TWELFTH CONGRESS.—FIRST SESSION. PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES.[13] (continued 4)

Permit me to refer the House to the Journal of the first session of the Third Congress, for the proof of what I have stated. During this session, the difficulties then subsisting between this country and Great Britain, became the subject of discussion, and a proposition for prohibiting all intercourse with Great Britain, in case justice was not done us, was then submitted to the House, and the previous question was called upon it, and decided in the affirmative, after which the subject was not only postponed, but, as appears by the Journal, was both amended and debated. It appears also from the Journal in 1795, that a proposition was amended after an affirmative decision of the previous question. In the year 1798, when a resolution was before the House for publishing the instructions to, and the despatches from our Ministers to the French Republic, the previous question was moved and determined in the affirmative; and it appears by the Journal that immediately after such decision, on the same day, debate was had on the main question.

But, sir, to come to our own times: on the 15th of December, 1807, a construction was given to the rule, after mature deliberation, by a large majority of the House, that the main question might be debated, after an affirmative decision of the previous question. This was done on an appeal from the decision of the Speaker, "that after the previous question is called for and determined in the affirmative, it precludes all debate on the main question." The House reversed the decision of the Chair by 103 to 14. A similar decision took place on the 2d of December, 1803, in the House—101 to 18. And, sir, I have been unable to find a single decision of the House to the contrary, from the first organization of the Government until the close of the last session. Indeed, sir, the words of the rule itself, show that the construction, which had so long prevailed, was the only true construction which could be given to it. The words are, and until it (viz: the previous question) is decided, "shall preclude all amendment and further debate on the main question." By which it is evident, that amendment and debate of the main question is only precluded, until the previous question is decided, but that after such decision, it was not precluded.

The gentleman from New York, (Mr. Gold,) and the gentleman from Virginia, (Mr. Nelson,) have truly stated that the previous question was taken from the rules of the British Parliament, and they have likewise stated the reason of its introduction into that body. It was, sir, to prevent debate in the House of Commons upon questions of a delicate nature with respect to high personages, &c. Yes, sir, it was introduced there to enable the Ministry to prevent the Commons from opening their lips on subjects relating to the Royal Family and the great men of the realm. But, sir, we have gone further than the Ministry and their majorities, despotic and tyrannical as they have been, have ever dared to go in Parliament. For even there members are now, and always have been, permitted to debate on the previous question; but which members on this floor are not now permitted to do. Mr. Speaker, the nature of our Government forbids that the majority should have the power to prohibit all debate on questions which may come before this House. We have not, as yet, I trust, any high personages in this country about whom it would be indelicate or improper for the members on this floor to speak; and let me ask what subject of national importance can be proposed for adoption, on which a member should be deprived of the privilege of speaking at least once before he gives his vote? Nay, sir, let me ask gentlemen whether this House has a right to compel me, or any other member, to vote on any question, without giving me an opportunity of explaining my reason for that vote. I deny, sir, that they have this right; as a member of this body, I claim the privilege of delivering my sentiments, or what I may consider the sentiments of my constituents, on any subject, before I give my vote upon it. I claim it not, sir, for myself personally, but I claim it in the capacity of a Representative of a free people, sent here, not like a member of the French Council of Five Hundred, for the purpose of voting merely, but for the purpose of deliberating on subjects of high concern to their peace, their prosperity, their happiness. For what, sir, are we assembled here under a constitution the purest in the world? Is it not for the purpose of promoting "the general welfare" of the nation which we represent? And how is this to be done, except by a free communication of our sentiments to each other, on the various plans which may be proposed for that object? The peace, the honor, and interest of this country is confided to our care, and while we are here deliberating on the best means of preserving the one or securing and promoting the other, the constitution has very wisely thrown around us a shield of complete indemnity—"for any speech or debate in this House," we are "not to be questioned in any other place." Will then the majority claim the right of depriving a member of this privilege of speech, a privilege not only thus secured to him by the constitution itself, but for the due exercise of which he is not to be questioned elsewhere? But, sir, those who oppose the amendment say that the construction is founded in necessity; that individual members have abused the privilege of speech; that they have heretofore, and probably will again, make long speeches merely for the purpose of delay, and of embarrassing the proceedings of the House; and that therefore the majority must have it in their power to stop debate, whenever they think proper, and that this power will always be exercised with a sound discretion.

I deny, sir, that any such necessity exists; it is a plea easily made, but generally difficult and in this case impossible to be supported. Why has it so happened that this necessity has never existed until the last session of Congress? Was it then for the first time, that a division of sentiment appeared on this floor? were parties never before heard of in this country? Were not parties arrayed against each other in 1796 on the subject of the British Treaty, and in 1798-'9, on the question of a war with France? Were not the disputes in this House, in those times, as long and as bitter as they have ever been since? Those were times, which have been so often quoted in this House as hard, and unconstitutional; times when the reign of terror prevailed, when corrupt majorities, as has been often said on this floor, passed alien and sedition laws. And, yet, sir, with all the political sins which have been heaped upon those majorities, the sin of having taken away the privilege of speech on this floor never has been, and as I have proved from the journals, never can be laid to their charge. This House, by the constitution, has the power to "determine the rules of its proceedings;" and in making those rules, it has the right of regulating, but not of entirely preventing debate.

It would indeed be a strange anomaly in politics, as well as in law, that under a general power of making rules of proceeding, we should make a rule to prevent all proceedings whatever. Gentlemen may as well assume the power of preventing a member from voting, as they now do that of preventing him from speaking. I am willing to agree, sir, that the privilege of debate, on this floor, may have been and will again be abused; that on particular subjects individual members have spoken much longer than was necessary, and I may add, also, with much less sense than a majority might have wished; and in some instances they may have prolonged their speeches, merely for the purposes of delay. But, sir, will you deprive a member of the right of speaking at all, because he is unable to convey his ideas in few words, or because he may have very few or no ideas to convey? Or because some may have spoken merely to delay the proceedings of the House, will you make a general rule, by which a member may be wholly deprived of the right of speaking? If indeed, sir, evils do arise in consequence of the liberty of speech in this house, if the business of the nation does not progress with as much rapidity as in countries under the control of an individual; they are evils which flow from the very nature of our Government, from that freedom which we so highly prize, and from that very constitution which we have sworn to support. So long as we are men we shall be imperfect, we shall bring with us on this floor different views, different ideas on political as well as on other subjects; and it would be strange indeed if, on the various topics of national importance brought before us for discussion, we should not at times come into strong collision with each other.

The question on the amendment was determined in the negative—yeas 36, nays 76.

Mr. Stanford moved to amend the rules by adding to the end of the paragraph relating to priority of business, the words "but no question of consideration shall be required upon an original motion;" which was also determined in the negative—yeas 30, nays 68.

On motion of Mr. Williams the said rules were amended by striking out the word "five," in the paragraph prescribing the manner in which the previous question shall be taken, and inserting the words "one-fifth of the."

The question was then taken to concur in the said rules as amended, and determined in the affirmative.[21]

Friday, December 27.

Mr. Nelson presented a petition of sundry inhabitants of the Territory of Louisiana, praying that the second grade of Territorial government may be extended to the inhabitants of said Territory.

Monday, December 30.

Burning of the Richmond Theatre.

Soon after the Journal was read,

Mr. Dawson rose and addressed the chair. The lowness of his voice, owing to recent indisposition prevented his being heard distinctly; but his observations were nearly as follows:

Mr. Speaker—Virginia, my parent State, has long to mourn the loss of some of her most valuable sons and estimable daughters, who on the night of the 26th of the present month, met their untimely end.[22]

Among those who perished in the flames, in the metropolis of that State, on that sad night, were the Chief Magistrate of the State, and a gentleman[23] well known to many of us, and who, for years, held an honorable station in this House. Some of the most valuable and prominent characters in their professions, and others who promised ere long to be ornaments to their country. With these, sir, was the rising offspring[24] of one of our present most valuable members, and many other amiable and virtuous women who adorned and improved society.

These, sir, with many others, have fallen victims to that unrelenting element, notwithstanding the bold and generous efforts which were made to save them.

Their ashes are now mingled with the dust, and their spirits have ascended to Heaven.

It is to us a great national calamity.

I well know, that on such occasions grief, although keen, is unavailing—that the decrees of fate are irrevocable and ought to be submitted to with humility. In order, however, to testify the respect and sorrow which this nation feels for the deceased, and to prove that we sympathize with the afflicted, without further comment on this painful subject, I beg leave to offer the following resolution:

Resolved, That the members of this House will wear crape on the left arm for one month, in testimony of the respect and sorrow which they feel for those unfortunate persons who perished in the fire in the city of Richmond, in Virginia, on the night of the 26th of the present month.

This resolution was unanimously adopted.

Tuesday, January 7, 1812.

Statute of Limitations.

On motion of Mr. Gholson, the House resolved itself into a committee, on a report of the Committee of Claims on the subject of excepting certain claims from the act of limitations. The report of the committee being read, which concluded with a resolve that it is inexpedient to open the act of limitations for the claims in question:

Mr. Gholson hoped the committee would not agree to this report. Information had been received from the Treasury Department, stating in a distinct and unequivocal manner, that all this description of claims (which were all liquidated claims, such as indents of interest, certificates, &c.,) might be allowed by the Government, without danger of fraud or imposition; and, said Mr. G., if justice can be extended to this description of claimants, without danger, why should it be deferred? Only one solitary reason had been offered—that the persons really entitled to these claims upon Government might not get the money. He hoped this would not be sufficient to prevent Congress from doing what was just on the occasion.

Mr. Clay (the Speaker) hoped the committee would disagree to this resolution. It appears that the officers of the Treasury are of opinion that provision may be made for this description of claims without that danger of fraud, which might possibly arise from a total repeal of the statute of limitations; that their whole amount does not exceed $300,000, and the probability is, that one-fifth will never be applied for, should they be authorized to be paid. What, said Mr. C, is this statute of limitations, which, whenever mentioned in this House, seems to make everybody tremble? It is a general rule prescribed by the Government for the direction of its accounting officers in order to exclude unjust claims. What are statutes of limitation as applicable to individual cases? A rule under which individuals claim protection whenever they choose to do so, and when, from the lapse of time, or loss of evidence, they would be injured, were they not to take this advantage. But in these statutes of limitation there are always exceptions in favor of cases of disability, infancy, coverture, insanity, absence beyond sea, &c. But what is the course which an individual would take who found himself protected by a statute of limitation? He would examine the justice of the claim brought against him; if the claim were just, if he had been deprived of no evidence by the delay, if as able to pay it as if it had been presented at an earlier day, he will not hesitate to discharge the claim, and scorn to take advantage of the statute. And, said Mr. O., shall the Government be less willing to discharge its just debts than an honest individual? Shall we turn a deaf ear to the claims of individuals upon Government because of this statute? He trusted not. The Committee of Claims ought to examine the merit of every claim which comes before it, and if it be just, decide in its favor. But what, said Mr. C, has been the history of claims for four or five years past? When a solitary claim was presented the House would say, we cannot legislate upon individual cases. They occupy too much of our time. The claim is put aside. The same individual some time after, appears in company with others. We then say there are too many of these claims—their amount is too large, and the Treasury too poor—that there are a great many other claims equally well founded—that justice cannot be done to them all. Sometimes there is a division between the two Houses. This House passes a bill in favor of some particular claim—the other tells you they will not legislate for particular cases; that if they act, they wish to take up the subject generally. Mr. C. said it was his wish, both in his public and private character, as far as possible, to do justice; he therefore hoped the course proposed by the Chairman of the Committee of Claims would be agreed to.

The resolution recommended by the report was negatived, 54 to 31: and a resolution offered by Mr. Gold, recommending a provision by law for these claims, after some objections from Mr. Alston, was agreed to, 39 to 36.

Wednesday, January 8.

Battle of Tippecanoe.

Mr. McKee, from the Committee on Indian Affairs, to whom was referred the Message of the President, transmitting two letters from Governor Harrison, reporting the particulars and issue of the expedition under his command against the hostile Indians on the Wabash River, and the memorials of the Legislature of the Indiana Territory, and the officers and soldiers who served in the said expedition, presented the twenty-fourth ultimo, made a report thereon; which was read and committed to a Committee of the Whole to-morrow. The report is as follows:

The committee to whom was referred the Message of the President of the United States, transmitting two letters from Governor Harrison, of the Indiana Territory, reporting the particulars and the issue of the expedition under his command against the hostile Indians on the Wabash, and to whom was also referred the memorial of the General Assembly of the Indiana Territory, and the memorial of the officers and soldiers of the militia of Knox county, in the Indiana Territory, who served in the late campaign under the command of Governor Harrison, report:

That they have had the several matters to them referred under their consideration, and have given to them that attention which their importance seems to merit.

It appears to the committee, that the troops under the command of Governor Harrison may very properly be termed raw troops: very few of the officers, and almost none of the men, had ever been in actual service; and a considerable portion of them had been only a few weeks withdrawn from the pursuits of civil life. The attack made on this quickly-assembled army by the hostile Indians on the Wabash, when viewed, either as it relates to the nature of the enemy, the time, or the violence with which the attack was made, cannot but be considered of such a character as would have severely tested the collected firmness of the most able and experienced troops. This attack, violent and unexpected as it seems to have been, was repelled by the troops under the command of Governor Harrison, with a gallantry and good conduct worthy of future imitation. The whole transaction, in the opinion of the committee, presents to the American people a new proof that the dauntless spirit of our ancestors, by whom the war of the Revolution was so ably and successfully maintained, has not been diminished by more than thirty years of almost uninterrupted peace, but that it has been handed down, unimpaired, to their posterity.

In estimating the claims of the army on the Government of the United States, it is worthy of remark, that the nature of the country, as well as of the enemy to be encountered, subjected the army to many extreme hardships, and equal dangers, where every thing was hazarded, and but little could be gained, except the regard of their country.

The volunteers and militia (to whose claims the memorials referred to the committee particularly relate) were in actual service but a short time, for which alone they are entitled to pay by law; the compensation, therefore, to which they are entitled, is not at all commensurate to the services rendered, and the dangers incurred. Besides, many of the officers and men who fell, or were wounded, in the battle of the 7th November, 1811, were purchasers of the public lands, for which they were indebted to the United States; which debt falls due in a short time, and the penalty of forfeiture will be incurred if the debt is not paid. It would be unjust to inflict a penalty so severe on the disconsolate widows and orphans of those officers and soldiers of the volunteers and militia, who, in common with their brother officers and soldiers of the regular troops, fell in their country's cause, in a manner so distinguished, that nothing was wanting but a great occasion, interesting to the feelings of the American people, to have crowned their names with unfading laurels.

As an evidence, therefore, of the regard due to the bravery and ability displayed by the troops under the command of Governor Harrison, in the battle of the 7th November, 1811, as well as to relieve the representatives of those who were killed in the action, from the pecuniary losses incurred in consequence thereof, the committee respectfully submit the following resolutions:

1. Resolved, That one month's pay ought to be allowed, in addition to the common allowance, to the officers, (according to the rank which they held,) the non-commissioned officers and privates of the regulars, volunteers, and militia, and to the legal representatives of those who were killed or have since died of their wounds, composing the army under the command of Gov. Harrison, in the late campaign on the Wabash.

2. Resolved, That five years' half-pay ought to be allowed to the legal representatives of the officers, (according to the rank which they held,) the non-commissioned officers, and privates, of the volunteers and militia who were killed in the battle of the 7th November, 1811, or who have since died of their wounds.

3. Resolved, That provision ought to be made by law to place on the pension list the officers, (according to the rank which they held,) the non-commissioned officers, and soldiers, of the volunteers and militia who served in the late campaign on the Wabash, under the command of Governor Harrison, and who have been wounded or disabled in the said campaign.

4. Resolved, That provision ought to be made by law to pay for the horses and other property of individuals lost in, or in consequence of, the said battle.

5. Resolved, That the further time of —— years ought to be allowed to the officers and soldiers who were wounded, and to the legal representatives of those who were killed, in the said battle, to complete the payments due or which may fall due to the United States on any purchases of the public lands made by them before the said battle.

Thursday, January 9.

Ursuline Nuns at New Orleans.

The petition which the Speaker laid before the House yesterday, from the Ursuline nuns at New Orleans, was enclosed to him and recommended by Governor Claiborne. It prayed for an exchange of the military hospital for some lots which they hold in that city better calculated for a hospital. After the petition was read,

Mr. Dawson observed that he had received a letter from Governor Claiborne relative to that petition, and in confirmation of the facts therein stated. This community of nuns is a most respectable and useful member of society, the whole of their temporal cares being directed to the education of female youth. They are that community which some years ago presented a most elegant address to the then President of the United States, and received from him an equally elegant answer.

I am well assured that the lots which they wish to exchange are more valuable, and better suited for the erection of a hospital than those on which the hospital now stands. I therefore move that the petition and accompanying papers be referred to a select committee, who will no doubt converse with the Secretary of War on the subject.

This was agreed to, and Mr. Dawson, Mr. Lowndes, and Mr. Macon, were appointed the committee.

Friday, January 17.

Quartermaster's Department.

The bill from the Senate "for the establishment of a Quartermaster's Department" came up on its third reading.

Mr. Alston said, if the House would pay attention to the duty of the Purveyor of Public Supplies, and examine the powers given to the Quartermaster General in this bill, it would appear evident that there was no necessity for both offices, and it certainly was not the wish of the House to erect two great departments to perform the same duties. He could perceive no way in which one officer was to be a check upon the other. He liked the bill as it came from the Senate better than as amended, as he saw no necessity for retaining the office of Purveyor.

Mr. Tallmadge observed, that the great object of this bill, and the only one which made it necessary, was to provide for a Quartermaster General's Department, instead of military agents, as employed at present. There never was such an officer in the staff department in the Revolutionary war. The late Secretary of War, as well as the present, were in favor of this change. The military agents, without much responsibility, had nearly controlled the whole War Department. An attempt was made two years ago to effect this change, but it then failed. The office of Purveyor of Public Supplies was instituted long before that of Military Agent. The duties of the Quartermaster General and Purveyor are very different. The former is a highly respectable and confidential officer; he is next in consequence to the Commander-in-chief, with whom he has frequent communication. Every movement of the Army is first communicated to him. He ought to be a military character. It is his duty to receive and deliver out the necessary supplies for the Army, and to attend to its movements. The duties of the Purveyor is to purchase, under the direction of the Secretary of the Treasury, arms, clothing, hospital stores, and every other article necessary for the Army. So that there is not the least similarity between the two officers; one being the purchasing, the other the distributing officer. If the office of Purveyor were to be done away, the Quartermaster General would have to employ a deputy or agent to make these purchases, which would be putting too much in the power of a subordinate officer, and would do away that check which will exist if the Purveyor be continued, as the purchaser and distributor of the supplies would be in the same person. The Purveyor is also the purchaser of goods for the Indian department.

Mr. Williams rose to prevent any person from falling into the mistake which the gentleman from North Carolina appeared to have done, by making remarks applicable to the printed bill (a part of which had been struck out and other parts amended) instead of the bill read from the Chair. He deemed it unnecessary to add any thing in reply to what had been so well said by the gentleman from Connecticut.

Mr. Alston said he had attended to the bill as read, and not to the printed bill; and insisted that, from the provisions of the bill, the Secretary of War might direct the Purveyor and Quartermaster to purchase the same articles. If the bill was what the gentleman from Connecticut had stated it to be, he should not have objected to it; but it was not.

Mr. Quincy had doubts whether both these officers were necessary. There was no such officer as Purveyor of Public Supplies during the Revolutionary war. If it were found hereafter that another besides the Quartermaster General was necessary, he could be appointed. There ought certainly to be a responsibility attached to the purchase of supplies, and this might be placed in the Head of the War Department or Quartermaster General. He had not sufficient light on the subject, to say that both these officers are necessary. He was in favor of the bill as it came from the Senate.

Mr. Blount said, that though there was not a Purveyor of Public Supplies during the Revolutionary war, there was a Clothier, who did much the same business. If we are going to war, said Mr. B., he did not see how we could do without a Quartermaster General; and it would be improper for him to become the purchaser of supplies, which it is the duty of the Purveyor to purchase, because, as had already been stated, there would be no check in the business. There must be propriety in keeping the offices distinct.

Mr. Macon observed, it was impossible to go to war without a Quartermaster General; for there is no man has so much to do about an army as this officer. There was always more difficulty in settling the Quartermaster General's accounts than any other. The only instance in which a Quartermaster General has to purchase supplies, is when, by some miscarriage or accident, the supplies from the Commissary or Purveyor do not arrive in season. It is necessary that such a power should be vested in this officer, to be used on such extraordinary occasions. As had been stated by his colleague, though there was no Purveyor during the Revolution, there were clothiers or agents employed in different situations, which answered the purpose. The qualifications necessary for the Quartermaster General and Purveyor are very different; the one ought to be a soldier, the other a merchant.

The bill passed by a large majority.

Naval Establishment.

The House resolved itself into a Committee of the Whole on the bill concerning the Naval Establishment.

Mr. Cheves, the Chairman of the Navy Committee, moved to fill the blank in the first section of the bill with "four hundred and eighty thousand dollars," and said he believed it to be his duty at this time, to disclose to the Committee of the Whole the views and motives of the select committee in reporting the bill. Mr. C. said, I consider this subject as one of the most important that can be brought before this House; as a great question, involving, to a considerable extent, the fate of a species of national defence the most essential and necessary to the interests of this country. I know, said Mr. C., how many and how strong are the prejudices, how numerous and how deeply laid are the errors which I have to encounter in the discussion of this question; errors and prejudices the more formidable, as they come recommended by the virtues, and shielded by the estimable motives of those who indulged them. I have been told that this subject is unpopular, and it has been not indistinctly hinted, that those who become the zealous advocates of the bill will not advance by their exertions the personal estimation in which they may be held by their political associates. I will not do my political friends the injustice to believe that these exertions will diminish their confidence; but, could I think otherwise, I hope I shall never be diverted from a faithful discharge of my duty by considerations of this kind. I wish to lead no man, and I am determined not to be blindly led by any man. In acting with a party, I do so, because I adopt their leading principles and politics as the best, and because I believe, from the nature of free Government, it is necessary so to act to give efficiency to the exertions of any individual; but I do not feel myself, therefore, bound to renounce my deliberate opinions on all the great interests of the nation, or to take no independent part in the exertions of the party to which I belong. I sincerely believe that, if this infant Naval Establishment be either abandoned or put down, the party who now form the majority in this House, and in the country, may run great risk of becoming the minority, not only within these walls, but in the nation.

It has been said, by a strong and lively figure of rhetoric, that this country is a great land animal, which should not venture into the water. But if you look at its broad high back, the Alleghanies, and its great sides swelling to the east and to the west, where do you find its immense limbs terminate? Not on some great plain which has been formed for their reception, but in two great oceans, the Pacific on the one side, and the Atlantic on the other. The figure explains the true interests of the country, in the inseparable union and necessary dependence of agriculture and commerce. The God of Nature did not give to the United States a coast of two thousand miles in extent, not to be used. No; it was intended by this bounty to make us a great commercial people; and shall we ungratefully reject the enjoyment of his unexampled beneficence? No, it has not and will not be neglected. A great portion of our people exist but upon the ocean and its fruits. It has been eloquently, and not less truly than eloquently, said, that "the ocean is their farm," and it must and will be protected. But how is this protection to be afforded? I will endeavor to prove that it can be done, and done most cheaply and effectually by a naval force; and if I succeed in this, I shall hope for the concurrence of the committee. No proposition appears to me more true or more obvious, than that it is only by a naval force that our commerce and our neutral rights on the ocean can be protected. We are now going to war for the protection of these rights; but in what way, and under what circumstances? The mode is altogether accidental, and not founded on the permanent relations or means of the country. It is not my intention to condemn the course which has been taken. It has had my hearty concurrence, and my zealous, though feeble, support. I hope it may be altogether effectual; and I believe it will inflict a wound which will be felt with poignancy. But it is, notwithstanding, partial and accidental; for, if Great Britain had not the Canadas on our borders, how could we attack or resist her, armed as we are? If we possess ourselves of the Canadas, and this we shall certainly do in the event of war, how and where shall we then continue the war without a naval force? We shall suffer the evils of war, without inflicting any of them on the enemy. We cannot send our regulars or our volunteers on the ocean. Does it not then result, inevitably, as the dictate of common prudence, that we should, as soon as possible, commence our naval preparations? The Naval Establishment of the United States has been heretofore so much neglected, that it is at present in a state of lamentable depression; and the question now is, whether we will suffer it to go down entirely, or attempt to raise it up to some degree of respectability. Some gentlemen say, "if you had asked for no more than the reparation of the frigates in ordinary, we might have granted your request." But, for myself, I would not thank any gentleman for this concession. The select committee conceived it to be their duty to bring the question fully before the House in the shape in which they have exposed it. Not to ask merely what it would do to assist by naval co-operation, in the first efforts of the contemplated struggle, but principally what it would do towards establishing and perpetuating a respectable naval force for the protection of those important rights of the people, which are, and must continue, exposed upon the ocean. Their determination was plainly, candidly, and boldly to speak to the House, and through it to the nation, on this great question, and leave its fate to the wisdom of the one and the good sense of the other.

That a respectable Naval Establishment affords the only effectual means of causing our commercial rights to be respected, will, as a general proposition, be denied by few persons, if any. But its adoption by us is deemed improper by those who oppose it, on the grounds of the enormous expense which, it is said, the establishment will necessitate, and the inability of the nation, by any force which it can provide, to resist, with effect, the immense naval power of Great Britain. Is it not surprising that so much prejudice should exist against this establishment on account of its expensiveness, when it is ascertained that, during the whole eighteen years of its existence, from 1794 to 1811, inclusive, it has cost the Government only $27,175,695? I am afraid I shall be tedious, because the only way in which I hope to bring conviction home to the minds of the House, is by entering, with minuteness and precision, into a dry detail of figures and statements; but the necessity of the case must be my apology for the course which I shall take. If the House shall have full confidence in my statements, much will be gained to the argument; for it will be difficult, if not impossible, for the hearer to follow me through an examination of these details, as the argument proceeds. For this confidence, therefore, I will venture to hope. I believe the statements on which I rely to be accurate, as far as accuracy is material to the discussion. I will state them with candor, and, when I have concluded, I will put them into the hands of gentlemen who may wish to examine them for their own satisfaction, or to refute them. The average annual expense of this establishment, so much censured for its wasteful and improvident management, has but little exceeded $1,500,000, which is not much more than twice the amount of the usual annual appropriation for our economical Civil List. It has been generally supposed that it has been much more expensive than the Military Establishment, but I will show that this is not really the case. The expense of the Military Establishment, from 1791 to 1811, inclusive, has been $37,541,669, giving an annual average of $1,700,000, or $200,000 per annum more than that of the Navy. It thus appears that, in the gross amount, as well as in the annual expenditure, the Army has been more expensive than the Navy. Compare, too, the services of the Army with those of the Navy, and it will be found that those of the latter have been most useful and most honorable to the nation. I know of no service of this character which the Army has performed, except the defeat of the Indians by General Wayne, and the late gallant affair on the Wabash. The Navy, in the contest with France in 1798, were victorious wherever it encountered an enemy, and probably laid the foundation of the subsequent accommodation with that nation. In the Mediterranean, its exploits gave a name to the country throughout Europe; humbled, in an unexampled manner, the piratical and barbarous foe, and crowned itself with a reputation for intrepidity and heroism, which had not been exceeded by the exploits of any nation, and which must go down to a distant posterity. I mean not, by this comparison, to say any thing injurious to the Army, but only to declare that preference to which I think the naval services of the country are entitled. Admitting, if it be desired, that the Navy has heretofore occasioned an expense not warranted by its force or its services; and I cannot deny but that, from a variety of causes, the expense may have been unnecessarily great; an argument cannot thence be fairly drawn against its future use—the contrary is the fair conclusion. Past errors lay the foundation of future improvement. It was thus the greatest orator, and one of the greatest statesmen of antiquity, reasoned. The great Athenian orator, when rousing his countrymen, by his impetuous eloquence, to resist the ambition of Philip, declared that it was on their past misconduct that he built his highest hopes; for, said he, "were we thus distressed, in spite of every vigorous effort which the honor of our State demanded, there were then no hope of recovery." So may we reason in this case; for had these extraordinary expenses been the result of good economy, then, indeed, would their diminution be hopeless; but, as they have proceeded from a wasteful or unskilful expenditure, the remedy will be found in a reform of the abuse; to effect this reform, is the duty of Congress. But it has not only been less expensive than the Army, but it may be proved, as the committee have declared in their report, that "a naval force within due limits and under proper regulations, will constitute the cheapest defence of the nation." This will be partly proved by a comparison between the expense of the permanent fortifications of our maritime frontier and that of an adequate naval defence. The experience of modern naval warfare has proved that no fortifications can prevent the passage of ships of war. The present fortifications of our maritime frontier, though they are more numerous and better than they have been at any other period in our history, cannot prevent an inconsiderable naval force from laying many of our towns in ashes. Indeed, it is believed that no fortifications which can be erected will afford a complete protection against such attacks, while their expense would be oppressive to the nation. The city of New York alone, if completely fortified, would require a further expenditure of three millions of dollars, and a garrison of ten thousand men, and then might be laid in ashes by four or five seventy-fours. But we have a coast of two thousand miles to protect, the expense of which could not be borne by the nation. A better defence would be furnished by such a naval force as would give you a mastery in the American seas, and at home much less expense.

The superior cheapness of naval defence seems to me to be satisfactorily established, and I am next to prove that the force proposed—I mean twelve seventy-fours and twenty frigates—are sufficient to protect us in our own seas, and defend our ports and harbors against the naval power of Great Britain. The first evidence that is offered in support of this proposition, is the opinion of naval men; and if the representations of any man may be relied upon with confidence, so far, at least, as that they are not founded in deception, I believe those of a sailor may be. By naval men, I have been assured that this force is adequate to the object proposed. It is impossible for me to state with accuracy, or in a manner calculated to give a due impression of them, all the reasons which they offer in support of their opinion, but among them are those detailed in the report of the select committee. Indeed, they advance the opinion, and support it with reasons, the error of which, if they be erroneous, I am unable to discover, that it will require the enemy to employ a triple force to put himself on a footing of equality with that of the United States. Their reasons are, as nearly as I can state them, these: there must be stationed on our coast, at any given time, an equal force; this force cannot be fitted out, unless with great disadvantage to the service in point of expense, and in respect to the health of the crew, for much more than three months' service. An equal force must be put in requisition and kept in readiness to relieve that on the station. But, as all the equipments of the enemy must be made in Europe, the force destined to relieve the first must be despatched by the time the first may be supposed to have arrived on our coast, because it will be necessary, at a period as early as the arrival of the second, for the first to return; but the first could not proceed to Europe, be equipped, and return to relieve the second in time; and therefore a third equivalent force is necessary, and thus three times the force of the United States must be employed by the enemy to place himself on a footing of equality with it. History may be resorted to, with confidence, to prove that neither Great Britain, nor any other nation, has ever been able to station, for any length of time, in distant seas, a force equal to that which, in the opinion of naval men, is sufficient to accomplish the objects proposed by the committee—the dominion of the American seas, and the defence of our ports and harbors. There is one fact which, above all others, shows the inability of Great Britain to keep a large fleet on our coast. From the frozen regions of the North to the Isthmus of Darien, she has not a port fit for naval equipment or repair, except Halifax; and if, as the opponents of the Navy seem to think certain, and I hope their opinions may be realized, we shall, in the event of war, deprive her of that, she will be without the means of repairing a disabled vessel in our seas. Under such circumstances, any thing but temporary service would be utterly impracticable.

But, said Mr. C., on the subject of the British naval force, there is great misconception. The high-sounding number of a thousand ships appals the mind, and an examination of its actual force, and the numerous requisitions which are made upon it, is usually rejected as an idle labor. Let this examination be made, and at least some part of the terror which it excites will vanish. Of the eight hundred and thirty-three ships which Great Britain had in commission in 1801, and she never had more, it is believed there were only three hundred and eighty-three that exceeded the size and capacity of the large privateers that will probably be fitted out by the citizens of the United States, in the event of war. Of this last number, there were one hundred and forty-two of sixty-four guns, and above; twenty-two between fifty and sixty guns; one hundred and fifty-six between thirty-two and forty-four; and sixty-three between twenty and thirty guns. The remainder of the vessels in commission consisted of one hundred and seventy-four sloops, one hundred and forty-one gun-vessels, and one hundred and thirty hired vessels. These hired vessels are small vessels, of from four to ten guns, which, it is believed, are only employed for revenue purposes. This review and enumeration, I have no doubt, proves the actual force of the navy of Great Britain, however great it really is, to be much inferior to the impression almost universally received, from the high-sounding boast of her thousand ships. Nor has the actual force of the British navy been more misconceived than the application of it. The common impression is, that the Government can direct to any given point almost an unlimited number of ships. But if this delusive impression be removed, it will be found that, notwithstanding the greatness of the force, the points to which it must be destined are so numerous and dispersed as to put it all in requisition. This I will prove by reference to the distribution of her fleets in 1801. [Here Mr. C. read a statement of the force and distribution of the British fleet at that time.] From which of these stations, said Mr. C., could she have spared, with safety and prudence, a portion of the force employed? Could she, from all, have stationed and continued in our seas a force which would have been equal, under the disadvantages which have been pointed out, to twelve seventy-fours and twenty frigates? How much less would she have been able to have furnished a force which would be superior to a naval armament whose expense should equal that of the military preparations of the present year? But it may be said, that the ships which Great Britain has in ordinary would be more than equal to any increase which any circumstances would require. This might be true, were her seamen unlimited in numbers, and her pecuniary resources inexhaustible; but both are limited, and so must be her naval armament. To fit out vessels which she has in ordinary, would require, within a few thousand, all the seamen in her merchant service, and such an addition to her annual expenditure, as the nation neither would nor could bear. The true object of inquiry to ascertain her efficient power is, what number of vessels is she practically able to keep in commission, and the answer may be received in a shape the most unfavorable to my argument, yet confirmatory of it, in the example of 1801, the year which I have selected for illustration, when it is confidently believed her equipment was greater, combining force and numbers, than at any other period of her history.

But, while it is contended by some that it will not be in the power of the nation to establish an effective naval force, there are others who are opposed to it, lest we become too great a naval power. They fear that our fleets will cover the ocean, and seeking victory on all the opposite shores of the Atlantic, involve the nation in oppressive expenses, and in wanton and habitual wars. Such objects are certainly not contemplated by the report of the committee; nor can such events possibly happen, as long as we remain a free people. The committee have recommended such a navy as will give to the United States an ascendency in the American seas, and protect their ports and harbors. The people will never bear the establishment of a greater force than these objects require. The reasons which forbid Great Britain, or any other European power, to station large fleets on our seas, will equally forbid us to cross the Atlantic, or go into distant seas, for the purpose of frequent or habitual wars.

But a navy is said to be anti-republican, because it was opposed by the Republicans in 1798. I apprehend, however, that it was then objected to, not because it was anti-republican in itself, but because the Republicans of that time believed it was to be employed for improper objects; because, while it was unnecessary at the time, it was of such a nature as only fitted it for the time, because it was part of a system which embraced unnecessary armies and unnecessary taxes and loans, to continue a war beyond the just objects of war—a war which, to use the language of the day, was to be waged by every man, woman, and child, in the nation, to which we are opposed.

We are told, also, that navies have ruined every nation that has employed them; and England, and Holland, and Venice, and other nations, have been mentioned as examples. The vast debt of Great Britain is declared to be among the pernicious fruits of her Naval Establishment. This I deny. Her debt has grown out of her profuse subsidies, and her absurd wars on the land. Though the ruin, which is supposed to threaten England, is attributed to her navy, it is obvious that her navy alone has saved and still saves her from ruin. Without it she must, long since, have yielded to the power of France her independence and her liberties. We are told that the same wealth which she has expended in supporting her navies would have been employed more profitably for the nation in the improvement of its agriculture and manufactures, and in the establishment of canals and roads, and other internal improvements. But experience is better than theory. Let us compare England with nations which have no navies, or comparatively inconsiderable navies. The nations of the Continent of Europe are without such overgrown and ruinous Naval Establishments, but do you there find the highest improvements in agriculture, the most flourishing manufactures, or the best roads and canals? No, it is in this nation, that has been ruined by her navy, that you find all these improvements most perfect and most extended. I mean not either to be the panegyrist of England; but these truths may be declared for our instruction, without suppressing the feelings excited by the wrongs she has done us. England has not, then, I conclude, been destroyed or impoverished, but preserved and enriched, by her navy. Was Holland ruined by her navy? No; surrounded by the great powers of the continent, with a population not exceeding 2,000,000 of souls, she protected and secured her independence for more than a century, against her powerful neighbors, by means of her commercial riches, which were cherished and defended by her naval power. Did Venice owe her decline, or fall, to her navy? While the neighboring Italian States were subdued, year after year changing their masters and their tyrants, she long continued to ride triumphantly amidst the storm, independent, and, in a great degree, free. It was her naval and commercial power which made her rich and great, and secured her existence as a State so long. Look even at the little Republic of Genoa, whose inhabitants, but for its commerce and its navy, would scarcely ever have possessed "a local habitation," or "a name!" But I must have exhausted the patience of the House, I will therefore conclude the observations which I proposed to make on the general merits of the question.

Saturday, January 18.

Naval Establishment.

The House then resolved itself into a Committee of the Whole, on the Navy bill; when Mr. Cheves finished his speech in favor of the bill, as given in full in preceding pages.

Mr. Seybert.—I rise under a pressure of more than ordinary embarrassment—prudence on one hand bids me shrink from the task which I am about to undertake; whilst on the other hand, a conscious duty impels me to engage in the consideration of the question now before the honorable committee. My friend from South Carolina (Mr. Cheves) says this question is all important to this nation; in this I perfectly coincide with him, and therefore cannot rest satisfied with a mere vote on this occasion. Sir, it is not my intention to follow the gentleman from South Carolina through all the windings of the labyrinth into which he has ventured to penetrate. I will not pretend to chase reason on the wing.

I will not particularly follow the gentleman in his comparison of the Army and Naval Establishments of the United States. He has stated to us that the Army has cost this nation much more than the Navy; he concludes we ought to be equally liberal in our appropriations for both these purposes. Sir, I perceive no reason in this assertion. Some gentlemen on the other side of the House may say, that we have been lavish in our appropriations for an army; even admitting that in this respect we have been liberal to extravagance, it surely cannot be inferred that we should make ourselves doubly guilty of this charge. I will agree to make appropriations for the establishing a navy for the United States. The gentleman from South Carolina has told us, that when the war which we are about to wage, shall be over, our Army will leave us. Sir, I am happy to hear that on such an event the military will be readily disbanded—a dread of the contrary gave much uneasiness to many a few days since—this is just what we wish should take place. On the other hand, said he, "your proud Navy," will remain. It is for this, with many other reasons, why I am opposed to a navy. I wish he could have proved to us, that with the end of the war the Navy would also leave us; perhaps I should then agree with him in favor of its establishment: though the "proud Navy" will remain with us, he has neglected to tell us at what rate of expense.

Sir, the gentleman from South Carolina says many oppose a navy, because they deem it an anti-republican institution. On this head, I shall remark but little: I will only ask if it is to remain with us in times of peace with its numerous train of officers, may it not become a powerful engine in the hands of an ambitious Executive?

Sir, it was thought proper to make the foregoing remarks as preliminary to the subject. The question of a Naval Establishment for the United States more especially concerns those who inhabit commercial districts. As one of these I am much interested. Many persons maintain, that a naval system of defence is indispensably necessary to a nation, whose seaboard extends more than 1,500 miles, with a shipping interest amounting to 1,300,000 tons—in this respect, ranking the second of modern nations. The argument is as specious as it is plausible; it is liable to many, and in my opinion, to insuperable objections. The proposition before us will be considered as leading to a permanent Naval Establishment. This course is warranted by the report of the Secretary of the Navy as well as by the mode which was pursued by my friend from South Carolina. I shall not hesitate to declare my decided opposition to such an establishment, and will proceed to state the objections whereon my opinion is grounded. Sir, I deem it inexpedient to commence a permanent Naval Establishment at this time. We are quite unprepared for it—we are in want of all the necessary materials; though we have been told that our forests abound in all the necessary timber, it was said little of this material was to be found in our dockyards. The gentleman from South Carolina has told us, that a sufficiency of seasoned timber, to build four seventy-fours, was now on hand, and that the proper authority deemed it advisable to be used for frigates. Sir, this timber is a portion of that which was purchased some years since, for the purpose of building six seventy-fours. It now appears, that of this timber as much as was sufficient for two of these vessels, has been employed to build smaller vessels or gunboats, I presume. This is all a piece with our pretended economy. This mode of proceeding will not answer, sir. We are in the wrong from the commencement of our Navy. I do not wish it to be understood that I have decided a navy will never be a proper mode of defence for this nation—but whenever it shall be determined on, we should begin right; this can only be done by following those nations who have had most experience on the subject. Our first step should be to store away the proper timber. This should be done in times when we can best afford it—in times when our market is glutted—in times when labor can be commanded at fair prices—at a period when we enjoy peace, and surely not when we are about to engage in a war. We have heretofore paid the highest price for every article; we have given double wages for labor; and instances might be mentioned, when the workmen were transported in stage coaches, at an enormous expense, from our large seaport towns to the navy yard of this city. Contracts for timber were made in haste and at a very advanced price. As soon as it was obtained, it was put together, and in a few months we saw it floating in the form of a ship of war—rotten ships, I may say, sir, for I believe without exception in the frigates which were built by the United States, the more important parts decayed and were rotten in two, three, or four years. In many instances the expense for repairs was equal to the original cost. A single frigate, the Constitution, has cost for repairs, from October, 1802, to March, 1809, the enormous sum of $302,582 21, or upwards of $43,000 per annum for seven years in succession.

Let us view this subject in a more extended sense—I mean as regards our commerce generally—we shall still have cause to entertain the opinion which we first adopted. We cannot protect our commerce on the ocean. Our ships have vexed every sea—we trade to all parts of the world; of course, to protect our commerce, our ships of war must abandon our coasts and encounter all the force of the enemy or those of Europe. The ports we have in view are European. If your frigates, for convenience and safety, are to cruise only on your coasts, what will be the fate of the millions which are embarked beyond the Cape of Good Hope? By this management surely you cannot afford it protection. France, Spain, and Holland, when combined and backed by an armed neutrality in the north of Europe, could not secure their commerce. The fleets of Great Britain now sail triumphant over every wave of the deep. The Russians have a navy far superior to that which it is proposed we shall establish, and they cannot protect their trade in the confined limits of the Baltic. They count fifty or sixty sail-of-the-line, besides many frigates and smaller vessels.

Sir, the expenses which are incurred by a Naval Establishment, far exceed the profits which arise from the commerce which it is intended to protect. This proposition is warranted by the experience of Great Britain, the most commercial nation of modern times. In the year 1798, the total imports and exports of Great Britain amounted to £94,952,000. For the same year the expenditure for her navy amounted to £13,654,013, or about one-seventh of the total imports and exports, or fourteen per cent. on the total capital employed in commerce. What regular trade can yield such profits on the outward and inward cargoes? To me this is a secret. In the year 1799 Mr. Pitt computed the profits on the commerce of Great Britain at £12,000,000, or one and a half millions less than the expenses for her navy the preceding year!

Sir, the expenses which are necessarily connected with a Naval Establishment, constitute a very serious objection to it. At this time, the annual expenditures for the British navy amount to nearly £17,000,000, or $80,000,000. Every succeeding year brings with it an increase of expenditures. This has been the result year after year since the commencement of the institution. Our prospects will be the more evident when we take a view of the expenses which have been already incurred for the infantile establishment of our country; we shall be led to the same conclusions. The American navy was commenced in the year 1794, and by the end of the year 1811, the expenditures amounted to $27,456,979—a sum much greater than the one-half of the public debt on the 1st of January, 1812. This would have been much better applied, had it been placed with the Commissioners of the Sinking Fund. I will ask the gentleman from South Carolina, what has the nation benefited for this enormous expenditure? What would have been the amount expended, had this engine been Herculean, with Admirals of the Red, White and Blue squadrons, with numerous dock and navy-yards, placemen, &c.? For we shall gradually advance to all this, if we do not stop short at this time. For the benefits of such appendages, I will refer you to a statement made to this House, the last session, concerning the navy-yards belonging to the United States; especially to the details of the expenditures of that connected with this city. The document I refer to, was laid before this House on the 25th February, 1811. It will inform you, sir, that the value of the work done from the 1st of January to the 31st of December, 1810, was $73,947 52. The commandant confesses, in his returns made to the Secretary, that this work, in many instances, is rated twenty per cent. above the prices paid in other places. The salaries in this same yard, for the same year, (1810,) amounted to $95,637 64¼. So that the pay for the salaries and the wages at this navy-yard, exceeded the value of the articles manufactured, even when rated far above the fair prices, in amount $21,790 12¼! This establishment is under the immediate eye of the Government; we might suppose every attention was paid to economy; if so, who will desire further proofs of the advantages of a navy!

Sir, I further object to a navy, because it will be the means of exciting many wars, which, without the establishment, may be honorably avoided. It is said, nations are involved in war, in proportion to the extent of their navies; and some assert (Brougham) that a perpetual war is one of the two modes which are necessary to support a powerful naval establishment. Sir, a naval establishment will create a new and a dangerous interest in our country. Nothing is more common than to be told, that such are the wishes of the naval interest of Great Britain, and that this or that war must be entered into to gratify them. For my part, sir, I shall be very sorry indeed, if ever the period arrives in the United States, when any particular interest or community shall direct the Government, whether it be naval, agricultural, manufacturing, or commercial—the general welfare should be the sole great ruling principle in the National Councils.

Sir, I am deterred, when I consider the fate of all those nations who at different periods have been famous for their navies. The naval strength of the Hanseatic League was such, two centuries past, as to excite terror on the part of England. These, sir, distant free cities, are now the appendages of mighty France, and have no political existence. Who has not heard of the once formidable fleets of Venice and Genoa? At one time England was indebted to the latter for officers to command her ships of war—alas! these republics are now consigned to oblivion. Denmark was at one time the mistress of the ocean; by means of her fleets she often invaded England, and held her in a state of subjection. The Danes heretofore burned London, Paris, and other great cities—they are now controlled by France, and they have had their Copenhagen defeat. Holland, with her Van Tromps, and De Ruyters, occupied the British Channel at pleasure; this power defeated the navies of England and France. Where is Holland now? Incorporated as a part of the French empire. Spain boasted her invincible armadas; Elizabeth of England, by nature haughty, proud, and ambitious, trembled at the very mention of them, until they were dispersed and destroyed by storms at sea; Spain is now the vassal of France. Not very long since the navy of France sailed triumphant along the British coast, looked into Portsmouth harbor, and taunted British spirit. I ask you, sir, where is the strength of which these nations formerly boasted? All are inoperative, and dread the gigantic power of the British navy—they are in part sick in dry docks, or are blockaded in their ports.

Mr. Chairman, Great Britain, though at this time triumphant in every sea, if she persists in her expensive naval establishment, with her present debt of £800,000,000, which was chiefly created for her navy—Great Britain, sir, I say, with all this, must sink under the heavy pressure. She will hereafter derive very little satisfaction from her brilliant victories on the 1st of June off Cape St. Vincent, Camperdown, Aboukir, and Trafalgar.

Shall I be pardoned, sir, when I fear our vessels will only tend to swell the present catalogue of the British navy? Of the 1,042 vessels which she possessed in July, 1811, one hundred and nine were captured from the French, forty-six from the Danes, twenty-five from the Spaniards, twenty-four from the Dutch, and three from the Italians; making a total of two hundred and seven captured ships, or one-fifth of her whole navy.

Small ships are proper for the service of the United States—by their agency we shall be able to annoy the convoys of an enemy. The privateers which were fitted out in every port during our Revolutionary war, destroyed much of the British commerce, even in the British and Irish Channels, whilst the frigates which were built by the Government did little or nothing—but two of them remained at the conclusion of the contest. The enemy will not watch your small vessels; they may enter all your small inlets, where heavy vessels cannot venture to approach them; and, at the conclusion of the war, they may be sold for the merchant service. I shall not follow the gentleman in his remarks on the bill before the committee; I shall vote against it, though it is my present intention to appropriate the sums requisite for the repairing and equipping our present ships of war. I will go no further. I tell you, sir, naval victories in the end would prove fatal to the United States; the consequences which have uniformly followed in other countries must take place here. If the United States shall determine to augment their navy, so as to rival those of Europe, the public debt will become permanent; direct taxes will be perpetual; the paupers of the country will be increased; the nation will be bankrupt; and, I fear, the tragedy will end in a revolution.

Mr. McKee rose, with deference, to perform a duty which he owed to his constituents, by delivering his sentiments on the very important subject before the committee, though he confessed himself very inadequate to do justice to it. He deemed the question of great magnitude; as he feared, if we were to proceed to build up a large naval establishment, it would affect the destinies of this nation to the latest posterity.

The gentleman from South Carolina has said, that he has great prejudices to encounter. Mr. McKee would have thought that the deliberate opinion of a majority of Congress, expressed upon more than one occasion, was entitled to a more respectful term than prejudices. Those decisions proceeded from the honest convictions of some of the best friends of the country.

Mr. McK. denied this doctrine, that "it is demonstrably clear that this nation is inevitably destined to be a naval power;" and he believed that, if the attempt were made to make it such, it would prove the destruction of our happy constitution. He would proceed to show on what ground he supported the opinion that the maintenance of a permanent naval establishment would prove ruinous to this country. For this purpose, he should be under the necessity of submitting some calculations to the House; for, though he had heard a course of this kind condemned, as fit only for the counting-house of the merchant, he considered it as the most conducive to correct legislation. It is certainly a matter of just calculation, when we are called upon to establish a permanent navy, to show that such an institution would cost more than any advantages to be derived from it would compensate.

[Here the Speaker went into detailed statements, taken from the authentic reports of the Navy Department, showing the enormous expense of building our ships, and the enormous expense of repairs; the great expense of manning and equipping them, and the pay of officers idle at home while the ship was rotting which cost so much, and which, at the time it was built, it was morally certain would have nothing to do until it rotted.]

Mr. McK. had said, this nation was not destined, under the present constitution, to be a great naval power; and he maintained that the statements which he had exhibited—and which he believed, for the purposes of argument, would be found substantially correct, when tested by experience—went conclusively to show that the expenses of the naval establishment of ten frigates and twelve seventy-four gun ships, now proposed to be built, could not be supported without permanent internal taxes, and a constant increase of the public debt and annual expenditure. And if the system was gone into, to the extent contemplated by the gentleman from South Carolina, (Mr. Cheves,) of building forty frigates and twenty-five seventy-four gunships, which he admitted would be necessary to relieve the naval establishment from comparative inefficiency, the annual expenses of the Government with such a system (as already shown) would be more than $25,000,000, which would rapidly increase the public burdens, and entail on this country that fatal system which has almost ruined the British Empire.

The gentleman from South Carolina (Mr. Cheves) takes it for granted that our commerce can be effectually protected by a navy; and assuming this fact, he proceeds to show that every portion of the American people are equally interested in the building a navy, because all are more or less interested in protecting commerce.

But, the fact is, that navies have never been considered as adequate to the complete protection of commerce. Look, said he, at the situation of the Old World, in times, to them, more prosperous than the present! What is the fact? Holland, with almost no navy, possessed an extensive and profitable commerce; and Spain, about the same period, with a large and powerful fleet, had no commerce.

But the situation of Europe is, in all respects, different from ours. The Governments of Europe are surrounded by rival powers, who are mostly engaged in war with each other, while we are happily far removed from them all, and have no neighbors to annoy us. Therefore, arguments drawn from the Old World are wholly inapplicable to this country, because their situation and form of Government are altogether unlike ours. And when we turn our eyes from foreign Governments to our own, we find that no people since Adam were ever more prosperous or more happy than the American people have been for the eight or ten years previous to the year 1808. Private fortunes have been accumulated with unequalled ease and rapidity; commerce has prospered beyond example; agriculture has flourished; and the revenue abundant, beyond the wants of the Government. And did this state of prosperity exist at a time when your commerce was protected by vessels of war? No; but at a time when your navy was out of use; and in proportion to the increase of your naval expenditure, in the same proportion has your commerce decreased. The protection of commerce is the only ostensible object for which navies are created, while power and conquest are the main objects. Show me, said Mr. McK., a nation possessed of a large navy, and I will show you a nation always at war. When has England been at peace with all the world, since she became a great naval power? Such instances in British history were so rare, and of such short duration, (if they existed at all,) that he could not answer the question; and he believed it would be difficult for the ingenuity of the gentleman from South Carolina (Mr. Cheves) to answer it. It is true, that England, the greatest naval power in the world, is also the most commercial; and it was not to be doubted that her commerce received aid from her navy, though it owed its extent principally to the industry and consequent wealth of the nation. But England has other and far more important objects to effect by her navy than that of protecting commerce. Her insular situation renders it necessary for her protection, and she keeps it up for the purposes of war and dominion. England would destroy her navy to-morrow, if the protection of commerce was her only object; because it cannot be denied that the expense of keeping up her navy exceeds the profits of that commerce which it is said to protect. Navies, therefore, must be considered as instruments of power, rather than as the means of protecting commerce. They are the vile offspring of those nations where the power and grandeur of the Government is every thing, and the people are nothing but slaves!

Mr. McK. having stated that a navy was an instrument of power, rather than a means of protecting commerce, in order to show that this opinion was not a mere vagary of his own imagination, but the deliberate opinion of some of the wisest men of this country, most solemnly pronounced, he would beg leave to read a document, which he hoped would have weight with some gentlemen of the committee. It is taken from the celebrated instructions of the Virginia Legislature, of 1801, to their Senators in Congress, and is said to have come from the pen of the present Chief Magistrate of the United States; and he believed he could venture to say, that no Legislature ever possessed more talents than were drawn together into the Virginia Assembly on that occasion. After having noticed other subjects, in speaking of the navy, they say:

"With respect to the Navy, it may be proper to remind you, that, whatever may be the proposed object of its establishment, or whatever may be the prospect of temporary advantages resulting therefrom, it is demonstrated by the experience of all nations who have ventured far into naval policy, that such prospect is ultimately delusive; and that a navy has ever, in practice, been known more as an instrument of power, a source of expense, and an occasion of collisions and wars with other nations, than as an instrument of defence, of economy, or of protection to commerce. Nor is there any nation, in the judgment of the General Assembly, to whose circumstances this remark is more applicable than to the United States."

These opinions may, now, however, be considered as old-fashioned; but being himself an old-fashioned man, he confessed he was more pleased with them than with the new political doctrines preached by the gentleman from South Carolina, (Mr. Cheves) to the House and the nation. It might, however, possibly be the fact, that he (Mr. McK.) was wrong, and only indulged ancient prejudices, and the gentleman from South Carolina right; and if such were the case, he could only say, in his own defence, that, under the influence of those old doctrines, the American people had enjoyed a state of prosperity and happiness unparalleled in the history of man—a state of prosperity which he feared he would never see equalled. He looked back on those days of happy prosperity with the same feelings of mournful regret with which he looked back to the days of his youth, fearing that they, like the days of his youth, would never again return—especially if the Navy mania should prevail.

Establish a navy, said Mr. McK. and this country may bid farewell to peace; because you thereby organize a class of society who are interested in creating and keeping up wars and contention. Officers in the Navy and Army are mere cyphers in society in times of peace, and are only respectable in time of war, when wealth and fame may await their exertions. They are, therefore, interested in keeping up a state of war; and being invested with the management of an instrument of war, it is to be expected that it will be used in some degree to answer their own purposes? No man who will reflect for a moment, but must be satisfied that the disgraceful and lawless conduct of the British naval officers on our coast originated in a desire on their part to bring on a war with this country, in which they looked forward to large dividends of prize money; and these acts were contrary to the wish and expectation of Great Britain; in one instance the act was disavowed; and it may be asked why were the officers not punished who acted contrary to the wishes of the Government? The answer is obvious; because the influence of the Navy in England is so predominant that the Government are afraid to touch the subject, and the consequence is, that the Government are compelled to bear the odium of acts which they disapprove; and the same cause which has produced this effect in England, if permitted to operate, will produce a similar effect in this country.

Our little Navy has already contributed much towards the irritation which exists between this country and England; and under any other President than Mr. Jefferson, it would have brought on a war in 1807. And what real benefit has resulted from it to the Government? Has a picaroon or a buccaneer ever been chastised by them? If they have, he had no recollection of the case; he had seen indeed paragraphs in the newspapers mentioning that the frigate President, or some one of the vessels, had sailed from the navy-yard to Norfolk, from thence to New York, and finally arrived safe at Boston; but for what purpose he was totally ignorant, unless, indeed, it was to sail back again, and furnish the materials for a new article for the newspapers; and for these eminent services, the American people have already paid about $30,000,000.

Tuesday, January 21.

Naval Establishment.

The House again resolved itself into a Committee of the Whole on the bill concerning the Naval Establishment.

Mr. Johnson said: I do not know, sir, why I should regret the discussion of any subject in this place, when I recollect that each member is under the same obligations of duty and responsibility. It has been said that no member would be thanked for his vote in favor of this bill—and, fearless of censure, I shall oppose this attempt to lay the foundation, and to pledge the property of the people for naval systems, as ruinous to the finances of the country, as it will be destructive to the peace of the nation. After every effort in my power, I could not suppress the sensation of sorrow, that Congress should be distracted with a subject that would justly excite alarm throughout the nation, even in the hours of profound tranquillity. I have looked to the Treasury reports, and I see a national debt of about fifty millions of dollars. I look to the aggressions of England, and I find we have been driven to the necessity of creating a great and expensive military force to avenge our wrongs and to expel the enemy from her North American colonies. I look to the arguments of the advocates of this pernicious system, and they acknowledge that we are driven to the brink of a war that will require loans and taxes, and end in a new debt of at least fifty millions of dollars—and under these circumstances, when we are upon the heels of a second revolution, when the people are likely to be most pressed for the ways and means to carry on the war with vigor and certain success, the ruinous system of a great navy is pressed upon us. Upon the return of a second peace, when the British possessions shall be incorporated into the Union, and our army disbanded—when commerce shall be restored, and a surplus of revenue in the Treasury—after meeting the demands of the Government, with more propriety might the question be presented for consideration. I believe, sir, since the political reformation in 1801, the question of building a navy had never been before presented directly to the consideration of Congress. When Mr. Jefferson, that illustrious character, presided over the destinies of the United States, why was not this navy-building proposed? Then we had a revenue of fifteen millions of dollars annually, and a surplus in the Treasury. No, sir, such a system had been put down too recently—the struggles against a navy in '98-9 were not forgotten. I deny the capacity of the United States to maintain a navy without oppression to the great mass of the community in the persons of tax-gatherers; and if a great navy could be maintained, it would be more than useless—it would be dangerous to the peace and tranquillity of this nation. I was in favor of repairing and putting into service the whole of our naval force, consisting of one hundred and sixty-two gunboats and upwards of fifteen frigates and smaller war vessels; because this naval force, united with our fortifications, would give security to our coasts and harbors, protect our coasting trade, and would be important in the present crisis to co-operate with privateers and individual enterprise against the commerce and plunder of Great Britain. But this is not the object of the bill. It contemplates and embraces a navy to protect our commerce in distant seas as well as at home, and which cannot cost less than twenty or thirty millions to accomplish; and, when built, would entail upon the Government of the United States the annual expense of fifteen millions of dollars,[25] equal to the amount of our whole revenue in the most prosperous years of commerce under the administration of Mr. Jefferson, and double the amount of our present financial income. It is the system, as well as the expense, that I object to; and while I am ready as any man to keep a small naval force, to be confined to the protection of our maritime frontiers, as well as I am to keep up a small land force, to protect our territorial frontiers, I will not vote one cent for a system of naval force which is destined to keep foreign nations in check in distant seas, and destined to entail upon this happy Government perpetual taxes and a perpetually-increasing national debt. The people will not support such a Naval Establishment—they have the corrective in their hands; and build this fleet of twenty seventy-fours and forty frigates, and the people will in their turn put them down. But, sir, we are told that we are a commercial people, and that you cannot restrain a spirit of enterprise in our citizens which is limited only by the polar snows to the North and the icy mountains to the South. No person has attempted to damp that gallant spirit, that mercantile enterprise—such adventurous voyages have been fostered and cherished by every means in the power of the Government. But, sir, has this unparalleled enterprise, this gallant spirit, been carried on by a navy? Such a thing has never been thought of, which proves that this question of a navy has no connection with this commercial enterprise; and the existence of one without the other, is positive proof of the fact. But it is also said, that agriculture and commerce are twin sisters, and the learned gentleman from New York (Mr. Mitchill) will not allow a more distant connection. I have no objection to such a union, and I did expect that it would have been demonstrated what was the real relationship between these twin sisters and a permanent navy; whether it is that of cousin-german, brother or husband. As these subjects have not been identified, I must be permitted to say that there is no connection—unless under the disguise of protection, the navy would be the destroyer both of commerce and agriculture—by taxes upon the one and constant war upon the theatre of the other. The advocates of a navy need not expect to cover the deformity and danger of the system by telling the people they are friends to the protection of commerce—and that those who oppose it are ready to relinquish our rights upon the ocean. No, sir, this will not do. They will ask if our commerce, as great as it has been, was ever protected by a navy. They will look at the expenditure of the public money—they will see twenty-nine millions of dollars expended upon our present Naval Establishment; and though they may not complain of that prodigal waste of public money upon so small a naval force, they will look to the effects produced by this power, and they will refuse to augment it, until, indeed, the Peace Establishment shall require augmentation. The people will look to the votes of this House, and they will see the opposers of a navy willing at this moment to avenge the depredation upon our commerce and neutral rights by actual hostility. I am not prepared to give up our rights, whether upon the ocean or upon land, whether commercial or personal; but I may differ in the means of avenging these wrongs, and vindicating those rights, and I shall ever differ from those who wish a navy to ride triumphant in distant seas, and, under a pretext of protection to commerce, doom the nation to galling burdens too intolerable to be borne. But we are told, sir, that this question partakes of the character of a self-evident proposition. Indeed, sir, and in what respect is it entitled to this definition of self-evident? Unless, indeed, from every consideration of history, experience and reason, it is evident that a navy is an engine of power and ambition, calculated to embroil a nation in quarrels and wars, and to fix permanent wretchedness upon the industrious class of the people. When we look to the delegation from each State, we find a difference in sentiment upon this subject, whether lying on the seaboard or distant from it.

The chairman of the Naval Committee has attempted to make us believe that a navy is the anchor of our hopes, and I dare venture to say, his eloquent colleague (Mr. Williams) will in due time denounce it as the most abominable system—always employed in the fell purposes of outrage, plunder, war, and death. The same division of sentiment exists in Massachusetts as to this destructive and expensive establishment. And, sir, let me not omit to mention, the sentiments of the Republicans of '98-9 were not only entitled to the love and confidence of the people, but worthy of our imitation. Nor will I omit the resolutions of the Virginia Legislature in opposition to a navy, when they remonstrated against measures which they considered ruinous to the freedom of the United States—nor is my respect for those opinions lessened, although many Republicans in Congress at this time, and men of talents, have become great advocates for a navy, and I will put it to the people whose opinions are entitled to their approbation, whether a navy beyond the peace establishment is ruinous, or the rock of our safety.

Leaving the division of sentiment in our country, let us advert to ancient and modern history, and search for examples upon this important subject. And here, sir, I will take this position, and defy history for an example, that no great naval power ever confined their naval strength to the legitimate object of protecting commerce in distant seas. I will refer to Tyre and Sidon, Crete and Rhodes, to Athens and to Carthage. No sooner had these nations ceased to confine their naval strength to their maritime defence at home, to the protection of their seacoast, than they were engaged in plunder, piracy, depredations upon other nations, or involved in wars, which certainly accelerated, if it did not produce, the downfall and destruction of those governments. Peace and tranquillity is not the natural state of a great naval power. A disregard of public law, sacred treaties, and bloodshed, would suit it better; and it has been and ever will be, the consequences of such force. These nations furnish another example and instructive lesson to the present generation—that while their commerce and navy furnished a small part of the people with the luxuries of every country at that time known, the great mass of citizens at home were miserable and oppressed. Their rights neglected, their burdens increased, and their happiness destroyed, while their fleets and external grandeur carried astonishment and terror to distant nations. When a nation puts forth her strength upon the ocean, the interior of the country will be neglected and oppressed with contributions. Ancient history does not furnish a solitary instance of any permanent good, or long continuance of peace arising from a great naval supremacy; such overgrown power, such unnatural strength, must feed upon plunder, at home and abroad. When we come to modern nations we have proof before us of the positions I have taken. We have been told of Holland, as a people existing in a most flourishing state of prosperous commerce without a navy to protect it, and we have been told of Spain as a naval power without commerce to protect. But leaving these examples, let us look at France and Great Britain; we here have examples before our eyes; we need no history; the facts are before us.

Admit that Great Britain, with her thousand vessels, could protect her lawful commerce, let me ask, if her navy has ever been confined to that object; whether it is confined to that object at this time; whether her navy has not fattened upon the spoils of Europe, Asia, Africa, and America, and the commerce of neutral nations, making war equally upon friends and enemies. Her navy, triumphant in every sea, is employed in a system of plunder against the world, and, notwithstanding this supremacy, we see her citizens groaning under a national debt of eight hundred millions of pounds sterling, more than all the nations of the universe could pay. We see her upon the precipice of bankruptcy—we see her people, her numerous subjects, loaded with taxes, that would astonish any man who did not know the fact—notwithstanding this, the public debt is daily increasing, and it is now acknowledged by all the world that she is fighting for her existence—victorious at sea and safe at home from invasion, and still her very existence is at stake. Sir, I never wish to see the liberties of my country afloat upon the ocean and staked upon the strength of a navy. Look at France, separated from her enemy by a narrow channel, without vessels to meet the fleets of England on the water, and still she is unable to burn the seaport towns of France or invade the French territories, or in any way to make an impression upon her. Populous and powerful upon land, nothing but the imperial despotism that exists throughout that vast empire, prevents the country from being the most enviable residence upon the globe, except our own favored land. Let not the Congress of the United States therefore stake their existence upon navies, let us not withdraw the protecting hand of Government from the soil; let us not increase the burdens of the people, and weigh them down with a public debt to support external grandeur. Do not by this system destroy the affections and attachments of the solid and honest part of the community, who support the government of the country.

Sir, the report of the Naval Committee has assumed principles as erroneous as they are novel—that the protection of maritime commerce was, above all other objects, the first and the greatest consideration which laid the foundation for the present constitution. There is nothing to warrant such a position; and no reason does exist why our commercial rights should have been better secured than the other various rights and interests embraced by that charter of our independence. In the specific grants of powers, Congress has the authority to regulate commerce with foreign nations, with the several States, and with the Indian tribes; not giving preference in language to foreign over State and domestic commerce. I will admit, sir, that our commercial rights formed one of the primary considerations—not more primary than the rights of agriculture and manufactures, nor the rights of property, the rights of persons, protection from foreign invasion and aggression, or from internal foes. These rights were equally important, and not less the considerations which strengthened the bonds of the Union. And if any consideration had a preference, it arose from considerations of peace and war.