TWELFTH CONGRESS.—SECOND SESSION. PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES. (continued 4)

2d. Whether there is a probability of obtaining a recognition of this principle by a continuance of the war.

The foreigners employed in our service are those who have not been naturalized, and those who have taken the benefit of our naturalization laws. The former constitute nearly the whole: the latter class is very inconsiderable. The foreigners of the first description, of course, were in competition with our native seamen, and either exclude them from employment, or lessen the rate of their wages. In this way, then, the employment of foreign seamen is an injury to our native seamen; and, in a national point of view, it may well be questioned, whether their employment subserves the permanent and solid interest of the country.

Is it not, sir, of the first importance to us, as a commercial and maritime nation, especially when it may be engaged in a war with a great naval power, to be able to have a sufficient number of native seamen employed in our service? Seamen, who shall be attached by every tie to this country, and on whom we can depend for its defence in time of danger?

This, sir, it is presumed, cannot be denied. If so, is it not the dictate of wisdom and of sound policy for us to give encouragement to our native seamen in preference to those of any foreign country?

The situation in which we now are proves the correctness, as well as the importance, of the position. We are now at war with Great Britain. And, at the very time when this war was declared, thousands of British seamen who had not been naturalized in this country, were, and they still continue in our employment. These seamen (I am speaking, sir, of those not naturalized) are now claimed as British subjects, and, indeed, by our own laws, are now considered as alien enemies. Will gentlemen suffer me to turn their attention to this last fact?

By a law passed the 6th of July, 1798, it is enacted, that "whenever there shall be a declared war between the United States and any foreign nation or Government, &c., all natives, citizens, denizens, or subjects, of the hostile nation or Government, being males of the age of fourteen years and upwards, who shall be within the United States, and not actually naturalized, shall be liable to be apprehended, restrained, secured, and removed, as alien enemies." Ought we, sir, to depend upon these men to man our fleets, or to defend our ports and harbors? So far as foreigners of this description are concerned, I do not hesitate to say that it is not for the interest of this country that our flag should protect them, and that I will never consent to continue this war for the maintenance of this principle on their account. It is well known, sir, that not only Great Britain, but that France, and all the nations of Europe, claim a right to the services of all their subjects in time of war. In the exercise of this right, the history of Europe shows that, at the commencement of almost all wars, proclamations have been issued by the belligerent powers, recalling their subjects to aid in the defence of their respective countries. During the present war in Europe, this has been done by Great Britain, by France, and the other belligerent powers. With respect to this claim of allegiance, it is not my intention to enter into the discussion whether, in the abstract, it is well or ill founded. This would lead me too far, and would tend to no practical good. I will, however, observe, that it is a right, a claim, which has been long exercised in Europe, and has been sanctioned and acknowledged by the most able and distinguished European writers on public law.

With respect to foreigners, who have been naturalized under our laws, the question is of a more distinct nature, and presents greater difficulties. We ought, undoubtedly, to fulfill all our obligations towards them. What these obligations are, and how far they extend, are questions about which a diversity of sentiment may prevail.—While they remain within our territories, and within our exclusive jurisdiction, they are shielded by the general principle, that all within our dominion and exclusive jurisdiction, are, of course, protected against all claims whatever, and never to be molested in any way without our consent. But, sir, when they go without our territories, and beyond our exclusive jurisdiction, and come within the sphere of the claim of their former Government, the opinion of the best writers on public law seems to be, that the obligation of the country, under whose laws they have been naturalized, does not extend to guaranty them against such claims, unless their allegiance was changed with the consent of their former Government. But, sir, whatever speculative opinions may be entertained on this subject, the number of naturalized seamen is so small, that few, if any, can be of opinion that we ought to have declared war, or that we ought to continue it on their account alone. The whole number of seamen naturalized from 1796 to 1810, as appears by the returns made to the Department of State, is 1,332. This includes those of all nations. What proportion of these were British, or how many of them are now in our service, it is impossible to determine. I presume, however, the number of naturalized British seamen now in our employ does not exceed two or three hundred. Shall we, sir, continue the war for these men?

I am aware, sir, that with respect to impressment from our merchant vessels, abuses have happened, that although the right of taking American citizens is not claimed, the British commanders have not been scrupulous whether they took British subjects or American citizens. Sir, these abuses I never can, and I never will justify. I am satisfied, however, that they have been exaggerated.

But, sir, let me ask, if we have not really intended to protect foreign seamen under our flag, if we have not been guilty of gross negligence, to say the least of it, towards our native seamen? whether, by our laws, and the practice under them, we have afforded them all that protection and security to which they are entitled?

In 1796, Congress passed an act for the relief and protection of American seamen. By this act, the collectors of the several ports were directed, on application, to enter the names of seamen, being citizens of the United States, to grant them certificates, in a form given in the act. In this certificate, the collector is to describe the person of the applicant: also, to declare that, on proof produced to him agreeable to the act, the seaman is a citizen of the United States of America.

It is not a little singular that, although the proof of citizenship to be produced to the collector must be agreeable to the directions of the act, the act itself nowhere directs what that proof must be. Every collector, therefore, has, under this act, used his own discretion, or has pursued such directions as he may have received from the Government as to the kind of proof. What, sir, has been the practice under this law? Have those certificates, or protections, as they are commonly called, been confined to bona fide American citizens? No, sir; we cannot, we ought not, to shut our eyes against facts too notorious to be concealed or denied. Under this act, made expressly for the protection of American seamen, every foreign seaman, almost, at the moment of setting his feet on our shores, has obtained a certificate from some collector, that he is a citizen of the United States; and, with this certificate in his pocket, although perhaps a deserter from his own Government, he enters a public or private vessel, as an American seaman. The mode of obtaining proof of citizenship is well understood. Among other modes, some of which are too disgraceful to be mentioned in this place, those foreign seamen will go before a magistrate, and, although hardly able to speak the English language intelligibly, will swear, for each other, that they were born within the United States, and are American citizens. On such proof, a proof of this sort, the collector issues his certificate.

It will be recollected, sir, that this subject was brought before this House during the last session, in a case from Philadelphia, when a certificate of this kind was obtained by the most flagrant and avowed act of perjury on the part of a foreigner who had just arrived in this country. It was found, on inquiry, that there was no law, either of Pennsylvania or of the United States, to punish the man for this act of false swearing. Not only have these protections been thus obtained by fraud and perjury, but they have also, long since, been an object of barter; they have been bought and sold, and transferred from one to another, not only in this country, but in foreign countries.

To show the extent of this traffic in seamen's protections, permit me to state some facts, of which I have no doubt, knowing the source from whence I have derived them. An American captain having a ship in Bristol, in England, without a crew, he applied to a man who kept a boarding-house for sailors, to procure a crew of American sailors in port; he showed him a great number of American protections, which he agreed to sell him for two guineas each, and with the aid of these to procure him a crew. By high wages, and by suiting these protections to the description of British sailors, he procured this captain his ship's crew; not only so, but when the ship was about to sail, and it was doubtful whether those who had engaged for the voyage would actually go on board, this man actually procured some of a press gang to take them as American sailors, who had deserted from their ships, and put them on board. When we ourselves place no confidence in these certificates, when we know that they are thus obtained by fraud and perjury, can we expect that foreign nations will give credit to them? Instead of being a shield and protection to the real American sailor, they have become a dangerous weapon of offence.

If, sir, it is not for the permanent interest of the United States to employ so many transient foreign seamen, we ought long since, not only to have refused these false protections, but to have passed laws for the encouragement of our native seamen, similar to those which have been adopted in commercial countries, and are commonly called navigation acts. This would, in some measure, have relieved us from the evils which we now experience, in consequence of the employment of so many foreign seamen.

Tuesday, January 5.

Additional Military Force.

The House resumed the order of the day on the bill for raising an additional military force of 20,000 men for one year, the question being on the passage of the bill to a third reading.

Mr. Boyd.—Mr. Speaker: It is with great diffidence that I address the Chair. When the bill now before the House was under discussion on Saturday last; that is, the then proposed amendment to insert eighteen months, instead of one year, I was offering my reasons why I thought that that amendment ought to prevail; when, unfortunately for me, I was considered as taking too great a latitude, and prevented from connecting my remarks. As there is little difference, in point of principle, as the bill then was and now is, I embrace this opportunity to make up that deficiency, and will now take care to stick as close as possible to the text.

Sir, I am opposed to passing the bill to a third reading, because I believe it to be altogether inadequate to the purpose intended to be accomplished by it. Sir, when I last addressed the Chair, I then took a retrospective view of our past expectations, plans, and propositions, from which we expected to derive great advantages. Such were the expectations of that time, that I did not accord with them. Those expectations have not been realized; but, instead thereof, we have met with disappointments and misfortunes. I thought that viewing the errors of the past was the most certain way to avoid the future; and I am not at this time sensible of that being erroneous.

Mr. Speaker, I am an old man, and not in the habit of public speaking; and if I have not the faculty of composing my arguments in so connected a form as a lawyer's special pleadings, I hope the House will excuse me, and grant me their indulgence to do it in such form as my capacity will admit of.

[The Speaker observed that it was unpleasant to the Chair that the gentleman should indulge in such remarks; he had certainly no wish not to give full latitude to debate. Mr. B. said he stood corrected, and was allowed to proceed.]

Then, Mr. Speaker, I object, because, in my opinion, it is not calculated to produce the desired effect, or that which is intended by it: that is, to raise a force competent to the conquest of the Canadas in the given time. I will ask how many regiments you have in your present establishment? Say thirty-five, and you add twenty, making together fifty-five: what use is there in multiplying regiments without men? The Chairman did state that from prudential motives, he had thought it inexpedient to give the number now actually in service, or enlisted by the present establishment. Sir, it is not my wish to go into a strict inquiry; the regard I have for the honor of my country forbids me; but I will suppose seventeen thousand, and, I believe, that is large; then there is left officers for eighteen thousand men. Are these not sufficient for the recruiting service? to engage every man who is willing to serve his country? to place a recruiting officer in almost every town and village in the United States? They are; and, therefore, you ought not to create an unnecessary addition. If the present establishment is not full, what is the reason? Either that the pay and bounty are not sufficient inducements, or there is a dislike to the service; your creating more regiments will not remove that difficulty. I am against the bill, because the term of service is too short to answer any valuable purpose. Suppose them intended to operate as a force against Canada. Let us see how that will answer the purpose: You send out your warrants to commence the enlistment of the proposed troops at this time; how long a time, is it contemplated, will be necessary for their enlistment? My opinion is, that you will not have them half full in four months; it is then time to take the field, and they are then raw troops. The honorable Chairman (Mr. D. R. Williams) states to you the number of troops necessary for defensive operations, according to his calculation, to be ten thousand; deducting that number from the present establishment, supposing it to be full. It is not for me to say how far the present establishment is short of the whole number, or will be at that time; but we know that it is far short; we do not know that it can be filled, and if it cannot, then those calculations are fictitious. He also states to you that the regular force in the Canadas is not to be estimated at less than twelve thousand, and three thousand in Halifax, besides their militia. According to this, and my views, you cannot enter Canada the next campaign with man for man; and surely that is not sufficient for conquest in an enemy's country. But I will suppose that you conquer a part of the country; that part must be garrisoned if you will keep it. In a year from the time of enlistment their term expires, and what becomes of your conquest, without force to keep it, supposing it to be made? Say that the officers will be called into service in four months, and there is some of the men enlisted six or eight months hence; the officers must serve until the expiration of the term of the last man engaged, or a derangement must take place—always a disagreeable occurrence in an army.

Sir, if you have not numbers sufficient to bear down all opposition, invade it not: act on the defensive until you have engaged your men, and for a term of time sufficient to answer your purpose; then may you count upon success and honor. I do not say that I believe land conquests will produce an acknowledgment of our rights on the ocean. I believe it will not; but unless you act with great regularity, system, and economy, you cannot avoid it; you must meet with nothing but disappointments and disgrace.

Mr. Law said as he was originally opposed to the war, and the preparatory steps which led to it, he could not admit the principle, that because war was declared he was bound to acquiesce, and lend his aid to promote every plan for prosecuting the war which might be proposed, however wild and extravagant the same might appear. He said he felt it a duty, and he claimed it as a right, (although he was not ambitious very often to exercise the right,) to offer objections to any measures which might be introduced, if he supposed they were not calculated to produce the effect intended, although he might not be in favor of the object itself; or if he believed the measure proposed would be productive of real evil. Now, sir, on this important occasion it would be wise for a moment to look back, and if we can bear the pain of retrospection, consider what this nation once was, what it might be, and what it in fact is. Time was, and that within the recollection of us all, when industry, commerce, prosperity, and peace, gladdened the hearts of this once happy people, and the use of arms was known only as a pacific pastime. The nation, like some individuals, could not bear the intoxicating influence of prosperity. It might have preserved its enviable condition, but it labored and groaned under the weight of national blessings; it submitted to regard the sinister views and malign influence of foreign powers; it listened—fatally listened—to a serpent more fell than the serpent of old. And now how sad is the reverse, let a dejected and impoverished nation answer; in the past, we see departed comforts; before us, we behold ruin and distress. The unhappy crisis to which we have arrived has been progressive. Had the transition been sudden, the nation would have been driven to desperation. We have been often admonished by those who foresaw the present evils; and had we been wise, might have avoided the calamities in which the country is now involved, and from which there is at present no prospect of speedy relief.

Sir, we will no longer dwell on times past; we will now briefly notice the causes which were alleged in the manifestoes which immediately preceded the declaration of war, and what was said to be the object, and attempt to show that the bill now under consideration is unnecessary for the attainment of the original object; that it will be injurious to the militia, and may endanger the liberties of the country.

As to the causes of the war, without admitting or denying their justice on national principles to justify the act at the time it was declared, he might say that some of the pretended causes have never been seriously relied on by our own Government. The principal one has been wholly removed; and but one of the ingenious catalogue now remains, and that might easily be adjusted to the mutual satisfaction of both nations. And, sir, it ought not to be forgotten, that the act declaring war was carried with great labor and much reluctance; and such was the majority in each branch of Congress that it might well have justified a doubt as to the expediency when it did pass. Besides, a large proportion of the United States were then, and even since have been opposed to the act. And this opposition was not confined to those who have been slanderously reported to be in the interest of Great Britain. The disgust and abhorrence was felt by some of the best patriots and purest bosoms in the country. Experience has also proved that the public sentiment was against the war; witness the feeble ranks of your volunteers, the slow and reluctant march of the militia, and the tardy progress in the recruiting service. Sir, the disgrace and disasters which have hitherto attended the army, have resulted more from a want of confidence in the justice and propriety of the war, than from the lack of talents in those who have conducted the battles, incompetent as they have been represented to command. A nation like this cannot be driven to war. They must feel the justice and necessity of it, and the justice must be so strong as to pierce every heart. This would be felt in a necessary and defensive war; then, indeed, the nation would smite with one arm. Before such a people, roused in such a cause, the veteran legions of Napoleon would be compelled to bite the dust. Such, alas! is not our case. We have a war, without the spirit or unanimity which springs from these causes, and without the pecuniary means of supporting it. Such a war must be disastrous! On what, sir, is the honor of this nation now suspended? On the Navy! that little navy which was despised, neglected, and forgotten, until it fought itself into notice, and rescued the sinking honor of the country.

What, sir, was the avowed object of this war? It has ever been said that conquest, with a view of extending our territory, and enlarging our dominion, was not the wish of this Government. The idea of this Republic following the footsteps of foreign ambitious nations, was so repugnant to the genius of the American people, and the constitution under which we live, that few, if any, of the warmest advocates of the war dare avow it.

The pretence was to take, or rather to receive Canada; for it was vainly supposed the inhabitants of that province would readily join our standard, on the first invitation. But we must go through the form of conquest to protect them from the charge of treason to their own Government. We were to hold Canada until peace should return, and then it was to be delivered up in exchange for maritime rights. And this it was supposed would be a powerful weapon in our hands in the negotiation. With this view the bills augmenting the Army, raising the volunteers, and transferring the militia, passed. By the present bill, and the project connected with it, the original plan is abandoned with the volunteers and militia, and we are now presented with a compound system of conquest, extermination, and defence. It would seem with the force of fifty-five thousand regular troops, we are to conquer all the residue of North America; exterminate every tawny infidel this side of the Isthmus of Darien, and defend a seacoast many hundred miles in extent from the incursions of the enemy! This is truly a gigantic project. He said he could not give it his aid; and he thought some honorable gentlemen who voted for the war would, when they reflected on the magnitude of the scheme now presented, seize this occasion to retire, unwilling to entail on themselves and posterity the expense and ruin which would flow from the project, if carried into execution.

Mr. Quincy.—Mr. Speaker, I fear that the state of my health may prevent my doing justice to my sentiments concerning this bill. I will, however, make the attempt though I should fail in it.

The bill proposes that 20,000 men should be added to the existing Military Establishment. This, at present, consists of 35,000 men. So that the effect of this bill is to place, at the disposal of the Executive, an army of 55,000. It is not pretended that this addition is wanted either for defence or for the relief of the Indian frontier. On the contrary, it is expressly acknowledged that the present establishment is sufficient for both of those objects. But the purpose for which these 20,000 men are demanded is, the invasion of Canada. This is unequivocally avowed by the chairman of the Committee of Military Affairs, (Mr. D. R. Williams,) the organ, as is admitted, of the will and the wishes of the American Cabinet.

The bill, therefore, brings, necessarily, into deliberation, the conquest of Canada, either as an object, in itself desirable, or consequentially advantageous, by its effect, in producing an early and honorable peace.[31]

Before I enter upon the discussion of those topics, which naturally arise from this state of the subject, I will ask your indulgence, for one moment, while I make a few remarks upon this intention of the American Cabinet thus unequivocally avowed. I am induced to this from the knowledge, which I have, that this design is not deemed to be serious by some men of both political parties; as well within this House as out of it. I know that some of the friends of the present Administration do consider the proposition as a mere feint, made for the purpose of putting a good face upon things, and of strengthening the hope of a successful negotiation, by exciting the apprehensions of the British Cabinet for the fate of their colonies. I know, also, that some of those who are opposed in political sentiment to the men who are now at the head of affairs, laugh at these schemes of invasion; and deem them hardly worth controversy, on account of their opinion of the imbecility of the American Cabinet, and the embarrassment of its resources.

I am anxious that no doubt should exist upon this subject either in the House or in the nation. Whosoever considers the object of this bill to be any other than that which has been avowed, is mistaken. Whosoever believes this bill to be a means of peace, or any thing else than an instrument of vigorous and long-protracted war, is grievously deceived. And whoever acts under such mistake, or such deception, will have to lament one of the grossest, and perhaps one of the most critical errors of his political life. I warn, therefore, my political opponents; those honest men, of whom I know there are some, who, paying only a general attention to the course of public affairs, submit the guidance of their opinions to the men who stand at the helm, not to vote for this bill under any belief that its object is to aid negotiation for peace. Let such gentlemen recur to their past experience on similar occasions. They will find that it has been always the case, whenever any obnoxious measure is about to be passed, that its passage is assisted by the aid of some such collateral suggestions. No sooner do the Cabinet perceive that any potion, which they intend to administer, is loathed by a considerable part of the majority, and that their apprehensions are alive lest it should have a scouring effect upon their popularity, than certain under-operators are set to work, whose business it is to amuse the minds, and beguile the attention of the patients while the dose is swallowing. The language always is: "Trust the Cabinet doctors. The medicine will not operate as you imagine, but quite another way." After this manner the fears of the men are allayed, and the purposes of the Administration are attained under suggestions very different from the true motives. Thus, the embargo, which has since been unequivocally acknowledged to have been intended to coerce Great Britain, was adopted, as the Executive asserted, "to save our essential resources." So, also, when the present war was declared against Great Britain, members of the House were known to state that they voted for it under the suggestion that it would not be a war of ten days: that it was known that Mr. Foster had instructions to make definitive arrangements, in his pocket; and that the United States had only to advance to the point of war, and the whole business would be settled. And now an army, which, in point of numbers, Cromwell might envy, greater than that with which Cæsar passed the Rubicon, is to be helped through a reluctant Congress, under the suggestion of its being only a parade force, to make negotiation successful; that it is the incipient state of a project for a grand pacification!

I warn also my political friends. These gentlemen are apt to place great reliance on their own intelligence and sagacity. Some of these will tell you that the invasion of Canada is impossible. They ask where are the men—where is the money to be obtained? And they talk very wisely concerning common sense and common prudence, and will show, with much learning, how this attempt is an offence against both the one and the other. But, sir, it has been my lot to be an observer of the character and conduct of the men now in power for these eight years past. And I state, without hesitation, that no scheme ever was, or ever will be, rejected by them, merely on account of its running counter to the ordinary dictates of common sense and common prudence. On the contrary, on that very account, I believe it more likely to be both suggested and adopted by them. And, what may appear a paradox, for that very reason, the chance is rather increased that it will be successful.

I could illustrate this position twenty ways. I shall content myself with remarking only upon two instances, and those recent; the present war, and the late invasion of Canada. When war against Great Britain was proposed at the last session, there were thousands in these United States, and I confess to you I was myself among the number, who believed not one word of the matter. I put my trust in the old fashioned notions of common sense, and common prudence. That a people, which had been more than twenty years at peace, should enter upon hostilities against a people which had been twenty years at war; that a nation, whose army and navy were little more than nominal, should engage in a war with a nation possessing one of the best appointed armies and the most powerful marine on the globe; that a country, to which neutrality had been a perpetual harvest, should throw that great blessing away for a controversy in which nothing was to be gained, and every thing valuable put in jeopardy; from these, and innumerable like considerations, the idea seemed so absurd that I never once entertained it as possible. And now, after war has been declared, the whole affair seems so extraordinary and so utterly irreconcilable to any previous suggestions of wisdom and duty, that I know not what to make of it or how to believe it. Even at this moment my mind is very much in the state of certain Pennsylvania Germans, of whom I have heard it asserted that they are taught to believe, by their political leaders, and do at this moment consider the allegation, that war is at present existing between the United States and Great Britain, to be a "federal falsehood."

It was just so with respect to the invasion of Canada. I heard of it last June. I laughed at the idea, as did multitudes of others, as an attempt too absurd for serious examination. I was in this case again beset by common sense and common prudence. That the United States should precipitate itself upon the unoffending people of that neighboring colony, unmindful of all previously subsisting amities, because the parent State, three thousand miles distant, had violated some of our commercial rights; that we should march inland, to defend our ships, and seamen; that with raw troops, hastily collected, miserably appointed, and destitute of discipline, we should invade a country defended by veteran forces, at least equal, in point of numbers, to the invading army; that bounty should be offered and proclamations issued, inviting the subjects of a foreign power to treason and rebellion, under the influences of a quarter of the country upon which a retort of the same nature was so obvious, so easy, and, in its consequences, so awful; in every aspect, the design seemed so fraught with danger and disgrace, that it appeared absolutely impossible that it should be seriously entertained. Those, however, who reasoned after this manner were, as the event proved, mistaken. The war was declared. Canada was invaded. We were in haste to plunge into these great difficulties, and we have now reason, as well as leisure enough, for regret and repentance.

The great mistake of all those, who reasoned concerning the war and the invasion of Canada, and concluded that it was impossible that either should be seriously intended, resulted from this, that they never took into consideration the connection of both those events with the great election for the Chief Magistracy which was then pending. It never was sufficiently considered by them, that plunging into war with Great Britain was among the conditions on which the support for the Presidency was made dependent. They did not understand, that an invasion of Canada was to be in truth only a mode of carrying on an electioneering campaign. But since events have explained political purposes, there is no difficulty in seeing the connections between projects and interests. It is now apparent to the most mole-sighted how a nation may be disgraced, and yet a Cabinet attain its desired honors. All is clear. A country may be ruined, in making an Administration happy.

I said, Mr. Speaker, that such strange schemes, apparently irreconcilable to common sense and common prudence, were, on that very account, more likely to be successful. Sir, there is an audacity, which sometimes stands men instead both of genius and strength. And most assuredly, he is most likely to perform that which no man ever did before, and will never be likely to do again, who has the boldness to undertake that which no man ever thought of attempting in time past, and no man will ever think of attempting in time future. I would not, however, be understood as intimating that this Cabinet project of invasion is impracticable, either as it respects the collection of means and instruments, or in the ultimate result. On the contrary, sir, I deem both very feasible. Men may be obtained. For if forty dollars bounty cannot obtain them, a hundred dollars bounty may, and the intention is explicitly avowed not to suffer the attainment of the desired army to be prevented by any vulgar notions of economy. Money may be obtained. What by means of the increased popularity derived from the augmentation of the navy, what by opening subscription offices in the interior of the country, what by large premiums, the cupidity of the moneyed interest may be tempted beyond the point of patriotic resistance, and all the attained means being diverted to the use of the army, pecuniary resources may be obtained, ample at least for the first year. And, sir, let an army of thirty thousand men be collected, let them be put under the command of a popular leader, let them be officered to suit his purposes, let them be flushed with victories, and see the fascinating career of military glory opening upon them, and they will not thereafter ever be deficient in resources. If they cannot obtain their pay by your votes, they will collect it by their own bayonets; and they will not rigidly observe any air-lines or water-lines in enforcing their necessary levies; nor be stayed by abstract speculation concerning right, or learned constitutional difficulties.

I will now proceed to discuss those topics which naturally arise out of the bill under consideration, and examine the proposed invasion of Canada, at three different points of view.

1. As a means of carrying on the subsisting war.

2. As a means of obtaining an early and honorable peace.

3. As a means of advancing the personal and local projects of ambition of the members of the American Cabinet.

Concerning the invasion of Canada, as a means of carrying on the subsisting war, it is my duty to speak plainly and decidedly, not only because I herein express my own opinions upon the subject, but, as I conscientiously believe, the sentiments also of a very great majority of that whole section of country in which I have the happiness to reside. I say then, sir, that I consider the invasion of Canada as a means of carrying on this war, as cruel, wanton, senseless, and wicked.

You will easily understand, Mr. Speaker, by this very statement of opinion, that I am not one of that class of politicians which has for so many years predominated in the world, on both sides of the Atlantic. You will readily believe, that I am not one of those who worship in that temple, where Condorcet is the High Priest and Machiavel the God. With such politicians the end always sanctifies the means; the least possible good to themselves perfectly justifies, according to their creed, the inflicting the greatest possible evil upon others. In the judgment of such men, if a corrupt ministry at three thousand miles distance shall have done them an injury, it is an ample cause to visit with desolation a peaceable and unoffending race of men, their neighbors, who happen to be associated with that ministry by ties of mere political dependence. What though these colonies be so remote from the sphere of the questions in controversy, that their ruin or prosperity could have no possible influence upon the result? What though their cities offer no plunder? What though their conquest can yield no glory? In their ruin there is revenge. And revenge to such politicians is the sweetest of all morsels. With such men, neither I nor the people of that section of country in which I reside hold any communion. There is between us and them no one principle of sympathy either in motive or action.

That wise, moral, reflecting people, which constitute the great mass of the population of Massachusetts—indeed, of all New England—look for the sources of their political duties nowhere else than in those fountains from which spring their moral duties. According to their estimate of human life and its obligations, both political and moral duties emanate from the nature of things, and from the essential and eternal relations which subsist among them. True it is, that a state of war gives the right to seize and appropriate the property and territories of an enemy. True it is, that the colonies of a foreign power are viewed, according to the law of nations, in the light of its property. But in estimating the propriety of carrying desolation into the peaceful abodes of their neighbors, the people of New England will not limit their contemplation to the mere circumstance of abstract right, nor ask what lawyers and jurisprudists have written or said, as if this was conclusive upon the subject. That people are much addicted to think for themselves, and in canvassing the propriety of such an invasion, they will consider the actual condition of those colonies, their natural relations to us, and the effect which their conquest and ruin will have, not only upon the people of those colonies, but upon themselves, and their own liberties and constitution. And above all, what I know will seem strange to some of those who hear me, they will not forget to apply to a case occurring between nations, as far as is practicable, that heaven-descended rule which the great author and founder of their religion has given them for the regulation of their conduct towards each other. They will consider it the duty of these United States to act towards those colonies as they would wish those colonies to act, in exchange of circumstances, towards these United States.

The actual condition of those colonies, and the relation in which they stood to the United States antecedent to the declaration of war, were of this nature. Those colonies had no connection with the questions in dispute between us and their parent State. They had done us no injury. They meditated none to us. Between the inhabitants of those colonies and the citizens of the United States, the most friendly and mutually useful intercourse subsisted. The borderers on this, and those on the other side of the St. Lawrence, and of the boundary line, scarcely realized that they were subjects of different governments. They interchanged expressions and acts of civility. Intermarriages took place among them. The Canadian sometimes settled in the United States; sometimes our citizens emigrated to Canada. After the declaration of war, had they any disposition to assail us? We have the reverse expressly in evidence. They desired nothing so much as to keep perfect the then subsisting relations of amity. Would the conquest of those colonies shake the policy of the British cabinet? No man has shown it. Unqualified assertions, it is true, have been made, but totally unsupported by any evidence, or even the pretence of argument. On the contrary, nothing was more obvious than that an invasion of Canada must strengthen the Ministry of Great Britain, by the excitement and sympathy which would be occasioned in the people of that country in consequence of the sufferings of the innocent inhabitants of those colonies, on account of a dispute in which they had no concern, and of which they had scarcely a knowledge. All this was anticipated—all this was frequently urged to this House, at the last and preceding sessions, as the necessary effect of such a measure. The event has justified those predictions. The late elections in Great Britain have terminated in the complete triumph of the friends of the British Ministry. In effecting this change, the conduct of the United States in relation to Canada has had, undeniably, a mighty influence, by the disgust and indignation felt by the British people at a step so apparently wanton and cruel.

As there was no direct advantage to be hoped from the conquest of Canada, so also, there was none incidental. Plunder there was none—at least, none which would pay the cost of the conquest. Glory there was none. Could seven millions of people obtain glory by precipitating themselves upon half a million, and trampling them into the dust? A giant obtain glory by crushing a pigmy! That giant must have a pigmy's spirit who could reap, or hope, glory from such an achievement.

Surely a people, with whom we were connected by so many natural and adventitious ties, had some claims upon our humanity. Surely if our duty required that they and theirs should be sacrificed to our interests or our passions, some regret mingled in the execution of our purpose. We postponed the decree of ruin until the last moment. We hesitated—we delayed until longer delay was dangerous. Alas! sir, there was nothing of this kind or character in the conduct of the Cabinet. The war had not yet been declared, when General Hull had his instructions to put in train the work of destruction. There was an eagerness for the blood of the Canadians—a headlong precipitation for their ruin, which indicated any thing else rather than feelings of humanity, or visitings of nature, on account of their condition. Our armies were on their march for their frontier, while yet peace existed between this country and the parent State; and the invasion was obstinately pursued, after a knowledge that the chief ground of controversy was settled by the abandonment of the British Orders in Council; and after nothing remained but a stale ground of dispute, which, however important in itself, was of a nature for which no man has ever yet pretended that for it alone war would have been declared. Did ever one Government exhibit towards any people a more bloody and relentless spirit of rancor? Tell me not of petty advantages—of remote, and possibly useful contingencies which might arise from the devastation of those colonies. Show any advantage which justifies that dreadful vial of wrath which, if the intention of the American Cabinet had been fulfilled, would, at this day, have been poured out upon the heads of the Canadians. It is not owing to the tender mercies of the American Administration, if the bones of the Canadians are not at this hour mingled with the ashes of their habitations. It is easy enough to make an excuse for any purpose. When a victim is destined to be immolated, every hedge presents sticks for the sacrifice. The lamb who stands at the mouth of the stream, will always trouble the water, if you take the account of the wolf who stands at the source of it. But show a good to us bearing any proportion to the multiplied evils proposed to be visited upon them. There is none. Never was there an invasion of any country worse than this, in point of moral principle, since the invasion of the West Indies by the Buccaneers, or that of the United States by Captain Kidd. Indeed, both Kidd and the Buccaneers had more apology for their deed than the American Cabinet. They had at least the hope of plunder; but in this case there is not even the poor refuge of cupidity. We have heard great lamentations about the disgrace of our arms on the frontier. Why, sir, the disgrace of our arms on the frontier is terrestrial glory, in comparison with the disgrace of the attempt. The whole atmosphere rings with the utterance, from the other side of the House of this word "glory"—"glory" in connection with this invasion. What glory? Is it the glory of the tiger, which lifts his jaws, all foul and bloody, from the bowels of his victim, and roars for his companions of the wood to come and witness his prowess and his spoils? Such is the glory of Genghis Khan, and of Bonaparte. Be such glory far, very far, from my country. Never, never may it be accursed with such fame.

But the wise and thoughtful people of our Northern section will confine their reflections to the duties which result from the actual condition of those colonies, and their general relations to the United States; they will weigh the duties the people of the United States owe to themselves, and contemplate the effect which the subjugation of those Canadians will have upon our own liberties and constitution. Sir, it requires but little experience in the nature of the human character, and but a very limited acquaintance with the history of man, to be satisfied that with the conquest of the Canadas, the liberties and constitution of this country perish.

Of all nations in the world, this nation is the last which ought to admit, among its purposes, the design of foreign conquests. States such as are these, connected by ties so peculiar; into whose combination there enters necessarily numerous jealousies and fears; whose interests are not always reconcilable; and the passions, education, and character of whose people, on many accounts, are repugnant to each other; with a constitution made merely for defence; it is impossible that an association of independent Sovereignties, standing in such relations to each other, should not have the principles of its union, and the hopes of its constitution, materially affected by the collection of a large military force, and its employment in the subjugation of neighboring territories. It is easy to see that an army collected in such a state of society as that which exists in this country, where wages are high and subsistence easily to be obtained, must be composed, so far as respects the soldiery, for the most part of the refuse of the country; and as respects the officers, with some honorable exceptions indeed, must consist, in a considerable degree, of men desperate sometimes in fortune, at others in reputation; "choice spirits;" men "tired of the dull pursuits of civil life," who have not virtue or talents to rise in a calm and settled state of things, and who, all other means of advancement or support wanting or failing, take to the sword. A body of thirty or fifty thousand such men, combined, armed, and under a popular leader, is a very formidable force. They want only discipline and service to make them veterans. Opportunity to acquire these, Canada will afford. The army which advances to the walls of Quebec, in the present condition of Canadian preparation, must be veteran. And a veteran army, under a popular leader, flushed with victory, each individual realizing, that while the body remains combined, he may be something, and possibly very great; that if dissolved, he sinks into insignificance; will not be disbanded by vote. They will consult with one another, and with their beloved chieftain, upon this subject; and not trouble themselves about the advice of the old people who are knitting and weaving in the chimney corners at Washington. Let the American people receive this as an undoubted truth, which experience will verify. Whoever plants the American standard on the walls of Quebec, conquers it for himself, and not for the people of the United States. Whoever lives to see that event—may my head be low in the dust before it happen!—will witness a dynasty established in that country by the sword. He will see a King or an Emperor, dukedoms, and earldoms, and baronies, distributed to the officers, and knights' fees bestowed on the soldiery. Such an army will not trouble itself about geographical lines, in portioning out the divisions of its new empire; and will run the parallels of its power by other steel than that of the compass. When that event happens, the people of New England, if they mean to be free, must have a force equal to defend themselves against such an army. And a military force equal to this object will itself be able to enslave the country.

Mr. Speaker—When I contemplate the character and consequences of this invasion of Canada; when I reflect upon its criminality and its danger to the peace and liberty of this once happy country; I thank the great Author and Source of all virtue, that through His grace that section of country in which I have the happiness to reside, is, in so great a degree, free from the iniquity of this transgression. I speak it with pride, the people of that section have done what they could to vindicate themselves and their children from the burden of this sin. That whole section has risen, almost as one man, for the purpose of driving from power, by one great constitutional effort, the guilty authors of this war. If they have failed, it has not been through the want of will or of exertion, but in consequence of the weakness of their political power. When in the usual course of Divine Providence, who punishes nations as well as individuals, His destroying angel shall on this account pass over this country—and sooner or later, pass it will—I may be permitted to hope that over New England his hand will be stayed. Our souls are not steeped in the blood which has been shed in this war. The spirits of the unhappy men who have been sent to an untimely audit, have borne to the bar of divine justice no accusations against us.

This opinion, concerning the principles of this invasion of Canada, is not peculiar to me. Multitudes who approve the war, detest it. I believe this sentiment is entertained, without distinction of parties, by almost all the moral sense, and nine-tenths of the intelligence, of the whole northern section of the United States. I know that men from that quarter of the country will tell you differently. Stories of a very different kind are brought by all those who come trooping to Washington for place, appointments, and emoluments; men who will say any thing to please the ear, or do any thing to please the eye of Majesty, for the sake of those fat contracts and gifts which it scatters; men whose fathers, brothers, and cousins, are provided for by the Departments; whose full-grown children are at, suck at the money-distilling breasts of the Treasury; the little men who sigh after great offices; those who have judgeships in hand or judgeships in promise; toads that live upon the vapor of the palace, that swallow great men's spittle at the levees; that stare and wonder at all the fine sights which they see there; and most of all wonder at themselves—how they got there to see them. These men will tell you, that New England applauds this invasion.

But, Mr. Speaker, look at the elections. What is the language they speak? The present tenant of the Chief Magistracy rejected, by that whole section of country, with the exception of a single State unanimously. And for whom? In favor of a man, out of the circle of his own State without much influence, and personally almost unknown. In favor of a man against whom the prevailing influence in New England had previously strong political prejudices; and with whom, at the time of giving him their support, they had no political understanding; in favor of a man whose merits, whatever in other respects they might be, were brought into notice, in the first instance, chiefly so far as that election was concerned, by their opinion of the utter want of merit of the man whose re-election they opposed.

Among the causes of that universal disgust which pervaded all New England, at the Administration and its supporters, was the general dislike and contempt of this invasion of Canada. I have taken some pains to learn the sentiments which prevail on this subject in New England, and particularly among its yeomanry, the pride and the hope of that country. I have conversed with men, resting on their spades and leaning on the handles of their ploughs, while they relaxed for a moment from the labor by which they support their families, and which gives such a hardihood and character to their virtues. They asked—"What do we want of Canada? We have land enough. Do we want plunder? There is not enough of that to pay the cost of getting it. Are our Ocean rights there? Or is it there our seamen are held in captivity? Are new States desired? We have plenty of those already. Are they to be held as conquered territories? This will require an army there. Then, to be safe, we must have an army here. And with a standing army, what security for our liberties?"

These are no fictitious reasonings. They are the suggestions I doubt not of thousands and tens of thousands of our hardy New England yeomanry; men who, when their country calls, at any wise and real exigency, will start from their native soils and throw their shields over their liberties, like the soldiers of Cadmus, "armed in complete steel;" yet men, who have heard the winding of your horn to the Canada campaign, with the same apathy and indifference with which they would hear in the streets the trilling of a jews-harp, or the twirring of a banjo.

The plain truth is, that the people of New England have no desire for Canada. Their moral sentiment does not justify, and they will not countenance its invasion. I have thus stated the grounds on which they deem, and I have felt myself bound to maintain, that this contemplated invasion of that territory is, as it respects the Canadians, wanton and cruel; because it inflicts the greatest imaginable evils on them, without any imaginable benefit to us; that, as it respects the United States, such an invasion is senseless, because, ultimately, ruinous to our own political safety; and wicked, because it is an abuse of the blessings of Divine Providence, and a manifest perversion of His multiplied bounties, to the purpose of desolating an innocent and unoffending people.

I shall now proceed to the next view I proposed to take on this project of invading Canada, and consider it in the light of a means to obtain an early and honorable peace. It is said, and this is the whole argument in favor of this invasion, in this aspect, that the only way to negotiate successfully with Great Britain, is to appeal to her fears and raise her terrors for the fate of her colonies. I shall here say nothing concerning the difficulties of executing this scheme; nor about the possibility of a deficiency both in men and money. I will not dwell on the disgust of all New England, nor on the influence of this disgust with respect to your efforts. I will admit, for the present, that an army may be raised, and that during the first years it may be supported by loans, and that afterwards it will support itself by bayonets. I will admit farther, for the sake of argument, that success is possible and that Great Britain realizes the practicability of it. Now, all this being admitted, I maintain that the surest of all possible ways to defeat any hope from negotiation, is the threat of such an invasion, and an active preparation to execute it. Those must be very young politicians, their pin-feathers not yet grown, and however they may flutter on this floor, they are not yet fledged for any high or distant flight, who think that threats and appealing to fear are the ways of producing a disposition to negotiate in Great Britain, or in any other nation which understands what it owes to its own safety and honor. No nation can yield to threat, what it might yield to a sense of interest; because, in that case, it has no credit for what it grants, and what is more, loses something in point of reputation, from the imbecility which concessions made under such circumstances indicate. Of all nations in the world, Great Britain is the last to yield to considerations of fear and terror. The whole history of the British nation is one tissue of facts, tending to show the spirit with which she meets all attempts to bully and brow-beat her into measures inconsistent with her interests or her policy. No nation ever before made such sacrifices of the present to the future. No nation ever built her greatness more systematically, on the principles of a haughty self-respect, which yields nothing to suggestions of danger, and which never permits either her ability or inclination to maintain her rights to be suspected. In all negotiations, therefore, with that power, it may be taken as a certain truth, that your chance of failure is just in proportion to the publicity and obtrusiveness of threats and appeals to fear.

The American Cabinet understands all this very well, although this House may not. Their policy is founded upon it. The project of this bill is to put at a still further distance the chance of amicable arrangement, in consequence of the dispositions which the threat of invasion of their colonies, and attempt to execute it, will excite in the British nation and Ministry. I have some claim to speak concerning the policy of the men who constitute the American Cabinet. For eight years I have studied their history, characters, and interests. I know no reason why I should judge them severely, except such as arise from those inevitable conclusions, which avowed principles and distinct conduct have impressed upon the mind. I say, then, sir, without hesitation, that in my judgment, the embarrassments of our relations with Great Britain, and keeping alive between this country and that a root of bitterness, has been, is, and will continue to be, a main principle of the policy of this American Cabinet. They want not a solid settlement of our differences. If the nation will support them in it, they will persevere in the present war. If it will not, some general arrangements will be the resort, which will leave open opportunities for discord; which on proper occasions will be improved by them. I shall give my reasons for this opinion. I wish no sentiments of mine to have influence any farther than the reasons upon which they are founded justify. They are public reasons, arising from undeniable facts; the nation will judge for itself.

The men who now, and who, for these twelve years past, have, to the misfortune of this country, guided its councils and directed its destinies, came into power on a tide, which was raised and supported by elements constituted of British prejudices and British antipathies. The parties which grew up in this nation took their origin and form at the time of the adoption of the treaty negotiated by Mr. Jay, in 1794. The opposition of that day, of which the men now in power were the leaders, availed themselves, very dexterously, of the relics of that hatred towards the British name which remained after the Revolutionary war. By perpetually blowing up the embers of the ancient passions, they excited a flame in the nation; and by systematically directing it against the honorable men who at that time conducted its affairs, the strength and influence of those men were impaired. The embarrassments with France, which succeeded, in 1798 and 1799, were turned to the same account. Unfortunately, those who then conducted the public affairs attended less to the appearance of things, than to their measures; and considered more what was due to their country than was prudent, in the state of the prejudices and jealousies of the people, thus artfully excited against them. They went on, in the course they deemed right, regardless of personal consequences, and blind to the evidences of discontent which surrounded them. The consequences are well known. The supreme power in these United States passed into the hands which now possess it; in which it has been continued down to the present time. The transfer of power was effected, undeniably, principally on the very ground of those prejudices and antipathies which existed in the nation against Great Britain; and which had been artfully fomented by the men now in power, and their adherents, and directed against their predecessors. These prejudices and passions constitute the main pillar of the power of these men. In my opinion, they never will permit it to be wholly taken away from them. They never will permit the people of this country to look at them and their political opponents, free of that jaundice with which they have carefully imbued the vision of their own partisans. They never will consent to be weighed in a balance of mere merits; but will always take care to keep in reserve some portion of these British antipathies, to throw as a make-weight into the opposite scale, whenever they find their own sinking. To continue, multiply, strengthen, and extend these props of their power, has been, still is, the object of the daily study and the nightly vigils of our American Cabinet. For this the British Treaty was permitted to expire by its own limitation; notwithstanding the state of things which the Treaty of Amiens had produced in Europe was so little like permanent peace, that the occurrence of the fact, on which the force of that limitation depended, might easily have been questioned, with but little violence to the terms, and in perfect conformity with its spirit. For this a renewal of the Treaty of 1794 was refused by our Cabinet, although proffered by the British Government. For this the treaty negotiated by Messrs. Monroe and Pinkney in 1807 was rejected. For this, in 1811, fifty thousand dollars were paid out of the public Treasury to John Henry, for the obvious purpose of enabling the American Cabinet to calumniate their political opponents, on this very point of British influence, upon the eve of elections, occurring in Massachusetts, on the event of which the perpetuation of their own power was materially dependent.

Mr. Speaker, such men as these never will permit a state of things to pass away, so essential to their influence. Be it peace or war arrangement or hostility, the association of these British antipathies in the minds of the mass of the community, with the characters of their political opponents, constitutes the great magazine of their power. This composes their whole political larder. It is, like Lord Peter's brown loaf, their "beef, mutton, veal, venison, partridge, plum-pudding, and custard."

From the time of the expiration of the British Treaty of 1794, and the refusal to renew it, the American Cabinet have been careful to precede negotiation with some circumstances or other, calculated to make it fail, or at least to make a successful result less certain. Thus in 1806, when, from the plunder of commerce, by British cruisers, a negotiation, notwithstanding the obvious reluctance of the Cabinet, was forced upon them, by the clamors of the merchants, the non-importation law of April, in that year, was obtruded between the two countries. In the course of the debate upon that law, it was opposed upon this very ground, that it was an obstacle to a successful negotiation. It was advocated, like the bill now under discussion, as an aid to successful negotiation. It was also said by the opponents of the law of 1806, that Great Britain would not negotiate under its operation, and that arrangement, attempted under proper auspices, could not be difficult, from the known interests and inclinations of that nation. What was the consequence? Precisely that which was anticipated. The then President of the United States was necessitated to come to this House, and recommend a suspension of the operation of that law, upon the openly-avowed ground of its being expedient to give that evidence of a conciliatory disposition; really, because, if permitted to continue in operation, negotiation was found to be impracticable. After the suspension of that law, a treaty was formed. The merits of that treaty, it is not within the scope of my present argument to discuss. It is sufficient to say, it was deemed good enough to receive the sanction of Messrs. Monroe and Pinkney. It arrived in America and was rejected by the authority of a single individual; apparently because of the insufficiency of the arrangement about impressment. Really because a settlement with Great Britain, at that time, did not "enter into the scope of the policy" of the American Cabinet. The negotiation was indeed renewed, but it was followed up with the enforcement of the non-importation law, and the enactment of the embargo. Both which steps were stated at the time, as they proved afterwards, to be of a nature to make hopeless successful negotiation.

In this State the Executive power of this nation formally passed into new hands, but substantially remained under the old principles of action, and subject to the former influences. It was desirable that a fund of popularity should be acquired for the new Administration. Accordingly, an arrangement was made with Mr. Erskine, and no questions asked, concerning the adequacy of his powers. But, lest this circumstance should not defeat the proposed arrangement, a clause was inserted in the correspondence containing an insult to the British Government, offered in the face of the world, such as no man ever gave to a private individual whom he did not mean to offend. The President of the United States said, in so many words, to the person at the head of that Government, that he did not understand what belonged to his own honor, as well as it was understood by the President himself. The effect of such language was natural, it was necessary; it could not but render the British Government averse to sanction Mr. Erskine's arrangement. The effect was anticipated by Mr. Robert Smith, then acting as Secretary of State. He objected to its being inserted, but it was done in the President's own handwriting. As Mr. Erskine's authority was denied by the British Government, it is well known that in fact, on the point of this indignity, the fate of that arrangement turned. Can any one doubt that our Cabinet meant that it should have this effect? I send you word, Mr. Speaker, that I have agreed with your messenger, and wish you to ratify it. I think you, however, no gentleman, notwithstanding; and that you do not understand, as well as I, what is "due to your own honor." What think you, sir? Would you ratify such an arrangement if you could help it? Does a proffer of settlement, connected with such language, look like a disposition or an intention to conciliate? I appeal to the common sense of mankind on the point.

The whole stage of the relations, induced between this country and Great Britain, in consequence of our embargo and restrictive systems, was, in fact, a standing appeal to the fears of the British Cabinet. For, notwithstanding those systems were equal in their terms, so far as they affected Foreign Powers, yet their operation was notoriously almost wholly upon Great Britain. To yield to that pressure, or to any thing which should foster, in this country, the idea that it was an effectual weapon of hostility, was nothing more than conceding that she was dependent upon us. A concession, which, when once made by her, was certain to encourage a resort to it by us on every occasion of difficulty between the two nations. Reasoning, therefore, upon the known nature of things, and the plain interests of Great Britain, it was foretold that, during its continuance she would concede nothing. And the event has justified these predictions. But the circumstance the most striking, and that furnishing the most conclusive evidence of the indisposition of the American Cabinet to peace, and their determination to carry on the war, is that connected with the pretended repeal of the French decrees, in November, 1810, and the consequent revival, in 1811, of our restrictive system against Great Britain.

If ever a body of men were pledged to any thing, the American Cabinet, its friends and supporters, were pledged for the truth of this fact; that the French decrees of Berlin and Milan were definitively repealed as it respects the United States, on the first of November, 1810. If ever any body of men staked their whole stock of reputation upon any point, our Cabinet did it on this. They and their partisans asserted and raved. They denounced every man as a British partisan who denied it. They declared the restrictive system was revived by the mere effect of the proclamation. But lest the courts of law should not be as subservient to their policy as might be wished, they passed the law of the 2d of March, 1811, upon the basis of this repeal, and of its being definitive. The British Government refused, however, to recognize the validity of this repeal, and denied that the Berlin and Milan decrees were repealed on the first of November, 1810, as our Cabinet asserted. Thus, then, stood the argument between the British Ministry and our Cabinet. The British Ministry admitted that if the Berlin and Milan decrees were repealed on the 1st of November, 1810, they were bound to revoke their Orders in Council. But they denied that repeal to exist. Our Cabinet, on the other hand, admitted that if the Berlin and Milan decrees were not repealed on the 1st of November, 1810, the restrictive system ought not to have been revived against Great Britain. But they asserted that repeal to exist. This was, virtually, the state of the question between the two countries on this point. And it is agreed, on all hands, that this refusal of the British Government to repeal their Orders in Council, after the existence of the repeal of the Berlin and Milan decrees, as asserted by the American Cabinet, was the cause of the declaration of war between the two countries. So that in truth, the question of the right of war depended upon the existence of that fact; for if that fact did not exist, even the American Cabinet did not pretend that, in the position in which things then stood, they had a right to declare war, on account of the continuance of the British Orders in Council.

Now, what is the truth in relation to this all-important fact, the definitive repeal of the Berlin and Milan decrees on the 1st of November, 1810; the pivot upon which turned the revival of the restrictive system and our declaration of war? Why, sir, the event has proved that in relation to that fact the American Cabinet was, to say the least, in an error. Bonaparte himself, in a decree, dated the 28th of April, 1811, but not promulgated till a year afterwards, distinctly declares that the Berlin and Milan decrees were not definitively repealed, as relates to the United States, on the 1st of November, 1810. He also declares that they are then, on that twenty-eighth of April, for the first time, repealed. And he founds the issuing of this decree on the act of the American Congress of the 2d of March, 1811. That very act, which was passed upon the ground of the definitive repeal of the Berlin and Milan decrees, on the 1st of November, 1810; and which, it is agreed on all sides, the American Government were bound in honor not to pass, except in case of such antecedent repeal.

Were ever a body of men so abandoned in the hour of need, as the American Cabinet, in this instance by Bonaparte? Was ever any body of men so cruelly wounded in the house of their friend? This, this was "the unkindest cut of all." But how was it received by the American Cabinet? Surely they were indignant at this treatment. Surely the air rings with reproaches upon a man who has thus made them stake their reputation upon a falsehood; and then gives little less than the lie direct, to their assertions. No, sir, nothing of all this is heard from our Cabinet. There is a philosophic tameness that would be remarkable, if it were not, in all cases affecting Bonaparte, characteristic. All the Executive of the United States has found it in his heart to say, in relation to this last decree of Bonaparte, which contradicts his previous allegations and asseverations, is, that "This proceeding is rendered, by the time and manner of it, liable to many objections!"

I have referred to this subject as being connected, with future conduct, strikingly illustrative of the disposition of the American Cabinet to carry on the war, and of their intention, if possible, not to make peace. Surely, if any nation had a claim for liberal treatment from another, it was the British nation from the American, after the discovery of the error of the American Government, in relation to the repeal of the Berlin and Milan decrees, in November, 1810. In consequence of that error, the American Cabinet had ruined numbers of our own citizens, who had been caught by the revival of the non-intercourse law; they had revived that law against Great Britain, under circumstances which now appeared to have been fallacious; and they had declared war against her, on the supposition, that she had refused to repeal her Orders in Council, after the French decrees were in fact revoked: whereas, it now appears that they were in fact not revoked. Surely the knowledge of this error was followed by an instant and anxious desire to redress the resulting injury. As the British Orders in Council were in fact revoked, on the knowledge of the existence of the French decree of repeal, surely the American Cabinet at once extended the hand of friendship; met the British Government half way; stopped all farther irritation; and strove to place every thing on a basis best suited to promote an amicable adjustment. No, sir, nothing of all this occurred. On the contrary, the question of impressments is made the basis of continuing the war. On this subject, a studied fairness of proposition is preserved, accompanied with systematic perseverance in measures of hostility. An armistice was proposed by them. It was refused by us. It was acceded to by the American General on the frontiers. It was rejected by the Cabinet. No consideration of the false allegation on which the war in fact was founded; no consideration of the critical and extremely consequential nature to both nations of the subject of impressment; no considerations of humanity, interposed their influence. They renewed hostilities. They rushed upon Canada. Nothing would satisfy them but blood. The language of their conduct is that of the giant, in the legends of infancy:

Can such men pretend that peace is their object? Whatever may result, the perfect conviction of my mind is, that they have no such intention, and that if it comes it is contrary both to their hope and expectation.

I would not judge these men severely. But it is my duty to endeavor to judge them truly; and to express fearlessly the result of that judgment, whatever it may be. My opinion results from the application of the well-known principle of judging concerning men's purposes and motives: to consider rather what men do, than what they say; and to examine their deeds in connection with predominating passions and interests; and on this basis decide. In making an estimate of the intentions of these or any other politicians, I make little or no account of pacific pretensions. There is a general reluctance at war, and desire of peace, which pervades the great mass of every people; and artful rulers could never keep any nation at war any length of time, beyond their true interests, without some sacrifice to that general love of peace which exists in civilized men. Bonaparte himself will tell you that he is the most pacific creature in the world. He has already declared, by his proclamation to Frenchmen, that he has gone to Moscow for no other end than to cultivate peace, and counteract the Emperor of Russia's desire of war. In this country, where the popular sentiment has so strong an impulse on its affairs, the same obtrusive pretension must inevitably be preserved. No man or set of men ever can or will get this country at war, or continue it long in war, without keeping on hand a stout, round stock of gulling matter. Fair propositions will always be made to go hand in hand with offensive acts. And when something is offered so reasonable that no man can doubt but it will be accepted, at the same moment something will be done of a nature to embarrass the project, and if not to defeat at least to render its acceptance dubious. How this has been in past time, I have shown. I will now illustrate what is doing and intended at present.

As from the uniform tenor of the conduct of the American Cabinet, in relation to the British Government, I have no belief that their intention has been to make a solid arrangement with that nation; so, from the evidence of their disposition and intention, existing abroad and on the table, I have no belief that such is at present their purpose. I cannot possibly think otherwise, than that such is not their intention. Let us take the case into common life. I have demands, Mr. Speaker, against you, very just in their nature, but different. Some of recent, others of very old date. The former depending upon principles very clearly in my favor. The latter critical, difficult, and dubious, both in principle and settlement. In this state of things, and during your absence, I watch my opportunity, declare enmity; throw myself upon your children and servants and property, which happen to be in my neighborhood, and do them all the injury I can. While I am doing this, I receive a messenger from you, stating that the grounds of the recent injury are settled; that you comply fully with my terms. Your servants and children, whom I am plundering and killing, invite me to stay my hand until you return, or until some accommodation can take place between us. But, deaf to any such suggestions, I prosecute my intention of injury to the utmost. When there is reason to expect your return, I multiply my means of injury and offence. And no sooner do I hear of your arrival, than I thrust my fist into your face, and say to you—"Well, sir, here are fair propositions of settlement; come to my terms, which are very just; settle the old demand in my way, and we will be as good friends as ever." Mr. Speaker, what would be your conduct on such an occasion? Would you be apt to look as much at the nature of the propositions, as at the temper of the assailant? If you did not at once return blow for blow, and injury for injury, would you not at least take a little time to consider? Would you not tell such an assailant, that you were not to be bullied nor beaten into any concession? If you settled at all, might you not consider it your duty in some way to make him feel the consequences of his strange intemperance of passion? For myself, I have no question how a man of spirit ought to act under such circumstances. I have as little, how a great nation, like Great Britain, will act. Now, I have no doubt, sir, that the American Cabinet view this subject in the same light. They understand well, that by the declaration of war, the invasion of Canada, the refusal of an armistice, and perseverance in hostilities, after the principal ground of war had been removed, they have wrought the minds of the British Cabinet and people to a very high state of irritation. Now is the very moment to get up some grand scheme of pacification; such as may persuade the American people of the inveterate love of our Cabinet for peace, and make them acquiescent in their perseverance in hostilities. Accordingly, before the end of the session, a great tub will be thrown out to the whale. Probably, a little while before the Spring elections, terms of very fair import will be proffered to Great Britain. Such as, perhaps, six months ago our Cabinet would not have granted, had she solicited them on her knees. Such as probably, in the opinion of the people of this country, Great Britain ought to accept; such perhaps as in any other state of things, she would have accepted. But such as, I fear, under the irritation produced by the strange course pursued by the American Cabinet, that nation will not accept. Sir, I do not believe that our Cabinet expect that they will be accepted. They think the present state of induced passion is sufficient to prevent arrangement. But to make assurance doubly sure, to take a bond of fate, that arrangement shall not happen, they prepare this bill. A bill, which proposes an augmentation of the army for the express purpose of conquering the Canadas. A bill which, connected with the recent disposition evinced by our Cabinet, in relation to those provinces, and with the avowed intent of making their subjugation the means of peace, through the fear to be inspired into Great Britain, is as offensive to the pride of that nation as can well be imagined; and is, in my apprehension, as sure a guarantee of continued war as could be given. On these grounds, my mind cannot force itself to any other conclusion than this, that the avowed object of this bill is the true one; that the Canadas are to be invaded the next season; that the war is to be protracted: and that this is the real policy of the American Cabinet.

I will now reply to those invitations to "union," which have been so obtrusively urged upon us. If by this call to union is meant a union in a project for the invasion of Canada, or for the invasion of East Florida, or for the conquest of any foreign country whatever, either as a means of carrying on this war or for any other purpose, I answer, distinctly, I will unite with no man nor any body of men for any such purposes. I think such projects criminal in the highest degree, and ruinous to the prosperity of these States. But, if by this invitation is meant union in preparation for defence, strictly so called; union in fortifying our seaboard; union in putting our cities into a state of safety; union in raising such a military force as shall be sufficient with the local militia in the hands of the constitutional leaders, the Executives of the States, to give a rational degree of security against any invasion; sufficient to defend our frontiers, sufficient to awe into silence the Indian tribes within our Territories; union in creating such a maritime force as shall command the seas on the American coasts, and keep open the intercourse, at least between the States: if this is meant, I have no hesitation; union on such principles you shall have from me cordially and faithfully. And this, too, sir, without any reference to the state of my opinion, in relation to the justice or necessity of this war. Because I will understand such to be the condition of man, in a social compact, that he must partake of the fate of the society to which he belongs, and must submit to the privations and sacrifices its defence requires, notwithstanding these may be the result of the vices or crimes of its immediate rulers. But there is a great difference between supporting such rulers in plans of necessary self-defence, on which the safety of our altars and firesides especially depend, and supporting them in projects of foreign invasion, and encouraging them in schemes of conquest and ambition, which are not only unjust in themselves, but dreadful in their consequences; inasmuch as, let the particular project result as it may, the general effect must be, according to human view, destructive to our own domestic liberties and constitution. I speak as an individual. Sir, for my single self, did I support such projects as are avowed to be the objects of this bill, I should deem myself a traitor to my country. Were I even to aid them by loan, or in any other way, I should consider myself a partaker in the guilt of the purpose. But when these projects of an invasion shall be abandoned; when men yield up schemes which not only openly contemplate the raising of a great military force, but also the concentrating them at one point, and placing them in one hand; schemes obviously ruinous to the fates of a free Republic—as they comprehend the means by which such have ever heretofore been destroyed; when, I say, such schemes shall be abandoned, and the wishes of the Cabinet limited to mere defence and frontier and maritime protection, there will be no need of calls to union. For such objects there is not, there cannot be, but one heart and soul in this people.

Mr. Archer said, so great was the respect which he felt for the House, so deep was the consciousness which he entertained of his inability to do justice to a cause, especially one of so much magnitude and importance, of which he might be the advocate, that he would be doing injustice to his feelings were he not to express the weight of the embarrassments which oppressed him. But the wide range which the present discussion had taken, involving considerations of great national interest, and calling forth the cruel asperities of political intolerance, seemed to leave him no alternative in the discharge of his duty, but to repel the unfounded insinuations which had flown in so copious a stream from the other side of the House. Were gentlemen to confine themselves to a temperate investigation of the propriety of adopting measures either recommended by the Executive, or proposed by the majority, who is there that would not listen with pleasure and satisfaction? But when the liberty of debate was prostituted in disseminating the most unfounded charges, in the indiscriminate abuse of the constituted authorities of the nation, he confessed he could not "always be a hearer, and never reply." The few observations he had to make would be without either system or arrangement, having bestowed no previous consideration on the subject, and should be confined not so much to the bill for raising an additional army, as the remarks and arguments of those gentlemen who had preceded him on the other side of the House.

And here, he said, he hoped to be permitted first to notice the charge which had been confidently made by a gentleman from New York (Mr. Gold) against the majority of the House. He had asserted (and he seemed to dwell upon the assertion with peculiar satisfaction) that war had been declared by Congress prematurely and without due preparation; that to embark in a war with a powerful nation, without a large standing army, was impolitic in the extreme. This principle, said Mr. A., in the general might be true, but it had certainly no application to this country. Our Government was founded on the broad basis of popular opinion, liable to fluctuation upon the first appearance of any system which might be calculated to destroy the liberties of the people. A laudable jealousy of their rulers throbbed in the heart of every man in the country, who would seize the first opportunity to change an Administration that would raise a standing army in time of peace, whatever might be the professed objects of such an Administration. From this jealousy the natural result would be, that the men who raised the army would never declare the war which it was intended to wage. He would refer to the Administration of Mr. Adams. An army had been then raised, or attempted to be raised, to defend the country against an anticipated French invasion. The professed object was disbelieved, and the people, apprehending an invasion of their rights, removed from power the men who had voted for the army. All our institutions were repugnant to a standing army in time of peace. Anticipated invasion would seldom justify it, because it might be made a pretext for the purpose at all times, and with the most dangerous views. What had been said by the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. Quincy) seemed to confirm this position, for he had expressed his fears of the army, even in a state of declared war, when that army was to be employed out of the limits of the country; and if jealousy existed at such time, the conclusion would naturally follow that it would exist to a greater degree in a time of peace. The argument then of the gentleman, if it proved any thing, proved too much, because its effect would always be to frustrate the views of the Government, and prevent it from going to war to avenge even the grossest insult, or to assert even its most indisputable rights. But an appeal had been made with much confidence to the history of all Europe, to bear him out in the charge he had made, and it had been said that no instance of a nation's engaging in a war without having a well-regulated and disciplined army could be adduced. This, said Mr. A., will be admitted, but he presumed it was incumbent upon the gentleman to show that some analogy existed between the Governments of Europe and that of the United States, before his argument could have any application to the subject. There the people had no voice in the selection of their rulers. There the arbitrary will of the monarch was the law of the land, and his decrees, however oppressive or obnoxious, were enforced by the hand of power, without a murmur or complaint. There each Government is surrounded by kingdoms powerful and strong, the ambition of whose rulers prompts them to seize upon every occasion to enlarge the boundaries of their dominions. For one of these powers, even in the most peaceful condition of the world, to be destitute of a powerful and permanent military force, would evince an inattention to its own security and independence, which would demonstrate the incapacity of its monarch to govern his subjects, or to preserve the integrity of his possessions. But the dissimilarity of the Government and situation of the United States would show the inapplicability of the gentleman's maxim to this country. Here we have no powerful neighbor whose incursions we dread. Here we are happily removed, by a wide-extended ocean, from those nations who, upon a declaration of war by us, could overrun the country with a military force, or endanger its civil institutions. Here we have a people proudly jealous of their liberties, who will put down constitutionally every attempt in a state of peace to raise a Military Establishment. To have delayed, then, the declaration of war against England, until the ranks of the army authorized to be raised had been completely filled, would have been a most certain course to have defeated the object which Congress had in view. The jealousies and fears which would have been the necessary consequence of such delay, would have brought into power men of far different views; men who, if the natural conclusion to be drawn from the arguments of some of them could be admitted, would sooner submit to all the indignities we had received from Great Britain, than resist her. The war was therefore not declared prematurely, but was delayed to as late a period as the nature of our institutions would permit. And, if what he had said would not be sufficient to satisfy the gentleman from New York of his error, the army that was so shamefully surrendered at Detroit, if it had been commanded by a man of spirit and fidelity, would long before this, by the possession which it would have given us of an important province of the enemy, have convinced him that war was not declared without preparation. But, for having said so much upon this point, some apology seemed to be necessary upon his part, and he could only say that he had been induced to do so, because, having been one of the majority who voted for war against England, the charge seemed to be an imputation against his character, which the duty every man owed to himself bound him to repel.