Volume 4 — Introductory material (continued 8)

The circumstances were such, as I was calling on him in the German Legation, that I had to listen to what he had to say and of course I was prepared to hear what he had to say although I already knew what his instructions were. I was nevertheless shocked to have him speak so baldly to me and when he finished I got up and told him how shocked I was to hear the accredited representative of a supposedly friendly state to Austria admit that he was proposing to engage in activities to undermine and destroy that Government to which he was accredited. He merely smiled and said, of course this conversation was between us and that he would, of course, not be talking to others so clearly about his objectives. I have gone into this detail with regard to this conversation as it is characteristic of the absolute frankness and directness with which high Nazi officials spoke of their objectives.

Nazi activities, forced underground in this period, were by no means neglected. The Party was greatly weakened for a time as a result of the energetic measures taken against the Putsch and as a result of the public indignation. Reorganization work was soon begun. In October 1934 the Austrian Foreign Minister, Berger-Waldenegg, furnished me the following memorandum, which he told me had been supplied to the Austrian Government by a person who participated in the meeting under reference.

“A meeting of the chiefs of the Austrian National Socialist Party was held on the 29th and 30th of September, 1934, at Bad Aibling in Bavaria.

“The meeting occupied itself principally with the reorganization of the Austrian National Socialist Party and particularly with the measures to be taken to this end in the Tirol.

“Measures were decided upon as to the means to be used to create better contact between the party leadership and its members as well as with respect to new propaganda measures.

“One principal point on the agenda had reference to the preparatory measures to be taken for taking over the power in Austria. It was decided to give to all of the Party Headquarters in Austria instructions preparatory to new Terroristic acts. The necessary material, however, is nevertheless until new instructions are issued not to be transported from the German border into Austria, but shall be kept assembled at appropriate places on the German side of the entire Austro-German frontier.

“From a report received by the Party chiefs on the situation in Vienna and upper Styria, it is established that agreements have been concluded with the Communists and with the Socialists with respect to a uniform and common procedure.

“The agents of the Party Direction in Germany have received orders in every Austrian district to prepare lists of all those persons who are known to actively support the present Government and who are prepared closely to cooperate with it.

“When the next action against the Government takes place these persons are to be proceeded against just as brutally as against all those other persons, without distinction of party, who are known to be adversaries of National Socialism.

“In a report of the Party leaders for Austria the following principles have been emphasized:

“A. The taking over of the power in Austria remains the principal duty of the Austrian National Socialist Party. Austria has for the German Reich a much greater significance and value than the Saar. The Austrian problem is the problem. All combat methods are consecrated by the end which they are to serve.

“B. We must on every occasion which presents itself appear to be disposed to negotiate, but arm at the same time for the struggle. The new phase of the struggle will be particularly serious and there will be this time two centers of the terror, one along the German frontier and the other along the Yugoslav frontier.”

The Austrian Legion was kept in readiness in Germany. Although it was taken back some miles further from the Austrian frontier, it remained undissolved in spite of the engagement which had been taken to dissolve it. The Austrian Government received positive information to this effect from time to time which it passed on to me and I had direct information to the same effect from reliable persons coming from Germany to Vienna who actually saw the Legion.

On the surface, however, German activities consisted principally of efforts to win the support of prominent and influential men through insidious efforts of all kinds, including the use of the German Diplomatic Mission in Vienna and its facilities and personnel. Von Papen as German Minister entertained frequently and on a lavish scale. He approached almost every member of the Austrian Cabinet, telling them, as several of them later informed me, that Germany was bound to prevail in the long run and that they should join the winning side if they wished to enjoy positions of power and influence under German control. Of course, openly and outwardly he gave solemn assurance that Germany would respect Austrian independence and that all that she wished to do was to get rid of elements in the Austrian Government like the Chancellor, Schuschnigg and Starhemberg as head of the Heimwehr and others, and replace them by a few “nationally-minded” Austrians, which of course meant Nazis. The whole basic effort of von Papen was to bring about Anschluss.

In early 1935, the Austrian Foreign Minister, Berger-Waldenegg, informed me that in the course of a conversation with von Papen, the latter had remarked “Yes, you have your French and English friends now and you can have your independence a little longer”. The Foreign Minister, of course, told me this remark in German but the foregoing is an accurate translation. The Foreign Minister told me that he had replied to von Papen “I am glad to have from your own lips your own opinion which agrees with what your chief has just said in the Saar and which you have taken such pains to deny.” Von Papen appeared to be terribly upset when he realized just what he had said and tried to cover his statements, but according to Berger-Waldenegg, kept constantly getting into deeper water.

Von Papen undoubtedly achieved some successes, particularly with men like Glaise-Horstenau and others who had long favored the “Grossdeutschtum” idea, but who nevertheless had been greatly disturbed by the fate of the Catholic Church. Without conscience or scruple, von Papen exploited his reputation and that of his wife as ardent and devout Catholics to overcome the fears of these Austrians in this respect.

Developments in the fall of 1935 and the spring of 1936 gave Germany an opportunity to take more positive steps in the direction of the Nazification of Austria. Italy, which had given Austria assurance of support of the most definite character against external German aggression, and on one occasion by mobilizing her forces, had undoubtedly stopped German aggressive action which had been planned against Austria, embarked on her Abyssinian adventure. This and the reoccupation of the Rhineland in 1936 completely upset the balance in Europe. The French and the British Minister informed me that as early as August 1935, they had informed their Governments, on the basis of conversations with the Austrian Foreign Minister, that if there was to be any Danubian Pact, it would have to come into being rapidly for the Austrian Government would be forced to negotiate with Germany even though it would have no confidence that any such agreement arrived at would be respected.

The result of all these forces was the Austro-German accord of July 11, 1936, the public text is as follows:

“Convinced that they are thereby rendering a valuable contribution toward the peaceful development of Europe, and believing that they are thereby doing the best service to the various common interests of the two German States, the Government of the German Reich and the Government of the Austrian Federal State have decided to restore normal and friendly mutual relations.

“It is therefore declared:

“1. In the sense of the statement made by the Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor on May 21, 1935 the German Government recognizes the full sovereignty of the Federal State of Austria.⁠[2]

FOOTNOTES:

“2. Each of these two Governments shall regard the internal political conditions of the other country, including the question of Austrian National-Socialism, as a domestic concern of that country, upon which it will exert neither direct nor indirect influence.

“3. The Austrian Federal State Government’s general policy and its policy toward Germany in particular shall be constantly guided by the Principle that Austria recognizes herself to be a German State. The Rome Protocol of 1934, together with its additional clauses of 1936, and the relations of Austria to Italy and Hungary, as partners in the said protocols are not hereby affected.

“Recognizing that the relaxation of tension desired by both parties can be brought about only if in addition certain preliminary conditions are established by the Governments of both countries, the Reich Government and the Austrian Federal Government shall in a series of detailed measures create these required preliminary conditions.”

Even more important than the terms of the agreement published in the official communique, was the contemporaneous informal understanding, the most important provisions of which were, that Austria would (1) appoint a number of individuals enjoying the Chancellor’s confidence but friendly to Germany to positions in the Cabinet; (2) would devise means to give the “national opposition” a role in the political life of Austria and within the framework of the Patriotic Front, and (3) would amnesty all Nazis save those convicted of the most serious offenses. This amnesty was duly announced by the Austrian Government and thousands of Nazis were released, and the first penetration of the Deutsche Nationaler into the Austrian Government was accomplished by the appointment of Dr. Guido Schmidt as Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and of Dr. Edmund Glaise-Horstenau as Minister without portfolio.

The significance of these arrangements can best be explained by quoting from an official dispatch which I wrote in October 1934 when concern was being expressed with regard to conversations which Chancellor Schuschnigg was reported as having with the “moderate Nazis”, Reinthaller and Riehl. I then reported as follows:

“It is obvious, however, that in view of certain well known facts, these conversations will be followed with interest. A major consideration which will not be disregarded is the fact that Chancellor Hitler himself has always been in favor of indirect rather than direct action in bringing Austria into the German picture. It is his belief that the way to be followed is to get representatives of the National Socialist Party into the penetration. It is an indication of political astuteness, for it is quite certain, in the opinion of many objective observers, that if once a militant, even though small, National Socialist minority gets representation in the Cabinet, it will be the forerunner of absorption. To explain why this is so is rather difficult, as it requires a full appreciation of many factors at play in Germany and in Austria. Briefly, however, it may be epitomized in the terroristic policy which is one of the primary principles of National Socialism. Even before July 25, when the National Socialist Party was legally prohibited, it was very difficult to get proper police and judicial action against National Socialists who committed terroristic acts or who were plotting against the Government. This inaction came, not through sympathy with the movement or through lack of definite knowledge of overt acts, but through fear—through fear of reprisals when a National Socialist regime might come, and that if it did come, those who had proceeded, even though in the line of duty, against National Socialists, would be dealt with with the barbarity and intolerance with which National Socialism has treated its opponents in Germany. The determined attitude of the Government after July 25, strengthened the administration of justice and of the security forces, and this changed attitude came about as a result not only of the feeling within the country that National Socialism would not come now, but also as a result of the action of the powers in support of the independence of Austria. Should the conversations which the Government is having with the National Socialist groups reawaken this fear, or should there be any weakening of the attitude of the Government towards National Socialist be admitted even to indirect or subordinate participation in the Government, it would undoubtedly bring back this fear in an even more acute form and bring into what element of weakness.

“The fact that these conversations are taking place need, therefore, not be considered as being intrinsically a disturbing factor in the internal and external situation of Austria, but should these National Socialist elements in the Government, there is reason for the gravest concern, not only so far as the internal situation in Austria is concerned, but this might become the focal point of disturbance without the country * * *”

The sequel of the agreement was the only one which could have been expected in view of all the facts and previous recorded happenings. Active Nazi operations in Austria were resumed under the leadership of a certain Captain Leopold, who it was known definitely was in frequent touch with Hitler. The Nazi program was now to form an organization through which the Nazi could carry on their operations openly and with legal sanction in Austria. There were formed in Austria several organizations which had a legal basis but which were simply a device by which the Nazis in Austria could organize, and later seek inclusion as a unit in the Patriotic Front. The most important of these was the Ostmarkischer Verein, the sponsor of which was the Minister of the Interior Glaise-Horstenau. Through the influence of Glaise-Horstenau and the pro-Nazi Neustadter-Sturmer, this organization was declared legal by the Courts. I made specific mention of the foregoing because it shows the degree to which the situation in Austria had disintegrated as a result of the underground and open Nazi activities directed from Germany.

Even more open recognition of the Nazis was demanded. In January 1937, Captain Leopold submitted a memorandum of Nazi demands, which, though not formally received, were known to and considered by the Austrian Cabinet.

The Leopold memorandum is as follows:

For the Internal Pacification of Austria.

* * * * * * *

[In Mr. Messersmith’s affidavit there appears at this point the body of Captain Leopold’s lengthy memorandum. It includes Captain Leopold’s statement of the existing situation in Austria. It includes the following demands: (1) An amnesty for all punishments or privations suffered for National Socialist or National activity or sympathy; (2) equal treatment for National Socialists, including freedom of political activity and cultural activity; abolition of laws and sanctions used by the Government against Nazi activity. The memorandum advocates cooperation on the basis of political principles including: A broadening of the Patriotic Front; changes in the Cabinet; an alliance with the Reich; common racial stock as a political aim, and the application of anti-Semitic measures; an early plebiscite on Anschluss.]

Later, a petition circulated by Leopold was submitted to the Austrian Government, demanding authorization to form a “nationalistic party”, which was to be incorporated as a group in the Political Front. It was a Party which its sponsorship plainly marked as openly Nazi. Pressure for the acceptance of these demands was exercised by staging frequent demonstrations and circulating propaganda, all of which was financed in and from Germany. Even as soon after July 11 as July 29, 1936, when the Olympic Torch was carried through the streets of Vienna, there were violent Nazi disorders. From then on, and until Austrian sovereignty was destroyed, there were constant arrests and trials of persons accused of distributing illegal literature or staging illegal demonstrations, accompanied by numerous press comments of more or less violence.

The Austrian Government sought to counteract this pressure in some way by allowing activity in favor of a restoration of the Hapsburgs. On his visit to Vienna in late February 1937, von Neurath took occasion to register Germany’s emphatic opposition to any such move. I remember von Neurath’s visit very clearly. I had known him well and was on friendly terms with him while I was stationed in Berlin. At that time and after the Nazi came into power, he told both Ambassador Dodd and me that he had remained as Foreign Minister when the Nazi came into power in order that he might exercise “a restraining influence” and render service to his country. This may have been the initial motive of von Neurath but he rapidly became one of the most complete and in some ways effective instruments of the Nazis. If he was not in accord with what they did, he was a perfect instrument in helping to carry it through.

Although I had known him well in Berlin and had on occasions been in his house in small gatherings, when he came to Vienna in 1937, there were a number of ceremonies and receptions given by the Austrian Government to which the Diplomatic Corps was invited. When he met me at these meetings he treated me with great coolness and even disdain, knowing my complete lack of sympathy with the program to which he had committed himself, and this manner of treating me with disdain and open disregard was probably his way of protecting himself and his own feelings of shame. Shortly after the visit of von Neurath, Chancellor Schuschnigg in my conversations with him told me that in his conversations with von Neurath, during the visit, von Neurath had been just as bad as if Habicht or Frauenfeld had been talking when they had discussed the German demands for the inclusion of Nazis in the Austrian Cabinet.

About the same time, Schuschnigg made some concessions to ease the pressure from the Nazis. In February, he appointed a so-called “Committee of Seven”, consisting among others of Dr. Jury and a man named Tavs, to discuss “nationalistic ambitions” with him. In June, following the visit of Glaise-Horstenau and General Kraus and Leopold to Hitler in Berlin, and the increased Nazi activities following, Schuschnigg appointed Seyss-Inquart and Dr. Pembauer to devise a means whereby the “Nationalists” could be incorporated into the Patriotic Front.

Dr. Seyss-Inquart himself was a prominent Vienna Lawyer, who had long been an intimate personal friend of Chancellor Schuschnigg. The Chancellor himself told me on various occasions that Dr. Seyss-Inquart had frequently attempted to convince him that the admission of the Nazi into the Austrian Cabinet would be for the best interest of Austria, in that it would relieve the pressure on Austria by Germany, and that he (Seyss-Inquart) at all times professed a sincere desire to maintain the independence of Austria. I had little personal contact with Seyss-Inquart but I knew from various sources absolutely reliable that while Seyss-Inquart was making these protestations to the Chancellor with whom he had had this intimate friendship, and which the Chancellor repaid by his confidence, Seyss-Inquart was in fact completely insincere. He was known at the time, and I had knowledge of this, to be in frequent contact with many high officials of the German Government and that he had had contact with Hitler himself. My information on this point was obtained not only from sources in Austria but also from acquaintances in Germany. There is only one thing which can be said in favor of Seyss-Inquart at the time and that is that he perhaps did believe the German protestations made to him that Austria’s independence would be respected. It is difficult, however, to conceive that a man who was known to have the legal ability and intelligence of Seyss-Inquart could have been completely taken in by these protestations. The probabilities are that at least from the outset he used his friendship with Chancellor Schuschnigg in order to help to destroy the independence of his country in order to make a place for himself.

I left Vienna on July 11, 1937, in order to assume the post of Assistant Secretary of State in Washington. I, therefore, left Vienna before the final tragedy occurred. The final outcome, however, was then already foreseeable. From the tenor of the Italian Minister’s conversations with me it was clear that Italy would not or could not any longer defend Austria militarily against German aggression. It was also clear that Austria could not resist the German pressures alone. Although France had given very definite assurances as to her interest in maintaining Austria’s independence and England had expressed her interest therein, the Austrian Government was less and less able to be assured of real support. When the Austrian government could no longer expect the full military support of Italy, it knew that its fate was sealed. Hitler was, therefore, free to work his will in Austria. The only question remaining was when he would do it and when he considered it opportune. The work of disintegration, set forth in this statement, had had its effect. Early in 1938, apparently satisfied that England and France would not move and knowing that Italy could not and would not oppose him, Hitler struck the final blow at Austria’s independence, bringing to a climax what must be recorded in history as one of the most insidious, dastardly, unjustified and altogether effective series of measures to undermine and bring about the end of a sovereign state, during the course of which machinations and operations the Nazi Government nevertheless consistently openly proclaimed its friendliness towards Austria and its intentions of maintaining its respect for its sovereignty and independence.

[Signed] G. Messersmith

Subscribed and sworn to before me, William L. Brewster, a Vice Consul of the United States of America, duly commissioned and qualified, in Mexico, D.F., Mexico, this 28th day of August 1945.

[Signed] William L. Brewster Vice Consul of the United States of America

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1765-PS

The commissioner for the four year plan Plenipotentiary for special missions

Berlin W8, Behrenstr. 43, 15 Jan 43

SECRET

To

1. His excellency, the Reich marshal of the Greater German Reich—commissioner for the four-year plan—

a. Attention the secretary of state Koerner or his representative

b. Attention the ministerial dirigent Dr. Gramsch or his representative

c. Attention ministerial councillor Dr. Kadgien or his representative

d. Attention ministerial councillor Legler, or his representative

2. the commissioner for the four-year-plan- central planning-Attention state councillor Schieber or his representative.

3. The high command of the armed forces

a. Office of economics—attention General Thomas or his representative

b. Special staff HWK, attention Admiral Groos, or his representative

c. Office of foreign intelligence, attention Admiral Canaris, or his representative

d. Army Administration Office, attention General Osterkamp, or his representative

e. Armed forces budget dept., attention Ministerial dirigent Dr. Tischbein, or his representative

f. Armed forces administrative dept., attention Intendant General Dr. Biehler, or his representative.

4. The High Command of the army—Quartermaster General, attention Maj. Gen. Wagner or his representative.

5. The Reich minister for Aviation and supreme commander of the Airforce, attention Field Marshal Milch, or his representative

b. Administrative office of the airforce, attention General Crosrav or his representative

c. Dept. GI—attention chief engineer Sellschopp, or his representative

6. The high command of the navy, attention Admiral-General Witzell, or his representative.

7. The Reichsfuehrer SS and Chief of the German Police

a. SS Main office of economic administration, attention SS brigadier General Loerner, or his representative.

b. SS-Office for raw materials—SS-Colonel Kloth, or his representative.

8. The Foreign Office

a. Attention Ministerial Director Wiehl, or his representative

b. Attention VLR. Bisse, or his representative

c. Attention Minister Hemmen, or his representative

9. The Ammunition Ministry

a. Attention Reichsminister Speer, or his representative

b. Attention Commercial Attaché Ruckenbrod, or his representative

10. Reich Minister for Nutrition

a. Attention Secretary of State Backe, or his representative

b. Attention Ministerial Director Dr. Moritz, or his representative

11. Reich Minister of Finance

a. Attention Reichsminister Count Schwerin-Krosigk, or his representative

b. Attention Ministerial Councillor von Knorre, or his representative

c. Attention Government Councillor Nitschke, or his representative

12. The Reichsminister of Economy

a. Attention the secretary of State Dr. Landfried, or his representative

b. Attention to the under secretary of state von Jagwitz, or his representative

c. Attention for the President Kehrl, or his representative

d. Attention to the Ministerial Councillor Dr. Drexl, or his representative

e. Attention of the Chief Councillor of government Dr. Goetze, or his representative

13. The Main Office for Reich Security [RSHA]

a. Attention SS-Brigadier General Ohlendorf, or his representative

b. Attention SS-Colonel Schellenberg, or his representative

14. The Reich Commissioner for price control

a. Attention Minister Fischboeck, or his representative

b. Attention Government councillor Dr. Wurst, or his representative

15. The Auditor-Generals Office of the German Reich

a. Attention Ministerial Councillor Kuesel-Glogau, or his representative

b. Attention Office Councillor Rueger, or his representative

16. The Military Commander in France

a. Attention KVCh Dr. Michel, or his representative

b. Attention KVACh Frhr. v. Mahs, or his representative

c. Attention OKVR Bolck, or his representative

d. Attention Intendant of General Staff Lenz, or his representative

17. The Military Commander in Belgium and Northern France

a. Attention KV Chief Reeder, or his representative

b. Attention Ministerial dirigent Dr. Schlumprecht, or his representative

c. Intendant in charge, Intendant of General Staff Fritsch, or his representative

18. Commissar of the Reich for the occupied Dutch Territories

a. Reichscommissar Dr. Seyss-Inquart, or his representative

b. Dept. of industrial economy, attention Chief Councillor of government Dr. Heinemann, or his representative

c. Dept. of the four-year plan, attention Mr. Pluemer, or his representative

19. Commander of the Armed Forces in the Netherlands

a. General Christiansen, or his representative

b. Intendant in charge, intendant of General Staff Dr. Geyer, or his representative

20. The Plenipotentiary General for Economy in Serbia, Consul General Neuhausen, or his representative

21. The Supervisory Office in Paris, attention Lt. Col. Koch, or his representative, two copies

22. The Supervisory Office in Belgium, attention Lt. Col. V. Parish, or his representative, two copies

23. The Supervisory Office in Lille, attention Major Woehlke, or his representative, two copies

24. The Supervisory Office Netherlands, attention SS-Major Hanke, or his representative, two copies

25. The Supervisory Office Belgrade, attention Major Werner, or his representative, two copies

26. The Roges trading Company Ltd., attention Director Kraney, or his representative

Enclosed I send copy of my second report of findings with the request for acknowledgement.

Heil Hitler signed: J. Veltjens Col AC certified: Hillmann office employee The commissioner for the four-year plan plenipotentiary for special missions

SECRET

2. Report of findings of the plenipotentiary for special missions

A. Obtaining of war important goods on the black market in the occupied western territories and in Serbia.

I. The black market up to the issue of the order to the plenipotentiary for special missions.

II. Development of the black market since the 1 July 1942.

1. General

2. The organization created by the plenipotentiary for special missions.

3. Scope of the previous purchases (per 30 Nov. 1942).

III. The further development

B. Obtaining of harbor installations and machines from shut down plants.

I. Harbor installations

II. Machines

C. Christmas action.

D. Miscellaneous.

A. Providing of war important goods on the black market in the occupied western territories and in Serbia.

I. The black market up to the issue of the order to the plenipotentiary for special missions.

The beginning of a black market in the occupied territories can already be ascertained in the time before the German troops entered. It started however, on a large scale after the German occupation and as matters were, the occupation authorities could not prevent this.—The following reasons have necessarily led to its rise:

1. The scarcity of goods in consequence of the exploitation and rationing as a result of hoarding as an escape into material values (particularly in metals) and as a result of removal for the purpose of sabotaging the German Military power.

2. The impossibility of enforcing price limits completely and consequently a constant enlargement of the divergence of price between raw materials and finished products on one hand and between goods and wages on the other.

3. The impossibility of controlling the prices on the German model because of the lack of personnel in the German supervisory organizations.

4. The lack of effective support of the counter-measures by the individual administrative state authorities, primarily in France.

5. The inefficient criminal justice of the individual state criminal authorities.

6. The lack of discipline in the civilian population.

This development was accelerated—particularly since the year 1942—by the attitude of numerous offices of the armed forces and other German organizations. The raw materials and finished products needed by these offices could often not be placed at disposal on the desired scale by the home land within the framework of existing priority measures. Consequently it became often actually the practice simply to use the way of supply through the black market. The activity of German agencies on the black market gradually reached an extent which led to increasingly more unbearable conditions; it was daily routine for the black marketeers to offer their goods simultaneously to several offices for sale and that that office which offered the best price received the merchandise so that the individual German formations in this manner not only snatched the merchandise away from one another, but also, inflated the prices.

Finally the black market dealings took a course which gave impetus to the most serious fears with respect to market- and currency policy. The military commanders in France, Belgium and northern France and the Reichscommissar for the occupied territories of the Netherlands therefore took measures during the course of the year 1941 to bring this development to a halt. However, in this respect the lever was not—at any rate not primarily—inserted at the price side because this promised only little success in the face of the internal conditions prevailing in the occupied territories; just as little could a stricter control of prices be considered at that time. The central occupation authorities rather began to do business themselves on the black market, with the aim of slowly gaining control of it and then to kill it gradually. These actions can be viewed as the predecessors of the organization of the Bfs, (Plenipotentiary for special missions) here also the purchased goods were distributed centrally and because the winding up was also executed through the Roges (in France) or through the AWG (in Belgium) and the Bfs in Holland in conjunction with the department “four year plan” of the Reich commissioner on the one hand and the departments of the Reich on the other. The purchase was at times made through a single purchasing agency. However, such a procedure had to be denied the desired success as long as it was not possible to hold off all the other offices from activity on the black market; it would have been a prerequisite for this, that all central authorities in the Reich had instructed the departments subordinated to them accordingly, but this was only done in part.

Finally, in June 1942 the plenipotentiary for special missions [Bfs] in agreement with all central authorities was ordered to take charge of the seizure and central control of the black markets. With that, the prerequisite for an effective beginning regarding the problem of the black market and with it the struggle against it existed for the first time.

II. Development of the black market since 1 July 1942.

1. General.

The plenipotentiary for special missions has from the beginning on viewed the purpose of the mission given to him less in presenting the highest possible figures of purchases; the final aim was set rather to combat the black market that is, to bring it to an end.

The starting point had to be however, that as long as in the occupied territories an essential part of the goods existing or produced at all, disappears by reason of inefficient control or various other reasons in the black market, in the interest of supplying the German war economy with the most important raw materials and finished products, as textiles and PX rations, seizure of these goods could not be avoided. One fact is overlooked again and again: that the black market is not a phenomenon evoked through the activity of the plenipotentiary for special missions or other departments, but—as is shown under I—has developed inevitably from the economic situation of the market and will exist and have to be exploited in the German interest as long as no way has been found to break it up completely or at least check it to the extent that the amount of goods caught through it are meaningless within the framework of the total supply. However, the figures given later on in detail show that for the time being there cannot be any question about it.

But the figures given later on show also that the purchases made on the black market could contribute essentially to the covering of many gaps in the supply of the German war economy without impairing the quota of deliveries in the occupied territories. Therefore the purchases can already for this reason not be refrained from as long as it has not been established that the goods can be secured in another way. The objection that these goods could have been secured anyhow within the frame work of the normal supply—and then much cheaper,—is incorrect. A typical example is the result of the last negotiations with France regarding leathergoods: Upon the desire of the Reichsminister of economics, the chief plenipotentiary for special missions had agreed to stopping the purchases on the leather and hide market, if the French who had complained about the German buying activity on the black market, would oblige themselves to deliver additionally in 1943 the same amount which had been bought in 1942 on the black market; the French declared that they did not feel in a position to do this. The objection mentioned is overlooking the fact that merchandise which had once been withdrawn from production or had been produced illegally, will never again become “white”. What is done cannot be undone, the black market is in existence and would also exist without any doubt if not a single German department would work in this field. The black market receives new impulse again and again and that on the one hand from the supply side, and

1. from the large hidden stocks still in existence,

2. from the illegal production which is taking place continuously (this subject will have to be investigated later on more in detail),

3. in France—at any rate up to date—through continuous supply from the unoccupied territory;

on the other hand, at the always increasing scarcity of goods every item finds a buyer, either from the civilian population or industry, or through purchase on the part of the Italians, Swiss, Spaniards; yes, numerous purchases could even be ascertained—in particular in unoccupied France—by the English or—evidently through British instigation—from neutral sources, as for instance the Portuguese which do not serve any other purpose than that of depriving Germany of the merchandise.

The consequence of such sudden cessation of purchases through the organization of the plenipotentiary for special missions would therefore only be that a so far not inconsiderable source of raw materials and war important finished products dries up without achieving on this account the end of the black market. Besides, it has to be doubted with good reason that it would be possible to keep up the prohibition of purchases which was issued to the German departments in the occupied territories, if the delivery by the organization of the plenipotentiary for special missions would suddenly cease. This applies particularly for the cases of the so-called immediate-need [Sofort-Bedarf]. The conception that the black market will come to an end if no more is bought on the part of the Germans, is incorrect. [Marginal notation in handwriting is inserted here: “Yes, our work has to begin here; with it we hit then the French black market primarily”.]

The central purchasing organization of the plenipotentiary for special missions for instance does not buy agricultural products (only some particularly reasonable items in price have been bought, which however are not at all worth mentioning within the framework of the total supply) and nevertheless the black market is the most significant just on this sector.

It has been explained that further activity on the black market at the scale up to date will in the long run not be bearable any more for the budget of the Reich. However, in this respect it has to be pointed out that the greatest part of the purchases—that is the ones made in France—have been financed from the French costs of occupation. Of RM 1,107,792,819——the total amount of purchases, RM 929,100,000 have been financed from French occupational funds. Therefore a debit to the budget of the Reich did not arise to this extent.

The claim that the black market or the activity of German departments on the black market would bring about an increasing decline of the currency in the occupied territories, cannot be recognized as the truth. The decline of the currency which has in part actually occurred already, is not a consequence of the black market, but on the contrary, the inflationary tendencies accompanying the increasing scarcity of goods have evoked the rise of the black market.

At this place it will not be necessary to elaborate on the advantages of a centralized obtaining of the purchases on the black market; only two points of view shall be emphasized:

1. While in the time before the commissioning of the plenipotentiary for special missions, the prices on the black markets rose always further,—for the most part a consequence of the mutual competition of the individual German buyers—it has since been possible, to stabilize the prices of most goods, and this in spite of the fact that the general level of prices in the occupied territories has risen further.

2. While until the commissioning of the plenipotentiary for special missions, the individual German departments received and used the goods purchased by themselves uncontrolled, without regard to the degree of necessity, the distribution now takes place within the scope of total planning by the Reich according to the degree of urgency.

In summarizing, it has to be said that in the face of the supply situation of the Reich, it cannot be refrained from skimming the black market now as before as long as there are still concealed stocks of war important goods. With regard to this higher interest all other points of view have to remain in the background.

2. The organization created by the plenipotentiary for special missions.

In his report at the end of August 1942, the plenipotentiary for special missions has presented in detail the organization created by him for the getting hold of and centralized control of the black market. Therefore here a short review only shall be given.

The general control and supervision of the purchasing activity is the task of the supervising offices newly created for this purpose.

They are:

a. the supervising office France with its seat in Paris

b. the supervising office Belgium and Northern France with its seat in Brussels

c. the supervising office Belgium and Northern France, Lille branch, with its seat in Lille

d. the supervising office Netherlands with its seat in the Hague

e. the supervising department Serbia with its seat in Belgrade.

Principle and directives for the execution are on the one hand “the instructions for the winding up of stocks of merchandise of uncertain origin” issued by the plenipotentiary for special missions in agreement with the military commanders of the Reich commissar for the occupied Dutch territories and on the other hand the contracts concluded by the Roges raw material trading company Ltd. with the purchasing organizations. The purchases themselves are made by a restricted number of authorized purchasing organizations, of which there are in France 11, in Belgium 6, in the Netherlands 6 and in Serbia 3. Thereby the total purchasing activity is subordinated to the central supervision of the plenipotentiary for special missions. Each purchasing organization is only authorized for a quite definite kind of goods. The engagement of a number of purchasing organizations which will on first sight appear comparatively high was necessary, because the black marketeers by experience want to sell for the most part only to certain departments, with which they have cooperated before and because they refuse to cooperate with other buyers whom they did not know previously; it had to be taken care, however, that none of the existing sources dried up. Participation has been prohibited to all other departments by corresponding orders of the central authorities in the Reich and the military commanders of the Reich commissioner.

The financing of purchases and the transportation of the goods will be taken care of by the Reich-owned Roges Ltd.; the goods are then distributed according to the urgency of the individual consumers in agreement with the instructions of the centralized planning or the departments charged by the centralized planning. It is the additional task of the Roges Ltd., to level the purchasing prices down to the German internal price; lower prices, however, will not be granted for deliveries to the armed forces, authorized and—in case of investment goods—to big plants. The adherence to the directives is guaranteed by the fact that the purchasing organizations at each offer may only then perform the transaction, if the supervising department has given its permission through an expert. The experts for their part will make their decision on the basis of the price and quality limits given by the plenipotentiary for special missions or the Reich departments.

3. Scope of the previously made purchases (up to 30/11/1942).

a. Since the beginning of the action (that is since purchases have been directly centralized by the military commander or the Reich commissar with centralized distribution of goods in the Reich).

Up till now since the beginning of the action purchases have been made in the total amount of RM 1,107,792,818.64, of which

in France RM 929,100,000.00

in Belgium RM 103,881,929.00

in Holland RM 73,685,162.64

in Serbia RM 1,125,727.00

Payment takes place in France from the funds for occupation, in the other countries through clearing.

In the following is a statement of the quantities involved:

1. Metals:

66,202 tons to the value of RM 273,078,287.00 of which there are

a. non-ferrous metals 58,742 tons, in particular copper and copper containing material (34,000 tons), lead and lead alloys (14,500 tons), furthermore (in the succession of their quantity) zinc, aluminum, tin, nickel, magnesium, antimony, manganese ore;

b. material containing iron (tools, junk, etc.) 7,460 tons.

2. Textiles:

To the total value of RM 439,040,000.00, of which there are 22,672,000 pieces of linen, suits (particularly workers’ clothing), overcoats, etc., 5,488,000 kg yarn and miscellaneous, 40,642,000 m cloth and ribbons, 10,072,000 pairs of gloves, suspenders, etc.

3. Leather, skins, and hides:

To the total value of RM 120,754,000.00, of which there are 5,053,000 kg raw hides, 3,390,000 square feet of finished leather, 1,783,000 pieces of hides, chamois, etc., 801,000 pairs of shoes, and 694,000 kg leather for soles and other shoe soling articles.

Furthermore was bought:

industrial oils and fats (1,330 tons) food oils and fats (346 tons) wool household articles PS goods including paper articles wines and alcoholic drinks equipment for engineers sanitary necessities sacks

The factors leading to excessive raising of prices of essential goods are at the present time the following:

France Belgium The Netherlands

Metals 9 9 5-6½

Textiles 4 6½ 5

Hides 6½ 6 4

Leather 6½ 6 6

Since beginning of the action the following items were bought in France—against payment from occupation funds:

Metals RM 248,000,000.00

Textiles RM 340,000,000.00

Hides, skins, leather RM 112,000,000.00

Wool RM 3,000,000.00

Oils & fats (for industrial and food purposes) RM 12,000,000.00

Household goods RM 46,600,000.00

PK goods RM 33,000,000.00

Wines and alcoholic drinks RM 50,000,000.00

Sacks RM 10,500,000.00

Paper and packing material RM 5,000,000.00

Food and pleasure items RM 33,000,000.00

Chemical products RM 8,000,000.00

Sanitary necessities RM 12,000,000.00

Miscellaneous RM 16,000,000.00

TOTAL SUM RM 929,100,000.00

Since beginning of the action the following items were bought in Belgium—against payment by clearing:

Metals RM 13,784,000.00

Textiles RM 43,755,000.00

Leather, skins & hides RM 4,030,880.00

Wool RM 2,179,720.00

Industrial oils & fats

Chemical products

Food-oils & fats RM 3,815,159.00

Household goods RM 2,512,912.00

Furniture RM 418,035.00

Paper & packing material RM 5,561,268.00

Food & pleasure items RM 3,393,955.00

Engineer equipment RM 7,500,000.00

Miscellaneous RM 16,931,000.00

TOTAL SUM RM 103,881,929.00

Since beginning of the action the following items were bought in the Netherlands—against payment through normal bank transactions:

Non-ferrous metals RM 6,706,744.00

Textiles RM 55,285,568.00

Wool RM 753,878.00

Leather, hides & skins RM 4,723,130.00

Wooden barrels RM 254,982.00

Furniture RM 272,990.00

Food-and pleasure items RM 590,859.00

Chemical-and cosmetic articles RM 152,191.00

Various iron-and steel goods RM 3,792,166.00

Rags RM 543,416.00

Motor oil RM 52,284.00

Raw diamonds RM 25,064.00

Miscellaneous RM 531,890.00

TOTAL SUM RM 73,685,162.00

In Serbia was bought against payment through clearing:

Non-Ferrous metals in the amount of RM 1,125,727.00

The action began here only in the month of November. Up to date the goods charged to the receivers amounted to a total of RM 86,084,910.06.

The reasons why, at a total delivery of RM 1,107,792,819.00 no larger quantities could be completely wound up, are various (aggravation of the winding up through the procedure in fixing the prices, difficulties in transportation, lack of personnel). The Plenipotentiary for special missions has instigated measures, in order to accelerate the wind-up in the future.

b. Since the beginning of the activity by the plenipotentiary for special missions, on the 1/7/1942, the following was bought (up to 30/11/1942):

Altogether for RM 840,382,893.00

of which

metals RM 174,982,697.00

textiles RM 318,013,354.00

leather, skins and hides RM 82,265,070.00

The figures mentioned above comprise roughly about the same period of time (1/7/-30/11, i.e., five months) as the purchasing action of the military commander or the Reichs Commissar before commissioning of the plenipotentiary for special missions (in France 6 months, in Belgium 2 months, in the Netherlands 7 months); the figures are however several times higher (RM 840,382,893.00—in contrast to RM 267,409,926.00). This proves more than anything else that and to what degree, the concentration of purchases on the black market through the organization of the plenipotentiary for special missions and the placing of the purchased goods at the disposal of the total planning of the Reich succeeded.

III. The further development.

There is not any doubt that the black market as such from the viewpoint of political economy is extremely undesirable and that therefore everything has to be attempted to bring it to an end. In this respect it is also necessary that the German purchasing activity be stopped as soon as possible. But on the other hand, as has already been explained above in detail, the delivery of war important raw materials and finished products cannot be refrained from. The plenipotentiary for special missions has therefore made his own suggestions to the departments involved to the effect the purchasing activity be abandoned by degrees if the black market is suppressed by corresponding measures; in this respect it must be certain however, that the quantities of goods which flowed up to date to the black market will now go into the “white” production and into normal trade. Naturally, however, repressive measures have to precede this; only then can the gradual abandoning of the purchasing activity take place in order to impair the total influx of goods as little as possible.

In examining the measures to be taken for the fight against it, a distinction must be made between the sources, from which the black market is fed. First, there are the concealed stores established for most varied reasons whose sale will bring a one time flow of goods. Second, the black market is fed by continuous illegal production. It is certain that with continued duration of the war the second mentioned source will gain more and more in importance; therefore special attention has to be paid to it.

The illegal production has its cause—aside from the general lure of higher prices—in the fact that the price divergence between raw materials and finished products has partly become so great that it cannot be bridged any more within the framework of normal production without endangering the solvency of the enterprise. Often the capacity of the enterprise is exploited only incompletely so that the entrepreneur, even if it is only in order to avoid a shut-down, turns to procurement of raw materials illegally in order to produce beyond his quota, that is, illegally. Previously the purchases in unoccupied France which were sent on special routes into the occupied territory, formed a third and considerable source. It remains to be seen, whether it is now possible to supervise production in the up to now unoccupied part of France on a stricter basis so that, here also, the fight against the black market can be initiated.

According to the conception prevailing here, the following measures for the removal of the black market would have to be effected:

1. Enlargement of the price supervision.—As an increase in personnel of the German departments entrusted with the supervision does not or only at a restricted scale seem possible, the administrative authorities of the individual state have to be constrained to show more activity.

2. The enactment of severer penalties for violations against measures of economic management taken in accordance with the German example because only then can the lack of discipline in the civilian population resulting from their individualistic and liberalistic attitude be removed. A supervision of the verdicts of the penal authorities of the individual states seems to be recommendable.

3. The announcement of awards for reporting violations against measures of economic management amounting to a not too small percentage of the value of the objects confiscated on the basis of the report.

4. Engagement of spies and agents provocateurs.

Besides for the prevention of illegal production:

5. Shut down of all plants which are not manufacturing for war purposes.

6. Stricter shut-downs or merger of plants whose capacity is exploited immediately only.

7. Stronger supervision of the production in factories.

8. Stricter scrutiny in the allotment of raw materials for the distribution of orders.

9. A price policy which gives to the enterprises sufficient prices and guarantees them the existence.

In order to create for the purchasing organizations of the plenipotentiary for special missions the basis for purchasing activity on the black market in the face of the administrative authorities of the individual state in the occupied territories, the plenipotentiary for special missions has in Belgium and in the Netherlands effected a “decree on the clarification of unexplained goods” or a “general decree”. Hereby the supervising departments and their purchasing organizations were given simultaneously the possibility of approaching through purchases of goods the source of error in management and control. In accordance with it a suggestion was made by the plenipotentiary for special missions also to Ambassador Hemmen for France, which will result in the issue of such a decree for France also in cooperation with the military commander.

Most important and promising of success for the beginning appears the measure outlined in 2 whereby the initial effort should be made toward commerce and there again first toward retail business. As soon as a number of draconic penalties has occurred, the retail dealers will in their own interest refrain from buying excessively priced merchandise from the wholesalers and manufacturers. The latter face then only the organization of the plenipotentiary for special missions; then it could be started by degrees to let the illegal producers crack up. The plenipotentiary for special missions has in this respect already performed certain preliminary work by directing part of the purchasing organizations to try to approach the manufacturers by eliminating of the black market traders.

The repressive measures mentioned above—particularly under 1 and 2—have to be performed in close cooperation with the individual state authorities; it is recommendable that as soon as possible proper measures be taken on the part of the German occupation authorities. The measures have to be accompanied by purposeful propaganda of press and radio (branding the black market as a crime against one’s own people); in order to build psychologically foundation for the strict measures with the population and to rouse it to cooperation.

Further, French and Belgium government—and economic circles—among others also the French chief of government—have lately found it necessary to complain about the organized German purchasing activity. In the face of such representations—aside from various other arguments—it should be pointed out that also on the part of Germany the greatest interest exists in the disappearance of the black market, but its existence is, in the main, the fault of the government authorities themselves, through their incapability in the supervision of prices and their laxity in penal prosecution, whereby, lack of discipline is bred within their own population.

B. Providing of fort installations and machines from shut-down plants.

I. Harbor installations.

A large amount of harbor equipment exists in the occupied western territories, which at the present time is not or is insufficiently used. On the other hand, in the eastern territories as well as partly in the Reich there exists an urgent need for such harbor installations. The plenipotentiary for special missions has therefore received the directive to seize these idle potentialities, in agreement with the departments involved. The determination of the objects to be shipped is up to the Reich commissar for navigation or those needing the goods after confiscation by the responsible navy departments, the plenipotentiary for special missions effects the financial settlement and puts the objects for installation at the disposal of those needing them. So far installations of that kind could already be provided for Oslo and for Hamburg; further transactions are in the process of being executed.

II. Machines.

Another task of the plenipotentiary for special missions is the seizure of machines from closed down plants. It is certain that large potentialities, particularly in machine-tools which are badly needed at home for the armament productions, are at the present time still idle. In agreement with the plenipotentiary for special missions, the military commander and the plenipotentiary for the production of machines a so-called “arbitration offices for machines” is anticipated in Belgium and the Netherlands. One of the main difficulties in this field lies in the overcoming of the resistance of both the owner of the plants involved and the individual state authorities in the occupied territories. Here the occupational authorities will have to employ all their initiative in order to break this resistance.

C. Christmas-Action.

At the end of August 1942 the plenipotentiary for special missions received a further special task, i.e. the providing of Christmas presents for the German people. Initially the action was calculated to amount to RM 300,000,000 (internal price). This task was undertaken immediately with all possible vigor, though it could be foreseen that providing and transportation of such quantities of goods in the comparatively short time available until Christmas could hardly be achieved; as the providing should if possible take place in the normal way—by payment through clearing also in France—and not on the black market, an organization had first to be created in order to master this task.

Actually it was possible to provide goods to the value of approximately RM 244,000,000 (purchase price) up to the 20 December 1942. But on account of the difficulties of transportation occurring in conjunction with the political events in France as well as the procedure necessary for fixing the prices and other reasons, it was impossible to bring all of these goods to Germany and to make them available for sale on time. 2,306 box-cars with 11,138,229 kg and further by ship 6,335 bales of goods with over 100,000 kg arrived in Germany. In the first place they comprise cosmetics, toys and in general gift-articles. Distribution was primarily made in the bomb-damaged regions as well as in the big cities Berlin, Vienna, Hamburg, Breslau, Koenigsberg and in the industrial region of Waldenburg and Upper Silesia. A conclusive report in the Christmas-action will be presented in the course of the month of February. If an identical action should be contemplated in the year of 1943 on the basis of experiences made it would have to be started in the course of the month of March.

D. Miscellaneous.

Recently a report has been made to the commissioner for the four-year plan on the other fields of activity of the plenipotentiary for special missions insofar as the providing of additional shipping space for war important purposes is concerned.

A report on the special imports by way of blockade running is anticipated.

On the orders issued recently

a. in the field of the so-called “commodity-arbitrage” b. the economic use made of enemy property,

a report shall be rendered at opportune time.

Signed: J. Veltjens Colonel of the Air-Force.

Berlin, 15 Jan. 1943

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1770-PS

1933 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 161

Law concerning Factory Representative Councils and Economic Organizations of 4 April 1933

The Reich Cabinet has decided the following law which is hereby made public:

Chapter I

Factory Representative Councils

Article 1

1. The Highest Authority of the Federal State can postpone the elections for the Legal Factory Representative Council for the Federal State, parts of the Federal State or for individual enterprises until 30 September of this year at the latest for reasons of public safety and order.

2. The Factory Representative Council existing up to date remains in office in the case of postponement of the elections. Filling of vacancies in Factory Representative Councils caused by dismissal of members is only necessary if the number of its members has fallen below half of the legal number of members or if they number less than three. The new members of the Factory Representative Council required for its minimum strength will be nominated from the eligible workers by the highest authority of the Federal State or the authority appointed by it.

Article 2

The highest authority of the Federal State can cancel the membership of members who have been appointed contrary to the spirit of State and economy [die in Staats- oder Wirtschaftsfeindlichem Sinne eingestellt sind.] It can appoint new members for the Factory Representative Councils from the eligible workers to replace the eliminated members.

Article 3

The aforementioned regulations will be applied accordingly to the “United Factory Councils”, created according to Article 50 of the Factory Council Law and to the “Special Representations” formed according to Articles 61 and 62. Article 93 of the Factory Council Law will not be applicable in the case of disputes concerning the execution of the above-mentioned regulations.

Article 4

The competent highest Reich authorities will be appointed to exercise the powers for the highest authority of the Federal State contained in Chapter I, in the case of the administrations and enterprises of the Reich, including the German Railroad Company and the Reichsbank.

Article 5

The regulations contained in Article 1, para. 2 and Article 2, 2nd sentence are also applicable to measures taken before the effectiveness of this law.

Chapter II

Dismissal of Workers

The right to oppose dismissal of a worker contained in Article 84 of the Factory Council Law is not applicable if the dismissed is suspected of an unfriendly attitude towards the State. The worker can appeal within a week to the authority declared competent according to Chapter I, Article 2. That authority decides, after hearing all those concerned, whether the suspicions are justified or not. The dismissal is cancelled if its findings are negative.

Chapter III

Representation of Economic Organizations within the Miners Insurance

Article 1

Article 184, Article 157, sentences 2 and 3 and Article 180, part 3 of the Reich Mining Law are hereby revoked.

Article 2

The Reich Labor Minister can charge members of the insurance or mine supervision authorities, as commissioners with the tasks of the instances which are in office at the time; the commissioners are under the authority of the Reich Labor Minister.

Chapter IV

Legal Representation before the Labor Court

The following part 3 is added to Article 11 of the Labor Court Law:

The Reich Labor Minister can, in agreement with the Reich Economy Minister and the Reich Minister of Justice, put other organizations on the same level for legal representation as the organizations named in parts 1 and 2.

Chapter V

Directives of Execution

The Reich Labor Minister has the power to issue legal decrees and general administrative directives in order to insure the execution of the Regulations of this Law; he is authorized to change regulations of the Reich Mining Law in order to adapt them to the decrees of Chapter III of this Law.

Berlin, 4 April 1933

The Reich Chancellor Adolf Hitler The Reich Labor Minister Franz Seldte The Reich Minister of the Interior Frick For the Reich Minister of Justice The Reich Minister of Finance Count Schwerin von Krosigk The Reich Minister of Economy Hugenberg

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1773-PS

THE LAW OF THE GENERAL GOVERNMENT

[Das Recht des Generalgouvernements] Krakau, 1941

E 8. Impounding of Valuables

E 800. Decree on the Sequestration of Property of the Former Polish State in the General Gouvernement.—15 November 1939

On the basis of Article 5, section 1 of the decree of the Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor governing the administration of occupied Polish territory dated 12 October 1939 (RGBl I, page 2077), I issue the following order:

Article 1—1. All movable and stationary property of the former Polish State with accessories, including all demands, participation, rights and other interests inside the General Gouvernement, will be sequestered for the purpose of securing all manner of public valuables.

2. The seizure, administration, and utilization of the sequestered property is the duty of the department “Trusteeship for the General Gouvernement” in the office of the Governor General.

Article 2—The director of the department “Trusteeship for the General Gouvernement” will in agreement with the director of the finance department in the office of the Governor General issue the regulations required to execute this decree, in particular on the duty to make a declaration of the wealth belonging to the former Polish State as well as the treatment of rights of third persons on the wealth of the former Polish State and of claims against this wealth.

Article 3—This regulation will be effective on the day of its publication.

The Governor General for the Occupied Polish Territories FRANK

E 810. Decree on the Right of Ownership of Wealth of the former Polish Territories.—24 September 1940

On the basis of Article 5, section 1 of the decree of the Fuehrer and chancellor of the Reich of 12 Oct 1939 (RGBl I, page 2077), I issue the following order:

Article 1—The property sequestered on the basis of Article 1, section 1 of the decree on the confiscation of the wealth of the former Polish State within the General Gouvernement of 15 Nov 39 (Verordnungsblatt GGP, page 37) will be transferred to the ownership of the General Gouvernement. A legal right of the General Gouvernement will not be established by this transaction.

Article 2—1. Rights of third persons in the property mentioned in Article 1 expire insofar as they existed before 20 November 1939.

2. It will be determined later on whether and to what extent an indemnification can be granted to persons, especially to rightful foreign claimants, for legal losses suffered through the action.

Article 3—The seizure and administration of the property mentioned in Article 1 will be executed until further notice on the basis of the regulation on the confiscation of the wealth of the former Polish State within the General Gouvernement of 15 November 1939 (Verordnungsblatt, GGP, page 37) and of the first executionary decree issued on 16 March 1940 (Verordnungsblatt GGP II, page 175).

Article 4—The director of the department “Trusteeship for the General Gouvernement” in agreement with the director of the finance department in the office of the governor general will be in charge of the property mentioned in Article 1.

Article 5—This regulation will be effective on the day of its publication.

The Governor General FRANK

E 845. Decree on the Confiscation of Art Objects in the General Gouvernement.—16 December 1939

On the basis of Article 5, section 1 of the decree of the Fuehrer and Chancellor of the Reich on the administration of the occupied Polish territories of 12 Oct 1939 (RGBl I, page 2077), I order the following:

Article 1—All art objects in public possession in the General Gouvernement will be confiscated for the fulfillment of public tasks of common interest insofar as it has not already been seized under the decree on the confiscation of the wealth of the former Polish State in the General Gouvernement of 15 November 1939 (Verordnungsblatt GGP, page 37).

Article 2—With the exception of art collections and art objects which were the property of the former Polish State, art objects will be considered as owned by the public:

1. private art collections which have been taken under protection by the special commissioner for the seizure and safekeeping of the art and cultural treasures.

2. all ecclesiastical art property with the exception of those objects required for the daily performance of liturgic actions.

Article 3—1. In order to determine whether art objects are public property in the sense of this regulation, every private and ecclesiastical art possession has to be registered with exact data on the kind, nature and number of pieces.

2. Everyone who possessed or at the present time is in possession of or else is entitled to dispose of such objects of art since 15 March 39, is obliged to register the same.

3. Everyone is obliged to make upon request truthful and appropriate statements.

Article 4—The special commissioner appointed by me for the seizure and safekeeping of the art and cultural treasures will determine in cases of doubt what art collections and art objects in detail will have to be regarded on the basis of Article 2 of this regulation as public art property. He also will decide on the eventual necessary exceptions.

Article 5—1. He will be punished with imprisonment

1. Who undertakes to conceal, sell or remove objects of art from the General Gouvernement.

2. Who refuses or else gives incorrect or incomplete information required from him on the basis of this decree.

2. The special court is competent for the trial.

Article 6—The special commissioner appointed for the seizure and safekeeping of the art and cultural treasures will issue the regulations necessary for the execution of this decree.

Article 7—This regulation will be put into effect immediately.

The Governor General for the Occupied Polish Territories FRANK

E 846. First Enforcement Regulation for the Order of 16 December 1939 on the Confiscation of Art Objects in the General Gouvernement.

In order to execute the decree on the confiscation of art objects in the General Gouvernement of 16 December 1939 (Verordnungsblatt GGP, page 209), I order the following:

Article 1—The registration decree in Article 3, section 1 of the regulation must be carried out by 15 February 1940 with the office of the special commissioner for the seizure and safekeeping of the art and cultural objects, Cracow, Bergakademie.

Article 2—1. Objects of artistic, cultural-historical and historical value which originate from the time before 1850, have to be registered.

2. The registration includes the following:

a. paintings

b. sculpture

c. products of handicraft (for instance antique furniture, china ware, glass, golden and silver objects, Gobelins, rugs, embroideries, lace-work, paramente, etc.)

d. drawings, engravings, woodcuts, etc.

e. rare manuscripts, musical manuscripts, autographs, book-paintings, miniatures, prints, covers, etc.

f. weapons, armors, etc.

g. coins, medals, seals, etc.

3. Regarding the art objects mentioned in section 2, detailed information has to be given, if possible, on the master, the time of production, the contents of the representation, measurements and material (for instance, wood, canvas, bronze, etc.)

Article 3—The special commissioner will send in writing his decision in doubtful cases or in the eventual necessary exceptions as provided for in Article 4 of the decree. The decision will be final.

Article 4—Scientific experts will be entrusted with the execution of the decree.

The Governor General for the Occupied Polish Territories

By order:

Dr. MUEHLMANN

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1774-PS

ORGANIZATIONAL LAWS OF THE GREATER GERMAN REICH

“Verfassungsrecht des Grossdeutschen Reiches” by Ernst Rudolf Huber.

FUEHRER, AND REICH-CABINET [REICH REGIERUNG, Page 223]

a. The Structure of the Reich-Cabinet

The political direction of the Reich is the task of the Fuehrer. The Fuehrer selects, in all fields of political developments the goals which should be attained, determines the methods to be used and makes all fundamental decisions when necessary. The authority of the Fuehrer [Fuehrergewalt] is the “Political Authority” in the new Reich. The term “Leadership” expresses better the mobilization of the collective political force of the people towards the achievement of the common goal, than the term “Government” which has been used heretofore for the highest authority of the State. The Fuehrer has the only final power to decide in all matters concerning movement [party], people, and Reich. He possesses and bears the historical responsibility to his people. Even in instances, where the law assigns certain tasks to the “Reichsregierung”, it is the Fuehrer who is responsible for the final decision.

The Fuehrer avails himself, however, in his decisions of the counsel and the constructive cooperation of his collaborators, especially the Reich-Cabinet, which combines the Subordinate-Fuehrers [Unterfuehrer] of the various departments of the State. The legal position of the Reich-Minister was originally laid down by the Reich-Minister Law of March 27 1930 (RGBl I 96). In its place Section XIII of the German Civil Servant Law is now applicable, with the exception of the regulations concerning the official salaries, service quarters, moving—and travel expenses, where the old law remains valid. The Reich-Ministers are appointed by the Fuehrer and maintain a public service relationship towards him and the Reich. They take a special oath before the Fuehrer when they assume their functions. They cannot belong to any economic enterprise as chairmen or members of administrative or supervisory councils while they hold office (“economic incompatibility”). The Reich-Ministers can be dismissed from their offices at any time by the Fuehrer. No disciplinary action against them will be taken. Special treatment of the Reich-Ministers is based on the fact that they are not “Civil Servants”. Civil Servants are only the members of the Bureaus which are sub- and coordinated to the hierarchic administrative structure, but not those who occupy immediate state-directing positions to whom the Reich-Ministers belong according to the present constitutional law.

The Fuehrer and Reich-Chancellor is at the top of the Reich-Cabinet. He hands down the directives for the over-all operation of the Government and the basic principles for the various departments. A number of Bureaus are subordinated to him for direct counsel and assistance, as follows:

1. The Reich-Chancellery (Chief: Reich-Minister, Dr. Lammers)

2. The Supreme-Command of the Armed Forces (Chief: Generaloberst (Gen.) Keitel)

3. The Presidential Chancellery (Chief: State Minister Dr. Meissner)

4. The Privy Cabinet Council (President: Reich-Minister Frh. von Neurath)

The Reich-Cabinet [Reich Regierung] comprises furthermore the department ministries proper. It is constituted in the following manner according to the official order of rank laid down in the year 1939:

1. The Deputy Commander for the Fuehrer (Reich-Minister Hess)

2. The Supreme Command of the Armed Forces (Generaloberst (Gen.) Keitel)

3. General Field-Marshal Goering (Deputy for the 4 Year Plan)

4. Foreign Office (v. Ribbentrop)

5. Reich-Minister of the Interior (Dr. Frick)

6. Reich-Minister for Enlightenment of the People and Propaganda (Dr. Goebbels)

7. Reich Air-Minister (Gen. Field-Marshal Goering)

8. Reich Finance Minister (v. Schwerin-Krosigk)

9. Reich-Minister of Justice (Dr. Guertner)

10. Reich-Minister of Economy (Funk)

11. Reich-Minister for Food and Agriculture (Darre)

12. Reich-Minister of Labor (Seldte)

13. Reich-Minister for Science, Education and National Culture (Dr. Rust)

14. Reich-Minister for Ecclesiastical Affairs (Kerrl)

15. Reich-Minister of Transportation (Dr. Dorpmueller)

16. Reich Postal Minister (Ohnesorge)

17. Reich-Minister Frank (Legal Affairs Reich-Fuehrer)

18. Reich-Minister Schacht

19. Reich-Minister Seyss-Inquart

20. Reich Forest-Office (Gen. Field-Marshal Goering)

The Commanders-in-Chief of the Army (Generaloberst (Gen.) v. Brauchitsch) and of the Navy (Great-Admiral Raeder) have also the rank of Ministers. Furthermore, the following participate regularly in the sessions of the Government, whenever matters of their department are being discussed:

1. The Prussian Finance Minister, Dr. Popitz.

2. The Reich-Fuehrer SS and the Chief of the German Police, Himmler.

3. The Reich Labor Leader in the Reich-Ministry of the Interior, Hierl.

4. The Chief of the Organization in Foreign Countries in the Foreign Office, Bohle. In addition, the following Supreme Reich-Bureaus are immediately subordinate to the Fuehrer:

1. Court of Accounts of the German Reich (State-Minister, retired, Mueller).

2. Inspector General for the German Road System (Dr. Todt).

3. Reich Office for Area Control [Raumordnung] (Kerrl).

4. Youth-Fuehrer of the German Reich (v. Schirach).

Furthermore, the following are immediately subordinate to the Fuehrer:

1. The German Reich-Bank (President Reich-Minister Funk).

2. Inspector General of Constructions for the Reich Capital (Professor Speer).

3. Counsellor General of Constructions for the Capital of the (party) movement (Professor Giesler).

4. Reich Construction Counsellor for the town of Linz on the Danube.

The directors of these Reich Bureaus act as direct advisers and collaborators of the Fuehrer in their department without being members of the Reich-Government by authority of their office.

A privy cabinet council, to advise the Fuehrer in the basic problems of foreign policy, has been created by the decree of 4 February 1938 (RGBl I, 112). This privy cabinet council is under the direction of Reich-Minister v. Neurath, and includes the Foreign Minister, the Air Minister, the Deputy Commander for the Fuehrer, the Propaganda Minister, the Chief of the Reich-Chancellery, the Commanders-in-Chief of the Army and Navy and the Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces. The privy cabinet council constitutes a select staff of collaborators of the Fuehrer which consist exclusively of members of the Government of the Reich; thus, it represents a select committee of the Reich Government for the deliberation on foreign affairs.

The law on the Supreme Leader of the State makes provision for the nomination of a Deputy Commander for the Fuehrer and also a Vice-Chancellor. Up to July 1934, von Papen, then Reich Minister, was Vice-Chancellor. Since then, no such nomination has been promulgated. The Deputy for the 4 Year Plan has a sort of representation in all matters concerning the 4 Year Plan, “all competent instances of party and state” being combined in his person, and he has been given the power to “issue directives to all authorities, including the highest Reich-Authorities and all offices of the party, its subdivisions and its affiliated associations”. The deputy for the 4 Year Plan is therefore within the limits of his authority superior to the other Reich Ministers, particularly to the economic and military departments. But he is not only superior to the offices of the State but also to those of the party. He is (with the exception of the Fuehrer) the only central authority which by virtue of an office (and not by virtue of a personal union of a party and State office) can issue binding directives to the offices of the party and the State. Considering the tremendous importance of the 4 Year Plan, this position of the deputy is an important means for securing unity between party and State.

This same object is furthermore pursued by the Office of the Deputy Commander for the Fuehrer. While the Deputy for the 4 Year Plan constitutes an authority of the State with the power to issue directives to the party, the Deputy Commander for the Fuehrer represents a party instance with authority to cooperate in State affairs to a large extent. The “Ministry Hess”, with its Liaison-Staff is charged to assert the influence of the party in the legislation and administration of the State. All projects of politically important laws have to be submitted to the Deputy Commander for the Fuehrer for his preliminary examination. He naturally has the power to propose laws from his side. His influence on the administration affects particularly the selection of personnel. All appointments to be made by the Fuehrer have to be examined first by the Deputy Commander for the Fuehrer. Besides these individual powers, it is the duty of the Deputy Commander for the Fuehrer to assert the will of the (party) movement in the organization of the State, to settle difficulties which develop, to investigate complaints, and thus to guarantee unity of party and State.

Unity of party and Reich-Cabinet is furthermore secured by the numerous personal unions i.e. association of Central State Offices with corresponding party offices. Such personal unions exist in the cases of the Food Minister and the Propaganda Minister, the Chief of the German Police and the Reich Labor Leader, the Chief of the Organization in the foreign countries, and the Reich Youth Fuehrer. Furthermore, the majority of the Reich-Ministries is occupied by leading old party members. Finally, all Reich Ministers have been accepted by the party on 30 January 1937 and have been decorated with golden party insignia.

b. The Reich-Cabinet as the bearer of responsible collaboration.

The relationship between the Fuehrer and the Reich-Cabinet differs from the Weimar colleague-like system as well as from Bismarck’s Chancellor System. The great political principles are determined by the Fuehrer; the will of the government is not expressed by vote, as under the colleague-like system; doubts and differences of opinion are also settled by the Fuehrer (in contrast to the provisions of Section 57 of the Weimar Constitution). The Reich-Ministers who act as advisers to the Fuehrer owe him loyalty and obedience in accordance with the oath they have to take by virtue of the law of 16 October 1934. The Fuehrer is therefore not “primus inter pares” (first among equal ones), as it was featured in the colleague-like system, but he is absolutely superior to the other Reich-Ministers. But, if therefore the principle of authority prevails within the Reich-Cabinet it is not permitted in this case in the least to become a formal bureaucratic mechanism like the one that characterized the Chancellor System of Bismarck. In the latter, the collaborators of the Reich-Chancellor, the State-Secretaries, were not independent and responsible chiefs of their departments, but they were the subordinates of the Chancellor and administered in his name and by his orders the various Reich-Offices, at the top of which stood the Chancellor. Even the law of 17 March 1878 concerning deputies did not change that state of affairs to any extent. Such a bureaucratic system does not permit the collaborators to develop a sense of enjoying responsible action and power of resolution and prevents genuine deliberation, the prerequisite of which is independence of the advisor. This is characteristic of an administrative state, where everything depends on the authoritarian technical functioning of the State apparatus. In the Reich of the Fuehrer the decisive factors are that the collaborators are subordinate leaders, that they are therefore possessed themselves with the desire for creative leadership and responsibility.

The Fuehrer does not avail himself of the Reich-Ministers as subordinate executive organs. The Reich-Cabinet is not a technical apparatus. It is therefore inadmissible to consider the Reich-Ministers as mere “Chiefs of Reich Offices” who preside over bureaucratic institutions, rather Reich-Ministers in particular must become genuine sub-leaders if the entire Reich is to be imbued with the spirit of the Fuehrer system. In the Reich Cabinet, the Fuehrer procures for himself the independent and responsible collaborators who do not only technically direct the various offices but who are also capable to act in a constructive and creative manner, within the scope of their assignments. The Reich-Ministers are therefore not only advisors but at the same time responsible creative assistants of the Fuehrer, who administer their offices independently under the direction of the Fuehrer. The prerequisite for the Fuehrer Principle which has been realized in the Reich-Cabinet, is independent cooperation based on confidence and responsibility, of the Fuehrer’s closest followers. Thus, the Fuehrer Principle presents far higher requirements than the bureaucratic absolutism and its not too different Chancellor System of Bismarck.

In view of this structure of the Reich-Cabinet it is only natural that the counter-signature, prescribed in Section 50 of the Weimar Constitution for all decrees and regulations issued by the Reich-President, becomes unnecessary for the decisions of the Fuehrer. They do not require the counter-signature of the Minister of the respective department. Compulsory counter-signature was an institution of the constitutional and parliamentary system. The Minister who counter-signed the orders of the Chief of State assumed thereby responsibility before parliament. The counter-signature was thus inseparably connected with the parliamentary responsibility of the Ministers; it lost its political foundation with the revolutionary elimination of parliamentarianism of any form. However, also in the New Reich during the period of Reich President Hindenburg’s administration, counter-signature of presidential acts by the Reich-Chancellor was maintained. Of course, the counter-signing Reich-Chancellor or Reich-Minister did not assume any more the “responsibility before the Reichstag”, as was the case within the limits of the Weimar parliamentary system. The counter-signature was used in this case rather as a suitable technical form for safeguarding the unified direction of the State as long as a dual Chief of State existed. This technical reason for maintaining the counter-signature was rendered unnecessary with the assumption of the presidential powers by the Fuehrer. Today, it is not necessary any more according to constitutional law. The decrees of the Fuehrer have legal force, even if they are not counter-signed by a Reich-Minister. Such was particularly the order of execution of the 4 Year Plan of 18 October 1936 (RGBl I, 887) which in fact contains a law issued by the Fuehrer alone without any counter-signature.

As a rule, the decrees of the Fuehrer, are on the other hand, even today co-signed by the Minister of the department concerned. Authorized to co-sign are the Reich-Ministers, within the limits of their departments. Furthermore the Chiefs of the Presidential-Chancellery and of the Reich-Chancellery for their departments (Decree of 22 November 1934, not published), and also the State-Secretaries of a Reich-Minister who is temporarily unavailable (Decree of 20 March 1935, RMinBl. 423). The decrees concerning the party are co-signed by the Deputy Commander of the Fuehrer, decrees concerning the range of problems of the 4 Year Plan by the Deputy of the 4 Year Plan and the military decrees by the Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces. The Chiefs of the Supreme Reich-Bureaus who are not Reich-Ministers are not authorized to co-sign.

Co-signature is being regularly maintained for two reasons. For once, the co-signature brings out the fact that the Minister of the department is more than a mere technical auxiliary tool of the Fuehrer, that he performs rather independent and objective work which requires of course the approval of the Fuehrer but which is nevertheless the Minister’s own work and performance. Thus, the co-signature gives prominence to the fact that the Minister is an independent collaborator and not only an executive instrument. Also, the co-signature is therefore documentary proof—and this is the second reason—for the responsibility of the Minister of the department, naturally not before the Parliament but before the Fuehrer himself. By co-signing the Minister accepts the responsibility before the Fuehrer that the decree is practical, has been carefully considered and thoroughly worked out. Such a responsibility of the Minister before the Chief of the State could not exist under the radical parliamentary Republic. The independence of the Minister from the Chief of State and his responsibility before the Parliament would have been weakened in that way. Under the old constitutional system, on the other hand, (as well as under the presidential system formed after the constitutional system) this responsibility of the counter-signing Minister also before the Chief of State was in existence. This type of “Minister responsibility” is indispensable under the Fuehrer Constitution. In view of the number and the importance of affairs, it is self-evident that the Fuehrer needs the advice, the suggestions, and the proposals of his collaborators; political leadership is impossible without reliable collaborators. The Ministers are responsible to the Fuehrer by their oath for competent and reliable counsel and preparation of his decisions. This responsibility of the Ministers of the various departments finds its public expression by their counter-signature. This counter-signature is not necessary, nevertheless. The Fuehrer can do without it and issue all decrees and decisions which have full legal effect by his own accord.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1775-PS

The OKW is asking the Fuehrer’s decision, concerning the following proposals:

Orders will be given immediately, after the detailed numbers and letters have been released by the Leader, for accomplishment.

1. To take no real preparatory measures in the Army or Luftwaffe. No troop movements or redeployments.

2. Spread false, but quite credible news, which may lead to the conclusion of military preparations against Austria,

a. through V-men [V-Maenner] in Austria, b. through our customs personnel at the frontier, c. through traveling agents.

3. Such news could be:

a. Furloughs are supposed to have been barred in the Sector of the VII A.K.

b. Rolling stock is being assembled in Munich, Augsburg, and Regensburg.

c. Major General Muff, the Military Attaché in Vienna has been called for a conference to Berlin. (As a matter of fact, this is the case).

d. The Police Stations located at the frontier of Austria, have called up reinforcements.

e. Custom officials report about the imminent maneuvers of the Mountain Brigade in the region of Freilassing, Reichenhall and Berchtesgaden.

4. Order a very active make-believe-wireless exchange in Wehrkreis VII and between Berlin and Munich.

5. Real maneuvers, training flights, and winter maneuvers of the Mountain Troops near the frontier.

6. Admiral Canaris has to be ready beginning on February 14th in the Service Command Headquarters in order to carry out measures given by order of the Chief of the OKW.

7. An answer is requested to Lt General Keitel through the Reich-Chancery.

Signed.Keitel.

14.2 7:30 Captain Eberhardt gives the information by phone, that the Fuehrer has given his approval in all points. Answer came only around 2 at night through Reich-Chancellery.

9:00 Telephone message transmitted to Admiral Canaris in Munich.

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1778-PS

THE POISONOUS MUSHROOM [Der Giftpilz]

A Stuermer book for young and old Fables by Ernst Hiemer Pictures by Fips Published by Der Stuermer—Nurnberg copyright 1938

* * * * * * *

[P.6] “It is almost noon,” he said, “now we want to summarize what we have learned in this lesson. What did we discuss?”

All children raise their hands. The teacher calls on Karl Scholz, a little boy on the first bench. “We talked about how to recognize a Jew.”

“Good! Now tell us about it!”

Little Karl takes the pointer, goes to the black board and points to the sketches.

“One usually recognizes a Jew by his nose. The Jewish nose is crooked at the end. It looks like the figure 6. Therefore it is called the “Jewish Six”. Many non-Jews have crooked noses, too. But their noses are bent, not at the end but further up. Such a nose is called a hook nose or eagle’s beak. It has nothing to do with a Jewish nose.”

“Right!” says the teacher. “But the Jew is recognized not only by his nose...” The boy continues. The Jew is also recognized by his lips. His lips are usually thick. Often the lower lip hangs down. That is called “sloppy”. And the Jew is also recognized by his eyes. His eyelids are usually thicker and more fleshy than ours. The look of the Jew is lurking and sharp.

[P.9] Then the teacher goes to the desk and turns over the black board, on its back is a verse. The children recite it in chorus:

From a Jew’s countenance—the evil devil talks to us,

The devil, who in every land—is known as evil plague.

If we shall be free of the Jew—and again will be happy and glad,

Then the youth must struggle with us—to subdue the Jew devil.

[P.32] Inge sits in the reception room of the Jew doctor. She has to wait a long time. She looks through the journals which are on the table. But she is much too nervous to read even a few sentences. Again and again she remembers the talk with her mother. And again and again her mind reflects on the warnings of her leader of the BDM [League of German Girls]: “A German must not consult a Jew doctor! And particularly not a German girl! Many a girl that went to a Jew doctor to be cured, found disease and disgrace!”

When Inge had entered the waiting room, she experienced an extraordinary incident. From the doctor’s consulting room she could hear the sound of crying. She heard the voice of a young girl: “Doctor, doctor leave me alone!”

Then she heard the scornful laughing of a man. And then all of a sudden it became absolutely silent. Inge had listened breathlessly.

“What may be the meaning of all this?” she asked herself and her heart was pounding. And again she thought of the warning of her leader in the BDM.

Inge was already waiting for an hour. Again she takes the journals in an endeavor to read. Then the door opens. Inge looks up. The Jew appears. She screams. In terror she drops the paper. Frightened she jumps up. Her eyes stare into the face of the Jewish doctor. And this face is the face of the devil. In the middle of this devil’s face is a huge crooked nose. Behind the spectacles two criminal eyes. And the thick lips are grinning. A grinning that expresses: “Now I got you at last, you little German girl!”

And then the Jew approaches her. His fleshy fingers stretch out after her. But now Inge has her wits. Before the Jew can grab hold of her, she hits the fat face of the Jew doctor with her hand. Then one jump to the door. Breathlessly Inge runs down the stairs. Breathlessly she escapes the Jew house.

[P.61]

The pimpf [Hitler boy between 10-14] so far has not said anything. Suddenly he stops. Then he grasps his two friends by the arm and pulls them away. They stop in front of a bill-board. They read a large poster. It says Julius Streicher makes an address in the People’s Hall about “The Jews are our misfortune”.

“That is where we go!” shouts Konrad, “I wanted to hear him speak for a long time.” “I have heard him once before at a meeting two years ago,” says Erich. “Do tell us all about it!” the two pimpfs beg.

The Hitler youth recounts:

“The meeting was overcrowded. Many thousands of people attended. To begin with, Streicher talked of his experiences in the years of struggle, and of the tremendous achievements of the Hitler Reich. Then he began to talk about the Jewish question. All he said was so clear and simple that even we boys could follow it. Again and again he told about examples taken from life. At one time he talked most amusingly and cracked jokes, making all of us laugh. Then again he became most serious, and it was so quiet in the hall that one could hear a needle drop. He talked of the Jews and their horrible crimes. He talked of the serious danger which Judaism is for the whole world.

“Without a solution of the Jewish question there will be no salvation of mankind.”

That is what he shouted to us. All of us could understand him. And when, at the end, he shouted the “Sieg-Heil” for the Fuehrer, we all acclaimed him with tremendous enthusiasm. For two hours Streicher spoke at that occasion. To us it appeared to have been but a few minutes.

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1780-PS

Excerpts from General Jodl’s Handwritten Diary, February 1937-August 1939.

1937

4 February:

Decisive conference about the scarcity of raw materials by the Commissioner of four-year plan.

Only 50% of steel and iron available, therefore rationing necessary. Full allotment only for export. Armed forces and constructions for four-year plan must be cut down by about 40%. Therefore, requests for money have to be converted into requirements for raw materials. Three branches of the Armed Forces and L. for R.V. special resources must make up a priority sequence. Until further notice no more orders to be placed with industry so they will have a chance to fill the many orders previously placed with them.

The sentence “Money is an unimportant factor” has come true, even in another sense. The main part is the raw materials.

Bad harvest and [illegible], especially bread grain [Brotgetreide], demand considerable use of foreign currency for the feeding of the people.

31 March:

Report to the Minister about the maneuvers of the Armed Forces. The Field Marshal emphasized the necessity to bring some influence to bear (on the maneuvers) in so far as a special Armed Forces problem has to be dealt with daily. These exercises are to be designated as “Armed Forces Maneuvers” (army, etc.). After two years, a two front war i.e., two maneuvers, should be presented.

5 November:

Hitler develops his ideas of future development, intentions, and conduct of policy to the Commanders-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, the Army, the Navy and the Air Force.

There is a divergence in the recording of his ideas as made by the Chief of the Armed Forces Office (War Department) [des Chef WA (R Kr. Min)] and by the Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force (Directive to the Chief of the General Staff of Air Force). (No minutes were kept).

Intention of L to put ideas on paper and transmit them to the Services (C-in-C Air Force); furthermore, to incorporate them into mobilization instructions.

1938

11 February:

In the evening and on 12 February General K., with General v. Reichenau and Sperrle, at the Obersalzberg. Schuschnigg together with G. Schmidt are again being put under heaviest political and military pressure. At 2300 hours Schuschnigg signs protocol.

13 February:

In the afternoon General K. asks Admiral C. and myself to come to his apartment. He tells us that the Fuehrer’s order is to the effect that military pressure by shamming military action should be kept up until the 15th. Proposals for these deceptive maneuvers are drafted and submitted to the Fuehrer by telephone for approval.

14 February:

At 2:40 o’clock the agreement of the Fuehrer arrives. Canaris went to Munich to the Counter-Intelligence office VII and initiates the different measures.

The effect is quick and strong. In Austria the impression is created that Germany is undertaking serious military preparations.

15 February:

In the evening an official communique about the positive results of the conference at the Obersalzberg is issued.

16 February:

Changes in the Austrian government and general political amnesty.

22 February:

At 1300 hours General K. sees the Fuehrer in order to inform him about the planned advances [Vorstoesse].

3 March:

The Austrian question is becoming critical. 100 officers shall be dispatched there. The Fuehrer wants to see them personally. They should not see to it that the Austrian Armed Forces will fight better against us, but rather that they do not fight at all.

10 March:

By surprise and without consulting his ministers, Schuschnigg ordered a plebiscite for Sunday, 13 March, which would bring strong majority for the Legitimists in the absence of plan or preparation.

Fuehrer is determined not to tolerate it. The same night, March 9 to 10, he calls for Goering. General v. Reichenau is called back from Cairo Olympic Committee. General v. Schebert is ordered to come, as well as Minister Glaise-Horstenau, who is with the District leader [Gauleiter] Burckel in the Palatinate. General Keitel communicates the facts at 1:45. He drives to the Reichskanzlei at 10 o’clock. I follow at 10:15, according to the wish of General v. Viebahn, to give him the old draft.