Volume 2 — CHAP. XXVI. A NAVAL STUDY—(continued).

THE EVIDENCE OF OFFICERS PRESENT IN BASQUE ROADS.—ADMIRAL AUSTEN’S OPINIONS CONFIRMATORY OF MY STATEMENTS—FALLACY OF ALLEGED REWARDS TO MYSELF, IN PLACE OF THESE PERSECUTIONS.—TREATMENT OF MY ELDEST SON LORD COCHRANE.—LETTER FROM CAPT. HUTCHINSON COMFIRMATORY OF THE ENEMY’S PANIC.—A MIDSHIPMAN NEAR TAKING THE FLAG-SHIP.—EVIDENCE OF CAPT. SEYMOUR, CONCLUSIVE AS TO NEGLECT, WHICH WAS THE MATTER TO BE INQUIRED INTO, IN NOT SENDING SHIPS TO ATTACK.—ATTEMPT TO WEATHER HIS EVIDENCE.—CAPT. MALCOLM’S EVIDENCE CONFIRMATORY OF CAPT. SEYMOUR’S.—CAPT. BROUGHTON’S TESTIMONY PROVES THE COMPLETE PANIC OF THE ENEMY, AND THE WORTHLESSNESS OF THEIR FORTIFICATIONS.—LORD GAMBIER DECLARES THEM EFFICIENT ON SUPPOSITION ARISING FROM HEARSAY.—ENEMY UNABLE TO FIGHT THEIR GUNS.—THE IMAGINARY SHOAL.—A GREAT POINT MADE OF IT.—MR. FAIRFAX’S MAP—LORD GAMBIER ON THE EXPLOSION VESSELS.—CONTRADICTED BY MR. FAIRFAX.—CONTRAST OF THEIR RESPECTIVE STATEMENTS.—FAIRFAX’S EVASIONS.—HIS LETTER TO THE “NAVAL CHRONICLE.”—THESE MATTERS A WARNING TO THE SERVICE.

The matters related in the preceding chapter will appear yet more extraordinary when contrasted with, and confirmed by, the evidence of eminent officers present in the action of Aix Roads; that is, of such officers commanding ships as were permitted to give their testimony, for those who were suspected of not approving the Commander-in-chief’s conduct, were not summoned to give evidence before the court-martial! In one instance—that of Captain Maitland, of the Bellerophon, whose opinions on the subject had been freely expressed—this gallant officer was ordered to 41join the squadron in Ireland, so as to render his testimony unavailable.

To a gallant officer still living, Admiral Sir Francis William Austen, K.C.B., who was present in Basque Roads, but, like other eminent officers, not examined on the court-martial, I am indebted for a recently-expressed opinion as to the causes why the majority of the enemy’s ships were suffered to escape beyond reach of attack, as well as of the persecution which I afterwards underwent, in consequence of my conscientious opposition to a vote of thanks to the Commander-in-chief.

The following is an extract from the gallant Admiral’s letter:—

“I have lately been reading your book, the ‘Autobiography of a Seaman,’ and cannot resist the desire I feel of stating how much pleasure I derived from its perusal, especially of that part which has reference to the movements of the fleet in the Mediterranean from 1798 to 1800. Having been serving for the greater part of those years on that station, your narrative excited in my mind a vivid recollection of former times—as it were living that part of my life over again.

“With reference to the latter part of the volume which details the proceedings in the attack on the enemy’s squadron in the Charente, I wish to say as little as possible which may inculpate the conduct of the Commander-in-chief, to whom, as you probably know, I owe a debt of gratitude for his kindness to me.

“But at the same time I cannot but admit that he appears to me to have acted injudiciously. It would have been far better had he moved the squadron to a position just out of reach of the batteries on Isle d’Aix, when he would have been able to see the position of the enemy’s ships, and thus have decided for himself whether they could have been attacked 42without needless risk, and not have been compelled to form his determination entirely on the report of others.^[30]

“Had he done so, it seems probable that he would have seen things in a different point of view, and decided to send in a force sufficient to have captured or destroyed the whole.

“I must, in conscience, declare that I do not think you were properly supported, and that had you been so the result would have been very different. Much of what occurred I attribute to Lord Gambier’s being influenced by persons about him who would have been ready to sacrifice the honour of their country to the gratification of personal dislike to yourself, and the annoyance they felt at a junior officer being employed in the service.^[31]

“I will only add that I consider your services in the Speedy, Pallas, and Impérieuse will entitle you to the warmest thanks of your country, as well as to the highest honours which have been awarded for similar services. Instead of which, you have in numerous instances been persecuted in the most cruel and unrelenting manner.

“I desire to subscribe myself, with much respect and esteem,

“My dear Lord Dundonald,

“Yours very faithfully,

“Francis W. Austen.

“Admiral the Earl of Dundonald.”

If anything could alleviate the remembrance of the bitter persecutions originating with this one-sided court-martial, it is an unsolicited expression of opinion like that of the gallant Admiral Austen, whose name, for evident reasons, was not included in the list of those summoned to give testimony on that remarkable occasion. 43That other gallant officers still living entertain similar sentiments, I make no doubt, for the simple reasons that, as honourable men, it is impossible for them to entertain other opinions. What would have been the result of the court-martial had such testimony as that of Admiral Austen been permitted, may safely be left to public decision.

The gallant Admiral and the naval public at large will perhaps be surprised to learn that my persecutions have not ceased at this day. Despite my restoration to rank and honours, my banner has never been restored to its place in Henry the Seventh’s Chapel, the unjust fine inflicted on me in 1814 has never been remitted, nor other rights withheld during my forced expulsion from the Navy conceded; the excuse being want of precedent, though with that of the gallant Sir Robert Wilson fresh in the archives of the nation.^[32]

A few words may here be devoted to a point intimately connected with this subject. In several reviews on the first volume of this work, the public has been told of the handsome rewards which have been bestowed for my services. The reader will perhaps be scarcely prepared to learn, in answer to such statements, that with the exception of the ordinary good service pension granted for general service in 1844, thirty-five years after the action in Aix Roads, I never in my life received a recompense from my country in any shape, the Order of the Bath alone excepted. For my services in the Pallas, 44that of destroying three heavily-armed French corvettes at the embouchure of the Garonne, and cutting out the Tapageuse—all performed in one day—not a shilling was awarded to myself, officers, and crew, though in the late war with Russia I have been told that the destruction of a Russian gunboat was scrupulously paid for. For my services on the coast of Catalonia in the Impérieuse, to which Lord Collingwood testified that, single-handed, I had stopped the advance of a French army, not a farthing was conceded, whilst the thanks of Lord Collingwood were the only expressions of the kind ever awarded for what English historians have eulogised even more highly than did his Lordship.

For the partial destruction of the enemy’s fleet in Aix Roads not a farthing was given to myself, officers, or crew; but nine years afterwards, when told that I might take my share of head-money with the rest of the fleet, I replied by refusing both the offer and the money, on the ground that the ships only which took part in the action had a right to it.

The reader will pardon this brief digression, which has arisen from Admiral Austen’s allusions to the persecutions unworthily inflicted on me, and I have chosen the opportunity to set the public right on a subject which has been much misapprehended, to the detriment of myself and family. Neither directly nor indirectly have my services throughout my whole career ever cost the country a penny beyond the ordinary pay and the ordinary good service pension to which my rank entitled me; nor did any of my family ever receive a place under government, other than that to 45which they have risen in the ordinary course of naval promotion.^[33] After this positive assurance on my part, I feel confident that the portion of the press which has expressed an opinion that “I had been amply rewarded for my services,” will do me the justice to acknowledge an unintentional error.

Since the receipt of Admiral Austen’s letter, I have been favoured with another, from Capt. Hutchinson, who, 46at the time of the action in Aix Roads, was a lieutenant in the Valiant, one of the two line-of-battle ships reluctantly sent to the assistance of the Impérieuse, when engaged single-handed with three of the enemy’s ships. Captain Hutchinson was, therefore, in action throughout the whole affair, but, like Admirals Austen and Maitland, was not summoned to give evidence on the court-martial.

Capt. Hutchinson’s letter, whether in point of fact or ability, deserves to be put on record as a proof that when naval officers have the opportunity of speaking their minds on any subject connected with their noble profession, there are few amongst them who will let self-interest outweigh the honour of the service. So complete is the information voluntarily given by Capt. Hutchinson, with whom I have not the pleasure of being even personally acquainted, that it might have saved me much of the lengthened critical explanation into which my sense of duty to the naval service, as well as to my own reputation, has compelled me to enter. As a further corroboration of my own proofs, written before the reception of Capt. Hutchinson’s letter, I can only tell that gallant officer how highly I appreciate it, and shall be surprised if the rest of my brother officers do not form the same judgment.

Cumberland House, Chilham, Canterbury,

June 8th, 1860.

“My Lord,

“I have read, with very great interest, the first volume of your Autobiography, and if the second is not yet published, it is possible that what I have to communicate may be 47of some service in any further notice you may give of the attack upon the French fleet in Aix Roads. I would not otherwise have taken the liberty of writing merely to express the interest taken in your Memoirs, since I can only entertain that in common with every naval officer who has any true love for his profession, and of esteem for those who have so eminently adorned it by their gallantry and skill.

“I was fifth or junior lieutenant of the Valiant, on the mortifying occasion above mentioned, and can bear testimony to the indignation which pervaded the whole fleet in witnessing the total want of enterprise, and even common sense of duty, which then permitted so many of the enemy’s ships to escape, when they were entirely at our mercy.

“I have, however, to mention some circumstances which may throw light upon the mystified despatch of Lord Gambier, which certainly surprised all those who were present. In the first place, Lord Gambier can have given no positive orders to Capt. Bligh of the Valiant to attack the French ships which were aground at the time indicated in the despatch, for after we had anchored off the Boyart Shoal, Capt. Bligh, seeing you go in with the Impérieuse unsupported (after waiting some time, expecting to be ordered by the Commander-in-chief to assist you) went in his gig on board the Caledonia to volunteer his services. Lord Gambier expressed himself greatly obliged, but said some other ship must accompany, upon which Capt. Bligh selected the Revenge, from regard for Capt. Kerr, who had been acting for him in the Valiant some time before, when he had occasion to go on leave of absence for private affairs.

“We accordingly ran in, as your Lordship has detailed, and I have nothing to remark as to what followed but one circumstance, of which your Lordship does not appear to have been aware. No doubt you would have observed that on the evening of the 12th the crews of the Ocean and two other enemy’s line-of-battle ships near her, were evidently flying from them in a panic, numerous boats from the shore assisting in conveying them from the ships.

48“This was so apparent that our Captain, Bligh, went in his gig, with two other Captains, as soon as it was dark, to reconnoitre these ships, with a view to take possession of them with boats, if they were deserted.

“These Captains returned, however, reporting that they had found them surrounded by boats, &c., and that, consequently, they could not be attacked. In the morning, however, no boats were near them, nor were any persons seen stirring on board them; and it was not till about ten o’clock, I think, that the crews, finding that we had not taken possession, took courage, ventured to return on board their ships, and immediately began to warp them out of our reach.

“Captain Bligh was a man of the firmest nerve I ever knew, and therefore I can only suppose that the boats he saw were still engaged carrying the crews on shore, though I believe it was at least ten o’clock at night when he went to reconnoitre, and I know we were greatly puzzled at the time to account for the presence of these boats. As a proof that these ships were totally deserted that night, I need only refer your Lordship to the account of Admiral Gravière, quoted by you, where he says, ‘The panic was so great, that ships which had not even been attacked were abandoned by their crews.’

“But, my Lord, we heard soon after this disgraceful affair, by means of some French vessel which had been boarded or taken, that such was the case. I do not now perfectly recollect how this information reached us, but we had no doubt of the fact at the time, it being only in accordance with our own observations and conjectures. I exceedingly regret that I did not make note of this at the time, but the belief in the fact of the crews having deserted those three ships was so general and undoubted, that it never occurred to me that it might be questioned.

“The report went further, and added one singular circumstance—that there was one man who did remain when all the remainder of the crews had quitted. This was a quarter-master 49on board the Ocean, who, indignant at the cowardly desertion of the ships, hid himself, when the crews were ordered to quit, and this was the salvation of that three-decker and the two other ships, in a very extraordinary way. A little midshipman belonging to one of our smaller vessels (I believe a brig) had been sent in a jolly-boat that night with a message to another ship, and having delivered it, instead of returning immediately to his own vessel, he proposed to his men to go and look at the French ships from which the crews had been seen to fly. His men of course were willing, and they approached cautiously very near to the three-decker (the night was very dark) before they could observe any stir on board or around her. They were then suddenly hailed by the quarter-master before mentioned with a loud “Qui vive!” Of course the poor little midshipman took it for granted that the ship was occupied by more than that one man, and he hastily retreated, glad to escape capture himself; but had he known the truth, that little midshipman, with his jolly-boat and four men, might have taken possession of a three-decker and two seventy-fours!

“This seems more like a story of romance than an actual occurrence, and I greatly regret that I did not then make note of every name and circumstance, which at this distance of time I cannot call to mind, but I have never entertained any doubts as to the facts here detailed, and I have always mentioned them in speaking of that most unsatisfactory affair of Basque Roads. Admiral Gravière’s account is a positive confirmation of what we observed and fully believed as to the abandonment of the ships, and I only wonder that he should not have mentioned the noble conduct of the quarter-master.

“Admiral Gravière, however, would probably not have heard of the approach of the boat, and the quarter-master himself would not perhaps have reflected upon the possible danger the ships were in from the approach of only one little boat; yet if he had not been there to hail that boat, it is more than probable that the little midshipman would have 50continued cautiously to approach, till he discovered that the ships were entirely deserted, and he would either have ventured to take possession himself, or would certainly have returned to report the circumstance, and a proper force would have been despatched to take advantage of the abandonment, if it had been found to be as he reported.

“It was the supposed abandonment of the ships, indeed, which induced him to approach them at all, and it was this also which induced Capt. Bligh to reconnoitre. These, my Lord, are the only circumstances I had to communicate, and no doubt they will be in some degree interesting, though not wholly satisfactory, from my inability to establish the perfect correctness and truth of them. I have not, and never had, any doubt myself, though I am by no means inclined to believe cock-and-bull stories. Of one thing I am very certain, that there was a universal conviction, that, but for the ingenious ruse adopted by your lordship of running in singly with the Impérieuse, and then making a signal of distress, or rather of want of assistance, nothing whatever would have been effected against the French fleet.

“I remain, my Lord,

“Your very obedient servant,

“Chas. Hutchinson, Capt. R.N.

“The Right Honble. the Earl of Dundonald.”

To return to the testimony of eminent officers at the court-martial, by which evidence Admiral Austen and Captain Hutchinson will be pleased to find their disinterested opinions corroborated.

The first evidence adduced shall be that of another distinguished officer, also still living, viz. Admiral Sir George Francis Seymour, K.C.B., G.C.H., who commanded the Pallas frigate at the action in Aix Roads, and remained by me when the line-of-battle ships left the roads on the morning of the 13th of April.^[34]

An attempt was made to stop the evidence of Captain Seymour nearly at its commencement, by Lord Gambier remarking that he had “no further questions to propose to Captain Seymour;” who however promptly asked whether he was not “bound by his oath to relate every circumstance within his knowledge, respecting the proceedings of the fleet.” (Minutes, p. 190.)

To this pertinent query the President replied; “If the questions that are asked you should not seem to embrace all the circumstances to which it refers, you are still bound to relate them.” (Minutes, p. 190.)

Capt. Seymour.—“From what period am I to give my answer?”

President.—“From the time of your being sent in to attack the enemy, and your having remained there.”

Capt. Seymour.—“Without going back to the 11th?”

President.—“No! I take it from your going in on the 12th.” (Minutes, p. 193.)

The President thus authoritatively stopped Captain Seymour from saying a single word relative to the neglect of the Commander-in-chief in not having sent ships to the attack before the Ocean and group floated away, as the Pallas and the other vessels were withheld until the afternoon of the 12th. This, however, did not prevent Captain Seymour from taking the course which he had evidently proposed to himself.

Capt. Seymour.—“I think the ships might have floated in sooner; that they might have come in on the last half of the flood-tide.”^[35]

52President.—“How much sooner would that have been than the time they actually did go in?”

Capt. Seymour.—“At eleven o’clock.”

President.—“What time did the line-of-battle ships go in?”

Capt. Seymour.—“Within a short time after two o’clock.” (Minutes, p. 193.)

These three hours made all the difference in the result of the action, and were in fact the point of inquiry before the court. At eleven o’clock the whole fleet came to an anchor in Little Basque Roads, instead of detaching a force to attack the enemy, as Captain Seymour testifies they might have done. The French ships were at that time helplessly aground. Seeing the British fleet come to an anchor, the enemy took heart, and strained every nerve to warp off, in which, being unmolested, they succeeded—by throwing their guns and stores overboard—and soon after one o’clock had effected their escape.

At two o’clock—seeing me go in with the Impérieuse, in order to prevent the other ships from escaping also, and rightly appreciating the risk I was running single-handed, the Commander-in-chief then, but not till then, reluctantly sent in two line-of-battle ships and some frigates, and this only after repeated signals—the final one necessarily being in want of assistance. So that no attack was made on the enemy’s ships till after the escape of the Ocean, and all those nearest the deep water, though these were most easily attackable; nor would any attack have been made at all, but for my last signal. Had Admiral Seymour been permitted to speak to this point, his evidence would have been most 53conclusive, as the President must have seen when he ordered the witness to speak only as to what occurred after he was sent in; that is, after the French ships had escaped, which was the subject of inquiry, about which Admiral Seymour was thus ordered to say nothing!

This forms, in fact, the history of the whole affair; three French ships only being attacked in the afternoon, after all the outermost had been quietly permitted to heave off and escape during the morning, and with a rising tide in favour of the British force. Captain Seymour’s highly honourable pertinacity in giving the above important opinion as to what was clearly the duty of the Commander-in-chief at eleven o’clock, after he had been cautioned by the President not to speak of anything which occurred previous to two o’clock, when the Pallas was sent in, will be regarded—as it deserves to be regarded—in the light of truth and honour holding itself superior to power. For the sake of the service no less than for that of Admiral Seymour, I am proud to record this instance in which self-interest weighed nothing in comparison with the interest of the country, and the service which Captain Seymour evidently considered to be at stake.

This reply of Captain Seymour took the Court by surprise, as opening the very point sought to be avoided. This led to the subjoined angry remonstrance from Admiral Young.

Admiral Young.—“The general question is not meant to subject the general conduct of the Commander-in-chief to the opinions of all the officers serving under his command. 54If you think the two ships (Revenge and Valiant) not going in so early as you think they might have floated to be an instance of neglect, it is your duty to state it, that we may inquire into it, and hear any other evidence upon it.”

The tendency and peculiarity of this remark to Captain Seymour, is worthy of note. It more than insinuates that he was incapable of forming a correct judgment, and plainly tells him that his evidence will go for nothing, but “to hear any other evidence” upon it. A perusal of the minutes of the court-martial will show the meaning of this expression, viz. that when any officer in command spoke his mind on the subject, the next witness was a master or other inferior officer to contradict his evidence. For this purpose masters and others were recalled over and over again—which is one of the most curious features of the court-martial.

Captain Seymour had said nothing about the two ships, but that the ships—meaning the British line-of-battle ships—might have gone in to the attack at eleven o’clock, and thus replied to the insinuation.

Capt. Seymour.—“I have already stated that I cannot say it was misconduct. I state the fact and leave the court to judge.”

Admiral Young.—“You state an opinion that the fleet would have floated in at eleven o’clock.”

Capt. Seymour.—“Yes, THAT THERE WAS WATER ENOUGH.”

Admiral Young.—“Is that all you mean to say, that there would have been water enough for them to have floated in?”

Capt. Seymour.—“Yes. That is all I have said.”

Admiral Young.—“When you say that the ships of the 55line would have floated in at eleven o’clock, do you mean to speak to the depth of water alone?”

Capt. Seymour.—“I confine myself to the meaning of the words, that there WOULD HAVE BEEN WATER ENOUGH FOR THE LINE-OF-BATTLE SHIPS TO HAVE FLOATED IN. That is what I mean to say. With regard to the opposition they would have met with, THE COURT HAVE AS MUCH BEFORE THEM AS I HAVE.”^[36] (Minutes, p. 195.)

That is, in Captain Seymour’s opinion, the fleet ought to have proceeded to the attack at eleven o’clock instead of then coming to an anchor, and by that act, giving the enemy’s ships aground ample time to warp off and escape, which they would not otherwise have attempted; a point on which all French writers agree.

Attention must here be drawn to Admiral Young’s constantly repeated expression “floated in.” The expression appears to have been used, not more to prevent Captain Seymour from using any other, than to convey the idea that there was no room in the Channel for operations, but that the ships, if sent to the attack, must have floated or drifted in, exposed to the fire of the enemy, had Lord Gambier directed them so to do!

At the conclusion of Captain Seymour’s evidence, so 56clear and so conclusive, the Commander-in-chief had the bad taste to remark that he “did not consider it of the least consequence!” (Minutes, p. 196.) An opinion in which posterity will assuredly not coincide.

I must here repeat that I was not permitted to be present in the court during the examination of the witnesses, or to know who had been summoned to appear, the evidence of Captain Seymour, and that of several other eminent officers, would not have been taken at all, had I not contrived to ascertain the names of those summoned. Finding that most of these had either not been present in the action, or were known to be in the interest of the Commander-in-chief, I went on the half deck of the Gladiator, and wrote a note to the Court, pointing out the unfairness of such proceeding, and naming other officers who ought to be examined. They were then summoned, and their evidence will be conclusive to the reader, as it ought to have been to the Court, and would have been so had not the Court itself been picked by the Government, i.e. principally composed of officers who had been ordered to hoist their flags to qualify them for sitting on the court-martial, which, being ended, they were ordered again to strike their flags!

As a contrast to the evidence of Captain Seymour, I will turn to that of three officers who were not present in the action, and in fact, do not appear to have been in Aix Roads at all, either before or after it; though without a minute knowledge of those Roads they could not be competent to give even a general opinion on the subject. Without reason assigned—as 57indeed it was not in their power to assign any—each thus delivered his testimony.

Question (put to each in succession).—“Was everything in your judgment done that could be done, to effect the destruction of the enemy’s ships?”

Capt. Burlton.—“I think there was.”

Capt. Ball.—“I think there was everything done.”

Capt. Newman.—“Perfectly so.”

Question.—“From the time the Commander-in-chief arrived in Basque Roads to the time of your quitting it, can you state any instance of neglect, misconduct, or inattention on his part to the public service?”

Capt. Burlton.—“I know of none.”

Capt. Ball.—“No; I cannot.”

Capt. Newman.—“None.”

Widely different was the testimony of Captain Malcolm of the Donegal—the late Admiral Sir Pulteney Malcolm—-whose love of truth, like that of Captain Seymour, was not to be fettered by negatives in reply to leading questions. Captain Malcolm thus spoke of the only two enemy’s ships afloat, Foudroyant and Cassard, which two ships Lord Gambier in his defence said “must have entirely crippled” the whole British force, had it attempted to pass the channel leading to Aix Roads.

“When those ships quitted their stations there was then no obstacle to prevent the small ships from going in; by which I mean the frigates, or even SEVENTY-FOURS. The fire from Isle d’Aix they nearly avoid by keeping near the Boyart.” (Capt. Malcolm’s evidence, Minutes, pp. 208, 209.)

Lord Gambier had stated in his defence that he refrained 58from sending in the ships on account of the danger from the fire of the fortifications. Mr. Stokes supported this view by swearing that the ships would have been “within point-blank range of shot.” The assertion of Captain Malcolm that they would be nearly out of reach of shot, which was true, was malapropos, though not to be shaken by the testimony of an inferior officer. It was therefore dangerous to recal Mr. Stokes in opposition to so high an authority as Captain Malcolm; Captain Kerr was consequently recalled whilst Captain Malcolm was under examination! to say that his ship was once hit from the batteries. After which extraordinary interruption Captain Malcolm was suffered to proceed with his testimony.

President.—“Was the enemy’s three-decker in a situation on the morning of the 12th to have done any mischief to ships that had been sent in?”

Capt. Malcolm.—“Till about noon she was heeling considerably, and appeared to me to be throwing her guns overboard. When she righted, she could have annoyed ships coming in.”

Question.—“At what time did the three-decker remove from the situation where you saw her on shore heeling?”

Capt. Malcolm.—“About two o’clock. I took no note of the time.”

Question.—“Would you have sent ships in before the two ships were removed and the three decker got off?”

Capt. Malcolm.—“Had it appeared to me that there was no other chance of destroying those ships but by such an attack, I certainly think it ought to have been made. It was understood that they must all again ground in the mouth of the Charente where it was the received opinion they could be attacked by bombs, gun-vessels, and fire-ships again, without risk.”

59Question.—“Upon the whole, are you of opinion that, of all the French ships which got ashore on the night of the 11th of April, any more could have been destroyed than were destroyed had the British ships been earlier sent in on the 12th of April to attack them?”

Capt. Malcolm.—“Had they been attacked by the British ships, in my opinion they could not have been warped off from the shore, as it was necessary to lay out anchors to heave them off. Those that were not aground had always the option of running further up the Charente. It should be understood that it must have been at the risk of our fleet, as I have already mentioned.”mentioned.” (Minutes, pp. 209 to 211).

Of course, every naval combat must be at the risk of fleets; such risk, in my judgment, forming the chief object in building fleets for the purpose of encountering it. But the risk to a whole squadron from two ships afloat, and a three-decker ashore, “heeling over, and throwing her guns overboard,” is what no brave seaman would ever take into consideration. The chief risk, as has been alleged by Lord Gambier, was from the fire of the batteries on Ile d’Aix, which he had shortly before pronounced “no obstacle.” What this was, may be judged from the fact that Captain Seymour, in the Pallas, Captain Woolfe, in the Aigle, and myself in the Impérieuse, lay for two days in this formidable position without loss of any kind.

The reply to the next question put to Captain Malcolm ought to have been conclusive with the Court.

Question.—“Would you, had you commanded the British fleet, have sent in ships to attack the enemy’s ships on shore?”

Capt. Malcolm.—“The moment that the two ships quitted 60their defensive position the risk was then small of sending ships, and, OF COURSE, I WOULD HAVE SENT THEM IN INSTANTLY.” (Minutes, p. 212.)

This was spoken like a seaman. No greater contrast can be set in juxtaposition with such evidence than that of the chartmaker Stokes, the master of Lord Gambier’s flagship, who, though of no higher rank than that of a warrant officer, was gravely consulted as to what, in his opinion, was the Commander-in-chief’s duty!!

The subjoined evidence of Mr. Stokes is very curious, not only from its effrontery in contradiction of superior officers, but in its own flat and unblushing contradiction to itself. The portion of Mr. Stokes’s evidence placed in a double column is truly wonderful; but it is more wonderful that any tribunal should have so far forgot itself as to act upon it.

“The ships would have been at half range of shell and point-blank shot.” (Minutes, p. 148.)

“They would have remained under the fire of the enemy’s batteries till the tide floated them to the southward of the Palles Shoal; but this retreat, in my opinion, they would not have been able to have gained.” (P. 148.)

“If we had made the attack on the morning of the 12th, we should have sacrificed our own ships without making any impression on the enemy, or destroying any of their ships.” (P. 148.)

“The enemy’s ships were fast on the ground with their sterns to the westward; and they could not bring their guns to bear on the ships that attacked them. Had the 61French ships grounded with their broadsides flanking the passage, they could not have been attacked with the least prospect of success.” (P. 151.)

“I told Sir H. Neale that perhaps we might destroy some of their ships, but that we should sacrifice our own.”^[37] (P. 151.)

“The three decker lay with her broadside flanking the passage. They all three could have fired with complete effect on any ships that might approach!!!” (P. 149.)

“Had four sail of the line run into Aix Roads when Lord Cochrane made the signal, the whole fire of Isle d’Aix, as well as the fire of the Foudroyant, Cassard, and Ocean, three-decker, would have been directed on them!!” (P. 152.)

The only comment here necessary is, that nothing in the evidence volunteered by Titus Oates in former years displayed greater effrontery. The evidence of the other chartmaker Fairfax is almost as astounding.

Question.—“Would ships of the line sent in have been within range of shells and shot from the enemy’s batteries?”

Mr. Fairfax.—“From every chart I have seen they certainly would.”

Question.—“Could any of the enemy’s ships before they run up the Charente have annoyed and raked (!!) any of the king’s ships that might have been sent to attack them?”

Mr. Fairfax.—“They certainly lay in a favourable place for it.”^[38] (Minutes, p. 144.)

62Question.—“Had even two or three ships of the line been sent in to attack those two ships, were any of the enemy’s ships aground(!) in a position to annoy our ships, either in the anchorage or in their approach to it?”

Mr. Fairfax.—“Some of them certainly were.” (P. 145.)

Question.—“If a part of the fleet had gone into Aix Roads when the Impérieuse made the first signal, must it have remained within three quarters of a mile of the batteries till the ebb made?”

Mr. Fairfax.—“They might have shifted with the flood!” (P. 146.)

The ingenuity of Mr. Fairfax in avoiding straightforward answers to embarrassing questions is remarkable. He was one of Lord Gambier’s tract distributors spoken of in the first volume, but though he had no objection to construct an imaginary chart to serve his chief, his conscience would not permit him to swear to its contents. Nevertheless such evasion ought not to have been tolerated by any tribunal. Yet on the charts and evidence of Stokes and this man was the result of the court-martial made to rest, in opposition to the testimony of officers of standing and character.

The opinion of another eminent officer, Captain Broughton of the Illustrious, will be even more to the purpose.

President.—“From the first attack on the ships of the 63enemy on the evening of the 11th of April to the time of your leaving Basque Roads, according to your judgment, was everything done that could be done to effect the destruction of the enemy’s ships?”

Capt. Broughton.—“I think it would have been more advantageous if the line-of-battle ships, frigates, and small vessels had gone in at half flood, which I take to be at about eleven o’clock A.M. or twelve.”^[39]

“The French admiral and two more got off and made sail towards the river, very soon after the two that were afloat.”

Question.—“By the French admiral you mean the Ocean?”

Capt. Broughton.—“Yes.”

Question.—“As the two ships that remained at anchor did not change their position till about noon, and the Ocean continued in her position till about the same time, if the British fleet had been ordered in at eleven o’clock, which you thought would have been the proper time——”

Capt. Broughton.—“I would rather say between eleven and twelve, which, in my judgment, was more advantageous.”

Question.—“Would not the ships sent in have been exposed to the fire of the two ships that remained at anchor, the French Admiral’s ship, and the batteries of Isle d’Aix, at the same time?”

Capt. Broughton.—“Certainly; but I conceive they were partly panic struck, and on the appearance of a force coming in might have been induced to cut their cables, and try to make their escape up the river.” (Minutes, pp. 219-221.)

There was not much to be feared from a “panic-struck” enemy, with only two ships afloat out of thirteen, eleven being on shore. Yet those who peruse 64the minutes of the court-martial will marvel to find these two ships set up as bugbears to a British fleet.

I will next adduce Captain Broughton’s testimony as to the trifling opposition to be anticipated from the batteries on Isle d’Aix, which three weeks previous to the action had been pronounced “no obstacle” by the Commander-in-chief, in his letter to the Admiralty^[40], but were now considered formidable enough to prevent a British fleet from passing within two miles of them!

It may here be remarked that Captain Broughton was well acquainted with these batteries, from having previously been here under Admiral Keats, as they were familiar to me from having been employed on the same spot under Admiral Thornborough, and having, in fact, engaged the Minerve frigate under their fire^[41], which I held so cheap as not to consider them or their ineffectual fire worthy attention. As Admiral Austen well remarks—all Lord Gambier knew respecting them was from the reports of others, who had not even ventured closely to reconnoitre the batteries. The report of Captain Broughton, who had reconnoitred them, was not acted upon.

President.—“In your services in Basque Roads had you any opportunity of making observations upon the state of the enemy’s fortifications on Isle d’Aix?”

Capt. Broughton.—“Yes, I had.”

President.—“Narrate those observations.”

Capt. Broughton.—“I was on board the Amelia when she was ordered to dislodge the enemy from the Boyart 65Shoal, and, being nearly within gunshot^[42], I observed the fortifications. They appeared to me in a very different state to what I observed them when serving two or three years before under Sir Richard Keats. I thought they were repairing the works from the quantity of rubbish that was thrown up; and I counted on a semicircular battery which commanded the roadstead where the enemy lay between fourteen and twenty guns, I am not positive as to the exact number. There was a small battery lower down, nearer the sea. I do not know the exact number of guns; there might be six or nine, I suppose. What I had before taken to be a block-house above the semicircular battery seemed to have no guns whatever; it appeared to be a barrack for containing the guard. I thought from this observation that the fortifications of the island, at least in that part, were not so strong as we supposed, and I reported my opinion to that effect to Lord Gambier.”

President.—“Are those the only guns you observed on Isle d’Aix that could bear upon the anchorage?”

Capt. Broughton.—“They were all that I observed; there might be more.”

Question.—“Did it appear to you that the enemy was constructing new works in front of the old ones, and nearer to the sea?”

Capt. Broughton.—“I think the rubbish was the remains of the old works that had been taken down.

President.—“Would your Lordship wish to ask any questions on the subject?”

Lord Gambier.—“I would wish Capt. Broughton to point out on the chart the situation of the Amelia when he was on board her and made those observations?”

Capt. Broughton.—“The south point of Isle d’Aix was 66just shut in with Fouras Castle, and I think the bearing was nearly S.E. and by E. when it was open. When it was touching the point we were just out of gunshot from both sides. They fired at us from both sides, but the shot did not reach us.” (Minutes, pp. 218, 219.)

This was decisive, and in his defence, the Commander-in-chief thus attempted to evade the facts which had been officially reported to him by Captain Broughton. To contradict them was impossible.

“With respect to the force of the Aix batteries, I apprehend what appeared to Lord Cochrane and to the master of his ship as ruins of the fort were, in fact, materials for improving or increasing the work! Indeed, can it be natural to suppose that the enemy, who are so active in forming batteries wherever they can be useful, and whose engineers are considered to be equal to any, would, of all moments, choose that for dismantling or blowing up works when they expected those works would be most required; for it is very certain the enemy was as fully apprised of our intentions of attacking their fleet as myself!!!^[43] And it will perhaps be considered less likely that the enemy should weaken their defences on Isle d’Aix, raised evidently for the protection of their fleet, when at the same time they were endeavouring to form others on the Boyart Shoal as a protection for it.” (Minutes, p. 135.)

There was no “supposition” in the matter, nor any necessity for hypothesis, in face of the fact that the fortifications were for the most part débris, or as Captain Broughton termed them, a mass of “rubbish.” No one said that they had been “blown up” or that the enemy were weakening their defences! The fact is, that only a month before the action Lord Gambier had himself set the matter at rest, by writing to the Admiralty as follows:—“The advanced work between the Isles of Aix and Oleron, I find was injured in its foundation, and is in no state of progress, it is therefore no obstacle to our bombarding the enemy’s fleet^[44],” yet it was now an “obstacle” to even attempt attacking ships on shore; and Lord Gambier condescended to resort to the just quoted assertions, in contradiction to his own letter to the Admiralty.

On the utter worthlessness of the batteries, as calculated to impede the operations of a British fleet, there was abundant evidence before the Court, as will be seen on an examination of the minutes of the court-martial, such testimony confirming the correctness of Lord Gambier’s letter to the Admiralty on the 11th of March, and completely disproving his Lordship’s contradictory assumptions in his extraordinary defence read to the Court.

Captain Broughton was next examined with reference to the imaginary shoal, which forms so conspicuous an object on Mr. Stokes’s chart (C).

“If the ships had been damaged in masts and rigging, 68considering the direction and strength of the wind at that time, was there any place those ships could have retired to?”

Capt. Broughton.—“I think as the wind was north-westerly and northerly, they might have found safe anchorage and protection in what is called in the French chart I had on board “Le Grand Trousse” (see Chart A), where there is thirty or forty feet of water OUT OF RANGE OF SHOT OR SHELLS IN ANY DIRECTION.”

Question.—“How many ships would you have thought it necessary to send into Aix Roads to attack the enemy?”

Capt. Broughton.—“I should think five or six ships of the least draught of water.”

“I conjecture that the discomfited French squadron would have made very little resistance.”

“From the situation in which the enemy were, not having recovered from the fright of the night before, I think our loss would have been very little, as few of the French ships were in a situation to FIGHT THEIR GUNS!!”

Question.—“Do you know that from the anchorage in Aix Roads to the anchorage you have just now described, that there is A BAR GOES ACROSS?”

Capt. Broughton.—“No! I do not know anything of it; I sounded from the wreck of the Varsovie to that anchorage, and FOUND NO SHOAL THERE!!”

President.—“That is not the place! It is marked in some of the charts that between the Boyart and the tail of the Pallas there is a bar!”

Capt. Broughton.—“I sounded as I came in from the fleet BUT DID NOT FIND ANY BAR.” (Minutes, pp. 221-233.)

The extraordinary conduct of the President in saying “That is not the place” and then that “in some of the charts there is a bar,” in the place which was “not the place,” needs no comment. The evidence of Captain Broughton, who had sounded there, should have been fatal to the chart of Mr. Stokes, who had not by his 69own admission taken soundings. The fact was, that this bar, made for the occasion, formed one of the main points in the Commander-in-chief’s defence, and Mr. Stokes’s chart was retained in spite of the testimony of those who, from having sounded, could alone know anything of the matter.

But Mr. Stokes shall first prove and then disprove his imaginary bar or shoal.

Notwithstanding that Mr. Stokes admitted that his knowledge of the supposed shoal between the Palles and the Boyart was only founded on an anonymous French MS., he subsequently forgot the admission, and swore to his own personal knowledge of the minutest particulars connected with the imaginary shoal!!

Lord Gambier.—“Is there not a bank between the Boyart and the Palles Shoal?”

Mr. Stokes.—“Yes.”

“What water is there generally upon that bank at low water?”

Mr. Stokes.—“From twelve to sixteen feet in the deepest part, but that part is very narrow.”

“If there are only sixteen feet, line-of-battle ships could not pass over it at all times?”

Mr. Stokes.—No^[45], not until nearly two-thirds flood. You must reckon on going over that part at twelve feet.”

“To get to the anchorage, it is necessary to pass over the bank just mentioned?”

Mr. Stokes.—“It is.”

Admiral Young.—“Is there a channel of sixteen feet all across?”

Mr. Stokes.—“There is a channel of sixteen feet all 70across, but that is narrow. There are about the middle of it patches of twelve feet.”

President.—“There is no going into the channel of sixteen feet without, in some instances, passing over that of twelve feet?”

Mr. Stokes.—“You may go over the channel of sixteen feet, but it is so narrow that I should calculate going over that part which is only twelve feet.”

President.—“It is so intricate, you must count on passing over some part with only twelve feet?”

Mr. Stokes.—“I should calculate on going over part of the twelve feet, because it is so narrow, it is difficult to hit the passage of sixteen feet.”^[46]

This is pretty minute for a man who was not present in the action, who confessed that he was “ignorant of the distance between the sands,” and had, in fact, “never sounded there at all,” that his survey had been made from the mizentop of the Caledonia, nine miles off, and that he had his information from Mr. Fairfax and an “anonymous French MS.,” which was not even produced in Court, nor demanded by the Court, so that it is not known to this day who was the author of that MS., or, indeed, whether it ever existed; a matter which, from its non-production, I do not hesitate to doubt.

The President was, however, bent on confirming Mr. Stokes’s shoal, but the result was most unfortunate. In order further to substantiate the alleged fact, Captain Woolfe of the Aigle, which vessel was present during the action, thus replied to an interrogation on the point.

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“I think four or five sail of the line might have lain clear of the enemy’s batteries. I lay there with the Pallas and fifteen or sixteen brigs, gun-brigs, cutters, and schooners!” (Minutes, p. 86.)

President.—“Would the casting your eye upon this chart (Stokes’s) give you a clearer comprehension!!!”

Capt. Woolfe.—“No! I have it all in my mind. I received orders to assist Mr. Stokes on a survey.

President.—“What was the report of the depth of water at any particular time of tide in the situation I have pointed out between the Palles and the Boyart, if you can recollect it?”

Capt. Woolfe.—“Mr. Stokes said HE HAD FOUND DEEPER WATER AND A LITTLE MORE ROOM FARTHER TO THE SOUTHWARD.”

Is it not wonderful that in face of such facts, the Court should have acted on Mr. Stokes’s chart or his evidence? Where Mr. Stokes had found “deeper water” he had marked on his chart a shoal, on which no admiral in his senses would have trusted a frigate, though the Revenge and Valiant line-of-battle ships, with five or six frigates had found plenty of water, and, whilst destroying two enemy’s ships, remained there through a whole tide without grounding! The following are extracts from the logs of the ships present.

“3·0 p.m. Shortened sail and anchored in 7 fathoms, near the outer ship of the enemy, Valiant in company.” (Log of the Pallas.)

“3·30. Came to with the best bower in 6 fathoms.” (Log of Valiant.)

“4·0. Anchored in 5½ fathoms.” (Log of Unicorn.)

“3·30. Anchored in 7 fathoms.” (Log of Indefatigable.)

“2·30. Anchored in 6 fathoms.” (Log of L’Aigle.)

The subjoined evidence of Mr. Spurling, the master 72of the Impérieuse, will render further allusion to the subject unnecessary.

“Where we anchored, which was out of the reach of shot and shell, we lay in five and a half fathoms at low water. Three or four cables’ length nearer to the Pallas Shoal than we lay, was a good berth for three or four sail of the line to anchor in five and a half or six fathoms dead low water. The marks for such anchorage I took myself.” “I know this from my own observation. It was marked on the French chart, but I did not choose to trust it, but wished to prove it. The lead was kept going the whole of the time on both sides.”

President.—“What water did you find in working out between the tail of the Pallas Shoal and the shoal towards the Boyart, when working to and fro?”

“From six and a half to seven fathoms.”

“Did you make any observation before you began to engage?”

“Yes. On the morning of the 12th I was desired by Lord Cochrane to lay a buoy on the Boyart Shoal, which I did in six and a half fathoms water, a sufficient distance to allow any ship to tack round that buoy.”

The reader must not imagine that I am too minutely descending into particulars. I am writing history—naval history—in which Lord Gambier is nothing—myself less, except as unavoidably connected with the proceedings of the court-martial. I have no wish to speak of Lord Gambier where it can be avoided. The subject is, however, one in which the nation is collectively interested, and the national, no less than naval character, involved. Now that the justice of the Duke of Somerset has given me the means of incontrovertible explanation, I am personally gratified in availing myself 73of it; but I repeat that my object is now, as it ever was, national; and having at length those means, it is my duty, no less than my pleasure, to use them as a warning to future generations of the noble service to which I have the honour to belong.

I must reluctantly turn for a moment to the evidence founded on Mr. Fairfax’s chart (D). First premising, that when Mr. Fairfax was asked to “state the situation of the enemy’s ships at noon,” he replied, that “at eleven o’clock he went down below, and did not come up again till near two.” (Minutes, p. 143). That is, during the whole of the three hours’ delay, and the consequent escape of the grounded ships, which constituted the question before the Court, Mr. Fairfax had been, by his own voluntary admission, in his berth, recovering himself from the fatigues of the previous night.

During these three hours, as has been said, the Océan, three-decker, and the three other line-of-battle ships had quietly hove off, and were running into the Charente. This was proved by the concurrent testimony of all the witnesses, and their escape formed the neglect, if any, of the Commander-in-chief. Yet Mr. Fairfax unblushingly testified that his chart showed their position on the morning of the 12th, and that when at two o’clock he returned from his three hours’ nap, the enemy’s ships were “NEARLY IN THE SAME POSITION as when he went below at eleven o’clock!” All the other witnesses, without exception, stating the fact that they had warped off and escaped beyond reach! Yet the Court made no comment on Mr. Fairfax’s evidence.

74When pressed to describe their position more minutely, Mr. Fairfax, with real or assumed indignation, replied, “I have described them in the chart produced by me.” The Court complacently declined further question, and Mr. Fairfax thus escaped the struggle between his chart and the truth, which had so much embarrassed Stokes, who had not the sagacity to perceive that his silence would have been more acceptable than his volubility.

Mr. Fairfax’s minute description of the “nearly same position” of the ships which had escaped while he was below! is yet more extraordinary.

“Were any of the enemy’s ships aground lying so close together as to have the yards of two of them locked together?”

Mr. Fairfax.—“By perspective those near the Tonnerre seemed to be very close. If you draw a line they appear in one.”

President.—“The question is, whether these two ships were lying so close together that their masts and yards might be locked in, or whether they were distinct?”

Mr. Fairfax.—“They were distinct at night!”

“Were you in any situation which enabled you to determine that they were not near each other?”

Mr. Fairfax.—“No; it was prior (i. e. before daylight) that I distinguished them separate.”

“Can you determine how far they were asunder?”

Mr. Fairfax.—“I should think a ship’s length from each other, those three.”

Yet even the reluctant vision of Mr. Stokes, at a distance of nine miles, could perceive at daylight four of the enemy’s vessels lying helplessly “in a group.” Mr. Fairfax—from whom a straightforward answer 75could not be got—said, when pressed, that amidst pitch darkness, and by “perspective,” he could plainly distinguish them as distinct from each other; and was thus, with difficulty, made to tell almost the truth as to how they lay when driven ashore on the preceding night. He could see in the darkness that their yards were not locked together, but they were only “a ship’s length from each other”—a distinction almost without a difference.

The whole affair was made to turn on the evidence of these two masters, Stokes and Fairfax, who unhesitatingly contradicted in that evidence the testimony of the most experienced officers present in the action, though the latter, had it not been for my pertinacity, as before described, would not have been allowed to give evidence before the Court. It has been shown that the charts of Messrs. Stokes and Fairfax were used to the exclusion of the actual charts of the enemy’s coast supplied under sanction of the Admiralty itself, because there were none more reliable in existence.

It would be easy to extract from the evidence of Fairfax much more to the same effect; but the subject is nauseating, and the naval reader may, if he choose, search the Minutes of the court-martial for himself. The young officer could scarcely occupy himself more profitably, if he wish to become acquainted with the practice of the service fifty years ago.

A short extract from Mr. Fairfax’s evidence relative to the explosion vessel and the Mediator is necessary, as Lord Gambier avowed in his defence that the “explosion vessels failed in their object;” and to corroborate 76this, Mr. Fairfax falsely placed on his chart the spot where the explosion took place, in a false position, in order to confirm to the eye of the Court the asseverations of the Commander-in-chief in his defence. Like Mr. Stokes, Mr. Fairfax swore the truth in his evidence in contradiction to his chart.

The assertion of the Commander-in-chief in his defence, with regard to the explosion vessels, is as follows:—

“The explosion vessels, conducted by Lord Cochrane, failed in their object, as will be seen with reference to the small chart which I now deliver into Court. (Mr. Fairfax’s chart D.) This points out where two of them blew up. The situation in which, and the time when, those vessels blew up, proved prejudicial to the enterprise in several respects.... In fact, had not Captain Wooldridge and some of the other officers, wholly disregarding the explosion, taken their fireships in a proper direction for the enemy, it is more than probable that none of them would have produced any effect on the enemy’s fleet.” (Lord Gambier’s Defence, Minutes, p. 124.)

Lord Gambier uttered this with the full knowledge that NOT A SINGLE FIRESHIP DID TAKE EFFECT ON THE ENEMY’S FLEET, a fact which his lordship openly states in another part of his defence; so prematurely were the fireships kindled, and so badly were they directed. That Captain Wooldridge took his fireship in “a proper direction,” is wholly disproved by the very man upon whose chart his lordship relies; viz. Fairfax, who states in his evidence that after the explosion had taken place he “hailed the Mediator to alter her course, or she would miss the French fleet!!

I am sorry to bring such evidence as the subjoined 77to confute the unfounded assertions of a British admiral, but justice to myself leaves me no alternative.

Question.—“Do you recollect when and where the explosion vessel blew up on the night of the 11th of April?”

Mr. Fairfax.—“She was about two cables’ length from the Lyra. The Lyra is marked in the chart produced by me, as well as the explosion vessel. When she blew up the fire vessels all seemed to steer for that point. I hailed four of them and the Mediator, and desired the Mediator to steer south-east, or else she would miss the French fleet.”

Here Mr. Fairfax proved; 1st, that the explosion-vessel took effect before a single fireship was kindled. 2ndly, that the Mediator was steering in a wrong direction, not a “proper direction,” as alleged by Lord Gambier. 3rdly, and that therefore the boom was destroyed before the Mediator could have got near it. The Mediator’s log is, however, luckily amongst the Admiralty records, and is carried up to the time the ship was set on fire, viz. 9·30 P.M., but not a word is said of breaking any boom, or even coming in contact with one, though had she done so the shock must have shook her from stem to stern. The subjoined are the Mediator’s last log entries previous to her being set on fire.

“8·30 P.M. Cut the cable and made sail for the French squadron.

“9·30. Set the ship on fire.”

The preceding extract from Mr. Fairfax is taken from the “revised” minutes. He says: “When the explosion vessel blew up all the fire-vessels seemed to steer from that point.WhatWhat he really said was, “I was below at the time of the first explosion! which I supposed was 78some shells bursting in the top, but I got on deck time enough to see her blow up!” This was expunged, and the above version substituted. The fact was, as every seaman will comprehend in a moment, that there was not a grain of powder, or a single shell, anywhere but in a mass in the hold, and this, as a matter of course, exploded in an instant! I do not say that Mr. Fairfax can be accused of this perversion of his evidence, as it was evidently the work of the person who revised the minutes for publication by a Portsmouth bookseller.

The Mediator’s log was taken out of her previously to her being set on fire, and is subsequently continued up to midnight, two hours and a half afterwards, but still not a word is mentioned of coming in contact with a boom. This should be conclusive on the subject, and it is not my fault that a fact beyond dispute, must necessarily disprove the asseverations of the Commander-in-chief in his defence before the court-martial. These, however, are both facts. Let the reader make the most of them.

Yet in his letter to the Admiralty of April 14th, Lord Gambier stated that “the weight of the Mediator broke the boom,” in that letter also ignoring the effect of the explosion vessels altogether. His Lordship says, in his defence, that they were signals for the fireships!! The subjoined are his Lordship’s words:—“Their explosion was to point out the proper time for the officers commanding the fireships to set fire to their respective vessels, and to intimidate and prevent the enemy from towing off the fireships.”^[47] Three explosion vessels 79fitted at an enormous cost for ammunition, &c., to do that which a signal rocket could have done as well!! If the explosion vessels did not strike terror into the enemy assuredly nothing did, for at page 125 of his defence he admits that “not one of the enemy’s ships was actually destroyed by means of fireships.”

This perseverance on the part of the Commander-in-chief in persisting that the explosion vessels “failed in their object,” though according to his own admission that the fireships failed also, was attempted to be corroborated by the evidence of Mr. Fairfax, but in a different way, viz. by swearing that she blew up at too great a distance from the enemy to produce any effect at all!

President.—“To the best of your judgment, what was the distance of the explosion vessel from the enemy when she blew up?”

Mr. Fairfax.—“About a mile.”

Admiral Young.—-“What sort of a night was it?”

Mr. Fairfax.—“Very dirty, and blowing strong. The Lyra was pitching bows under.”

“Was the night light or dark?”

Mr. Fairfax.—“Very dark at intervals.”

“How then did you, in a very dark night, ascertain that the explosion vessel blew up within a mile of the enemy?”

Mr. Fairfax.—“By her computed distance from us in the Lyra, judging the distance she was from the enemy.” [Minutes, p. 177.)

At first sight, these questions on the part of the Court seem impartial, but their object was to make Mr. Fairfax say that she might have been more than a mile from the enemy, as appears from the subsequent evidence. Mr. Fairfax would not say this. He, however, 80placed her on his chart on this “very dark” night near the Boyart shoal, and not close to the Ile of Aix and the boom, where Captain Proteau, who was lying under the lee of the boom, says she blew up.

Unfortunately for the veracity of Mr. Fairfax on this point, he had previous to the trial unwittingly written a letter to the editor of the Naval Chronicle, evidently not for publication, but in explanation of a chart. The editor of the Naval Chronicle, however, published the explanatory remarks, which are in complete contradiction to Mr. Fairfax’s evidence on the court-martial—in fact, this portion of the letter tells the truth in the following language:—

“I have it from good authority that the fuses on board one of the explosion vessels only burned six minutes and a half, instead of twenty.^[48] Had they burned twelve minutes longer nothing could have been better placed! I saw the French ships with lights up immediately after the explosion, before any of the fireships got near!!—Edward Fairfax.” (Naval Chronicle for 1809, vol. xxii. p. 49.)

With this glaring contradiction between his evidence and his previous honest assertion to the editor of the Naval Chronicle, I take my leave of Mr. Fairfax and the subject, being quite content to rest my character on the contradictory evidence of those suborned to serve the cause of an administration in want of the prestige of a victory, at the expense of truth and even common sense, had such been relied on in the investigation.

81I will conclude with the remark, that had I been permitted access to the charts before the lapse of fifty-one years from the date of the action—or could I after the court-martial have prevailed on Parliament to investigate the matter, by demanding the production of the minutes of the court-martial before voting thanks to the Commander-in-chief, the Administration of that corrupt day would never have dared to treat me as an officer maligning my Commander-in-chief unjustly, nor to have followed up their malignity to its final consummation of driving me from the British Navy, on the imputation of an offence of which I had not the smallest cognisance, as will by and by appear as plainly, and I trust as satisfactorily, as do these extraordinary revelations concerning a court-martial which will stand a beacon and a warning to the naval service as long as that service may exist. God grant that the records of that noble service to the latest day of its existence may never again be sullied in like manner!

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