XI. The Shadow Deepens

The fall of the Minseito Cabinet marked the end of an era. The crisis of 1930-31 had unleashed new forces. And these forces were destined to mold Japan’s policy in the decade that followed.

At their head was the army. Not all of the army leaders, however. At times the “army extremists” seemed to be only a small minority. Their power rose and fell. Yet they took command of Japan’s foreign policy, and gained more and more control over her domestic policy. And as time passed, their outlook was increasingly stamped on the army as a whole.

THE ARMY EXTREMISTS

Who were the army extremists? Names are not important, except as labels of a whole group. There has been no outstanding fascist leader in Japan, such as Mussolini in Italy or Hitler in Germany. It is enough for us to note that, in the 1930-32 period, the high army leadership centered in three generals—Araki, Muto and Mazaki. This trio was supported by a powerful group of “young officers,” such as Doihara and Itagaki, who have since become ranking generals.

These men were not from the old clan aristocracy. They came mostly from the lesser clans, or from the middle classes in town and village. They knew at first hand the sufferings of the farmers and the small tradesmen. Like Mussolini and Hitler, they claimed to be the friend of the common man. They bitterly denounced the “corrupt alliance” of the political parties and the capitalists.

All this was part of their fight for political control at home. They wanted a “national socialist” reformation in Japan. By this they meant that the army, under the Emperor, should run the government. They wanted the political parties suppressed and industry run by the state—all, as they said, for the benefit of the common man.

On the home front, the army extremists have had little success. None of their glowing promises of economic “reforms” has been carried out. In the foreign field, however, their program has been largely adopted. We must now see what their aims in foreign policy were.

THE DEMAND FOR “LIVING SPACE”

At the heart of the military-fascist program in Japan, just as in Germany and Italy, lay a demand for territorial expansion. The army extremists made careful plans for a series of bold moves. First, Manchuria and Mongolia were to be conquered, then China, then the rest of Asia. In the past decade we have seen this seemingly wild and visionary program translated into reality to an extraordinary degree. In fact, the actual course of Japan’s foreign policy has followed it very closely.

With territorial expansion was linked an economic idea—that of regional self-sufficiency, or the “bloc economy.” In 1931, Manchuria was called Japan’s “economic life-line.” In 1932-33 the watchword was the “Japan-Manchoukuo economic bloc.” After 1937 the demand was for a “Japan-China-Manchoukuo bloc.” Finally, the slogan today is for a “Greater East Asia,” to include the rich territories of Indo-China, Malaya, the East Indies and the Philippines.

What the army leaders were chiefly seeking through this program was to overcome Japan’s dependence on the international market. They were proposing a basic alternative to Shidehara’s plan for the peaceful development of international trade. In 1930-31 they had seen Japan’s foreign trade suddenly collapse, plunging the country into an economic crisis. They were determined that this should not happen again. The answer, they felt, lay in extending Japan’s political control over a vast region. The markets and raw materials of such an area, they thought, would make Japan economically independent of the rest of the world.

WEIGHTING THE SCALES

The army extremists were not the only ones to share these views. They had supporters in the bureaucracy, even in the highest positions. Many naval officers also supported them, although the navy as a whole was more conservative than the army. And, despite their anti-capitalist propaganda, they had close relations with some business groups who hoped to profit from the expansion program.

Though the military-fascist leaders did not succeed in organizing a unified mass fascist party, they wielded extraordinary powers. They influenced public opinion through the Ex-Servicemen’s Association, with its three million members. They also had a host of reactionary societies to work through. Some of them were dignified patriotic societies, with members from the highest ranks of Japanese society. Others went in for espionage, strike-breaking, or outright terrorism. Finally, the army had its special powers under the Constitution, such as dictating the choice of War Minister, and going direct to the Emperor over the head of the Premier.

To all these powers the extremists now added two special techniques and used them for all they were worth. One was resorting directly to military action, without waiting for authorization from the Cabinet. Underlings in the field could plot “incidents” which committed their superior officers and the government to certain courses of action. The Manchurian occupation was largely brought about in this way.

The second technique was terrorism, or direct action, against political opponents at home. Public opinion in Japan does not automatically condemn assassination, especially if it appears to have been inspired by patriotic or disinterested motives. The list of distinguished Japanese who have been assassinated is very long—Okubo, Ito, Hara (the first commoner to become Premier), Hamaguchi, to mention a few. Since 1931 many others have been added to this list, and their deaths have all helped the military-fascists to rise to power.

AGAINST THE ARMY?

On the surface it has often seemed that the capitalists were the chief opponents of the army extremists in the political struggle of the past decade. This is only partly true. These two groups have been the strongest political forces in Japan. They have both sought to win the bureaucrats and public opinion to their side. On the other hand, they are in agreement on many points.

For the capitalists, as well as the military, are interested in territorial expansion, and have taken advantage of its results in China. Many of them favored the Manchurian invasion, because they saw that it would give the widespread social discontent in Japan a safe outlet. But at the same time, the capitalists tend to be more cautious than the army leaders in foreign policy. They do not want to take risks, or to plunge recklessly into a big war if the chances of success are slight.

Even on the home front, there is an area of agreement between the army extremists and the business men. Both wish to maintain their ruling position against the threat of social revolution. The Minseito government took measures to stamp out revolutionary groups as early as 1929-30. There is full agreement on regimentation of this kind. But the capitalists have bitterly opposed the army’s efforts to take over all political power, or to seize control of their business enterprises.

Keeping these general tendencies in mind, we can now turn to a consideration of the events of the past decade.

THE EXTREMISTS TAKE DIRECT ACTION

The “Mukden incident” of September 18, 1931 marked the halfway point in the sharp political struggle which was then convulsing Japan. Its violent phase lasted for eight months longer, until May 15, 1932.

We have already seen the first result of this struggle—the overthrow of the Minseito Cabinet. The Seiyukai party took up the reins of power in mid-December 1931. It proved to be the last one-party government to hold office during that decade. Inukai, its Premier, was a moderate; so also was Takahashi, the aged Finance Minister. General Araki, symbol and titular leader of the army extremists, was the Minister of War.

Not content with having forced a change of Cabinet, the extremists still pressed the attack on party government. Inouye, Finance Minister in the previous Minseito Cabinet, was assassinated on February 9, and Baron Dan, head of the Mitsui interests, was shot on March 5. Both were victims of the Blood Brotherhood League, organized to use terrorism against the “corrupt political parties, slaves of the capitalists.” More plots followed. Then, on May 15, 1932, Premier Inukai in turn was assassinated. His death was the climax of an outbreak supported by high army officers, who had planned to seize control of the government.

CONQUEST IN MANCHURIA

After this affair, things quieted down a little at home. But the extremists had meanwhile had their way in the sphere of foreign policy. Japanese troops had spread over most of Manchuria. In February the Japanese attack on Shanghai had occurred. In March the “independent” state of Manchoukuo was established. Far from being independent, it was really the plaything of Japan’s army extremists who had planned the “Mukden incident.”

Another year passed before the Manchurian issues were fully ironed out. In September 1932 the Japanese government formally recognized Manchoukuo. Early in 1933, on basis of the Lytton Report, the League of Nations passed judgment on Japan. The army at once moved again in Manchuria. In March 1933 Japanese troops occupied Jehol province, and added it to Manchoukuo. In May these troops advanced to the gates of Peiping and Tientsin, and enforced “demilitarization” of the region immediately south of the Great Wall of China. Meanwhile, Japan had withdrawn from the League of Nations. For the time, her conquest of Manchuria had been made good in her own eyes, if not in the eyes of the world.

PEACEFUL INTERLUDE (1933-35)

The period from the middle of 1933 to the end of 1935 was “peaceful” only by contrast with the years before and after. The contrast is sufficiently striking, however, to justify our using the term.

Two strong Cabinets, headed in turn by Admirals Saito and Okada, old-line naval administrators opposed to extremism, governed Japan during these years. The Saito Cabinet had entered office in May 1932, after the death of Inukai. Party men held only a few of the lesser Ministries. Nevertheless, the Cabinet was in the main moderate. The key Finance Ministry, in particular, was in the capable hands of Takahashi, who allowed only limited increases in the defense budgets. Early in 1934 the fiery Araki resigned from the War Ministry. Araki’s successor carried out a partial “purge” of the army extremists.

KEEPING THE ARMY QUIET

There were several reasons for this moderate trend. For one thing, foreign trade had turned upwards in 1932, and by 1935 Japan was again enjoying a trade boom which soon overcame the worst effects of the economic crisis and tended to calm the political waters.

In the second place, the army extremists were kept busy with their experiment in Manchoukuo, where they were trying to realize their goal of “state socialism.” They were building strategic railways, and fostering the growth of Manchurian industry. They met with opposition from business interests at home, and found it hard to raise sufficient capital for their projects in Manchuria. In order to secure greater influence over these economic questions, the extremists forced the establishment inside the Cabinet of a Manchoukuo Affairs Board. Here the army was in the saddle. And the extremists did secure enough capital for their projects to provoke the wise old Takahashi into issuing a warning that Japan’s finances could not stand such a large and continuing investment drain to Manchoukuo.

On the whole, however, the army men were disappointed with the economic results in Manchoukuo. By 1935 they were trying to bring North China into their Manchurian realm, and thus enlarge their economic bloc. In November 1935 Doihara, the “Lawrence of Manchuria,” tried to detach five of the northern provinces from Chinese control. The extremists also planned these moves as part of an effort to strengthen their position at home. For there they were being steadily pushed into the background.

DYING FLICKERS OF DEMOCRACY

Plots were still being hatched within Japan, even during this “peaceful” period. But the moderates were reasserting their control. They kept the high posts in the Privy Council and the Imperial Household Ministry. The Cabinet was firmly set for a moderate course. Even the parties’ strength was reviving. The climax of this trend came with the general election of February 1936. For the voting showed that the people had swung decisively away from the extremists. Japan’s labor party elected eighteen Diet members, while three left-wing proletarians won Diet seats. It was thought that a new Cabinet, with much greater party influence, might now be formed.

But the extremists were unwilling to admit defeat. Their answer came in the military uprising of February 26, 1936—known in Japan as the “2-26” affair.

THE “2-26” UPRISING

The direct participants in this historic revolt were some 1,400 troops, with their lower officers. No upper officers openly joined them. Yet the insurgents had contact with the highest army quarters. And General Mazaki, an outstanding army extremist, was kept under detention for a year after the outbreak.

A long death list had been prepared. Actually only three high officials were killed: Takahashi, the moderate Finance Minister; Admiral Saito, the former Premier, then Lord Privy Seal; and General Watanabe, who had been responsible for shifts in army officerships. Premier Okada escaped, but his brother, who resembled him, was killed. Outside of Tokyo both Count Makino, former Lord Privy Seal, and Prince Saionji, the last Elder Statesman, managed to escape attacks directed against them.

For three days the insurgents occupied the center of Tokyo. They were finally disarmed when it became clear that the revolt was not taking hold anywhere else. Once again, an attempt to seize the government had failed. Nevertheless, the uprising caused an important shift in the balance of political power. The trend toward moderation was reversed. Under succeeding Cabinets, new policies were adopted which led directly toward the war with China in 1937.

PRELUDE TO WAR (1936-37)

The chief result of the “2-26” uprising was to give greater power over government policy to the army leaders. This power was not exercised by the extremists in person, because the military revolt had temporarily discredited them in the people’s eyes. A new set of army leaders adopted most of their platform, however, and succeeded in putting it across. The public strongly opposed the expansionist and military-fascist tendencies of the new program, but could do no more than delay its realization.

The new program took definite shape under the Cabinet headed by Hirota, a bureaucrat with extremist leanings. It called for stronger pressure on China, expressed in demands for “Sino-Japanese cooperation.” The anti-Comintern pact was concluded with Germany in November 1936. On the home front, there were efforts to amend the Election Law in such a way as to curb the political influence of the parties. The new budget included large increases in defense expenditure. Sections of heavy industry, interested in the profits to be reaped from supplying armaments for the defense services, threw their support to the enlarged arms program. On the other hand, popular opposition to the Hirota Cabinet grew steadily. Following strong attacks in the Diet, Hirota resigned in January 1937.

General Hayashi, the next Premier, barred the recognized Minseito and Seiyukai party leaders from his Cabinet. Within two months he had carried through the economic planks of Hirota’s platform. Ikeda and Yuki, representing the business houses, took official posts in order to handle the financial problems. Premier Hayashi also instituted a Cabinet Planning Board, which became an economic general staff for the army program.

THE PEOPLE VS. THE MILITARY

These rapid steps toward a “wartime economy” met with bitter opposition from the parties and even more from the public at large. A wide breach opened up between the Hayashi Cabinet and the people. When Hayashi dissolved the Diet, he was overwhelmingly defeated in the general election of April 1937. Out of 466 members in the Diet’s lower house, the government elected less than 50 supporters. It tried to stay in office, but finally, on May 31, had to resign.

The popular disapproval of the military-fascist program was shown quite unmistakably in this election—even more unmistakably than in the earlier election of February 1936. At that time, the extremists had defeated the will of the people by the “2-26” uprising. This time they used new methods.

Under the Konoye Cabinet, national unity was restored—at least to all outward appearances. Party members were included in the Cabinet, and Prince Konoye was made the symbol of unity. But the party men chosen for Cabinet posts were in sympathy with the military-fascist program, and in any case held only minor offices. The chief Ministries were cornered by the army leaders and by bureaucrats who supported them.

But merely setting up a new Cabinet was not enough to quell the widespread suspicion of the army’s aims. It was necessary to quiet opposition voices, reestablish the army’s prestige and really get somewhere with the “controlled economy” plans.

How could all this be done? Two months after the Konoye Cabinet entered office, Japan was at war with China.