Volume 2 — CHAP. XXXIV. MY SECRET PLANS.

MY PLANS SUBMITTED TO THE PRINCE OF WALES.—NEGOTIATIONS THEREON.—A MODIFIED PLAN SUBMITTED, WHICH CAME TO NOTHING.—INCONSIDERATE PROPOSITION.—RECENT REPORT ON MY PLANS.—OPINIONS OF THE COMMISSIONERS.—PLANS PROBABLY KNOWN TO THE FRENCH.—FAITH KEPT WITH MY COUNTRY IN SPITE OF DIFFICULTIES.—INJURIOUS RESULTS TO MYSELF BOTH ABROAD AND AT HOME.—OPPOSITION TO MY PLANS INEXPLICABLE.—THEIR SOCIAL EFFECT.—THE SUBJECT OF FORTIFICATIONS: THESE GREATLY OVERRATED.—REASONS WHY.—THE NAVY THE ONLY RELIANCE.

Soon after my return from the Mediterranean, I had the honour of laying before His Royal Highness the Prince Regent, a new and most formidable method of attacking and destroying an enemy’s fleet, and of performing other warlike operations on a large scale. His Royal Highness was pleased to refer the plans laid before him to a Secret Committee, consisting of the late Duke of York, as president, Lord Keith, Lord Exmouth, and the two Congreves, one of whom, Sir William, was the celebrated inventor of the rocket which bears his name.

These officers—as stated to me in a private letter from Lord Keith, who took a warm interest in the matter—gave it as their opinion that under the circumstances 228detailed in my explanatory paper, such a mode of attack would be irresistible, and the effect of the power and means proposed, infallible; adding, however, that if the plan was divulged, it might become perilous to our Colonial possessions; an observation marked by no little foresight, for had the same plan been known to the rebels in the late Indian mutiny, not a European in India would have escaped.

The Prince Regent and the Duke of York fully concurred with the Committee in the destructive character of the plans submitted, for their consideration as well as in the danger of divulging them. His Royal Highness sending for me to Carlton House, commanded secresy on my part. I told His Royal Highness that my plans were only known to Sir Alexander Cochrane, and to my uncle, Mr. Cochrane Johnstone, who had, in fact written out for me the papers which had been laid before His Royal Highness, but that I would obey his injunctions, and had no fear of my relatives disclosing so important a secret. The investigation being secret, of course no official report was made on the subject.

Not long after this interview Lord Melville signified to me his intention to put in execution a portion of my plans, and requested my attendance at the Admiralty for the purpose of conferring on the subject. To this partial execution of the project I of course demurred, as unfair to the invention and necessarily incomplete in operation, whilst development of a portion might give the enemy such an insight of the whole as would enable him to turn it against ourselves on a large scale; his lordship, nevertheless, did not seem inclined to give 229way, and I quitted the Admiralty without having been enabled to arrive at any satisfactory conclusion.

Lord Melville having mentioned to Lord Keith the result of our interview, Lord Keith urged me to acquiesce in the First Lord’s views, adding, that he was too well acquainted with the soundness of my plans to doubt the practicability of destroying with a portion only the enemy’s ships in Genoa harbour and the outer roads of Toulon. His lordship further urged that a success once achieved, the popular voice would place it in my power to enforce the execution of the more destructive portion of the invention within the enemy’s inner harbours.

In deference to Lord Keith’s opinion I at once prepared a plan of attack on the outer roads of Toulon, in accordance with the views of Lord Melville. That communication, omitting the essential parts of the plan, I now subjoin.

“12 Portman Square, May 12th, 1812.

“My Lord,—In consequence of the conversation I had the honour of holding with your Lordship yesterday, and of your desire that I should state what force would be required for carrying into execution the plan submitted for the destruction of the Toulon fleet, I beg to submit the following arrangements as applicable to this particular object.^[81]

“One seventy-four.

“Two 38-gun frigates.

“Two 18-gun brigs.

“Two cutters or schooners.

“The above force is requisite as an escort, and to protect the boats.

230“In order to ensure success, although one-half will probably be sufficient, the subjoined will be necessary.

[Here follow particulars.]

“As your Lordship permitted me to recommend such officers as I thought best calculated for this service, I beg leave to name the following:—

“Captain Robert Baine.

“Sir Thomas Staines, now of the Hamadryad.

“Captain Johnstone, now commanding the Avenger, if he has not sailed; and if he has—

“Captain Hall, now commanding the gunboats at Messina, and lastly

“The Honourable Lieutenant Napier, now in the Mediterranean.

“My late first Lieutenant, Travers, now in the Impérieuse, to be first of whatever ship your Lordship may be pleased to assign to me, which, in order further to conceal the enterprise, may, if your Lordship should think proper, be placed under the command of my brother Captain Archibald Cochrane, late of the Fox frigate. I can furnish him confidentially with all the necessary instructions, so that I might at once proceed to Lisbon, apparently in a private capacity, so as to disarm suspicion.

“I have taken the liberty of submitting the names of the above officers to your Lordship, because I am well acquainted with their characters and zeal for the service, and am sure that whatever is undertaken by them will first be well weighed, and then executed with determination.

“The above operation is calculated without the assistance of troops, but if your Lordship wish to secure the ships, instead of destroying them, 4000 troops should be embarked at Messina^[82] as though under the destination of Catalonia, and having been shifted into the ships of war now blockading Toulon, should be held in readiness to be disembarked in the 231peninsula of Cape Cepet, the heights of which may be held, although not yet fortified, against any force that may be brought against them. When I was last there, with Lord Collingwood’s fleet, I stood particularly close in, within point blank range of shot, and there were not sufficient men in any of the batteries to train more than one gun at a time—indeed, they appeared merely to be stationed there to take charge of the stores. There was neither smoke in the chimneys of the barrack-rooms, nor was there a door or window open, though the weather was extremely hot.

“If the operations are to be extended along the coasts, your Lordship will see the propriety of embarking 300 marines on board the seventy-four, and 100 in each of the frigates.

“The expense of the expedition will be within three months’ cost of that of the blockading force, and half the stores enumerated may accomplish the service.

“I have, &c. &c.

“Cochrane.

“The Right Honourable Lord Melville, &c. &c.”

Inconsiderable as was the expense, in comparison with other armaments producing little or no result, Lord Melville hesitated to incur it; or rather, as I have reason to believe, his lordship was overruled by the ill-feeling against me at the Admiralty, as the concurrence of the Board would have placed me in command of a squadron, with my flag flying in a line-of-battle ship. This was evidently considered too high a position for one who had been for three years kept unemployed from political and personal dislike, was evidently not to be thought of, and the project after long fruitless expectation was dropped.

I then proposed to conduct a similar expedition against Flushing, but this also was declined. As, 232however, public dissatisfaction began to manifest itself, Lord Melville informed me that I might make an attempt on Toulon on a small scale! In other words, that I might, “on a small scale,” show the enemy how to put my plans in operation against ourselves on a large scale! The permission was so preposterous, besides being not altogether free from the suspicion that failure would be more acceptable than success, I declined it, notwithstanding the renewed recommendation of Lord Keith to close with Lord Melville’s offer. As at this time only a few sail of the line remained at Toulon, I hesitated to comply, considering that the result of destroying these would have been badly compensated by the disclosure of the means whereby their destruction had been effected.

Soon after the accession of William IV. I submitted my plans to His Majesty’s consideration, and being himself a practical seaman, His Majesty at once admitted their importance and honoured me with personal interviews on the subject, at which I explained my methods of putting them in execution under various circumstances. His Majesty was further pleased to observe that I ought to be rewarded as well for the plans as for the secrecy which had been observed, yet not the slightest reward did I ever reap for the invention or for having kept my secret out of pure love to my country, a motive which will be better appreciated when subsequent temptations to divulge it come to be shown.

An incontrovertible proof of the efficiency of the plans submitted by me to various ministries is on 233record in the shape of a report from a comparatively recent commission, one of the commissioners—who ranks amongst the highest in his profession—being still living. As from the non-employment of those plans on any occasion, an opinion may have gone abroad that their destructive character is illusory, I feel myself justified in dispelling the illusion by subjoining the report.

Towards the close of 1846, when the late Lord Auckland was at the Admiralty, suspicion being excited as to the motives and intentions of the then French government, another commission was appointed, to decide upon a mode of trying my inventions in a way to satisfy the public as to their efficacy, and at the same time to preserve secresy. This being found impracticable, the trial was never made, but the commission proceeded to report on the plans. The members were Sir Thomas Hastings, Sir J.F. Burgoyne, and Lieut.-Col.Lieut.-Col. Colquhoun.

The subjoined is their report, addressed to the then Master of the Ordnance and forwarded to me by Lord Auckland.

“Ordnance Office, Jan. 16, 1847.

“My Lord,—In conformity with your Lordship’s instructions, we, the undersigned, have met to consider and report on the secret war plans of Vice-Admiral the Earl of Dundonald, transmitted to us by the First Lord of the Admiralty, the Earl of Auckland.

“These plans may be classed under three heads:—

“1st. One, on which an opinion may be formed without experiment, for concealing or making offensive warlike operations; and we consider that, under many particular circumstances 234this method of his Lordship may be made available as well by land as by sea, and we therefore suggest that a record of this part of Lord Dundonald’s plans should be deposited with the Admiralty, to be made use of when in the judgment of their Lordships the opportunity of employing it may occur.

“2nd. One on which experiments would be required before a satisfactory conclusion could be arrived at.

“3rd. Nos. 1 and 2 continued for the purpose of hostile operations.

“After mature consideration, we have resolved that it is not desirable that any experiments should be made. We assume it to be possible that the plan contains power for producing the sweeping destruction the inventor ascribes to it; but it is clear this power could not be retained exclusively by this country, because its first employment would develope its principle and application. The last observation applies equally to plan No. 1.

“We considered in the next place, how far the adoption of the proposed secret plans would accord with the feelings and principles of civilised warfare. We are of unanimous opinion that plans Nos. 2 and 3, would not do so.

“We therefore recommend that, as hitherto, plans Nos. 2 and 3 should remain concealed. We feel that great credit is due to Lord Dundonald for the right feelings which prompted him not to disclose his secret plans when serving in war as naval Commander-in-Chief of the forces of other nations, under very trying circumstances, in the conviction that those plans might eventually be of the highest importance to his own country.

“We have only to add that we have sealed up, under one cover all the papers which have been submitted to our consideration by the First Lord of the Admiralty and the Earl of Dundonald, and our correspondence with the latter in another—both of which we have marked ‘secret.’

“With regard to the disposal and future custody of these papers, we await instructions from your Lordship, or the Earl 235of Auckland, to whom we propose this letter should—after your Lordship has perused it—be transmitted.

“We have the honour to be,

“Your Lordship’s obedient servants,

“Thomas Hastings, Capt. R.N., and

Principal Storekeeper.

“J.F. Burgoyne.

“J.S. Colquhoun, Lieut.-Col. R.A.

“To the Marquis of Anglesey, K.G. and K.C.B.”

Let the public now judge of the nature and value of those plans—of the merit of never having disclosed them, though exposed to severely trying circumstances, and also whether they are impracticable.

I have been told, on indubitable authority that during the late war with Russia an interchange of warlike plans took place between the English and French Governments. It was further pointed out to me but the other day, that a French journal of high authority had remarked to this effect, “should a war arise between England and France, the latter power would bring warlike engines into play to which rifled cannon were a trifle.” From this I make little doubt but that my plans are known to the French Government, and if so, whenever they are applied, the people of this country will find them no “trifle”—for as the report just adduced infers, no power on earth can stand against them. It is one of my most bitter reflections that such plans have been utterly thrown away as regards our own nation, and that from the imprudence of Governments they may one day be turned against my own country.

236In the late war with Russia, I twice offered these plans to the Government. The first time they were declared “inexpedient!” The second time I offered to conduct them myself, either against Cronstadt or Sebastopol—old as I was—the forts of Cronstadt being especially open to their application. As regarded Sebastopol, the question was put to me whether I would instruct two engineer officers in applying them? My answer was, “No, I have offered to risk my own life and reputation on their efficacy, but will not impart my mode of applying them to others, who may not, either from preconceived notions or professional jealousy of naval inventions, comprehend them.”

Had I not adduced the report of the last committees appointed to examine the plans, this might be thought the bombast of an old admiral whose physical vigour had outlived his judgment. I flatter myself, however, that more years of sharp experience than usually falls to the lot, even of admirals, has fixed my judgment of warlike operations too firmly to be shaken even by age. I repeat that should those plans ever be turned against ourselves, the English public will be in a condition to pronounce an opinion on that point.

The report of the committee gives me great credit for not having made use of those plans elsewhere. As before stated, I promised the Prince Regent never to divulge them except for the honour and advantage of my own country, and although driven from the profession of my choice I did not forget my promise.

It may be permitted me to add that when, in 1820, I came with four ships before the Castles of Callao, 237it was perfectly well known to me that money and property considerably exceeding in value a million sterling, besides all the plate in Lima, had been sent to these castles for security. I could, with the aid of a small portion of my plans only, and in spite of opposition, have possessed myself of this treasure in an hour, and my share could not have been less than half a million sterling.

Let posterity judge of my conduct, as compared with the blind enmity of those who persecuted me wrongfully. Yet there was every inducement to employ my own plans for my own benefit. When I entered the service of the South American States, my private income, never large, and entirely of my own creation, had been wholly wasted by the expenses consequent on forced litigation and in defending myself from an iniquitous prosecution. For more than four years I had been deprived of my professional income, and at forty years of age found myself thrown on the world to seek the means of making provision for myself and an increasing family.

Had I been indifferent to the welfare of my own country, my position, as Commander-in-Chief of the squadrons of Chili and Peru, and afterwards of the Brazilian squadron, would have enabled me to amass an immense fortune, by putting an early end to the wars of those countries through the adoption of secret plans, as the Governments of those states expected. For not having done so, they manifested their displeasure and declined to pay me the stipulated rewards for what I effected towards their liberation.

238It was forcibly urged upon me by the South American governments that the unjust deprivation of rank and honour in my own country released me from any obligation to obey the injunction of secresy which had been imposed upon me, and that I ought to profit from my own discovery, by applying it to the ample opportunities before me. I can safely say, that love of country, alone restrained me from listening to their temptations, and that I did not yield to the great necessities of my position is now one of the proudest consolations of my life.

Yet I repeat—and the assertion will one day be confirmed—that these plans afford the infallible means of securing at one blow our maritime superiority and of thereafter maintaining it in perpetuity—of at once commencing and terminating war by one conclusive victory. A hundred millions employed in war could not complete the ruin of our maritime opponents so effectually as could be done by the simple methods indicated in my plans; and that too in spite of the apparently formidable fortifications and other defences of ports and roadsteads. The expenditure of millions in the construction of such works on the coasts of any country would be in vain, when any hostile power in possession of the knowledge of such means of attack, could at a trifling cost and with the utmost facility accomplish in a few hours any assignable amount of destruction without impediment from such costly but really impotent safeguards. Still more easily might this country protect itself by destroying at one blow the marine of an enemy, and that by a process which 239our most eminent engineer officers—as has been seen—have pronounced infallible.

It is somewhat singular—that, notwithstanding my admitted experience, as demonstrated by the acts and success of my early life, and notwithstanding the destructive character of my plans as certified by committees of the most eminent men to be found in both services, I have never, throughout my whole life, been officially consulted on the means of defence of this country!

This cannot have been accidental. It is not probable that any prime minister should consider himself so well up in naval matters as to despise my experience. Nor is it probable that he should prefer consulting officers who never saw a shot fired in actual warfare,—as was frequently the case previous to the Russian war,—to the opinions of one whom committees of the highest professional character had declared to be the inventor of plans which would totally change the aspect of war, and supersede every known system of warlike operations.

When the dominion of the sea, the existence of our mercantile marine, and the peace of Europe were—as they are at this moment—in question, it is nevertheless difficult to conceive this extraordinary inconsistency. Still there is the fact. None to whom my plans have been submitted, have ever pretended to throw doubt on their efficacy. Some, it is true, have said, “For heaven’s sake, don’t encourage such plans,—what is to become of us?” What? Universal peace: for after their disclosure not a man would be found to 240engage in war except for defence of his country, when, as was said of the cholera by an eminent French surgeon, “Il cadavreisera le monde.”

What can have been the cause of such neglect and contumely as I have suffered, under the full knowledge that such a secret was in my power? There can only have been two causes,—unmerited personal aversion without reason, or want of political courage to put my plans in execution. Whether of the two causes be accepted, they form the highest compliment which was ever paid to man, viz. that no amount of neglect or persecution could induce me to betray my country. The report of the committee paid me the compliment which is at least my right, and how great a compliment it is, futurity may one day unexpectedly have to decide.

No doubt to use such powers for ambitious purposes would be wicked; but what guarantee have we that if in the possession of ambitious nations, they may not be turned against us. To use them in the defence of order and civilisation would be praiseworthy, but to let the world know that we are at all times prepared to use them against aggression, would be a protection of the best interests of mankind no less than of our own. Such knowledge can only be dangerous to those who have cause to fear it, but to those possessing it it is power, strength, and safety.

The public is now in possession of all material circumstances connected with the subject, except the plans themselves, which, for obvious reasons, are, it is to be hoped, still secret.

241I am not certain whether—were the plans disclosed—the advantage would not be in favour of publicity. Such disclosure would demonstrate that there could be no security in coast defences and other stationary asylums, on the construction of which it is now proposed to expend so many millions of the public money. It would show the inexpediency of an expenditure of ten—which may mean twenty—millions for the construction of forts and harbours, instead of applying half the amount to remodel and renovate the navy. The disclosure might have the effect of preventing useless expenditure, and of averting the danger of future parsimonious naval administration, by leading to the adoption of essential measures of nautical improvement, by which alone the safety of the country can be preserved.

The disclosure of these plans would also have the effect of binding over nations to keep the peace. Still less would the English public countenance the extravagant and inefficient projects devised for the protection of their insular position, open at all points, and only to be protected by a superior naval force, which shah avert danger on the first menace.

As the subject of fortifications is now uppermost in every man’s mind, I will venture a few remarks on my experience of this mode of defence.

A story is told of the Duke of Wellington which embraces the whole subject. On his appointment as Warden of the Cinque Ports, the inhabitants of Dover, well known for their keen scent of a profitable job, applied to the Duke for an increase of their fortifications, 242already a stupendous monument to the folly of those who have added to them.

The Duke’s reply was the perfection of military wisdom. “The fortifications of Dover would be, no doubt, very useful if an enemy came in that way, but I don’t think he would! They might also be very useful if an enemy went out that way, but I don’t think he would!” In that sentence is comprised the whole subject of fortifications, unless erected specifically for the defence of a dockyard or an arsenal, as at Portsmouth, Plymouth, &c. It is true that in his last years the Duke retracted his opinion in some degree, but I could never learn the reasons he assigned for so doing.

Why should an enemy go to a coast fortification when he can land miles away from it? I will take the instance of the Dover fortifications, which are amongst the most stupendous in this country. What is there to prevent an enemy from landing at Walmer, where there is nothing to oppose him but the six popguns in the flower garden of the Castle? He may effect a debarkation there at all times of the tide, in any wind and almost in any weather. The distance from the fortifications of Dover is little short of seven miles. By making a strong feint by sea on Dover, the garrison could not quit their works to prevent the disembarkation at Walmer, for if they did the feint would be turned into a real attack. Neither, when the disembarkation had been effected, would they be likely to quit their works for the purpose of harassing the invaders, for so surely as they marched out for this 243purpose a sufficient portion of the enemy would march in. The whole would simply amount to this, that the garrison, say 10,000 or 20,000, would be cut off from communication with the army elsewhere, and would thus be completely neutralised. Lastly, when disembarked at Walmer, the fortifications of Dover could not in the slightest degree interrupt the enemy’s communications by sea. Nothing but an efficient navy could do that; and with an efficient navy the disembarkation at Walmer would never be attempted. All this is plain enough; for, after all, military tactics are founded on common sense, and the amount of common sense decides their superiority.

Where fortifications are the key to a province, frequently advisable to capture them, and this may be an easier matter than military men in general are willing to admit. Of course, if they sit down before fortifications secundum artem, the matter is one merely of time and calculation, as we have learned at Sebastopol.

When on the coast of Chili I captured a province with 120 men only, and that by storming its fortifications. These were thirteen in number, and were garrisoned by 2000 men. I was accused of rashness for the attempt; yet no more doubted the fact of my success than I doubted the reality of the attack. It was simply a matter of well matured deliberation and calculation, in which, of course, the panic of the enemy formed an important item. The result was that I did not lose a man, whilst the enemy’s killed and wounded amounted 244to more in number than my whole force! With this in addition to my former experience it perhaps will not be wondered at that my respect for fortifications is by no means great, though my respect for an efficient navy is excessive.

Full discussion of this matter would, however, require more space than can here be devoted to it, and should my life be spared I will on a future occasion enter more extensively into this and other cognate subjects. Were I now to do so, I am afraid public faith in some of its newly cherished fortifications would be materially shaken, and will therefore refrain from so doing, in the hope that improvements in our navy, the only true basis of national safety, will render such remarks unnecessary.

In short, immovable stations of defence as a protection against invasion, are not only costly and of doubtful utility, but a reliance on them is, in my mind, an indication of a declining state. It is little short of national imbecility to suppose that because we erect imposing fortifications an enemy will come to them! when he can operate elsewhere without the slightest regard to them; and the more so, as the common experience of warfare will tell him that numerous fortifications are in the highest degree national weakness, by splitting up into detail the army which ought to be in the field against him, but who are compelled to remain and take care of their fortifications. Yet half the sum required for fortifications as defences in case of war, would suffice to place the navy in a condition 245of affording far more effectual protection. There is no security equal to that which may be obtained by putting it out of the power of an enemy to execute hostile intentions. This can never be effected by forts, but may be accomplished by the adoption of proper measures, which I shall at present refrain from commenting on.

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