Der echte und der Xenophontische Sokrates. By Karl Joël. Volume I. Berlin: R. Gaertner. 1893.

There are two sources from which we have derived the main bulk of our knowledge concerning Socrates; namely, the writings of Plato and Xenophon. The former is generally regarded as an idealiser, and the latter as an historical biographer; for Plato simply uses the impressive figure of Socrates to expound his own philosophy, while Xenophon, the general, the politician, the historian, is supposed to give in the “Memorabilia” a simple and faithful account of what appeared to him worthy of being preserved. As Xenophon was not a philosopher himself, it is tacitly assumed that he had no reason to alter, to suppress, or to add his own personal views to the historical account of the great master whom he bore in grateful remembrance as a faithful disciple. There are some other sources; but they are less rich than those of Plato and Xenophon. Among them must be mentioned several passages in Aristotle, especially in “Magna Moralia” I, p. 1182, a 15. Our author urges with good reason that the Xenophontic Socrates is radically different from and even opposed to the real Socrates, and that we ought to rely more on Aristotle than on Xenophon. Xenophon’s “Memorabilia,” Karl Joël declares, is not an historical writing but a Tendenzschrift, and we have to be on our guard wherever Xenophon’s special tendency comes in.

Socrates is the representative of the philosophical spirit of Attica, and the character of his teachings may in a word be described as a noble and sublimated subjectivism. Socrates is a rationalist and as such he opposes the mysticism of the soothsayer and mantic. He goes so far in his rationalism as to identify knowledge and virtue. He cannot understand, from his point of view, (which regards the soul as a rational being only and leaves out of sight the existence of impulses,) that a man can knowingly neglect to choose the better thing and choose the worse. Plato, in order to avoid the error of Socrates, invented the distinction between the rational and irrational part of the soul and Aristotle criticises Socrates saying τὰς γὰρ ἀρετὰς ἐπιστήμας ἐποίει.

The subjectivism of Socrates appears in his trust in the δαιμόνιον, the divine voice within his soul, his rationalism in his constant request to gather information before beginning to act. He exhibits in his talks great irony; for instance, when telling a politician that as a shoemaker must know his trade before making shoes, so he, the politician, ought to know his business before undertaking to manage affairs of state. Again and again he satirises the bungling levity of men who imagine that in the greatest and gravest things of life they can act without any information. Both the subjectivism and rationalism of Socrates appear in his constant inculcation of the Delphian motto “know thyself.”

What a different character is Xenophon! He was a convinced believer in manticism. There are more than a hundred passages in his writings in which not rational forethought but the art of the soothsayer is left to decide the most important questions of practical life. When the courageous ten thousand offered him the leadership in their dangerous retreat, his ambition urged him to accept, but he first asks the God, and the omens being unfavorable, he refuses. He did not accept the offer until he had received another more auspicious omen. In the same way Xenophon acts throughout. All important decisions which prudence would urge, are made dependent upon sacrifices, dreams, or the flight of birds, and more than once the safety of the army is greatly endangered by a fatal passivity caused through unfavorable omens which prevent Xenophon’s acting with decision at the right moment. It is no exaggeration to say that these ten thousand Greek soldiers escaped only by good luck the fate of the Athenian army in Sicily under Nikias. And this man, a zealous believer in manticism, should be an impartial and reliable historian of the doctrines of Socrates? The δαιμόνιον of Socrates is changed into a mystic power, a kind of spiritus familiaris. It has ceased to be the divinity of man’s inner self as which it appears in Plato’s account, and is represented by Xenophon as some peculiarity of Socrates which was given him as a special favor by the gods. Socrates dethroned the old fate that was supposed to rule the affairs of men and pointed out the importance of knowledge, for through knowledge we can learn to regulate our fate ourselves. The philosopher who thought little of well-being, of εὐτυχία, and demanded above all a well-doing, an εὐ πράττειν (“Memorabilia,” III, 9, 14, 15,) did not recommend asking soothsayers questions where we should better ask ourselves, although it is probable that he recommended the Athenians to apply to the Delphic oracle instead of relying upon omens not so much because he believed in prophesies, but because he thought that they would be influenced by the authority of this venerable institution whose wisdom and conservative spirit were beyond question, so that good advice could be expected from it. Karl Joël, accordingly, advises us to read the “Memorabilia” with an inversion of the points, viz., to convert the sentences qualified by “although” and “to be sure” into the main sentences and vice versa. In this way we shall be able to distinguish between the pagan orthodoxy of Xenophon and the rationalism of Socrates. Why does Xenophon not state directly and simply (1) Socrates advised his friend to ask the oracles in all cases of uncertainty, (2) manticism is indispensable in the economy of a household as well as of a state, and (3) the gods have not granted us any real knowledge as to a final success and reveal it through special revelations. Why must he add long sentences introduced by “although”? He adds to (1) that everybody ought to act solely according to his own conviction, to (2) that all the trades up to the highest professions had to be learned before practiced, and to (3) that those who inquired at the oracles for things which could be learned and studied in the usual way are crazy and even blasphemers.

This sketch may suffice to characterise the book which is much better than could be anticipated after a perusal of the preface, which almost induced us to lay it aside unread. It is not the modesty of the author which produces a prejudice but the random talk concerning things which neither a reader nor a reviewer will care to know. The author has apparently no talent for writing prefaces, and he would be wise to omit them in the future entirely. The book might be very much condensed, repetitions avoided, and an alphabetical index certainly should have been added.

It contains five hundred and fifty-four pages; and the author says he is preparing a second volume. We think it would have been better for his views if he had expressed them in a pamphlet.

κρς.

A Perplexed Philosopher. Being an examination of Mr. Herbert Spencer’s various utterances on the land question, with some incidental reference to his synthetic philosophy. By Henry George. New York: Charles L. Webster & Company. 320 pp.

The “Perplexed Philosopher” herein described is Mr. Herbert Spencer, and persons who like ginger in their ale will enjoy this book; for its eloquent invective, hot from the heart, cheers us like that stimulating drink. Because of this fiery and revengeful attack on Herbert Spencer much dignified reproof has been aimed at Mr. George by those excellent people who religiously forgive the injuries done to others, and allow only to themselves the luxury of retaliation; but when we consider the provocation given by Mr. Spencer, this counter-blow of Mr. George is mild. Mr. Spencer had a critic’s right severely or tenderly to condemn the doctrines of Mr. George; and had he kept himself within his privilege Mr. George in reply would not have had any right to assail the personal character and motives of Mr. Spencer; but the older philosopher chose to treat the younger with supercilious disdain, and this was a personal affront that fully justified a retort personal. Scorn is an ignoble argument, lawful only in return for scorn.

Apart from the truth or error they contain, the writings of Mr. George have achieved a phenomenal popularity; their influence on social opinion has been in some directions almost revolutionary; they are to-day the political creed of many men in different parts of the world, and especially of many thousands in America, Great Britain, and Australia. They are bold in theories, attractive in illustration, and admirable in their literary form. Their approval of “Social Statics” was an advertisement that multiplied by hundreds the readers of that book, and there is no philosopher great enough to affect ignorance of Mr. George’s writings, or to dismiss them with a sneer. More copies of “Progress and Poverty” have been sold than of any other book on social economics that ever has been written, and when Mr. Spencer spoke of that book as “a work which I closed after a few minutes on finding how visionary were its ideas,” he put on airs of aggravating superiority which naturally provoked the resentment of Mr. George.

After not reading the book Mr. Spencer condemned its heresies and said:

“There is the movement for land nationalisation pressed by Mr. George and his friends with avowed disregard for the just claims of existing owners....

“And now this doctrine (that society as a whole has an absolute right over the possessions of each member) is being openly proclaimed. Mr. George and his friends, Mr. Hyndman and his friends, are putting their theory to its logical issue.”

To that Mr. George replies as follows:

“In nothing I have ever written or spoken is there any justification for such a characterisation. I am not even a land nationalisationist as the English and German and American nationalisationists well know.... I have been a staunch denier of the assumption of the right of society to the possessions of each member, and a clearer and more resolute upholder of the rights of property than Mr. Spencer has been.”

Without waiting to inquire whether Mr. George includes within the “rights of property” the right to property in land, it is enough to say that here at least Mr. Spencer is at a disadvantage. He disarmed himself before going into battle by refusing to read Mr. George’s writings, and scorning to examine them he accused them of communism, confiscation, and land-nationalisation. Mr. Spencer cannot now strike back for he has thrown his weapons away. He is a prisoner in the hands of Mr. George, who couples him with Parson Wilbur denouncing a print called the Liberator, “whose heresies,” he said, “I take every opportunity of combating, and of which, I thank God, I have never read a single line.” The parallel is well drawn; and the lesson of it is this, never challenge a man and then treat him with contempt; if you think he is not a foeman worthy of your steel, let him alone.

Had Mr. Spencer studied the works of Mr. Henry George, he would have found in them some doctrines having a manifest family likeness to communism, confiscation, and land-nationalisation; but they avail Mr. Spencer nothing, because he would not condescend to read the chapters where those revolutionary principles are. If he would bend his brow a moment and examine them he might find that in this controversy there are two perplexed philosophers instead of one. In the book before us Mr. George remarks:

“It is this confusion of Mr. Spencer as to rent and value that has led him into confusion as to the right of property; and that, at first, at least prevented him from seeing that to secure the equal rights of men to land, it is not necessary that society should take formal possession of land, and let it out, and consequently, that the difficulties he anticipated in taking possession of improved land were imaginary.”

But, in “Progress and Poverty,” Chapter II, he said:

“We should satisfy the law of justice, we should meet all economic requirements, by at one stroke abolishing all private titles, declaring all land public property, and letting it out to the highest bidders in lots to suit, under such conditions as would safely guard the right to improvements.”

The italics are ours, directing the attention to apparent contradictions which it is for Mr. George to reconcile. And, if English words have any meaning, “abolishing all private titles” means confiscation; and “declaring all land public property and letting it out to the highest bidders,” is land-nationalisation; at least, the ordinary reader may innocently think so, yet Mr. George declares that he is not a land-nationalisationist.

As a personal defense and explanation Mr. George has a right to say that he is not a land-nationalisationist, or a communist, or an “ist” of any other kind, and we are bound to take his word for it, but in this dispute that matter is wholly immaterial. The question before the meeting is this, Is Mr. George’s book a land-nationalisationist or is it not? Is it a confiscationist or not? In “Progress and Poverty” Mr. George explains his meaning thus:

“I do not propose either to purchase or to confiscate property in land. The first would be unjust, the second needless. Let the individuals who now hold it still retain, if they want to, possession of what they are pleased to call their land. Let them continue to call it their land. Let them buy and sell and bequeath and devise it. We may safely leave them the shell if we take the kernel. It is not necessary to confiscate land; it is only necessary to confiscate rent.”

The italics are by Mr. George; and a little farther on, he says;

“That is the first step upon which the practical struggle must be made. When the hare is once caught and killed, cooking him will follow as a matter of course.”

And several years afterwards, in “Protection or Free Trade,” page 302, Mr. George describes the artful mechanism of the snare by which the hare is to be caught and killed:

“Now it is evident that, in order to take for the use of the government the whole income arising from land just as effectively as it could be taken by formally appropriating and letting out the land, it is only necessary to abolish, one after another, all taxes now levied, and to increase the tax on land values till it reaches as near as may be the full annual value of the land.”

In that paragraph “government” is merely another word for “nation,” and the taking away from private owners all the lands of the country “for the use of the government” is land-nationalisation, whether the taking be done boldly by imperial decree, or furtively by taxing it up to its “full value” and out of the hands of its owners.

The discrimination above made must apply to Herbert Spencer as well as to Henry George. Mr. Spencer has a right to qualify and explain as much as he pleases; he may properly say what he thinks now about the right of land-ownership, but the question at issue is this, What are the opinions of “Social Statics” upon the land question? Are they not in principle, and very nearly in expression the opinions of “Progress and Poverty”?

It is not to be denied that “Progress and Poverty” found moral support in “Social Statics.” In fact, the disciples of Henry George, whenever their doctrines were assailed, brought Herbert Spencer into the field as a reinforcement. This, at last, gave Mr. Spencer great annoyance, and in a moment of irritation he determined even by a qualified recantation to withdraw the reserve brigade on which “Progress and Poverty” had so long depended for assistance. Hence, his letters to the Times and the St. James’s Gazette, and the modification of his views which appears in “Justice.” He tried to do this by dropping Mr. George to the ground, while endeavoring to stand on consistent feet himself; and this it is that inspires the vehement criticism of Mr. George.

With a scalpel most logically keen Mr. George has dissected Mr. Spencer’s philosophy of land, and with almost Indian exultation he exposes its eccentricities and contradictions. As was inevitable, for we cannot get along without it, the old familiar Galileo moral is brought in by Mr. George to prove that “still it moves.” He is right; for if it is ethically and politically true, as declared by Mr. Spencer in 1850, “that equity does not permit property in land,” it will be true forever, and no extremity of recantation can make it false. The attempt of Mr. Spencer to show by duplicate metaphysics that his later opinions concerning land are not inconsistent with the occult meaning of “Social Statics,” is a failure. It cannot stand a moment before the searching analysis and legible comparisons of Mr. George.

The attempt to resolve a concrete subject, such as government ownership of land, into abstract terms of justice limited or expanded by the right of some private person to the house on the land, and the barn, and the well, and the fences, and the apple-trees, and other appurtenances, corporeal and incorporeal, has involved Mr. George himself, as well as Mr. Spencer, in some confusion of thought, and has entangled both of them in varieties of statement not easy to reconcile. This might be due to obscure definitions and multiplied explanations, or to changes of opinion, but Mr. George asserts that Mr. Spencer’s inconsistencies are the result of moral and intellectual dishonesty, prompting him to explain away his principles to propitiate the landlords and other aristocratic persons who admitted him into their high society after he became eminent, and before they knew that his philosophy denied the right of private property in land.

In his letter to the Times, apologising for “Social Statics,” Mr. Spencer said:

“The work referred to—“Social Statics”—was intended to be a system of Political Ethics—absolute political ethics, or that which ought to be, as distinguished from relative political ethics, or that which is at present the nearest practical approach to it.”

And then the philosopher becomes a politician and frames for the landed and the landless a moral code, ambidextrous and elastic as a party platform. Duty, justice, right, and truth, lose all their absolute qualities, and become relative to expediency and our own convenience. He teaches us to oppose wrongs until they become vested rights and then defend them. He makes ethics changeable as our coats, and the man who can afford two suits of clothes may have two suits of ethics, an “absolute” suit for Sundays and a “relative” suit for every day; an “abstract” suit for wearing about the house, and a “practical” suit for business purposes. He may wear a suit of “pure” ethics when buying, and a suit of “applied” ethics when selling; and so, at last, by those harlequin morals, it happens that what we ought to do has no relation at all to “that which ought to be.” Those pure subtleties and applied subterfuges make Mr. Spencer an easy mark for the indignant sarcasm of Mr. George, who shows what Mr. Spencer thought of absolute and relative ethics when he said in “Social Statics”:

“When a man admits that an act is ‘theoretically just,’ he admits it to be that which, in strict duty, should be done. By ‘true to principle’ he means in harmony with the conduct decreed for us. The course which he calls ‘abstractedly right,’ he believes to be the appointed way to human happiness. There is no escape. The expressions mean this or they mean nothing.”

The book is written in an angry vein, and the nicknames “traitor,” “juggler,” “apostate,” and the like, add nothing to the value of its argument; they only give bitterness to the censure. They are not to be commended, although they ought to be excused, for they sprang out of “a tempest of provocation.” Mr. George has been fighting under the banner of Herbert Spencer, and he feels like a soldier whose general deserts him in the battle and then disowns him altogether.

The only rational explanation of Mr. Spencer’s letters to the Times and the St. James’s Gazette is that he has radically changed his opinions about the private ownership of land: and his timid, uncertain, and equivocal way of saying so makes him look very much like the “perplexed philosopher” that Mr. George describes. At the same time it must be noticed that Mr. George himself is not so radical in this last book as he was in “Progress and Poverty.” His principles appear to be the same, but in the application of remedies he is milder than he was about fourteen years ago. When he reaches Mr. Spencer’s age he may be just as conservative and “perplexed” as that philosopher is now.

M. M. Trumbull.

FOOTNOTES:

PERIODICALS.

ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR PSYCHOLOGIE UND PHYSIOLOGIE DER SINNESORGANE.

CONTENTS: Vol. IV. Nos. 4 and 5.

Die Grundempfindungen in normalen und anomalen Farbensystemen und ihre Itensitätsverteilung im Spektrum. By Arthur König and Conrad Dieterici.

Ist eine cerebrale Entstehung von Schwebungen Möglich? By Karl L. Schaefer.

Ueber einige neuere Fortschritte in der Anatomie und Physiologie der Arthropodenaugen. By Sigmund Fuchs.

Litteraturbericht.

CONTENTS: Vol. IV. No. 6.

Das Tapetum lucidum bei Durchleuchtung des Auges. By Ziem.

Berichtigung zu Professor Münsterbergs Beiträgen zur experimentellen Psychologie, Heft 4. By G. E. Müller.

Litteraturbericht. (Hamburg and Leipsic: Leopold Voss.)

PHILOSOPHISCHE MONATSHEFTE.

CONTENTS: Vol. XXIX. No. 3 and 4.

Die älteste Fassung von Melanchthons Ethik. By H. Heineck.

Die moderne Energetik in ihrer Bedeutung für die Erkenntnisskritik, II. By K. Lasswitz.

Die sittliche Frage eine sociale Frage, II. By F. Staudinger.

Johann Eduard Erdmann. By B. Erdmann.

Litteraturbericht. (Berlin: Dr. R. Salinger.)

VIERTELJAHRSSCHRIFT FÜR WISSENSCHAFTLICHE PHILOSOPHIE.

CONTENTS: Vol. XVI. No. 4.

Die statischen Functionen des Ohrlabyrinthes und ihre Beziehungen zu den Raumempfindungen. (Part I.) By R. Wlassak.

Ueber Verschmelzung und Analyse. Eine psychologische Studie. (Part I.) By H. Cornelius.

Die Wichtigkeit der Reproductionsgefühle für die Entwicklung und Bildung des Menschen. By J. Zahlfleisch.

CONTENTS: Vol. XVII. No. 1.

Ueber den Begriff der Wissenschaft bei Galilei. By A. Riehl.

Die statischen Functionen des Ohrlabyrinthes und ihre Beziehungen zu den Raumempfindungen. (Concluded.) By R. Wlassak.

Ueber Verschmelzung und Analyse. Eine psychologische Studie. (Concluded.) By H. Cornelius.

Werththeorie und Ethik. (Part I.) By Chr. Ehrenfels.

A. Voigt’s “elementare Logik” und meine Darlegungen zur Logik des logischen Calculs. By E. G. Husserl. (Leipsic: O. R. Reisland.)

ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR PHILOSOPHIE UND PHILOSOPHISCHE KRITIK.

CONTENTS: Vol. CI. No. 2.

Doxographisches zur Lehre vom τέλος. By A. Döring.

Ernst Platner’s und Kant’s Erkenntnisstheorie mit besonderer Berücksichtigung von Tetens und Aenesidemus. By Dr. Arthur Wreschner.

Jahresbericht über Erscheinungen der philosophischen Litteratur in französischer Sprache aus den Jahren 1889 und 1890. By Adolph Lasson.

Recensionen. (Leipsic: C. E. M. Pfeffer.)

THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF PSYCHOLOGY.

CONTENTS: Vol. V. No. 2.

On the Development of Voluntary Motor Ability. By Wm. L. Bryan.

The Training of Animals. By James E. LeRossignol, Ph. D.

On the Judgment of Angles and Positions of Lines. By Joseph Jastrow, Ph. D.

Statistics of “Unconscious Cerebration.” By Charles M. Child.

Experimental Psychology at Wellesley College. By Mary Whiton Calkins. (Worcester: J. H. Orpha.)

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS.

CONTENTS: Vol. III. No. 2.

The Ethics of Social Progress. Prof. Franklin H. Giddings.

Did the Romans Degenerate? By Mary Emily Case.

Political Economy and Practical Life. By Prof. William Cunningham.

German Character as Reflected in the National Life and Literature. By Richard M. Meyer, Ph. D.

Book Reviews. (Philadelphia: International Journal of Ethics, 118 South Twelfth Street.)

THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW.

CONTENTS: Vol. II. No. 1.

The Philosophy of Religion. By Prof. Otto Pfleiderer.

An Ancient Pessimist. By Prof. J. Clark Murray.

The Concept of Law in Ethics. By Prof. F. C. French.

J. H. Lambert. By Harold Griffing.

CONTENTS: Vol. II. No. 2.

Kant’s Critical Problem. By J. G. Schurman.

Epistemology in Locke and Kant. By Prof. Andrew Seth.

Anthropometry and Experimental Psychology. By Prof. E. B. Titchener.

Discussions: Reality and Idealism. By David G. Ritchie and F. C. S. Schiller.

Book Reviews. (Boston, New York, Chicago: Ginn & Company.)

THE NEW WORLD.

CONTENTS: Vol. II. No. 5.

The Place of the Fourth Gospel in the New Testament Literature. By Orello Cone.

The Folk-Song of Israel in the Mouth of the Prophets. By Karl Budde.

Cosmopolitan Religion. By C. A. Bartol.

The Alleged Socialism of the Prophets. By A. W. Benn.

Whittier’s Spiritual Career. By John W. Chadwick.

The Personal Factor in Biblical Inspiration. By Marvin R. Vincent.

Israel in Egypt. By C. H. Toy.

The Briggs Heresy Trial. By C. R. Gillett. (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin & Co.)

REVUE PHILOSOPHIQUE.

CONTENTS: Vol. XVII. No. 12.

Le mouvement philosophique en Russie: II. La philosophie de Hegel et les cercles philosophiques. By E. Lannes.

La composition musicale et les lois générales de la psychologie. By M. Paulhan.

La psychologie de W. James (2nd article). By L. Marillier.

Analyses et comptes rendus.

CONTENTS: Vol. XVIII. No. 1.

La psychologie de W. James (3d article). By L. Marillier.

La Croyance métaphysique. By J. Gourd.

La Beauté plastique. By L. Couturat.

Analyses et comptes rendus.

CONTENTS: Vol. XVIII. No. 2.

L’Unité de la philosophie. By P. Janet.

L’Expression objective en musique d’après le langage instinctif. By J. Combarieu.

La Psychologie de W. James. (Concluded.) By L. Marillier.

Revue des périodiques étrangers. (Paris: Félix Alcan.)

CONTENTS: Vol. XVIII. No. 3.

Recherches sur la succession des phénomènes psychologiques. By B. Bourdon.

L’amour est-il un état pathologique? By G. Danville.

Sur un effet particulier de l’attention appliquée aux images. By André Lalande.

Beauté organique et beauté plastique. By A. Naville.

REVUE DE MÉTAPHYSIQUE ET DE MORALE.

CONTENTS: Vol. I. No. 1.

Métaphysique et morale. By Félix Ravaisson.

Le continu mathématique. By H. Poincaré.

Essai sur quelques problèmes de philosophie première. By F. Rauh. (Paris: Librairie Hachette et Cie.)

VOPROSUI FILOSOFII I PSICHOLOGII.⁠[87]

CONTENTS: Vol. III. No. 15.

The Aim of Human Life. By W. Rosanoff.

The Problem of Judgment. By F. Charitonoff.

The Positivism of Kant. By A. Kozloff.

The Basis of the Moral Duty. By N. Grote.

A Criticism of Moral Altruism. By W. Preobrajensky.

The Sense of Love. By W. Solowoff.

The Founder of Transcendental Monism. By A. Wedensky.

The Second International Congress of Experimental Psychology in London. By W. Chige.

The Question of Zoöpsychology. By W. Wagner.

The Law of Perception. By N. Lange. (Moscow, 1892.)

PHILOSOPHISCHES JAHRBUCH.

CONTENTS: Vol. VI. No. 1.

Ueber die actuale Bestimmtheit des unendlich Kleinen. By Pohle.

Gassendi’s Skepticismus und seine Stellung zum Materialismus. By Kiefl.

Der Begriff des “Wahren.” By Franz Schmid.

Der Begriff des Unbewussten in psychologischer und erkenntnisstheoretischer Hinsicht bei Ed. v. Hartmann. By Achelis.

Der Substanzbegriff bei Cartesius im Zusammenhang mit der scholastischen und neueren Philosophie. (Continued.) By Carl Ludewig, S. J. (Fulda, 1893.)

SPHINX.

CONTENTS: Vol. XV. No. 84.

Nirwana. By Menetos.—Die Wiederverkörperungslehre im Drama. By Ludwig Deinhard.—Die Gnade. By Maria Janitschek.—Das Fernsehen als Funktion des transscendentalen Subjekts. By Carl du Prel, Ph. D. (Concluded.)—An Carl du Prel. By Martin Greif.—Sehen und Wahrträumen. By Hermann Haug.—Ueber die spiritistischen Phänomene vom physikalischen Standpunkt. By Dr. Anton Lampa.—Schuld und Sühne. Ein Beitrag zur Frage der Telepathie. By M. Const. Hoch. (Concluded.)—Die Göttin des Genusses. Eine Traumphantasie. By Karl Friedr. Jordan.—Fegfeuer. Nach François Coppée. By Rudolf Geering.—Gerettet! By Raphael von Koeber, Ph. D.—Melancholie. By Carl Vanselow.—Die sechs Schwäne. Ein Beitrag zum Nachweis des Esoterismus im Volksbewusstsein. By Gottschalk Thorsten.—Geheimniss. By Adolf K. W. Hochenegg.—Eine Geisterstimme. By Hugo Gozdawa.—Der Begriff des Absoluten. By O. Plümacher.

CONTENTS: Vol. XVI, No. 85.

Lebe deinem höchsten Ideal getreu!—A-u-m. By Menetos.—Psalmen. By Franz Evers.—Meister der Mystik. By Wilhelm von Saintgeorge.—Aegyptens grosse Pyramide. Ein Tempel der Einweihung in die Mysterien. By Eduard Maitland.—Die deutsche Gesellschaft für ethische Kultur und Herr von Egidy. By Hugo von Gizycki.—Die Mystik des Islam. By Adolf Engelbach.—Ein echter Diener Gottes. By Dr. Raphael von Koeber.—Ein Gegner des Spiritismus. By Carl du Prel.—Die Wissenschaft der Magier. By Ludwig Deinhard.—Hebe dich weg von mir, Satan! By H. v. M.—Anna Henle. Ein Erlebnis. By Hübbe-Schleiden.—Der Stern der Sintflut. By Arthur Stentzel.—Selige Gegenwart. By Maria Janitschek.—Sehnsucht. By Carl Vanselow.—Das Elflein, das ausging, den König zu suchen. By Bernhard Fabler.—Der blinde Passagier. By Ludwig Ganghofer.—Frühlings Erwachen. Für Väter und Erzieher. By O. Plümacher.—Drei Knospen. By Hans von Mosch. (Brunswick: C. A. Schwetschke & Son.)

We cannot be accused of having any penchant for Theosophy or Spiritualism and find little occasion to praise their productions, which are usually crude and illiterate. But we must confess that Hübbe-Schleiden’s review, the Sphinx, is greatly superior to anything in this field we have ever seen. There is artistic taste about it; there is, so far as its position admits of, a certain contact with positive science; there is an attractive popularity without shallowness. All these means are skilfully employed by the editor to impress his ideas, erroneous though they may be, upon his public. If the magazine appeared in English, instead of German, it would at once become the recognised leader in its field.

FOOTNOTES:

Vol. III. July, 1893. No. 4.