TWELFTH CONGRESS.—FIRST SESSION. PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES.[13] (continued 5)

When I look into the preamble of the constitution, which to be sure is no specific grant of power, but is an interpretation of the objects of that great charter of our Union, I find it was to establish justice, insure domestic tranquillity, provide for the common defence and general welfare, and to secure the blessings of liberty, that the constitution was adopted; and although maritime commerce has only a co-equal right with all others, still, the greatest means and resources of the Government have been directed to its protection. And still it would seem, if we do not ruin the nation by the establishment of a navy, we wish to make encroachments upon commerce, to damp the commercial spirit. And this we are told in the face of facts which appear upon record, and in the face of every expensive war measure now taken and adopted. Sir, in a colonial state, it was a duty upon tea that was the immediate cause of a war, which was bloody indeed, and continued upwards of seven years; a conflict which has no parallel in history as to its beginning and termination. And at this moment, violations of our neutral rights upon the ocean is a primary cause why we are about to wage a second war with Great Britain; and still we are gravely told that we are unwilling to protect commerce, and that we are ready to abandon it, because we will not vote away the substance of the people upon a system of policy which must ruin the nation if not crushed in its infancy. The constitution says, Congress shall have the power to provide and maintain a navy. And this has been read. So has it authorized Congress to raise and support armies, to lay and collect taxes, and declare war; but the constitution does not fix the limit of these powers, and all are liable to abuse. And the convention did not suppose that any Congress would so far abuse these powers as to keep either a standing army in time of peace, which must endanger the liberties of the people, or a permanent navy, that would involve us in continual wars with other nations, and permanent taxes upon the people. A reasonable peace establishment to protect our maritime and territorial frontier, consistent with strict economy, must have been contemplated; and this force, naval and military, we have maintained; and we are as secure as a nation can expect to be from savages or a maritime foe. There would be as much reason why we should keep in pay five hundred thousand regular troops in time of peace, as your twenty vessels of seventy-four guns and your forty frigates, in addition to our present naval force. In every point of view, therefore, a permanent navy is as injurious to the country as a standing army. One will endanger your liberties by conquest, and the other by wars with foreign nations.

But I am asked, how will you contend with a maritime nation, without a navy? Sir, that question is as easily answered as the first. I will ask, how we succeeded in the Revolutionary war? We were without any security upon our seacoast, and still we succeeded. But to be more specific—I would grant letters of marque and reprisal, and authorize privateering. Give scope to individual enterprise, to destroy the commerce of the enemy—which can be done effectually. I would fortify our seaport towns; station our gunboats and frigates along our coast, to protect us at home. And in this way I would in war avenge the infractions of our neutral rights.

Mr. Lowndes.—Mr. Speaker, in one opinion expressed by the honorable gentleman last up, (Mr. Johnson,) I can concur. The constitution was not formed for the exclusive protection of commerce, but for the defence of all the interests of the United States. These are to be protected by the whole force of the nation. If he had adhered throughout his speech to this opinion, the question would have been narrowed to the inquiry, by what means shall commerce be protected? He has asserted the adequacy to this purpose of the naval force which we now possess. This is, indeed, a different view of the subject from that which was taken by his honorable colleague. We were told but yesterday, that the undivided exertions of the United States could not give them a navy large enough to be useful. To-day the five frigates which we have in commission are thought sufficient if properly employed, to redress all our injuries. The death of Pierce might have been revenged, and the disgrace of the Chesapeake obliterated, if these five frigates had been sent a cruising. We did not want force, but spirit to employ it. Can it be necessary gravely to answer these assertions? May I not trust their confutation to that general knowledge of the subject which every member of the House possesses? Must we inquire what number of British vessels have been lately stationed near our coast, or what greater number it is in the power of England to station there?

But, although the honorable gentleman from Kentucky is determined to defend commerce by some method which he will not fully disclose, his arguments like those of my honorable friend from Pennsylvania, appeared designed to show that commerce was not worth defending. After the full discussion of this subject, produced by the report of the Committee of Foreign Relations, and the debates at every stage of the bill for raising an additional army, the House might have supposed that this question was at last dismissed. I hope, however, to be excused for remarking that both these gentlemen have considered the profits of commerce as confined to the merchant. They have forgotten that commerce implies a change of commodities, in which the merchant is only an intermediate agent. He derives, indeed, a profit from the transaction—but so must the seller and the buyer, the grower and the consumer, or they would not engage in it. So must all those who are supported by their own industry in commercial cities—the clerk, the artisan, the common laborer. But my honorable friend from Pennsylvania says that Mr. Pitt estimated the profits of commerce in England at only twelve millions for a year, in which the naval expense was fourteen or sixteen millions. I suppose this estimate to have been made in relation to the income tax, and it obviously must have referred only to the profits of merchants. The profits of merchants may be computed, but no sober financier would attempt to compute the entire profits of commerce. If it be desirable to form, not, indeed, an estimate, but some conception of its importance, let my honorable friend compute the value of New York, where a few square feet of land are an estate, and then compare it with the value of the same extent of ground for the purposes of the plough. But, is it in this nation, and at this time, that it can be supposed that the profits of commerce are confined to the merchant? Your trade was, a few years ago, unrestrained and flourishing—did it not enrich the most distant parts of your country? It has since been plundered and confined. Does not the industry of the country languish? Is not the income of every man impaired? If commerce were destroyed, the mercantile class, indeed, could exist no longer; but the merchant, the rich capitalist, at least, would individually suffer less than any other part of the community, because, while their property would become unproductive, the value of money would rise rather than fall.

The value of commerce, then, has been strangely misunderstood by these gentlemen, who suppose that they have calculated it so very accurately. But whatever may be its value, you have already determined to defend it. Considerations of expense are not, indeed, to be neglected. We must employ, in the prosecution of the war, the cheapest and most efficacious instruments of hostility which we can obtain. But the arguments of the honorable gentlemen on the other side, are almost all of them directed against the war rather than the navy. It would be absurd, say they, to protect commerce by a navy, which should cost more than that commerce is worth. It must yet be more absurd, then, to protect it by an army which costs much more than the navy. In the comparison of the expenses and of the efficiency of an army and navy, instituted by my colleague, there is nothing invidious. The army is acknowledged to be necessary. It has had our votes. But, from the acknowledged propriety of raising the army, was fairly inferred the propriety of employing a navy, if it should be proved to be less expensive in proportion to its probable efficacy. War, and all its operations and all its instruments, must be expensive. It is difficult to determine upon the expediency of employing any of these instruments, except by comparing it with some other. To compute the result of this comparison, the honorable gentlemen on the other side must show, not that it is more expensive to maintain a navy than to be without one—not that it is more expensive to go to war than to remain at peace, (these propositions they, perhaps, have proved,) but that the objects proposed to be attained by the navy may be better or more cheaply attained in some other way. My honorable friend from Pennsylvania, then, in determining not to follow my colleague in the investigation of the comparative expense of different kinds of force, must have determined to avoid the best, and, indeed, the only method of examination from which a just conclusion could be deduced.

The honorable gentleman from Kentucky, however, who spoke yesterday, offered objections to a navy, which, if they were well founded, would supersede all further reasoning and calculation. He opposes a navy now—he will oppose it for ever. It would produce no possible good and all possible evil. It would infallibly destroy the constitution. Will the honorable gentleman tell us why? how? He sees the danger clearly? Will he explain it? An ambitious General might corrupt his army, and seize the Capitol—but will an Admiral reduce us to subjection by bringing his ships up the Potomac? The strongest recommendation of a navy in free Governments has hitherto been supposed to be that it was capable of defending but not of enslaving its country. The honorable gentleman has discovered that this is a vulgar error. A navy is really much more dangerous than an army to public liberty. He voted for the army and expressed no fears for the constitution. But a navy would infallibly terminate in aristocracy and monarchy. All this may be very true. But are we unreasonable in expecting, before we give up the old opinion, to hear some argument in favor of the new one? The honorable gentleman has asserted his propositions very distinctly. We complain only that he has not proved them.

Yet there is a view in which this question of a navy is, indeed, closely connected with the constitution. That constitution was formed by the union of independent States, that the strength of the whole might be employed for the protection of every part. The States were not ignorant of the value of those rights which they surrendered to the General Government, but they expected a compensation for their relinquishment in the increased power which would be employed for their defence. Suppose this expectation disappointed—suppose the harbor of New York blockaded by two seventy-fours? The commerce of that city, which exists only by commerce, destroyed? The protection of the General Government claimed? Your whole navy could not drive these English seventy-fours from their station. Would the brave and enterprising people of New York consent to see their capital emptied of its inhabitants, and their whole country beggared by so contemptible a force? Their own exertions would raise a fleet which would drive off the enemy and restore their city to its owners. But, when a single State shall find herself able to raise a greater fleet than the General Government can or will employ for her defence, can it be expected that she shall consider that Government as essential to her safety—as entitled to her obedience? I repeat that the Federal Constitution was instituted by the States, that the strength of the whole might be combined for the protection of any part which should be attacked. But what is the nature of the defence which one of our large States may be supposed interested to obtain from the General Government? Is it a land force? We can scarcely expect an attack on land, to repel which the militia of New York or Massachusetts would be unequal. Were either of these States attacked, the General Government would protect her by ordering out her own militia. To render the Union permanent, you must render it the interest of all the States, the large as well as the small, to maintain it; you must show them that it will provide, not an army which they can have without it, but what without it they cannot have—an adequate navy.

The honorable gentleman who anticipates the destruction of the constitution, unless we shall neglect one of the great interests which it was intended to protect, considers the English Orders in Council as leaving our institutions firm and untouched. Regulations, the effect of which is to give to a foreign power the complete disposition of the property of a large class of our people, are it seems in their political result innocent. Although every citizen who has property on the ocean become dependent on the English Ministry, become their subject, our liberty and independence are (we are told) unimpaired. But let a navy be raised—let the Government which expects obedience provide protection, and the constitution perishes!

But we have been referred particularly by my honorable friend from Pennsylvania to the experience of the world, as having already decided the question which we are now discussing. It seems that Venice and Genoa, and every other naval power which can be named, have all furnished abundant proof of the ruinous effects which such a force is calculated to produce. Sir, the assertion is new. I do not pretend to an intimate acquaintance with the histories of those nations, but I have hitherto believed that the first great shock which the power of Venice received, was given by the League of Cambray—a league formed to repress her ambition, not of maritime, but of territorial aggrandizement. But, whilst Venice has lost her independence, after maintaining it for five or six centuries, may I ask my honorable friend whether the States of Italy, which were never oppressed by fleets, had enjoyed a longer term of prosperity and freedom? As to Genoa—her naval power, her independence and glory, rose and sunk with the same man—Doria. But Holland, says the gentleman from Kentucky, affords an example of a nation, whose commerce flourished greatly before it had a navy, and decayed while her navy continued powerful. If there ever were a people, whose naval power has been employed to protect and almost to create their commerce, it is the Dutch. They fought their way at the same time to trade in the East Indies and America, and to national independence in Europe. The decay of their trade is to be attributed to the development of the resources of other nations; to the navigation act of England; and the similar measures adopted by other powers. As to France—the period of her greatest financial prosperity probably coincided with that of her greatest naval power; both were due to the administration of Colbert. But the evils of a navy (gentlemen tell us) have been concentrated in the case of England. With all her fleets she is destined soon to lose her independence. The expense of those fleets has crushed the industry of her subjects, and must soon reduce her to national bankruptcy. Let us suppose that these gentlemen, who have been so much mistaken in regard to the past, may be more accurate in their narrative of the future. Still England will have owed to her fleets her redemption from invasion for ages past. While every other considerable nation of Europe has been bankrupt over and over again, she is not yet bankrupt. While nearly every other Government of Europe has been overset, hers yet rides out the storm. Should England fall to-morrow, it should seem impossible to deny that her navy will have prolonged her independence for at least two centuries.

My honorable colleague has calculated the expense of building and maintaining a navy of 12 ships-of-the-line and 20 frigates, and has explained the principles on which his calculations have been founded. The estimate of the gentleman from Pennsylvania can hardly be considered, after the error which has been remarked, as impugning those calculations. I have not myself attempted to estimate the probable expense of maintaining 12 ships-of-the-line and 20 frigates with any precision, but I cannot doubt the fairness of the rule which deduces it from the expense of such a force to England. This is the rule which I understood my colleague to have employed. It has not been disputed in debate; it has been in conversation. Many gentlemen have objected to an estimate of the expenses of a navy during war, in which (as they suppose) no allowance is made for the peculiar expenses which war involves. To have all our ships safe at the end of the contest is observed to be rather a sanguine expectation. But if the rate of expense in the estimate of my colleague were deduced from the rate of English expense during war, these objections must be altogether groundless. Now, it was deduced from the expense which is found sufficient to maintain the English Navy in a state of unimpaired strength during war. The English expense, from which it was inferred, included the charge of docks and navy-yards, of the repair of old ships and of the building of new ones. It included pensions to their officers, and even the support of the prisoners taken from their enemies. I have on my table a detailed account of the English naval expenditure for a year of the last war. The whole amount was about twelve millions and a half, and of this sum fully four millions and a half were applied to what may be considered the contingent expenses of the navy. Now, is there any reason to suppose that the contingent expenses of our navy would be greater in proportion to its force than this? And if not greater, has not an allowance been made for the capture of some of our ships, or, in other words, for the building of new ones? It is true, that from the superiority of English sailors to their present enemies, England loses little by capture, and, it may be supposed, that from the greater frequency and severity of our conflicts when we shall be engaged in war against her, our contingent expenses may be greater in proportion to the number of our ships then hers. But there are many expenses to which she is necessarily subject, from which we shall be exempt. I will instance that resulting from blockading squadrons, and that from repairs in colonial and foreign ports. These can appear inconsiderable to no man who has given his attention in any degree to the subject. Naval men I believe would not contradict me, if I were to state the expense of a ship employed in a strict blockade, and particularly during the winter months, as fully double that of a ship engaged in ordinary service. In fact, England finds the expense too great for her finances, and has been obliged, in some measure, to give up the practice. The other article of expenditure to which I have referred, I shall not attempt to estimate with any precision. It must, however, be obvious to every man, that the ships of war of England must frequently be repaired and refitted in distant countries. In these the most scrupulous fidelity and economy on the part of her officers cannot prevent the expense from being frequently extravagant. The most salutary regulations and most provident instructions on the part of the Administration at home cannot prevent her officers from being sometimes careless and fraudulent. I recollect an instance of the enormous expense involved in the distant services required from the British Navy, which I cannot pretend to state with accuracy, but in which I hope not to be substantially wrong. Sir Home Popham (a distinguished officer in the English Navy) had under his command in the last war two or three frigates in the East Indies. They had left England in good condition, and their repairs for two or three years, and the supply of the different articles of equipment which they occasionally required, exceeded, I believe, the prime cost of the vessels themselves. These two items of expenditure, blockading squadrons, and repairs in distant countries, (to neither of which an American Navy would be liable,) will be acknowledged, I think, to justify the conclusion, that the contingent expenses of the English Navy must be as great in proportion to its force as ours would be in war—and therefore that the rule employed in the calculations of my colleague was correct.

But our resources for the equipment of a navy appear to the honorable gentlemen on the other side, as deficient in respect to men and money. Sailors in this country cannot be obtained in sufficient numbers without impressment. It is not necessary, sir, to inquire whether for the defence of their peculiar rights the services of a marine militia may not be required. There is no reason to doubt our being able to procure the voluntary services of our seamen. If we shall at any time be engaged in a war (like that with France in 1798) which shall leave the greater part of our trade unaffected, the wages of sailors will, indeed, be high, but the number required will be small and the Government can afford high wages. In a war of a different character—against a nation powerful at sea—your sailors will be thrown out of employment and their wages will be necessarily low. But gentlemen object to this reasoning on the supposition that in such a case our sailors would all engage in privateers. The notion that in any war there will be a demand in this country for more than thirty thousand sailors for privateers is surely an extravagant one. But it has been shown by my colleague that in a war which should diminish our trade by one-half, (and a war requiring any great naval exertion would necessarily do this,) thirty or forty thousand seamen may be employed in privateers, and a sufficient number would remain for your public ships. But are not your privateers as much a part of the naval force of the nation as your ships of war? It has been said, indeed, that they are the more useful part. Now, if the Government should believe (what neither sober reflection nor the experience of other nations can permit it to doubt) that this part of your force cannot be in any great degree serviceable unless supported by a fleet—then surely a limitation to its extent, which would be necessary even to the interest of its owners, cannot fairly be objected to. The law just passed for raising twenty-five thousand men, provides, I think, for only one regiment of cavalry. Now, it is very possible that a much larger proportion of the twenty-five thousand men that can be accommodated in this regiment, may choose to go to Canada on horseback. They must be disappointed, and either not go into the army at all, or go into the service which they least desire. No man has hitherto denounced the act as on this account tyrannical and oppressive. Yet this case seems to me a true parallel to the other. In the naval, as in the military service, the interest of the country requires the employment of different sorts of force; and the object may be attained with equal fairness in both services by limiting the amount of the favorite force.

Mr. Law said: Being in favor of the bill now under consideration, I beg leave to express my sentiments, and state the reasons in support of my opinion; and the only pledge I shall offer to the House, for their attention, is, that I shall not occupy much of their time.

This bill, sir, embraces two objects—one relates to the repairs and equipment of the ships of the United States now out of service—the other contemplates the building of ten additional frigates, and laying the foundation of a new Naval Establishment. The view which I entertain of this subject, does not arise from its connection with that system which grows out of what is called the present crisis, or putting the nation in armor for war, as reported by the Committee of Foreign Relations; but from a conviction, that, as an abstract question or matter of general policy, I deem it for the interest and security of the United States, to begin the establishment of a Navy, to be perpetuated and extended hereafter—and, because I believe it may be accomplished, to the extent at present proposed, from the ordinary means we ought to possess, without adding any new burdens on the citizens. In order to decide whether it is for the interest of the United States we must examine and see how it is connected with the great and essential interest of the country. The basis of our national wealth is agriculture; the real substance of the nation is drawn from the earth. This arises from the great and extensive territory which we possess, thinly settled, low in price, of an excellent soil, capable, from its fertility and variety of climes, of affording produce of every kind, in the greatest abundance. The surplus of all is wanted in other countries, where nature has been less bountiful; and it must be a great while before the labor of our citizens can be diverted extensively into other channels—I mean manufactures. This is a condition in which we ought to rejoice for the causes, which bind us in this necessity, are those which tend to preserve the morals, the happiness, and the independence of the nation. And until our lands are taken up, and population becomes redundant, the basis of our national wealth must be the farming interest. But, sir, in a country so blessed by nature; where the inhabitants have the greatest stimulus to industry, the fruits of their labor secured by just and equal laws; where the property cannot be taken from the owner without his consent, there will be a vast surplus, beyond what the consumption of the country requires. Hence, commerce springs up as the daughter and handmaid of agriculture. Without commerce, agriculture would languish. With it, wealth is consolidated, and industry promoted. It diffuses its benign influence, discoverable in the splendid and delightful improvements, which rejoice the eye of the traveller, throughout the country. And it is as unnatural for the farming interest to oppress the commercial, as it is for the parent to abandon its offspring. They mutually cherish and support each other; and, by natural sympathy, must be affected by the checks and disorders which each may receive. But commerce must be protected. It cannot protect itself against force. Being carried on abroad on the ocean, (for I am speaking of foreign commerce,) it is subject to annoyance, interruption, and hazard. We must pass the common highway of nations to get to a market; and in this route, the weak and defenceless must, and always will be the sport and prey of the strong and violent, whom they meet in the way. From the wretched state of those nations with whom we have intercourse, we, from weakness, must fall victims to their violence. This is an evil which we shall always experience as a neutral, coming in collision with belligerents. Shall we then abandon commerce, or shall we strive to support it? It will be for the interest of the country to support it, if possible; for if we abandon it, the evil will recoil on the agricultural part, who, no longer than foreign commerce is supported, can find a vent for their surplus; and without a vent for the surplus, a bare competency might be endangered. Internal commerce would always fail, for that, being but a stream from foreign commerce, must dry when the fountain from whence it issues fails. Enterprise ceases, and languor and poverty ensue. It is then for the interest of the nation to cherish commerce. But how can this be done? Will a navy have this effect? I think it will. Indeed, if the little navy which was commenced some years ago, had been supported and increased as it might have been without any difficulty, we might, and in all probability should, have avoided our present calamities. We are now the defenceless prey of both France and England; deprived of the common rights of nations and citizens of the world. Will it then be asked, shall we not go to war and fight our way? I have already recorded my negative on the several questions preparatory to that step, and I am decidedly against going to war. We have not the means necessary, and unsuccessful resistance will only make our condition worse. I verily believe, if this nation had fostered our infant navy, from the time it was commenced, and had not, by a strange infatuation, abandoned and neglected it, it would now have been too important to be despised, by either France or England. Our prosperity would have continued. Our strength would have been dreaded, and our friendship courted by both nations. While they have been contending for the mastery, we, with such naval force as we ought to have had, and a strict course of neutrality, might have pursued a lawful and gainful trade. We might have had a perpetual revenue of sixteen millions, instead of the pittance now received at the Treasury. I believe, that with the navy we might have had, and a correct strict neutral course, there would have been neither Berlin and Milan Decrees, nor Orders in Council, to annoy our lawful commerce.

Mr. Roberts observed, that there appeared to be a disposition in the committee to take the question on the filling the blank in the first section without further debate. As he could not vote for appropriating $480,000 for the repair of the vessels of war unfit for service, it would perhaps be the most proper time to submit his opinions. I have not, Mr. Chairman, said he been a listless hearer of the very ingenious arguments advanced by gentlemen in favor of the report. He had, however, been so unfortunate as to be more confirmed in his inclination to vote against the bill, from attentively weighing these arguments. The select committee in their report (for they had reported specially as well as by bill) have said, with oracular confidence, that this country is inevitably destined to become a naval power. He had not, with them, become a fatalist. Though he was disposed to claim a high destiny for his country, he did not believe that destiny was yet immutably fixed. He, however, believed the question now to be decided must have an influence on that destiny, that might at an early day, if decided affirmatively, obliterate our happy civil institutions; if negatively, preserve them long the best blessings of posterity. Gentlemen who have advocated a naval establishment, have chosen to consider this bill and report as the furtherance of a system already in existence, and that, however short of their wishes the committee may be disposed to go, they stand prepared to view whatever might be done to augment the naval force as an evidence of assent to their system. Mr. R. said at one time he had inclined to vote for the appropriation of a sum to equip such of the vessels now out of service as might be found worthy of refittal. But on discovering it would be considered as an acknowledgment that a navy was proper in the sense it had been brought into view by the committee, and doubting, on better consideration, whether there was not great likelihood the money would be worse applied in repairing old, than in building new vessels, and feeling a conviction that if these vessels should be deemed worthy of repair, they could not be brought into action in that exigence of war when they could be useful, as in that case land defence must be resorted to, and the consequent expense incurred, he should feel it his duty to vote against this appropriation.

It has been observed that the constitution has invested Congress with power to regulate commerce, to provide and maintain a navy, &c. There is nothing, said Mr. R., imperative in this. It was necessary in a general grant of powers to insert many items to be left to the sound discretion of Congress, to use or not to use. Soon after the Government came into operation, it became a favorite object with one set of politicians to form a navy. On the occasion of our commerce being depredated upon by the Barbary corsairs, the question first came up. It became a matter of deliberation whether a peace should be purchased of them with money and presents; whether some European power should be subsidized to keep a few frigates on that station, or whether a naval force should be equipped for the purpose (as alleged) of enabling the President to negotiate to better effect. The party with whom I have always found it my duty to act, said Mr. R., opposed, on that occasion, the commencement of a navy system, when it was invited under circumstances so specious. They were, however, in the minority. The ships of war were voted—with what effect on the Algerines, he did not stop to inquire. If this opposition to the commencement of a Naval Establishment was wrong in the minority, their successors ought not to follow them; but if it should be found that they were right, the ground ought never to be quitted. The question of increasing the navy was again discussed in the celebrated times of '98-9. The collisions with France had raised the war fever very high. A navy was vociferously contended for as the most efficient means of defence. It was when things were in this state, that the President, in his reply to the Marine Society of Boston, who had with much fervor tendered him their approbation of his measures, hoped to see the wooden walls of America considered as her best defence. Because Athens, when she was invaded by the hosts of Xerxes, had chosen to interpret the oracle that promised her safety in wooden walls, rationally, America must take the same course, however dissimilarly situated. The people of Attica, inhabiting a circumscribed territory, found safety in their fleet, and they could have found it nowhere else. But such cannot be the case with America. Even the hosts of Xerxes could not make it necessary for the American people to quit their territory—the figure would not hold. On this occasion, too, the Republican party consistently opposed a navy; strange blindness and obstinacy, if they were not sustained by reason as well as principle. On this occasion, the supporters of a navy system were a majority in council. For a moment they succeeded with their measures. But the public councils were soon filled by the people with men of other minds, and the question was put to rest.

Gentlemen have considered this subject on its general principles and remote consequences. In this point of view, said Mr. R., it presents a wide field for reflection. The Chairman (Mr. Cheves) has complained he has had to meet this subject encumbered with much error and many prejudices; among which is the idea that a naval system is prejudicial to civil liberty. The opposers of a navy, with an air of no small triumph, are called upon to show how a system of maritime power would endanger the freedom of our country. It has been said, a military chieftain, by an easy transition, may become a civil ruler, and that the commander of an army has often become a despot, while no such event could happen from a naval commander, as such an office gave no power on terra firma. If we look a little deeper into the subject, we shall find we have as much to fear, and even more, from a naval than a military power. The latter can only be kept in time of war, and for comparatively but short periods; at a time too, when the public spirit is awakened and ready to oppose encroachment. The chair of rule may possibly be gained by a military chief; but an attempt on the public liberty has a much greater chance to fail. Evils of this sort can only take place on very rare contingency; but the ruin of the public liberty can hardly fail to be a consequence of the establishment of a naval power. History proves to us that maritime power has always excited national ambition to a spirit of conquest and plunder. A naval power will seek colonies and ports in distant places. The chance, nay, the certainty, of collisions with other nations, is multiplied, and a corruption of morals is produced, that cannot fail to make the first Government on earth a tyranny, by a course of events that the patriot can neither prevent nor divert to other consequences. A short time after Athens had found safety in her wooden walls, one of her statesmen proposed she should burn the fleets of her neighbors, that she might thereby be rendered mistress of Greece. This project the virtue of the people resisted; but that virtue soon gave way in the expedition to the Cyclades, where her navy committed acts of violence that must indelibly fix the stain of the blackest perfidy and cruelty on the Athenian character. What could be a more unprovoked act of aggression than her crusade against Syracuse, a crime that visited her with a declension of power from which she never recovered? For a nation to believe her destinies fixed, is in a great measure to fix them. Nothing, perhaps, contributed more to make Rome the mistress of the world, than the oracles that promised it. Her heroes and statesmen were stimulated thereby to fulfil her destiny. The maritime supremacy of Britain is, perhaps, owing as much to the belief that she is the destined Queen of the waters, as to any other cause. Though such operations be calculated to bring about astonishing effects, how unfortunate is it when a nation's eyes are thus directed to improper attainments—it becomes a source of incalculable evil. Athens and Rome were the victims of such a policy, as Britain is at this time. I fervently hope, said Mr. R., for a better destiny for our beloved country. Rome and Carthage were both great maritime powers; it was not in Lybia and Italy they began to contend for superiority, but in Sicily and Iberia. The conflicts thence arising brought terror to the gates of Rome, and laid Carthage in ashes. The abuse of maritime power in both those States changed the free features of the government, and left a dreary despotism in their stead. A naval victory secured to the second Cæsar the rule of the mistress of the world. In later times, we have been told, said Mr. R., the declension of maritime States has been due to other causes than their Naval Establishments. In some instances it may have been so. When the strength and power of a State has arisen entirely from the profits of commerce, when that commerce has taken another course, the transitory splendor it has built up has vanished. Venice was an example of this. The commerce of the East caused her to rise out of the circumscribed and marshy Islands at the bottom of the Adriatic, the proud Mistress of the Waves. When the Cape of Good Hope had been doubled by the Portuguese, her commercial advantages failed. She sunk from the conqueror of the Eastern Empire, to a mere city of Italy and Portugal; a narrow territory, by the same commerce, assumed the first rank among the nations of the world. A naval power may serve sometimes to extend commerce to wider limits; but it can by no means control it with certainty to channels through which nature, and often the policy of other nations, bid it to flow. What is the state of British commerce at this time? The rupture of the peace of Amiens did not arise from Britain having received injuries from France after the cessation of hostilities. The new war was a commercial one. The British Cabinet saw, in a state of peace, France would not be unmindful of her commercial interests. The intelligence, the enterprise, and population, and the resources of France, all indicated that she would at least divide successfully the profits of commerce with her rival. The naval power of Britain giving her the command of the sea, she could oppose only with effect the growing commerce of her neighbor in a state of war. This step of British policy imposed on the ruler of France the necessity of changing the channels of commerce. In this way he has aimed a blow at the vitals of her strength, which her tremendous naval power neither enables her to avert nor lessen its force. Her marine puts the trident into her hands, but she can no longer shake the earth. Her monopolizing spirit has sealed the Continent of Europe against her, and interdicted her commerce with America. She has reduced the ocean almost to a desert; and she seems hastening to that destiny which has generally attended her predecessors in naval power through her ambition to rule the waves.

Gentlemen propose to protect commerce on this side the Gulf Stream, yet admit if our vessels are despoiled on the Indian Ocean, we must apply retaliation in the West Indies. The Gulf Stream limitation is at once given up; a new expedition to the Cyclades is in that case to take place. Begin your conquest in the West Indies, and you must increase your navy to acquire and defend them. It is at once an admission that naval power must be used more for ambition than the protection of commerce and our territorial waters. But, what is worse, as you acquire colonies and ships you must create armies. The hands of the Executive, restricted and elective as it is, in the United States, became thence armed with a sceptre formidable indeed, and the more so as it acquires this strength without producing the shock to public feeling which the seizure of power by a military leader will always excite. It has been said, (said Mr. R.,) that the existence of Great Britain hung upon her navy in the contest in which she is now engaged. If her fate hangs suspended by her naval power, she owes her peril to that source. Without her maritime strength, would she have aspired to balance the scales of power on the Continent? Would she have become a party to the infamous conspiracy of Pilnitz? Would she have wantonly plotted the dismemberment of France? Would she have broken the peace of Amiens whence her present dangers arise? Certainly not.

On the article of cost, said Mr. R., it is of little importance whether the army or navy of Great Britain is most burdensome on her finances, though it has been dwelt upon with particular emphasis, nor whether an army be more expensive in every case, than a navy. Armies are a necessary consequence of navies. Has not the British army increased with equal pace with her navy?

The humane mind, said Mr. R., cannot contemplate without pain, that from naval power have flown the most copious streams of human misery. The plunder of half the world, with immense advantages in addition, has not sustained the British navy. A debt has been accumulated that almost baffles the power of figures to estimate. But debt, and a prospect of Government insolvency at home, are of much less account than the wrongs this navy has wrought on the society of nations. And yet it is this Government that is held up to Republican America as a model for imitation.

Need I remind you, said Mr. R., of the millions of victims sacrificed to commercial cupidity on the plains of Hindostan, by means of this navy? A population, thrice as great as that of the British Isles, has been exterminated in this devoted region, within comparatively but a few years, by mercantile rapacity. Colonel Dowe informs us, that the wealth of one of the cities of this wretched country had whetted the avarice of Clive and his associates, and that an offer was made to the Government to pay the public debt for permission to sack it. It was too gross an act of infamy to assent to, and the adventurers obtained their end by other means. A famine and pestilence was substituted for the bayonet, and the spoils of the devoted city glutted the hands of rapine. In this exploit, a shoe-black divided his £200,000. Need I remind you, said Mr. R., that the population of Africa has been drained, to groan out a wretched existence in the West India colonies, to prop up this naval and commercial power, or that the remotest corners of every sea have been visited with the scourge of blood and desolation for the same purpose? On general principles, does not past experience afford sufficient warning to these States to avoid those shoals on which so many nations have been wrecked?

Mr. Chairman, under no view which I have been able to take of this subject, considering it either as the furtherance of a system of naval power, to be expanded with the growing strength of the Union to gigantic size, or that it is a proper time for providing a temporary increase of naval force, can I agree, said Mr. R., to the bill on your table.

When Mr. Roberts had concluded, the committee rose, and had leave to sit again.

Wednesday, January 22.

Another member, to wit, William M. Richardson, from Massachusetts, appeared, produced his credentials, was qualified, and took his seat.

Naval Establishment.

The House again went into a Committee of the Whole on the bill concerning the Navy. The question on filling up the blank in the section which provides for repairing the vessels on hand, with four hundred and eighty thousand dollars, was carried by a large majority.

The next section provides for the building of ---- additional frigates.

Mr. Clay (the Speaker) rose to present his views on the bill before the committee. He said that as he did not precisely agree in opinion with any gentleman who had spoken, he should take the liberty of detaining the committee a few moments while he offered to their attention some observations. He was highly gratified with the temper and ability with which the discussion had been hitherto conducted. It was honorable to the House, and, he trusted, would continue to be manifested on many future occasions.

On this interesting topic a diversity of opinion has existed almost ever since the adoption of the present Government. On the one hand there appeared to him to have been attempts made to precipitate the nation into all the evils of naval extravagance, which had been productive of so much mischief in other countries; and, on the other, strongly feeling this mischief, there has existed an unreasonable prejudice against providing such a competent naval protection for our commercial and maritime rights as is demanded by their importance, and as the increased resources of the country amply justify.

The attention of Congress has been invited to this subject by the President in his Message delivered at the opening of the session. Indeed, had it been wholly neglected by the Chief Magistrate, from the critical situation of the country, and nature of the rights proposed to be vindicated, it must have pressed itself upon our attention. But, said Mr. C., the President, in his Message, observes: "Your attention will, of course, be drawn to such provisions on the subject of our naval force as may be required for the service to which it is best adapted. I submit to Congress the seasonableness also of an authority to augment the stock of such materials as are imperishable in their nature, or may not at once be attainable." The President, by this recommendation, clearly intimates an opinion that the naval force of this country is capable of producing some effect; and the propriety of laying up imperishable materials was no doubt suggested for the purpose of making additions to the navy, as convenience and exigencies might direct.

It appeared to Mr. C. a little extraordinary that so much, as it seemed to him, unreasonable jealousy should exist against the Naval Establishment. If, said he, we look back to the period of the formation of the constitution, it will be found that no such jealousy was then excited. In placing the physical force of the nation at the disposal of Congress, the Convention manifested much greater apprehension of abuse in the power given to raise armies than in that to provide a navy. In reference to the Navy, Congress is put under no restrictions; but with respect to the Army—that description of force which has been so often employed to subvert the liberties of mankind—they are subjected to limitations, designed to prevent the abuse of this dangerous power. But it was not his intention to detain the committee by a discussion on the comparative utility and safety of these two kinds of force. He would, however, be indulged in saying, that he thought gentlemen had wholly failed in maintaining the position they had assumed, that the fall of maritime powers was attributable to their navies. They have told you, indeed, that Carthage, Genoa, Venice, and other nations, had navies, and, notwithstanding, were finally destroyed. But have they shown, by a train of argument, that their overthrow was, in any degree, ascribable to their maritime greatness? Have they attempted even to show that there exists in the nature of this power a necessary tendency to destroy the nation using it? Assertion is substituted for argument; inferences not authorized by historical facts are arbitrarily drawn; things wholly unconnected with each other are associated together—a very logical mode of reasoning! In the same way he could demonstrate how idle and absurd our attachments are to freedom itself. He might say, for example, that Greece and Rome had forms of free government, and that they no longer exist; and deducing their fall from their devotion to liberty, the conclusion in favor of despotism would very satisfactorily follow! He demanded what there is in the nature and construction of maritime power to excite the fears that have been indulged? Do gentlemen really apprehend that a body of seamen will abandon their proper element, and, placing themselves under an aspiring chief, will erect a throne to his ambition? Will they deign to listen to the voice of history, and learn how chimerical are their apprehensions?

But the source of alarm is in ourselves. Gentlemen fear that if we provide a marine it will produce collisions with foreign nations—plunge us into war, and ultimately overturn the constitution of the country. Sir, if you wish to avoid foreign collision you had better abandon the ocean; surrender all your commerce; give up all your prosperity. It is the thing protected, not the instrument of protection, that involves you in war. Commerce engenders collision, collision war, and war, the argument supposes, leads to despotism. Would the counsels be deemed wise, of that statesman who should recommend that the nation should be unarmed—that the art of war, the martial spirit, and martial exercises, should be prohibited—and that the great body of the people should be taught that national happiness was to be found in perpetual peace alone? No, sir. And yet every argument in favor of a power of protection on land applies, in some degree, to a power of protection on the sea. Undoubtedly a commerce void of naval protection is more exposed to rapacity than a guarded commerce; and if we wish to invite the continuance of the old, or enaction of new unjust edicts, let us refrain from all exertion upon that element where they operate, and where, in the end, they must be resisted.

For his part, Mr. C. said, he did not allow himself to be alarmed by those apprehensions of maritime power which appeared to agitate other gentlemen. In the nature of our Government he beheld abundant security against abuse. He would be unwilling to tax the land to support the rights of the sea, and was for drawing from the sea itself the resources with which its violated freedom should at all times be vindicated. Whilst this principle is adhered to, there will be no danger of running into the folly and extravagance which so much alarms gentlemen; and whenever it is abandoned—whenever Congress shall lay burdensome taxes to augment the Navy beyond what may be authorized by the increased wealth, and demanded by the exigencies of the country, the people will interpose, and, removing their unworthy representatives, apply the appropriate corrective. Mr. C. could not, then, see any just ground of dread in the nature of naval power. It was, on the contrary, free from the evils attendant upon standing armies. And, the genius of our institutions—the great representative principle, in the practical enjoyment of which we are so eminently distinguished—afforded the best guarantee against the ambition and wasteful extravagance of Government.

What maritime strength is it expedient to provide for the United States? In considering this subject, three different degrees of naval power present themselves. In the first place, such a force as would be capable of contending with that which any other nation is able to bring on the ocean—a force that, boldly scouring every sea, would challenge to combat the fleets of other powers, however great. He admitted it was impossible at this time, perhaps it never would be desirable for this country to establish so extensive a Navy. Indeed, he should consider it as madness in the extreme in this Government to attempt to provide a Navy capable to cope with the fleets of Great Britain, wherever they might be met.

The next species of naval power to which he would advert, is that which, without adventuring into distant seas, and keeping generally in our own harbors, and on our coasts, would be competent to beat off any squadron which might be attempted to be permanently stationed in our waters. His friends from South Carolina (Messrs. Cheves and Lowndes) had satisfactorily shown that, to effect this object, a force equivalent only to one-third of that which the maintenance of such squadron must require would be sufficient. That if, for example, England should determine to station permanently upon our coast a squadron of twelve ships-of-the-line, it would require for this service thirty-six ships-of-the line, one-third in port repairing, one-third on the passage, and one-third on the station. But that is a force which it has been shown that even England, with her boasted Navy, could not spare for the American service whilst she is engaged in the present contest. Mr. C. said he was desirous of seeing such a force as he had described, that is, about twelve ships-of-the-line and fifteen or twenty frigates, provided for the United States; but, he admitted that it was unattainable in the present situation of the finances of the country. He contended, however, that it was such as Congress ought to set about providing, and he hoped, in less than ten years, to see it actually established. He was far from surveying the vast maritime power of Great Britain with the desponding eye with which other gentlemen beheld it. He could not allow himself to be discouraged at the prospect even of her thousand ships. This country only required resolution, and a proper exertion of its immense resources, to command respect, and to vindicate every essential right. When we consider our remoteness from Europe, the expense, difficulty, and perils, to which any squadron would be exposed, stationed off our coasts, he entertained no doubt that the force to which he referred would insure the command of our own seas. Such a force would avail itself of our extensive seaboard and numerous harbors, everywhere affording asylums to which it could retire for safety from a superior fleet, or from which it could issue for the purpose of annoyance. To the opinion of his colleague, (Mr. McKee,) who appeared to think that it was in vain for us to make any struggle on the ocean, he would oppose the sentiments of his distinguished connexion, the heroic Daviess, who fell in the battle of Tippecanoe.

[Here Mr. C. read certain parts of a work written by Colonel Daviess, in which the author attempts to show that, as the aggressions upon our commerce were not committed by fleets, but by single vessels, they could in the same manner be best retaliated; that a force of about twenty or thirty frigates would be capable of inflicting great injury on English commerce by picking up stragglers, cutting off convoys, and seizing upon every moment of supineness; and that such a force, with our seaports and harbors well fortified, and aided by privateers, would be really formidable, and would annoy the British navy and commerce, as the French army was assailed in Egypt, the Persian army in Scythia, and the Roman army in Parthia.][26]

The third description of force worthy of consideration is, that which would be able to prevent any single vessel, of whatever metal, from endangering our whole coasting trade, blocking up our harbors, or laying under contribution our cities; a force competent to punish the insolence of the commander of any single ship, and to preserve in our own jurisdiction the inviolability of our peace and our laws. A force of this kind is entirely within the compass of our means at this time. Is there a reflecting man in the nation who would not charge Congress with a culpable neglect of its duty, if, for the want of such a force, a single ship were to bombard one of our cities? Would not every honorable member of this committee inflict on himself the bitterest reproaches, if, by failing to make an inconsiderable addition to our gallant little Navy, a single British vessel should place New York under contribution? Yes, sir, when the city is in flames, its wretched inhabitants begin to repent of their neglect in not providing engines and water buckets. If, said Mr. C, we are not able to meet the wolves of the forest, shall we put up with the barking of every petty fox that trips across our way? Because we cannot guard against every possible danger, shall we provide against none? He hoped not. He had hardly expected that the instructing but humiliating lesson was so soon to be forgotten which was taught us in the murder of Pierce; the attack on the Chesapeake; and the insult offered in the harbor of Charleston, which the brave old fellow that commanded the fort in vain endeavored to chastise.

It was a rule with Mr. C., when acting either in a public or private character, to attempt nothing more than what there existed a prospect of accomplishing. He was, therefore, not in favor of entering into any mad projects on this subject; but for deliberately and resolutely pursuing what he believed to be within the power of Government. Gentlemen refer to the period of 1798, and we are reminded of the principles maintained by the opposition at that time. He had no doubt of the correctness of that opposition. The naval schemes of that day were premature, not warranted by the resources of the country, and were contemplated for an unnecessary war into which the nation was about to be plunged. He always admired and approved the zeal and ability with which that opposition was conducted by the distinguished gentleman now at the head of the Treasury. But the state of things is totally altered. What was folly in 1798 may be wisdom now. At that time, we had a revenue only of about six millions. Our revenue now, upon a supposition that commerce is restored, is about sixteen millions. The population of the country, too, is greatly increased—nearly doubled—and the wealth of the nation is, perhaps, tripled. While our ability to construct a navy is thus enhanced, the necessity for maritime protection is proportionately augmented. Independent of the extension of our commerce, since the year 1798, we have had an addition of more than five hundred miles to our coast, from the bay of Perdido to the mouth of the Sabine—a weak and defenceless accession, requiring, more than any other part of our maritime frontier, the protecting arm of Government.

Friday, January 24.

Naval Establishment.

The blank in the section for providing a dock yard, was filled with one hundred thousand dollars.

Mr. Rhea moved so to amend the bill as to fix the dock yard in the navy-yard at Washington City; but this motion was negatived by a large majority.

On motion of Mr. Cheves, the words "central and," were struck out, so as to leave the site of the dock yard to be determined by the Executive.

The committee having gone through the bill, rose and reported it to the House with the amendments. The House took up the bill, and on the question of filling up the blank for repairing the vessels on hand with "four hundred and eighty thousand dollars," it was carried—yeas 90, nays 23.

The question was next put upon agreeing to the report of the committee to strike out the second section of the bill, which contemplated the building of new frigates; when

Mr. Williams rose and spoke at considerable length. He said the time was very inauspicious for commencing an undertaking of such magnitude as the building a navy, which could be of no use in the approaching contest. He doubted the policy of engaging in the business at all; for navies, he said, had deceived the hopes of every country which had relied upon them; that we could never expect to be able to meet Great Britain on the ocean; that we had fought through the Revolution without a navy; for in that contest, a single privateer had done more than the few ships of war which were in possession of the old Congress; that except we are able to build and equip a navy equal to meet the British at sea, we were better without one, as our ships would probably fall a prey to their superior force; that his greatest objection against a navy was, that it must be kept up in time of peace as well as in war; that when the gentlemen spoke of a navy as cheaper than an army, they could not mean to say that if we had a navy the army could be dispensed with—they could not, for instance, take possession of Canada by a navy; that the building of a navy would burden the people with oppressive taxes; that such an establishment would serve only to increase Executive patronage; that with respect to commerce, the people were willing to give it all the protection in their power, but they could not provide a navy for that purpose.

Saturday January 25.

Naval Establishment.

Mr. Quincy.—Mr. Speaker, I rise to address you, on this occasion, with no affected diffidence, and with many doubts concerning the expediency of taking any part in this debate. On the one hand, the subject has been discussed with a zeal, industry, and talent, which leave but little scope for novelty, either in topic or illustration. On the other hand, arguments from this side of the House, in favor of this question, are received with so natural a jealousy, that I know not whether more may not be lost than gained by so unpropitious a support. Indeed, sir, if this subject had been discussed on narrow or temporary or party principles, I should have been silent. On such ground, I could not condescend to debate—I could not hope to influence. But, the scale of discussion has been enlarged and liberal—relative rather to the general system, than to the particular exigency. In almost every respect, it has been honorable to the House, and auspicious to the prospects of the nation. In such a state of feeling and sentiment, I could not refrain from indulging the hope that suggestions, even from so favorite a quarter, would be received with candor—perhaps with attention. And, when I consider the deep interest which the State from which I have the honor to be a Representative has, according to my apprehension, in the event, I cannot permit the opportunity entirely to pass, without bringing my small tribute of reflection to the general stock of the House.

The object I shall chiefly attempt to enforce, is, the necessity and duty of a systematic protection of our maritime rights, by maritime means. I would call the thoughtful and intelligent men of this House and nation to the contemplation of the essential connection between a naval force, proportionate to the circumstances of our seacoast, the extent of our commerce, and the inherent enterprise of our people; I say, sir, I would call them to the contemplation of the essential connection between such a naval force and the safety, prosperity, and existence, of our Union. In the course of my observations, and as a subsidiary argument, I shall also attempt to show the connection between the adoption of the principle of a systematic maintenance of our maritime rights, by maritime means, and relief from our present national embarrassments.

I confess to you, Mr. Speaker, I never can look—indeed, in my opinion, no American statesman ought ever to look—on any question touching the vital interests of this nation, or of any of its component parts, without keeping at all times in distinct view the nature of our political association, and the character of the independent sovereignties which compose it. Among States, the only sure and permanent bond of union is interest. And the vital interests of States, although they may be sometimes obscured, can never, for a very long time, be misapprehended. The natural protection which the essential interests of the great component parts of our political association require will be sooner or later understood by the States concerned in those interests. If a protection, upon system, be not provided, it is impossible that discontent should not result. And need I tell statesmen, that, when great local discontent is combined in those sections with great physical power, and with acknowledged portions of sovereignty, the inbred ties of nature will be too strong for the artificial ties of parchment compact. Hence it results that the essential interests of the great component parts of our association ought to be the polar lights of all our statesmen—by them they should guide their course. According to the bearings and variations of those lights, should the statesmen of such a country adjust their policy—always bearing in mind two assurances, as fundamental principles of action, which the nature of things teaches, that, although temporary circumstances—party spirit, local rivalries, personal jealousies, suggestions of subordinate interests—may weaken, or even destroy, for a time, the influence of the leading and permanent interests of any great section of the country, yet those interests must ultimately and necessarily predominate, and swallow up all these local, and temporary, and personal, and subordinate considerations; in other words, the minor interests will soon begin to realize the essential connection which exists between their prosperity and the prosperity of those great interests which, in such sections of the country, nature has made predominant; and that no political connection among free States can be lasting, or ought to be, which systematically oppresses, or systematically refuses to protect, the vital interests of any of the sovereignties which compose it.

I have recurred to these general considerations, to introduce and elucidate this principle, which is the basis of my argument, that, as it is the incumbent duty of every nation to protect its essential interests, so it is the most impressive and critical duty of a nation, composed of a voluntary association of vast, powerful, and independent States, to protect the essential interests of all its great component parts. And I add, that this protection must not be formal or fictitious, but that it must be proportionate to the greatness of those interests, and of a nature to give content to the States concerned in their protection.

In reference to this principle, the course of my reflections will be guided by two general inquiries—the nature of the interest to be protected, and the nature of the protection to be extended. In pursuing these inquiries, I shall touch very slightly, if at all, on the abstract duty of protection, which is the very end of all political associations, and, without the attainment of which, they are burdens and no blessings. But I shall keep it mainly in my purpose to establish the connection between a naval force and commercial prosperity; and to show the nature of the necessity, and the degree of our capacity, to give to our maritime rights a maritime protection.

In contemplating the nature of the interest to be protected, three prominent features strike the eye, and direct the course of reflection, viz: its locality, its greatness, and its permanency.

The locality of any great interest, in an association of States such as compose this Union, will be a circumstance of primary importance, in the estimation of every wise statesman. When a great interest is equally diffused over the whole mass, it may be neglected or oppressed or even abandoned, with less hazard of internal dissension. The equality of the pressure lightens the burden. The common nature of the interest removes the causes of jealousy. A concern equally affecting the happiness of every part of the nation, it is natural to suppose, is equally dear to all, and equally understood by all. Hence results acquiescence in any artificial or political embarrassment of it. Sectional fears and suspicions, in such case, have no food for support, and no stimulant for activity. But it is far otherwise when a great interest is, from its nature, either wholly, or in a very great proportion, local. In relation to such a local interest, it is impossible that jealousies and suspicions should not arise, whenever it is obstructed by any artificial or political embarrassment; and it is also impossible that they should not be, in a greater or less degree, just. It is true, of the wisest and the best and the most thoughtful of our species, that they are so constituted as not deeply to realize the importance of interests which affect them not at all, or very remotely. Every local circle of States, as well as of individuals, has a set of interests, in the prosperity of which, the happiness of the section to which they belong is identified; in relation to which interests, the hopes and the fears, the reasonings and the schemes, of the inhabitants of such sections are necessarily fashioned and conducted. It is morally impossible that those concerned in such sectional interests, should not look with some degree of jealousy on schemes adopted in relation to those interests, and prosecuted by men, a majority of whom have a very remote or very small stake in them. And this jealousy must rise to an extreme height, when the course of measures adopted, whether they have relation to the management or the protection of such interests, wholly contravene the opinions and the practical experience of the persons immediately concerned in them. This course of reflection has a tendency to illustrate this idea—that, as in every political association it is of primary importance that the great interests of each local section should be skilfully and honestly managed and protected, so, in selecting the mode and means of management and protection, an especial regard should be had to the content and rational satisfaction of those most deeply concerned in such sectional interests. Theories and speculations of the closet, however abundant in a show of wisdom, are never to be admitted to take the place of those principles of conduct in which experience has shown the prosperity and safety of such interests to consist. Practical knowledge, and that sagacity which results from long attention to great interests, never fail to inspire a just self-confidence in relation to those interests—a confidence not to be browbeaten by authority, nor circumvented by any general reasoning. And, in a national point of view, it is scarcely of more importance that the course adopted should be wise, than that content and rational satisfaction should be given.

On this topic of locality, I shall confine myself to one or two very plain statements. It seems sufficient to observe, that commerce is, from the nature of things, the leading interest of more than one-half, and that it is the predominant interest of more than one-third, of the people of the United States. The States north of the Potomac contain nearly four millions of souls; and surely it needs no proof to convince the most casual observer, that the proportion which the commercial interest bears to the other interests of that great section of the Union, is such as entitles it to the denomination of leading interest. The States north of the Hudson contain nearly two and a half millions of souls; and surely there is as little need of proof to show that the proportion the commercial interest bears to the other interests of that Northern section of the Union, is such as entitles it there to the denomination of predominating interest. In all the country between the Potomac and the Hudson the interest of commerce is so great, in proportion to the other interests, that its embarrassment clogs and weakens the energy of every other description of industry. Yet, the agricultural and manufacturing interests of this section are of a nature and a magnitude, both in respect of the staples of the one and the objects of the other, as to render them, in a very considerable degree, independent of the commercial. And, although they feel the effect of the obstruction of commerce, the feeling may be borne for a long time, without much individual suffering, or any general distress. But, in the country north of the Hudson, the proportion and connection of these great interests are different. Both agriculture and manufactures have there grown up in more intimate relation to commerce. The industry of that section has its shape and energy from commercial prosperity. To the construction, the supply, and the support of navigation, its manufactures have a direct or indirect reference; and it is not very different with its agriculture. A country divided into small farms, among a population great compared with its extent, requires quick circulation and easy processes in the exchange of its commodities. This can only be obtained by an active and prosperous commerce.

But, perhaps, the greatness of this interest, and our pecuniary ability to protect it, may be made more strikingly apparent by a comparison of our commerce with that of Britain, in the single particular of export. I state, then, as a fact, of which any man may satisfy himself by a reference to McPherson's Annals of Commerce, where the tables of British export may be found, that, taking the nine years prior to the war of our Revolution—from 1766 to 1774 inclusive—the total average export of Great Britain was £16,000,000 sterling; equal to $71,000,000—an amount less, by $10,000,000, than the present total average export of the United States. And again, taking the nine years beginning with 1789, and ending with 1797, inclusive, the total annual average export of Great Britain was £24,000,000 sterling—equal to $106,000,000—which is less, by $2,000,000, than the total export of the United States in 1807. It is true, that this is the official value of the British export, and that the real value is somewhat higher—perhaps thirty per cent. This circumstance, although it in a degree diminishes the approximation of the American to the British commerce, in point of amount does not materially affect the argument. Upon the basis of her commerce, Great Britain maintains a maritime force of 800 or 1,000 vessels of war. And will it be seriously contended, that, upon the basis of a commerce like ours, thus treading upon the heels of British greatness, we are absolutely without the ability of maintaining the security of our seaboard, the safety of our cities, and the unobstructed course of our coasting trade?

By recurring to the permanency of this interest, the folly and madness of this negligence and misplaced meanness—for it does not deserve the name of economy—will be still more distinctly exhibited. If this commerce were the mushroom growth of a night—if it had its vigor from the temporary excitement and the accumulated nutriment which warring elements in Europe had swept from the places of their natural deposit—then, indeed, there might be some excuse for a temporizing policy touching so transitory an interest. But commerce in the Eastern States is of no foreign growth, and of no adventitious seed; its root is of a fibre which almost two centuries have nourished; and the perpetuity of its destiny is written in legible characters, as well in the nature of the country, as in the disposition of its inhabitants. Indeed, sir, look along your whole coast, from Passamaquoddy to Capes Henry and Charles, and behold the deep and far-winding creeks and inlets, the noble basins, the projecting headlands, the majestic rivers; and those sounds and bays, which are more like inland seas, than any thing called by those names in other quarters of the globe! Can any man do this, and not realize that the destiny of the people inhabiting such a country is essentially maritime? Can any man do this, without being impressed by the conviction, that, although the poor projects of politicians may embarrass, for a time, the dispositions growing out of the condition of such a country, yet that nature will be too strong for cobweb regulations, and will vindicate her rights with certain effect—perhaps with awful perils? No nation ever did or ever ought to resist such allurements and invitations to a particular mode of industry. The purposes of Providence relative to the destination of men are to be gathered from the circumstances in which his beneficence has placed them; and to refuse to make use of the means of prosperity which his goodness has put into our hands, what is it but spurning at his bounty, and rejecting the blessings which his infinite wisdom has designated for us, by the very nature of his allotments? The employments of industry, connected with navigation and commercial enterprise, are precious to the people of that quarter of the country, by ancient prejudice, not less than recent profit. The occupation is rendered dear and venerable, by all the cherished associations of our infancy, and all the sage and prudential maxims of our ancestors. And, as to the lessons of encouragement derived from recent experience, what nation, within a similar period, ever received so many that were sweet and salutary? What nation, in so short a time, ever before ascended to such a height of commercial greatness?

Having concluded what I intended to suggest, in relation to the nature of the interest to be protected, I proceed to consider the nature of the protection which it is our duty to extend. And here, Mr. Speaker, I am necessitated to make an observation which is so simple and so obvious, that were it not for the arguments urged against the principle of maritime protection, I should have deemed the mere mention of it to require an apology. The remark is this: that rights, in their nature local, can only be maintained where they exist, and not where they do not exist. If you had a field to defend in Georgia, it would be very strange to put up a fence in Massachusetts. And yet, how does this differ from invading Canada, for the purpose of defending our maritime rights? I beg not to be understood, Mr. Speaker, by this remark, as intending to chill the ardor for the Canada expedition. It is very true, that, to possess ourselves of the Canadas, and Nova Scotia, and their dependencies, it would cost these United States, at the least estimate, $50,000,000; and that Great Britain's national pride, and her pledge of protection to the people of that country, being put out of the question, she would sell you the whole territory for half the money. I make no objection, however, on this account. On the contrary, for the purposes of the present argument, I may admit that pecuniary calculation ought to be put out of the field, when spirit is to be shown, or honor vindicated. I only design to inquire how our maritime rights are protected by such invasion. Suppose that in every land-project you are successful—suppose both the Canadas, Quebec, Halifax, every thing to the North pole, yours by fair conquest—are your rights on the ocean, therefore, secure? Does your flag float afterwards in honor? Are your seamen safe from impressment? Is your course along the highway of nations unobstructed? No one pretends it. No one has or can show, by any logical deduction, or any detail of facts, that the loss of those countries would so compress Great Britain as to induce her to abandon for one hour any of her maritime pretensions. What then results? Why, sir—what is palpable as the day—that maritime rights are only to be maintained by maritime means. This species of protection must be given, or all clamor about maritime rights will be understood, by the people interested in them, to be hollow or false; or (what is worse) an intention to co-operate with the enemies of our commerce in a still further embarrassment of it.

In considering this subject of maritime protection, I shall recur to the nature and degree of it, and to our capacity to extend it. And there we are always met, at the very threshold, with this objection: "A naval force requires much time to get it into readiness, and the exigency will be past before the preparation can be completed." This want of foresight in times past, is made an apology for want of foresight in the time present. We were unwise in the beginning, and unwise we resolve to continue until the end of the chapter. We refuse to do any thing until the moment of exigency, and then it is too late. Thus our improvidence is made sponsor for our disinclination. But what is the law of nature and the dictate of wisdom, on this subject? The casualties of life, the accidents to which man is exposed, are the modes established by Providence for his instruction. This is the law of our nature. Hence it is that adversity is said to keep a school for certain people who will learn in no other. Hence, too, the poet likens it to "a toad, ugly and venomous, which bears a precious jewel in his head." And, in another place, but with the same general relation, "out of this thorn danger, we pluck the flower safety." This law is just as relative to nations, as it is to individuals. For, notwithstanding all the vaunting of statesmen, their whole business is to apply an enlarged common sense to the affairs intrusted to their management.

Touching the nature and degree of that maritime protection, which it may be wise in this nation to extend to its maritime interests, it seems to me that our exertions should rather be excited than graduated, by the present exigency; that our duty is to inquire, upon a general scale, what our commercial citizens have, in this respect, a right to claim; and what is the unquestionable obligation of a commercial nation, to so great a class of its interests. For this purpose, my observations will have reference rather to the principles of the system, than to the provisions of the bill now under debate. Undoubtedly, an appropriation for the building of ten, or any other additional number of frigates, would be so distinct a manifestation of the intention of the National Legislature to extend to commerce its natural protection, as in itself to outweigh any theoretic preference for a maritime force of higher character. I cannot, therefore, but cordially support an appropriation for a species of protection so important and desirable. Yet in an argument, having relation to the system, rather than to the occasion, I trust I shall have the indulgence of the House, if my course of reflections should take a wider range than the propositions on the table, and embrace, within the scope of remark, the general principles by which the nature and degree of systematical naval protection should in my judgment be regulated.

Touching that branch of interest which is most precious to commercial men, it is impossible that there can be any mistake. For however dear the interests of property or of life, exposed upon the ocean, may be to their owners or their friends; yet the safety of our altars and of our firesides, of our cities and of our seaboard, must, from the nature of things, be entwined into the affections by ties incomparably more strong and tender. And it happens that both national pride and honor are peculiarly identified with the support of these primary objects of commercial interest.

With respect to the nature and extent of this naval force, some difference of opinion may arise, according to the view taken of the primary objects of protection. For myself, I consider that those objects are first to be protected, in the safety of which the national character and happiness are most deeply interested. And these are chiefly concerned, beyond all question, in the preservation of our maritime settlements from pillage and our coast from violence. For this purpose it is requisite that there should be a ship of war for the harbor of every great city of the United States, equal, in point of force, to the usual grade of ships-of-the-line of the maritime belligerents. These ships might be so instructed as to act singly or together, as circumstances might require. My reason for the selection of this species of force is, that it puts every city and great harbor of the United States in a state of security from the insults, and the inhabitants of your seacoast from the depredation, of any single ship of war of any nation. To these should be added a number of frigates and smaller vessels of war. By such means our coasting trade might be protected, the mouths of our harbors secured (in particular that of the Mississippi) from the buccaneers of the West Indies, and, hereafter perhaps, from those of South America. A system of protection, graduated upon a scale so conformable to the nature of the country, and to the greatness of the commercial interest, would tend to quiet that spirit of jealousy which so naturally and so justly begins to spring up among the States. Those interested in commerce would care little what local influences predominated, or how the ball of power vibrated among our factions, provided an efficient protection of their essential interests, upon systematic principles, was not only secured by the letter of the constitution, but assured by a spirit pervading every description of their rulers. But it is said that "we have not capacity to maintain such a naval force." Is it want of pecuniary or want of physical capacity? In relation to our pecuniary capacity, I will not condescend to add any proof to that plain statement already exhibited, showing that we have an annual commercial exposure, equal to six hundred millions of dollars, and that two-thirds of one per cent. upon this amount of value, or four millions of dollars, is more than is necessary, if annually and systematically appropriated, for this great object; so anxiously and rightfully desired by your seaboard, and so essential to the honor and obligations of the nation. I will only make a single other statement, by way of illustrating the smallness of the annual appropriations necessary for the attainment of this important purpose. The annual appropriation of one-sixth of one per cent. on the amount of the value of the whole annual commercial exposure, (one million of dollars,) is sufficient to build, in two years, six seventy-four gun ships; and taking the average expense in peace and war, the annual appropriation of the same sum is sufficient to maintain them afterwards, in a condition for efficient service. This objection of pecuniary inability may be believed in the interior country, where the greatness of the commercial property and all the tender obligations connected with its preservation, are not realized. But, in the cities and in the commercial States, the extent of the national resources is more truly estimated. They know the magnitude of the interests at stake and their essential claim to protection. Why, sir, were we seriously to urge this objection of pecuniary incapacity to the commercial men of Massachusetts, they would laugh us to scorn. Let me state a single fact. In the year 1745, the State, then the colony of Massachusetts Bay, included a population of 220,000 souls, and yet, in that infant state of the country, it owned a fleet consisting of three ships, one of which carried twenty guns, three snows, one brig, and three sloops; being an aggregate of ten vessels of war. These partook of the dangers, and shared in the glory, of that expedition which terminated with the surrender of Louisburg. Comparing the population, the extent of territory, the capital, and all the other resources of this great nation, with the narrow means of the colony of Massachusetts at that period of its history, it is not extravagant to assert that the fleet it then possessed, in proportion to its pecuniary resources, was greater than would be, in proportion to the resources of the United States, a fleet of fifty sail-of-the-line and one hundred frigates.

The general effect of the policy I advocate, is to produce confidence at home and respect abroad. These are twin shoots from the same stock, and never fail to flourish or fade together. Confidence is a plant of no mushroom growth and of no artificial texture. It springs only from sage counsels and generous endeavors. The protection you extend must be efficient and suited to the nature of the object you profess to maintain. If it be neither adequate nor appropriate, your wisdom may be doubted, your motives may be distrusted, but in vain you expect confidence. The inhabitants of the seaboard will inquire of their own senses and not of your logic, concerning the reality of their protection.

As to respect abroad, what course can be more certain to insure it? What object more honorable, what more dignified than to behold a great nation pursuing wise ends by appropriate means; rising to adopt a series of systematic exertions, suited to her power, and adequate to her purposes? What object more consolatory to the friends—what more paralyzing to the enemies of our Union—than to behold the natural jealousies and rivalries, which are the acknowledged dangers of our political condition, subsiding or sacrificing? What sight more exhilarating than to see this great nation once more walking forth among the nations of the earth, under the protection of no foreign shield? Peaceful because powerful—powerful because united in interests, and amalgamated by concentration of those interests in the national affections.

But, let the opposite policy prevail; let the essential interests of the great component parts of this Union find no protection under the national arm—instead of safety let them realize oppression, and the seeds of discord and dissolution are inevitably sown in a soil the best fitted for their root, and affording the richest nourishment for their expansion. It may be a long time before they ripen. But, sooner or later, they will assuredly burst forth in all their destructive energies. In the intermediate period, what aspect does a Union, thus destitute of cement, present? Is it that of a nation keen to discern, and strong to resist, violations of its sovereignty? It has rather the appearance of a casual collection of semi-barbarous clans, with the forms of civilization, and with the rude and rending passions of the savage state. In truth, powerful—yet, as to any foreign effect, imbecile—rich, in the goods of fortune, yet wanting that inherent spirit without which a nation is poor indeed; their strength exhausted by struggles for local power; their moral sense debased by low intrigues for personal popularity, or temporary pre-eminence; all their thoughts turned not to the safety of the State, but to the elevation of a chieftain. A people presenting such an aspect, what have they to expect abroad? What but pillage, insult, and scorn?

The choice is before us. Persist in refusing efficient maritime protection; persist in the system of commercial restrictions; what now is, perhaps, anticipation, will hereafter be history.

Mr. Fisk said that, when this subject was first presented to the House, he felt inclined to vote for a small increase of the Naval Establishment; but it now appears that, what is asked for is considered only as laying a foundation for a great system—a system which, he feared, if carried into execution, might change the Government.

Mr. F. contended that the Navy never had, and never could protect our commerce. Like standing armies, he considered navies as dangerous to liberty. As to the constitutional provision, with respect to a navy, it is nothing more than a mere grant of power, which Congress is at liberty to use or not, as they may deem it necessary or expedient.

Though he had listened with candor to all the arguments which had been used in favor of an increase of this Establishment at the present time, he was far from being convinced that such an increase, at present, is either necessary or expedient. It appeared to him that every nation which has embarked, to any extent, in Navy Establishments, has been eventually crushed by them. Whether you go back to ancient, or look upon modern Europe, you will find navies have not afforded that protection which gentlemen are desirous of persuading the House they are capable of affording. Has the navy of Russia protected her commerce? There are in the Russian dominions from twenty-five to thirty millions of people; but, by every account we have of them, their situation is not very enviable; nor have they any great degree of commerce to protect. Where are the navies of Sweden and Denmark? The latter, it is well known, were swept away and destroyed by the British fleet; and the fleet of Sweden serves only to keep the country in poverty to maintain it. A navy looks pretty well in theory; but look into the experience of nations, and it will be found to have been the bane of every country which has had any thing to do with it. We should want wisdom, therefore, to pursue a system which has proved so ruinous to others.