Which Should be Germany’s Objective?
Reading edition
By special cable to The New York Times from London on July 1, 1915, came the following information:
Count von Reventlow, in last Sunday's Deutsche Tageszeitung, explains the importance and meaning of Calais as a German objective in the west and as a key to the destruction of the British Empire. Dr. Ernst Jaeckh, in an article called "Calais or Suez," maintained that if an English statesman had to make a choice he would undoubtedly give up Calais and cling to Suez rather than give up Suez and control Calais. Reventlow maintains there is no reality about this alternative.
About the importance of Suez, Jaeckh and Reventlow are agreed. Reventlow for his part declares England's main interest in the Dardanelles operations is the desire to protect Egypt and that this is the explanation of all her efforts to range the Balkan countries against Austria-Hungary, Germany, and Turkey. As translated in The Times he proceeds:
"These efforts are not yet at an end, and they will be continued with a desperate expenditure of strength and all possible means. It was believed that the Russian armies and influence exercised upon the Balkan peoples would make Egypt safe. These hopes are now tottering or vanishing. All the greater must be the energy of our triple alliance in order completely to clear the way and then at the proper moment to take it with firm determination to see the thing through. Here also we see the correctness of our old argument, that for Germany and her allies success lies in a long war and that time works for them if they employ the time in working. Our forces are increasing with time and, as has been said, Germany has the assured possibility of gaining time. To strike our chief enemy at a vital point is worth the greatest efforts and sacrifice of time, quite apart from the fact that we owe it to the Turkish Empire to assist with all our strength in restoring Egypt, which was stolen by England."
Reventlow then says that a comparison of "the Calais idea" with Suez is as idle as the comparison of a chair with a table. He says Jaeckh is mistaken in supposing Calais does not concern more than the south coast of England or that it merely threatens one of many ways to and from England. Reventlow says:
"This by no means completes the Calais idea. From a military or political or economic point of view one should look at the matter with the eyes of Great Britain and define the Calais idea as a possibility for a seafaring continental power to conduct a war against Great Britain from the continental coast channel and with all military resources while holding open communication between the Atlantic Ocean and the North Sea."