FIFTH CONGRESS.—THIRD SESSION. (continued 2)

With respect to the three points stated generally by the Secretary of State, they are not said to go to the point for which the gentleman from Virginia has taken them. With regard to the douceur of £50,000, Mr. P. would say, that if we believe this attempt to have been made to extort this sum of money from our Envoys, for corrupt purposes, (and notwithstanding all that has been said on the subject, he did believe that X and Y were the agents of the French Government in that transaction, and which has, indeed, been acknowledged by Y, Mr. Bellamy, of Hamburg, who declares he has never written or said any thing to our Envoys, but by the direction of the Secretary of Foreign Affairs,) no reliance ought to be placed upon any of their declarations; for after such an act, it may be supposed they will say one thing at one time and another at another; and no reliance could be had upon any thing which comes from so corrupt a source.

Mr. P. said he would not trouble the committee longer, except in one point, and that was as to the consequences which might flow from a declaration of independence on the part of St. Domingo. He should endeavor to answer the gentleman from Pennsylvania as to the consequences which it might produce to the Southern States. It was a subject to which he had paid all the attention in his power. He did, on all questions, endeavor as much as possible to divest himself of any thing like party spirit; but in this case, where he had himself so much at stake, in which his native country and every thing dear to him was concerned, his sincerity could not be doubted. Mr. P. did not himself believe that this bill would have the least tendency to procure the independence of St. Domingo; but as some gentlemen think it is probable that this may be the result, and as no one could say with certainty what the effect of any measure would be, he had considered the subject, and was clearly of opinion, that should the independence of that island take place, the event would be more advantageous to the Southern States, than if it remained under the dominion of France, considering the disposition which France has evinced towards us, (and of which he saw no prospects of a change,) and the present conduct of the inhabitants of St. Domingo. Nothing which we can do, said Mr. P., can bring back the internal state of that island to the state it was formerly in. Considering the inhabitants, then, in the light of freemen, whether will it be better for us, in the Southern States, to have to deal with them, as such, or under the direction of the French Government, unreasonable and arbitrary as we have found it? He had no hesitation in saying, that, it would be more for the safety of the Southern States, to have that island independent, than under the Government of France, either in time of peace or war. If our dispute with France should not be accommodated, and they keep possession of St. Domingo, they could invade this country only from that quarter. There is there a large body of troops, and their unofficial agents told our Envoys, that in case we did not submit to their conditions, we might expect an attack from that quarter. It would certainly lessen the danger from that island, were it to be separated from France; but remaining in the hands of France, and supported by the powerful navy of France, notwithstanding all the vigor we have shown on the ocean, we might be very much annoyed from thence.

If these people in St. Domingo find that we withhold from them supplies which are necessary for their subsistence, said Mr. P., though they are friendly disposed towards us, they will look elsewhere for support; they must either turn their attention to cultivating their land, look to Great Britain, or become freebooters. Which situation is it most for the interest of the United States that they should be in? Surely the peaceful cultivation of the ground; and to induce them to take this course, it will be our interest to supply them with what they have occasion for, lest they should get the habit of freebooters, and make our commerce the object of their plunder. He hoped, therefore, the motion for striking out would not prevail.

Mr. Macon had no doubt the gentleman from South Carolina had paid particular attention to this subject. It was to be expected that every gentleman from the Southern States would pay attention to it. In one respect, he was precisely in the same situation with the gentleman from South Carolina. He lived in a country that would be affected by any event, such as had been mentioned, and all his connections were there. It was the same with all other gentlemen from the Southern States. He differed in opinion, however, when the gentlemen said that we should have less to apprehend from St. Domingo, in case it should become independent, than whilst it remained a part of the French Republic. He believed the state of society to be such in that country, as not to admit of self-government. In case they separate from France, he should apprehend that the consequence will be, that instead of being ruled by one of the European powers, they would become the tools of them all, in turn, and we should probably have the same game played off upon us from thence, that we have heretofore had played upon us by means of the Indians.

Mr. M. said, that although the part of the bill moved to be stricken out, does not go directly to say that it has reference to St. Domingo, it is a little extraordinary that no other case will fit it. There could be no doubt, if the island became independent, we should have a right to trade to it; but he believed it would puzzle gentlemen to find an instance of a Legislature passing a law in order to fit a case which might happen. As he thought it improper, he hoped it would be stricken out.

Mr. Goodrich said this amendment went to change the principle of the bill. The bill goes upon the idea that when any island in the West Indies shall cease to make depredations upon our commerce, our trade shall be opened with them, without regarding by what authority or force the change was effected. The matter is not placed upon the ground of any treaty whatever; for, said Mr. G., we can neither increase nor diminish the power of the President in this respect. A great deal of mist has been thrown on this subject. The effect of this amendment will be, that the person restraining from depredations upon our commerce must act under the authority of the French Republic; on the contrary, the friends of this bill wish not to examine by what authority the thing is done, provided that it be done. We have a right to say that our vessels shall go to any port we please; but, according to the doctrine of the amendment supposing the island of St. Domingo was conquered, we could not send our commerce there, nor could we send it to a place in rebellion; so that our commerce was to be affected by every change of circumstances which might take place. He hoped the committee would recognize no principle which shall say we have not a right to send our commerce wherever we please, whether the places to which our vessels go are in war, peace, or rebellion.

Mr. Gallatin was astonished to hear the gentleman from Connecticut say that this is merely a commercial question. Let us, said he, examine the effect of this amendment. We are told that the provisions of this bill do not extend to any colony which may be conquered; for instance, to St. Martin's, St. Lucia, or any other colonies which have been conquered. Let us see, then, how it will apply if this amendment is rejected, and whether the question is commercial or political. Let us inquire, said he, what is the case provided for, if the amendment is rejected, and which is unprovided for if it is adopted, and it will then appear what ground is covered by the opposers of this amendment. If rejected, it will result, that all persons who may claim or exercise any command in any island, &c., although they have not that command under the Government of France, and who shall refrain from privateering, shall be entitled to a free trade with this country. The only case is a case of insurrection and rebellion. Suppose, said Mr. G., I should agree with the gentleman from Connecticut, that if once a rebellion takes place, or any colony shall declare itself independent, (but, by the by, the doctrine is not countenanced by the law of nations,) that we may trade there as we please. Does it result that we have a right to pass a law beforehand to contemplate such an event? If we do, it will be speaking publicly, thus: "If any persons shall, in any island, port, or place, belonging to the French Republic, raise an insurrection, and declare themselves independent, and shall be found to refrain from committing depredations upon our commerce, we will open a free trade with them." And yet the gentleman from Connecticut calls this a mere commercial question.

The committee have been told of a number of cases which he had been astonished to hear—cases which happened in our war. Gentlemen who have mentioned these have not attended to any of the facts of the war. Mr. G. referred to the case of the treaty made in Holland, which has already been explained in a former debate. Mr. G. said, gentlemen might put what construction they pleased upon this section; but certainly publicly to tell the French colonies that if they will rebel against their Government, and restrain from depredating upon us, we will treat with them, is to invite them to do it. A declaration of war has always been the consequence of such a conduct in other countries; and he supposed gentlemen are not ready for a declaration of war, though they tell us there is no change in our affairs for the better; that negotiation is at an end; that no idea can be entertained of the sincerity of any professions of the French; and not being ready to bring in a declaration of war, they are not surely ready to make it, or provoke it; and if not, why assume a principle that may have this effect? He hoped the amendment would be agreed to.

The committee now rose, and had leave to sit again.

Thursday, January 24.

Death of Mr. Tazewell.

A message was received from the Senate, informing the House that Henry Tazewell, Esq., one of their body, died this morning, and that they had directed orders to be taken respecting his funeral.

Afterwards, on motion of Mr. Dent, the House came to the following resolution:

Resolved, That this House will attend the funeral of Henry Tazewell, Esq., late a member of the Senate of the United States, on to-morrow, at half past four o'clock.[42]

Intercourse with France.

The House again resolved itself into a Committee of the Whole, on the bill further to suspend the commercial intercourse between the United States and France, and the dependencies thereof, and for other purposes.

Mr. Spaight's amendment being under consideration,

Mr. Hartley said the general policy of this bill had been considered at the last session; and he had no doubt, that when any parts of the French dominions cease to depredate upon our commerce, we might, with propriety, open our intercourse with them. If, for instance, the Isle of France had fitted out privateers, and depredated upon our commerce, and chose to forbear to do so in future, and leave our passage to the Indian seas clear, it would be a good reason for opening our commerce with that place. The case of St. Domingo is still stronger, and has, as has been shown, the power of doing as much mischief, should we refuse to furnish them with the necessary supplies. If they call in their privateers, therefore, it would certainly be right to open our intercourse with that valuable island, especially since they appear to be abandoned by France, who has withdrawn all her troops from the island.

After some other observations, Mr. H. concluded with hoping the amendment would not be agreed to, as it would only tend to embarrass the bill, by making it necessary to ascertain the legality of the governing authority of the places with which we might open our intercourse.

Mr. Brace was opposed to this amendment, as it came round to the same point with that which the gentleman from Pennsylvania had proposed. It struck him that, in the course of the debate, gentlemen have forgot the ground on which we stand. Our treaties with the French Government have been declared void, on account of the conduct of that Government. We have proceeded further, and suspended all commercial intercourse with France and her dependencies. It would be well to consider what kind of connection now exists between the United States and France, and whether a measure of the kind proposed can injure our present prospect of peace. By the arguments of some gentlemen it would seem that we are under some obligation or contract to that Government; whereas, we ought to consider ourselves, with respect to it, in no other light than we consider ourselves with respect to the governments of the world with which we have no connection. We have, therefore, no object to pursue, but what, in a dignified national view, it is our duty and our interest to pursue.

This separation having been effected by the wrong acts of the French Government, she can have no claim upon us; we have taken our stand upon such ground as can always be justified, whenever a spirit of justice shall return. There is no man, said Mr. B., in the House, who does not wish for peace, whenever it can be obtained on a solid foundation. But it was well observed yesterday by his colleague, (Mr. Goodrich,) that this question is wholly a commercial one. This declaration gave offence to the gentleman from Pennsylvania. He was surprised that any one could suppose this to be the case. Mr. B. said he was equally surprised at the arguments of that gentleman. What connection had we with the French Government? or what connection had we with, any other, besides commercial? He had heard much clamor out of doors about other connections—about treaties offensive and defensive. He hoped no such connexion ever would exist between this country and any nation whatever.

Mr. Spaight said, he wished to have given the reasons which induced him to make this amendment yesterday, but a motion being made for the committee to rise, prevented him. Having been a member of the committee who formed this bill, and having given his consent to it, he trusted it would not be believed that he brought forward this motion to defeat the bill; his object was to make it more palatable to many gentlemen, who, if an amendment something like the present was not adopted, would vote against the bill. The gentlemen from Massachusetts and Connecticut have said, that if this amendment is adopted, it will destroy some of the most important principles of the bill. He believed they had mistaken the effect of the amendment. They state that it will be necessary for the President to inquire whether the commander of any island with which he was about to open our intercourse, had his authority from the French Government? On the contrary, it appeared to Mr. S. that, so long as the citizens of any island acknowledged France as the mother country, whatever authority may exist there, the place must be under the Government of France. If an open rebellion took place, it would alter the case entirely. And if conquered by any of the belligerent powers, it would not then come under the bill; so that, in either case, the amendment could have no bad effect. The principal motive with him for moving the amendment was, in order to take away the objection made to it by many gentlemen, that the bill is calculated to produce the independence of St. Domingo; for he himself had no such view, nor did he think any other member of the committee, who reported the bill, had. He believed, if the wants of these people are supplied from this country, it will be better that they should remain under the Government of France; but, if we refuse to supply them with provisions, they may act as freebooters, or do still worse—throw themselves into the hands of Great Britain, in order to procure supplies. These reasons had induced him to make the amendment, and he should be glad to see it adopted.

Mr. Champlin could see no difference between this and the former amendment, which had been negatived. The design of this section is, to authorize the President to open the intercourse with any of the islands and the United States, whenever he shall deem it consistent with the honor and dignity of this country, without inquiring whether such place is under the French Government. Frequent decrees are passed in France, said Mr. C., for revoking the commissions of these officers, which are not enforced; and yet, if this amendment is passed, such a person could not be treated with, and it would always be difficult to ascertain whether an officer acted under the French Government or not. If the islands choose to cease from their depredations, he would openly trade with them; for the intercourse was originally suspended, not with a view of starving the islands, but to prevent depredations being committed upon our commerce. He was astonished to find that nothing could come before this House, but gentlemen are ready to object to it on account of the effect it may have on France. For his part, if the measure be beneficial to this country, he cared not what effect it might have upon France. It was said this provision would have a tendency to provoke insurrection, or the independence of the island; on the contrary, he believed, if this law does not pass, they will throw themselves into the hands of Great Britain, or become plunderers of our property. He hoped to see the intercourse opened, not only with St. Domingo, but with the Isle of France.

Mr. Harper said, when this amendment was first made, he considered it as making no considerable change in the section, and was, therefore, inclined to vote for it; but the gentleman from Massachusetts, (Mr. Varnum,) of whose discernment he had a very high opinion, having said that he considered it as making a very considerable change in the section, and declaring that he would, on that account, vote for it, he was induced to take a further view of it, and he found, upon reconsideration, that it would, indeed, make a very material change in the section, and because he found this would be the case, he must vote against it.

Mr. Gallatin said, it appeared to him that this amendment goes no further than to prevent any stipulations with persons who have usurped the power of a country. It was yesterday stated by the gentleman from Massachusetts, and repeated to-day by the gentleman from North Carolina, that it did not extend to cases where men's commissions are doubtful. If a man has once held a commission as an agent in any French colony, he may be recognized as their agent, so long as he has not been publicly declared to be otherwise. His exercising the power will be sufficient proof that he has it; and, unless this principle is admitted, it must be evident that the bill is intended to operate in favor of revolters.

There is a great difference, said Mr. G., between this amendment and the one which had been moved by the gentleman from Virginia, the gentleman from New York, or that which he had himself moved. It was the opinion of the gentleman from Virginia, and it was his also, that the President ought not to be authorized to open a trade with St. Domingo, unless the constituted authorities of France had disavowed their former aggressions, and refrained from them; they did not think it right to permit a trade with particular parts of the possessions of France, considering that the measure was originally taken to distress the French Government, and bring it to terms; but this section gives the power of opening a partial intercourse with St. Domingo, though the Government of France should not disavow any of her former illegal acts; and the present amendment only proposes to except cases of insurgency. Nor could he see what possible objection can be made to it, except that it will prevent a lure from being held out to promote the independence of St. Domingo; for in nothing else does the amendment differ from the bill as it now stands.

If we are to hold out this lure, said Mr. G., it must be because we have the right, and it is our interest to do it. When he asserted we have not the right to do it, he would remark upon the word "right." Gentlemen say we have a right to do this, because we are an independent nation. No doubt. But when he said we have not a right to do it, he meant that we could not do it without infracting the law of nations, or those rules which we have declared ought to govern every nation. And though the gentleman from Connecticut has said that there is no connection of a political nature between us and France, and therefore considers this as merely a commercial regulation, Mr. G. said, he has mistaken his meaning, by making use of the word "connection" instead of relation. We have no connection, either commercial or political, with France; but we stand, as a nation, in a political and commercial relation with France and other nations. There is no connection between us, but there is the same relation, both political and commercial, that there is between all other nations. And, said Mr. G., it is, doubtless, an infraction on the law of nations to offer any lure, or promote the independence of a colony. We certainly have a right to give assistance, in case of a rebellion, by running the risk of becoming a party in the war, but not without infracting the law of nations; still less could we do it without breaking that morality in politics, the breach of which we have so often complained of. We may suppose the Government of France radically wrong, and the people exercising it corrupt, but neither would justify the overturning, or holding out any encouragement to others to overturn, the Government of any part of her dependencies. A conduct of this kind could only be justified in time of war.

In this country, in our speeches, at least, we have gone further, and said that, even in case of war, it would not be right to sow the seeds of insurrection; for, on what other grounds could we account for the philippics which have been pronounced on this floor against France, for her conduct not only against countries with whom she was at peace, but also against those with whom she was at war. This was the case with respect to all the charges made against France with respect to Holland, or the Milanese (now Cisalpine Republic) with whom she was at war when the attempts condemned were made. But we have said, war is at best an unfortunate state, and it is not right to heighten its evils by exciting insurrections and commotions. If this principle is right, and Mr. G. believed it correct in most cases, it is clear that we shall not be justified in promoting insurrections, even in war, much less in this state which is a state of hostility, but not of war.

Notwithstanding the respect which he paid to the opinion of the gentleman from South Carolina (Mr. Pinckney) he could not be persuaded that the independence of St. Domingo could be a desirable object. To-day, it had been avowed, in what fell from his colleague, (Mr. Hartley,) that this was the ground upon which the clause was founded, all the French force being withdrawn. He gave credit to the candor of his colleague for the declaration, and it was in this point of view which he had always considered it, because he had stated that, no doubt, an agent from that quarter had come with propositions to our government.

Mr. G. repeated some of his former reasons against the policy of promoting the independence of St. Domingo. He heard the gentleman from Rhode Island, with regret, repeat one of those illiberal ideas that had been so frequently introduced here, by saying that gentlemen seemed opposed to this measure, because it would be injurious to France.

Mr. Pinckney wished to make a single observation upon what fell from the gentleman from Pennsylvania. In order to defeat all that has been said about this section holding out a lure for the establishment of the independence of St. Domingo, it need only be said, that it is confined to the colonies which are under the jurisdiction of France. The language of this clause is, "so long as you continue dependent, we will treat with you."

Mr. Nicholas explained.

Mr. Sprague observed that the gentleman from Pennsylvania insisted upon it, that, without this amendment, this bill would hold out a lure to insurrections in St. Domingo, and that if gentlemen did not wish to encourage these, they must agree to the amendment. What is this encouragement? It is, "if you will forbear committing depredations, which we have heretofore experienced from you, we will open our trade with you." Then, according to the gentleman's reasoning, acts of hostility against the commerce of this country, are favorable to France; or rather, ceasing to commit them is an act of rebellion against the mother country; and, to hold out a lure on our part, to stop these depredations, is so contrary to the views of France, as to give a high offence to that country.

Mr. McDowell remarked, that gentlemen opposed to this amendment, all agree that the section, as it stands, holds out no lure to insurrection in the French West India islands; if not, why should they object to this amendment, which is only calculated to make certain what is at present doubtful to some members. He wished gentlemen to consider what might be the consequence of authorizing the President to treat with unauthorized persons. Gentlemen have stated, and he supposed truly, that the trade of this island of St. Domingo is a gold mine to the merchants of this country; and he was afraid that the richness of this trade had too much attraction to be resisted by those concerned in it, though it might be dearly purchased by the nation at large. He differed widely in opinion from the gentleman from South Carolina, with respect to the effect which the independence of that island would have upon this country; he believed it was by no means a desirable event to this country.

Mr. J. Williams did not intend to have said any thing on this subject, as it is principally a commercial concern, of which he knew but little; but he also conceived that the agricultural interest is connected with it. Gentlemen are afraid more is meant by this bill than meets the eye; they are afraid to take a worm or a fly, lest a hook should be concealed in them. Instead of war, he thought this bill calculated to promote peace. It is admitted, on all hands, said Mr. W., that Hispaniola cannot support itself. How must they, then, get support? Either we must supply them, or they must depend upon neutral islands, or the people must bend their whole force upon our commerce. What, said he, is most prudent to do? He thought the regulation proposed by this bill the best that could be hit upon. But the gentleman from Virginia said we are obliged to send our tobacco through Spain to France; is this, said he, an advantage to the people of this country? It may be presumed, Mr. W. said, that the President will go no further in this business than the interest of the country requires. This jealousy of the President has a bad effect; because from a want of confidence in this officer, he will be unable to do any thing for us. He hoped the amendment would not be agreed to.

It was negatived—49 to 41.

Monday, January 28.

Intercourse with France.

The bill further suspending our commercial intercourse with France and her dependencies, and for other purposes, having been read the third time,

Mr. Allen moved for a recommitment of the bill in order to have expunged a proviso introduced by the member from Tennessee, excluding the port of New Orleans from its operation. He stated his reason to be, that he did not believe that was likely to be a rendezvous for French privateers; but that, if it should be, it ought to be liable to the same restrictions with other ports; and, if it was not likely to become a harbor of privateers, to insert a proviso of this kind, was to show a distrust that the President would not exercise the power given to him for the interest of the United States.

This motion was seconded by Mr. Otis, and opposed by Messrs. Venable, Nicholas, S. Smith, W. Claiborne, and Harper. It was negatived, the yeas and nays being taken—74 to 18.

The question on the passing of the bill was then taken, and stood, yeas 55, nays 37, as follows:

Yeas.—John Allen, George Baer, jun., Bailey Bartlett, James A. Bayard, Jonathan Brace, David Brooks, Stephen Bullock, Christopher G. Champlin, John Chapman, James Cochran, William Craik, John Dennis, George Dent, William Edmond, Thomas Evans, Abiel Foster, Dwight Foster, Jonathan Freeman, Nathaniel Freeman, jun., Henry Glenn, Chauncey Goodrich, Roger Griswold, William Barry Grove, Robert Goodloe Harper, Thomas Hartley, William Hindman, Hezekiah L. Hosmer, James H. Imlay, John Wilkes Kittera, Samuel Lyman, James Machir, William Matthews, Daniel Morgan, Harrison G. Otis, Isaac Parker, Josiah Parker, Thomas Pinckney, John Reed, John Rutledge, jun., James Schureman, Samuel Sewall, William Shepard, Thomas Sinnickson, Samuel Smith, Richard Dobbs Spaight, Peleg Sprague, George Thatcher, Mark Thompson, Thomas Tillinghast, John E. Van Allen, Peleg Wadsworth, Robert Waln, John Williams, and Robert Williams.

Nays.—Abraham Baldwin, David Bard, Thos. Blount, Richard Brent, Robert Brown, Samuel J. Cabell, Thomas Claiborne, William C. C. Claiborne, Matthew Clay, John Clopton, Thomas T. Davis, John Dawson, Joseph Eggleston, Lucas Elmendorph, William Findlay, Albert Gallatin, James Gillespie, Andrew Gregg, John A. Hanna, Carter B. Harrison, Jonathan N. Havens, Joseph Heister, David Holmes, Walter Jones, Edward Livingston, Matthew Locke, Nathaniel Macon, Anthony New, John Nicholas, Thompson J. Skinner, William Smith, Richard Sprigg, Abram Trigg, John Trigg, Philip Van Cortlandt, Joseph B. Varnum, and Abraham Venable.

French Affairs.

The following Message was received from the President of the United States.

Gentlemen of the Senate, and Gentlemen of the House of Representatives:

An edict of the Executive Directory of the French Republic of the twenty-ninth of October, 1798, inclosed in a letter from our Minister Plenipotentiary in London, of the sixteenth of November, is of so much importance that it cannot be too soon communicated to you and to the public.

JOHN ADAMS.

January 28, 1799.

Extract of a letter from Rufus King, Esq., Minister Plenipotentiary of the United States at London, to the Secretary of State, dated November 16, 1798.

"The annexed arrêt would appear extravagant and incredible, if it proceeded from any other authority; but mankind is so accustomed to the violence and injustice of France, that we almost cease to express our surprise and indignation at the new instances that she continues to display."

[TRANSLATION.]

Decree of the Executive Directory, of October 29, 1798.

The Executive Directory, upon the report of the Minister of Foreign Relations, considering that the fleets, privateers, and ships, of England and Russia, are in part equipped by foreigners.

Considering that this violation is a manifest abuse of the rights of nations, and that the powers of Europe have not taken any measures to prohibit it. Decrees:

1st. Every individual, native (ou originaire) of friendly countries, allied to the French Republic, or neutral, bearing a commission, granted by the enemies of France, or making part of the crews of ships of war, and others, enemies, shall be by this single fact declared a pirate, and treated as such, without being permitted in any case to allege that he had been forced into such service by violence, threats, or otherwise.

2d. The Executive Directories of the Batavian, Lagurian, Cisalpine, and Roman Republics, shall be instructed to this effect.

3d. The provisions contained in the first article shall be notified to those powers which are neutral or allied to the French Republic.

4th. The Ministers of Exterior Relations is charged with the execution of the present arrêt which shall be printed in the Bulletin of the Laws.

(Signed) TERILHARD, President.

The message and documents were read, and ordered to lie on the table.

Tuesday, January 29.

Thomas Sumter, from South Carolina, appeared and took his seat in the House.

Friday, February 1.

John Fowler, from Kentucky, appeared and took his seat in the House.

Remonstrance of Georgia.

On motion of Mr. Baldwin, the House resolved itself into a Committee of the Whole on the report of a select committee on the petition and remonstrance of the Legislature of Georgia; and the resolution reported by that committee being under consideration, its adoption was opposed principally by Mr. Allen.

Mr. Nicholas thought the following resolution would be less exceptionable than the one reported, and it was agreed to—55 votes being in its favor.

"Resolved, That provision ought to be made by law for complying with such treaty as the President of the United States may think proper to make with the Creek Indians, and for obtaining possession, in behalf of the State of Georgia, of the lands lying within the country of Tallassee, or other lands on the frontier of the said State, which may be deemed equivalent thereto, and that —— dollars be appropriated therefor."

The committee rose, and after some further remarks from Mr. Allen, the resolution was concurred in—59 votes being in its favor. It was then referred to the select committee to report a bill.

The House adjourned to Monday.

Thursday, February 7.

Augmentation of the Navy.

On motion of Mr. Josiah Parker, the House resolved itself into a Committee of the Whole on the bill for the augmentation of the Navy, and fixing the pay of the captains of ships or vessels of war; when the first section being under consideration—

Mr. Gallatin moved to strike out the words "six ships of war, of a size to carry, and which shall be armed with not less than seventy-four guns each; and these shall be built or purchased within the United States;" in order to take the sense of the committee on the propriety of building, at present, ships-of-the-line. When this subject was last year before the House, the general opinion was, that during the present war, considering the crippled state of the French navy, frigates and vessels of a smaller size, were sufficient to protect our vessels on our own coast, and in the West India seas; nor did that opinion seem to have undergone any material alteration; for, although the Secretary of the Navy, and the select committee, had reported that the expense of building the six seventy-four gun ships now proposed, would amount to $2,400,000, yet the appropriation asked for the present year was only one million of dollars. It was not expected that much more than one-third of the work necessary to send those ships to sea, could be executed during the present year. It was not expected that they could be finished in less than two or three years. They were not wanted for any immediate purpose. The proposed measure was not therefore a measure of defence. It was a project of a general nature. The question is, whether it be proper, at the present time, to lay the foundation of a navy, of a fleet, that might be able, hereafter, to give us a certain weight in relation to European nations; which might be able to cope with the fleets of those nations: and it was in order to bring that question fairly before the Committee of the Whole that he had made his motion. Should that motion prevail, it would not affect the building of the six sloops of war which were said to be immediately wanted, in addition to our present naval force, for the purpose of protecting our commerce. It would merely prevent the building, at present, of a fleet which was supposed, by the friends of the bill, to be wanted only for future purposes.

This led him naturally to consider the expense of that navy. It is stated by the Secretary of the Navy, that the annual expense of a 74-gun ship will exceed 216,000 dollars, and that therefore the annual expense of six of these ships will be about 1,300,000 dollars. That the building and equipping a 74-gun ship, exclusive of military stores, will be 342,700 dollars; and that the military stores will cost 48,000 dollars; so that the first building and equipping six of these vessels will cost about 2,400,000 dollars. This is the first expense, but nothing is said of the yearly repairing and building which will be necessary to keep up a fleet of this kind. It is estimated, in the navies of Europe, that a ship-of-the-line will last from 12 to 15 years; so that, besides ordinary repairs, the whole expense of building would have to be renewed every 12 or 15 years.[43] It would have been desirable, and it might have been expected, that the select committee should have laid before the House an estimate of the peace establishment of a navy to the extent proposed, in order to have enabled the House to have formed a just opinion on the main question. This they have not done; but supposing the other estimates to be perfectly correct; supposing that the expense would not overrun the calculations laid before the House, and, if so, it would be the first time it had not done it; supposing, according to those calculations, that a 74-gun ship will hereafter cost us less than two-thirds of what 44-gun frigates have heretofore cost us; it results, that the first necessary expense (including $150,000 for docks and timber) will exceed, for six ships only, two millions and a half of dollars; and that the annual expense of supporting them, when in commission, exclusively of annual repairs, and of building new ships, necessary to supply those that from time to time will become unfit for service, will amount to 1,300,000 dollars.

If these premises are true, and he knew they could not be contradicted, the conclusion must be most forcible that it is improper at present to build a navy, especially since there is no immediate demand for it. But if once the foundation of a large navy is laid, no one can say where it will stop. The Secretary of the Navy does not suppose that six 74-gun ships will be sufficient. He supposes twelve necessary; six are now proposed merely as an entering wedge. And when once twelve ships-of-the-line are obtained, if our commerce and coast, extensive as they are, must be effectually protected, these will not be deemed sufficient. He drew this conclusion from the naval force of European nations. Our tonnage exceeds that of any European nation, except Great Britain and Holland; and if we must have a navy to protect our commerce, it must bear some proportion to the extent of our coast, to the amount of our tonnage, and to the navies of the European nations. And upon what terms are we to cope with the powers of Europe with respect to any navy? It would be recollected that when last year there was a mutiny on board the British fleet, in order to put an end to it, the sailors' wages were advanced to one shilling sterling per day, equal to thirty shillings sterling, or six dollars and two-thirds per month, whilst we give our seamen seventeen dollars a month, so that we pay nearly three times as much for men to supply our navy, as England does.

Mr. G said, he would not detain the committee longer at present, though he meant to have made some observations with respect to the expense of navies to those nations who support them in order to show that the expense of them far exceeds the benefits derived from them. If reference were had to European nations, it would be found, Mr. G. said, that navies were used more as engines of power, than as a protection to commerce. Even with respect to Great Britain, which is the only nation which has succeeded in effecting any material object by a navy, though she has obtained a preponderancy at sea, and has been mistress of it for the last hundred years, yet it has been the means of involving her in almost continual war, and the support of it has always been attended with enormous expense. He believed he was correct, when he stated that from 1776 to 1789, the average expense of the navy of Great Britain (including a period of seven years of war and six of peace) was six millions of pounds sterling a year. Now, said Mr. G., if we calculate the rate at which we shall be obliged to pay for every thing appertaining to a navy, what will be the sum necessary to support a navy of any extent here? Suppose a navy should only be one-tenth part of the British, and instead of 120 ships-of-the-line, we should be content with twelve. The expense, according to the British rate of expenditure, would be £600,000 sterling, nearly three millions of dollars a year; but when we know that we pay three times as much for our seamen as they do, it is impossible precisely to calculate what the expense would be.

In relation to European nations, it would be found, that none had ever derived any advantage from a navy, except Great Britain. It has been said (and by high authority) that an extensive commerce cannot be maintained without a navy. In answer to this it may be said, that Spain has always had a considerable navy, but very little commerce; their tonnage compared with ours was insignificant, yet theirs is the third navy in Europe. Holland, for a time, had a powerful navy; but they gave it up, as more expensive than beneficial, since the wars of Queen Anne. Yet their commerce, on this account, never diminished in any considerable degree. They are the second commercial nation in Europe; and they never suffer for want of a navy, except when they become a party in war; he conceived, therefore, that a navy is not necessary to protect commerce. At this time, Mr. G. knew that the commerce of Holland was in a great degree annihilated; but so was that of France and Spain, notwithstanding their powerful navies. Holland being at the door of Great Britain, may, in time of war, be altogether blocked up by the fleets of that nation. Fortunately that was not our situation.

Mr. G. concluded by saying, that as he believed commerce might exist independently of a navy; that a navy would cost far more than it would ever benefit the country; and knowing our finances were not such as to admit of the expense, he must hope his motion would prevail.

Friday, February 8.

Augmentation of the Navy.

The House then went into Committee of the Whole on the bill for augmenting the Navy, Mr. Gallatin's motion for striking out what relates to 74-gun ships being under consideration.

Mr. Josiah Parker hoped this amendment would not be agreed to. He was happy to find, however, that the gentleman from Pennsylvania did not go farther, and oppose the whole force, as he had heretofore always opposed every thing like a navy. Indeed, he has acknowledged that our infant navy has done some service, though he does not give to it all the credit which the committee who reported this bill thinks it deserves. He attributes the fall in insurance to other objects than the navy, because he says it has fallen more on vessels to Europe, where our navy could have had no effect, than to the West Indies, where that effect was more likely to be produced. But the gentleman should have recollected that the fall to Europe may have been occasioned by the vigilance of the British navy; but in the West Indies, the British, or at least the officers of the British men of war, seemed rather to countenance, than prevent, the depredations of the French; as, in many instances, they have suffered captures to be made by the French, and immediately afterwards recaptured the vessels, and by that means obtained a salvage upon them. Nor did he suppose the British Government would regret these depredations, since they knew such treatment would serve to rouse the resentment of this country against her enemy. Mr. P. supposed that the saving produced by our navy had even been greater than the committee had supposed, as, by the report made yesterday on the subject of our exports, it appears they have been ten millions more than the committee calculated them at. He allowed that our navy had not been the sole cause of safety to our commerce; the British navy had also contributed greatly to it. But it would be recollected that when this navy was first fitted out, French privateers and picaroons were not only upon our coast, but in our very bays; and, but for these measures, there can be no doubt, but our shores would at this time have swarmed with French privateers, which the British would have suffered, in order to widen the breach between the two countries.

Mr. P. hoped when the quantity of shipping, and the number of seamen we employ, is considered—that these are the means of bringing us from foreign countries all that we desire to have from thence, and that they thereby fill our treasury with money—gentlemen will not hesitate to allow our commerce a competent protection. No nation, except Great Britain, exceeds this country in the number of vessels and men engaged in this service, yet no nation has done so little to protect them. He trusted we should be allowed to have a sufficient navy to protect our commerce and coast, and to cause us to be respected abroad.

The British Government, Mr. P. said, has 141 sail-of-the-line, (according to Steele's list, which he had lately seen,) and these, according to the opinion of the first statesman and politician that England ever possessed, Lord Chatham, require as many thousand seamen; not that each vessel requires 1000 men, but it is necessary to have this number in order to employ their frigates and sloops of war, not that the ships of the line require 1000 men; yet, though Britain has this immense navy, she has not double the number of merchant vessels and seamen which this country possesses. If, said Mr. P., these six 74-gun ships and six sloops are agreed to, we shall not want more than 12,000 seamen to man our navy. At present we have only 4,000; and the whole annual expense will be 4,230,149 dollars. Mr. P. believed, in order to give us efficient protection, we ought to have eleven sail-of-the-line; but as he considered six to be as many as our present finances will allow, he should be satisfied with that number.

The gentleman from Pennsylvania wished to be informed as to the expense of a peace establishment of our navy. A large navy in time of peace would be unnecessary; he should wish it, however, to be kept on a respectable footing. Many of our ships, Mr. P. said, will last much longer than the gentleman from Pennsylvania had supposed; some of them, he doubted not, would last forty or fifty years. The British have ships which have been in service thirty years; when poorly built they may not last more than seven years. He had not made an estimate of what would be the expense of a peace establishment with respect to the navy; nor did he know what force the President of the United States might think it necessary to maintain in time of peace, but he supposed it would be small, and a single officer and thirty men would be sufficient to take care of a ship where she is laid up in ordinary: that only a few of the best ships would be kept, and the others sold.

The gentleman from Pennsylvania had represented the expense of a navy in this country as being much greater than in England; but when he spoke of the pay of British sailors being only one shilling sterling a day, he was certainly mistaken. They have at least a guinea and an half a month, which is seven dollars; and ours average fourteen dollars, which is double to that of England. If the same means were taken here that are taken in England, of raising men by means of press-gangs (which, however, he rejoiced never could be suffered in this country,) they might, perhaps, be gotten on easier terms, as the Government might follow the example of Great Britain, by fixing the pay and pressing the men. He would much rather pay higher wages; especially when it is considered that a very small part of the money paid to seamen will ever go out of the country; they spend their money freely, and the United States will not, therefore, lose it.

And as to the number of men employed in the navy, if they were not thus employed in our own service, they would go abroad, since this is the employment they choose; indeed, if all our citizens were employed in cultivating the ground, our produce would be so great, and sell for so little, as to make it scarcely worth the trouble of raising. And if we do not provide for our own defence, we shall be at the mercy of every foreign power which chooses to insult or ill-treat us. The interests of commerce and agriculture must always go hand in hand; and farmers who now get so much better a price for their product than they heretofore got, ought to be the first in supporting a navy sufficient to protect our vessels in carrying that produce to foreign countries. When they see their interests more clearly, Mr. P. trusted they would, like the gentleman from Pennsylvania, be ready to allow that our navy is of service. It would be happy for us, and for the world, Mr. P. said, if there were no use for navies, and nations might be permitted to carry their productions wherever they pleased without annoyance; but, while nations continue to make war upon each other, we must expect to come in for our share of the evils of such a system, and it will be necessary to have some force not only to guard against injuries, but to keep foreign belligerent nations in check, lest we should throw our force into the scale against them. The French Directory, said Mr. P., have lately passed a decree, which ought to be considered as a declaration of war against the world, "that the citizens of neutral countries found on board of any of their ships shall be considered and punished as pirates!" Where is the man, exclaimed he, who will not defend his country and his fellow-citizens against such a decree?

Mr. P. said he would take the liberty of quoting the authority, on the subject of a navy, of a gentleman who deservedly ranked high in public estimation, and whom he was proud to call his countryman. The authority he referred to was Mr. Jefferson's Notes on Virginia. He read the following extract.

"But the actual habits of our countrymen attach them to commerce. They will exercise it for themselves. Wars, then, must sometimes be our lot; and all the wise can do, will be to avoid that half of them which would be produced by our own follies, and our own acts of injustice; and to make for the other half the best preparations we can. Of what nature should these be? A land army would be useless for offence, and not the best nor safest instrument of defence. For either of these purposes, the sea is the field on which we should meet an European enemy. On that element it is necessary we should possess some power. To aim at such a navy as the greater nations of Europe possess, would be a foolish and wicked waste of the energies of our countrymen; it would be to pull on our own heads that load of military expense which makes the European laborer go supperless to bed, and moistens his bread with the sweat of his brow. It will be enough if we enable ourselves to prevent insults from those nations of Europe which are weak on the sea, because circumstances exist which render even the stronger ones weak as to us. Providence has placed their richest and most defenceless possessions at our door—has obliged their most precious commerce to pass, as it were, in review before us. To protect this, or to assail us, a small part only of their naval force will ever be risked across the Atlantic. The danger to which the elements expose them here are too well known, and the greater danger to which they would be exposed at home, were any general calamity to involve their whole fleet. They can attack us by detachment only; and it will suffice to make ourselves equal to what they may detach. Even a smaller force than what they may detach will be rendered equal or superior by the quickness with which any check may be repaired with us, while losses with them will be irreparable till too late. A small naval force, then, is sufficient for us, and a small one is necessary. What this should be, I will not undertake to say. I will only say, it should by no means be so great as we are able to make it."

Mr. P. perfectly concurred in this opinion. He had frequently expressed it. But the gentleman from Pennsylvania says we have no money, and therefore we ought neither to have a navy nor any thing else, to defend ourselves at home or at sea. He tells the House that our revenue will not exceed ten millions, and that if we agree to have these ships built, we shall want twelve millions. Mr. P. trusted that if these two millions were wanted the ways and means will be found, rather than that we shall suffer our commerce to be destroyed, and lose all our credit as a nation abroad. Admitting, said Mr. P., that our debt is a hundred millions of dollars, it must be recollected that its increase has been owing to a number of causes which could not be avoided, amongst which was our war with the Indians, the Western insurrection, our treaty with Algiers, and the building of vessels for the protection of our commerce; but if our debt is fifteen millions more now than it was at the commencement of the present Government, our numbers have greatly increased since that time, so that he supposed, considering the number of individuals who have to bear it, it is not so heavy, in proportion to our population, as it was at that time. Having the ability, therefore, he trusted there would be found the will to provide a respectable naval force to protect us at home, our commerce abroad, and leave us in a situation to be more respected by foreign nations than we have heretofore been, and therefore hoped the present motion would be rejected.

Mr. Harper.—Notwithstanding, Mr. Chairman, the subject now before the committee, the usefulness of a Naval Establishment for the United States, has been so frequently and so fully discussed on former occasions, I deem it important to enter once more into a particular consideration of it, less on account of the general reasons so often urged against the measure, than of those particular objections, founded on the supposed state of our pecuniary resources, whereby it has, at this time, been assailed.

The gentleman from Pennsylvania has proved, as he thinks, that no possible navy could be equal to the protection of our commerce, extended as it is. And how has he proved this? By the example of other nations—of Holland, Spain, and Great Britain. Spain, he says, has a very considerable navy, perhaps the third in Europe, and yet no commerce. Holland found herself unable to support her navy, and even while she supported it, was unable to protect her trade; and therefore she gave it up, and yet, after she had done so, continued to possess a very great commerce. Even Britain, according to him, mistress of the ocean as she has been for a century past, has not fully protected her trade by her marine; which, in the mean time, has cost her more than the whole sum which her trade has yielded—and, therefore, she would have been better without a navy. This, Mr. Chairman, is the calculation of a schoolboy, not of a statesman; of the counting-house, not of the cabinet; and if the judgment of the gentleman from Pennsylvania were not warped on this, as on so many other occasions, by his particular political system, he would be one of the last persons in the world to present the subject in a point of view so much beneath a mind of the least political discernment. The gentleman, in fact, forgets that Britain is indebted to her navy, not for her commerce only, but for her independence; not only for the dominion of the seas, but for her existence as a nation. Every man, who is in the smallest degree versed in history, knows that Great Britain, but for her navy, must long since have been a province of France. Had not Britain been mistress of the ocean, France would long since have been not only her mistress, but mistress of the rest of Europe. That great people, uniting within itself all the sources of military, pecuniary, and maritime strength, has never ceased to contend for universal empire, with immense means, vast genius, boundless ambition and unwearied perseverance, since the period when, two centuries ago, its provinces became united under one Government, and its immense resources, managed and called into activity by a minister whose mind was equal to his station, were directed to the increase of its power and extension of its limits. How has Britain been enabled to check this formidable career, to maintain her own power, and to arrive at her present high pitch of consequence in the scale of nations? Not by her population, which is little more than one-third of that possessed by France; nor by her insular situation, which heretofore could not protect her from invasion and conquest; nor by her military power, which, when compared with that of France, has never been considerable—but by her navy. It was that navy, and the wealth which commerce, protected by it, poured into her lap, that enabled her to support with glory so unequal a contest, to call to her aid the military force of Germany, and thus to establish a counterpoise to the power of France. But for this naval force, and the commerce which it protected and cherished—but for this union, cemented by the money, and aided by the maritime preponderance of England—France, combining, as she did, greater means of strength of every kind than any other nation, or even than all the nations of Europe united, except Germany and Great Britain, must long since have established her dominion over all. England must have fallen first, being unable, without the command of the sea, to save herself from invasion; and then the powers of the Continent, deprived of the pecuniary aid wherewith England was enabled by her commerce, under the protection of her navy, to supply and unite them, would have bent, one after another, beneath her formidable and continually augmenting strength. Even now this same navy enables England to ride secure amidst the most terrible storm wherewith the political world has ever been afflicted; to brave all the tremendous dangers by which she has been threatened; to baffle every attempt against her safety, or that of her remotest possessions; and amidst the dismay, the humiliation, or the total overthrow of so many powers, to triumph over her rival, whose strength, always formidable, is exercised, not more by her extension of territory and of influence, than by the consternation wherewith her successes have stricken other States, by the disunion and feebleness which has characterized their counsels, by the terrible weapon of internal commotion with which she threatens, or has actually assailed them, and by the unheard of despotism of her own Government, which enables it to employ, in a degree hitherto unexampled in the history of civilized men, the physical forces of the nation, in executing its plans of plunder and conquest. This same navy enables England not only to maintain thus gloriously a conflict so dreadful and so unequal, but to stand the barrier between independence and universal dominion, between liberty and the most degrading despotism, between civilization and the barbarism of the dark ages—to become the citadel of property, the storehouse and the banker of the world, and to render all nations, with their own consent, tributary, by means of her commerce, to the support of her greatness.

What, then, Mr. Chairman, must we think of that political system which estimates the British navy by a calculation of the sums which it has cost to maintain it; forgetting that, without this navy, there would have been no wealth to supply these sums, and, perhaps, no nation to pay them; that without this navy, Great Britain, instead of holding her present exalted station among the powers of the earth, must long since have sunk into a secondary and unimportant State; and, probably, into the condition of a province of that very rival against whom she now so nobly and so gloriously contends! Is it too much to say of such a calculation, that it is a paltry calculation, unworthy of a statesman, and befitting only a schoolboy?

But even the navy of Great Britain, the gentleman from Pennsylvania has told us, formidable as it is, has not afforded complete protection to her commerce. How, then, he asks, can we expect to protect our commerce by a navy? If the gentleman means by "protection" the total prevention of captures at sea, it is certain that no nation ever did, or ever can protect its commerce, in that scale. But that is not the true idea of "protection," which means nothing more than such a degree of safety as may enable the merchants of a nation, taken as a body, to pursue their commercial enterprises without discouragement, or eventual loss. This is all the protection that is ever attempted, or that is necessary; and this, I contend, we have it in our power to give.

Respecting the navy of Holland, the gentleman from Pennsylvania falls into a mistake equally remarkable. Holland, he tells us, has no navy, and yet maintains a very great commerce. Formerly she had a navy, but could not maintain it, and was forced to give it up. But where did that gentleman learn that Holland has no navy? Had she no navy in the American war, when with great gallantry, though with unequal success, she fought the English at sea? Had she no navy when she fitted out the formidable armament under De Winter, in October, 1797, which, after a dreadful conflict, was defeated rather by the superior address of the British Admiral, than the superior force or bravery of his fleet? Do we not know, that even now, after this fatal defeat, she possesses, in her different harbors, a much more numerous fleet than is proposed by the present bill for the United States? How then could the gentleman from Pennsylvania say that Holland has no navy? He ought to have known that until the marine of France and Spain were destroyed, in the present war, that of Holland was sufficient to turn the scale in their favor and against England; which gave her not only security for her commerce, but respectability and weight among the maritime powers of Europe.

As to the other assertion of the gentleman from Pennsylvania, that Holland a long time ago found her navy too burdensome for her resources, and therefore gave it up, it is equally erroneous. Holland, as we have seen, never gave up her navy, and even now, exhausted and ruined as she is by French fraternity and internal revolution, maintains a much greater one than is proposed for the United States. There is, indeed, a period in her history, the close of the last and the beginning of the present century, when she ceased to be ranked with the first maritime powers of Europe; but that happened, not through the want of means, but a mistake in policy. Before that period her system had been wholly maritime. All her resources were applied to her navy. A maritime armed neutrality was her great object, and she long preserved it with success. Her commerce, fostered by her marine, spread over every sea; and the Northern maritime States, guided to the same policy by her influence, acknowledged her as their umpire, their mediator, and their safeguard. The great powers courted her alliance and respected her rights. She interfered with weight in their disputes. Her village of the Hague became the centre of their most important negotiations. She disputed the empire of the seas with them singly; and, at one time, she held the united forces of France and England in check at sea, and finally compelled the French armies to retreat from her territory, which they had overrun and occupied. All this she effected by means of her navy, and of the resources which it had furnished to her by the protection of her commerce.

At this period she altered her system, and instead of cherishing her marine, and confining herself solely to the maintenance of her commerce, by an armed maritime neutrality at the head of the Northern Powers, she engaged in the land wars of the great military powers, and made exertions disproportionate to her strength, whereby her resources were exhausted. Into this fatal mistake she was drawn by the aspiring ambition, the popularity, and the heroism of one of her own citizens, stimulated and aided by the aggressions, the insults, and the alarming encroachments of the French Monarch, Louis XIV., at the zenith of his glory, evidently aspiring to universal dominion. William III., placed by his birth and personal merit at the head of the Dutch nation, saw those objects of French ambition, and roused his own country to resistance. Called, at length, to the Government of England, he communicated to that nation his own martial ardor. He finally succeeded in forming a confederacy to check the progress of France. Of this confederacy, Holland, his native country, was induced by his influence to become a principal member. At the head of it he struggled against the power of France, with unequal means, and sometimes with unprosperous fortune, but with a genius and perseverance not to be subdued, and a heroism rarely to be equalled. After his death, the impulse which his mind had given to his own and other countries continued to be felt, and the confederacy was renewed under his successor, on a different occasion, but with the same views. At length its object was altered. France was completely humbled and Europe secured against her enterprises, but the strength of Holland was undermined in the struggle. The vast armies which she had kept up had loaded her with debts. Her operations for so many years, by land, had drawn off her attention from her marine; and from that moment it declined, while that of England rose gradually on its ruins.

Hence, Mr. Chairman, the downfall of the maritime greatness of Holland. Her resources were not equal to the maintenance of fleets and armies, of both maritime and military strength. While she was left to attend solely to her maritime concerns, she continued to be powerful, respected, and prosperous; but her situation on the Continent, in the neighborhood of a great and ambitious military power, drew her, perhaps unnecessarily, into land wars, to which her strength was unequal, and, of course, her naval power declined. But still she continued for a century to keep up a navy sufficient to form a considerable weight in the scale, and to secure attention to her rights as a nation; and under this security her commerce continued to flourish, in a greater or less degree, till a domestic revolution, aiding and aided by foreign oppression, dried up all its sources.

What, then, Mr. Chairman, is the instruction which we may draw from this example? A nation whose population never exceeded two millions and a half, and whose territory, compared with ours, is but a mere speck on the surface of the globe, a mere garden spot, was able to maintain a most formidable marine, while it attended to that object solely, to extend its commerce under the protection of this marine, and to maintain not only an equal, but a distinguished rank, among the great powers of Europe, by whose territories it was surrounded, and by whose formidable armies it was liable to be invaded. Even this nation, after a mistake in its policy, or the pressure of inevitable circumstances, it had been induced to divert its attention from its marine to land wars, to exhaust its resources, and burden itself with debts too great for its means, by these disproportionate efforts, still was able to preserve a navy sufficient to give respectability to its flag, and a degree of safety to its commerce. Even now, when its resources are dried up by anarchy, or diverted by foreign exaction into the coffers of another nation; when its territory is curtailed, and its population reduced to one million and a half; when it is compelled to maintain an army of 25,000 men for France, still it has a navy greater than we propose. Shall it, then, be said, that this country, with probably six millions of population, most rapidly increasing, with an extent of territory capable of containing fifty millions, with a commerce greater than that of Holland ever was, and with more tonnage and sailors than she ever possessed, is not able to support such a navy as she, even since the commencement of her downfall, has always supported, and still supports? Yes, it is said by the gentleman from Pennsylvania; but the good sense of this House and of this country will, I trust, correct his mistake, as it has so often done heretofore.

But if it were true, Mr. Chairman, that Holland had afforded no protection to her commerce by the navy which she has been able to keep up, does it follow that the same thing will happen to us? Will the same navy be more efficacious in our case, than in the case of Holland, or Spain, or Portugal? This must be taken for granted in order to give any solidity to the argument of the gentleman from Pennsylvania, and yet nothing can be more untrue. Those States are situated at the very door of the great maritime powers, and their dominions are also exposed to invasion by land. They must, therefore, either singly or by combinations with other powers, contend against the whole maritime force of those great States, and must maintain navies adequate to that purpose. But we are under no such necessity. Placed at a vast distance from those great powers, and in the neighborhood of those possessions which contribute most to the support of their commerce and their navies, we can attack them in a weak, and yet a vital part, with our whole force, while but a small part of their force can at any time be brought to act against us. It is with this part only that we shall have to contend, should they at any time drive us into a war. Let us take England as an instance. Her great and valuable possessions lie at our threshold. The uniform course of the trade-winds compels all her vast and rich commerce with those possessions, to pass almost in sight of our shores. The force which she can send to protect this commerce and annoy us, in case of a rupture, will not be her whole force, but that part of it only which she can spare from Europe, after securing her preponderance there. France, notwithstanding the prostrate condition of her navy at present, possesses maritime means which will speedily enable her to raise it up again, whensoever those means come to be directed, as one day they must, by a Government of some understanding. This navy, and the maritime combinations which will be formed under its protection, England must watch and keep under. Her existence will depend upon it. She will, therefore, have but little force to spare which she can bring to act against us. A comparatively small maritime force, therefore, will compel her to respect us, and to avoid a quarrel with us by all just and reasonable means.

It follows that a moderate navy, a much smaller one than Holland, Spain, or even Portugal, have supported, would be sufficient for our protection, aided by the peculiar advantages of our situation. Those nations, inconsiderable as they are when compared to us in population, wealth, and extent of territory, have supported navies which, however unequal to that of England, have yet afforded some degree of protection to their trade, rendered their flags in some degree respectable, and given them a weight in the scale, a consequence among nations, which otherwise they could not have had. And shall not we, with our great and increasing resources, and the peculiar advantages of our situation, be able to effect still more?

Mr. Nicholas said this question was different from any former question, with respect to the Navy, which had been before the House. Whatever gentlemen may have heretofore said with respect to the advantages of a navy for the protection of our commerce, they must agree that the present question has a different aspect, as no man can say that seventy-four gun ships are calculated to resist the kind of force which has heretofore made attacks upon our commerce in the West Indies.

Mr. N. was far from believing that our armed vessels had produced the effect which the committee, who reported this bill, stated them to have done. He thought the gentleman from Pennsylvania had adduced many sufficient reasons for the fall which had taken place in the price of insurance, independent of our navy; and that, therefore, the committee were wholly mistaken that the advantages already derived from our navy have exceeded the cost of it; and that, if it had been established several years ago, it would have proved a great saving to the United States.

Mr. N. confessed he had always been opposed to a naval force for the purpose of warring with European nations, and whether the force now proposed is considered as necessary for defence or offence, it must have that character. The propriety of a naval force for this purpose never appeared to him in a questionable point of view; he thought every consideration of policy and interest forbids it. We are well informed, said he, by the best historians, that the British navy has been the means of sinking that nation to its present state; for he could not admire, like the gentleman from South Carolina, the splendor and prosperity of a nation, which is brought into such a situation as to render it doubtful whether it can exist for a day, a month, or any other period. If the navy of Great Britain, then, commenced under different circumstances from those in which we are placed—which, according to the gentleman from South Carolina, was not only for the protection of her commerce, but as a defence against neighboring nations, and to guard against the worst revolutionary principles—has nearly ruined that country by the immense sums necessary for its support, shall we, who, according also to the confession of that gentleman, have nothing to fear from European nations—[Mr. Harper interrupted Mr. N. to deny that he had said we had nothing to fear from Europe. He had said we had nothing to fear but from the sea.] Mr. N. said this was the way in which he understood the gentleman, and that no danger exists of any invasion by a land force. If this is the case, the use to which a navy can be put will only be to defend our commerce from cruisers, and passing fleets. We have not, therefore, half the inducements to the establishment of a navy which influence European nations, and many powerful reasons against such a force.

The European nations have, most of them, distant colonies, which they have to protect, and with which they have to keep up a constant communication across the ocean, which renders a navy in some degree necessary. But all the European nations commenced their navies under the delusion that a small force would only be necessary, and that one or two ships would give them an ascendency over other nations. Can we expect this, said Mr. N.? No; we begin the business with fewer inducements than any other nation ever begun a navy, and without necessity; for it is acknowledged we have nothing now to apprehend from invasion, (and if we had, this force could not be provided in time,) we have no colonies to protect, and no intercourse which calls for a naval force.

We cannot, therefore, said Mr. N., embark in this business with the same motives which influenced all European nations in establishments of this kind. They built small navies because they would be equal to cope with the small navies of their neighbors; but we are about to begin the business with a navy staring us in the face, the most formidable that any man could suppose to exist. According to his colleague, the British have 140 sail-of-the-line; and yet our navy is undertaken with the avowed purpose of keeping her, as well as the other nations of Europe, in check. Mr. N. asked whether we could ever hope to succeed in a plan of this kind? We certainly could not, since Great Britain would always even in war have more than a sufficient force to meet all the ships which we can build. Besides, if our situation, as gentlemen say, will make a small force so operative in our hands in time of European wars, will not our possessing it be sufficient to produce war with Great Britain, when it is always a sufficient cause for war, in the opinion of Great Britain, for any other maritime power to put a few more ships in commission than their ordinary establishment? And, if Congress were to order the building of fifty ships, it would only increase the certainty of this effect. How is a naval force to guard us, which Great Britain can destroy, whenever she pleases, even in time of war? For she has frequently ships sufficient on our coast to destroy all the vessels which are contemplated to be built. In short, this navy will be the means of keeping this country in continual broils. On the first appearance of arming any additional vessels on the part of Great Britain, for whatever cause, we must set on foot a negotiation to combine the other powers of Europe in our favor; and this country will become the centre of intrigue and tricks for the agents of every country.

But the gentleman from South Carolina says, this is the cheapest mode of defence; but does the gentleman prove this? Can he prove that £10,000,000 sterling is only the third part of the expense of defence, as he says? Does he not recollect how much of the revenue of that country goes to pay the interest of their enormous debt, and, therefore, cannot be considered as a part of the expenditure for defence? The gentleman will find, on reflection, he is much mistaken in his calculation in this respect. The gentleman from South Carolina has been loud in his encomiums on the British navy, on account of its usefulness to the world; and he calls the calculation of the gentleman from Pennsylvania, relative to the expenses of a navy, a paltry, schoolboy calculation, because it has not taken into view this usefulness. That gentleman, said Mr. N., only referred to the British navy so far as it was useful in the way gentlemen say they expect ours to be advantageous. But from the contradictions which the gentleman from South Carolina seemed to run into on this subject, he did believe that he had not an eye to a navy, merely for the defence of our commerce; he appeared to wish that this country should take a stand like that of Great Britain, that the safety of the world may, at a future day, depend upon us, as it now does upon Great Britain. Mr. N. believed the ambition of this country, the pride of its Government, and naval commanders, will all operate this way; and we may, one day or other, if we proceed with this navy scheme, be as aspiring, as domineering, as any other nation in the world, and by this means be embroiled in continual war, and be saddled with a debt equal to that of Great Britain.

Mr. N. believed there existed no good reason for going into the establishment of a navy at all, because he believed it would never be really useful to this country; but if it should be otherwise determined by a majority of Congress, this, he thought, of all times the most improper to commence the work.

Mr. J. Williams then moved to strike out what relates to 18-gun vessels, on the ground that the thirty-nine small vessels which we have are sufficient. The motion was negatived without a division.

Mr. J. Parker proposed filling up the blanks in the section fixing the pay of captains in the Navy, with an advance from $75 to $100 per month to captains of 74's, and others in proportion; except the masters of vessels under 20 guns, which were proposed to be lowered.

Some objection, however, being made to this, and particularly to the mode of doing the business, this being the first time that the subject had been before the House, the section was moved to be struck out, and carried.

The committee then rose, and the House having concurred in the amendment reported,

Mr. Nicholas renewed the motion for striking out the 74-gun ships, and called the yeas and nays upon it. They were taken and stood, yeas 40, nays 54, as follows:

Yeas.—Abraham Baldwin, David Bard, Richard Brent, Robert Brown, Samuel J. Cabell, Thomas Claiborne, William Charles, Cole Claiborne, John Clopton, John Dawson, Joseph Eggleston, Lucas Elmendorph, William Findlay, John Fowler, Albert Gallatin, James Gillespie, Andrew Gregg, John A. Hanna, Carter B. Harrison, Jonathan N. Havens, Joseph Heister, David Holmes, Walter Jones, Edward Livingston, Matthew Locke, Nathaniel Macon, Blair McClenachan, Joseph McDowell, Anthony New, John Nicholas, Thompson J. Skinner, William Smith, Richard Sprigg, Richard Stanford, Thomas Sumter, Abram Trigg, John Trigg, Philip Van Cortlandt, Joseph B. Varnum, Abraham Venable, and Robert Williams.

Nays.—John Allen, George Baer, jun., Bailey Bartlett, James A. Bayard, Jonathan Brace, David Brooks, Stephen Bullock, Christopher G. Champlin, James Cochran, William Craik, Samuel W. Dana, John Dennis, George Dent, William Edmond, Thomas Evans, Abiel Foster, Dwight Foster, Jonathan Freeman, Henry Glenn, Chauncey Goodrich, William Gordon, Roger Griswold, William Barry Grove, Robert Goodloe Harper, Thomas Hartley, William Hindman, Hezekiah L. Hosmer, James H. Imlay, John Wilkes Kittera, Samuel Lyman, James Machir, William Matthews, Daniel Morgan, Lewis R. Morris, Harrison G. Otis, Isaac Parker, Josiah Parker, Thomas Pinckney, John Read, John Rutledge, jun., James Schureman, Samuel Sewall, Thomas Sinnickson, Samuel Smith, Richard Dobbs Spaight, Peleg Sprague, George Thatcher, Richard Thomas, Mark Thompson, Thomas Tillinghast, John E. Van Alen, Peleg Wadsworth, Robert Waln, and John Williams.

The bill was then ordered to be engrossed for a third reading [and passed by the same vote].[44]

Thursday, February 14.

Relations with France.

Mr. Livingston called up for consideration the resolution which he yesterday laid upon the table, calling upon the President for any information which he may possess touching the suspension of the French arrêt, declaring neutral citizens pirates when found on board the vessels of belligerent powers; which being read,

Mr. L. called the yeas and nays upon it. He said he understood that, since yesterday, a member of this House had applied at the office of the Secretary of State, and had been informed that some information had been received relative to this subject. Perhaps the gentleman would himself state to the House what he had learned from that office.

Mr. Harper said, he had only to state, that he had made inquiry at the office of the Secretary of State, and had been informed that a letter had been received from our Minister in London, enclosing an extract from the Redacteur (supposed to be an official French paper) stating that the Executive Directory had suspended the edict in question. This extract, he understood, does not state the reason of this suspension; but our Minister writes it was owing to a threat of the British Government to retaliate upon French citizens within their power.

The yeas and nays were taken, and stood—52 to 38.

Naval Pay.

On motion of Mr. Josiah Parker, the House resolved itself into a Committee of the Whole, on the bill fixing the pay of captains of ships and vessels of the United States; and after some amendments, the bill was reported, and ordered to be engrossed for a third reading.

[This bill provides "that all vessels in the service of the United States, mounting 20 guns and upward, be commanded by captains; those not exceeding 18 guns (except galleys, which are to be commanded as heretofore provided by law,) by masters or lieutenants, according to the size of the vessel, to be regulated by the President of the United States; that the pay of a captain, commanding ships of 32 guns and upward, be $100 dollars per month, and eight rations per day; of captains, commanding ships of 20 and under 32 guns, $75 a month, and six rations a day; of a master-commandant, $60 per month, and five rations per day; and of lieutenants who may command the smaller vessels, $50 dollars per month, and four rations per day; that whenever any officer as aforesaid shall be employed in the command of a squadron, in separate service, the allowance of rations to such commanding officer shall be doubled during the continuance of such command, and no longer, except in case of a commanding officer of the Navy, whose allowance, while in service, shall always be at the rate of sixteen rations per day."]

Friday, February 8.

Relations with France.

The following Message was received from the President of the United States:

Gentlemen of the House of Representatives:

In pursuance of the request, in your resolve of yesterday, I lay before you such information as I have received, touching a suspension of the arrêt of the French Republic, communicated to your House by my Message of the 28th of January last. But if the execution of that arrêt be suspended, or even if it were repealed, it should be remembered that the arrêt of the Executive Directory of the 2d of March, 1797, remains in force, the third article of which subjects explicitly and exclusively American seamen to be treated as pirates, if found on board ships of the enemies of France.

JOHN ADAMS.

United States, February 15, 1799.

Extract of a letter from Rufus King, Esq., Minister Plenipotentiary, &c., London, to the Secretary of State, dated 28th November, 1798.

"Annexed I send you a copy of a note from Lord Grenville, respecting the French arrêt transmitted to you with my No. 9. A late French paper contains a second arrêt which postpones the execution of the first."

Lord Grenville to Mr. King.

The undersigned, His Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, has the honor of communicating to Mr. King, Minister Plenipotentiary for the United States of America, for the information of his Government, that, by a decree, published officially at Paris, it appears to have been declared, in the name of the French Directory, that every person being a native of or originally belonging to neutral countries, or to such as are in amity and alliance with the French Republic, who shall bear any commission under His Majesty, or who shall form a part of the crews of any British ships of war, or other vessels, should, on the proof of that fact alone, be considered and treated as a pirate, and that it has been ordered that this resolution shall be notified to the neutral powers, and to those in alliance with France.

Even this decree, contrary as it is to the usages of every civilized nation, cannot excite any surprise, as proceeding from those in whose name it has been published. To the different powers who are thus insulted, and whose innocent subjects are exposed to the most cruel treatment on the part of a Government professing friendship or alliance with them, His Majesty must leave it to adopt such measures as they will, without doubt, judge necessary, in the case of an outrage hitherto unexampled in the history of the world.

The King, however, feels, that protection is also due from him to those who sail under his flag, either in His Majesty's ships of war, or in other British vessels; His Majesty has, therefore, not hesitated to direct it to be signified to the Commissioner for French prisoners in Great Britain, that the first instance of the execution of this decree shall be followed by the most rigorous retaliation against the French prisoners, whom the fortune of war has already, or may hereafter place at the King's disposal.

It would certainly never be but with extreme reluctance that the King could yield to the painful necessity of exposing so many unfortunate individuals to the fatal but inevitable effects of this atrocious decree; but His Majesty will have at least the satisfaction of feeling that nothing has been omitted on his part to prevent its execution, and that the authors of it can alone be considered responsible for all its guilt and all its consequences.

GRENVILLE.

Downing street, November 27, 1798.

Mr. Livingston moved that this communication be printed.

Mr. Allen objected to the motion as it would delay the consideration of the bill proposing to vest the President with the power of retaliation in certain cases; and it was clear, from this communication, it ought to have no effect upon that bill.

Mr. Livingston said he was not possessed of that intuitive faculty which the gentleman from Connecticut seemed to have, as he seems prepared to act on the bill alluded to, without scarcely hearing this communication read; and, perhaps, without knowing the dates of the different decrees. The President has told the House that though the obnoxious decree has been repealed, there is still left in force another decree. Does the gentleman from Connecticut recollect the words of that decree? Or has he had time to examine whether that decree is really in force, or not? If he had done this, Mr. L. said he had not done it. It would appear, from what happened the other day, that the House ought not to move quite so rapidly in this business. The House was then told by the gentleman from South Carolina, that it was impossible that this information could have been received by the President, because, if it had been received, the President would undoubtedly have immediately sent it to the House. [Mr. Rutledge said, he did not use the word impossible, but improbable.] Mr. L. admitted this might be the word. But it now appears, that the President has not only received the information then alluded to, but received it officially.

Mr. Allen interrupted Mr. L. by withdrawing his motion. The communication was ordered to be printed, and was committed to the same Committee of the Whole to whom was referred the bill vesting the power of retaliation in the President.

Monday, February 18.

Army Increase.

A bill from the Senate giving eventual authority to the President of the United States to augment the army. [This bill gives the President authority, in case a war shall break out between the United States and any foreign power, or in case of imminent danger of such war, in his opinion to exist, to organize and raise twenty-four regiments of infantry, one regiment of riflemen, and three regiments of cavalry. The President is also authorized to call out the volunteer corps, on all occasions in which he is at present authorized to call out the militia, provided that he does not call a greater proportion from any one State, than he is authorized to call out of the militia, by the law which directs the 80,000 militia to be held in readiness. If it be necessary to carry this law into effect, two millions of dollars are appropriated for the purpose.]

On the question for reading this bill a second time, it was carried—45 to 37.

Capture of French Vessels.

On motion of Mr. Otis, the House went into a Committee of the Whole, Mr. Rutledge in the chair, on the bill encouraging the capture of French armed vessels, by armed ships or vessels, owned by a citizen or citizens of the United States, and for allowing salvage in certain cases. The bill, which proposes a bounty on guns, according to their sizes, having been read,

Mr. McDowell observed, that this bill is similar to the one which was two or three different times negatived at the last session. At that time, he considered the situation of this country more alarming than at present, and the conduct of France more likely to drive us to extremities than it has since been. Knowing this, he did not expect gentlemen would have introduced a bill of this kind. Finding however that gentlemen are not satisfied with things as they are, but are desirous of hiring the people of the United States to make war upon France, though they are unwilling to declare war, and not being willing to give his vote to any such measure, he should move to strike out the first section of the bill.