TENTH CONGRESS.—SECOND SESSION. PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES. (continued 4)

But, sir, its pressure is upon the whole country, and it carries misery throughout our land; and if continued, the distress occasioned by it must still be much greater than it has been, and will become intolerable in some parts of the Union, and the consequences may be dreadful to the nation. And as to its effects on France or England, for myself, I am of opinion, that the Emperor of France and King of Italy is well pleased with it, for, as it is observed by Mr. Canning, "it certainly comes in aid" of his grand design of destroying the commerce of the English, and trying to give that nation the consumption of the purse; and, until he is satisfied with that speculation, he will wish us to keep on the embargo. And since Spain and Portugal have refused any longer to be under the control of Bonaparte, and have bid him and all his hosts defiance, and have connected themselves with the English, I believe the English care nothing about the embargo, but would give us their free leave to keep it on forever; for, sir, it gives the greatest activity to their colonies of Canada and Nova Scotia, and must be the means of increasing their settlements with astonishing rapidity. Experience has already proved to them, that their colonies in the West Indies can be maintained without us, and Spain and Portugal and their colonies having become open to them, to vend their manufactures, and with what can be smuggled into the continent and into our country, in spite of all the laws that can be made against it, will furnish them market enough; and our navigation being all laid up, and out of the way, their ships will obtain great freights from Spain and Portugal to the colonies, and from the colonies back to the mother country; and in consequence of our retiring into a state of dignified retirement, as it has been called, they will have nearly the whole trade of the world in their own hands. And it appears to me, sir, in every point of view that I can place the subject, if we continue the embargo, it will operate to distress ourselves a hundred times more than it will anybody else. I will now, as I have heard the call so frequently made, that, if you do not like this system, point out a better, and if it appears so, we will adopt it—I will, therefore, point out what appears to me a better line of conduct for the United States to pursue, and if I am so unfortunate as not to find a man in this House of my opinion, I cannot help it, for I feel myself constrained, from a sense of duty to my suffering constituents, to inform this House and the nation, that I wash my hands of it, and protest against it. I therefore, sir, with great deference to superior abilities, propose that the law imposing an embargo on all ships and vessels of the United States, and all the laws supplementary thereto, be immediately repealed, and that we authorize our merchants to arm their vessels, under proper regulations, in defence of our legitimate and lawful commerce; that the Government from time to time afford the commerce of the country such protection as may be found necessary and prudent. If this was done, I have no doubt but that the citizens of the United States would soon be relieved from their present embarrassments and distress. This, sir, would produce a circulation in the body politic, our planters and farmers would immediately find a sale for their surplus produce, our merchants would find employ for their vessels, and all that numerous class of citizens who have heretofore been engaged in the active and busy scenes of commerce, would again find employ in our seaports. In lieu of beholding dismantled ships covered with boards and mats, we should see in them spars and rigging aloft, and the ports whitened with their sails, and again hear the cheering sound of industry. But it has been said that if the embargo was removed and our merchants should send their vessels to sea, most of the property would be taken by one or other of the great belligerent powers, and thus be lost to our country; and that we have so little trade left that it is not worth our notice. But let us examine this, and see if it be so. Could we not, sir, in the present state of the world, trade to England, Scotland, and Ireland, to Sweden, Spain, and Portugal, to some of the islands in the Mediterranean, and some of the Turkish ports on that sea; to nearly all the ports in the East and West Indies, to both sides of the continent of South America, and some other places, and have the obstruction occasioned by the embargo laws removed from our own coast? Is all this trade of no importance to trading people? Gentlemen have gone into statements to show, from our former trade, how much of our domestic produce could be exported to the different parts of the world, under the present embarrassments, occasioned by the great belligerent powers; but for myself I put no confidence in such statements. I consider trade may in some measure be compared to water; if the channel it has been used to run in becomes obstructed, it will find new channels to vent itself in. For instance, sir, suppose we should adopt the resolution offered by the gentleman from New York (Mr. Mumford). He mentioned that we could trade to the little Swedish island of St. Bartholomews, in the West Indies. Now suppose we should look over our former exports to this island in any one year, what should we find the amount to be? I do not know, sir, perhaps one hundred thousand dollars, but double, triple it if you please, and what comparison would it bear with the amount that would be shipped there under his system? Would it not immediately become a distributing point for the whole of the West India Islands, and the amount increased to an astonishing degree, when compared with what used to be exported there? And so it would be in other parts of the world. The articles will go where they are wanted, in a greater or less degree; and if they cannot be carried directly, they will find their way in an indirect manner. And as to the danger of the property being captured and confiscated, I think our merchants and underwriters are the most competent to judge of that. They do not wish the Government to become guardians for them in this respect. All they wish for Government to do is to let them manage their own affairs in their own way; and the Government to afford the commerce of the country as much protection as shall be for the real interest of the whole nation. Have we not seen, in the summer past, with what eagerness the merchants in the United States availed themselves of the special permission granted to fit their vessels in ballast, and go abroad to collect debts? And was not every old and obsolete claim hunted up that existed in the country, to make out the amount necessary to avail themselves of this permission? Is not this proof that the merchants did not consider the risk very great? And were not several hundred sail of vessels fitted out under this permission; and have they not nearly all returned back to the United States in safety? Many of these vessels were insured to the West Indies, out and home, at premiums of about eight and nine per cent., and this in the midst of the hurricane season. This proves that the underwriters did not estimate the political risk at more than two or three per cent., for the natural perils in time of profound peace would be considered equal to six per cent. And the calculation of the underwriters has proved correct, for they have made money by the business. And was our embargo removed, I am of opinion that the premiums of insurance would not be more than six or seven per cent. to any port in Great Britain, and about the same to Spain and Portugal. This, if correct, proves that the political risk is not considered to be very great by those who are the best judges of it. But, sir, it appears to me there are many gentlemen in this House who think it will not do to trade, until all political risk is removed out of the way. If we wait for this, we shall never trade any more, for the natural perils of traversing the ocean always exist, and always remain nearly the same, allowing for the variation of the seasons. And the political perils always exist, but they vary according to the state of political affairs among the nations of the world. But, sir, I have repeatedly heard it said, and the same thing is expressed in the report of the committee, that our situation is such, that we have no other alternative than a war with both Great Britain and France, submission, or a total suspension of our commerce.

The committee have, sir, after a long statement, brought our affairs up to this point, and I do not like any of the alternatives out of which they say we must make a choice, for I do not believe that we are reduced to this dilemma; and I will not agree to go to war with both England and France, nor will I agree to submit, or to totally suspend our commerce. But I will agree to give our merchants liberty to arm their vessels, under proper regulations, in defence of our legitimate commerce, and leave it to them to send their vessels for trade where they please; and if any of them are so unwise as to trust their property to France, or to any ports in Europe where the French control, let them fight their way there if they choose. I see no other course, sir, that we can pursue, that will be so much for the interest and honor of our country, as the one pointed out. The American people are a cool, calculating people, and know what is best for their interest, as well if not better than any nation upon earth, and I have no idea that they will support the Government in a ruinous war with England, under the present existing circumstances, nor in measures depriving them of all trade and commerce.

Mr. Mumford then offered a few observations in answer to the remarks of Mr. Gholson of Virginia. During the discussion, six different motions were made for an adjournment, the last of which, offered by Mr. Gardenier, was carried—yeas 58, nays 48.

Tuesday, December 13.

On motion of Mr. Thomas,

Resolved, That a committee be appointed to inquire into the expediency of dividing the Indiana Territory; and that they have leave to report by bill or otherwise.

Ordered, That Mr. Thomas, Mr. Kenan, Mr. Bassett, Mr. Taggart, and Mr. Smilie, be appointed a committee pursuant to the said resolution.

On motion of Mr. Thomas, the resolutions of the House of Representatives of the Indiana Territory, which were read and ordered to lie on the table on the fourteenth ultimo, were referred to the select committee last appointed.

Mr. Marion, from the committee to whom was referred, on the tenth instant, the bill sent from the Senate, entitled "An act further to amend the Judicial System of the United States," reported the bill to the House without amendment: Whereupon the bill was committed to a Committee of the Whole to-morrow.

The bill sent from the Senate, entitled "An act for the relief of Andrew Joseph Villard," was read twice and committed to a Committee of the Whole to-morrow.

On motion of Mr. Alexander,

Resolved, That a committee be appointed to inquire whether any, and if any, what farther provision ought to be made by law, prescribing the manner in which the public acts, records, and judicial proceedings of one State, shall be proved and given in evidence in another State, and the effect thereof; and that they have leave to report by bill or otherwise.

Ordered, That Mr. Alexander, Mr. David R. Williams, Mr. John G. Jackson, Mr. Key, and Mr. Quincy, be appointed a committee, pursuant to the said resolution.

A message from the Senate informed the House that the Senate have passed a bill, entitled "An act supplemental to an act entitled 'An act for extending the terms of credit on revenue bonds, in certain cases, and for other purposes;'" also, a bill, entitled "An act to change the post route from Annapolis to Rockhall, by Baltimore to Rockhall;" to which they desire the concurrence of this House.

Foreign Relations.

The following is Mr. Gardenier's speech entire:

Mr. Speaker: I had intended to defer the delivery of my sentiments upon the second resolution, until that resolution should come before the House. But the course which the debate has taken, has produced a change in my original intention.

That the first resolution is an unnecessary one, because no clear, definite, practical results can flow from it, appears to me self-evident. Are the people of this country suspected of an intention to abandon their rights or their independence? Indeed, sir, they are not. Why then is it, that we are called upon to make a new declaration of independence? Or was the Administration conducted in such a manner as to make the firmness and patriotism of the nation itself doubted abroad? Even I, sir, who am not suspected of a blind confidence in our rulers, will not advance such a charge.

The true question is not, Is the matter expressed in this abstract proposition true? But, Is it necessary that a resolution containing it should be passed by this House? I agree with the gentleman from Tennessee (Mr. Campbell) that it would be no less ridiculous to pass this resolution than to pass one that the sun shines. Allowing both to be true, both are equally unnecessary to be embodied in a resolution of this House. Begin this system of abstract legislation, and where are you to stop? Sir, it partakes too much of the character of disturbed, revolutionary times. To such a blasphemous height was this notion of voting abstract propositions, or declarations, or truisms (call them what you will) carried at one time in France, that their Convention very gravely decreed "that there was a God!" This was a self-evident truth; and being so could not become more so by being decreed. And if the edicts of Great Britain and France go to the destruction of our "rights, honor and independence," our voting that such is their operation, makes it neither more nor less true.

But, it is said, a select committee have placed the resolution before us, and we are bound to vote whether the assertions it contains are true or false. Why, sir, if I should offer a resolution that at this moment the sun shines, and some one should second me, would it be contended that this House ought gravely to proceed to the question? and if any member should say, "I vote against this resolution because it is too true to be made more so; and because, therefore, I think it unnecessary to be passed," that he, sir, should be considered blind?

Again, gentlemen, some too with whom I am in the habit of acting, say, at the worst, the resolution is harmless—it ties you down to no specific course, and therefore you may as well vote for it; that to vote against it, will afford a handle against our popularity—that the resolution itself is an artful one—a trap set to catch the Federalists, as it will hold them up to suspicion, if they vote against it—for the vote will appear upon the Journals, when the argument is not to be found there. Well, sir, if it be in truth a trap to catch poor Federalism in, I, for one, sir, am willing to be caught. I never deceived the people whom I have the honor to represent, either by giving a vote to the propriety of which my judgment was opposed, or by professing opinions which I did not entertain; and, sir, I trust in God I never shall. The applause of my constituents is dear to me. But I would rather strive to deserve it—than, not deserving it, to receive it. Yes, sir, my course shall be always a plain one—a straightforward course. I have not acquired the confidence of my constituents by increasing their delusions. I have always labored to disperse them. At my first election to this House, a decided majority of them were opposed to my politics. The thought has often distressed me. But the cause of that distress exists no longer. And, therefore, sir, I will go on discharging my duty with the most scrupulous obedience to my judgment, and where the weight of a hair ought to turn the scale, it shall turn it.

But if I had no other objection against this abstract "harmless" resolution, there is one which would be decisive: I would reject it on account of "the company it keeps." The committee, for reasons which I shall not stop to disclose, have thought it important to introduce this, by way of propping the second one. That second one, sir, the undoubted object and inevitable tendency of which my whole soul recoils from, which I abhor and deprecate, as fatal to the prosperity and happiness of my country—as the grave of its honor—and I fear I do not go too far when I add, of its independence! that resolution is not alone submission to France; but, under the pretence of resisting her infractions of the laws of nations, her violations of the sacred rights of hospitality, her laughing to scorn the obligation of treaties—it makes us submit to all—to encourage a perseverance in all. Nay, sir, it throws the whole weight of our power into her scale, and we become not only the passive, but, to the whole extent of our means, the active instruments of that policy which we affect to abhor. This, sir, unhappily, is capable of the most clear demonstration; and, in the proper place it shall appear so. I enter now upon the discussion of the second resolution. And although I am aware how little professions of sincerity and embarrassment are generally regarded, and, indeed, how little they ought to be regarded, yet I cannot approach this awful subject without declaring that I feel as if I was about to enter the sanctuary of our country's independence; and I tremble with the same fearful distrust of my powers, the same distressing perplexity which would embarrass me if I had entered the labyrinth in which was concealed the secret of that country's honor, prosperity and glory. I do feel, sir, that we should enter upon the discussion of this question divested of all the prejudices and passion of party—no less than all foreign predilections and animosities—with clean hearts, sir; yes, hearts seven times purified, to prepare them for the discharge of the sacred, the holy duties of this awful crisis. He who can come to this debate with other motives than to save his country, placed as it is on the brink of a dreadful precipice, deserves to be heard nowhere but in the cells of the Inquisition. The sound of his voice should never be suffered to pollute the Hall of the Representatives of the American people. But he who, thinking that he has traced the causes and the progress of our misfortunes, and that he may, perhaps, point the nation to a path which may lead it back to the prosperous position it has been made to abandon, would be a traitor to the State, if any considerations could keep him silent.

In my view, sir, we have gone on so long in error—our affairs have been suffered to run on, year after year, into so much confusion, that it is not easy to say what should be done. But if it is magnanimous to retract error, certainly it is only the performance of a sacred duty, which their servants owe the people, to abandon a system which has produced only disappointment and disasters hitherto, and promises only ruin and disgrace in future.

The time, sir, has been, when the Government was respected at home and abroad, when the people were prosperous and happy, when the political body was in high, in vigorous health; when America rejoiced in the fulness of her glory, and the whole extent of the United States presented a scene unknown in any other country, in any other age. Behold now the mournful contrast, the sad reverse! We are "indeed fallen, fallen from our high estate!" The nation is sick—sick at heart. We are called upon to apply a remedy; and none will answer which shall not be effectual. No quack prescriptions will answer now. And the cure, to be effectual, must not persevere in a course which has not only produced no good, nor promises any; but which has brought the patient (if I may use the figure of the gentleman from Maryland, Mr. Nelson) to his present forlorn condition. Such a perseverance may seem to argue great hardihood, or, if you please, spirit; but, after all, it is nothing but the desperate frenzy of a losing, half-ruined gamester.

It becomes, therefore, at last, indispensable to take a retrospective view of our affairs. And, if in taking this view, we should find the cause of our disasters, we must not fear to contemplate it, to hold it up; and, having grown wise by experience, we must not be prevented by false pride, from profiting by it; we must not shrink from the exercise of a virtue because it is also an imperious duty. And I hope that no gentleman who hears me is unwilling to sacrifice the popularity of the Administration to the salvation of the country.

Permit me then, sir, to go back to that period in our history which immediately preceded the adoption of our present form of Government. What was then our condition? The people were poor—for there was no commerce to assist agriculture—there was no revenue for general objects. Many States were hardly able to collect enough for State purposes. And, of course, there was no such thing as public credit, although there was an immense floating debt. We had no reputation abroad—there was no confidence even at home. But, sir, we had a Washington, and we had the pupils of Washington, men whom he knew to be faithful in the Cabinet, for he had found them faithful in the darkest stages of the Revolution. The nation, happily, had not been deluded—they knew their friends by their deeds—they had not yet yielded to the sweet fascination of the seductive popular declamations of these latter times. Men were known by what they did, not by what they said. These men, sir, had the sagacity to discover the secret springs of our prosperity and happiness and glory. And they were able to strike them with a powerful hand, and with a powerful hand they did strike them; and, instantly, as if by enchantment, the scene changed. Suddenly, agriculture raised her drooping head, for commerce beckoned her to prosperity. Your people began to pay their debts and to become rich. Public credit was restored; the Treasury began to fill readily. Sources of revenue were explored, certain of continually increasing, equally certain of being never exhausted, except by folly and madness. Indeed, sir, so perfect was the financial machinery that it admitted of no improvement. It required no more skill in the successors of the illustrious Hamilton to make this instrument "discourse most excellent music," than it would a child to play a hand-organ. An end was put to our Indian wars; our Algerine captives were redeemed—our reputation was established abroad, and the United States assumed their just rank among the nations of the earth! This was, indeed, a work worthy of the illustrious patriots who achieved it. It was the result of that profound practical wisdom, which, never yielding to the deception of brilliant theory, saw the public interest with a clear eye, and pursued it with a firm and steady step; and it was no wonder that it was successful. Let me add, too, that all this was accomplished without taxation being felt by the people.

But this great prosperity was not without interruption. It received a stroke, sir, deep and dangerous, and almost mortal, from the tremendous system of spoliations commenced by Great Britain in 1793. Misfortunes cast themselves across the path of nations as well as individuals. They are often unavoidable, and no nation can hope to be always exempt from them. The wisdom of the human mind is displayed in putting an end to them in private affairs, and in public that statesman only is great who can overcome and disperse them, who, though he cannot avert the bolt, can prevent the ruin it threatens. At the period of which I speak, we had such statesmen. Yes, sir, the alarm was depicted on every countenance—though the nation staggered to its centre under the severity of the blow it had received, yet was the Administration equal to the dreadful emergency—it had brought the nation into existence and prosperity, and it was equal to the preservation of both. And they showed it not by venting their rage in idle reproaches, but by applying efficient remedies to the diseases of the country.

Let it be remembered that justice was to be obtained from Great Britain; from that power which is now represented and held up to our indignation as "proud, unprincipled, imperious, and tyrannical;" and which certainly was at least as much so then; for then she had on her side all Europe engaged in combination against France, and France was alone as England is now. In short, she was then on the continent of Europe what France is now. Yet, from this same country did our Government succeed in obtaining not only reparation for the spoliations committed, but a surrender of the Western posts also. I repeat, sir, all this was accomplished when Great Britain was not less imperious in disposition, but more formidable in power than she is now. And surely all this ought to appear strange and wonderful indeed to those who have been deluded into the idea that, when Great Britain was struggling, gasping for existence, the same thing was impossible: that has with ease, and under more inauspicious circumstances, been accomplished, which the men now in power pretend they have attempted in vain. Still strange as it may seem to them, it is a fact—it is history. Well, sir, how was this miracle brought about? By a process very plain and simple. The Administration was sincerely desirous of peace; and that single object in their eye, they exerted their abilities to obtain it and consequently did obtain it. The instructions of the Minister breathed a desire of peace—of reconciliation upon terms compatible with the honor of both nations. The Administration did not send with their Minister a non-importation act, a proclamation, or a permanent embargo, by way of exhibiting their love of peace. The refinement in diplomacy which sends with the negotiator a new cause of quarrel for the purpose of accelerating the adjustment of an old one, was not yet invented. No, sir, Mr. Jay, (and the name of that stern, inflexible patriot and Republican, I always repeat with delight and veneration, because he is a patriot and a Republican)—

[Here Mr. Upham took the advantage of a pause made by Mr. G. to observe that, as the gentleman appeared considerably exhausted, &c., he would move an adjournment, which was taken by ayes and noes and lost—ayes 47, noes 65—Mr. G. voting in the affirmative.]

Mr. G. continued.—Mr. Jay had no disposition to bully the British Government into justice; he had no objection that they should have all the merit of returning voluntarily to a sense of justice, provided his country might have the benefit of substantial reparation. The stern sage of the Revolution became the courteous ambassador, and, appealing "to the justice and magnanimity of His Britannic Majesty," he demanded redress and he obtained it. The British Government saw that ours was sincerely disposed to be at peace with them, and, pursuing the natural direction of their interests, there was no difficulty in making peace. Our plundered merchants were compensated—paid, sir, bona fide. We did not purchase redress; we did not pay for the surrender of the Western posts, which were our right, and out of the purchase money indemnify a portion of our own citizens. No; the payment was to all; and in right old-fashioned "British gold," all counted down on the nail. I wish that I could, with equal truth, say the same thing of more modern treaties.

And now, sir, compensation being made by Great Britain for the spoliations on our commerce, the Western posts being surrendered, a commercial treaty being established, the dark cloud which obscured our prospects being dispersed, the sun of our prosperity once more burst forth in all its radiance, and again all was well.

I care not what were the objections of the day, begotten in the brain of faction, and cherished in mobs; under the treaty we were prosperous and happy, and that one fact is enough for me. Bad as the treaty was represented to be, and the worst feature of it most probably was, that it was a British Treaty—bad as it was, the continuance of its existence has been precisely co-extensive with the progress of our prosperity—it made our people rich and happy; and, bad as it was, they would have cause to rejoice indeed if the present Administration had furnished them with just such another.

France saw with uneasiness the return of a good understanding between America and Great Britain. And she, in her turn, let loose her plunders upon our commerce. Again the wisdom of our Government was called into action, and again it produced the most happy result. What did they do? An embassy was despatched to France, redress was demanded, but the Ministers were not received, nor could be, till a douceur—a tribute—was paid. From a nation which returned such an answer, redress could not be expected; and there was an end of negotiation. Britain and France had acted toward us with equal injustice—the disposition of our Government, its desire of peace, was the same with both. Its conduct was the same to both, but France would not even hear our demands. The American Government were at no loss how to act. The case was a plain one. One nation robs another—that other demands reparation—prevarication is the reply. It requires no skill to see, in such a case, that, to coax the offender into reparation is impossible. Accordingly, our Government did not hesitate as to the course it should pursue; they did not wait to be spurred on by any Government to an assertion of their rights; they would not leave it one moment doubtful whether they had the disposition and the courage to assert them. They proceeded immediately to annul the French Treaty, to pass non-intercourse laws; they built ships of war, and sent them upon the ocean, to protect our commerce. They were not so obstinate but that they could receive instruction, even from the author of the "Notes on Virginia," who, in that work, so judiciously recommends a navy. Our little armament picked up the French cruisers, great and small; the coast, the sea, was soon cleared of them. And our commerce again visited every clime in safety.

I will here remark, sir, that, during all this time, the staple commodities (particularly of the Northern States) suffered no diminution, but an increase in price. Well, sir, France very soon discovered that she had nothing to gain, and we nothing to lose by such a state of things. Even then, when she had some naval power, she discovered this. She was, therefore, very soon disposed to change it. A treaty was patched up, in the end, and something like the appearance of redress provided for.

Now, sir, for the result. A former Administration were able to settle our differences with Great Britain, although she governed all Europe, although she was unjust, haughty, and imperious. Now the same thing is said to be impossible! A former Administration were able, after a fair negotiation had failed, to bring France, who had then some maritime power, on her marrow-bones. And now, when she has none, again the same thing is impossible! How happens all this? Sir, I am afraid your Administration have committed most capital mistakes. They have been unwilling to learn wisdom from the experience and success of their predecessors. I do fear, and I shall be obliged to prove, that, on the one hand, they have been actuated by, certainly they have never (following the example of a former Administration) manifested a sincere disposition to accommodate our difficulties with Great Britain. And, on the other hand, they have in no instance shown to France that bold front which, in more unpromising times, brought the terrible Republic to her senses. These two errors, these wilful, wanton aberrations from established policy, are the true causes of all our misfortunes. It is owing to them that we have, if we believe the Administration sincere, two enemies who are already at war with each other, and we, the only instance of the kind since the creation of the world, are to step out a third and distinct belligerent, a sort of Ishmaelite belligerent; our hand against every nation, and every nation's hand against us. We are in a situation which defies hope, one in which we have but a single miserable consolation, that though it promises nothing but ruin, yet it is so ridiculous, so ludicrous, that we can but smile at it.

These remarks are extorted from me a little out of their order. I return to the period of the restoration of peace between the United States and France.

The Administration now (1801) passed into the hands of other men. They received a country, rich, prosperous, and increasing in prosperity. A people contented and happy; or discontented only with those who had been the authors of their prosperity. They received a Treasury full and overflowing, giving a vigor and a spring to public credit almost unknown before, and to the reputation of the country a dignity unsullied; they found us in peace and friendship with all nations, our commerce whitening every sea, and rewarding agriculture for all its industry, and every one sitting in peace under his own vine and fig tree. Our country presented to the animated philanthropist one uninterrupted display of liberty, of gaiety, and of felicity. Oh! happy, happy period of our history—never, never, I fear to return. And, if ever truth dropped from the lips of man, it was when the nation was declared to be in "the full tide of successful experiment." Never were the destinies of a nation in more wonderful prosperity committed to men. That prosperity had been acquired at a price no less unparalleled, at the expense of the destruction and disgrace of those whose wisdom and energy had produced it.

The new men, sir, were not required to bring order out of confusion; that had been done already.

They were not called upon to lay the deep and strong foundations of national prosperity and happiness; that had been done already.

They were not enjoined to "multiply" the talents committed to their stewardship; that was unnecessary—they were merely commanded to preserve them undiminished.

They were not required to create a paradise—but to keep uninjured that which was committed to their guardianship.

They promised, indeed; they were so rash, in the fulness of their exultation, as to promise to do more; but folly alone could believe them; and for breaking this promise I forgive them, for to do more was impossible. And if they had but preserved unimpaired, if they had not totally destroyed the inestimable treasures intrusted to them, I would have endeavored to overcome my resentment, my indignation, and my despair.

In performance of their lofty promises, in disregard of sacred duties, what have they done? In what condition do they leave the country, which, eight years since, "in the full tide of successful experiment," fell into their hands? They present to us, sir, the gloomy reverse of all it was. The people discontented and distressed—all becoming daily more and more poor—except, indeed, that class of rich speculators, whose wealth and whose hearts enabled them to prey upon the wants of their countrymen. The despair and dismay of 1786 are returned! The prosperity of twenty years is annihilated at one stroke! The sources of revenue are dried up. The Treasury, indeed, may be now full—but it must continually diminish—and, without its usual supply, it must soon be empty. We have still some credit. But how long, sir, can that be maintained, when it is known that we have no longer the means, allowing us to possess the disposition, to fulfil our pecuniary engagements? When you cannot collect a cent upon imposts, and dare not lay a direct tax, how far you will be able to obtain money on loan, is, to say the least of it, very questionable. But, I will hasten to finish the contrast I was about to make. Commerce, sir, has perished, and agriculture lies dead at her side—for these twin sisters must flourish or die together. No nation in the world is our friend—our paradise is becoming a wilderness; our soil is stained with the blood of our own citizens; and we look around us, in vain, for one solitary benefit to compensate us for all the dreadful effects of the present system.

Perhaps, sir, I may be answered: "Though all you have said be true, though our former prosperity exists no longer, it is ungenerous, it is unjust to impute the change to the agency of the Administration. What has happened could not be prevented." Though such a rebuke were reasonable, I will still insist that the Administration, if they deserve no censure, are certainly entitled to no praise, and can ask for no confidence. If they have not been the authors of the public calamities, they have not, like their predecessors, discovered the ability to prevent them from coming thick upon us. If their hearts are honest, their heads have not discovered much soundness. No set of men, however ignorant, however stupid, could have placed the country in a worse or a more deplorable situation. The truth is plain and palpable. Judging of the wisdom of the Administration by the result of its measures, I cannot sing praises to them for their skill and ingenuity in diplomacy. No, sir; I delight in that diplomacy which makes the poor rich; which makes industry prosperous; which spreads contentment through the land, and happiness among the people. I delight in the diplomacy, whose skill and wisdom can be read in the countenance of my countrymen, and makes the face of my country the evidence of its prosperity. I like not, I abhor that diplomatic skill which can be found only in a book! which has produced nothing but calamity, and whose praise is written in the blood of my countrymen.

But, sir, how happens it that we still remain under the distresses occasioned by the belligerents? Is there, indeed, a physical impossibility of removing them? From Great Britain, and that, too, when she had the whole continent on her side, we could once obtain justice, not only for the past, but security for the future. From France, too, we could once obtain justice, but now we can gain justice from neither. What change, sir, has occurred in the state of things to produce this strange impossibility? Our commerce is more an object to Great Britain now, than it was formerly—and France can oppose to us no resistance on the ocean. And yet no remedy can be found for our calamities! Sir, I will not be the dupe of this miserable artifice. What has been done once can be done again by employing the same means.

The Administration have committed greater errors. They have conducted all their affairs in such a style as to leave Great Britain no room to doubt that, when they asked for peace, they wanted it not. To this cause may be traced all our difficulties, so far as they proceed from that power. As it regards France, I fear that they have not acted the proper, the manly part. In short, sir, they have not pursued toward England the policy which saved us in 1795, nor toward France the policy which was successfully opposed to French rapacity and French obstinacy in '93.

I think an error was committed, when, affecting to desire an amicable arrangement with Great Britain, instead of treating with her as a nation not to be intimidated, much less bullied, the non-importation act was passed. For, sir, if she was so proud, so haughty, so imperious, as some gentlemen delight to describe her, then to bring her to justice by assuming an attitude of menace, was evidently impossible. When, therefore, you passed the non-importation act, under a pretence that it would be a successful auxiliary to friendly negotiation, what could you expect but to alarm the pride, and the haughtiness, and imperiousness of that nation? And, doing that, how could you expect an amicable result? No, sir, it was not, and it could not be expected. You obtained a treaty indeed—but it was from a Fox Ministry. Yet such as it was, it was not so good as a Jay's Treaty, and the Executive rejected it without so much as laying it before the Senate.

In support of the embargo system, gentlemen say, if we suffer our commerce to go on the ocean, or wherever it goes, it will be crippled either by France or Great Britain. Although this is not true in the extent laid down, yet it will hold tolerably true as respects the European seas. From what gentlemen are pleased to represent as the impossibility of sailing the ocean with safety, result (say they) the propriety and necessity of the embargo system. And they say, it is not the embargo, but the decrees and orders which are the true cause of all we suffer; that the embargo, so far from being the cause of, was advised as a remedy for the evils we endure. Well, sir, for the sake of the argument, be it as they say. Has the embargo answered? Is there any probability, the slightest indication, that it will answer? Has it operated, to any perceptible extent, except upon ourselves, during the twelvemonth it has been in existence? If, then, neither the remembrance of the past, nor the prospect of the future, gives the least encouragement to hope, why will gentlemen persist in the system? And that too, sir, at an expense to their own country so enormous in amount? Will they go on obstinately amid all the discontents, or clamors (as gentlemen in very anti-republican language call the voice of the people) in the Eastern and Northern States? And that from mere obstinacy—an obstinacy not encouraged by the least glimmering of hope? If I could be pointed to a single fact, produced by the operation of the embargo, which would prove that it had any other effect on the disposition of Great Britain than to irritate—or any other on France than to please, than to encourage her to a perseverance in that system of injustice which we pretend to oppose, but to the policy of which we give all our support with an infatuated wilfulness, and which, therefore, increases the hostility Great Britain has felt from the measure—if they could show me, sir, that the embargo will bring either to terms, I would abandon the opposition at once, and come heart and hand into the support of your measures. The other day, the gentleman from South Carolina (Mr. Williams) almost persuaded me that it ought to operate upon Great Britain; but I looked and I found it did not, and I was convinced it would not.

But, have gentlemen reflected that, if all the evils were drawn from Pandora's box, to vex Great Britain, you could have hit on none so well calculated to call out all her resistance, and all her obstinacy, as this same expedient, the embargo! If she yields to us, under the pressure of such a system, she discloses to us the secret of her independence! Sir, the embargo is war; it was intended as such against Great Britain. And she understands its meaning and its character too well for us to disguise it, under a pretence of its being a mere precautionary municipal measure. Its efficacy as a coercive measure has been too often and too loudly boasted of in this House, to make its real object a secret to her. Nay, in so far as the great and prominent feature of war is coercion; in so far as war is always intended to make the adversary yield that which he will not yield voluntarily; in so far, are the embargo and the non-importation act WAR. Each was intended to coerce Great Britain to yield to us points which it had been ascertained she would not yield voluntarily. It was a system of coercion, a new-fangled sort of philosophical experimental war; novel, to be sure, in its character, but, to all substantial purposes, war. Instead of bloodshed, there was to be ink shed—instead of bayonets, pens—instead of the bloody arena, huge sheets of paper! Whenever Great Britain shall yield to the coercion of the non-importation, embargo, or non-intercourse system, she virtually tells the people of the United States, "we are in your power whenever you choose to make a claim upon us, whether just or unjust; threaten us with an embargo and a non-intercourse, and you bring us to your feet." Does any gentlemen believe, even allowing the pressure of the embargo to be great upon her, that she can yield, that she can afford to yield? That she can admit that we have her always perfectly in our power? Sooner would she give up in battle—sooner would she see her soldiers retreating before our bayonets; sooner would she see her armies perish under our valor, than acknowledge herself the slave of this magic wand. Her children might grow to be men, and she might try the fortune of another day; the hair of Samson might grow on again, and his strength be renewed; but in yielding to the chance of the embargo, she places her existence in our hands, and becomes dependent upon our will for the existence of her sovereignty. Sir, the King of England cannot, he dare not, yield to our embargo.

But, sir, he has not told us that he considers our embargo hostile to him; nor has our Government ever told him that it was; such a declaration has never been put to paper. No, sir; when you look into the correspondence, it would seem that the embargo was never intended as a coercive measure, nor even understood so by Great Britain. Every thing on both sides is conceived in a sincere spirit of "friendship." Our non-importation act, our proclamation, our embargo, are all acts of friendship and kindness toward Great Britain, for aught we find there. And Great Britain issues her Orders in Council in a reciprocating spirit of amity toward us. She is not offended with our non-importation act, nor our embargo. Not at all. Her orders are not intended to harm us. She means nothing in the world, but simply to retaliate upon France—and she is sorry that almost the whole force of the blow falls upon us, but it is unavoidable. She, by the laws of nations, has as perfect a right to retaliate upon France as we have to make our innocent municipal regulations—and she is full as sorry that her retaliation system should wound us, as we are that our municipal regulations should incommode her. Sir, this diplomatic hypocrisy (begun, I acknowledge, by us) is intolerable. Sir, there is not one word of truth in the whole of it, from beginning to end. The plain state of the case is this: Anterior to the non-importation act, the British Treaty had expired—there were points of dispute, particularly concerning the impressment of seamen, which could not be adjusted to the satisfaction of our Government. In this state of things, either we ought to have gone to war, or we ought not. If we had intended to do so, stronger measures should have been resorted to than a non-importation act. If we had not intended to do so, the act should never have been passed. Those who passed it could have but one of two objects in view; either to coerce Great Britain to the terms we demanded—or, by vexing and irritating her, to raise up in due time an unnecessary fictitious quarrel, which (as this country is known to be extremely sensitive of British aggression) might ultimately end in a real old-fashioned war. No men could have been so weak as to calculate upon the first result. As to the other, the wisdom of the calculation is pretty strongly proved by the situation in which we now find ourselves. Sir, this is the whole mystery—and it must be explored—it must be exposed. We must understand the real character of our controversy with Great Britain—the real character, intent, and aim, of the different measures adopted by us and by her, before we can hope to heal the wounds our peace has received, or to restore the prosperity we have been unnecessarily made to abandon. I know, sir, how difficult it is to overcome matured opinions or inveterate prejudices; and I know, too, that, at this time, the individual who shall venture to lay open "the bare and rotten policy" of the time, makes himself the butt of party rancor, and strips himself to the unsparing "lacerations of the press." But these are considerations too feeble to deter me from my duty.

[Mr. G. appearing much exhausted, and Mr. Quincy having intimated to the House that Mr. G. suffered under a pain in the side, moved for an adjournment. The Speaker inquired whether Mr. G. yielded the floor? Mr. G. replied, he had himself little inclination to continue his remarks, but the House appeared so eager to hear him, (a laugh,) he hardly knew what answer to make. However, he said, he would give the floor. The House then adjourned.]

The object, sir, of our present deliberations is, or ought to be, to relieve our country from the distresses under which it groans; to do this, we should be prepared to legislate with a single eye to the welfare and happiness of the nation. It is of the first necessity that we should deliberate with calmness, if we mean to apply an effectual remedy to the diseases of the State. In the remarks which I had the honor to make yesterday, I was constrained to draw a contrast between the measures and prosperity of former times and those of the present times. Under circumstances of the same character, we were formerly able to overcome our misfortunes. Now we are not. And I did this for the purpose of impressing upon the House an opinion, that if the Administration had practised upon the principles of their predecessors, all had been well; or, that if retracing their steps, or relinquishing the path of error and misfortune, they would still be the learners of wisdom and experience, it would not even now be too late to retrieve the affairs of the country. If I know my own heart, I did not make the comparison from any invidious purposes; but merely to turn the minds of gentlemen back to former times; that they might reflect upon the perils and calamities of those times, and the means by which an end was put to them; but in doing this, I could not avoid paying the tribute of deserved praise and of sincere gratitude to the men under whose agency we prospered abundantly. In contrasting the conduct of the present with that of the former Administration, I meant to subserve no purposes of party. Nay, sir, I could have much desired to have been spared the necessity of presenting that contrast before the nation. I could have wished to have avoided these references, lest I might excite party feeling in others; lest I might appear to be governed by them myself. But truth could not be attained by any other course, and I have been compelled to take it.

The first resolution, contained in the following words, was divided, so as to take the question first on the part in italic:

"Resolved, That the United States cannot, without a sacrifice of their rights, honor, and independence, submit to the late edicts of Great Britain—and France."

The question was then taken on the first clause of this resolution, and carried—yeas 136, nays 2.

The question being about to be put on the remaining part of the resolution, viz: on the words "and France"—

The question then recurred on the second member of the first resolution; and the same being taken, it was resolved in the affirmative—yeas 113, nays 2.

The main question was then taken that the House do agree to the said first resolution as reported to the Committee of the Whole, in the words following, to wit:

"Resolved, That the United States cannot, without a sacrifice of their rights, honor, and independence, submit to the edicts of Great Britain and France:"

And resolved in the affirmative—yeas 118, nays, 2.

Saturday, December 17.

A division of the question on the resolution depending before the House was then called for by Mr. David R. Williams: Whereupon, so much of the said resolution was read, as is contained in the words following, to wit:

"Resolved, That it is expedient to prohibit, by law, the admission into the ports of the United States of all public or private armed or unarmed ships or vessels belonging to Great Britain or France, or to any other of the belligerent powers having in force orders or decrees violating the lawful commerce and neutral rights of the United States."

The question then recurring on the first member of the original resolution, as proposed to be divided on a motion of Mr. D. R. Williams, and hereinbefore recited, a division of the question on the first said member of the resolution was called for by Mr. Gardenier, from the commencement of the same to the words "Great Britain," as contained in the words following, to wit:

"Resolved, That it is expedient to prohibit, by law, the admission into the ports of the United States of all public or private armed or unarmed ships or vessels belonging to Great Britain."

The question being taken that the House do agree to the same, it was resolved in the affirmative—yeas 92, nays 29.

A farther division of the question was moved by Mr. Elliot, on the said first member of the resolution, on the words "or France," immediately following the words "Great Britain," hereinbefore recited: And the question being put thereupon, it was resolved in the affirmative—yeas 97, nays. 24.

And on the question that the House do agree to the second member of the said second resolution, contained in the words following, to wit:

"Or to any other of the belligerent powers having in force orders or decrees violating the lawful commerce and neutral rights of the United States:"

It was resolved in the affirmative—yeas 96, nays 26.

The question then being on the residue of the said resolution contained in the following words:

"And, also, the importation of any goods, wares, or merchandise, the growth, produce, or manufacture, of the dominions of any of the said powers, or imported from any place in the possession of either:"

The question was taken, and resolved in the affirmative—yeas 82, nays 36.

The main question was then taken that the House do agree to the said second resolution, as reported from the Committee of the whole House, and resolved in the affirmative—yeas 84, nays 30, as follows:

Yeas.—Lemuel J. Alston, Willis Alston, jun., Ezekiel Bacon, David Bard, Joseph Barker, Burwell Bassett, William W. Bibb, William Blackledge, John Blake, jun., Thomas Blount, Adam Boyd, John Boyle, Robert Brown, William A. Burwell, William Butler, Joseph Calhoun, George W. Campbell, Matthew Clay, Joseph Clopton, Richard Cutts, John Dawson, Joseph Desha, Daniel M. Durell, John W. Eppes, William Findlay, Jas. Fisk, Meshack Franklin, Francis Gardner, Thomas Gholson, jun., Peterson Goodwyn, Edwin Gray, Isaiah L. Green, John Heister, William Helms, James Holland, David Holmes, Benjamin Howard, Reuben Humphreys, Daniel Ilsley, John G. Jackson, Richard M. Johnson, Walter Jones, Thomas Kenan, William Kirkpatrick, John Lambert, John Love, Nathaniel Macon, Robert Marion, William McCreery, John Montgomery, Nicholas R. Moore, Thos. Moore, Jeremiah Morrow, John Morrow, Roger Nelson, Thos. Newbold, Thomas Newton, Wilson C. Nicholas, John Porter, John Rea of Pennsylvania, John Rhea of Tennessee, Jacob Richards, Matthias Richards, Benjamin Say, Ebenezer Seaver, Samuel Shaw, Dennis Smelt, John Smilie, Jedediah K. Smith, John Smith, Henry Southard, Richard Stanford, Clement Storer, John Taylor, George M. Troup, James I. Van Allen, Archibald Van Horne, Daniel C. Verplanck, Jesse Wharton, Robert Whitehill, Isaac Wilbour, David R. Williams, Alexander Wilson, and Richard Wynn.

Nays.—Evan Alexander, John Campbell, Epaphroditus Champion, Martin Chittenden, John Culpeper, Samuel W. Dana, John Davenport, jun., Jas. Elliot, William Ely, Barent Gardenier, John Harris, Richard Jackson, Robert Jenkins, James Kelly, Philip B. Key, Joseph Lewis, jun., Matthew Lyon, Josiah Masters, William Milnor, Jonathan O. Mosely, Timothy Pitkin, jun., Josiah Quincy, John Russell, James Sloan, L. B. Sturges, Samuel Taggart, Benjamin Tallmadge, Jabez Upham, Philip Van Cortlandt, and Killian K. Van Rensselaer.

And on the question that the House do concur with the Committee of the Whole in their agreement to the third resolution, in the words following, to wit:

Resolved, That measures ought to be immediately taken for placing the country in a more complete state of defence:

It was unanimously resolved in the affirmative.

On motion of Mr. George W. Campbell,

Ordered, That the second resolution be referred to the committee appointed on so much of the Message from the President of the United States, at the commencement of the present session, as respects our relations with foreign powers, with leave to report thereon by way of bill or bills.

On motion of Mr. George W. Campbell,

Ordered, That the third resolution be referred to the committee appointed, on the 8th ultimo, on so much of the said Message from the President of the United States as relates to the Military and Naval Establishments, with leave to report thereon by bill, or bills.

Monday, December 19.

Miranda's Expedition.

Mr. Love called for the order of the day on the report of the committee on the subject of the thirty-six persons confined in Carthagena, South America. The following is the resolution reported by the committee:

Resolved, That the President of the United States be requested to adopt the most immediate and efficacious means in his power to obtain from the Viceroy of Grenada, in South America, or other proper authority, the liberation of thirty-six American citizens, condemned on a charge of piracy, and now held in slavery in the vaults of St. Clara, in Carthagena, and that the sum of —— dollars be appropriated to that purpose.

Mr. D. R. Williams moved to postpone the consideration of the subject indefinitely. Negatived—50 to 36.

The House then went into a Committee of the Whole on the subject—39 to 33.

Mr. Love moved to amend the resolution by striking out the words in italics, and inserting "authorized to request."—Carried, ayes 54.

Those gentlemen who supported this resolution in the debate were Messrs. Love, Lyon, Bacon, Nelson, Sloan, and Wilbour. Those who opposed it were Messrs. D. R. Williams, Taylor, Smilie, Macon, and Southard.

The gentlemen who opposed the resolution, among other objections, contended that an agreement to the resolution would but involve the Government in difficulty without answering any good purpose; that it would in fact be aiding the attempt of a certain party to prove that the General Government had some connection with this expedition originally, which it certainly had not; that the facts set forth in the petition were wholly unsupported by evidence; that these persons had engaged themselves in a foreign service; that they had become weary of the privileges of freemen, and had entered into a hostile expedition against a foreign country, and, in so doing, had been taken, condemned for piracy, and immured as a punishment for that offence; that the British Government, having been at the bottom of this business, was the proper power to release these persons, and indeed had applied to the Spanish commander for the purpose; that even were the United States bound by the laws of justice or humanity to intercede for these persons, they knew not to whom to make application, and would probably meet with a refusal, perhaps a rude one, if any judgment could be formed from the present situation of our affairs with Spain; that if gentlemen wished for objects on which to exercise their humanity, they might find them in the lacerated backs of our impressed seamen, without extending it to criminals. In reply to an observation of Mr. Lyon, that if we did not get these men Great Britain would do so, and employ them to extend her naval force, Mr. Macon replied, if she did, she was welcome to keep them; but she was in the habit of supplying her navy with seamen from our vessels, without the trouble which the acquisition of these men might occasion her.

In reply to these objections, and in support of the resolution, the humanity of the House was strongly appealed to. It was urged that the Government could in nowise be involved by an appeal to the generosity of the provincial government; that these men had not wilfully committed piracy, but had been deluded under various pretences to join the expedition; that they had joined it under a belief that they were entering into the service of the United States; that, even admitting them to have been indiscreetly led to join the enterprise, knowing it to be destined for a foreign service, yet, that they had been sufficiently punished by the penalty they had already undergone; that it was wholly immaterial what inference any persons might draw from the conduct of the United States in this respect, as to their concern with the original expedition; that such considerations should have no weight with the House; that if these poor fellows were guilty, they had repented of it; and Mr. Nelson quoted on this point the Scriptures, to show that there should be more joy over one sinner that repenteth, than over ninety and nine who have no need of repentance. In reply to an intimation that it was not even ascertained that they were American citizens, Mr. Bacon observed that one of them had been born in the same town in which he was, and was of a reputable family.

The resolution was negatived by the committee—49 to 31.

The committee rose and reported the resolution, which report the House agreed now to consider—ayes 57.

The question of concurrence with the committee in their disagreement to the resolution, was decided by yeas and nays, 50 to 34.

On motion, the House adjourned.

Tuesday, December 20.

A new member, to wit, Joseph Story, returned to serve in this House, as a member for the State of Massachusetts, in the room of Jacob Crowninshield, deceased, appeared, produced his credentials, was qualified, and took his seat in the House.

Wednesday, December 21.

Captain Pike's Expedition.

On motion of Mr. J. Montgomery, the House resolved itself into a Committee of the Whole, on the bill making compensation to Z. M. Pike and his companions.

[The first section of this bill grants to Captain Pike and his companions a certain quantity of land. The second section allows them double pay during the time they were engaged in exploring the western country.]

Mr. Stanford moved to strike out the first section of the bill; which was negatived—53 to 38.

The second section was stricken out—42 to 35.

A considerable debate took place on this bill, in which Messrs. Montgomery, Lyon and Alexander supported the bill, and Messrs. Macon, Durell, Stanford and Tallmadge opposed it.

The bill being gone through, was reported to the House.

Saturday, December 31.

Division of the Indiana Territory.

Mr. Thomas, from the committee appointed on the thirteenth instant, to inquire into the expediency of dividing the Indiana Territory, made a report thereon; which was read, and committed to a Committee of the Whole on Monday next. The report is as follows:

That, by the fifth article of the ordinance of Congress for the government of the Territory of the United States Northwest of the river Ohio, it is stipulated that there shall be formed in the said Territory no less than three, nor more than five States; and the boundaries of the States, as soon as Virginia shall alter her act of cession, and consent to the same, shall become fixed and established, as follows:

The Western State shall be bounded by the Mississippi, the Ohio, and Wabash rivers; a direct line drawn from the Wabash and Post Vincennes, due north, to the Territorial line between the United States and Canada, and by the said Territorial line to the Lake of the Woods and Mississippi.

The middle State shall be bounded by the said direct line, the Wabash, from Post Vincennes to the Ohio; by the Ohio, by a direct line drawn due north from the mouth of the Great Miami, to the said Territorial line, and by the said Territorial line.

The Eastern State shall be bounded by the last-mentioned direct line, the Ohio, Pennsylvania, and the said Territorial line: Provided, however, and it is further understood and declared, that the boundaries of these three States shall be subject so far to be altered, that if Congress shall hereafter find it expedient, they shall have authority to form one or two States in that part of the said Territory which lies north of an east and west line drawn through the southerly bend or extreme of Lake Michigan. And whenever any of the said States shall have sixty thousand free inhabitants therein, such State shall be admitted by its delegates into the Congress of the United States on an equal footing with the original States, in all respects whatever, and shall be at liberty to form a permanent constitution and State Government: Provided, the constitution and government so to be formed shall be republican, and in conformity to the principles contained in these articles; and, so far as it can be consistent with the general interest of the Confederacy, such admission shall be allowed at an earlier period, and when there shall be a less number of free inhabitants in the State than sixty thousand.

By the aforesaid article, it appears to your committee that the line fixed as the boundary of the States to be formed in the Indiana Territory is unalterable, unless by common consent; that the line of demarcation, which the Wabash affords between the eastern and western portion of said Territory, added to the wide extent of wilderness country which separates the population in each, constitute reasons in favor of a division, founded on the soundest policy, and conformable with the natural situation of the country. The vast distance from the settlements of the Wabash to the present seat of Territorial government, renders the administration of justice burdensome and expensive to them in the highest degree. The superior courts of the Territory are, by law, established at Vincennes; at which place suitors, residing in every part of the Territory, are compelled to attend with their witnesses, which, to those who reside west of the Wabash, amounts almost to a total denial of justice. The great difficulty of travelling through an extensive and loathsome wilderness, the want of food and other necessary accommodations on the road, often presents an insurmountable barrier to the attendance of witnesses; and, even when their attendance is obtained, the accumulated expense of prosecuting suits where the evidence is at so remote a distance, is a cause of much embarrassment to a due and impartial distribution of justice, and a proper execution of the laws for the redress of private wrongs.

In addition to the above considerations, your committee conceive that the scattered situation of the settlements over this extensive Territory cannot fail to enervate the powers of the Executive, and render it almost impossible to keep that part of the Government in order.

It further appears to your committee, that a division of the said Territory will become a matter of right under the aforesaid article of the ordinance, whenever the General Government shall establish therein a State Government; and the numerous inconveniences which would be removed by an immediate separation, would have a direct tendency to encourage and accelerate migration to each district, and thereby give additional strength and security to those outposts of the United States, exposed to the inroads of a savage neighbor, on whose friendly dispositions no permanent reliance can be placed.

Your committee have no certain data on which to ascertain the number of inhabitants in each section of the Territory; but, from the most accurate information they are enabled to collect, it appears that west of the Wabash there are about the number of eleven thousand, and east of said river about the number of seventeen thousand, and that the population of each section is in a state of rapid increase.

Your committee, after maturely considering this subject, are of opinion that there exists but one objection to the establishment of a separate Territorial Government west of the river Wabash, and that objection is based on the additional expense which would, in consequence thereof, be incurred by the Government of the United States. But, it is also worthy of observation, that the increased value of the public lands in each district, arising from the public institutions which would be permanently fixed in each, to comport with the convenience of the inhabitants, and the augmentation of emigrants, all of whom must become immediate purchasers of these lands, would far exceed the amount of expenditure produced by the contemplated temporary government.

And your committee, being convinced that it is the wish of a large majority of the citizens of the said Territory that a separation thereof should take place, deem it always just and wise policy to grant to every portion of the people of the Union that form of government which is the object of their wishes, when not incompatible with the constitution of the United States, nor subversive of their allegiance to the national sovereignty.

Your committee, therefore, respectfully submit the following resolution:

Resolved, That it is expedient to divide the Indiana Territory, and to establish a separate Territorial Government west of the river Wabash, agreeably to the ordinance for the government of the Territory of the United States northwest of the river Ohio, passed on the 13th day of July, 1787.

Mr. Thomas, from the same committee, presented a bill for dividing the Indiana Territory into two separate governments; which was read twice and committed to a Committee of the Whole on Monday next.

A motion was made by Mr. Wynn, that when this House adjourns, it will adjourn until Tuesday morning, eleven o'clock: And the question being taken thereupon, it was resolved in the affirmative—yeas 60, nays 45.

Monday, January 9, 1809.

Another member, to wit, John Rowan, from Kentucky, appeared, and took his seat in the House.

Naval Establishment.

The amendments of the Senate to the bill sent from the House for employing an additional number of seamen and marines, were taken up. [The amendments propose the immediate arming, manning, &c., all the armed vessels of the United States.]

Mr. G. W. Campbell expressed a hope that the House would disagree to the amendments. The President was already authorized by law to fit out these vessels, whenever, in his opinion, the public service should require it; and the expense which would attend them was a sufficient argument against it, if no urgent occasion existed for their service, which he believed did not.

Mr. Story entertained a very different opinion from that of the gentleman from Tennessee. In case of war there must be some ships of war of one kind or other; and it would take six months at least to prepare all our ships for service. At present they were rotting in the docks. If it were never intended to use them, it would be better to burn them at once than to suffer them to remain in their present situation. He believed if out at sea they might be useful and would be well employed. Why keep them up at this place, whence they could not get out of the river perhaps in three weeks or a month? He believed that a naval force would form the most effectual protection to our seaports that could be devised. Part of our little navy was suffered to rot in the docks, and the other part was scarcely able to keep the ocean. Could not a single foreign frigate enter almost any of our harbors now and batter down our towns? Could not even a single gunboat sweep some of them? Mr. S. said he could not conceive why gentlemen should wish to paralyze the strength of the nation by keeping back our naval force, and now in particular, when many of our native seamen (and he was sorry to say that from his own knowledge he spoke it) were starving in our ports. Mr. S. enumerated some of the advantages which this country possessed in relation to naval force. For every ship which we employed on our coasts, he said, any foreign nation must incur a double expense to be able to cope with us. The truth was, that gentlemen well versed in the subject, had calculated that it would require, for a fleet competent to resist such a naval force as the United States might without difficulty provide, four or five hundred transport ships to supply them with provisions, the expense of which alone would be formidable as a coercive argument to Great Britain. He wished it to be shown, however small our naval force, that we do not undervalue it, or underrate the courage and ability of our seamen.

Mr. Cook followed Mr. Story on the same side of the question. He compared the nation to a fortress on which an attack was made, and the garrison of which, instead of guarding the portal, ran upon the battlements to secure every small aperture. He thought their attention should first be directed to the gates, and that a naval force would be the most efficient defence for our ports.

Mr. D. R. Williams called for the yeas and nays on the amendments.

Mr. Smilie said that raising a naval force for the purpose of resisting Great Britain, would be attacking her on her strong ground. If we were to have a war with her on the ocean, it could only be carried on by distressing her trade. Neither did he believe that these vessels of war would be of any effect as a defence. They did not constitute the defence on which he would rely. If we had a navy, it would form the strongest temptation for attack upon our ports and harbors. If Denmark had possessed no navy, Copenhagen would never have been attacked. The only way in which we could carry on a war on the ocean to advantage, Mr. S. said, would be by our enterprising citizens giving them sufficient encouragement. Were we to employ a naval force in case of war, it would but furnish our enemy with an addition to her navy. He hoped the House would disagree to the amendments of the Senate and appoint a committee of conference.

Mr. Dana said that the amendments sent from the Senate presented a question of no small importance to the nation. Without expressing any opinion on the question, it appeared to him to be at least of sufficient importance to be discussed in Committee of the Whole. Coming from the other branch of the Legislature, and being so interesting to the nation, he wished that it might be discussed fairly and fully; and, therefore, moved a reference to a Committee of the Whole.

Messrs. Dana, Tallmadge, and Story, urged a reference to a Committee of the Whole on account of the great importance of the subject, on which a full discussion would be proper; and Messrs. Macon, G. W. Campbell, and Holland opposed it, because the seamen proposed by the original bill were now wanted, and the subject of the amendment was already referred to a Committee of the Whole in a distinct bill. Motion lost, 58 to 55.

Mr. Macon observed, that the immediate expense of this arrangement, if agreed to, would be at least five or six millions of dollars, and but four hundred thousand were appropriated by the bill. When he compared this bill with the report of a select committee made to the House of Representatives, he said he was astonished. A part of that report was a letter from the Secretary of the Navy, in which the very number (two thousand) contained in the bill as it went from this House, was desired. Mr. M. adverted to the observation of Mr. Story, that it would cost Great Britain as much to keep one frigate as it would cost us to keep two. He thought the expense would be about equal. The expense of the transportation of provisions would be counterbalanced by the difference of expense between the pay of the British and American seamen, the latter being double of the former generally. He objected to this bill from the Senate because no estimate accompanied it. He thought they would go far enough if they gave the departments all that they asked. This House had indeed as much right to judge of the force requisite, as any other department; but he did not wish to be called upon to supply a deficit in the appropriation, which never failed to occur even in the ordinary appropriations for the Navy Department. Give the four hundred thousand dollars asked for, and the deficit in the appropriation will be at least ten times the amount of the sum appropriated.

Mr. Cook contended strenuously in favor of a naval force. He detailed the advantages which would accrue to the nation from a few fast sailing frigates. He said they were essentially necessary to defence. He expatiated on the difficulty with which any foreign power could maintain a force on our coast.

Mr. Holland did not profess to have much knowledge on this subject, but he said it did not require much to overthrow the arguments of gentlemen on the subject. What defence a few frigates would be to the extensive coast of this country, he could not understand. There certainly never had been a time when this country should rely on a maritime force as a sufficient protection. Indeed, he said, if we had fifteen or twenty or more sail-of-the-line, he should hesitate much before he would go to war with Great Britain, because these would undoubtedly be lost. Our power of coercion was not on the ocean. Great Britain had possessions on this continent which were valuable to her; they were in the power of the United States, and the way to coerce her to respect our rights on water, would be attacking them on land. He said he certainly did not undervalue the disposition and prowess of our seamen; and it was because he valued them, that he did not wish them to go into an unequal contest, in which they must certainly yield. Gentlemen might understand naval matters; but it was no reason that they should therefore understand the efficiency of a naval force. There was sufficient evidence in history to warn the United States against it.

Mr. Troup said he rose but for the purpose of stating facts which struck him as being applicable to the subject before the House. He referred chiefly to an extract of a letter written to himself and published in the paper of to-day. [Mr. T. then read the extract which appeared in the National Intelligencer on the 9th instant.] In addition to these facts, letters had been received, in the course of this morning, containing further particulars, which he begged leave to state to the House. After the officer (commander of a British armed vessel) had been forced on board his vessel, and while lying in our waters and within our jurisdiction, he had fired several shots at pilot-boats, passing and repassing, had been very abusive, and threatened the town with what he called vengeance; and, in addition to these facts, letters had reached Savannah from Liverpool, giving satisfactory information that vessels of fifteen or twenty guns had been fitted out for the purpose of forcing a cotton trade with South Carolina and Georgia. This information, Mr. T. said, came from unquestionable authority. And it was because he was unwilling that the people of this country should longer submit to the abuse of British naval officers; because he was unwilling that they should be exposed to the insolence of every British commissioned puppy who chose to insult us; because he was unwilling that armed vessels should force a cotton trade, when every man knew that nine-tenths of the people of Georgia would treat as traitors the violators of the embargo; it was for this reason that he was disposed to vote for the amendments from the Senate. The great objection which had been taken to them was the expense which they would produce. Economy, Mr. T. said, was a good thing in time of peace; but if this contracted spirit of economy predominated in our war councils, if we were forced into a war, so help him God, he would rather at once tamely submit our honor and independence than maintain them in this economical way. If we went to war, we ought not to adopt little measures for the purpose of executing them with little means; neither should we refuse to adopt great measures, because they could not be executed but with great means. It was very true that, in war as well as in peace, calculation to a certain extent was necessary; but, if they once resolved on an object, it must be executed at whatever expense. He was no advocate for standing armies or navies, generally speaking; but, in discharging his duties here, he must be governed by the circumstances of every case which presented itself for his decision, and then ask himself, Is it wise, politic, and prudent, to do this or omit that? He said he would never go back to yesterday to discover what he had then said or done, in order to ascertain what he should now do or say. Political conduct must depend on circumstances. What was right yesterday might be wrong to-day. Nay, what was right at the moment he rose to address the House, might, ere this, be palpably wrong. Conduct depended on events, which depended on the folly or caprice of men; and, as they changed, events would change. It might have been a good doctrine long ago that this country ought to have a navy competent to cope with a detachment of the British navy; it might have been good doctrine then, but was shocking doctrine now.

At that time England had to contend with the navies of Russia, Denmark, France, Holland, Spain, &c. Now England was sole mistress of the ocean. To fight her ship to ship and man to man, and it was impossible that gentlemen could think of fighting her otherwise, if they fought her at all, we must build up a huge navy at an immense expense. We must determine to become less agricultural and more commercial; to incur a debt of five hundred or a thousand million of dollars, and all the loans and taxes attendant on such a system, and all the corruption attendant on them. He should as soon think of embarking an hundred thousand men for the purpose of attacking France at her threshold, as of building so many ships to oppose the British navy. It was out of the question; no rational man could think of it. But that was not now the question. It was, whether we would call into actual service the little navy we possessed. It was not even a question whether we would have a navy at all or not. If that were the question, he would not hesitate to say that even our present political condition required a navy to a certain extent, to protect our commerce against the Barbary Powers in peace, and in time of war for convoys to our merchantmen. He only meant a few fast-sailing frigates, such a navy as we have at present, for the purpose of harassing the commerce of our enemies also. He therefore thought our present naval force ought to be put in service. As far as the appropriation ($400,000) would go, it would be employed; but if Congress should hereafter see cause to countermand or delay the preparation, they would have it in their power to do so by refusing a further appropriation.

Mr. D. R. Williams said it was his misfortune to differ with gentlemen upon all points on the subject of the navy. He was opposed to it from stem to stern; and gentlemen who attempted to argue in favor of it as a matter of necessity, involved themselves in absurdities they were not aware of. When money had been appropriated for fortifications, there had been no intimation that it would be necessary to prop them up with a naval force. If our towns could not be defended by fortifications, he asked, would ten frigates defend them? The gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. Story) had even gone so far as to say that a single gunboat could sweep one-half of our harbors. If a single gunboat could now sweep most of our harbors, Mr. W. said he should like to know what eleven hundred and thirty vessels of war could do, even when opposed by our whole force of ten frigates! The gentleman from Massachusetts had said it would be cheaper to keep these vessels in actual service than in their present situation. Mr. W. said he supposed that the gentlemen meant that they would rot faster in their present situation than if they were at sea. He said he was for keeping them where they were, and would rather contribute to place them in a situation where they would rot faster. Mr. W. combated the arguments that employing the navy would afford relief to our seamen, and that the maintaining a navy on our coast would be more expensive to an European power than the support of a larger naval force by us. And he said we should never be able to man any considerable fleet except the constitution were amended to permit impressments, following the example of Great Britain.

The gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. Story) had said that except we begun with this bill, and got his fast-sailing frigates, we should never regain our rights. If that were really the case, Mr. W. said he was ready to abandon them. He considered that the sort of maintenance of our rights adverted to by the gentleman from Massachusetts, would be destructive to those rights. Gentlemen must have forgotten that when Hamburg was in the greatest state of prosperity, she did not possess even a single gunboat. Why! there was not wealth enough in this whole nation, if every one were to carry his all, thus to maintain our rights against the navy of Great Britain. If we were carried into a war, and every thing really seemed to be tending that way, we must rely upon the enterprise of our citizens; and that, when set at liberty, would be found more desperate than the navy of any country. When we arrived at the end of the Revolutionary war we had but one frigate, and the best thing we ever did was to give that one away. The State of South Carolina had not yet got clear of the curse. She embarked one frigate in the general struggle, and she had not rid herself of the debts incurred by it yet. Private enterprise must be depended upon. The people from the Eastward had shown in the last war what they would do. When vessels were loaded with sugar they would fight like bull-dogs for it. He recollected a story, he said, of one of our privateers being beat off by a Jamaica man, whom they attacked. The captain not liking to lose the prize, and finding his crew disheartened, told them she was full of sugar. "Is she?" said they, "by G—d; let us at them again." They scarcely ever failed in their enterprises.

In allusion to the case at Savannah, Mr. W. regretted that an insult should be offered to the people of the country. The insult at Savannah had by this time been redressed, he had no doubt. He had no information to induce him to believe so, but the knowledge that the sloop-of-war Hornet was stationed off Charleston, and of course cruised near the place. The Hornet was perfectly adequate to drive any vessel of twenty guns out of our waters. She was one of the best vessels of the United States, and as well officered as any. [Mr. Troup observed that the Hornet was off Charleston. Now, he wanted a frigate at Savannah.] Mr. W. said that Savannah was the very place where gunboats would be perfectly effectual. He meant to make no reflection against the proposer of the gunboat system, but he did against those who had only given one-half of the system, and omitted the other—the marine militia. And now, when an attack was menaced at Savannah, gentlemen wanted a frigate! If nine-tenths of the people were opposed to the evasions of the embargo law, Mr. W. said it would not be evaded. The evaders would be considered as traitors—as the worst of traitors. As to preparing a force for the protection of navigation, the gentleman from Georgia must well know that the whole revenue of the United States would not be competent to maintain a sufficient number of vessels to convoy our merchantmen.

Mr. W. concluded by saying, that he wished the nation to be protected, and its wrongs to be redressed; but when he reflected that at Castine the soil had been most abominably violated, he could not view the insults in our waters as being equal to it; for, said he, touch the soil and you touch the life-blood of every man in it.

Mr. Durell considered the present subject as one of the most important which had been introduced at this session. It would indeed be difficult to reason gentlemen into a modification of a principle to which they were opposed throughout; but he trusted that this House was not generally so disposed. He believed that a large majority of the House were at the present moment in favor of embargo or war, because the House had been so distinctly told by a committee on our foreign relations, that there was no alternative but submission; and almost every gentleman who had the honor of a seat within these walls, had committed himself on the subject, either to persevere in the embargo or resort to war. What would be the object of a war? Not the right of the soil, not our territorial limits, but the right of navigating the ocean. Were we to redress those wrongs, those commercial injuries, on the land? Not altogether, he conceived. Would it be good policy, he asked, to let our means of carrying on war on the ocean rot in our docks, and not make use of them? These vessels would also be useful as a defence. Why then should they not be manned and put in readiness for service? It was said that we could not cope with the British navy. Mr. D. said this argument proved too much, if it proved any thing. If he did not feel perfectly comfortable in a cold day, should he therefore divest himself of all clothing? Why send out the sloop of war Hornet, alluded to by the gentleman last up—why rely upon it for redressing the insult at Savannah, if naval force was useless? It was no reason, because Great Britain had more vessels than we, that we should not use what we had. Indeed, those gentlemen who objected to naval force, appeared to be mostly from the interior, and of course could not properly estimate its value.

Mr. Sawyer was wholly opposed to the amendments from the Senate. The objection to this particular increase of naval force on the score of expense, was not to be disregarded. He called the attention of gentlemen to the state of the Treasury. The expense of this system would be three millions; and when this sum was added to other sums which would be requisite if measures now pending were adopted, it would render it necessary for Congress now to borrow money on the credit of posterity. The expedient of direct taxation would not be resorted to. It had already been the death-blow to the political existence of one Administration. This Government, he said, was founded on public opinion, and whenever the approbation of the people was withdrawn, from whatever cause, the whole superstructure must fall.

Mr. S. dwelt at some length on the disadvantage of loans. He said, if this nation was destined to raise a navy for the protection of commerce, it should have begun earlier, in the year 1793, when such outrageous violations had been committed on our commerce. The expense of such an establishment would have far exceeded the amount in value of captures made since that period. He concluded, from a number of observations which he made on this subject, that, on the score of the protection of trade, it would not be proper to fit out a navy. This proposition, he said, was the mere entering-wedge. The system was either unnecessary, or would be wholly futile in practice. Our seamen would cost us at least double of what is the expense of her seamen to Great Britain; and it required her utmost exertions to pay the interest of the enormous debt with which her unwieldy navy had saddled her. He therefore certainly thought that an attempt to justify it on the score of profit would not succeed. He deprecated the extension of Executive patronage, which would result from an increase of the Naval Establishment. Need he go back, he asked, to the time when the black cockade was necessary, in some parts of the country, to secure a man from insult from the officers of the navy? He wished to limit the Executive patronage; to adhere closely to the maxims of our forefathers. By sending out a navy, too, he said, we should volunteer to support the ascendency of the British navy, become the mere jackals of the British lion. Mr. S. went at some length into an examination of the former Administration in relation to a navy. There was nothing, he observed, in the nature of our Government, or of our foreign relations, to require a navy. If we could not carry on foreign commerce without a navy, he wished to have less of it and more of internal commerce, of that commerce which the natural advantages of the country would support between different parts of it. If we were to build a navy for the protection of foreign commerce, we should throw away our natural advantages for the sake of artificial ones. He was in favor of the embargo at present. There was more virtue in our barrels of flour as to coercion than in all the guns of our navy; and we had lately given our adversaries a supplementary broadside, which he hoped would tell well. Mr. S. stated the origin and progress of navies at some length, commencing with the Republic of Genoa. Our chief reliance as to defence must be on our militia. So little did Great Britain now rely on her navy for defence of her soil, that she had called upon every man in the country to be at his post, if danger came. Other nations might be justified in supporting a naval force, because they had colonies separated from them by the sea, with whom they were obliged to have means of intercourse, but we had not that apology for a navy. Mr. S. concluded his observations, after speaking near an hour, not, he said, that he had gone through the subject; but, as it was late in the day, he yielded the floor to some other gentleman.