XIII. Shadow Over Asia

Under the second Konoye Cabinet, formed July 22, 1940, the flood that had been sweeping over Japan since 1931 reached a new high. Territorial aims were enlarged. Expansion was no longer to be confined to China. The goal was now a “Greater East Asia,” including all the rich colonial territories in southern Asiatic waters. At home, also, the pace quickened. The army leaders moved toward full suppression of the parties, and a reduction of the Diet’s powers. Obstacles to foreign expansion and internal regimentation continued to exist, however, and slowed down the fascist advance.

In foreign policy, the Konoye Cabinet made two far-reaching moves. On September 27, 1940 it concluded a military alliance with Germany and Italy. By this alliance, as we have seen, Japan was allotted “Greater East Asia” for her “living space.” This sphere, however, was not yet under Japanese control. It had to be won. So the second move was a step in the direction of winning it. It was a move into Indo-China.

In September 1940, a French-Japanese agreement admitted a limited number of Japanese troops to northern districts of the French colony of Indo-China. These troops were the entering wedge. Then Japan pushed her control southward to Saigon. Early in 1941, Tokyo dictated a settlement of the Thailand-Indo-China conflict, which she hoped would eventually yield her full control of Indo-China, and still greater powers over Thailand, where Japanese influence was already strong. And Saigon, we should add, is only 650 miles north of Singapore.

A HARD ROW TO HOE

In other respects, however, the Konoye Cabinet’s expansionist program—like that of its predecessors—did not enjoy easy going. For the war in China was still not won. In November 1940 Japan formally recognized Wang Ching-wei’s Nanking regime (the puppet government she herself had created). But this step merely spotlighted Japan’s failure to secure peace in China. Tokyo also undertook negotiations with the Soviet Union, but with little immediate result. Finally, the British and the Dutch strengthened the defenses of both Malaya and the Netherlands Indies, and the American fleet at Hawaii served as an eloquent warning against any move by Japan on Singapore, strategic key to southeast Asia.

THE HOME FRONT

On the home front, the Konoye Cabinet clamped down even firmer dictatorial control. All political parties “voluntarily” dissolved in the summer of 1940. There was a plan afoot to curb the Diet’s influence by amending the Election Law to give fewer people votes. And the extremists began to organize a mass fascist party, with local units throughout the country.

These efforts achieved some practical results. The outspoken criticism marking previous Diet sessions was less apparent in 1940-41. The “near neighbor” groups, set up by the new fascist party, gave the authorities a means of checking up closely on popular opinion, and taking measures to suppress opposition as soon as it appeared. Economic difficulties were piling up, and the need for repression was becoming greater. Rationing of sugar, charcoal and matches, begun in 1940, was extended to rice early in 1941.

A HORSE TRADE

But the political struggle within Japan, even among its ruling circles, was not settled by the Konoye government’s actions. On the contrary, it continued as strong as ever. A characteristic “deal” indicated the lines along which the struggle was being fought. The military-fascist groups were unwilling to permit a general election, due in 1941, to take place. On the other hand, the moderates opposed moves to revise the Election Law and to strengthen state control over industry. In January 1941, a deal was made in which the extremists agreed to drop these moves, while the moderates consented to let the Diet run on without an election for one year, and to support the government’s program in the meantime.

EXPANSION OR DEFEAT?

In the early months of 1941, Tokyo increasingly committed itself to a policy dictated by the results of a decade of aggression. Since 1937 Japan had spent nearly 20 billion yen on the war in China, or twice the total national debt in 1936. She had suffered more than a million casualties, in killed, wounded and diseased. In return for these great losses, she expected vast gains.

Thus “Greater East Asia” became the avowed goal of Japan’s foreign policy. To Japan’s rulers, it represented the full flowering of the “bloc economy” idea. They now considered not only Manchuria and China, but the whole of East Asia, necessary for such a bloc. The raw materials of southeast Asia, especially the oil, tin and rubber of the Indies and Malaya, were needed to make up the deficiencies of a “Japan-China-Manchoukuo” bloc. But even with these rich prizes Japan would not be entirely self-sufficient economically. She would still lack high-grade machinery and certain other products. Nevertheless, with the raw materials of East Asia firmly under her control, Japan believed she would have sufficient bargaining power to secure the foreign currency necessary for buying all she needed in the world market.

Japanese statesmen continually stressed this idea of an East Asiatic bloc in their speeches. To make its realization possible, they concluded the alliance with Germany. Barring an outright German victory in Europe, however, the difficulties which confront Tokyo’s advance toward mastery of East Asia are still formidable.

For Japan’s economic resources are at a low ebb. Industrial production has begun to decline. Foreign trade is falling off, and reserves of foreign currency are low. China is unconquered, and relations with the Soviet Union are uncertain. The British Empire and the United States, which stand guard over southeast Asia, are the mainstays of Japan’s foreign trade. By moving against them in that region, Japan might risk everything gained thus far. For the first time, she would be staking her future on a war with powers that control the seas and access to world markets. She would be facing all the dangers that she successfully avoided in the World War of 1914-18.

Japan’s geographical location, close to the scene of action in the Far East, is still her great strategic advantage. Her economic deficiencies have been, and continue to be, her main source of weakness. The ratio between these two controlling factors may well determine the immediate future. Is Japan’s new Empire to reach out over immensely larger areas, or is it to suffer its first great defeat?