Volume 2 — CHAP. XXIX. REFUSAL OF MY PLANS FOR ATTACKING THE FRENCH FLEET IN THE SCHELDT.

REFUSED PERMISSION TO REJOIN MY FRIGATE. I AM REGARDED AS A MARKED MAN.—NO SECRET MADE OF THIS.—ADDITIONAL CAUSE OF OFFENCE TO THE MINISTRY.—THE PART TAKEN BY ME ON THE REFORM QUESTION, THOUGH MODERATE, RESENTED.—MOTION FOR PAPERS ON ADMIRALTY COURT ABUSES.—EFFECT OF THE SYSTEM.—MODES OF EVADING IT.—ROBBERIES BY PRIZE AGENTS.—CORROBORATED BY GEORGE ROSE.—ABOMINABLE SYSTEM OF PROMOTION.—SIR FRANCIS BURDETT COMMITTED TO THE TOWER.—PETITIONS FOR HIS LIBERATION INTRUSTED TO ME.—NAVAL ABUSES.—PITTANCES DOLED OUT TO WOUNDED OFFICERS.—SINECURES COST MORE THAN ALL THE DOCKYARDS.—MY GRANDMOTHER’S PENSION.—MR. WELLESLEY POLE’S EXPLANATION.—OVERTURE TO QUIT MY PARTY.—DEPLORABLE WASTE OF PUBLIC MONEY.—BAD SQUIBS.—COMPARISON WITH THE PRESENT DAY.—EXTRACT FROM “TIMES” NEWSPAPER.

Just at the period of the court-martial on Lord Gambier, great national expectations were excited by the combined military and naval expedition to Walcheren, under the Earl of Chatham and Sir Richard Strachan. The object of this armament, the most formidable England had ever sent forth, was the capture or destruction of the French fleet in the Scheldt, and of the arsenals and dockyards of Flushing, Terneuse, and Antwerp, at the latter of which ports Buonaparte was carrying on naval works with great vigour.

The force employed for this purpose comprised 12740,000 troops, 35 sail-of-the-line, 2 fifty gun-ships, 3 forty-four gun-ships, 18 frigates, and nearly 200 smaller vessels, besides dockyard craft; the first portion of the expedition quitting the Downs on the 28th of July, 1809, and anchoring the same evening near the coast of Walcheren.

To the reader acquainted with the views expressed in the first volume of this work, it will not be surprising that I viewed the departure of this force with regret; as had one half of the troops been placed, as suggested in my letter to Lord Mulgrave, on the islands of the French coast, and had half the frigates alone been employed, as had been the Impérieuse and other vessels in the Mediterranean, not a man could have been detached from Western France to the Spanish peninsula, from which the remaining portion of the British army might have driven the French troops already there.

Full of these views, and knowing that short work might be made of the Walcheren expedition, so as to liberate both the naval and military force for service elsewhere, I laid before the Admiralty a plan for destroying the French fleet and the Flemish dockyards, somewhat analogous to that which would have proved completely effectual in Basque Roads, had it been followed up by the Commander-in-chief. My new plan had, moreover, received an important addition from the experience there gained, and was now as formidable against fortifications as against fleets.

The first measure of indignation against me for my late services to my country was the summary rejection 128of my plan, and not only this, but a refusal by Admiralty letter, given elsewhere, to proceed to the Scheldt to join my frigate, which had been sent there under the temporary command of the Hon. Captain Duncan, a most excellent and gallant officer.

Of the disastrous failure of the Walcheren expedition—the destruction of a large portion of the army by disease—and the retreat of the remainder, I shall not speak; these matters being already well known to the student of English history. I will, however, assert—and the assertion will be borne out by the plan of attack submitted by me to the Admiralty—that had my recommendation been adopted, even though not carried out under my own supervision, nothing could have saved the French fleet in the Scheldt from a similar fate to that which had befallen their armament in Aix Roads. Even—as with the disaster in Aix Roads fresh in remembrance, is probable—had the French fleet in the Scheldt taken refuge above Antwerp, it could only have placed itself in a cul-de-sac; whilst there was ample military and naval force to operate against the dockyards and fortifications during the period that my appliances for the destruction of the enemy’s fleet were in progress; for I in no way wished to interfere with the operations of the general or admiral commanding, but rather to conduct my own operations independently of extraordinary aid from either.

The cost of this plan to the nation would have been ten rotten old hulks, some fifty thousand barrels of powder, and a proportionate quantity of shells. The cost of the expedition, which failed—in addition to the 129thousands of lives sacrificed—was millions; and the millions which followed by the prolongation of the war, by the refusal of the Admiralty to put in operation any naval expedition calculated to effect a beneficial object—who shall count? So much for war when conducted by cabinets! But I was now a marked man, and the Government evidently considered it preferable that the largest force which England had ever despatched from her shores should incur the chance of failure in its object, than that the simple and easily applied plans of a junior post-captain should again jeopardise the reputation of his Commander-in-chief.

It was very curious that whilst this animosity was being directed against me in my professional capacity, I had shortly before received from His Majesty George the Third the highest decoration of the order of the Bath for my professional services!

So little secret did the Government make of their determination not to employ me again, that the public press regarded this determination as a settled matter. It was nothing that I had been instrumental in destroying the fleet so much dreaded by our West India merchants and the nation generally, or that I had offered to serve the French fleet in the Scheldt in the same way. I was now an obnoxious man, and the national expenditure of millions for defeat, was by the ministry of that day deemed preferable to cheap victory if achieved by a junior officer, to whom the Chancellor of the Exchequer—whilst denying him thanks for the service—had attributed the destruction of a fleet quite as formidable as the one in the Scheldt.

130It may be scarcely credible to the present age that the Government should have openly announced such a determination. On the principle adopted throughout this work, of adducing nothing without proof, it will be necessary to place the preceding facts beyond dispute. From one of the most talented periodicals of the time I extract the following passage: “The worst injury which the radical reformers have done the country, has been by depriving it of Lord Cochrane’s services, and withdrawing him from that career which he had so gloriously begun.”^[72] The pretence was, that I had withdrawn myself! at the time I was entreating the Admiralty to permit me to return to my frigate! This matter will shortly be made very clear.

One grave cause of offence to the Ministry, in addition to my determination to oppose the vote of thanks to Lord Gambier, had been the part I took at the famous meeting; held at the Crown and Anchor in the Strand. For a junior naval officer in that day to associate with such persons as Sir Francis Burdett and Major Cartwright was bad enough, but that he should act with them was a thing unheard of in the naval service.

At this meeting many irritating things were said, though not by me. The late trial of the Duke of York was freely handled, and Colonel Wardle, the principal promoter of it, held up to public admiration. The “borough-mongering faction,” as it was forcibly termed by Sir Francis Burdett, was painted as involving the country in perpetual misfortune, and consigning to 131hopeless imprisonment all who ventured to expose their practices; whilst, it was said, even His Majesty could not carry on his fair share of government, being compelled to choose his ministers from a faction which not only oppressed the people, but controlled the King himself.

The resolutions moved by good old Major Cartwright at this celebrated meeting were at that time regarded as treason, though at the present day sound doctrine, viz. that “so long as the people were not fairly represented corruption must increase—our debts and taxes accumulate—our resources be dissipated—the native energy of the people be depressed, and the country be deprived of its best defences. The remedy was only to be found in the principles handed down to us by the wisdom and virtue of our forefathers, in a full and fair representation of the people in Parliament.”

This was perfectly true, and singularly enough, after the lapse of fifty-one years, the very same question forms the principal feature of the present session of Parliament, the debates on the subject in our day differing very little from their predecessors of half a century ago, if we may credit the following picture from a Times leader of April 23rd last. “Call Reform what you will, it is almost anything you please, except legislation. The belligerent parties will fight and cheat one another, and both together will cheat the people!”

If after a battle of fifty years the people have not achieved the victory which early Reformers began, I have some right to call on the public to estimate the amount of obloquy which befell myself for my volun- 132*tary enrolment amongst the combatants on their side; and in the belief that the public of the present day will do my memory that justice which through life has been denied me, I shall not shrink from laying these matters before them. If such a picture of our present legislators be truly drawn, what must have been that of the faction against which I had to contend?

The speech made by me at the Crown and Anchor was very moderate, and indeed was spoken of by the ministerial organs as expressing less of the spirit of faction than any which had been delivered on that day. The worst part of it, so far as I can recollect, was that generally recorded, that “I hoped the time would come when ministers would not be employed all day in thinking what they were to cavil about all night, and all night in useless debate—whereby the real business of the country was neglected; so much so indeed, that when the newspapers had reached me abroad, I felt ashamed at the manner in which the government of my country was conducted.”

I had even gone further in moderation, though the Ministry did not know it, viz. by observing to Sir Francis Burdett that I thought he was going too far. His reply was characteristic. “My dear Lord Cochrane you don’t know ministers. If you wish to get anything from them, you must go for a great deal more than you want. Even then you will get little enough.” “Oh!” replied I, “if those are your tactics, go on, I’ll follow.”

The real grievance was, however, my support of the motions in Parliament which arose from the meetings 133at the Crown and Anchor. Mr. Madocks distinctly charged the Ministry with trafficking in seats, offering to prove to the House that Lord Castlereagh had, through the agency of the Honourable Mr. Wellesley, been instrumental in purchasing for Mr. Quintin Dick the borough of Cashel; and that when in the matter of the Duke of York Mr. Dick had determined to vote according to his conscience, Lord Castlereagh intimated to that gentleman the necessity of voting with the Government, or resigning his seat, which was accordingly done. The Ministry declined to accept the challenge.^[73]

The subsequent motion of Mr. Curwen went further. But I must not forget that I am writing my autobiography, and not political history; I never made pretensions to parliamentary eloquence, and shall not inflict on the reader my humble efforts, excepting only those connected with the naval service.

On the 19th of February I moved for certain papers relative to the conduct of the Admiralty Court, and as my speech on that occasion was sufficiently comprehensive, 134I will adduce it with some slight explanations indicative of the practices which at that time were in full operation:—

“If these papers are granted it will be in my power to expose a system of abuses in the Admiralty Court unparalleled in this country, even exceeding those prevalent in Spain under the infamous administration of Godoy.

“The whole navy of England was, by the existing system, compelled to employ one individual to carry on its business before the Admiralty Court; a person perhaps in whose competence or honesty they might have no confidence. But admitting his ability and integrity to be unquestionable, still the thing was preposterous. Would any man like to employ an attorney who at the same time did business for the other side? Was such a regulation consistent with equity or common sense?

“Even the personal liberty of naval officers was answerable for some seizures, the produce of which notwithstanding went to the Crown, and the most abominable compromises sometimes took place. Whether the profits of these compromises found their way into the pockets of any particular individual I was not absolutely sure, but had evidence to presume that this was the fact. What indeed could be the design of confining the captors to one proctor, except that secrecy as to these questionable transactions may be preserved.”

One case was my own. In the first volume of this work is narrated the capture of the King George privateer, or pirate, for which seizure by any vessel of war a reward of 500l. had been issued. The King George in part actually belonged to parties connected with the Maltese Admiralty Court. As her condemnation was unavoidable, she was condemned as a droit to the Crown; and costs to the extent of 600l. were decreed against myself, officers, and crew, for having taken 135her! A subject which will hereafter have to be further alluded to.

The effect of this system was to indispose officers to look after prizes, and thus many an enemy’s vessel was suffered to escape. One of my reasons for harassing the French on the coasts of Languedoc and Catalonia was, that it appeared more advantageous to effect something of service to the country, than to take prizes for no better end than to enrich the officers of the Maltese Admiralty Court, and at the same time to be ourselves condemned in costs for our trouble.

Some curious stories might be told of the effect of the system. It was my own practice, when any money was captured in a prize, to divide it into two portions, first, the Admiral’s share, and next our own. We then buried the money in a sand-bank, in order that it might not be in our possession; and, as opportunity occurred, it was afterwards taken up, the Admiral’s share being transmitted to him, our share was then distributed at the capstan, in the usual proportions. As I never made any secret of my own transactions, the Maltese officials regarded me with perfect hatred; they, no doubt, honestly believing that by appropriating our own captures to our own use, we were cheating them out of what they had more right to than ourselves! By their practices they appeared to entertain one idea only, viz. that officers were appointed to ships of war for the sole purpose of enriching them!

In a case narrated in the first volume, where I had, in Caldagues Bay, taken thirteen vessels laden with corn for the French army in Barcelona, after having 136sunk two small ships of war protecting them—we sold the corn vessels and their cargo to the Spaniards for a trifle, dividing the dollars amongst us, after sending Lord Collingwood his share. We afterwards took the vessels of war after raising them to Gibraltar, where I purchased one as a yacht. Had I sent those corn vessels to Malta, and had them condemned there—in place of obtaining anything for the capture, a heavy bill of costs for the condemnation of such small vessels would have greatly exceeded the sum realised by their sale.

To return to my address to the House:—

“The Navy was paralysed by this corrupt system. The most insignificant vessels were condemned at an expense equal to that of the largest, so that the condemnation of a fishing lugger might be swelled up to the expense of condemning an Indiaman, the labour of capture ending in nothing but putting money into the proctor’s pocket. As an instance within my own knowledge, Moses Griffin, a Jew agent at one of the outports, received two thirds out of the produce of a vessel, the remaining third being the whole share distributed for admiral, captain, inferior officers, petty officers, seamen, and marines. What was the effect of such a system but to paralyse the Navy? It prevented exertion on the part of the officers. Could it possibly be necessary to have 120 ships of the line in commission to blockade twenty-three ships of the enemy, if proper exertions were made. To insure alacrity in harassing the shipping and commerce of the enemy, the abuses of the Admiralty must be stopped, and nothing else would be effectual.”

A more startling practice was the following:—

“The commerce of the enemy was carried on to an immense extent by a system of licenses, which permitted the 137enemy to trade where they pleased. These licenses, issued by us, formed an article of common sale in Hamburgh and other places, and by means of such licenses the enemy’s ships were seen coasting along by hundreds in perfect security, even filling the river Thames, contrary to the Navigation Act! We were thus raising up sailors for Buonaparte, to whose commerce and navy our ministers were the best friends.”

My representations were met by Sir William Scott, the Judge of the Admiralty Court, with the inquiry as to “how that Court could possibly be answerable for the accounts of the agents on which I had founded my invectives? Lord Cochrane was a prompt accuser, but an unfortunate one, and he pledged his credit these accusations would prove as unfortunate as any that had preceded them.”

Unluckily for Sir William Scott’s allusion to my “unfortunate habit of making unfounded accusations,” Mr. Rose, the treasurer of the Navy, got up and officially confirmed my statements, by admitting the abuses complained of!

“This evil,” said Mr. Rose, “had been so strongly represented to him, that soon after he had become treasurer to the Navy he had bestowed many days and nights in its investigation. The result was, that he had before him no less than 153 cases, nine out of which were now before the judge of the Admiralty Court (Sir W. Scott himself!) in consequence of the enormous charges which their accounts contained. In one case the charges of an agent at Portsmouth, who had 62,000l. to distribute, amounted to 9462l., of which 1200l. was stated to be for postage!”

Mr. Rose recommended me to alter my motion, and to move for papers relative to a particular ship. I 138took this advice and moved for documents relating to two vessels, which was carried. Sir William Scott, however, never forgave me.

On the 9th of March, when these papers were laid before the House, I moved for others in order to elucidate them. This gave rise to another debate, in which some curious facts were brought to light by Colonel Wardle:—

“In the Navy Pay Office it was usual to promote junior clerks over the heads of men who were many years their seniors in the service. One junior clerk, eleven years in the office, was promoted to a place of 300l. a year, over the heads of senior clerks from twenty-seven to thirty years in the service. In another case a gentleman was obliged to retire against his will on 170l. per annum, and a boy of fourteen was appointed to his situation with a raised salary, and over the heads of many senior clerks. The Secretary of the Sick and Hurt Office was pensioned off at his full salary of 500l., and an assistant appointed in his stead with a salary of 1000l.!!”

On the 12th of March, my respected colleague, Sir Francis Burdett, than whom a purer patriot never breathed, moved that Mr. Gale Jones should be discharged from Newgate, to which prison he had been committed by order of the House, for placarding a handbill, the contents of which were construed into a violation of the privileges of the House. Sir Francis—conceiving that the people had privileges as well as those claiming to be their representatives, or rather that the popular voice constituted the power of their representatives—demanded the release of Mr. Jones, on 139the ground that the House possessed no privilege to commit a man for asserting his right to discuss its measures, and that neither legally nor constitutionally could such privilege exist.

The debate which ensued, not coming within the scope of this work, may be omitted. Suffice it to say that Sir Francis published in Cobbett’s Weekly Register a revised account of his speech, in which he declared that the House of Commons sought to set aside Magna Charta and the laws of England by an order founded on their own irresponsible power.

Accompanying this revised speech was a letter addressed by Sir Francis to his constituents of Westminster; and these coupled together the House chose to construe into a breach of their privileges also. The result, as every one knows, was a motion for the committal of Sir Francis Burdett to the Tower.

My worthy colleague, however, refused to surrender. As there was no knowing to what lengths the despotism of the House might extend, a rumour of breaking into the honourable Baronet’s house being prevalent, a number of his friends, myself amongst them, assembled at his residence in Piccadilly to see fair play; but one morning, during our absence, an officer, armed with the Speaker’s warrant, forcibly entered, and Sir Francis was carried off to the place of his imprisonment.

It is quite unnecessary to detail these circumstances, as they are well known to every reader of English history. On the day after my excellent colleague’s capture the electors of Westminster held a meeting in 140Palace Yard, and adopted a petition which fell to my lot to present to the House.

The petition went even farther than had Sir Francis, by denouncing the House as “prosecutor and juror, judge and executioner,” and denying its right to exercise these combined offices. It taunted the House with evading the offer of a member to prove at the bar that two of the ministers had been distinctly charged with the sale of a seat on their benches, and that such practices were “as notorious as the sun at noonday.” They therefore prayed not only for the release of their member, but for a reform of the House itself, “as the only means of preserving the country from despotism.”

To have committed the whole of the electors of Westminster for adopting such a petition would have been inconvenient. To have committed me for presenting it would have been scarcely less dangerous, as depriving Westminster of both its representatives. The predominant feeling in the House appeared to be that of astonishment that a naval officer should dare to meddle with such matters. One member opposed its reception at all, another begged me to withdraw it, which I refused to do; and, therefore, the House adopted the only possible alternative of “ordering it to lie on the table.” The feeling towards myself may be conceived.

A similar petition from the freeholders of Middlesex was presented by Mr. Byng, and denounced by Mr. Perceval as a “deliberate and unparalleled insult to the House;” the petition denying the right of the 141House to imprison Sir Francis, and accusing Mr. Perceval and Lord Castlereagh by name as openly trafficking in seats; the petitioners further declaring that the presence of Sir Francis Burdett in the House was necessary to “enforce his plan of reform.” Angry debate followed, but neither Sir Francis nor Mr. Jones were released till the following month of June.

On the 11th of May Mr. Croker proposed a vote for the ordinances of the Navy, when I embraced the opportunity of making what was at the time termed “one of the most remarkable speeches ever delivered in that House.” The speech indeed was remarkable—not for its eloquence, for it had none, but for some very awkward statistics which my enforced leisure had enabled me to collect and arrange. And let me here remark, that when my parliamentary speeches are adduced, the object is to give a faithful picture of the condition as well of the House as of the Navy at that period, not as specimens of an eloquence to which I had no pretension. My parliamentary efforts, such as they are, are on record, and the reproduction of a portion may save both myself and the reader the trouble of further dilating thereon.

One besetting sin of the Administration was the bestowal of pensions, which was carried on to a wonderful extent. Wives, daughters, distant relatives, &c., of all sorts of people who had votes or influence claimed a pension as a matter of right. Another besetting sin of the Government was doling out pittances scarcely sufficient for the support of life to those who had fought and bled for their country.

142Bearing this in mind, the reader will readily comprehend the following “remarkable” address—as it has been termed by historical writers—to the House of Commons:—

“An admiral, worn out in the service, is superannuated at 410l. a year, a captain at 210l., a clerk of the ticket office retires on 700l. a year! The widow of Admiral Sir Andrew Mitchell has one third of the allowance given to the widow of a Commissioner of the Navy!

“I will give the House another instance. Four daughters of the gallant Captain Courtenay have 12l. 10s. each, the daughter of Admiral Sir Andrew Mitchell has 25l., two daughters of Admiral Epworth have 25l. each, the daughter of Admiral Keppel 24l., the daughter of Captain Mann, who was killed in action, 25l., four children of Admiral Moriarty 25l. each. That is—thirteen daughters of admirals and captains, several of whose fathers fell in the service of their country, receive from the gratitude of the nation a sum less than Dame Mary Saxton, the widow of a commissioner.

“The pension list is not formed on any comparative rank or merit, length of service, or other rational principle, but appears to me to be dependent on parliamentary influence alone. Lieutenant Ellison, who lost his arm, is allowed 91l. 5s., Captain Johnstone, who lost his arm, has only 45l. 12s. 6d., Lieutenant Arden, who lost his arm, has 91l. 5s., Lieutenant Campbell, who lost his leg, 40l., and poor Lieutenant Chambers, who lost both his legs, has only 80l., whilst Sir A.S. Hamond retires on 1500l. per annum. The brave Sir Samuel Hood, who lost his arm, has only 500l., whilst the late Secretary of the Admiralty retires, in full health, on a pension of 1500l. per annum!

“To speak less in detail, 32 flag officers, 22 captains, 50 lieutenants, 180 masters, 36 surgeons, 23 pursers, 91 boatswains, 97 gunners, 202 carpenters, and 41 cooks, in all 774 persons, cost the country 4028l. less than the nett proceeds of 143the sinecures of Lords Arden (20,358l.), Camden (20,536l.), and Buckingham (20,693l.).

“All the superannuated admirals, captains, and lieutenants put together, have but 1012l. more than Earl Camden’s sinecure alone! All that is paid to the wounded officers of the whole British navy, and to the wives and children of those dead or killed in action, do not amount by 214l. to as much as Lord Arden’s sinecure alone, viz. 20,358l. What is paid to the mutilated officers themselves is but half as much!

“Is this justice? Is this the treatment which the officers of the Navy deserve at the hands of those who call themselves His Majesty’s Government? Does the country know of this injustice? Will this too be defended? If I express myself with warmth I trust in the indulgence of the House. I cannot suppress my feelings. Should 31 commissioners, commissioners’ wives, and clerks have 3899l. more amongst them than all the wounded officers of the Navy of England?

“I find upon examination that the Wellesleys receive from the public 34,729l., a sum equal to 426 pairs of lieutenants’ legs, calculated at the rate of allowance of Lieutenant Chambers’s legs. Calculating for the pension of Captain Johnstone’s arm, viz. 45l., Lord Arden’s sinecure is equal to the value of 1022 captains’ arms! The Marquis of Buckingham’s sinecure alone will maintain the whole ordinary establishment of the victualling department at Chatham, Dover, Gibraltar, Sheerness, Downs, Heligoland, Cork, Malta, Mediterranean, Cape of Good Hope, Rio de Janeiro, and leave 5460l. in the Treasury. Two of these comfortable sinecures would victual the officers and men serving in all the ships in ordinary in Great Britain, viz. 117 sail of the line, 105 frigates, 27 sloops, and 50 hulks. Three of them would maintain the dockyard establishments at Portsmouth and Plymouth. The addition of a few more would amount to as much as the whole ordinary establishments of the royal dockyards at Chatham, Woolwich, Deptford, and Sheerness; whilst the sinecures and offices executed wholly by deputy 144would more than maintain the ordinary establishment of all the royal dockyards in the kingdom!

“Even Mr. Ponsonby, who lately made so pathetic an appeal to the good sense of the people of England against those whom he was pleased to term demagogues, actually receives, for having been thirteen months in office, a sum equal to nine admirals who have spent their lives in the service of their country; three times as much as all the pensions given to all the daughters and children of all the admirals, captains, lieutenants, and other officers who have died in indigent circumstances, or who have been killed in the service!”

This portion of the speech, true in every figure, was not incorrectly termed “remarkable;” and it made an enemy of every sinecurist named, as I had afterwards but too good reason to know. Nevertheless, the Administration had made a mistake. I was not permitted to be employed afloat, and was determined to effect all the good I could for the naval service by advocating its interests ashore.

But the worst was yet to come. My very excellent grandmother, of whom I have spoken in the first volume of this work in terms feebly expressive of her worth, had a pension of 100l. for the services of her gallant husband, Captain Gilchrist; and though she had been dead eight years, some patriotic individual had been drawing her pension, as though she were still living! Given, a hundred dead widows, with a pension of 100l. each, and some one was at the national expense the richer by 10,000l. per annum!

On this point, I thus proceeded, no doubt to the intense disgust of the party enjoying the defunct pensions:—

145

“From the minute expenses noticed in the naval estimate, viz. for oiling clocks, killing rats, and keeping cats, I suppose that great care has been taken to have everything correct. It was, therefore, with great surprise that I found the name of my worthy and respected grandmother, the widow of the late Captain Gilchrist of the navy, continuing on the list as receiving 100l. per annum, though she ceased to exist eight years ago!”

Notwithstanding the unanswerable argument of my grandmother’s pension, and the equally unanswerable comparison of sinecures and naval rewards—the Secretary of the Admiralty, Mr. Wellesley Pole, considered that he satisfactorily replied to both, by pronouncing my statements “inaccurate, and my complaints inconsistent! As to the pensions to the children of admirals, Lord Cochrane must know very well that the widow or children of an admiral were not entitled, strictly speaking, to any pension!”

In his defence to the sinecures of his own family, Mr. Wellesley Pole was even more infelicitous:—

“Lord Cochrane has thought proper to make an attack on the Wellesley family, of which I am a member. He asserts that the Wellesleys receive from the public no less than 34,000l. a year in sinecure places, and then makes a calculation of the number of arms and legs which that sum would compensate. In answer to this, I must observe that no member of the Wellesley family, except the noble lord at the head of it, possesses any sinecure. That noble lord certainly did, many years ago, receive the reversion of a sinecure which had since fallen in, when he was about to go to a distant part of the world, in a most arduous and important public situation. He was at that time in a delicate state of health, and had a large family!”

146That is, Mr. Wellesley Pole confirmed my calculation of the arms and legs. Though one sinecure had “fallen in,” he neither said when, nor what other sinecures had since accrued to the head of the family. His general reply to the matter is curious even at the present day. Mr. Wellesley Pole proceeded:—

“There is a considerable degree of eccentricity in the noble lord’s manner, but at the same time he has so much good British stuff about him, and so much knowledge of his profession, that he will always be listened to with great respect. It is, therefore, the more to be lamented that he does not follow the dictates of his own good understanding, instead of being guided by the erroneous advice, and adopting the wild theories of others. Let me advise him that adherence to the pursuits of his profession, of which he is so great an ornament, will tend more to his own honour and to the advantage of his country, than a perseverance in the conduct which he has of late adopted, conduct which can only lead him into error, and make him the dupe of those who use the authority of his name to advance their own mischievous purposes.”

This overture was unmistakable. If I would quit Sir Francis Burdett, sell my constituents, and come over to the ministerial side, the Government would—despite the affair of Lord Gambier—put me in the way of advancement. If I did not forsake my party, the high professional character drawn by Mr. Wellesley Pole would avail me nothing—not even to get employed again! I need scarcely say that the overture,—politely insinuating, as it did, that I was to be bought—was rejected on my part.

The remainder of my speech consisted of a contrast between this reckless extravagance in pensions and sinecures, 147and the petty saving which rendered the Navy useless:—

“Such are some of the pretended savings by which, when any are made, the country is duped. Were there a prospect of success, I could point out some savings better worthy attention. By adopting canvass of a better quality, a saving equal to the additional income-tax imposed by the Whigs may be made, equal, in fact, to one fourth of the Navy. The remaining three fourths of the ships will be more effectual than the whole, as their velocity would be increased by upwards of half a mile in seven, and they would thus be enabled to capture those vessels which at present escape from them all. The enemy distinguish our ships of war from foreign ships by the colour of the wretched canvass, and run away the moment they perceive our black sails rising above the horizon, a circumstance to which they owe their safety, even more than to its open texture. I have observed the meridian altitude of the sun through the foretopsail, and by bringing it to the horizon through the foresail, have ascertained the latitude as correctly as I could have done otherwise. The paltry increase of cost will be more than compensated by the superior strength of the canvass, on which depend the safety of the ship and the preservation of all the lives on board.

“I shall, no doubt, hear it urged that a remedy is about to be applied, and so it has ever since I can remember, but remedies at public boards are sought in vain.”

To comprehend the preceding statements, it may be necessary to observe that we had at that time more than 1000 ships of war of all classes afloat, and that from the general bad character of their sailing and equipment, the enemy, who had little more than a tenth of the number, fairly laughed at us. Under any circumstances, the waste of money was deplorable, but under the corrupt system by which worthless ships 148were then introduced into the Navy, to which subject allusion is made in the first volume, it was utter paralysation of every natural effort.

The amount of obloquy these efforts to raise the condition of the naval service brought on me, amongst persons who held that afloat or ashore the duty of a naval officer was implicit obedience to the ministry of the day, will be readily understood. Reply to my statements being impossible, the ministerial organs made me the subject of numerous bad squibs, one of which is subjoined:—

“You fight so well and speak so ill, Your case is somewhat odd, Fighting abroad you’re quite at home, Speaking at home—abroad;

Therefore your friends, than hear yourself, Would rather of you hear; And that your name in the Gazette, Than Journals, should appear.”

The wit is somewhat obtuse, but the feeling here expressed was no doubt sincere. The Ministers indeed began to suspect that they had committed an error in preventing me from joining my ship, and shortly afterwards attempted to repair it by ordering me immediately to sea! With what effect will appear in the next chapter.

To the credit of the present age, wilful corruption has passed away, but false economy still prevails. It is only six years ago that we commenced a war without a single gun-boat, the only description of vessel that could operate with effect in the enemy’s waters. The consequence was that nothing was effected. At the 149close of the war we built gun-boats by the score, but now that they may be required for the defence of our own coasts, only to find them so rotten, as to be in danger of crumbling under the concussion arising from their own fire.

In the absence of a more assignable reason, it may be assumed that they have been cheaply built, for it cannot for a moment be supposed that the disaster arose from want of proper supervision. The subjoined extract from a leading article of the Times of April 25th, 1860, will tell the story better than I can, and by that the public will see that the vice of what may be termed extravagant saving is not yet extinct:—

“Five years ago we were compelled to denounce the management of our military and naval establishments. The public and the Government have long since done us justice in this matter, the former by demanding that ‘the system’ which paralysed the efforts of Englishmen should be at once reformed, the latter by setting about those reforms with more or less activity. We have now, most unwillingly, to return to the charge, and to lay before our readers a sad history of mismanagement and waste.

“At this time, we are told, there are forty-seven gunboats, besides mortar vessels, hauled up at Haslar yard. All the world remembers the pæan which was sung over this miniature fleet. Christened with coquettish little names, the gunboats, built according to the newest model and commanded by gallant young officers, were the pets and the pride of the country. It was told how after the war they were all drawn up ready for use on the shortest notice, how they could be brought down to the water in less than an hour, and the enemy confronted in less than a week with an extempore fleet as formidable as any that could issue from Cherbourg. Twenty-two, we are told, have been repaired at a great cost, 150and, with the exception of coppering, are fit for launching. Nine vessels are under repair, fourteen are waiting examination. These repairs began more than three years ago, and have been continued at intervals to the present time. It will appear singular that vessels built only in 1854 and 1855 should so soon require such extensive reconstruction. Very quietly do these repairs seem to have been carried on. The decay has been attributed to the fact that the gunboats had been stripped of their copper, and placed high and dry in a current of air. But now it is announced that the decay must be attributed to another cause. Some gunboats which had been kept afloat have been hauled up, and have been found to be ‘far more defective than those stored beneath the sheds, and the only conclusion which can be arrived at is that the whole of our gunboats afloat are unfit for service.’ They have been constructed with the most reckless disregard to the quality of the material. If those which have been examined are a sample of the whole, we are at this moment without an efficient gunboat. Scarcely a sound piece of wood can be seen about them, every part bearing marks of ‘sap,’ and some of the ribs are completely enveloped with it; the pressure of the hand on their frame crumbles it to dust. Much more to this effect is given in our Naval Intelligence. The copper bolts, also, which should have gone through and been clinched on each side, ‘were found to have been changed into short ends of about two inches, driven in on each side;’ a fact which, if correct, convicts either the builders or their workmen of a deliberate and most disgraceful fraud.

“It may bebe that the Government price was too low, and it is said that the only two sound vessels were built by a firm which lost money by their construction. But that cannot be an excuse for the others. The public will demand a searching and unsparing inquiry into these delinquencies, and if it should appear that men holding a foremost position in the community have been guilty of such malpractices, they should be duly exposed and punished.”

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