that, in the eight years of the succeeding Administration, it cost $12,700,000. I make these remarks, because the statement differs from that made by the worthy gentleman from Connecticut in this respect; that, when he made the expenditure under the last Administration to amount to fourteen millions, he did, in my opinion, improperly saddle that Administration with the expenditure of the year 1801, viz: $2,111,424, authorized and voted under Mr. Adams's administration. From the mere glance at this paper it will be seen, that from 1801 to 1802, the expenditure fell from the above sum of $2,000,000, to $900,000, marking distinctly the retrenchment at the period of Mr. Jefferson's accession. The first year properly chargeable to the last Administration is that succeeding the one in which they came into office, viz: 1802. I find, also, from a comparison of the statements in the same document, that the most extravagant year of the second Administration was the year 1800—the year after I first had the honor of a seat in this House—when the expenditure amounted to $3,448,716. The most extravagant year of the last Administration was the year succeeding its going out of office, the expenses of which were incurred and voted by it, viz: to the amount of $2,427,758.

Against the administration of Mr. Adams, I, in common with many others, did and do yet entertain a sentiment of hostility, and have repeatedly cried out against it for extravagance, and for profusion, and for waste—wanton waste—of the public resources. I find, however, upon consideration—whether from the nature of man, or from the nature of things, or from whatever other cause—that that Administration, grossly extravagant as I did then and still do believe it to have been, if tried by the criterion of the succeeding one, was a pattern of retrenchment and economy; and I ask the House to put the question to themselves, whether we are likely to see, at any future period, an Administration more economical than that of which we have just now taken leave? And this I say, without meaning to cast the slightest imputation on the present. The person now at the head of affairs, has, at least in one respect, conducted himself in his high office in a spirit dear to my heart—it is the spirit of a gentleman. The first session of Congress under the last Administration was a period of retrenchment. Throw the session of last summer out of the question, and this must be the session of reform under the present. Have we any reason to conclude, from what we have seen or heard, that we can look forward to any policy more economical than that of the Administration of which we have just taken leave? I wish it to be clearly understood, that in the year 1800, in which our expenses amounted to $3,448,060, we had three 44-gun frigates; six frigates, from 44 to 32; two of 32, of a large size; four of 32, smaller; eight from 32 to 20; three sloops of war and four brigs, from 18 to 16; and five brigs and schooners, from 14 to 12 guns—employing a total of 7,296 seamen. This Administration, too, it should be remarked, not only built every frigate, every vessel of respectable force—yes, sir, built them from the stump—which the United States now have, but many others, which have been since sold, and the proceeds of which have gone into the Treasury. At this time, then, when the United States had this formidable force afloat; when nearly 8,000 seamen were employed; (I know the documents only state 7,300, but I am told from the best authority there were nearly 8,000;) when our flag at least triumphed in our own seas; when we had nothing of that system of drawing within our shell, which the gentleman from Connecticut so justly derides; when we had not reached the soft-shelled state in which we were placed by the non-intercourse law;—at that time, the Navy of the United States cost nearly three millions and a half, making for each seaman about $472. I know, sir, that these statements are dry, but they are useful in proportion as they are dry. According to the statement which my colleague (Mr. Bassett) has made, and which he has told you not only came from the Secretary of the Navy, but was in the Secretary's own handwriting, the number of seamen which he had last year in employ was 2,723, which cost the nation $2,427,000—for each man employed, within a trifle of $900! Now, sir, if every seaman under the last Administration cost double the expense which was incurred for the same man under the preceding one, if the same system is continued, we have no reason to doubt that the seamen next year will cost double of their present expense. But, even suppose the expense to remain the same as it now is, will the Representatives of the American people agree to maintain a naval force which costs us $900 (within $13) per man, the use of which no man has attempted to guess, much less to demonstrate!