Volume 2 — CHAP. XXXV. NAVAL AND OTHER DISCUSSIONS IN PARLIAMENT.

SINECURES.—ADMIRALTY EXPENSES ILL DIRECTED.—WHAT MIGHT BE DONE WITH SMALL MEANS.—FLOGGING IN THE ARMY AND NAVY ATTRIBUTABLE TO A BAD SYSTEM: NEVERTHELESS, INDISPENSABLE.—NATIONAL MEANS WRONGLY APPLIED.—INJURIOUS CONCESSIONS TO THE FRENCH.—DENIED BY THE GOVERNMENT.—EXPLANATIONS OF MY PARLIAMENTARY CONDUCT ON THE DISSOLUTION OF PARLIAMENT.—LETTER TO MY CONSTITUENTS.—APPOINTMENT OF OFFICERS BY MERIT INSTEAD OF POLITICAL INFLUENCE THE TRUE STRENGTH OF THE NAVY.—MY RE-ELECTION FOR WESTMINSTER.—ADDRESS TO THE ELECTORS.—MINISTERIAL VIEWS.—TREATMENT OF AN OFFICER.—MY INTERFERENCE.

At the commencement of the session of 1812, it became known that His Royal Highness the late Duke of Cambridge had voluntarily given up a military emolument of nearly 5000l. a-year. The patriotism which moved His Royal Highness to relinquish a lucrative command which had dwindled into a sinecure, was too conspicuous to be lost sight of, not only on account of his disinterestedness, but because there was hope this practical specimen of reform, proceeding from so high a quarter, might be brought to bear on others in such a way as to induce them to emulate the example.

On the 23rd of January, I therefore moved for a copy of His Royal Highness’s letter of resignation, for the purpose of grounding thereon a resolution expressive of the opinion of the House on the subject, at the 247same time intimating to sinecure-holders in general the desirableness of imitating the magnanimity of the royal duke. The effort was, however, in vain.

On the 23rd of February, a question was raised by Mr. Bankes respecting the payment of 2790l. a-year to the Secretary of the Prince of Wales, as paymaster of widows’ pensions. A former report on a committee of the House had pronounced this office a perfect sinecure, of no public utility whatever, and that the office of deputy-paymaster was little better, the whole business being transacted by a clerk in the War Office at a salary of 100l. a-year. The reply of Mr. Perceval (then Prime Minister) to this statement was “that there was more danger to the country from declamations against sinecures than from the sinecures themselves!”

On this occasion I supported the retention of the sinecure, on the ground that the abolition of so insignificant a sum might deceive the public into a belief that their interests were watched in that House. The House had suffered the reports of various committees on the subject to lie dormant for thirty years, and now wished to abolish three only out of the long list of sinecures, which their committees had declared to be useless and burdensome to the country. It was the bounden duty of the House to have pronounced on the whole class, and not partially. They ought to have enumerated the sinecures to be abolished, and thus put it out of the power of ministers to exercise any discretion on the subject; instead of singling out a comparatively insignificant place from a long list of enormous sinecures, upon which the House had not so much as expressed an 248opinion, notwithstanding the numerous representations of its committees.

On the motion of the First Lord (the Right Hon. C. Yorke) that a sum of upwards a million should be granted for the contingent expences of the Admiralty, I spoke as follows:—

“Lord Cochrane hoped, that, as a deviation from mere detail was allowed when the army estimates were in a committee, it would not be entirely out of course to offer a few general remarks while the supply of the navy was before the House; not with a view to oppose the supply for the ordinary establishment of the navy, but as to the proper application of the enormous sums granted for that service generally.

“To this nothing could, in his opinion, contribute more than that the Board of Admiralty should not be considered as a mere appendage to the minister of the day, and be displaced by every agitation of the political system—whereby misapplication of means was rendered perpetual; for, just as the members acquired some knowledge of their complicated duties, and of the powers they ought to direct against the enemy, they were then displaced, to make room for others of no experience.

“The observations which he had to address to the chairman related chiefly to the means of annoying the enemy, which means the Government possessed in a right disposal of the naval force of the country. This was at present totally useless, except for the purpose of passive blockades. Had 5000 men, with attendant naval transports, been kept in readiness in such a central situation as Minorca, for instance, it would have been impossible for the French to have made any progress on the eastern side of the Peninsula; for no sooner should the enemy have laid siege to Tarragona, Valencia, Alicant, or any other place on the Mediterranean coast of Spain, than their affairs might have been reversed at the other extremity. Rosas, for instance, was within twelve hours’ sail of Minorca, and about eighteen from 249Alicant, whereas on the other hand it was twenty-five days’ march at least from Alicant to Rosas.

“Comparing the respective populations of Britain and France, it was impossible to think of carrying on an equal warfare in the Peninsula. A greater number of men than all the British who were at present there, must perish before it could be possible to drive out the French. The desultory nature of naval warfare was, in his opinion, the best calculated for that purpose, and for this we had the highest authorities in ancient and modern times. If the French, with a contemptible flotilla, could keep this country in alarm, what was our gigantic navy not capable of doing? The whole of France lay at the mercy of the British ministry. Had the enemy a naval superiority, and only 10,000 disposable troops, on what part of the shores of England could people repose in tranquillity?

“The war as at present conducted could not possibly have a successful termination. It was a great misfortune that the House of Commons listened to nothing which was beyond the sphere of their own knowledge; and when any professional man, like himself, rose up to give information, party was immediately thrown in his teeth; factious motives were instantly imputed, however pure his wishes for the good of his country. He put it to the committee, whether the whole force of this country was not on the alert, and almost concentrated on the coasts of Kent and Sussex, when an invasion was threatened by a contemptible flotilla of the enemy; and if so, what might not be done, if the gigantic naval power of England was to threaten the enemy’s shores? It was his sincere opinion, that the whole coast of France was completely at the mercy of His Majesty’s ministers.

“The noble lord next adverted to the coasting trade carried on by France, and which it was in our power to destroy. That trade existed to an extent almost incredible. It was in our power to dismantle their batteries,—to blow up their towers,—and, above all, to destroy that chain of signal-posts, by which a telegraphic communication was kept up from 250Flushing to Bayonne, and from the south-east point of Spain to Venice. Each of those signal-posts could be successfully attacked by ten men, as, except in a few situations, they were exposed, and seldom had above two or three maimed soldiers to conduct them. He had no interest whatever in forcing those observations on the attention of the committee, and he hoped the right hon. gentleman would not think them altogether unworthy of his consideration. He should not, he said, at that time attempt to say more; but he trusted that members who were far more capable to do justice to the subject than he could pretend to be, would turn it in their minds, and bring the subject forward, or that His Majesty’s ministers would investigate the truth and act accordingly. In either case he was certain attention to the hints he had thus thrown out could not fail of being attended by the most beneficial results to the country. He did not think ministers, in not having attended to the subject, were so much to blame as the House itself, for they were, or ought to be, the guardians of the public purse; but he was sorry to say, the practice of the House was to vote estimates to a very great amount, without at all troubling themselves to inquire how those estimates were applied.

“Besides the signal-posts he had mentioned, there were placed along the whole coast of Spain many small parties of soldiers in churches, convents, and other buildings, for the purpose of keeping the people of the maritime towns in awe, and passing along supplies to the armies, which supplies it was in our power to intercept, as the only practicable military road was within a pistol-shot of the margin of the sea. The smallest assistance would encourage the people to rise upon them; but without such assistance they are afraid to do so, knowing that the French would burn their houses, violate their wives, and murder themselves. This he had seen them do.

“During all the time he was off Catalonia, the French had barely sufficient force to defend themselves against the natives, and in every enterprise which they undertook they 251were foiled. It was notorious, however, to all the world, that the attention of ministers was always engaged exclusively on one or two objects, and that they never took an extended view of things. If our commander on that coast had had discretionary powers to supply Figueras, which was the key of Catalonia, with provisions, it could not have been taken by force, for it was impregnable. If Government would only act in a proper way, it was impossible that Buonaparte could go on a twelvemonth longer.

“The noble lord then referred to the American war: had ministers during that war, instead of marching large armies through the country, only transported 10,000 men from one place to another, they would soon have laid waste the whole sea-coast, and the country must have submitted.

“Mr. Hutchinson deprecated the species of warfare recommended by the noble lord, which he thought would not be productive of the effects he expected.

“Lord Cochrane, in explanation, defended the system which he had recommended, as peculiarly calculated to injure the enemy’s coasting trade, which was the great nursery of his seamen.

“After a few questions from Admiral Markham and Mr. Tierney, as to the decrease in the estimates, and replies from Mr. Yorke, the resolution was agreed to, as were also the other usual annual resolutions relating to the navy.”

As the subject of flogging in the army and navy forms a prominent subject in the present day, I may be pardoned for putting my own views, then and now, on record. On the 13th of March, on the motion for the third reading of the Mutiny Bill, Sir Francis Burdett, in a speech distinguished for humanity and eloquence, animadverted on the punishment of flogging in the army and navy, as a system derogatory to our country, where the principles of liberty, of humanity, and of 252civilisation were better understood and practised than in any other country.

On this occasion, I delivered my sentiments as follows:—

“Lord Cochrane hoped that, by degrees, this punishment might in due time be abolished, but declared that it was impracticable to govern any large body of men without having the power of recourse to it. He believed, however, that much of the mischief which arose from the punishment of flogging, especially in the navy, had been caused by the influence of that House. Great parliamentary interest had enabled the first families in the kingdom to force their children into the service, when too young to understand the nature of the authority entrusted to them. Many of them insisted on their decks being as clean and as shining as the floor of a drawing-room, and that their kitchen utensils should be scoured as bright as silver, with a variety of other useless and fantastic commands; and if such commands were not obeyed, they flogged severely those who had those articles in charge.

“The discipline of the navy depended on the commanding officer of each ship; and if they continued to flog for such offences, the navy must suffer. Gentlemen might think otherwise, but he knew it to be true, and he was afraid they would be convinced of it too soon. The family interest he had alluded to prevailed also, to such a degree, that even the Lords of the Admiralty had lists made out, and when an officer went to offer his services, or to solicit promotion for services performed, he was asked—‘Are you recommended by my Lady this, or Miss that, or Madam t’other?’ and if he was not, he might as well have stayed at home.

“He could not, however, vote for the motion. It would be better to look to those to whom power was entrusted, than to take away the power of punishing altogether. If it were so taken away, it would ruin the service. The best seamen in the navy would say so, and if put to the vote among the 253sailors, he was sure the decision would be in favour of the present mode of punishment; but they would at the same time tell the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty that they ought to be commanded by persons of experience, and not by young men appointed by parliamentary or any other influence. He hoped he should see the practice of flogging abolished, while the power of inflicting it was suffered to remain.”

Good seamen are thoroughly aware that they have nothing to fear from a judicious and well-regulated captain, a man of sense, who knows his duty and that of those under him. Such captains have indeed no difficulty in manning their ships, whilst those in whom the men have no confidence find difficulty. Good men on board ship stand as little in awe of the cat as do the good people ashore—who make so much fuss about what they cannot possibly understand. Amongst many hundreds of men there are always some vagabonds, who, were it not for the fear of punishment, would throw their whole work on the hands of others. On such men reasoning has no effect, nor have good seamen any sympathy with them. On the contrary, they would rather see them compelled to do their duty by the dread, or even the application of the lash, than be obliged to do the work of lazy men in addition to their own.

Landsmen also forget that a naval officer cannot get rid of a worthless vagabond. He has to account for him to the Admiralty. Were it possible to give an officer power to turn such over the side, as a landsman can turn away an unprofitable servant, and he would have no occasion for the lash. But so long as he is 254obliged to retain such men, he must secure their obedience by the only means which will control them.

On the 16th of March came on one of those questions which added so materially to our national debt. Lord Castlereagh proposed a sum of two millions sterling as a subsidy to Portugal. He declared that the circumstances of Portugal were so much improved, and her troops exhibited so much valour, that he did not expect any opposition to the measure. This was, however, opposed by several members, on the ground of impoverishing ourselves by a system which did not produce the results the nation had a right to expect. By myself it was not opposed, but I embraced the opportunity of giving my opinion to the following effect:—

“Lord Cochrane considered Portugal to be defensible against the French arms chiefly at the lines of Torres Vedras, which were so strong as not to require so great an army as we had there, and which gave us a free communication with the sea; whereas our operations were conducted on a much more extensive scale between Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajoz,—places which, if we got possession of them both, were not tenable unless we had a force perfectly capable of coping with the French forces in the open field. Both these places stood on plains, and the French, it should be recollected, were much superior to us in the number of their cavalry, and had often brought a much larger general force into the field.

“The war would be much less expensive, were the lines of Torres Vedras considered as the true defence of Portugal; by which means, instead of our keeping 60,000 or 70,000 men in Portugal, comparatively idle, or, at least, not in a state of military activity, we might detach just now, as we might have done before, a portion of our army to Cadiz, and raise the blockade of that city. A small portion of our army might also be sent to Catalonia, where they might reverse all 255the success of the enemy; and we might act all along the margin of the Mediterranean with the best effect. There were numerous small forts on the coast which we might get possession of, and thereby command all the neighbouring country. We might have done much on the whole eastern side of Spain—at Valencia particularly, and might probably retake Barcelona. All this was not only useful, but practicable at a much smaller expense than our present system. Thus we might have constantly checked and counteracted the objects of the French.

“This suggestion he did not make as his own. It had been the recommendation of others as well as his, and seemed obvious to anybody. For the principles on which it was founded he had the advantage of great authority, which he quoted. He declared that he saw nothing in the war to occasion our despair, if we conducted it on principles by which we might be enabled entirely to clear the sea-coast, and have, at the same time, a large proportion of our army, now in Portugal, disposable at home or elsewhere, for such objects as we desired to obtain. The vote for the two millions might, if applicable to these views, prove very beneficial; for no service could be more important than to sweep the French, as we might do with one effort, from the neighbourhood of Cadiz, and clear the whole Mediterranean coast from their intrusion.

“The resolution was then put and carried.”

On the 4th of May, I gave notice of a motion for an account of the quantity of French silks imported into this country under licence. The effect of this system has on one or two occasions been brought under the notice of the reader, as encouraging the French Navy, by encouraging their shipping whilst our own laboured under every species of discouragement.

On the statement of Mr. Rose, Vice-President of the Board of Trade, that he had no objection to the motion, 256I then said that, if agreeable to the House, I would at once proceed with it, and adverted to the fact that large quantities of French silks were openly exposed for sale in this country to the prejudice of our manufacturers, to whom not the slightest concession was offered in return. Whether rightly or wrongly, it was the established policy of the legislature to prevent the importation of French manufactured goods, but the licence to do so to a small extent had been construed into a licence to import to any amount, and that without the necessary introduction through the Custom-house. I had been credibly informed that silks, to the value of several hundred thousand pounds, were at that moment lying in the river, whilst the only clause in the licences under which these goods were suffered to be imported, and which went to secure any reciprocity whatever to this country, was one requiring that sugar or coffee, to the value of 5l. per ton burden, should be exported in lieu of these rich manufactured goods of the enemy. If this were the policy of our ministry at the present period of unexampled distress to the manufacturing interests, the great dissatisfaction of the manufacturers was by no means surprising.

The correctness of the statement being denied by Mr. Rose, I remarked that if no silk goods had really been imported, the return would effectually show this, and as effectually calm any dissatisfaction that might prevail. After some further unimportant discussion, the motion was agreed to.

On the order of the day for the third reading of the Sinecure Offices Bill (June 15th), I expressed my conviction 257of the propriety of abolishing all unnecessary offices during the present state of the country, feeling persuaded that sinecures were the bond of union which held parties together in that House, and that if sinecures did not exist, much more attention would be paid to public expenditure. I did not so much object to the expense which necessarily devolved on the public, as to the influence which the power of giving sinecures gave to the ministry for the time being.

The Parliament being shortly afterwards dissolved, my explanations, to the electors of Westminster relative to the conduct I had deemed right to pursue in Parliament were comprised in the following letters:—

“Portman Square, 28th September, 1812.

“Gentlemen,—Being conscious that I have not used the trust reposed in me to my private advantage, or to promote the interests of those with whom I am connected by the bonds of consanguinity or friendship, and that I have no personal object to attain, I shall venture to submit my conduct to the scrutiny it must undergo, on presenting myself with a view of again becoming one of the representatives of this great city; an honour which I do not aspire to from a vain notion that I possess the qualifications requisite to perform its duties, otherwise than by acting uniformly according to the best of my judgment, uninfluenced by considerations of a personal nature. Should it appear, however, that I have erred, I am ready to assign the reasons which have determined my vote on every occasion.

“It is unnecessary to apprise you, Gentlemen, who are so well acquainted with the fact, that it is impossible for an individual, unconnected with either party, to succeed in any measure which has for its object a diminution of the means of corruption, or, in other words, the power of rewarding those who are base enough to support men in office, regardless 258of their measures. Had the list of places and pensions, possessed by the members of the House of Commons and their relations, been granted, which list I moved for shortly after my return to Parliament, the public would long ago have been convinced that sinecures ought not to be considered, as they generally are, a burden of a known amount. It has ever been my opinion that their abolition alone would relieve the Crown from the thraldom in which it is held; and restore the depreciating currency, by promoting the proper inquiry into the general application of the public money, particularly as to the sums demanded for our enormous and disproportionate military establishment.

“I have frequently stated, without avail, that simply by enforcing the acts relative to prize concerns, two-thirds of the navy now employed would be more efficient than the whole is, under the mortification of finding the fruits of their toil, and often more, taken for the mere condemnation of legal captures! History shows, without the example of the House of Commons, that this is not the way to stimulate men to undergo fatigue, and encounter that kind of danger, from which no honour is to be derived. On this subject I have not been able to induce the House to look at the proofs which I held in my hand, and offered to produce. I am averse to trespass on your time, though I feel that I have material points to explain; but these I shall defer to a more fit opportunity.

“I am, however, anxious to add, that my absence lately, on occasions when you have had a right to expect my attendance, has been occasioned solely by ill health, and not by a disposition to tamper with ministers for employment, even in the execution of important plans which I had suggested; and which, if prosecuted on a fit scale, would afford France full employment in her own defence, instead of suffering her troops to employ themselves in the subjugation of our allies, by whom they are paid and maintained!

“Whether I am returned to Parliament or not, as soon as I shall have tried every means to promote measures which, 259if disclosed at present, would prove highly prejudicial to the public interests, I pledge myself to prove to the country, that ten millions sterling may annually be saved, and that the relative military force of England will be increased.

“Viewing your exertions in the cause of freedom and the purity of election with that admiration which they so justly deserve,

“I have the honour to be, Gentlemen,

“Respectively, your obedient servant,

“Cochrane.”

“Portman Square, Sept. 30, 1812.

“Gentlemen,—Since I had the honour of addressing you, by letter, at your last meeting, I have been informed by the public prints and otherwise that some gentlemen deemed it a material omission that I had neglected to state my opinions therein relative to Parliamentary Reform,—a course which I adapted, perhaps erroneously, as most respectful to the Committee for promoting the Purity of Election; under the conviction that they would judge of the future by the past, and not by professions. Now, however, to clear up this doubt, if any, after reflection, remains on their minds, I hereby pledge myself to vote on all occasions for Reform, from a persuasion that the ruin of the country can be averted by that means only. I will likewise support every measure for the abolition of sinecures, which form the bond of union in the House of Commons against the interests of the people. Indeed, reflection impresses this fact so strongly on my mind, that I am disposed to think, if the advocates for Parliamentary Reform were to direct their efforts first against these glaring evils, that an efficient Reform would not be so far distant as the difference of sentiments amongst its advocates unhappily indicates.

“As to the Catholic Question, Gentlemen, it is proper to inform you that so long as its inquisitorial auricular confession and its principles so favourable to despotism prevailed on the Continent, I was hostile to it; but that I am now 260inclined to grant the claims of the Catholics of Ireland, provided that they are content to receive the privileges of Englishmen, and to relinquish their predilection in favour of the jurisdiction of the Pope, which, however, they seem anxious to establish in that part of these kingdoms.

“Having said thus much on the most important questions that occur to me, I have only to add, relative to the objection made to a naval officer being a representative for Westminster (which I conclude is meant to extend to all other parts of the kingdom) that one half of the taxes levied on the people of England is disbursed on the navy—for objects which the ability of all the civil members of Parliament cannot detect to be erroneous from the inspection of accounts. Neither are they judges of the means best calculated to give protection to trade, and annoy the enemy by that mode of warfare to which England must at last resort.

“I had nearly omitted to notice that I am no advocate for flogging; although I maintain, from a knowledge of fact, that your fleets could not be governed at present if the power did not exist,—a power which will cease to be abused when Parliamentary influence shall cease to place incompetent persons in command, and that in a great measure depends upon your exertions.

“I have the honour to be,

“Gentlemen,

“Your most humble obedient servant,

“Cochrane.”

The concluding paragraph of this letter will bear comment, even in our day. The appointment of officers to commands ought to be regulated less by interest than desert. The truth of this is now practically admitted in other departments of the State, but unhappily the Admiralty, to which is confided our only protection from invasion, is, to a great extent, looked upon as a ministerial patronage preserve, and to this supposed 261necessity the national safety may one day be sacrificed. It has been urged, in defence of the system, that it is a matter of little consequence, for that steam having bridged the Channel, invasion is only a question of a few hours, whoever may be in command of our ships. This I deny. If our ships are in a fit condition, and properly commanded, it is as easy to destroy the enemy’s “bridge” as ever it was, and we shall be as much at liberty to use our own bridge as in former days.

If the Admiralty could be freed from its political trammels, there is no question but that those who direct its affairs would be generally guided in their appointments by merit alone. That it is not so, is a proof that, under the unfortunate prevalence of political influence and patronage, no fair and well-understood system of promotion can be established. Hence boys and subordinate officers, if destitute of influence, have no stimulus to acquiring a knowledge of their profession. Far otherwise, for whatever may be their proficiency or services, the only certainty they have is that some one with more influence and perhaps inferior claims may be promoted over their heads. It is not reasonable to suppose that such a system can produce energetic captains or admirals, except by accident.

As one ship well officered and manned is more effective than two of an opposite description, a defined and well-regulated system of promotion upon which all can rely will cost less to the nation, and become the most economical as well as the most effective. The true strength of the navy is not in the 262multitude of ships, but in the energies and alacrity of officers and crews; and the repression of these qualities by a false system of political influence, renders a double force requisite for the accomplishment of the vital objects of the naval service. This is as much a waste of power as the system itself is want of power.

The necessity of wholesome stimulating encouragement was deeply felt in the wars consequent on the French Revolution, and it will be felt in future wars whenever they arise. No one unacquainted with the matter can imagine how much was lost during those wars from a total disregard of the fitness of individuals appointed by political influence. The subordinate officers appointed to ships of war were frequently so incompetent as to paralyse the exertions even of the most able commanders, who could not be expected to sustain the fatigue of being always on deck. For my own part, I was so annoyed by the description of persons attempted to be palmed upon me, that, as I have somewhere else said, I preferred going to sea with midshipmen of my own training, making them perform the duties of lieutenants, rather than run the risk of receiving such lieutenants as were frequently appointed to situations in active frigates, through aristocratic or political influence. I am sorry the names of my midshipmen have for the most part escaped my memory, but I may point to three of my own making—the late Lord Napier, Captain Marryat, and the present gallant Admiral Sir Houston Stewart. These were my officers in Basque Roads, where I had only one lieutenant. On quitting Plymouth in the Impérieuse to undertake that perilous 263duty, I sailed with one lieutenant only, to avoid the encumbrance of persons in whom I feared to repose confidence.

To return to my subject. On my re-election for Westminster, I published a long address to my constituents. From this I shall only adduce the following extracts:—

“Gentlemen,—Being unable to convey in words the sensations I experience in reflecting on the manner in which you have returned me to Parliament, I shall leave it to you, who are capable of such acts, to estimate my feelings.

“Gentlemen, no part of the cant of the times seems to me more hypocritical than the declamation by party-men against what they term the ‘overwhelming influence of the Crown;’ when the fact is notorious to us all that the ruling faction in Parliament seize the offices of state and share them amongst themselves. If a doubt as to this truth exist in the mind of any one, let him reflect on the language of the parties themselves, ‘Such an administration cannot stand.’ And why, Gentlemen?—not because the royal protection has been withdrawn, but because a sufficient number do not agree as to the division of the spoil. Our liberties in these days are not in danger from violent and open exercise of regal authority; such acts, being free from the deception practised by the mock representatives of the people, would not be tolerated for an instant. No, Gentlemen, it is by the House of Commons alone that the Constitution is subverted, the prerogatives of the Crown usurped, the rights of the people trampled upon.

“Gentlemen, I shall not attempt to enumerate the decisions of the late House of Commons,—these stamp little credit on the memory of the principal actors, who cannot escape from the contempt of posterity, as may, from their insignificance, the nameless individuals who composed their corrupt majorities. The effects, however, of this system of 264corruption may be thus briefly stated; the prolongation of war, the increase of the national debt, the depreciation of our currency, the disappearance of our coin, the stagnation of our commerce, and the consequent unexampled embarrassment of our manufactures.

“Hurtful, however, as the measures pursued have been, our total neglect of others has proved still more prejudicial; for whilst France has inflicted on us the evils of war, intimidating surrounding states into compliance with her views, we, who have possessed facilities to direct every portion of our force to unknown points within the extensive range of 2000 miles of unprotected shore, have never even made a demonstration with intention to disturb the enemy’s projects and force him to keep his legions at home, but have left him at full liberty to prosecute his plans at the expense of our allies, or in the way most conducive to his interests; and, surely, none could suit him better than to fix the little army of England in the centre of the Peninsula, where its movements are not of a desultory nature, and where, admitting the great ability of its commander, a comparatively small portion of the enemy’s force is fully adequate to counteract its known movements! What part of these kingdoms would be secure from attack if the French possessed a naval superiority, with only 20,000 troops at their disposal? It is obvious that there must be in every district a force equal to that which the enemy could bring against it.

“Gentlemen, I cannot avoid stating a fact to you which I have often offered to prove at the bar of the late House of Commons, namely, that whilst our commerce has decreased, that kind of trade which is most beneficial to a state has augmented on the shores of the enemy, in a prodigious ratio; and the produce of the northern and southern provinces is freely interchanged under the protection of the abuses of our Admiralty Courts, which afford better security than all the batteries of France. The plain reason for this is, that each of the numerous coasting vessels must, for the benefit of the court, be separately condemned, at an expense greater than 265was formerly demanded for the adjudication of an Indiaman! Gentlemen, the rapacity of these courts is frequently not satisfied by appropriating the whole proceeds to themselves, but the captors are compelled to pay an additional sum for thus performing a service to their country. Gentlemen, that you may have a correct notion of a proctor’s bill, I take the liberty of inclosing one for your inspection, which, I assure you, may be considered very moderate, being only six fathoms and a quarter long, or thirty-seven feet six inches, whereas I now possess others that extend to fifty feet; but I prefer sending this to your committee, as it is the one produced by myself in the House of Commons, and by the venerable Earl of Suffolk in the House of Lords; the exhibition of which was pronounced by the present Lord Chancellor Eldon (the brother of the judge of the Admiralty Court) to be a species of mummery never before witnessed within those walls, and altogether unbecoming the gravity of that branch of the legislature.

“The example of the industrious bee demonstrates by the laws of nature that the drone is not to live at the expense of the community, notwithstanding what the Whigs have said of sinecures being held by tenure equal to that of freehold property.”

From the preceding incomplete enumeration of my parliamentary efforts, it will be apparent that as regarded my profession I had not been idle; but every step I took appeared to remove me farther from my chance of being again employed. Notwithstanding that in those days the language of members frequently passed those bounds which the modern practice of the House of Commons has prescribed, in no instance, that I am aware of, could I be accused of intemperate treatment of any subject under discussion. Independently of the sore point of Lord Gambier’s court-martial, 266which was no act of mine—my offending could have been none other than the one of attempting to rouse the authorities to an effort for the amelioration of the navy, for objects which under the old system were notoriously not achieved, viz. crippling the energies of the enemy. It was in the circle of my political opponents considered that as member for Westminster I had no right to interfere with naval matters—because I was a post-captain!

It is, nevertheless, a singular fact—and one which cannot be said of any other officer of my then standing as a post-captain—that from 1801 to 1812,—on no occasion, not even for a single day was any vessel of war—save the one in which my pennant flew—once placed under my command, or once offered to me, with the single exception of the affair of Basque Roads, when I was for a few days appointed to organise and make use of a flotilla of explosion and fireships, the command of which had been declined by several other officers to whom it had been proposed, and then thrust on me contrary to my inclination.

That one cause of my being thus passed over was my unceasing advocacy of the navy, admits of no doubt. It must be apparent that my motions relative to the Courts of Admiralty raised the enmity of all who profited by their abuses, and these were neither few nor uninfluential,—that my repeated invectives against sinecures and pensions arrayed against me all who benefited by them—whether personally or through their connections. It is, indeed, not too much to say, that those interested in sinecures and pensions comprised in those days a 267majority of the House of Commons, who stood up for their own interest at the national expense as for a right.

My motion respecting the treatment of French prisoners, and especially my declaration of the probable motive for erecting the prison of Dartmoor in a dreary, desolate, and unhealthy position, such as ought not to have been selected for convicts, served to increase the ministerial anger. Nor was the evil abated. On a second visit to the place, I encountered a spectacle which made me ashamed of my country.

The reader will remember the action between the Pallas and Minerve in Basque Roads, as narrated in the first volume. My gallant adversary in that frigate was Captain Collett, who kept the deck after every one of his crew had been driven below by our fire, which, as the Minerve had taken the ground, swept her decks. My gallant opponent, however, kept the deck, or rather stood on a gun, with as much sang-froid as though we had been firing a salute. On our becoming entangled with the Minerve’s rigging, he raised his hat, with all the politeness of a Frenchman of the old school, and bowed to me, a compliment which I returned. Judge of my surprise, when refused admission into the prison at Dartmoor, and prowling about its out-offices, at finding my gallant enemy located in the stall of a stable, he having been recently made prisoner. I promised to use my best endeavour to get him removed, and on my arrival in London did so. I believe with effect, but to what other locality has passed from my memory.

268There is no necessity to enumerate other matters already familiar to the reader in order to show the estimation in which I must have been held by those who opposed what they considered innovations, though they must have been as well aware of the evils of a rotten system as myself.

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