ELEVENTH CONGRESS.—SECOND SESSION. PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES. (continued 4)

I wish to be indulged in a little further comparative political economy. I believe, sir, that the same good results in politics from comparing the merits of different Administrations, that results in medicine and surgery from the dissection of the human body—that they are fairly to be tried by the same rules. I find, then, that in the year 1800 the estimated pay of the officers is $391,000, and that the estimated pay of the seamen in the same year is $818,000. And yet, sir, by the estimate now before me, and which any gentleman can turn to, made for the year 1800, the subsistence of the officers, their pay, and that of the seamen, amounts only to $296,000—a sum less, by nearly $100,000, than the estimated pay alone of the officers in 1800—while the expense of the whole Establishment approach for the last year within $1,000,000 of the expense of the year first mentioned. I am at a loss to account for these manifest inconsistencies, and I might say solecisms, in our political arithmetic. We have a Navy which we are told employs 2,700 men, which costs within a third as much as a Navy employing nearly 8,000 men, and yet, when we come to compare the great objects of expense—to wit: pay and subsistence of the officers and seamen, the reward of valor and merit—we find a contrast which I believe no man in this House is prepared to explain.

Now, sir—for the whole subject, thank God, is now before us—let us look at the expenses of the Marine corps. I have always understood that marines were necessary in proportion to the extent of the Navy—that such a force is put on board of every ship of such a number of guns. I find that in the year 1800, when we had nearly forty ships of war in commission, manned with nearly 8,000 men, the expenses of the Marine corps amounted to $162,000; and in 1809, when we have ten or fifteen vessels of all sorts, manned with 2,300 seamen, the expense of the Marine corps amounts to $211,000. And yet, sir, if we look at the items, there does not seem to be a very great variation between some of the most important—for instance, I find that the clothing in 1800 was estimated at $33,000, in 1809 at but $32,000—and yet, the troops whose clothing costs $1,000 less, cost in the aggregate $50,000 more. But, if we look at some of the items of this account, we shall be struck at once with the difference. The pay and subsistence for instance in 1800 was $102,000, in 1809 it was $160,000. I have been at the pains even to note the prices of the most material articles of provision, and find that in the old estimate beef is rated at $13, pork at $14, and flour at $10 per barrel; while in the last year the same articles stood in the estimate of $14, $18, and $8. The material article (flour) being much lower than in 1800, and the market value of the others also, I believe the inference would necessarily follow, that the subsistence ought to have been cheaper. But, sir, look at their establishment at the navy-yard, and I believe we shall want no ghost—certainly no argument of mine—to show the cause of this difference of expense.

Then comes the navy-yards. Of these, that of Washington alone has cost nearly one-half of the sum expended on them all. Well might my colleague say it was worth as much as the whole, when it had cost as much; when, indeed, we have witnessed a considerable town—and the most flourishing town, too, in this wide region called the City of Washington—built out of the public treasury.

Yes, sir, we have economized until we absolutely have reduced the annual cost of a seaman from $472—as it was under the very wasteful expenditure of Mr. Adams's administration—down to the moderate sum of $887! We have economized until a paltry fleet, consisting of vessels built to our hand—to say nothing of those that have been sold, and the warlike stores of which have been retained and preserved; which fleet was built, equipped, and every cannon and implement of war purchased under the old Administration—has cost us $12,000,000, when it cost the preceding Administration but $9,000,000! Is this no argument for reduction? The gentleman from Connecticut (Mr. Dana) tells you he does not wish an annihilation, but a reform of the Naval Establishment. Sir, as long as a single chip remains in that navy-yard, you will never see any thing like reform; as long as you have a chip of public property—one chip of live oak belonging to the United States—you will have a man riding in his carriage, with a long retinue and deputies and clerks to take care of it. And, sir, if the gentleman from Connecticut does not mean utterly to disgust the people of the United States against a navy—if in truth he is a friend to a navy—he ought to join and put down this navy-yard, and not, with my friend from North Carolina, (Mr. Macon,) keep it up, in hopes the enormity of the evil will at some time or other correct itself. Among the many reasons offered to this House for retaining the various parts of this Establishment, no one said a word in favor of the Marine corps—that went sub silentio—but a great deal was said in favor of Washington. We were told that our fleet might be Copenhagened, and that it was therefore necessary to stow it away here. We also heard of the great press of work in the large towns—of the mercantile employ which there came in competition with that of the United States. I believe, sir, that our workmen, and men of all descriptions, from the highest to the lowest—I speak of subordinates—have long ago found the truth of the old proverb, that "The King's chaff is better than other men's corn." But it seems, that in order to get a commodity cheap, we are not to go where it is to be had—oh no, there is competition!—but we must bring workmen here in the mail-coach, by which conveyance I understand not only live stock for the navy-yard but copper bolts, and such light articles, are sometimes brought, I suppose, to get out of the way of competition—competition in the markets of Philadelphia and Baltimore, where they are bought at private sale. In this way have seamen, in some instances, been conveyed; and unquestionably every material of ship timber and naval store has been repeatedly brought from Norfolk to this place at an immense cost, worked up here by men collected from Baltimore, Philadelphia, &c., in order that, so worked up, it might go back to Norfolk, there to remain. But, sir, if our object really be to prevent our fleet from being Copenhagened, we had better put it above the Falls of Niagara. There it would unquestionably be most secure, unless the party on the other side of the lake should fit out a fleet to attack it; in which case, I suppose, we must resort to another series of measures similar to those lately adopted for the protection of commerce and the Navy. An embargo to protect ships of war! This is, indeed, putting the cart before the horse. We are to have a navy for the protection of commerce, and all our measures in relation to it are calculated on the basis of keeping it (poor thing! like some sickly child) out of harm's way! On the same principle of economy on which the navy-yard is kept up here, viz: for fear that merchants and others should come into competition with the Government, I presume, we have sent abroad for workmen to carry on the public buildings. If the navy-yard is to be kept up here merely that it may be under our eye, I would humbly suggest, sir, that we first pluck out the beam that has so long blinded us. We need only to do that to see this building falling to pieces over our heads; and yet an enormous appropriation is called for towards finishing it, which I have no doubt my worthy colleague (Mr. Lewis) will press very strongly before the close of the session.

I had forgotten the gunboats; and perhaps the best notice which can be taken of them, is that which is taken on some occasions of other things—to pass by them with contempt. They are not worth bringing into account, except for their expense. Children must have toys and baubles, and we must indulge ourselves in an expense of many millions on this ridiculous plaything!

But, sir, the sale of our superfluous vessels met with the high objection that they were to be purchased up by Christophe and Petion, and that the constituents of my colleague (Mr. Bassett) are to be terrified, if not into bodily fear, at least out of their peace of mind, by these vessels; and, at the same time, we are told that Christophe was in such good credit, only forty miles off, that vessels are building at Baltimore for his use; and yet, sir, no gentleman has brought forward a bill making it penal to supply these barbarians with ships of war and warlike stores. In other words, sir, to avoid the possibility of Christophe and his seamen foundering on board these rotten hulks, my colleague would much rather drive him into Baltimore, where he can purchase good vessels, which will answer his purpose much better than these frigates, which the barbarians would not know how to manage, and which are not calculated, from their great draught, for predatory warfare in the West India seas. My worthy colleague has given us a curious illustration of the superiority of naval over military force, by comparing the navy of Great Britain with her army. I suppose, if the argument were retorted on my colleague by a comparison of the army of Bonaparte with his navy, he would say that the same amount was not there expended upon the navy as upon the army; whereas in England, the amount of money expended on each is equal. But, does not my colleague know that one and the chief cause of the superiority of the British navy over the army, is, that in the navy men rise by merit—that they do not get in, to use a seaman's phrase, at the cabin windows—and that the army, if we give credit to the Parliamentary investigation, is a mere sink of corruption—a mere engine of patronage—a place in which a corrupt commander-in-chief acts according to his vile pleasure, and the pleasure of all the pimps and parasites and harlots who environ him. This, sir, is the cause of the superiority of the naval over the military force of Great Britain. But, when the British navy shall have effected what the armies of other nations from time immemorial have done—when it shall have subjugated whole continents—then will I agree in the superior power of naval over military force. I have no hesitation in saying that I would rather vote for naval than military force, and it is because a naval force has not the same power as a military one. I have never heard of a despotic power created by a naval force, unless perhaps in the chieftain of a band of pirates.

But it would appear that the politics of my unfortunate friend from North Carolina, (Mr. Stanford,) who sits near the Speaker, are a mere counting-house business of pounds, shillings, and pence, or dollars and cents; that, in fact, the spirit of lucre is transferred from the warehouses and counting-rooms of the merchants to the tobacco-fields and cotton plantations of the Southern planters; and that, to such a pitch has the patriotism of the mercantile class risen, that they are really ready to sacrifice one-half of their property for the protection of the Government of their country. If the gentleman from New York (Mr. Mumford) will permit me, I will protest against this idea. I have once before protested in company with that gentleman, and I hope he will permit me to protest, even when I have not the sanction of his respectable authority. With regard to the politics of my worthy friend from North Carolina, I recollect very well, in the days which were called the days of profusion, patronage and terror, his politics were not of that minute and microscopic grade that no scale could be graduated sufficiently low to measure them; that, if his republicanism was a matter of pounds, shillings, and pence, then and now, it was not that sort of republicanism which was too cheap to be measured by the value of the smallest known coin, even by a doit. I really feel something like sympathy with the gentleman from North Carolina—and it is not at all to be wondered at; for the republicanism of that gentleman used to be that which I always have professed—and if the remark applied to the gentleman from North Carolina, who I believe is not yet quite out of the pale of the political church, how much more forcibly did it apply to an unpardonable political sinner like myself! With respect, sir, to this patriotism, or this republicanism, that has left the tobacco fields and cotton plantations, and taken up its dwelling in the counting-house, I beg leave to express my doubt of the fact. I never have had that high opinion of the mercantile class expressed by some gentlemen in this House. I think of them as of other men—that in proportion to the temptations to which they are exposed, so are they virtuous or otherwise. But, sir, I have not and cannot have confidence in a man to whom the great Emperor has given a paternal squeeze, whose property is sequestered at Bayonne or St. Sebastian—I disclaim any thing like personal allusion; I speak of a class—I cannot have the confidence, on the subject of our foreign relations, in a man so situated, that I can have in the planter or farmer whose property is growing on his land around the house in which he nightly sleeps—and why? Because, mutatis mutandis, I should not have the same confidence in myself. I should not believe it possible, if I had rich cargoes under sequestration in France, that I could vote free from the bias which the jeopardy of that property would throw on my mind.

Sir, I have been very irregular, because I have been compelled to follow, not the current of my own ideas, but the objections started by gentlemen in different quarters, and (as it is the fashion to express it) on different sides of the House, whom I have found united against the bill as reported by myself. I would ask, in a few words, if we ought to continue this establishment in its present state? I ask if it is necessary? For the expense of a navy has been proved to be in inverse ratio to its utility. To what purpose do we keep up the Marines, another branch of the Establishment? If I am correctly informed, these men are willing to run away whenever they have a chance to desert—if they can get an opportunity—and I am willing that they shall quit the service without being exposed to be brought to a court martial for desertion. Nothing, indeed, was said on the subject of the Marine corps, when the gentleman from Maryland (Mr. Key) moved to strike out the whole section of the bill. Fertile as the gentleman may be in reasons, he did not offer one. He must have supposed it to be perfectly correct that a Marine establishment should be kept up for a navy employing 2,700 seamen, more expensive than the same establishment for a navy employing 8,000. It was, indeed, facetiously urged in the select committee, as a reason why these men should be retained, that they came to this House regularly on Sundays to serve the Lord—to assist at the weekly pageant here performed. Sir, far be it from me to say, or even to think, with the Protector Cromwell, that this is a House where the Lord has not been served for many years. But, permit me to state, that in our country, it is the practice to pay no man out of the public purse, even for advocating the cause of other people with the Most High, much less for advocating his own. In other words, that when men with us serve the Lord, they do it at their own expense.

We have heard to-day, sir—and I hope the report of Congress at their next session will verify it—that a grant of power to the Executive in relation to any subject—say borrowing of money—does not necessarily imply an exercise of that power. We have heard, too, that notwithstanding the power devolved on the President of the United States, by the bill authorizing him to borrow to an amount of upwards of five millions of dollars, which this day passed this House, to enable the Government to get along, we shall at our next session probably be presented with the joyful tidings that it is not necessary to make use of the power, at least in its full extent; but it depends upon our own act, whether this expectation be realized or not. We are, in this instance at least, of that description of prophets who have it in their power to bring about the event they predict. And I do earnestly hope that the House will not, by a disagreement with the report of the select committee, insure the defeat of their hope—the nonfulfilment of the prediction. I hope we shall take up the subject, and go through with it; that we shall account, and account rationally too, for some of the facts at least which I have presented to the House this day, in terms extremely defective, I know; but the time was short—now or never—and I presented them in the only mode in which I could possibly do it.

In the course of my observations, I think I forgot to mention that when the United States kept forty sail of armed vessels afloat, and employed 8,000 seamen, we had no navy-yards at all. If we had, there must have been some extraordinary oversight committed by the then Secretary of the Treasury; and I believe politicians were not any more apt then than now to omit any items of public expense; they crowded in all they could. In the estimate which I hold in my hand, there is no item of that expense. I hope, if the House agree (which God forbid!) to so much of the report of the Committee of the Whole as retains the frigates and ships of war, that they will at least consent to put down the navy-yard at this place, and break down the supernumerary Marines. Really, sir, I am fond of music, but I do not mean to grant $211,000 of the people's money annually for a song. I hope at least that the Marines will be reduced, and that we shall retain at least not more navy-yards than ships. What would an honest Dutchman in the West think of a man who kept as many stables as horses, and those of the most expensive construction, too?

I have done, sir. I have endeavored to discharge my duty. No man is more sensible of a failure in the manner than I am; but I will thank any one to convince me of the utility of a navy, according to the doctrines and practice of the new school, and to facts, as far as they have been stated.

Mr. Bassett said that his colleague could not always adhere to the principle that it was his duty to ferret out every error. Error is the lot of human nature, said Mr. B., and no one is infallible. Give a small authority to-day, and it will increase to an unexpected amount before to-morrow. I am authorized to state that such has been the case in the Navy Department; that under the late Secretary of the Navy large expenses had been incurred; and that before he left his office he commenced a reduction of them. Since the present Secretary (Mr. Hamilton) has been in office, the expenditures have been much reduced. In the navy-yard at this place, for example, a permanent reduction has been made in the expenses to the amount perhaps of 30 or 40 per cent., and a very considerable reduction also as to immediate disbursements. It is nevertheless our duty, after the suggestions that have been made, to commence a thorough investigation, and I can only regret that the subject has been introduced to our attention at so late a period of the session. Instead of regretting what has been said, I am glad of it, and hope that at an early period in the next session an investigation will be made. Without any particular direction of the House, the committee of the Naval Establishment thought it their duty to examine the whole establishment at the navy-yard in this city. All the good expected from doing so was to convince them that the eye of the Government was upon them. I am proud to say that not only myself, but every gentleman of the committee with me, was much pleased with the appearance of things as they stood. It was not in our power to investigate minutiæ. On visiting the establishment of the Marine corps we saw every thing in order; we saw the armory establishment, wherein we discovered that arms which had been injured were usefully and handsomely repaired. As well as we could discover by the eye, every thing was pleasing to my mind—and one innovation in discipline in the Marine corps gave me very great satisfaction, viz: the substitution of solitary confinement for personal chastisement. In the navy-yard, the expense of which has been much complained of, we saw great piles of useful buildings. These were not constructed without cost. The present establishment there, in addition to store-houses, &c., consists of an extensive forgery, where all the iron work for the navy is done, a lead foundry, a brass foundry, where articles are made out of worn-out old metals, which otherwise would be of no use. I was desirous, both for my own information as well as that of the House, to procure an account of the work done at the navy-yard, to compare it with the expense—for that is the only way of fairly estimating the value of the establishment; but the time allotted to us during this session is not sufficient to attain that object.

Some facts I will also mention, which, though not from an official source, are known to me as matter of fact, viz: that the vessels now in service have been lately repaired in so complete a manner that they are worth more than when they were built. The President, the United States, the Chesapeake, Essex, John Adams, and others, were repaired at the navy-yard at this place, besides the Congress, now repairing. There have been several small vessels also built here. In short, I believe that since the establishment of the navy-yard here, there has been but one vessel repaired any where but at this yard. The Constitution was repaired at Boston. When we come to get the account of the expenses of that ship's repairs and compare them with the expenses of repair at the navy-yard in this city, we shall know how to appreciate that object. A full examination of it would, I feel convinced, entirely reconcile us to the great amount apparently expended here. A remark made by the gentleman from Connecticut (Mr. Dana) here applies with great force: that it was indispensably necessary to economy that there should be system and order; and how shall we accomplish that object but by regularly established navy-yards? Can you have economy when you go into market to bid for what you want? Can you expect system and order unless you pay for it? You cannot. Money is well laid out if it be done with honesty and integrity to pay for system and regularity.

I did not yet mention one particular fact on the subject of naval equipments, which I should have done, in the article of sail cloth, making an immense difference in the expenditure of 1799 and 1809. The gentlemen acquainted with the prices at these times could inform the committee that the difference in the prices of sail duck is somewhere about 100 per cent.

I will mention another fact: that although the President has power to employ 5,000 seamen, he has employed but 2,700 men, who have received bounties. Sound economy would authorize the retaining them a few months longer, till we come here again in the fall, till we know whether it be proper to disband them or not.

Although friendly to a naval force, I am not for keeping up any great naval force when there is no appearance of danger. At the present evil time, when every thing is uncertain, I am not for giving up one single atom of defence. If gentlemen will but cast their eyes along our seacoast, and look at our unprotected waters, at the situation of my particular district, they would like me feel the necessity of some floating security; they would feel the value of that peace of mind necessary to me and to my constituents. With these observations I shall dismiss the subject.

Some further remarks were made by Mr. Macon and Mr. Randolph.

The question was stated on concurrence with the Committee of the Whole in striking out so much of the bill as directs the unconditional sale of all the frigates but three.

Mr. Randolph called for the yeas and nays on this question, considering it the pith and marrow of the business; and as the vote would show who were the navy and who the anti-navy men in the House.

Mr. Smilie said it would be remembered that his object in voting to strike out this part of the bill was to introduce the amendment he had offered in Committee of the Whole, viz: to place the Navy on the same footing as in 1806.

The following were the votes on concurrence with the Committee in striking out so much of the bill as relates to the frigates—yeas 76, nays 32.

So that part of the bill was struck out.

The first section, which requires the dismissal of all the seamen in service, except so many as sufficient to man three frigates, &c., was struck out—ayes 60.

The next amendment made by the committee was to insert "Washington" among the navy-yards to be retained.

The yeas and nays on concurrence with the committee—58 to 46.

So the navy-yard at Washington is among those to be retained.

The next amendment was to strike out the section of the bill which reduces the Marine Corps to two companies.

Mr. Randolph said on recurring to the documents he found the price of the ratio in 1800 to have been 28 cents, whilst in the last year it was put 20; so that rations were now nearly a third cheaper than they were nine years ago, and the difference in the expenses of the Naval Establishment was, therefore, the more unaccountable. I had also taken it for granted, said Mr. R., that my colleague (Mr. Bassett) was right in his statement of the seamen's wages being only eight dollars per month. But, sir, here is a statement on the subject—and I only wish that in the estimate of last year we had had the same valuable details as there are in the estimate of the year 1800—for the estimate in relation to the Navy Department for the last year is most shamefully deficient, as I could demonstrate if the House had time and patience and I had lungs. I find that there is in this estimate of 1800 a minute and detailed statement of every item of expense. Instead of the wages being eight dollars then and twelve now, as my colleague has been told, the pay was then for able-bodied seamen seventeen dollars per month, ordinary seamen twelve, and boys eight; so that this saving in the pay does not account for the monstrous difference. I have not time to examine into the article of duck, but I believe the gentleman's duck will not swim any more than the rest of his arguments.

I trust, sir, that the House will not agree to the report of the committee for this reason: Referring to these documents, I discover that in 1800, when we had nearly 8,000 seamen, we had 890 marines; and in the year 1809, when we have only 2,700 seamen employed, we have agreeably to estimate precisely the same number of 890 marines. It would appear that something has taken place to render this species of force peculiarly valuable, or that these gentlemen possess a very successful art of keeping in, of not going out with others. And, sir, when I recollect the statements which I have heard on this floor and the sources whence some of them have probably been derived, I am not at all surprised that this navy-yard and this Prætorian camp, and everything connected with it, should keep up to the old height when every thing else has diminished. Eight hundred and ninety men! Call them 900, and you have one mariner for every three seamen. I have no doubt, if the House act on the principle on which they have done heretofore, that we shall have very polite assurances that these men are of the greatest imaginable service and have wrought wonders in defence of the country, but I cannot for my soul understand how this species of force goes to quiet the mind of my colleague or of his constituents on the Chesapeake.

I have done my duty on this subject, sir. From whatever motive, of that motive I am alone the human judge. I have acted the part of a real friend to the Administration of this Government. Like my friend from North Carolina, I belong to that "faction" which brought him from a minority to a majority on the very ground I now occupy. I have heard before of a people being their own worst enemies—but what shall we say to an assertion that persons selected from the people for their wisdom and discretion, should be their own worst enemies? Is it to the interest of the Administration that these abuses should continue, and that loans and taxes should be resorted to to cover them? Who, sir, are the true friends—I do not speak of motives—who in fact are the true friends of Administration? Those who move to abolish and retrench, or those who persevere in keeping up such establishments and resort to loans and taxes to defray the expense of them? Are you willing that any part of the loan authorized by the act which unhappily passed this House this morning should be borrowed for the purpose of keeping up as many marines as were deemed necessary in 1800, for treble the amount of naval force—and we then said it was a Government of profusion and patronage—yes, sir, we heaped a great deal of opprobrium and many hard epithets on it. I am just as tired now of maintaining idlers, and dissolute idlers too, out of the proceeds of my property as I was when I first came into Congress—and I care not whether it be under the Administration of a President called Republican, or of a man called a Federalist. I could repeat the very words then used. I do say that I never see one of those useless drones in livery crawling on the face of the earth that my gorge does not rise—that I do not feel sick. I see no reason why we should not maintain sturdy beggars in rags as well as beggars of another description in tinsel. I have as much respect as any one for the man who risks his life in his country's service—and I have shown it; but the man who has drawn on a livery and quartered himself on the public because he has not sufficient capacity to get a living elsewhere, I will not foster. The change may be rung to the end of time—gentlemen may talk about pounds, shillings, and pence, as long as they please, but these men shall never have a single cent of money with my consent. I wish every ploughman in the country could come and see these people, keeping equipages, living in splendor, in palaces almost—I hardly know five men in Virginia who could afford to live in such a house if their fathers had left it to them, much less if they had it to build, as some of these people occupy at the public cost. But because this proposition for reduction is made by a somebody, the cut of whose face or the cut of whose coat we do not like, we are to go on maintaining these locusts for spite. It is impossible to prevent the people from reading this. It may be said these are Federal lies. Ten years ago the same things were said to be Democratic lies; but they were tested by the most enlightened among the people, and found to be truth—even the story of Jonathan Robbins was then all a Democratic lie. You are to keep up the same number of marines that Mr. Adams kept up, but you maintain them at one-fourth greater expense, when not a man who hears me can pretend to designate the service they perform. I know you may be told these marines may be useful on shipboard, which, however, has not relation to the question before the House. The question is, how many marines are necessary, and in what battles are they employed? Recollect, sir, that in this estimate of the expenses of these marines, the Prætorian camp erected for their accommodation is not taken into question—nor do I believe there is a man in the House who can guess within a hundred thousand dollars what it has cost. I cannot—I do not even know the authority under which it was built. I suppose it was erected, like some other public buildings, without law, by authority unknown to the law. Yes, sir, and this is the place for Aaron Burr and such choice spirits. When they wish to turn us out of the House, where do they look but to men who are incarcerated and would run away at a bare invitation, much more would follow a military leader to plunder, to office, to cordons and legions of honor? I cannot consent to retain them. I feel indignant—I feel mortified at the conduct of that part of the House of Representatives calling itself Republican—because I believe, sir, that the hint given by my worthy friend from North Carolina, has been taken by the gentlemen of another denomination, and they have thrown their weight so equally on both sides as to poise the balance—they have worked a sort of political equation there. Yes, sir, we must have fifty per cent. increase of the present ad valorem taxes, and an additional third upon molasses and brown sugar, upon the articles on which the poorest families on the seaboard make their daily meal—and in return we shall have a man, the texture of whose coat, whether homespun or imported, you cannot tell for the gold lace with which it is covered, and an establishment of marines at an expense of more than two hundred thousand dollars—and whom to protect? To protect the constituents of my worthy colleague, in the enjoyment of their peace of mind? When you consider in what manner every claim of merit is treated in this House—when you consider the poverty and misery in which thousands and tens of thousands of the people of the United States live, from whose earnings you daily take a part, I hope you will pause and reflect before you dispose of one doit of this sum on such objects. Why, sir, should a poor man laboring out of doors not be suffered to take his breakfast or give it to his children without paying a tax to the Government, in order that the man who does not labor, and whose head is of no more use to the community than his arms, should live in idleness?

But, unfortunately for myself, I have been here too long—I have seen the profits made by individuals with no other visible resources than the cheese-parings and candle-ends of the Government; and it has got to that now that every branch of our establishments has become a department—we have almost got a door-keeping department—not only in this House but elsewhere. But all I have said is wrong, very wrong—we are all Republicans, all Federalists—all is right—this is all an idle clamor, made to effect a given purpose. Sir, I might go on and compare these two books of 1800 and 1809 and take up every item of expense, military, naval, or civil—the civil branch of the Army as well as the military, the civil as well as the naval branch of the Navy—they are all, all alike. In this book (the estimate of 1800) is such a detailed statement that the value of every ration is stated, and the amount of force in detail. What have we here, in the estimate of last year? In relation to the Navy you have some three or four pages. I really had not a conception, till I came to examine it, that there could be such a difference between the estimates of 1800 and 1809. But if I am overruled, which I think highly probable from the appearance of things, we shall have the satisfaction, in case I return here next year, and Messrs. Pepin and Breschard give their attendance, of a fine band of music to entertain the audience—and for this undoubtedly the good people, the fishermen of Marblehead, and the planters of Virginia, will be proud to pay $260,000. But this is all right—it is all Republicanism! All Federalism!

Mr. W. Alston spoke in favor of reducing them, and Messrs. Lyon, McKim, Bassett, and Dana, against it.

The question on concurring with the committee in striking out this section was decided in the affirmative—yeas 49, nays 43.

So the section for reducing the marines was stricken out.

A motion having been made by Mr. Randolph to amend the bill so as to disband the master commandants now belonging to the Navy,

Mr. McKim said he should like to know the gentleman's reason for getting rid of them. The gentleman had appealed to the House to know why they would retain them? The onus probandi, however, lays with the gentleman himself. He ought to show why they should be dismissed. Mr. McK. said he did not like to vote in the dark. His vote given without knowledge might derange the whole system. He hoped the gentleman from Virginia, (Mr. Randolph,) from his extensive knowledge on the subject, would favor them with the reasons why these men should be dismissed.

Mr. Boyd said he did not rise to make a long speech but to tell the House that he felt much imposed upon by the comparisons made between the late and Federal Administrations. If I were to do all this, said he, I might get into the newspapers and make believe that I am the first man in the nation; but I take things as I find them. The former Administration may have acted rightly in their day; but reason is to guide us. Sir, is it parliamentary, is it genteel, or agreeable to common sense, that a hundred and forty men should sit here listening to what one man says, and he having recourse to papers in every one's reach? I had rather consult the papers for myself: for I should not garble them, taking just what suited me, but should read the whole. No doubt gentlemen do what they think answers their own purpose and I what answers mine; and my purpose is the good of the nation. If a larger navy was necessary, I should vote for it; if an army of thirty thousand men was wanted, I should vote for it. Sir, have we no rights to defend? There never has been a time, in my opinion, since the Government was formed, that so preposterous a proposition was offered as this one to reduce the Army and Navy at this time—for what? Are the orders and decrees altered? I understand all Spain is in a state of blockade. For what have you given money to build fortifications? Pounds, shillings, and pence, are the order of the day—we sell a little tobacco, a little cotton—and our independence goes to wreck. But gentlemen even on their own principles go to work the wrong way. If they submit to get a little this year, they will get less the next, depend upon it. I think it my duty to speak in this open manner—not to please gentlemen, but for my country's good.

Mr. Randolph said in reply to the gentleman from Maryland, who wished to know why he wanted to get rid of the masters commandant, that it was because there never had been a reason assigned in this House for their creation. The act which established them had come from the other House at the end of a session; it had not originated in this House, and he had never heard a reason assigned in favor of them—and he had no knowledge that the public service had suffered from the want of them during the whole of Mr. Adams's Administration, and more especially not from the 4th of March, 1801, to April 1806. That gentlemen who voted against the proposition to reduce the Army and Navy, said he, should vote against my amendment is nothing more than natural; and I suppose if those averse to reduction had been put on the committee, we should have had no such bill reported. If gentlemen who voted for the general proposition that it is expedient to reduce the Army and Navy are willing to be held up as bowing the knee to foreign powers, let it be so. They were a large and certainly not disrespectable majority. I feel no sensibility on the subject. The House may act as it pleases; in whatsoever manner it may act, it will not affect my vote or conduct. I stand here, as I always have done, and always will do, on ground independent of all party considerations. If this amendment be submission to the belligerents, what is the proposition of the gentleman from Pennsylvania, (Mr. Smilie,) which is acknowledged to go further in reduction than the bill as first reported? It is in vain to oppose a reduction of the Army and Navy on the ground of submission. Gentlemen should prove that they are resistance. What resistance do they afford against their decrees or confiscation? Have they taken a single man out of a ship of war, or one man out of the dungeons of Paris or Arras? This is as plain a question of expediency as whether you will alter the time of holding the courts of the State of Maryland or any other question. Mr. R. had however some expectations that they should have some war speeches on this occasion, and they had them accordingly. They had heard some on the general proposition for reduction, and one this morning from the gentleman from Tennessee (Mr. Rhea) on the bill. Was it proposed now to declare war? Was it believed that the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Smilie) was disposed to submit to the belligerents? That the gentlemen on the other side of the House were divided on that subject, as they were upon the question of the reduction of the Navy? Was the gentleman from Massachusetts, (Mr. Quincy,) who represented the town of Boston, so strenuous an advocate at this moment for war (and he supposed especially for war with England) that he was obliged to oppose a reduction on that ground? Was the gentleman from Maryland (Mr. Key) who represented the adjacent district, in the same belligerent temper? Did he too oppose this proposition on the ground of resisting the belligerents or of making war with England? The very moment any political touchstone was brought to test the objections to the bill which the committee had offered, they dissolved at once, and the opposition to it resolved itself into the principle of old Federalism. It was nothing else. It was office! patronage! expenditure of public money! And hence it was said (and for no other cause whatever) that these strange votes were seen. The gentleman from Connecticut, perhaps the only member or one of the very few on that side of the House who had a seat on this floor during the Administration of Mr. Adams, opposed the bill because, as he had told the house, he preferred his old principles—they had triumphed over his recent disgust, though even he acknowledged that great abuses had taken place. The gentleman had declared that he would stick to his old principles; and I, said Mr. Randolph, am for sticking to mine; and my two friends from North Carolina (Messrs. Macon and Stanford) who were also members under Mr. Adams's Administration, stick to their old principles, and I will venture to say will never relinquish them. It has not effected a change in the gentleman from Connecticut, that he and his friends are out, nor a change in my friends from North Carolina—I will not say that they are in the power, for of that they have not much to boast; but that their friends are in power. And why should this clamor be raised on the question whether you will or will not make a formal renunciation of the old articles of political faith? Although, on reconsideration, perhaps I have no cause to be surprised, and ought to pardon gentlemen. It is a situation in which no man likes to be placed, to be brought up and compelled either to forego present gratification or make a formal renunciation, something like the Christian at Algiers, who hesitates whether he will put on the turban and share the plunder of the day, or consent to abide by those principles which he received from his parents and from heaven. No doubt there are many who would infinitely prefer to slip over or slide under this question; and I am therefore glad, sir, that the decision of the chairman has enabled me to present the chalice to their lips and compel them to swallow it to the dregs.

Mr. Rhea said that the gentleman from Virginia held no obnoxious cup to him; for he should vote against the gentleman with the greatest imaginable pleasure. As to all that had been said about patronage, it had no weight with him. He had no relation in office, nor did he ever expect to have one. He had no object in view but the well-being and safety of the nation. He was unwilling to give the least evidence of a determination to relinquish any kind of opposition (though it was scarcely apparent) to the wrongful doings of other nations against the United States. He had made no war speech; if he had intended that, he should have made rather a different speech from any the House had heard from him yet. If they went on in this way he said they would hold out an inducement to all the marauders in the universe to come and plunder the trade of the United States as they pleased. He repeated that he did not make war speeches; but he thought our situation required a war speech against somebody—he would not say who. We have indeed, said he, had sufficient provocation for war; and I say now, as I have said often before, that had we taken a proper stand at a former time, the United States would have avoided all their present difficulties. But so long as we go on as we have gone, and encourage a peace in war and a war in peace, so long as the Federalists teach us to acquiesce in all the iniquitous decrees of the belligerents, so long will our difficulties continue. I shall vote to continue the Navy, and I hope that this proposition, and any other to reduce the Naval Establishment, will be negatived; for on this establishment depends the protection of our maritime border, and safety of the people upon and near it. It may be said that I and my constituents are safe, but I will act for others who are not so.

Mr. Dana congratulated the House that the only point of controversy now with gentlemen who had heretofore complained so loudly of Federalism, was, that in coming up to the mark of Federalism they should not do it with so much violence as to go beyond it. He thought it would be well if our relative expenditures could be brought back to the worst year of Mr. Adams's Administration, and our measures as to foreign affairs to the first eight years of the Federal Administration, which, when it resolved, did it so sincerely and so unalterably. He congratulated the nation that it was no longer an argument against a measure that it had been adopted by those called Federalists; he rejoiced that this slang of party was scouted from the House—that it was no longer a piece of artillery successfully wielded on all sides. He hoped it would forever be dismissed, and that gentlemen, convinced of their error, would come up and place their recantation on record. If for the same sum as was expended for those objects by the Federal Administration they could obtain the same number of fighting men on land and water, he thought they would make an extremely good bargain, when compared with the state of things which now existed. Until this session he said he had been unapprised of the enormities of expenditure in the Navy Department for so little effect; that there had been so much of waste and so much done instrumental to the extension of patronage. He wished it however to be understood that he deemed it essential that those who compose the main body of the Army and Navy, those on whom the brunt of the battle falls, those who stand in the front of danger, should be well paid, well fed, and well clad, in such a manner that one need not blush to see them on parade appearing like the ragged recruits of Sir John Falstaff. When he saw the soldier placed in this unfortunate situation, and the squalid unfortunate troops pointed at as objects of pity, and when this situation was the result of a want of attention in those who had the care of them, he could scarcely give utterance to his indignation.

Mr. D. said he did not feel disposed to diminish the number of fighting men afloat at the present time; though he was not influenced at all by the resolution which the House had passed not to submit. He had sometimes thought that they had passed too many resolutions to be resolute. No, sir, said he, if, when we were insulted on the water; if, when a British squadron remained in our waters in defiance of our laws, we had made use of our navy, our officers and men would have done their duty; but it was then deemed more expedient to deal in paper than in powder and shot. I feel that we have gone far enough, and too far, in the downhill course of debasement; by much too far. I would dismiss all this parade of words. I really would cease to think to terrify the French or British nation by them. Although those nations have hated each other for years, they look up to each other with reverence, because they know that victory would be glorious. I wish, too, that we should proceed in such a manner as that our actions should not wear the appearance of gasconade, and that we should march up to the works with a steady eye. I think, sir, that the population and strength of the United States and their commercial capital being augmented, it may be proper, after a lapse of ten years, to have a Peace Establishment somewhat extended beyond the former; and I am therefore against so great a reduction as is proposed.

On motion, the House then adjourned—41 to 38—at six o'clock, after a sitting of eight hours.

Thursday, April 26.

Reduction of the Navy.

The House resumed the consideration of the unfinished business.

Mr. Smilie moved the following as a substitute for the sections stricken out:

"And further, that the President of the United States be, and he is hereby, authorized to keep in actual service as many of the frigates and other public armed vessels as in his judgment the nature of the service may require, and to cause the residue to be laid up in ordinary in convenient ports; Provided, the whole number of officers and seamen shall not exceed that fixed by the act 'in addition to the act, supplementary to the act, providing for the Naval Peace Establishment, and for other purposes,' passed the 21st day of April, 1806."

Mr. S. spoke in support of his motion, and remarked that it would produce a saving in the next year's expenditure of near a million of dollars.

Mr. Bacon, after observing that the amendment now offered would go to reduce the number of seamen in service to two hundred and ninety-five, a number smaller than that authorized by the bill as originally reported, as it would not man more than one frigate, three armed vessels, and the twenty-two gunboats at New Orleans, moved to amend the section by including also the seamen (five hundred additional) authorized by the act of the 3d day of March, 1807.

Mr. Rhea said that this proposition amounted to just the same as the original bill, as respected the number of men to be employed. He asked whether it was proper to ask this House to do (in other words to be sure) that which they had the day before refused to do. This was no time for those who voted to increase the Navy to vote to reduce it. What reason had been given for such a course? Gentlemen had said that they believed if nobody attacked us, we should attack nobody, and that, therefore, we should have no war. Gentlemen might have some internal evidence, incomprehensible to him, that we should continue in a state of peace, or might have some reasons evident to themselves; but unless these reasons were communicable, Mr. R. said he could not consent to the amendment. They had been told that there was no such thing as a disposition in this House to go to war. How had this indisposition for war got into the House? Mr. R. could not account for this dread of war. He said he had not the least disposition to give evidence of submission to foreign powers by putting down the small naval force we have; for doing so would evince our apathy and indisposition to protect our rights. If we go on in this manner, said he, we shall be the prey of every picaroon on the ocean. We shall become a prey to our black neighbors of St. Domingo. For what reason are we to subject even our coasters to plunder and abuse? To save money! Why, sir, if we do it we shall be plundered to an amount sufficient to fit out a little navy. At least let us defend ourselves against these black people of St. Domingo. We shall have nothing to prevent the barbarian cruisers from coming on our coast, and there is hostility enough in Europe against us to set those people, as well as the cruisers from St. Domingo, against us. The reduction will not comport with the safety of the nation. The House has already declared by its vote that it will not sell any of the frigates. Will it contradict itself by taking away the seamen? Now that our naval force consists of picked men and the very best officers, I am unwilling to disband them and pick up men just as they are wanted. I am utterly against any reduction now, when we have no evidence of better times; for we have no official information before us to that effect.

Mr. Bassett said he was about to have proposed an amendment, but was prevented from so doing by Mr. Bacon's. He wished to retain the first part of Mr. Smilie's amendment, and to add to it a proviso that the number of seamen should not exceed two thousand seven hundred and twenty-three, (the number now in service.) The effect of the amendment thus amended would be to give to the President an authority which he has not now, to cause the frigates to be laid up at any time he thought proper.

Mr. Tallmadge spoke of the obscurity in which the amendment was involved by a reference to so many different laws. He could not vote for it, he said, unless he could understand it.

On the suggestion of Mr. Bacon, Mr. Smilie modified his motion by making the proviso to read as follows: "Provided, That the number of seamen and boys to be retained in service shall not exceed ——." This blank Mr. Bacon proposed to fill with one thousand five hundred.

Mr. Randolph said he was afraid, after the pledge that this House had given to reduce the Naval Establishment, that that pledge was not to be redeemed; that the whole business was to end in smoke, unless some pitiful, paltry retrenchment, to the amount of a hundred thousand dollars, was made to enable them to swear by—to say here and out of doors, and to enable the public prints to say, that they had reduced the Naval Establishment. It is a matter of fact, said Mr. R., that when the Administration of Mr. Adams went out of power, they made the only reform which has ever taken place in the Naval Establishment of the United States, and that at the succeeding session no reform was made. The act of the 3d of March, 1801, authorized the President, when the situation of public affairs in his judgment should render it expedient, to cause to be sold all the vessels of the Navy except the frigates of the United States, Constitution, President, Chesapeake, Philadelphia, Constellation, Congress, New York, Boston, Essex, Adams, John Adams, and General Greene; and of that number the President was further authorized to lay up all except six. To the vessels laid up were attached one sailing master, one boatswain, one gunner, one carpenter, and one cook, one sergeant or corporal, and eight marines, and from ten to twelve seamen, according to the size of the frigate. This was the act which we found already passed when we came into power—I do not wish to be arrogant, but say we to save circumlocution. By the same act were retained in service—mark that, sir—nine captains, thirty-six lieutenants, and one hundred and fifty midshipmen, to receive only half pay when not in actual service; and the officers dismissed under that act (and a very considerable number they were) received four months' pay in addition to their other emoluments as a gratuity on quitting the public service. This is the act on which we proceeded; and under that act you will find that the expenses of the Navy amounted, in 1802, to $915,000. Well, sir, it seems we were then of opinion that even our predecessors had in one branch of reform gone far enough. It was not my opinion; but it was the opinion of a majority of this House and of the other. In 1803 the President was authorized to buy or build four vessels, to carry not exceeding sixteen guns each, for the protection of our commerce in the Mediterranean, and towards this object $96,000 were appropriated. It was not until 1803 that any increase took place in the naval establishment left us (if the expression may be pardoned) by the Federalists. We had slept long enough, I suppose, on reform, and we made this little addition. But, sir, in the unfortunate year of 1806, the memorable year of the schism, as it is called, the year of non-importation-act memory, in that year when we had a war message against Spain on the table, and a message of a different character locked up in the drawer—in that year we passed an act which has been quoted, by which we repealed the second and fourth sections of the act to provide for the Naval Peace Establishment; that is to say, we undid the reform which had been carried into execution by our predecessors—with a very ill grace, I acknowledge, and at the very last time of asking, on the 3d of March, 1801, late at night—it was a forced put, no doubt of it—we passed an act in which we repealed the second and fourth sections of that act, and added to the officers of the Navy as follows: instead of nine captains, to which number the Federal Administration had reduced them, and which number we believed for four years to be amply sufficient, we added five new captains—and yet we ought to recollect that in the interim between these two acts the frigate Philadelphia had been wholly lost, and another frigate (the General Greene) retained in the service by the act of the 3d of March, 1801, worse than totally lost, as any one may see who will go and look at her remains in the navy yard—so that the number of officers made by Congress in 1806 was in the inverse ratio to the number of ships, and, with two frigates less, we determined to have five captains more. This same act of April 21st, 1806, only doubled the number of lieutenants. The act of the 3d of March, 1801, reduced the number to thirty-six; the act of 1806 repealed that reduction and authorized the appointment of seventy-two lieutenants—it is true, sir, that the same act made no addition to the number of midshipmen, nor to the number of ordinary seamen then in service. Then again the act of the 3d of March, 1807, added to that number five hundred seamen, making the whole number of seamen 1,425. Subsequently they have been increased by the act of January 31, 1809, as the House knows, to 2,700—and an increase is authorized to the number of 5,000, with 300 additional midshipmen. I do hope that the gentleman from Pennsylvania, and the gentleman from Massachusetts, will be prepared to give this House some reason, when we have not added a single frigate to the number retained by the act of 1801, when we have even lost two of those retained by that act, when several others are almost in the last stage of decay, why we should require five captains more than the Federal Administration required for a greater number of vessels, and why we should double the number of lieutenants? In other words, why the number of officers should now be fixed agreeably to the act of April 21, 1806, rather than that of the 3d of March, 1801? Sir, the gentleman from Massachusetts has already demonstrated to the House, and I am thankful to him for it—I know with what authority any statement comes from that gentleman—that the real protection afforded to the constituents of my worthy colleague by the bill, as reported by the select committee, is greater than that afforded by the amendment of the gentleman from Pennsylvania—that is to say, that it would keep a greater number of seamen employed, with fewer officers to be sure, because we retain only as many as we want. The efficient protection afforded by the bill as it originally stood is greater at a less expense—because that branch of the naval service of which I have been compelled to present so hideous a picture to this House is left by the amendment untouched. My worthy colleague (Mr. Bassett) stated yesterday—and I confess it was quite novel to me; I felt so astonished at it as not only to be unable but absolutely to forget to reply to it—that before he left the Department, the ex-Secretary of the Navy had commenced a system of economy, which system it seems is now prosecuting with renovated vigor by the present Secretary—the mantle of Elijah has descended on the shoulders of his successor. I am sorry, sir, to differ with my worthy colleague on so many points; but I am really not sorry that circumstances have put it in my power to prove, from the most incontestable authority, that where I have the misfortune to differ from him, I am most indubitably supported by facts. Now, sir, the first year's expenditure under the late Secretary of the Navy was $915,000. Even in that year the appropriation was exceeded, and we had to pass an appropriation bill to make up the deficit; and from that time to his going out of office, the expenditure of that department has regularly increased. The second year, the expenditure was $1,246,000; the next year, $1,273,000; the next year (and this was the year the Philadelphia was taken—she was taken about December, 1803, and that year, I believe, was about the most vigorous of the war) the expenditure was $1,597,000; the next year, $1,649,000; the next year, $1,722,000; the next year, $1,884,000; the next, two millions and a half within a trifle. Now, sir, this is a specimen of such economy as does not suit my taste, nor, I believe, the taste of the people of this country. I believe it is in proof and in the recollection of every member of experience on this floor, that that Department has long ago passed into a proverb of prodigality and waste; and if my honorable colleague will give himself an opportunity to probe it, he will find such was the fact. With respect to the present Secretary of the Navy, I have the best reason to believe that, on his coming into office, he did take various steps to introduce reform into the civil branch of the department—in regulating and checking the pursers, for instance.

Sir, a few days ago a bill was before this House for appropriating a small sum of $20,000 to prevent the most precious archives not only that this country but that any other country possesses, the evidence of the titles of our political independence, the title-deeds of the great American family, the great charters of our liberty, from destruction. The gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Smilie) did on that occasion vehemently oppose this bill, and on this ground—(the bill was brought in by a gentleman from Massachusetts—Mr. Quincy) that though there was no impropriety perhaps in gentlemen on that side of the House voting for unnecessary expenditures of the public money, which in the present unexampled state of the Treasury, might tend to embarrass the Government—a strange doctrine to be sure—yet it did not become him to do it. I do hope that the worthy gentleman from Pennsylvania, who could not find it in his heart to loosen the purse-strings of the nation for the purpose of preserving the valuable archives of the country, and which, if another fire should break out in the building at the other end of the palace, between this time and the next session of Congress, might be irredeemably destroyed, for which those who were the cause of the destruction would have been answerable—if he would not vote money for this object, I hope he will not insist upon exceeding, in point of expense, as relates to the Navy, the reform which our predecessors, the Federalists, made before they went out of office, which we accepted at their hands and were contented to practise on for four years, and not compel us to go into unnecessary and wanton expenses authorized by the act of April, 1806—when, I have no hesitation in making the assertion, and am prepared to prove it, a material change was effected in the principles of those in Administration, such as I knew them, and such as they were practised upon for about the term of four years, when we began to find that patronage was a very comfortable thing, that office was desirable, that navies were not the bugbear we had thought them, and that armies were very good depositaries for our friends and relatives and dependents who had no better resource. I, therefore, move to amend the amendment of the gentleman from Pennsylvania so as to reduce the Navy to the standard of the act of 1801.

This is indeed, said he, a novel situation in which I find myself—it is unprecedented. Little did I believe that the time would ever come when it would be my lot thus to press economy upon a Republican majority—to intreat that they would come down, not to any ideal imaginary standard of perfection—not to any theoretical proposition of mine—but that in practice they would come down, on the subject of naval expenditure, to the standard established by their Federal predecessors: and that too when we have lost, as I stated before, the Philadelphia and General Greene, and when, I believe, the John Adams is in a condition that I will not attempt to describe—I understand this vessel is so cut down and metamorphosed that nobody knows what to make of her; that she retains nothing of her former character. When I make this motion, sir, I do it with an intention of moving other amendments to other sections of the bill, so as to make the service of the United States in relation to the navy-yards and marine corps comport with the reduction which will have taken place, provided I have the good fortune to succeed.

Mr. R. then moved to amend Mr. Smilie's proposition by adding the following:

"And that the President shall retain in the Navy service of the United States nine captains, thirty-six lieutenants, and one hundred and fifty midshipmen, including those employed on board of the frigates and other armed vessels to be kept in service; and that he be authorized to discharge all the other officers in the Navy service of the United States; but such of the aforesaid officers as shall be retained shall be entitled to receive no more than half their monthly pay during the time when they shall not be under orders for actual service. And provided further, That all the commissioners and warrant officers who shall be discharged as aforesaid shall be entitled to receive ---- months' pay over and above what may be due to them respectively at the time they were discharged."

Mr. Johnson expressed his hope that the House would come to some decision, without consuming more of the time of the House in debate.

Mr. Smilie said he was seriously in favor of a reduction in the Navy, and was therefore opposed to Mr. Randolph's amendment to his amendment.

After some further remarks of Messrs. Randolph and Dana in favor of a reduction, and Messrs. McKim, Boyd, and Rhea of Tennessee against it, the question was taken on Mr. Randolph's motion to amend Mr. Smilie's amendment, and negatived—yeas 36, nays 67.

Mr. Newton then said he was anxious to do his duty; but could not consent to stay here when one-third of the House at least had deserted their seats and fatigue oppressed the remainder. He therefore moved to adjourn.—Carried—yeas 60, after seven hours' sitting.

Friday, April 27.

Mortality of the Troops at Terre aux Bœuf.

Mr. Newton, from the committee appointed to inquire into the causes of the mortality which prevailed in the detachment of the army ordered for the defence of New Orleans, made a long report, accompanied with various depositions and other papers. The report concludes as follows:

"The committee, from a knowledge which they have acquired of the climate of New Orleans and of the country surrounding it, and from the facts stated in the depositions, are of opinion that the mortality in the detachment ordered to New Orleans is to be ascribed to the following causes:

"1st. The detachment consisting of new levies.

"2dly. The insalubrity of the climate, the summer and autumn of the year 1809 being unusually sickly.

"3dly. To the nature of the ground on which the detachment was encamped at Terre aux Bœuf, and the detention of it at that place during the whole of the summer, contrary as the committee conceive to the instructions contained in the letter of the Secretary of War bearing date the 30th of April, 1809.

"4thly. To the want of sound and wholesome provisions and of vegetables—the want of an hospital and of hospital stores and medicines.

"5thly. The excessive fatigues to which the troops were subjected in clearing, ditching, and draining the ground on which they were encamped.

"6thly. To the want of repose during the night, owing to the troops not being provided with bars and nets to protect them from the annoyance of mosquitoes.

"7thly. The want of cleanliness in the camp, the nature of the position rendering it almost impracticable to preserve it.

"8thly. The sick and well being confined to the same tents, which neither protected them sufficiently from the heat of the sun, nor kept them dry from dews and rains."

The report and documents were ordered to be printed.

Saturday, April 28.

Reduction of the Navy.

The House resumed the consideration of the bill for reducing the Naval Establishment of the United States.

Mr. Smilie's amendment was modified so as to fix the number of officers, &c., to be retained in service, as follows: thirteen captains, nine masters commandant, seventy-two lieutenants, ---- midshipmen and —— seamen, ordinary seamen and boys.

Mr. Mumford again moved to postpone the further consideration of the subject indefinitely—lost, yeas 40, nays 54.

Mr. Randolph moved to strike out the numbers thirteen, nine, and seventy-two, in the amendment, being desirous of reducing the officers, if any part of the establishment. Motion lost, ayes 40, noes 46.

Mr. N. R. Moore called for a division of the question on Mr. Smilie's amendment.

And the question was taken on that part of it which authorizes the President to keep in service so many of the armed vessels as he may think proper, and to lay up the rest in ordinary in convenient ports. This part of the amendment was agreed to—yeas 61, nays 38.

The second clause of Mr. Smilie's amendment being under consideration—

Mr. Smilie moved to fill the blank for the number of midshipmen with "one hundred and fifty" (about half the number at present in service)—Agreed to, ayes 51, noes 37.

The question was stated on filling the blank for the number of seamen to be retained with "two thousand seven hundred and twenty-three," as moved by Mr. Bassett, and rejected, yeas 46, nays 52; also the question was taken on filling with 2,000, and rejected, yeas 39, nays 56; also on filling with 1,400, which was carried; and the House then adjourned.

Tuesday, May 1.

General Wilkinson.

Mr. Butler, from the committee appointed to inquire into the conduct of Brigadier General, James Wilkinson, rose to make a report.

The question on reading the report was taken and carried, 58 to 32.

The report is as follows:

The committee to whom was referred the resolution of the 4th instant, directing an inquiry into the conduct of Brigadier General James Wilkinson, in relation to his having at any time, while in the service of the United States, corruptly received money from the Government of Spain, or its agents, or in relation to his having, during this time aforesaid, been an accomplice, or in any way concerned with the agents of any foreign power, or with Aaron Burr, in a project against the dominions of the King of Spain, or to dismember these United States, and to inquire generally into the conduct of the said James Wilkinson, as Brigadier General of the Army of the United States, report, that they have had under consideration the several subjects of inquiry, and have investigated them to the utmost of their power since the time of their appointment, but from the limited period in which they have acted, and from the extensive and complicated nature of the subjects, they are under the necessity of stating that they have not been able to make any thorough and conclusive investigation of the objects of their inquiry.

Such testimony, however, as they have been able to procure, they beg leave to submit as part of this report, and which may be referred to under the following heads and order:

In relation to the first objects of inquiry, to wit: the receipt of money by General Wilkinson from the Spanish Government or its agents, refer to the

[Here follows a list of papers, 19 in number.]

In relation to the second object of inquiry, to wit: the connection of General Wilkinson with the agents of Spain in a project to dismember the United States, refer to the

[Here follows a list of 11 papers.]

In relation to the third object of inquiry, to wit: General Wilkinson's connection with Aaron Burr, refer to

[Here follows a list of 14 papers.]

In relation to the fourth point of inquiry, to wit: the conduct of General Wilkinson, as Brigadier General of the army of the United States, refer to the

[Here follows a list of 6 papers.]

The committee think proper, also, to submit the following papers relating to tobacco and other commercial transactions in which General Wilkinson was concerned, from the month of —— in the year 1788, to the month of —— in the year 1790, to wit:

[Here follows a list of 10 papers.]

In making the last preceding statement the committee beg leave to remark, that from an examination of the sentence of the military court of inquiry, ordered at the request of General Wilkinson, and of which Colonel Burbeck was President, it appears that the tobacco transactions of General Wilkinson at New Orleans in 1789 and 1790 constituted a material part of that inquiry, and that a copy of an account current was laid before the said court by General Wilkinson and designated by No. ——, and several letters accompanying said account, supposed by the court to be in the handwriting of Philip Noland, the agent of General Wilkinson.

The committee conceiving that the papers collected by the said court would aid them in their investigation, made application for those papers to the Secretary of War, but were unable to obtain them, they having been taken from the office by General Wilkinson, as appears from the deposition of John Smith, chief clerk in the War Office. The committee then directed a subpœna to General Wilkinson, requiring him to send or produce all the papers which had been used or collected by the said court, in obedience to which General Wilkinson sent to the committee a packet of papers which did not contain either the account and letters referred to in the sentence of the court, or the defence of General Wilkinson, nor have the committee been able to procure them, and, consequently, have not had it in their power to compare the accounts herewith exhibited with those which were laid before the military court of inquiry. For the further elucidation, refer to Walter Jones's deposition, marked W. J.

The committee also submit the deposition of Daniel W. Coxe, authenticating the papers to which he specially refers, marked D. W. C.

Mr. Gholson observed that the reading of the documents accompanying the report would take until midnight, at least, and he hoped there would be no objection to dispense with the reading of them.

No one objecting, the reading of the documents was dispensed with, and the whole was ordered to be printed.

Adjournment.

A message from the Senate informed the House that the Senate have appointed a committee on their part, jointly with such committee as may be appointed on the part of this House, to wait on the President of the United States, and inform him of the proposed recess of Congress.

The House proceeded to consider the resolution from the Senate to appoint a joint committee to wait on the President, and acquaint him of the proposed recess of Congress; and the same was concurred in by the House; and Messrs. Crawford and Roane were appointed the committee on the part of the House.

A message from the Senate informed the House that the Senate, having completed the legislative business before them, are ready to adjourn.

Mr. Crawford, from the joint committee to wait on the President of the United States, and inform him of the proposed recess of Congress, reported that the committee had performed that service, and that the President informed them that he had no further communication to make to Congress during the present session.

Ordered, That a message be sent to the Senate to inform them that this House are now ready to adjourn; and that the clerk do go with the said message.

The clerk accordingly went with the said message; and, being returned, the Speaker adjourned the House until the first Monday in December next.

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