SIXTH CONGRESS.—FIRST SESSION. (continued 2)

MAJOR TAYLOR.

Extract of a letter from Admiral Sir Hyde Parker, to Robert Liston, Esq., Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of his Britannic Majesty to the United States, dated

Port Royal Harbor, "Jamaica, Sept. 9, 1799.

"I have had the honor of receiving duplicates of your Excellency's letters, numbered 10, 11, 12, and, in answer thereto, acquaint you that in consequence of Nash, one of the ringleaders in the mutiny, murders, &c., on board the Hermione, being delivered up by the United States to me, he has been tried at a court martial, and sentenced to suffer death, and afterwards hung in chains, which sentence has been put into execution. He acknowledged himself to be an Irishman."

Extract of a letter from Benjamin Moodie, Esq., Consul of his Britannic Majesty at Charleston, South Carolina, to Robert Liston, Esq., Envoy of his said Majesty to the United States, dated

November 19, 1799.

In consequence of many obstacles I had to encounter in obtaining the delivery of Thomas Nash, late of His Majesty's ship Hermione, and of the numerous publications to the northward and in this place, I wrote to Admiral Sir Hyde Parker, requesting he would be good enough to send me minutes of the court martial, to which he answered under date 13th September: "I am to acquaint you that Nash has been executed agreeably to a court martial, and that he confessed himself to be an Irishman; and it further appears, by the Hermione's books, that he was born at Waterford; on the 21st December, 1792, entered a volunteer on board the Dover, received £3 bounty money, and was removed to the Hermione, 28th of January, 1793. And with respect to transmitting the minutes of his trial, that is not in my power, but rests with the Lords of the Admiralty only."

Monday, February 10.

Amy Dardin's Claim for the Horse Romulus.

The petition of Amy Dardin was called up, and after some opposition, on account of a former reference and decision, was referred to the Committee of Claims.

Thursday, February 13.

Military Interference in Elections.

Mr. Leib called up for consideration the following resolution, which he laid on the table on the 4th instant, viz:

Resolved, That a committee be appointed to bring in a bill making provision for the removal of the regular troops of the United States which may be stationed where an election is held, and that such removal shall take place at least two days previous to such election, and to a distance not less than two miles.

Mr. Otis moved to amend the resolution by striking out the words in italic, in the second line, and inserting "inquire into the expediency of."

A long debate ensued on this motion, in which it was conceded, on all sides, that the resolution was too definite, and left nothing in the power of the committee to act on, except merely bringing in a bill conformable to it. If excesses had been committed by the military at elections, and they were guilty of improper interference, it seemed to be the wish of every member that some provision should be made to guard against them in future; but they were unwilling to say what that provision should be, until an inquiry were made into the facts stated. The removal of the troops to the distance mentioned, was also particularly objected to, as it might leave fortifications, arsenals, and military stores, for two or three days, entirely unprotected.

Mr. Leib at length withdrew his original proposition, and submitted the following, which was adopted without objection, viz:

"Resolved, That a committee be appointed to prepare and report a bill, containing such legislative provisions as may be judged expedient, either for removing any military force of the United States, from any place of holding elections, or for preventing their interference in such elections."

Mr. Marshall, Mr. Leib and Mr. Otis, were appointed the committee.

Amendment to the Constitution.

Mr. Livingston laid the following joint resolution on the table:

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America, in Congress assembled, That the following article be proposed to the Legislatures of the several States, as an amendment to the Constitution of the United States, which, when ratified by three-fourths of said Legislatures, shall be valid as a part of the said constitution, viz:

No Judge of any Court of the United States shall, during his continuance in office, or within six months after he may have resigned the same, be appointed to any other than a judiciary office, under the United States.

Monday, February 17.

Case of Jonathan Robbins.

Mr. Rutledge said, he had expected that some order would have been taken on the Message of the President, before this time, by the gentleman who called for it; but as he had been disappointed, he would now give notice to the honorable member from New York that he would call for some order upon the Message to-morrow.

Mr. Livingston said, the gentleman had momentarily anticipated him; he meant to have moved for a reference to a Committee of the whole House this morning, with an intention to introduce certain resolutions, and he would now make that motion.

The question on commitment was put and carried—yeas 50, nays 43; and was made the order of the day for Friday.

Mr. Bayard then laid the following resolution on the table, which was read and referred to the above committee, viz:

Resolved, That the conduct of the Executive Government of the United States, in relation to the requisition made by his Britannic Majesty's Minister, of the delivery up to justice of Thomas Nash, otherwise called Jonathan Robbins, upon the charge of murder, committed on board of the Hermione British frigate, which said Nash had sought an asylum within the United States, was conformable to the duty of the Government, and to the obligations of good faith stipulated in the 27th article of the Treaty of Amity, Commerce, and Navigation, made with Great Britain.

Thursday, February 20.

Case of Jonathan Robbins.

Mr. Livingston proposed the following resolutions:

"Resolved, That it appears to this House that a person, calling himself Jonathan Robbins, and claiming to be a citizen of the United States, impressed on board a British ship-of-war, was committed for trial in one of the courts of the United States for the alleged crime of piracy and murder, committed on the high seas, on board the British frigate Hermione: That a requisition being, subsequent to such commitment, made by the British Minister to the Executive of the United States, for the delivery of the said person (under the name of Thomas Nash) as a fugitive, under the 27th article of the Treaty with Great Britain, the President of the United States did, by a letter written from the Department of State to the Judge who committed the said person for trial, officially declare his opinion to the said Judge that he 'considered an offence committed on board a public ship of war on the high seas to have been committed within the jurisdiction of the nation to whom the ship belongs;' and, in consequence of such opinion and instruction, did advise and request the said Judge to deliver up the person so claimed to the agent of Great Britain, who should appear to receive him, provided only that the stipulated evidence of his criminality should be produced. That in compliance with such advice and request of the President of the United States, the said person so committed for trial was, by the Judge of the District of South Carolina, without any presentment or trial by jury, or any investigation of his claim to be a citizen of the United States, delivered up to an officer of his Britannic Majesty, and afterwards tried by a court martial, and executed on a charge of mutiny and murder.

"Resolved, That inasmuch as the Constitution of the United States declares that the Judiciary Power shall extend to all questions arising under the Constitution, laws, and treaties, of the United States, and to all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction: and, also, that the trial of all crimes (except in cases of impeachment) shall be by jury; and that such trial shall be held in the State where such crime shall have been committed; but when not committed within any State, then at such place or places as Congress may by law have directed; and inasmuch as it is directed by law that the offence of murder committed on the high seas shall be deemed to be piracy and murder, and that 'all crimes committed on the high seas, or in any place out of the jurisdiction of any particular State, shall be tried in the district where the offender is apprehended, or into which he may be first brought:' therefore the several questions, whether the alleged crime of piracy and murder was committed within the exclusive jurisdiction of Great Britain; whether it comes within the purview of the said twenty-seventh article; and whether a person stating that he was an American citizen, and had committed the act of which he was accused in attempting to regain his liberty from illegal imprisonment, ought to be delivered up, without any investigation of his claims to citizenship, or inquiry into the facts alleged in his defence, are all matters exclusively of judicial inquiry as arising from treaties, laws, constitutional provisions, and cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction.

"Resolved, That the decision of those questions by the President of the United States, against the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States, in a case where those courts had already assumed and exercised jurisdiction: and his advice and request to the Judge of the district court that the person thus charged should be delivered up, provided only such evidence of his criminality should be produced as would justify his apprehension and commitment for trial, are a dangerous interference of the Executive with Judicial decisions; and that the compliance with such advice and request on the part of the Judge of the District Court of South Carolina, is a sacrifice of the Constitutional independence of the Judicial power, and exposes the administration thereof to suspicion and reproach."

The question of reference to the Committee of the Whole was taken and carried—yeas 55.

The House then adjourned.

Friday, February 21.

Eulogium on the Character of Washington.

A message was received from the Senate informing the House that the Senate had this day come to the following resolution, viz:

"Resolved, That the Senate will to-morrow, at half past 12 o'clock, meet in the Senate Chamber, and from thence walk in procession to the church in Race street, to hear the eulogium to be pronounced on the character of General Washington."

Ordered to lie on the table.

The Speaker said he was requested, by a member of the Catholic church, to inform the House that seats were provided for the accommodation of such members as would please to attend to hear the delivery of the oration to-morrow.

Mr. Rutledge said, before the receipt of the message from the Senate, he had intended to move that when the House adjourn they do adjourn till Monday; but the Senate having informed the House that they intended to walk in procession, he conceived this House ought to come to a similar resolution, and moved the following:

"Resolved, That the House of Representatives will meet to-morrow, at half-past 12 o'clock, at their Chamber, and from thence walk in procession to the church in Race street, to hear the eulogium there to be pronounced on the character of General Washington."

It was objected to this resolution, that it had not been contemplated this House would walk in procession, no arrangement having been made for that purpose; and that as it might be the wish of several members to attend the oration at the Catholic Church in preference to the one in Race street, it ought to be left to their own option.

The question on the resolution was put and negatived—yeas 40, nays 43.

Monday, February 24.

Western Lands.

The House resolved itself into a Committee of the Whole on the report made the 18th instant, by the committee appointed to inquire whether any, and, if any, what, alterations are necessary in the laws providing for the sale of the lands of the United States north-west of the Ohio; and, after some time spent therein, the committee rose and reported several resolutions thereupon; which were severally twice read, and agreed to by the House, as follows:

Resolved, That all the townships directed to be sold, either in quarter townships or in tracts of one mile square, by the act "providing for the sale of the lands of the United States, in the Territory north-west of the river Ohio, and above the mouth of Kentucky River," shall be subdivided into half sections, containing, as nearly as may be, three hundred and twenty acres each: the additional expense of surveying to be paid by the purchaser, at the rate of three dollars per tract.

Resolved, That all the said lands shall be offered for sale at public sale, in tracts of three hundred and twenty acres as above directed: Provided, That the same shall not be sold under the price of two dollars per acre, and that the sale shall be at the following places, to wit:

All the lands contained in the seven first ranges of townships, and north of the same, shall be offered for sale at Pittsburg.

All the lands contained in the eight next ranges of townships, shall be offered for sale at Marietta.

All the lands lying west of the fifteen first ranges of townships, and east of the Sciota River, shall be offered for sale at Chillicothe.

All the lands lying below the Great Miami shall be offered for sale at Cincinnati.

Resolved, That one or more land offices shall be opened in the North-western Territory, and that every person be permitted to locate and purchase, at the rate of two dollars per acre, one or more of the half sections that shall not have been sold at public sale.

Resolved, That the payments for lands purchased either at public or private sale, may be made as heretofore in public securities, and shall be made in the following manner, and under the following conditions, viz:

1st. At the time of purchase, every purchaser shall deposit one-twentieth part of the amount of purchase-money; to be forfeited, if, within three months, one-fourth of the purchase-money, including the said twentieth part, is not paid.

2d. One-fourth of the purchase-money to be paid as aforesaid, within three months, and the other three-fourths in three equal payments, within two, three, and four years, respectively, after the date of the purchase.

3d. No interest to be charged in case of punctual payment; but interest at the rate of six per cent. a year, to be charged from the date of purchase, on any part of the purchase-money which shall not have been paid at the time, respectively, when the same shall have become due.

4th. A discount at the rate of eight per cent. a year, to be allowed on any of the three last payments, which shall be paid before the same shall have become due.

5th. If any tract shall not be completely paid for within one year after the date of the last payment, the tract to be sold in such manner as shall be provided by law; and after paying the balance due to the United States, including interest, the surplus, if any, to be returned to the original purchaser.

Ordered, That a bill or bills be brought in, pursuant to the said resolutions; and that Mr. Harrison, Mr. Brace, Mr. Gordon, Mr. Davis, Mr. Lyman, and Mr. Gallatin, do prepare and bring in the same.

Tuesday, February 25.

Case of Jonathan Robbins.

The House having resolved itself into a Committee of the Whole on the Message of the President respecting Jonathan Robbins, a short debate took place whether the committee should take up the business of the resolution first proposed by Mr. Bayard, or those subsequently offered by Mr. Livingston. Mr. Bayard seemed inclined to withdraw his motion, but the committee seeming of opinion that both resolutions were within their jurisdiction, and that they might proceed on either, the question was taken whether the committee would proceed on the resolutions of Mr. Livingston and carried in the affirmative.[49] Messrs. Bayard, Rutledge, Otis, &c., voting in favor of the question, and Messrs. Livingston, Nicholas, &c., against it.

Mr. Livingston then entered upon an argument in support of the resolutions which he had some days before submitted to the House, and which now were taken up. Soon after he began the discussion, he was proceeding to read a deposition of Jonathan Robbins, and certificates accompanying the same, to prove himself a citizen of the United States, in which the deponent swore, before the court of South Carolina, that he was born at Danbury in the State of Connecticut, and that he was impressed from on board the American brig Betsey, by the crew of the British frigate, about two years before, where he was detained contrary to his will until the mutiny occurred.

Mr. Bayard opposed the reference to a fact so incompetently authenticated as the report of a case upon newspaper testimony, especially when, if it had been the desire of the gentleman to have introduced it as evidence, it was extremely easy to have procured the record of the court before he proceeded on his allegations. If such evidence as this was to be admitted, other and perhaps more important evidence might next be introduced to impose on the committee. Besides, it certainly must be looked upon as ex parte evidence, which it was impossible to repel. Mr. B. submitted to the Chair whether it would be in order to admit any fresh evidence to support the resolutions, when all the documents which had been asked for, and which had come to the knowledge of the Executive, had been submitted to the House.

Mr. Gallatin, on the question of order, contended for the admission: this document, he said, was referred to as authentic, in his letter. He says, "That, by the proceedings before that judge, (Bee,) as they have been published, it appears that a seaman named Thomas Nash did assume the name of Jonathan Robbins, and make oath that he was a native of the State of Connecticut," &c. Certainly it cannot be deemed improper to refer to the identical document there mentioned. If it was proper for the Secretary of State to make the allusion, the House could take it up under the same idea. He did not think it was introduced as evidence before the committee.

Mr. Dana said he was very sorry the gentleman had been interrupted; he could not think of admitting it as evidence, but the gentleman might read it as part of his speech, which perhaps might otherwise have a chasm in it.

Mr. Livingston said he did wish to read this paper as part of his speech; and he believed it a very material part, because it was a justification of a point which he wished to establish; he wished to show the committee that Jonathan Robbins claimed to be an American citizen, and that he said he was impressed. This he swore to in court; and that he did so, he hoped would be admitted. He said he only introduced it with this view. Surely he could not be so far mistaken in his law knowledge as to be thought to have said that the culprit could be evidence in his own behalf. If he did say he was a citizen, then the matter, upon examination, must appear more serious than gentlemen would be willing to think.

Mr. Bayard had no doubt but it was the gentleman's intention to impress the force of the facts contained in that paper upon the minds of that committee; and to suppose it would have no impression would be absurd. It would afterwards be said that this man was admitted to be an impressed American citizen, and that he was praiseworthy in committing what would then be called the homicide. The decision of the committee would be much affected, he said, by the kind of evidence which was adduced. If this was admitted, it would be impossible to ascertain the extent of the principle. Other depositions may be produced—indeed, he had no doubt but the gentleman could get proof to any point which he might think it material to ascertain. In saying this, he did not mean to insinuate that any improper steps would be taken by that gentleman, but there were volunteers enough to be found who would step forward in order to answer a party purpose, and make oath of any thing.

Mr. Livingston supposed he should increase the astonishment of gentlemen still more when he declared that he did not believe a word of the affidavit; but he believed Nash was an Irishman, and that he entered on board and committed all the crimes charged to him. It was clear that this affidavit could not be evidence. In admitting this, he believed he did not surrender one point of the resolutions; he should prove that all which he wished to ascertain was that such claim was made to the court.

Mr. Bayard asked where could be the necessity of proving a fact which every member of the House was willing to admit. All acknowledged that Nash claimed to be an American citizen; but perhaps the wish of the gentleman was to have additional light on this subject, on which account he introduced the deposition. But, Mr. B. said, he was willing only to proceed upon what the House knew from the documents before them, and not take a step on precarious ground. It must be well known what the gentleman wanted to get this admission for; he no doubt wished to prove that, upon his own mere suggestion, he was an American citizen, and that he was impressed—he was entitled to a trial by jury in this country, and on that account the act of sending him away was unconstitutional. This would lead to an extensive field of argument. If there was any necessity for more evidence, or to call witnesses to the bar of the House, let proper measures be taken to procure them, but let them not come forward in any other way.

Mr. Dana read the resolution first offered to the House for a call for papers relative to Jonathan Robbins; this was answered, he said, by the Secretary of State, that no requisition or proceedings had been had in that name; but he presumed allusion was made to the case of Thomas Nash, concerning whom proceedings were had in the District Court of South Carolina; in that way, and that only, the Secretary made reference to the printed report. In this blundering way, Mr. D. said, the business was begun. [He was called to order.] In addition to this, he said, the proceedings of gentlemen were erroneous; but, notwithstanding that, Mr. D. said, he would gratify the feelings of the gentleman, as far as his vote would go, for him to read it, but only as part of his speech. No doubt he wished to support some point of his argument by it, and in that view he had a right to read it; but that it was evidence, he denied.

The Chairman having stated his reasons, concluded with an opinion that the member could not proceed to read the affidavit.

Mr. Gallatin appealed to the committee from the decision of the Chair; when there appeared 39 in favor of the decision, and 48 against it.

At this point the committee rose, and had leave to sit again.

Wednesday, February 26.

Case of Jonathan Robbins.

Mr. Davis moved that the Committee of the whole House be discharged from the further consideration of the resolutions proposed by Mr. Livingston and Mr. Bayard, on the affair of Jonathan Robbins. The small progress, Mr. D. said, which was made yesterday in the discussion, fully convinced his mind that nothing at all would be done in it; besides, were he convinced that the subject would be impartially conducted, he did not know of any possible good that could arise from the adoption of the resolutions. If there had been any error in the proceedings of the Executive, he conceived that error would correct itself. If there was an improper interference, he was certain it could not have arisen from improper motives, and therefore he sincerely hoped he should not be called upon to give an opinion on the subject. Nor, on the other hand, was he at all prepared to compliment the Executive, or any officer of the Government, for having done what he thought to be right. If he had done right, it was his duty. He did not think it of any great importance; but, most assuredly, if the argument was extended, it would be made a case of much importance. It was better, however, to let the case of Jonathan Robbins sleep in the Committee of the Whole, where it then was. He was not prepared to criminate, nor was he prepared to applaud.

Mr. Randolph said, that no gentleman had a higher respect for the motives of the gentleman from Kentucky than himself; but, however disagreeable it might be, he must differ from him in his present opinion. He really hoped the gentleman would reconsider the motion he had made, and not stop the gentleman from New York in this early stage of the business. If there were any defects in the papers, and their authenticity was questionable, it must not arise from the gentleman from New York, but from those whose duty it was to furnish all the facts relative to the subject. He was obliged to read a printed paper, because those with whom the authoritative copies are, have not thought proper to furnish the House with them. He hoped, if a stop was put to the proceedings, it would not be to discharge the committee, but to call for authentic copies of all the papers within the reach of the Government. It must be acknowledged that the man whose case the House are considering did put in his claims to citizenship, and to the protection of his country on that account. If that acknowledgment is refused on account of the paper which has been produced being a newspaper, reference must be made to what is within the reach of the House—more authentic papers.

Mr. H. Lee considered the motion would have the complete effect any gentleman could wish whose desire it was to reprobate the conduct of the Administration of our Government. How could the motion be necessary—how be useful? If they were to ask more evidence, said Mr. L., I would vote for it to be produced; they have brought the subject before the House—let us see it in the purest colors which it can be placed in. We are ready to meet them here; we are willing they should have every evidence that can be obtained to elucidate their charge; but let not the Executive be hung up to reproach without a trial; let not suspicion be encouraged, which must have all the effects of a substantiated charge. I wish them to go on with the discussion, that all the truth may be disclosed, and every fair light be given which the case will bear; for now the people of the United States have their eyes fixed upon our proceedings on this important question.

Mr. Macon was in favor of the motion. If the Committee of the Whole was not to be discharged, he hoped at least the subject would be postponed till the public business of the session was over; there were many public bills, he said, that must be passed. The House was called upon to judge with almost no testimony, and yet upon this uncertain ground, perhaps a whole week might be spent of the most precious time of the House; for if the House was to rise at the time proposed, the loss of this time would certainly be felt.

As to the impression it would leave on the minds of the people, they had as many facts to judge from as the House, and they certainly would form an opinion, whether the House did so, or not. Gentlemen were very much mistaken, he said, if they undertook to lead the people; they would think, and they would show what their judgment was when a proper time came for that purpose. The time the people would take to show their approbation or disapprobation of the measures of the Administration was at elections, and then they would do it.

Mr. Dana was against the postponement of the subject, or the rising of the committee. It was to be recollected that the business had assumed its present shape only in consequence of the zeal of the gentleman from New York, and his coadjutors, to censure the Executive. On the 7th of February, it was committed to the whole House; contrary to the opinion of a number of gentlemen, who wished the facts investigated by a select committee; thirteen days then elapsed before he had prepared his resolutions—resolutions not calculated to make an inquiry into the conduct of the Executive, but expressive of the most pungent censure upon his conduct. These resolutions were produced upon the papers which, at the desire of those gentlemen, were submitted to the House. The only question then, is, Do the papers upon which those resolutions are predicated warrant the censure contained in them, or not?—It certainly would be a high reproach to the very idea of a public inquisition to admit more evidence upon those grounds. Still, however, let gentlemen go on in their heterogeneous proceedings, the House would have the wisdom justly to appreciate the various attempts made to clear themselves of a predicament in which their over-arduous attempts to censure had thrown them.

Mr. Livingston conceived it his duty to answer the observations of the gentleman from Connecticut, (Mr. Dana,) as to the resolutions being founded upon the facts then before the House. He did not think the facts were precisely sufficient to warrant every idea contained in the resolutions. When the original call for papers was agreed to by the House, he had hoped that something more authentic than newspaper testimony would have been referred to by the Executive; and upon that he was now compelled to act, if at all. The gentleman has said that my zeal and that of my coadjutors, to censure the Executive, has brought us into this situation. Who, sir, I would ask the gentleman, are my coadjutors? That gentleman himself was my coadjutor, and every gentleman in the House, because the resolution was adopted. The House directed the inquiry, and every gentleman must therefore take the burden, in part, with me.

Mr. Craik said, that very early in this business he thought the House were entering into it very improperly, either having nothing at all to do with it, or else taking wrong measures, if they had; he thought then, and was yet of opinion, that if the object was to impeach the President, measures ought to have been taken accordingly. He never did look upon the House of Representatives as having either the power to censure or to approbate the conduct of the Executive, and, therefore, he equally disapproved of the resolutions of the gentlemen from New York and Delaware; and, upon that ground, he felt strongly inclined to vote with the gentleman from Kentucky for giving the whole subject the go by, and getting clear of it by any possible means.

Mr. Harper agreed with the gentleman, that it would be folly for the House to spend time in useless discussion, which could lead to no decision; but, viewing this resolution as he did, he must conclude it of more importance; he thought it the direct road to an impeachment of the President of the United States, and, if so, surely it must appear important. The resolution declared, in express terms, that the Executive had exercised unconstitutional powers—one of the most dangerous crimes that he could commit. If he had so exercised his power, the inevitable consequence must be, that the President of the United States must be impeached by this House. Then, how could any gentleman say this was a trifling question, and one with which the House had nothing at all to do? Certainly no question can be more important.

Mr. Rutledge regretted that he could not join with his friend from Maryland, (Mr. Craik,) in thinking this consideration useless; he believed the attention of the people had been called to view this subject, and they were anxiously looking for a decision in some way. Neither did he think, with his honorable friend, that the House had nothing to do with it, because no impeachment could grow out of it. It was impossible to say what the gentleman meditated in his resolutions, but one thing was certain, if the gentleman has wished to promote an impeachment, he could not have taken a more direct means for it, if the resolutions should be carried.

Mr. Kitchell thought no good could arise from the investigation of this subject, because he did not know what was to be done in it, let the decision be what it might. The gentleman from South Carolina (Mr. Harper) wished to have an opportunity of showing that every part of the resolution was built on false ground. Every gentleman in the House was not so fond of speaking nor of hearing as was that gentleman, and he hoped, merely on that account, that the House would not spend time on what (in his opinion) could not possibly lead to impeachment. What effect could a discussion have, but to show the world that there were parties in the House, and to raise a rancorous disposition? He did not know what there was in the resolution that could lead to an impeachment, nor did he know what the House, in their censorial capacity, had to do but to impeach. He believed it out of the power of the House to applaud. In short, he did not think they had any thing to do with it.

Mr. Nicholas hoped the discussion would proceed. Although there might not be sufficient ground on which to impeach the Executive, he could not agree that, therefore, no inquiry ought to be made into his conduct; there might be an error in his conduct, and yet no impeachment be necessary to be raised out of it; and, if so, it would be extremely wrong to suffer it to go out to the world without a decision, after the subject had once been taken up by the House. Where there might be no bad intention or wicked design, the action might be of a dangerous tendency, and proper to be inquired into, in order to express an opinion thereupon. Mr. N. said he was well pleased that his opinion, that the motion ought to be negatived, accorded with that of the gentleman from South Carolina, because it would afford him an opportunity of showing what he said he could show.

Mr. Bayard had no doubt of the competency of the House either to impeach, to censure, or to approbate the conduct of the Executive, and of course both the resolutions were in their power.

Several gentlemen had intimated that the authentic evidence and the whole of the documents were not before the House, and that the Executive Department was to blame for the deficiency. It appeared that the gentleman himself had forgotten the import of his resolution; it called for such documents as might be in possession of the Department of State. Now, what could possibly be in possession of that Department? The President of the United States had his duties to perform, and the judge of the district his duties; each had their separate documents; and, as neither interfered with the other, therefore, it could not be expected to be in the power of the President to furnish the papers belonging to the courts of South Carolina, any further than they came within the joint duties of both. Agreeably to treaty, the British Consul made a requisition for the person; a copy of this, and the several letters and instructions, were sent to the House, but it was not in the power of the Executive to order the judge to furnish him with a record of the proceedings; he was not bound to furnish it if the President had called for it, and no doubt he had furnished the House with every paper in his possession.

Mr. Otis said, when first the motion was made by the gentleman from Kentucky, he felt for a moment inclined to lean to it; the motives of that gentleman appeared to be so candid and liberal, that, for the moment, Mr. O. confessed, his feelings got the better of his reason. But a short reflection induced him to change an opinion thus hastily formed, and he felt satisfied that to vote with him, would be to display, in the conduct of gentlemen who wished to support the Administration of this country, worse than censure. He joined that gentleman in regret that it had gone so far, but certainly it was a subject of the most irritating nature possible: a charge the most serious; a breach of law by the Executive Magistrate, who is bound to support it and see it carried into effect. It is certainly a charge of much importance, and however disagreeable it might feel to him, Mr. O. said, he must vote that every argument should be used that could possibly tend to substantiate the charge, that nothing of truth might be hidden.

Mr. O. said he did not know to what points the evidence required by the gentleman from New York could apply, except it was to that of his being an American citizen, and of his being impressed. An affidavit was produced to prove these facts, but it would be found from an examination of the documents that nothing relating to those points was in the office of the Department of State; for the date of the affidavit of Robbins is the 25th of July, but the order of the Secretary of State bears date the 5th of June, so that no papers as to his claim can be in the possession of that department. Mr. O. thought the documents before the House contained every thing that was important to the point.

Mr. Craik was sorry that gentlemen who advocated this motion should be charged with an opposition to the administration of Government; he believed his conduct had heretofore evinced a different line of conduct. He still denied that the mode taken by the resolution could lead to impeachment. It certainly did contain a very great censure, and one which the House had no authority to inflict.

Mr. Gallatin considered the motion to be grounded on two ideas; that there was not sufficient foundation for the House to act upon, and therefore that it was necessary to discharge the committee, or postpone the subject for want of further evidence.

It is clear, said Mr. G., that the evidence is not sufficient to impeach the District Judge of South Carolina. If an impeachment of him was the object, it would be impossible to carry it forward without an authoritative copy of the record of the court; but if there was no intention to impeach, he did not think there was any material evidence wanted in order to decide upon the resolution, since it only meant an implication of censure upon the Executive and the District Judge, and not impeachment.

Mr. G. agreed there was at first sight some weight in the sentiment expressed by the gentleman from Maryland, (Mr. Craik,) that the House had only a power to impeach but not to censure; but certainly, when it was considered that an act might be committed without any ill motive, and yet the act be injurious, it could not be the subject of impeachment, but it might be of censure. The same act committed with a criminal motive would be impeachable, which without it would be of a nature not to admit of it.

Again: Mr. G. thought that though the House might have ground whereupon to censure, they ought not, at any time; but they had exercised that power. They had in a number of cases approved of the conduct of the President, and if the act of approbation had been done, they surely had as much power to disapprove and censure.

The question was then taken on the motion to discharge the Committee of the Whole from the further consideration, and negatived—yeas 14, nays 76.

Thursday, February 27.

Another member, to wit, John Smith, from New York, appeared, produced his credentials, was qualified, and took his seat.

Case of Jonathan Robbins.

Mr. Davis said, as the House had yesterday thought proper to negative a proposition to discharge the Committee of the Whole from the further consideration of the business, and as one great motive for that motion was the incompetency of evidence before the House, and as he knew it was in the power of the House to procure that evidence by a proper application, he hoped gentlemen would now indulge him in the adoption of the following, which he moved, viz:

Resolved, That the President of the United States be requested to direct the proper officer to lay before this House a copy of the proceedings of the court held in the district of South Carolina, in the case of Thomas Nash, calling himself Jonathan Robbins.

Mr. Bayard said, if he was persuaded, or if the gentleman could convince him that there was any particular evidence in the hands of any officer that would tend to throw such light as to give the least explanation to the case, he certainly would be willing to accord with the resolution; but he believed every necessary fact was before the House, and this had been acknowledged by several gentlemen. If the object was to prove that Nash was an American citizen, and that he was impressed, that could not be necessary as it respected the resolutions of the gentleman from New York, for that gentleman himself had acknowledged that he believed no such thing, but that the whole claim was falsehood. Would the gentleman, then, inform the House what point he wished to ascertain, or in what he expected additional proof? He wished information, farther, who was the "proper officer" to whom reference was expected to be made. There are but two officers at all in view, one is the Secretary of State, the other the District Judge of South Carolina; the gentleman could not suppose that the Judge would be able to transmit the records of that court previous to the adjournment of the House; and if it could be obtained, no evidence to the point could be expected from him. If, on the other hand, it was meant to call on the Secretary of State, it was not to be expected, from the nature of the case, that any more documents were in his hands than those already furnished; he had given copies of the correspondence and requisition, which, it might be fairly inferred, from the nature of his office, was all of which he could be possessed. But if any gentleman doubted this fact, he could apply to the office of the Secretary of State, from whom he could procure whatever was in his possession.

If it was the intention of the House to close this very disagreeable business in the present session, they must negative the resolution and let the discussion go forward. The gentleman who brought forward the resolution ought to have been provided with every document that was necessary to support the charges, before he suffered them to appear. However, he did not think but the gentleman who proposed the resolutions thought his grounds were quite sufficient to support them.

Mr. Nicholas said he always believed that the testimony was incomplete, but when he heard a gentleman get up and mention particular testimony which he considered so important that without it he should not know how to vote, whatever, Mr. N. said, might have been his former satisfaction as to the establishment of the points, he certainly must now be inclined to grant gentlemen every point of evidence that they should think necessary, if within the reach of the House.

One particular piece of testimony had been mentioned, viz: that the man had filed an affidavit that he was an American citizen and was impressed on board a British man-of-war. Could any gentleman pretend to say that no inference might be drawn from this source and the concomitant facts? The gentleman from New York, to be sure, had declared his satisfaction with the facts that had been produced to the House, but did the gentleman from Delaware know that this was the case with any other gentleman in the House? That gentleman's conclusions and impressions were not to be taken as the opinions of others, nor were others obliged to be satisfied because he was; and therefore to couple others in a measure to which they were not privy, and to ascribe opinions to them which they had not expressed, was at least unfair.

Mr. Dana thought this a most extraordinary resolution indeed? Was the President of the United States the clerk of the court, to keep the records of it? What had the President to do with the proceedings of that court? It was certainly a total departure from all the forms of judicial proceedings to suppose a thing of the kind. The gentlemen must certainly have mistaken the situation held by the President, or they would never have made such a vast departure from order and propriety of proceeding. The President is not the public accuser; he is not to be called upon for papers with which he has nothing to do. When he found gentlemen outraging every thing that belonged to judicial propriety; when he found them stumbling into error after error, and departing totally from all jurisprudential propriety, Mr. D. said, he could not avoid rising to oppose it.

Mr. Livingston said he did hope that this motion would not have been brought forward; but as he meant to vote in favor of it, after having declared his satisfaction with the documents, as sufficient to support his resolutions, he should be accused of advocating a question of which he had before spoken apparently differently, unless he should now give his reasons; and lest he should be accused of a desire to keep alive a calumny against the President of the United States, an effect which had been stated, he took opportunity to answer the insinuation by saying that he as much abhorred so mean a principle as any gentleman in the House.

Mr. Marshall said, it was with no inconsiderable regret that he perceived so much of the time of the House, which ought to be devoted to more beneficial purposes, employed in preliminary discussion. He thought that it was impossible the House could agree to a postponement, which the motion under consideration must cause when it was reflected how much time must be employed in procuring those papers—it could not take less than a month; for they could only be found, he would presume to say in the Court of the District of South Carolina: it was therefore scarcely to be expected that they could be obtained until just before the rising of the House, a period, if they arrived before the House rose, too late for their consideration.

Mr. Bayard said he could not distinguish between the present motion and one yesterday negatived, because it must operate as a discharge upon the Committee of the whole House. There could be no doubt but the Secretary of State had furnished all the papers relative to the business in his possession—indeed, he could assuredly say so. He said he held in his hand a letter from the Secretary of State, in answer to one from an honorable member of the House inquiring whether there were any more documents in his office; he answered that he had no certified copy whatever but those which he had furnished the President with, from whom they came to the House. Gentlemen must then perceive that the mere operation of this resolution was an absolute and inevitable postponement of the business till another session. Many gentlemen, who were yesterday ashamed to vote for a postponement, would now have a plausible cover for their vote by calling for additional proof, to accomplish the object of the resolution of yesterday; and thus he feared it would have many advocates, but, however specious the pretext, he hoped it would not be carried.

Mr. Rutledge conceived this motion to be the same as to postpone the business. Further information was wanted, and that information could alone come from South Carolina. He wished the gentleman from Kentucky would read the resolution before he pressed his motion: he would find that the District Judge was not charged; no, it was only a charge against the Executive; there was not a word of irregularity of proceeding in the Court, but the Executive was seriously charged.

Mr. Davis explained. He said his objects were to have the record in order to see whether Robbins did produce a certificate that he was an American citizen; to see a copy of the warrant by which he was committed; and thirdly, to know what stratagem or what proceedings were used to take him out of the cognizance of the Court, where he must have remained, if the President had not interfered. These things he wished to ascertain, but that would be impossible without the court record.

Mr. Rutledge said, he conceived this to be the object, but he by no means thought that the gentleman would be satisfied on these points, were he to be possessed of the record. The gentleman might inquire the reasons for the Executive and Judicial conduct being as it was, but perhaps he would not receive the information. Every gentleman in the House would unite their vote to procure all the testimony within their reach, so as to enable the House to prosecute the business. We know, said Mr. R., what monstrous clamor has been raised about this business; we know that great pains have been taken to make the people believe that their fellow-citizen has been torn from his country; that he has been impressed into a foreign service; that the treaty has been violated; that their fellow-citizen has been taken to a foreign country, and there been tried in a summary manner and executed. We have been told for months past that this business would be inquired into; we wish not to avoid it; we will by all means in our power assist it; we have done it. Some time since papers were asked for, we agreed with gentlemen that they should be furnished; it was done, and they are now on your table. They have been there many days; so that gentlemen had sufficient time, long before this, to have known whether they were satisfied or not. The gentleman himself who brought forward the resolutions affected to be satisfied, but, in compliance with the wish of his friends, he now wishes to postpone it. We want to bring the matter to a decision, and so far as we can accommodate gentlemen and avoid delay we will do it.

Mr. Nicholson rose to correct what he considered a mistake in the gentleman last up, (Mr. Rutledge,) when he said that the Executive only was implicated in the resolutions; he conceived that the District Judge of South Carolina was implicated, and that the papers of that court were necessary to examine the conduct of that judge. He read the resolution, and contended that his deduction was accurate. Mr. N. said he wanted to know whether the District Judge of South Carolina had committed this man for trial; this would appear or be disproved by the warrant.

That the President of the United States was not to be considered as the servant of that House, he was willing to admit, but he did not think that the President might, with propriety, apply to the judge of the district for the documents of the court; and he did not believe that the President would object to make the application. However, the object he presumed was to procure the papers, no matter from whom; that being the object, he hoped the mover of the resolution would withdraw it, in order to accommodate it more to the feelings of some members in the House, by adopting something like the following:

Resolved, That the Speaker of the House of Representatives be requested to procure, from the Clerk of the District Court of South Carolina, copies, under seal, of the proceedings of that court, together with the evidence produced in the case relative to the requisition for Thomas Nash, alias Jonathan Robbins, who was delivered to His Britannic Majesty's Consul.

Mr. Davis withdrew his resolution, and Mr. Nicholas moved the substitute, which was now before the House.

Mr. Harper moved a postponement of this resolution to this day week. The object of the resolution which was before the Committee of the Whole was twofold—a charge on the President, and a charge on the District Judge. So much as related to the President of the United States, it was manifest that the testimony called for by this resolution could have no effect whatever upon him, because he left the whole to the judge. The President went no further than to declare that if it should appear that the acts committed by this man came within the purview of the British Treaty, the man ought to be delivered up conformably to that stipulation.

Mr. Nicholas thought, with the gentleman last up, that if the only inquiry was as to the conduct of the President, or if the inquiry was only to respect the judge, the papers might be dispensed with; but it was otherwise—the conduct of both was called forth to view by the resolutions, but how far the conduct of either may be reprehensible, depended on the testimony which might appear before the House. It was impossible to say what the President had done until the documents should be seen. If gentlemen refused the inquiry being made of the court in South Carolina, they, by that act, made the President answerable for every part of the facts, which he believed they would not pretend to do. He really believed it extremely important to know what steps had been taken in this very serious business, to know whether the man was in course for trial, and whether the President had acted in the hasty and premature manner which was stated, in delivering him up.

Mr. Gallatin could not help observing the disposition which gentlemen evinced of placing the opinions and sensations expressed by one gentleman to the account of others. To take a fair view of the resolutions, what did they amount to? Nothing more than the deductions which one man had drawn from the message sent to this House by the Executive: these deductions, in the form of a resolution, he had submitted to the consideration of the Committee of the Whole. Now, except it could be proved that that gentleman had made all the deductions of and acted for every gentleman, there could be no ground for saying that every gentleman would be satisfied, without the evidence which might be collected from the records of the District Court of South Carolina. Was any gentleman in the House bound to be satisfied, with the gentleman from New York, that all the facts necessary to be known were furnished? Was every gentleman in the House bound to confine himself solely to the resolutions before the House? Certainly not. It could not be denied that the evidence now required was essential to a full investigation of the conduct of the judge, who was the principal agent of the Executive in this case.

Mr. H. Lee hoped that the gentleman from South Carolina would withdraw his motion. He would mention some reasons which would induce him to vote differently from gentlemen with whom he usually had the honor to vote. Considering this a question of very great importance, not only to the American people, and to the reputation of the House, but also to the highly respectable character presiding over our Government, he trusted the House would, in its whole process, be led by principles so fair and candid, as not to leave the least room for a charge of derogation from its own dignity or of the great subject it was discussing.

He would vote for the motion calling for the papers, but he would do it with an expectation that it would not postpone the discussion of the business so far as related to the conduct of the President of the United States. It appeared that the conduct of the President, as charged, was fully before the House; there could be no difficulty therefore to proceed on it; but, as far as respected the judge, Mr. L. trusted the record of the court would be sent, for he thought it but fair to gratify gentlemen who considered there was any material evidence wanting.

Mr. Varnum would vote for the resolution proposed; he thought it was doubtful whether the President had acted with propriety or not; but he believed if there had been any incidental impropriety of conduct, it was never done with an evil design, nor with a view to interfere with any other department of the Government; but certainly to deny this evidence, which several gentlemen had stated to be necessary to assist them in making up their minds, would stamp a censure on the conduct of those officers as great as that contained in the resolution. He thought the gentleman from New York had a right to bring the subject to the view of the House. If he saw any proceeding which to him appeared dangerous, it was his duty to commence an investigation. No man ought to flinch from what he thought right. The only way to give public satisfaction, in a matter that had so much engaged public attention, was to give all the evidence which could be procured, and let the matter be investigated to the bottom; and, most assuredly, the only way effectually to clear the characters implicated, if they were innocent, was to leave no doubt as to the desire of the House to scrutinize their conduct. But, certainly, the very great reluctance which gentlemen showed to procure all the evidence, and, after all, their denial of it, must leave a suspicion bordering much on guilt.

Mr. Bayard rose, in answer to Mr. Gallatin and others, and observed, that, with respect to Nash calling himself an American citizen before that court, (an object which it was desired to prove by this call for evidence,) they were asked to admit the fact. Mr. B. asked, would these gentlemen admit that Nash was guilty of the dreadful murders committed on board the British frigate? Would they admit that he falsely made the claim? However, he had no disposition to rest on that point. Another fact, however, which it was required to admit was as to the jurisdiction of the court of the United States upon the case. Mr. B. denied this, and repeated the former arguments in proof of his opinion. He insisted that the whole arrest and proceeding was had at the instance of the British Consul and Minister, in proof of which he quoted their letters. The record, he said, could not possibly dispense any light to this fact; the record would only give the warrant and some of the depositions first taken before the judge; but as to the court being designated where the case was to be tried, he contended that it was not usual to insert it in the warrant—he never saw one so drawn. It was possible that Nash was committed with a view to be delivered up to the British, before the letter was received by the judge from the President; and it was very reasonable that the whole previous business was at the instigation of the British agent, but it was impossible to prove that jurisdiction had attached before the letter directing the delivery to be made was received.

Mr. Jones said, that finding himself, from the vote he was about to give, implicated in the charge made by the gentleman from Delaware, (Mr. Bayard,) that gentlemen who were yesterday ashamed to vote for the proposition to discharge the committee from further consideration of the subject, in general and express terms, because it would imply a distrust of the sufficiency of the ground on which to support the principles of the resolutions, were now disposed to effect the same object by a decision which would, in fact, go to evade the question during the present session, he felt himself impelled, by a respect for his own conduct, to explain the motives which would govern his vote on the present question. He considered the case which had been called into view by the proposition of the gentleman from New York, (Mr. Livingston,) as one that involved in it the dearest interests and deepest concerns of the people of the United States. The gentleman from Delaware (Mr. Bayard) and the gentleman from Connecticut (Mr. Dana) had indulged themselves in the most violent invectives and unnecessary abuse against the unfortunate, the obscure, and insignificant character, now dead, who was the subject of this proposition. On this topic they had exercised all their powers of passionate declamation. If this was a grateful theme for the employment of their talents, he did not envy them the enjoyment of it. How that kind of argument would apply to the question, he left to the House to determine.

For his part, Mr. J. said, he deemed it totally immaterial whether the man was, as they had declared, an Irishman or not; whether he was a Turk, a Hottentot, or a native-born American, if he claimed to be an American citizen, and produced a certificate in due form, under the signature of a proper officer, of his citizenship, and that claim was slighted by the judge, or declared immaterial, and the fact not inquired into of his being a citizen, then he conceived the safety of the citizens of America to be equally put in jeopardy, as if the man had been born and raised in Charleston, in the circle of the judge's own acquaintance. If, he asked, a dagger aimed at my breast by an assassin in the dark, should by mistake or impetuosity pierce the bosom of another, would not the discovery of such an attempt awaken alarm, and demand a precaution for my future safety? Certainly it would. So in this case, if this man claimed to be a citizen, and wore about him the legal voucher of that claim, and if he was told in the presence of American citizens, "it is of no importance whether you are, or are not a citizen, that is a point of no concern in the case," notwithstanding it may afterwards be found he was no citizen, yet would it equally involve the safety of every true citizen who might fall into similar circumstances. We may congratulate ourselves that it has not fallen on a fellow-citizen, but we ought still to improve the lesson this case has presented. Mr. J. hoped that it would be improved, and that, at least, legislative provisions would be made to prevent this decision from operating on a citizen, if such a case should occur in future.

The question was then taken on the motion of Mr. Harper, to postpone the consideration of the motion of Mr. Nicholson, for a call of the record of the District Court of South Carolina, for one week, and negatived—yeas 32, nays 63.

The question then recurred upon adopting the resolutions.

Mr. Marshall spoke at length against it. He contended there was no prospect of coming to a decision of the original question this session, if this were adopted; and asked if the character of the President of the United States ought to be held up in the suspicious view in which the resolution placed it, until the next session of Congress? He hoped not. It seemed to him that a postponement amounted to a declaration to the people of America that there was much cause for suspicion, and that additional evidences were wanted to substantiate it.

Mr. Nicholas replied to Mr. M., and contended that the whole truth of the case was to come out of the additional testimony now asked for.

An adjournment was then called for, and negatived—yeas 30.

Mr. Randolph spoke in favor of the resolution, and in answer to Mr. Marshall.

The question was then taken that the House do agree to the motion first proposed, and passed in the negative—yeas 44, nays 57.

And then the House adjourned.

Friday, February 28.

Mr. Harper moved a postponement of the order of the day on the business of Jonathan Robbins, until Monday. He did not conceive much progress would be made this day, and as there was much private business on hand it could not be gone through with. If the business be taken up on Monday it can be regularly gone through with without intermission.

The motion was agreed to.

Monday, March 3.

Lake Superior Lands.

Mr. Cooper observed that a navy was considered an object of great importance, as was also our extended commerce, and neither of these could be carried on to any profit without a very liberal use of copper. That article could not be purchased at present at less than half a dollar a pound, but by attention to an object which was within our own power it might be had at a very low price. From these considerations he laid on the table the following resolution:

Resolved, That a committee be appointed to bring in a bill authorizing the President of the United States to appoint an agent to purchase of the Indians that tract of land on the south side of Lake Superior, which shall include the great copper bed.

Mr. C. said, as this invaluable copper mine was well known by individuals, it no doubt would soon become an object of speculation, but wishing to make it of public utility, as it must become if purchased, he hoped the proposition would be adopted.

Jonathan Robbins.

The House then resolved itself into a Committee of the Whole on the Message of the President respecting Jonathan Robbins, when Mr. Livingston spoke about three hours in support of the resolutions he some time since submitted to the House on that subject.

Mr. Bayard was proceeding to follow Mr. L. when a member moved the committee to rise and ask leave to sit again. Mr. B. objected: he said he was prepared to proceed if the House would have patience at that late hour to hear him. Several members expressed a desire that he might proceed, which he was doing, when the Speaker hoped the gentleman would give way to a motion for the committee to rise; he had no doubt of his friend being prepared for the discussion, but from the length the answer must necessarily take, the House certainly would be fatigued much before he would conclude. The motion was made and carried.

During Mr. Livingston's observations he introduced a copy of the record of the Circuit Court in New Jersey, where three men were tried and acquitted on the charge of piracy, and one of them for murder, on board of the same frigate and at the same time. This record, on motion of Mr. Rutledge, was ordered to be printed.

Mr. Nicholas, not being able to account to his satisfaction for the obvious change of conduct in our Executive in this recited instance and the one now under the consideration of the House (though precisely the same in facts) any other way than by supposing that a correspondence on the subject had occurred between the Executive of the United States and the British Government; though he expressed himself to be extremely unwilling, yet he thought it his duty to move that the President be requested to furnish it to the House.

An adjournment was immediately called and carried.

Wednesday, March 5.

The House then resolved itself into a committee on the Message, when Mr. Bayard proceeded, in answer to Mr. Livingston, in which he spoke about three hours.[50] The committee then rose, and obtained leave to sit again.

Thursday, March 6.

A message from the Senate informed the House that the Senate had passed the bill, entitled "An act declaring the assent of Congress to certain acts of the States of Maryland and Georgia," with an amendment; to which they desire the concurrence of this House.

Jonathan Robbins.

The House went into Committee of the Whole on the Message of the President, in the case of Jonathan Robbins, when Mr. Nicholas spoke about three hours[51] in favor of the resolutions introduced by Mr. Livingston, which were negatived—yeas 34, nays 58.

Some discussion then took place on taking up the resolution presented by Mr. Bayard, which was also with the Committee of the whole House. The committee at length rose without entering upon it, and reported their disagreement to the resolutions proposed by Mr. Livingston; and the question whether the committee should have leave to sit again was taken by yeas and nays, and carried—yeas 59, nays 38.

The question was then before the House to agree to the report of the committee in their disagreement with the resolutions.

Mr. Gallatin rose, and entered generally into the argument, in a speech of about two hours, after which the House adjourned.[52]

Friday, March 7.

Jonathan Robbins.

The House took up the unfinished business of yesterday, and the question, Will the House agree with the Committee of the Whole in their disagreement to Mr. Livingston's resolutions? being under consideration,

Mr. Marshall said, that believing, as he did most seriously, that in a Government constituted like that of the United States, much of the public happiness depended, not only on its being rightly administered, but on the measures of Administration being rightly understood—on rescuing public opinion from those numerous prejudices with which so many causes might combine to surround it, he could not but have been highly gratified with the very eloquent, and what was still more valuable, the very able and very correct argument which had been delivered by the gentleman from Delaware (Mr. Bayard) against the resolutions now under consideration. He had not expected that the effect of this argument would be universal; but he had cherished the hope, and in this he had not been disappointed, that it would be very extensive. He did not flatter himself with being able to shed much new light on the subject; but, as the argument in opposition to the resolutions had been assailed with considerable ability by gentlemen of great talents, he trusted the House would not think the time misapplied which would be devoted to the re-establishment of the principles contained in that argument, and to the refutation of those advanced in opposition to it. In endeavoring to do this, he should notice the observations in support of the resolutions, not in the precise order in which they were made; but as they applied to the different points he deemed it necessary to maintain, in order to demonstrate, that the conduct of the Executive of the United States could not justly be charged with the errors imputed to it by the resolutions.

His first proposition, he said, was that the case of Thomas Nash, as stated to the President, was completely within the 27th article of the Treaty of Amity, Commerce, and Navigation, entered into between the United States of America and Great Britain.

He read the article, and then observed: The casus fœderis of this article occurs, when a person, having committed murder or forgery within the jurisdiction of one of the contracting parties, and having sought an asylum in the country of the other, is charged with the crime, and his delivery demanded, on such proof of his guilt as, according to the laws of the place where he shall be found, would justify his apprehension and commitment for trial, if the offence had there been committed.

The case stated is, that Thomas Nash, having committed murder on board of a British frigate, navigating the high seas under a commission from His Britannic Majesty, had sought an asylum within the United States; on this case his delivery was demanded by the Minister of the King of Great Britain.

It is manifest that the case stated, if supported by proof, is within the letter of the article, provided a murder committed in a British frigate, on the high seas, be committed within the jurisdiction of that nation. That such a murder is within their jurisdiction, has been fully shown by the gentleman from Delaware. The principle is, that the jurisdiction of a nation extends to the whole of its territory, and to its own citizens in every part of the world. The laws of a nation are rightfully obligatory on its own citizens in every situation where those laws are really extended to them. This principle is founded on the nature of civil union. It is supported every where by public opinion, and is recognized by writers on the laws of nations. Rutherforth, in his second volume, page 180, says: "The jurisdiction which a civil society has over the persons of its members, affects them immediately, whether they are within its territories or not."

This general principle is especially true, and is particularly recognized, with respect to the fleets of a nation on the high seas. To punish offences committed in its fleets, is the practice of every nation in the universe; and consequently the opinion of the world is, that a fleet at sea is within the jurisdiction of the nation to which it belongs. Rutherforth, vol. ii. p. 491, says: "there can be no doubt about the jurisdiction of a nation over the persons which compose its fleets, when they are out at sea, whether they are sailing upon it or are stationed in any particular part of it."

The gentleman from Pennsylvania, (Mr. Gallatin,) though he has not directly controverted this doctrine, has sought to weaken it by observing that the jurisdiction of a nation at sea could not be complete even in its own vessels; and in support of this position he urged the admitted practice of submitting to search for contraband—a practice not tolerated on land, within the territory of a neutral power. The rule is as stated; but is founded on a principle which does not affect the jurisdiction of a nation over its citizens or subjects in its ships. The principle is, that in the sea itself no nation has any jurisdiction. All may equally exercise their rights, and consequently the right of a belligerent power to prevent aid being given to his enemy, is not restrained by any superior right of a neutral in the place. But, if this argument possessed any force, it would not apply to national ships-of-war, since the usage of nations does not permit them to be searched.

According to the practice of the world, then, and the opinions of writers on the law of nations, the murder committed on board the British frigate navigating the high seas, was a murder committed within the jurisdiction of the British nation.

Although such a murder is plainly within the letter of the article, it has been contended not to be within its just construction; because at sea all nations have a common jurisdiction, and the article correctly construed, will not embrace a case of concurrent jurisdiction.

It is deemed unnecessary to controvert this construction, because the proposition, that the United States had no jurisdiction over the murder committed by Thomas Nash, is believed to be completely demonstrable.

It is not true that all nations have jurisdiction over all offences committed at sea. On the contrary, no nation has any jurisdiction at sea, but over its own citizens or vessels, or offences against itself. This principle is laid down in 2 Ruth. 488, 491.

The American Government has, on a very solemn occasion, avowed the same principle. The first Minister of the French Republic asserted and exercised powers of so extraordinary a nature, as unavoidably to produce a controversy with the United States. The situation in which the Government then found itself was such as necessarily to occasion a very serious and mature consideration of the opinions it should adopt. Of consequence, the opinions then declared deserve great respect. In the case alluded to, Mr. Genet had asserted the right of fitting out privateers in the American ports, and of manning them with American citizens, in order to cruise against nations with whom America was at peace. In reasoning against this extravagant claim, the then Secretary of State, in his letter of the 17th of June, 1793, says:

"For our citizens then to commit murders and depredations on the members of nations at peace with us, or to combine to do it, appeared to the Executive, and to those whom they consulted, as much against the laws of the land as to murder or rob, or combine to murder or rob its own citizens; and as much to require punishment, if done within their limits, where they have a territorial jurisdiction, or on the high seas, where they have a personal jurisdiction, that is to say, one which reaches their own citizens only; this being an appropriate part of each nation, on an element where all have a common jurisdiction."

The well considered opinion, then, of the American Government on this subject is, that the jurisdiction of a nation at sea is "personal," reaching its "own citizens only;" and that this is the "appropriate part of each nation" on that element.

This is precisely the opinion maintained by the opposers of the resolutions. If the jurisdiction of America at sea be personal, reaching its own citizens only; if this be its appropriate part, then the jurisdiction of the nation cannot extend to a murder committed by a British sailor, on board a British frigate navigating the high seas under a commission from His Britannic Majesty.

As a further illustration of the principle contended for, suppose a contract made at sea, and a suit instituted for the recovery of money which might be due thereon. By the laws of what nation would the contract be governed? The principle is general that a personal contract follows the person, but is governed by the law of the place where it is formed. By what law then would such a contract be governed? If all nations had jurisdiction over the place, then the laws of all nations would equally influence the contract; but certainly no man will hesitate to admit that such a contract ought to be decided according to the laws of that nation to which the vessel or contracting parties might belong.

Suppose a duel, attended with death, in the fleet of a foreign nation, or in any vessel which returned safe to port, could it be pretended that any government on earth, other than that to which the fleet or vessel belonged, had jurisdiction in the case; or that the offender could be tried by the laws or tribunals of any other nation whatever?

Suppose a private theft by one mariner, from another, and the vessel to perform its voyage and return in safety, would it be contended that all nations have equal cognizance of the crime, and are equally authorized to punish it?

If there be this common jurisdiction at sea, why not punish desertion from one belligerent power to another, or correspondence with the enemy, or any other crime which may be perpetrated? A common jurisdiction over all offences at sea, in whatever vessel committed, would involve the power of punishing the offences which have been stated. Yet all gentlemen will disclaim this power. It follows, then, that no such common jurisdiction exists.

In truth the right of every nation to punish is limited, in its nature, to offences against the nation inflicting the punishment. This principle is believed to be universally true. It comprehends every possible violation of its laws on its own territory, and it extends to violations committed elsewhere by persons it has a right to bind. It extends also to general piracy.

A pirate, under the law of nations, is an enemy of the human race. Being the enemy of all, he is liable to be punished by all. Any act which denotes this universal hostility, is an act of piracy.

Not only an actual robbery, therefore, but cruising on the high seas without commission, and with intent to rob, is piracy. This is an offence against all and every nation, and is therefore alike punishable by all. But an offence which in its nature affects only a particular nation, is only punishable by that nation.

It is by confounding general piracy with piracy by statute, that indistinct ideas have been produced, respecting the power to punish offences committed on the high seas.

A statute may make any offence piracy, committed within the jurisdiction of the nation passing the statute, and such offence will be punishable by that nation. But piracy under the law of nations, which alone is punishable by all nations, can only consist in an act which is an offence against all. No particular nation can increase or diminish the list of offences thus punishable.

It has been observed by his colleague, (Mr. Nicholas,) for the purpose of showing that the distinction taken on this subject by the gentleman from Delaware (Mr. Bayard) was inaccurate, that any vessel robbed on the high seas could be the property only of a single nation, and being only an offence against that nation, could be, on the principle taken by the opposers of the resolutions, no offence against the law of nations; but in this his colleague had not accurately considered the principle. As a man who turns out to rob on the highway, and forces from a stranger his purse with a pistol at his bosom, is not the particular enemy of that stranger, but alike the enemy of every man who carries a purse, so those who without a commission rob on the high seas, manifest a temper hostile to all nations, and therefore become the enemies of all. The same inducements which occasion the robbery of one vessel, exist to occasion the robbery of others, and therefore the single offence is an offence against the whole community of nations, manifests a temper hostile to all, is the commencement of an attack on all, and is consequently, of right, punishable by all.

His colleague had also contended that all the offences at sea, punishable by the British statutes from which the act of Congress was in a great degree copied, were piracies at common law, or by the law of nations, and as murder is among these, consequently murder was an act of piracy by the law of nations, and therefore punishable by every nation. In support of this position he had cited 1 Hawk. P. C. 267. 271-3, Inst. 112, and 1 Woodeson, 140.

The amount of these cases is, that no new offence is made piracy by the statutes; but that a different tribunal is created for their trial, which is guided by a different rule from that which governed previous to those statutes. Therefore, on an indictment for piracy, it is still necessary to prove an offence which was piracy before the statutes. He drew from these authorities a very different conclusion from that which had been drawn by his colleague. To show the correctness of his conclusion, it was necessary to observe, that the statute did not indeed change the nature of piracy, since it only transferred the trial of the crime to a different tribunal, where different rules of decision prevailed; but having done this, other crimes committed on the high seas, which were not piracy, were made punishable by the same tribunal; but certainly this municipal regulation could not be considered as proving that those offences were, before, piracy by the law of nations. [Mr. Nicholas insisted that the law was not correctly stated, whereupon Mr. Marshall called for 3 Inst. and read the statute:]

"All treasons, felonies, robberies, murders, and confederacies, committed in or upon the seas, &c., shall be inquired, tried, heard, determined and judged in such shires, &c., in like form and condition as if any such offence had been committed on the land," &c. "And such as shall be convicted, &c., shall have and suffer such pains of death, &c., as if they had been attainted of any treason, felony, robbery, or other the said offences done upon the land."

This statute, it is certain, does not change the nature of piracy; but all treasons, felonies, robberies, murders, and confederacies, committed in or upon the sea, are not declared to have been, nor are they piracies. If a man be indicted as a pirate, the offence must be shown to have been piracy before the statute; but if he be indicted for treason, felony, robbery, murder, or confederacy, committed at sea, whether such offence was or was not a piracy, he shall be punished in like manner as if he had committed the same offence on land. The passage cited from 1 Woodeson, 140, is a full authority to this point. Having stated that offences committed at sea were formerly triable before the Lord High Admiral, according to the course of the Roman civil law, Woodeson says:

"But, by the statutes 27 H. 8. c. 4, and 28 H. 8. c. 15, all treasons, felonies, piracies, and other crimes committed on the sea, or where the admiral has jurisdiction, shall be tried in the realm as if done on land. But the statutes referred to affect only the manner of the trial as far as respects piracy. The nature of the offence is not changed. Whether a charge amount to piracy or not, must still depend on the law of nations, except where, in the case of British subjects, express acts of Parliament have declared that the crimes therein specified shall be adjudged piracy, or shall be liable to the same mode of trial and degree of punishment."

This passage proves not only that all offences at sea are not piracies by the law of nations, but also that all indictments for piracy must depend on the law of nations, "except where, in the case of British subjects, express acts of Parliament" have changed the law. Why do not these "express acts of Parliament" change the law as to others than "British subjects?" The words are general, "all treasons, felonies, &c." Why are they confined in construction to British subjects? The answer is a plain one: The jurisdiction of the nation is confined to its territory and to its own subjects.

The gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Gallatin) abandons, and very properly abandons, this untenable ground. He admits that no nation has a right to punish offences against another nation, and that the United States can only punish offences against their own laws and the law of nations. He admits, too, that if there had only been a mutiny (and consequently if there had only been a murder) on board the Hermione, that the American courts could have taken no cognizance of the crime. Yet mutiny is punishable as piracy by the law of both nations. That gentleman contends that the act committed by Nash was piracy, according to the law of nations. He supports his position by insisting that the offence may be constituted by the commission of a single act: that unauthorized robbery on the high seas is this act, and that the crew having seized the vessel, and being out of the protection of any nation, were pirates.

It is true that the offence may be completed by a single act; but it depends on the nature of that act. If it be such as manifests generally hostility against the world—an intention to rob generally, then it is piracy; but if it be merely a mutiny and murder in a vessel, for the purpose of delivering it up to the enemy, it seems to be an offence against a single nation and not to be piracy. The sole object of the crew might be to go over to the enemy, or to free themselves from the tyranny experienced on board a ship-of-war, and not to rob generally.

But, should it even be true that running away with a vessel to deliver her up to an enemy was an act of general piracy, punishable by all nations, yet the mutiny and murder was a distinct offence. Had the attempt to seize the vessel failed, after the commission of the murder, then, according to the argument of the gentleman from Pennsylvania, the American courts could have taken no cognizance of the crime. Whatever then might have been the law respecting the piracy, of the murder there was no jurisdiction. For the murder, not the piracy, Nash was delivered up. Murder, and not piracy, is comprehended in the 27th article of the treaty between the two nations. Had he been tried then and acquitted on an indictment for the piracy, he must still have been delivered up for the murder, of which the court could have no jurisdiction. It is certain that an acquittal of the piracy would not have discharged the murder; and, therefore, in the so much relied on trials at Trenton, a separate indictment for murder was filed after an indictment for piracy. Since, then, if acquitted for piracy, he must have been delivered to the British Government on the charge of murder, the President of the United States might, very properly, without prosecuting for the piracy, direct him to be delivered up on the murder.

All the gentlemen who have spoken in support of the resolutions, have contended that the case of Thomas Nash is within the purview of the act of Congress, which relates to this subject, and is by that act made punishable in the American courts. That is, that the act of Congress designed to punish crimes committed on board a British frigate. Nothing can be more completely demonstrable than the untruth of this proposition.

It has already been shown that the legislative jurisdiction of a nation extends only to its own territory, and to its own citizens, wherever they may be. Any general expression in a legislative act must, necessarily, be restrained to objects within the jurisdiction of the Legislature passing the act. Of consequence an act of Congress can only be construed to apply to the territory of the United States, comprehending every person within it, and to the citizens of the United States.

But, independent of this undeniable truth, the act itself affords complete testimony of its intention and extent. (See Laws of the United States, vol. i. p. 10.) The title is: "An act for the punishment of certain crimes against the United States." Not against Britain, France, or the world, but singly "against the United States."

The first section relates to treason, and its objects are, "any person or persons owing allegiance to the United States." This description comprehends only the citizens of the United States, and such others as may be on its territory or in its service.

The second section relates to misprision of treason; and declares, without limitation, that any person or persons, having knowledge of any treason, and not communicating the same, shall be guilty of that crime. Here then is an instance of that limited description of persons in one section, and of that general description in another, which has been relied on to support the construction contended for by the friends of the resolutions. But will it be pretended that a person can commit misprision of treason who cannot commit treason itself? That he would be punishable for concealing a treason who could not be punished for plotting it? Or, can it be supposed that the act designed to punish an Englishman or a Frenchman, who, residing in his own country, should have knowledge of treasons against the United States, and should not cross the Atlantic to reveal them?

The same observations apply to the sixth section, which makes any "person or persons" guilty of misprision of felony, who, having knowledge of murder or other offences enumerated in that section, should conceal them. It is impossible to apply this to a foreigner, in a foreign land, or to any person not owing allegiance to the United States.

The eighth section, which is supposed to comprehend the case, after declaring that if any "person or persons" shall commit murder on the high seas, he shall be punishable with death, proceeds to say, that if any captain or mariner shall piratically run away with a ship or vessel, or yield her up voluntarily to a pirate, or if any seaman shall lay violent hands on his commander, to prevent his fighting, or shall make a revolt in the ship, every such offender shall be adjudged a pirate and a felon.

The persons who are the objects of this section of the act are all described in general terms, which might embrace the subjects of all nations. But is it to be supposed that, if in an engagement between an English and a French ship-of-war, the crew of the one or the other should lay violent hands on the captain and force him to strike, that this would be an offence against the act of Congress, punishable in the courts of the United States? On this extended construction of the general terms of the section, not only the crew of one of the foreign vessels forcing their captain to surrender to another, would incur the penalties of the act, but, if in the late action between the gallant Truxton and the French frigate, the crew of that frigate had compelled the captain to surrender, while he was unwilling to do so, they would have been indictable as felons in the courts of the United States. But surely the act of Congress admits of no such extravagant construction.

His colleague, Mr. M. said, had cited and particularly relied on the ninth section of the act; that section declares, that if a citizen shall commit any of the enumerated piracies, or any acts of hostility, on the high seas, against the United States, under color of a commission from any foreign Prince or State, he shall be adjudged a pirate, felon, and robber, and shall suffer death.

This section is only a positive extension of the act to a case which might otherwise have escaped punishment. It takes away the protection of a foreign commission from an American citizen, who, on the high seas, robs his countrymen. This is no exception from any preceding part of the law, because there is no part which relates to the conduct of vessels commissioned by a foreign power; it only proves that, in the opinion of the Legislature, the penalties of the act could not, without this express provision, have been incurred by a citizen holding a foreign commission.