Volume 2 — Italy's Neutrality—the Last Phase

The attitude of the Italian press since the character of its papers were defined in the May number of THE CURRENT HISTORY is here recorded. Since May 17, when the King, on account of the heated pro-intervention demonstrations held all over Italy, declined to accept the resignation of the Salandra Ministry, the Giolittian organ, the Stampa, of Turin, has dropped something of its feverish neutralistic propaganda, the Giolittian color has gradually faded from the Giornale d'Italia and the Tribuna, while ex-Premier Giolitti himself has left Rome, declaring that he had been misunderstood in having his declaration that Italy could obtain what she desired without fighting construed into meaning that he desired peace at all costs.

It is understood that in the middle of April Austria-Hungary became convinced that neutralistic sentiments might prevail in the peninsula, and consequently became less active in her negotiations with the Salandra Government. Thereupon Italy resumed negotiations with the Entente powers, and on April 14 acknowledged that Serbia should have an opening on the Adriatic Sea. This caused the Austro-Italian negotiations to be heatedly resumed, and on May 18 the German Imperial Chancellor read to the Reichstag the eleven Austro-Hungarian proposals. The text of these proposals, together with the Italian counter-proposals and the Italian exchange of claims in the Adriatic with the Entente powers, will be found outlined in the Italian official statement cabled by Minister Sonnino to the Italian Ambassador at Washington, presented on Page 494.

It must be borne in mind that the press comments are based upon an imperfect knowledge of the ultimate proposals and claims, and that the Italian attitude for rejecting the Austro-Hungarian proposals obviously rests on these grounds:

1. They are inadequate and might be rendered nought in case of the victory of the Entente powers.

2. They do not give Italy a defensive frontier in the north and east.

3. They do not materially improve Italy's commercial and military condition in the Adriatic.

4. They make no mention of Dalmatia and the Dalmatian Archipelago, with their deep harbors and natural fortifications—a curious contrast to the lowland harbors of the Italian coast opposite.

The Italian demands take into account the possible victory of the Entente powers.

In the circumstances, it is best to begin with an extract from a German paper, as there seems to be an impression abroad that Germany has not appreciated Italy's reasons for not joining with her allies at the beginning of the war and has conducted a propaganda discrediting her willingness to remain neutral provided the Austro-Hungarian concessions proved sufficient and were sufficiently guaranteed.

THE GERMAN VIEW.

From the Frankfurter Zeitung of March 3.

Article VII. of the Austro-German-Italian Treaty, the terms of which have never before been made public, not only provides for the right of compensation in case one party to the contract enriches itself territorially in the Balkans, but also forbids either Austria or Italy to undertake anything in the Balkans without the consent of the other....

In the Tripoli war, when the energetic Duca degli Abruzzi made his advance in the Adriatic against Prevesa and wished to force the Porte to yield through a serious action in the Dardanelles, and when Italy wished to extend her occupation of the Aegean Islands, which lie as advance posts before the Dardanelles, she was obliged to forego her aims, and did loyally forego them, because Austria at that time did not yet desire a movement on the then still quiescent Balkan Peninsula. According to the Italian view, Austria, in determining to liquidate her matured account with Serbia without coming to an agreement in the matter with Italy, canceled the treaty in an important and essential part, irrespective of the assurance that she contemplated merely punishment of Serbia and not the acquisition of territory in the Balkans. The Italian policy considered itself from that moment free from every obligation, even if the speech of Premier Salandra in December could not be interpreted as a formal denunciation of the Dreibund....

We have today good grounds for assuming that much as we must reckon with the fact that the country is determined to go to war if nothing is granted to it, just so little would it support a Government bent on making war because it does not receive anything.

It will be as impossible to solve the Trentino question from the point of view of abstract right as to solve any other iridescent question in that way. The Trentino question, which was long a question of national, historical, and ethnological idealism, has now become a real question of power. The European war and its developments have placed Italy in a position to use her power in order to expand. This is not unusual in history....

But it should be carefully noted that only to an Italy remaining within the Triple Alliance can compensation be given, and, of course, only on the basis of complete reciprocity—(zug um zugleistung gegen leistung). To demand anything whatsoever Italy has no right. On the other hand, the ignoble exploitation of the needs of an ally fighting for her existence would correspond neither with the generosity of the Italian nature nor with her real interests.

The honest path for Italy, who finds herself unable to enter the war on the side of her allies in accordance with the spirit of the Alliance, is to preserve unconditional neutrality. A simple discussion between the leading statesmen of all the three powers will banish every shade of misunderstanding and clear the situation. Italy will spare her strength for the great task on the other side of the Mediterranean and for her correct and sensible attitude will receive, under the guarantee of her friend, (Germany,) the promise of the fulfillment of her comprehensible desire. Any other policy would be foolish and criminal.

ITALY AND ENGLAND.

From the Giornale d'Italia, March 26.

It is known in London, we believe, that Italy is firmly resolved to assure her own future in whatever manner seems best. A seafaring, agricultural, industrial, mercantile, emigrant people like the Italian must for its very existence conquer its own place in the sun, cannot endure hegemonies of any kind, cannot suggest exclusions, oppressions, or prohibitions of any kind, but must defend at any cost its own liberty, not only political, but economic and maritime. Italy is resolved to defend à outrance that sum total of her rights in which the whole future is inclosed. A people does not spend for nothing in a few months $300,000,000 to complete its military preparations and does not intrust for nothing, with a great example of concord, the most ample powers to the Government.

From the Messaggero, April 1.

As Prince von Bülow's negotiations have apparently failed, Italy naturally addresses herself to England. There is, however, this difficulty: England has already made arrangements with France and Russia for the solution of the questions of the Dardanelles and Asia Minor, whereas Italy wishes to have her say in these questions before giving her assistance to the Triple Entente. Moreover, there are Greek aspirations in the Levant and Serbian in the Adriatic to be reconciled with those of Italy. Consequently the situation is not easy.

From the Stampa, April 11.

Not only must Italy have her natural frontiers on the east restored, not only must she have her legitimate supremacy in the Adriatic assured, not only must she safeguard her interests in the Eastern Mediterranean and in the eventual partition of the Turkish Empire, but she must also see assured in the Western Mediterranean a greater guarantee for the safety of herself and her possessions and wider liberty of action than that of which she has recently had painful experience. These things must be guaranteed by an alliance with either Russia or with England....

Before having solved this difficulty any decision in favor of war would be a leap in the dark, an act of inconceivable political blindness. It would be, to adopt a rough, but inevitable, term, a veritable betrayal.

From the Giornale d'Italia of April 12, in criticising the foregoing.

We absolutely fail to understand the motive which induced the Piedmontese journal to print matter so calculated to confuse public opinion. Indeed, the care with which our contemporary seeks to embarrass Italian diplomatic action seems somewhat strange and cannot escape the blame of all those who think it necessary not to hamper the liberty of action conceded to the Government almost unanimously by Parliament and by the people....

It seems almost as though the Piedmontese journal had no thought but to put insoluble problems to the Government, in the face of public opinion, so as to try to prejudice its action in advance. The Stampa's program practically means that to the diplomatic rupture with the Central Empires would be added another diplomatic rupture with the Triple Entente, thus insuring the isolation which the Stampa professes to fear so much.

From the Corriere della Sera, April 12.

The article in the Stampa, which appears ultra-nationalist, is in reality purely neutralist. Italian aspirations must be kept within reasonable bounds. What would happen to Italy if demands were put forward which the Entente could not entertain? Quite apart from questions of direct interest and gain, other factors must be taken into account. There is the danger to Italy in case of the success of her late allies, which would mean the prostration of France, the annexation of Belgium to Germany, the arrival of Austria at Saloniki, British naval hegemony replaced by German, the revival of Turkey, and the consequent ambition to resume possession of lost territories.

ADRIATIC PROBLEM.

From the Politika of Belgrade, March 30.

Italy is claiming not only Italian territories which are under Austro-Hungarian domination, but also a very considerable part of the most purely southern Slav regions. Italy will have to realize one simple fact. Until this war Serbia was closed in on all sides by Austria-Hungary. She therefore asked that Europe should secure for her from Austria-Hungary at least a free outlet to the Adriatic, the price of which she had already paid in blood.

The two Balkan wars were waged primarily for the same thing, since they were wars of liberation. Today it is no longer a question of the economic independence of Serbia, since Austria-Hungary is passing from the scene, but it is a matter of the liberation and of the union into a single State of our race as a whole. This is the idea which at this moment governs the masses of our people, and the numberless graves of our fallen heroes testify to the sacrifice which we have made for the sake of this idea. Whoever, therefore, opposes our national union is an enemy of our race.

Deeply as it would pain Serbia to uproot out of her heart the sympathy which she feels for Italy, she will none the less do so without fail if ever it should become manifest that Italy's present policy signifies that she desires not only to consolidate her legitimate interests, but also to encroach upon the Balkans by attacking Serbia.

From the Giornale d'Italia, April 4.

No one in Italy has ever said or thought that in the event of a bouleversement in the Adriatic and the Balkans there should be denied to Serbia or any Slav State which might arise from the ruins of Austria-Hungary a wide outlet to the Adriatic. But, on the other hand, no one in Italy could ever permit that the reversion of Austria's strategic maritime position should fall into any hands but ours.

There are political and military considerations which are above any question of nationality whatever. It should be enough to cite the example of an England which holds a Spanish Gibraltar and an Italian Malta, besides a Greek Cyprus and the Egyptian Suez Canal. It should be enough to recall the claim made by all the press of Petrograd to establish Russia at Constantinople and on the banks of the Bosporus and the Dardanelles, in spite of all the principles of nationality, Balkan or Turk.

Let the Serbians, in case of an Adriatic and Balkan upset, have an ample outlet to the Adriatic, but do not let them aspire to conquer a predominance in that sea. The Italian people is not, and can not be at this moment, either phil or phobe regarding any other people. The existence, or at least the future, of all the nations is at stake today, and whoever desires the friendship of Italy must begin by loyally recognizing her rights and interests.

From the Giornale d'Italia of April 19.

We reject altogether the idea that Italy would be satisfied with the western portion of Istria, leaving the rest of the Eastern Adriatic shore to the Croatians and Serbians. While Italy would certainly gain by the possession of Trieste and Pola, the strategic position in the Adriatic would still be exceedingly disadvantageous, especially as the Slav claim advanced by certain Russian newspapers, (that Croatia become an autonomous State and divide Dalmatia with Serbia,) includes the right to maintain fortified naval bases on the eastern shore.

This would merely mean exchanging Austrian strategical predominance for Slavonic, and, consequently, Russian predominance nearly as threatening to Italian interests.

The principal objective of Italy in the Adriatic is the solution once for all of the politico-strategic question of a sea which is commanded in the military sense from the eastern shore, and such a problem can be solved only by one method—by eliminating from the Adriatic every other war fleet. Otherwise the existing most difficult situation in the Adriatic will be perpetuated and in time inevitably aggravated.

From the Messaggero of April 21.

We understand that an Italian-Russian accord has been practically concluded. This accord refers both to the war, on which Italy will shortly embark, as well as to the peace which will be finally signed. The French and British Governments have taken an active part in facilitating this accord, as it deals with other questions besides that of the Adriatic.

From Idea Nazionale, May 10.

Italy desires war:

1. In order to obtain Trent, Trieste, and Dalmatia. The country desires it. A nation which has the opportunity to free its land should do so as a matter of imperative necessity. If the Government and the institutions will not make war, they render themselves guilty of high treason toward the country.

2. We desire war in order to conquer for ourselves a good strategic frontier in the north and east in place of the treacherous one which we now have. When a nation can assure the protection of its domain it ought to do so, otherwise its future will have less. It is a necessary duty. There is no other alternative but this—either complete the work or betray what has already been done.

3. We desire war because today in the Adriatic, the Balkan Peninsula, the Mediterranean, and Asia Italy should have all the advantages it is possible for her to have and without which her political, economic, and moral power would diminish in proportion as that of others augmented. To this has the Hon. Salandra borne witness. If we should avoid war we desire less than his words most sacredly proclaimed to the nation in Parliament. If we would be a great power we must accept certain obligations; one of them is war in order to keep us a great power. If we do not want to be a great power any longer, we deliberately and vilely betray ourselves.

The foregoing are the three reasons for entering the war—reasons which are tangible, material, and comprehensive.

From the Giornale d'Italia, May 12.

Italy is determined to realize her national aspirations, cost what it may. For this reason the Government has hastened its preparations for war which, when completed, caused Austria to offer compensations, thus tacitly acknowledging the claims of Italy.

When the Austro-Italian negotiations were begun Signor Giolitti most unfortunately obstructed their successful issue by his inopportune letter declaring that war was unnecessary. Nevertheless, owing to the firmness of the Government and the determination to resort to war, the conversations were resumed. However, Austria, aside from offering insufficient concessions, assumed a waiting policy and sought secretly to conclude a secret peace with Russia. Thereupon the Italian Government opened negotiations with the Allies, which had the effect of increasing the offers of Austria.

During the ultimate, delicate phase of the conversations, when those who advocate neutrality are causing great injury to the interests of the country and also helping its enemies, the Government, reposing in the support of the people, is determined to expose the intrigues and conspiracies intended to favor the Austrians and Germans.

Hence the Government will, if necessary, make an appeal to Parliament. Meanwhile, it will conserve its power and righteously defend the interests of the country.