Volume 4 — Introductory material (continued 11)

Heydrich: But we’ll also have to find an arrangement for confiscation of valuable objects in Jewish possession.

Goering: What he has now in his possession, that’ll come.

Schmer: Article 7 of the decree states that the use of Jewish wealth in German economy shall be regulated through the Four Year Plan.

Goering: I think Fischboeck’s proposal is very good. We should give it the form of a draft now, find the apartment buildings, the shares, etc.

Fischboeck: I should also like to have a decision made on the following question. In Austria, individuals, not institutions, owe the Jews 184 billion Reichsmarks. This way the Jews certainly have invested money in a way we don’t like. That is money which they have loaned out to other Jews, oftener enough to an Aryan. This way, a dependency of the Aryan artisan from the Jewish creditor is created which we do not want. Now the question arises, and I would answer yes. Should trustees not be created to administer these debts and then pay with claims on the debit-ledger, according to demand coming in. The goal of this procedure would be to make the debtor independent from the Jewish creditor, to insert Aryan trusteeship and pay the Jew, as far as his demands could actually be met. Therefore it does not have to be paid. So we should have to insert trusteeship in this case also, but the difference to that in the case of the bonds would be that we won’t simply pay but leave the decision for payment up to the trusteeship.

Funk: If word of this debate should reach the public, we’d have a run on the capital market tomorrow.

Fischboeck: That’s why we have postponed these ideas all the time. We have examples for it that the Jews have sold, head over heel, bonds of internal loans, shares and everything they had.

Goering: I could stop that with a single decree, ordering the immediate stoppage of traffic of Jewish capital. He is punishable who buys from Jews, and his purchase shall be confiscated. I would not do it any other way.

[Part VI is missing]

Part VII

Frick: The Ministry of the Interior shall have to take part in it.

Goering: I have said so before.

(Shout by Goebbels)

* * * that is a misunderstanding. That is now the committee which is elaborating on nothing but on this problem which is being tackled. How are the shares, how are the claims on the debit-ledger to be handled? Therefore, I shouldn’t like to have anybody else in the Committee, in order to keep it as small as possible.

Buerkel: Is the plan for the aryanizing to be discussed also?

Goering: Mr. Fischboeck shall bring that up. This place is the crux of the matter. I hope you have listened properly so that you know exactly what is to be valid for the Sudetengau! Of course, I too am of the opinion that these economic measures ought to be strengthened by a number of Police-action-Propaganda-measures and cultural displays so that everything shall be fixed now and the Jewry will be slapped this week right and left.

Heydrich: In spite of the elimination of the Jew from the economic life, the main problem, namely to kick the Jew out of Germany, remains. May I make a few proposals to that effect?

Following a suggestion by the Commissioner of the Reich, we have set up a center for the Emigration of Jews in Vienna, and that way we have eliminated 50,000 Jews from Austria while from the Reich only 19,000 Jews were eliminated during the same period of time; we were so successful because of the cooperation on the part of the competent Ministry for Economic Affairs and of the foreign charitable organizations.

Goering: The main thing is, you cooperated with the local leaders of the “Green Frontier.”

Heydrich: That amounted to a very small number, your excellency. Illegal * * *

Goering: This story has gone through the whole world press. During the first night the Jews were expulsed into Czechoslovakia. The next morning, the Czechs grabbed them and pushed them into Hungary. From Hungary, they were returned to Germany and from there into Czechoslovakia. They traveled around and around that way. They landed finally on an old Barge in the Danube. There they lived, and wherever they tried to go ashore, they were barred.

Heydrich: That was the report. There weren’t even 100 Jews.

Goering: For practically two weeks, a number of Jews left every midnight. That was in the Burgenland.

Heydrich: At least 45,000 Jews were made to leave the country by legal measures.

Goering: How was that possible?

Heydrich: Through the Jewish Kulturgemeinde, we extracted a certain amount of money from the rich Jews who wanted to emigrate. By paying this amount, and an additional sum in foreign currency, they made it possible for a number of poor Jews to leave. The problem was not to make the rich Jew leave but to get rid of the Jewish mob.

Goering: But children, did you ever think this through? It doesn’t help us to extract hundreds of thousands from the Jewish mob. Have you ever thought of it that this procedure may cost us so much foreign currency that in the end we won’t be able to hold out.

Heydrich: Only what the Jew has had in foreign currency.

(Goering: agreed)

This way. May I propose that we set up a similar procedure for the Reich, with the cooperation of the competent government agencies, and that we then find a solution for the Reich, based on our experiences, after having corrected the mistakes, the General Field Marshall has so rightly pointed out to us.

(Goering: agreed)

As another means of getting the Jews out, measures for Emigration ought to be taken in the rest of the Reich for the next 8 to 10 years. The highest number of Jews we can possibly get out during one year is 8,000 to 10,000. Therefore, a great number of Jews will remain. Because of the aryanizing and other restrictions, Jewry will become unemployed. The remaining Jews gradually become proletarians. Therefore, I shall have to take steps; to isolate the Jew so he won’t enter into the German normal routine of life. On the other hand, I shall have to restrict the Jew to a small circle of consumers, but I shall have to permit certain activities within professions; lawyers, doctors, barbers, etc. This question shall also have to be examined.

As for the isolation, I’d like to make a few proposals regarding police measures which are important also because of their psychological effect on public opinion. For example, who is Jewish according to the Nurnberg laws shall have to wear a certain insignia. That is a possibility which shall facilitate many other things. I don’t see any danger of excuses, and it shall make our relationship with the foreign Jew easier.

Goering: A uniform?

Heydrich: An insignia. This way we could also put an end to it that the foreign Jews who don’t look different from ours, are being molested.

Goering: But, my dear Heydrich, you won’t be able to avoid the creation of ghettos on a very large scale, in all the cities. They shall have to be created.

Heydrich: As for the question of ghettos, I’d like to make my position clear right away. From the point of view of the police, I don’t think a ghetto in the form of completely segregated districts where only Jews would live, can be put up. We could not control a ghetto where the Jews congregate amidst the whole Jewish people. It would remain the permanent hideout for criminals and also for epidemics and the like. We don’t want to let the Jew live in the same house with the German population; but today the German population, their blocks or houses, force the Jew to behave himself. The control of the Jew through the watchful eye of the whole population is better than having him by the thousands in a district where I cannot properly establish a control over his daily life through uniformed agents.

Goering: We’d only have to forbid long-distance calls.

Heydrich: Still I could not completely stop the Jews from communicating out of their districts.

Goering: And in towns all of their own?

Heydrich: If I could put them into towns entirely their own, yes. But then these towns would be such a heaven for criminals of all sorts that they would be a terrific danger. I’d take different steps. I’d restrict the movement of the Jews and would say; in Munich, the governmental district and the district

* * *

Goering: Wait a minute! I don’t care so much for it that the Jews don’t appear in spots where I don’t want them. My point is this one: if one Jew won’t have any more work, he’ll have to live modestly. He won’t be able to go far on his 3½%—to restaurants, etc. He’ll have to work more. That’ll bring about a concentration of Jewry which may even facilitate control. You will know that in a particular house only Jews are living. We shall also have concentrated Jewish butchers, barbers, grocers, etc., in certain streets. The question is of course whether we want to go on tolerating that. If not, the Jew shall have to buy from the Aryan.

Heydrich: No, I’d say that for the necessities in daily life, the German won’t serve the Jew anymore.

Goering: One moment. You cannot let him starve. But there’ll be the following difficulty. If you say that the Jews will be able to have so and so many retail stores, then they’ll again be in business, and they’ll continually have to sell for the wholesaler.

Schmer: In a small town that wouldn’t work at all.

Goering: It could only be worked out if you’d reserve in advance whole districts or whole towns for the Jews. Otherwise, you’ll have to have only Germans do business, and the Jew shall have to buy from them. You cannot set up a Jewish barbershop. The Jew will have to buy food and stockings.

Heydrich: We’ll have to decide whether we want that or not.

Goering: I’d like to make a decision on that right now. We cannot make another subdivision here. We cannot argue: so and so many stores will remain for the Jew because then again no control will be possible since these stores in turn would have to work with wholesale stores. I’d say, all stores should be Aryan stores, and the Jew may buy there. One may go one step further and say that these and these stores will probably be frequented mostly by Jews. You may set up certain barbershops operated by Jews. You may make concessions in order to channel certain professions into certain streets for certain tasks. But not stores.

Heydrich: What about the ghetto? Would the Jew have to go to an Aryan district to buy?

Goering: No. I’d say that enough German storekeepers would love to dwell in the ghetto if they could do some business there. I wouldn’t alter the principle that the Jew shall have no more say in German economy.

Heydrich: I shouldn’t like to comment on that. Now a few things which are important also from a psychological angle.

Goering: Once we’d have a ghetto, we’d find out what stores ought to be in there, and we’d be able to say: you, the Jew so and so, together with so and so, shall take care of the delivery of goods. And a German wholesale firm will be ordered to deliver the goods for this Jewish store. This store would then not be a retail shop but a cooperative store, a cooperative one for Jews.

Heydrich: All these measures would eventually lead to the institution of the ghetto. I’d say one shouldn’t want to build a ghetto. But these measures, if carried through as outlined here, shall automatically drive the Jews into a ghetto.

Funk: The Jews will have to move quite close together. What are 3 million? Everyone will have to stand up for the next fellow. The individual alone will starve.

Goering: Now, as to what Minister Goebbels has said before, namely compulsory renting. Now, the Jewish tenants will be together.

Heydrich: As an additional measure, I’d propose to withdraw from the Jews all personal papers such as permits and driver’s licenses. No Jew should be allowed to own a car, neither should he be permitted to drive because that way he’d endanger German life. By not being permitted to live in certain districts, he should be furthermore restricted to move about so freely. I’d say the Royal Square in Munich, the Reichsweihestatte, is not to be entered any more within a certain radius by Jews. The same would go for establishments of culture, border fences, military installations. Furthermore, like Minister Dr. Goebbels has said before, exclusion of the Jews from public theaters, movie houses, etc. As for cultural activities, I’d like to say this: cultural activities in holiday resorts may be considered an additional feature, not absolutely necessary for the individual. Many German Volksgenossen are unable to improve their health through a stay at a resort town. I don’t see why the Jew should go to these places at all.

Goering: To health spas, no.

Heydrich: Well, then I’d like to propose the same thing for hospitals. A Jew shall not lie in a hospital together with Aryan Volkgenossen.

Goering: We’ll have to manage that gradually.

Heydrich: The same applies to public conveyances.

Goering: Are there no Jewish Sanatoriums and Jewish hospitals?

(Remarks—Yes!)

We’ll have to finagle all this. These things will have to be straightened out one right after another.

Heydrich: I only meant to secure your approval in principle so that we may start out on all this.

Goering: One more question, gentlemen: What would you think the situation would be if I’d announce today that Jewry should have to contribute this 1 billion as a punishment?

Buerckel: The Viennese would agree to this whole-heartedly.

Goebbels: I wonder if the Jews would have a chance to pull out of this, and to put something on the side.

Brinkmann: They’d be subject to punishment.

V. Krosigk: Mr. Fischboeck, one question: Could this authorization be ordered without their closing out their securities?

Funk: They are all registered. They’ll also have to register the money.

V. Krosigk: But for the time being they may dispose of it.

Goering: It won’t help them to cash them all. They can’t get rid of the money.

Funk: They’ll be the ones to have the damage if they sell their stocks and bonds.

Fischboeck: There is a certain danger, but I don’t think it is very great. But only then, when all the other measures shall definitely be carried out during next week.

V. Krosigk: They have to be taken during the next week at the latest.

Goering: I would make that a condition.

Fischboeck: Maybe it is good that we put ourselves under pressure this way.

Goering: I shall close the wording this way; that German Jewry shall, as punishment for their abominable crimes etc., etc., have to make a contribution of 1 billion. That’ll work. The pigs won’t commit another murder. Incidentally, I’d like to say again that I would not like to be a Jew in Germany.

V. Krosigk: Therefore, I’d like to emphasize what Mr. Heydrich has said in the beginning; that we’ll have to try everything possible, by way of additional exports, to shove the Jews into foreign countries. The decisive factor is that we don’t want the society-proletariat here. They’ll always be a terrific liability for us.

(Frick: “and a danger!”)

I don’t imagine the prospect of the ghetto is very nice. The idea of the ghetto is not a very agreeable one. Therefore, the goal must be, like Heydrich said, to move out whatever we can!

Goering: The second point is this. If, in the near future, the German Reich should come into conflict with foreign powers, it goes without saying that we in Germany should first of all let it come to a showdown with the Jews. Besides that, the Fuehrer shall now make an attempt with those foreign powers which have brought the Jewish question up, in order to solve the Madagascar project. He has explained it all to me on 9 November. There is no other way. He’ll tell the other countries. “What are you talking about the Jew for?—Take him!” Another proposal may be made. The Jews, gotten rid of may buy territory for their “coreligionists” in North America, Canada, or elsewhere.

I wish to summarize: The Minister of Economic Affairs shall direct the committee and he shall in one form or another, take all steps necessary within the next few days.

Blerning: I fear that during the next few days, beginning Monday, the Jews will start to sell bonds on internal loans for hundreds of thousands, in order to provide themselves with means. Since we control the course of the internal loan in order to sell more bonds, the Reich-Treasury, Loan-Committee or the Reich Minister for Finance should have to back this internal loan.

Goering: In what way could the Jew bring his bonds on the market?

(Remark: “Sell them”)

To whom?

(Remark: “on the stock market—he orders a bank to do it.”)

Well, I’ll prohibit selling internal loan bonds for three days.

Blerning: That could be done only through a decree.

Goering: I can’t see any advantage for the Jew. He won’t know himself how and he’ll have to pay. On the contrary, I believe he won’t move.

Goebbels: For the time being he is small and ugly and stays at home.

Goering: I don’t think it would be logical. Otherwise we’ll have to do it. The reason why I want this decree in a hurry is that for the time being we have peace but who can guarantee that there won’t be new trouble by Saturday or Sunday. Once and for all I want to eliminate individual acts. The Reich has taken the affairs in its own hand. The Jew can only sell. He can’t do a thing. He’ll have to pay. At this moment, the individual Jew won’t think of throwing anything on the market. There’ll be some chatter first, and then they will begin to run to us. They’ll look for those great Aryans with whom, they’ll think they may have some luck, the so-called various mailboxes of the Reich with whom they can lodge their protests. These people will run my door in. All that takes some time, and by then we’ll be ready.

Daluege: May we issue the order for confiscating the cars?

Goering: Also the Ministry of the Interior and the Police will have to think over, what measures will have to be taken. I thank you.

[Conference closed at 2.40 PM]

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1817-PS

ORGANIZATION BOOK OF THE NSDAP, 1936 EDITION

The Reich Organization Leader of the NSDAP, published by the Central Publishing House of the NSDAP, Franz Eher Successor, Munich. Page 211.

BUREAU FOR FACTORY TROOPS [AMT WERKSCHAREN]

I. TASK:

The factory troops in the National Socialist Community “Strength through Joy” [NS—Gemeinschaft “Kraft durch Freude”] carry out the following tasks:

1. To help and come to the rescue, in their capacity as a young factory guard, whenever there is a question of bringing the German working man strength through joy.

2. Shaping of factory celebrations and festivals in order to permeate the factories with National Socialist ideology and philosophy, with special regard to the creation of a new ritual.

3. To be an ideological shock squad [Weltanschaulicher Stosstrupp] within the factory.

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1818-PS

ORGANIZATION BOOK OF THE NSDAP, 1940 EDITION

The Reich Organization Leader of the NSDAP [Dr. Robert Ley] published by the Central Publishing House of the NSDAP, Franz Eher Successor, Munich. Pages 195-196b.

BUREAU FOR FACTORY TROOPS AND TRAINING

The Bureau of Factory Troops and Training [Werkschar und Schulung] is simultaneously a Bureau under the jurisdiction of the Reich Organization Leader of the NSDAP—Main Training Bureau.

* * * * * * *

The education and training of the Bureau of Factory Troops and Training has in mind the totality of the tasks of the NSDAP and of the German labor front. It comprises political shaping of the will, and conveying trade knowledge, and includes the whole labor policy on an ideological basis, character education, and creation of a soldierly attitude [Soldatisch-haltungsmaessige Ausrichtung].

It is the aim of the German labor front training to enable the factory troops and the German labor front functionaries to lead the workers of the German people, and thereby to render real the National Socialist community of factory, accomplishment and people.

* * * * * * *

THE FACTORY TROOPS OF THE GERMAN LABOR FRONT IN THE FACTORY

Regulations for its building:

The Factory Troop as an organization exists only in the factory. It is the nucleus of the factory community.

The Factory Troops Leader:

The confirmed factory chairman [Betriebsobmann] of the German Labor Front leads, under the same title, the Factory Troops of the factory. For training and commitment of the shock squad [Stosstrupp] the factory chairman deputizes a shock squad leader [Stosstruppfuehrer].

Membership in the Factory Troops:

Membership in the Factory Troops is voluntary and it presupposes readiness to fight for a National Socialist conception of work and for a German worker’s community.

* * * * * * *

TASK OF THE FACTORY TROOPS

Under the leadership of the factory chairman, it is the task of the Factory Troops to guarantee, under all circumstances and by all means, the political security and readiness of the factory to commit itself.

Not through words and speeches alone, but primarily through their example, the Factory Troops shall convince the community of their fellow-workers of the justice of the National Socialist will, and educate them to utmost effort, to highest accomplishments, and to most extreme devotion.

It must remain the aim of the Factory Troops to fuse the factory into a closely-meshed, single-willed community capable of the highest accomplishments for the people and the Reich. Commitment:

Directives and regulations for physical coordination, commitment and utilization of the Factory Troops are issued by the Reich Organizational Leader, or on his behalf by the head of the Central bureau, or the German Labor Front chairmen of district [Gau] county [Kreis] and locality [Ort], so far as it is not a question of Factory Troops tasks falling within the professional sphere of activity of the factory.

The competent regional chairmen (district, county and locality) are solely responsible for the over-all commitment of the Factory Troops.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1822-PS

[Item 1]

1. Letter of the Fuehrer with wording of 25 August 1939 transmitted to me by telephone from the Reich Labor Ministry.

2. Telegram No. 370 of 25 August 1939 concerning transmittal of Fuehrer’s letter to Duce.

3. Second letter of Fuehrer to Duce, dated 25 August 1939 transmitted by telephone by the Reich Labor Ministry to the Ambassador.

4. Tel. No. 371 of 25 August 1939 concerning transmission of second letter of Fuehrer.

5. Note of Envoy von Plessen concerning telephone call from Berlin, dealing with alleged contradiction between telegram 370 and a letter transmitted by Ambassador Attolico in Berlin.

6. Note of 26 August 1939 on same subject.

7. Letter of Duce to Fuehrer of 26 August, transmitted at 1210 hours by telephone in Berlin by Count Ciano to Attolico.

[Item 2]

Rome, August 25, 1939.

Embassy Courier (Btsch./Kr.)

Telegram in code (Secret Ch. V.)

(Valid)

Foreign Affairs Berlin

Citissime

No. 370 of 25 August

Top Secret

To: The Minister of Foreign Affairs. Subject: Today’s Telephonic Instructions.

V. 1. Encoding: Fink/Grade/Haupmann.

2. Dispatched: Krueger/Limberg/Zimmerm.

3. To me dispatched in sections (last one at 11 p. m.)

[Illegible notations]

I have personally handed on to the Duce in the Palazzo Venezia at 1520 o’clock in the presence of Ciano the contents of today’s letter of the Fuehrer conveyed here by telephone. The Duce, who was possessed of great calmness, at first, read the letter through entirely, and then went over it, with me sentence for sentence, at which time, he translated the sentences into Italian for Ciano, who is not conversant with German, and, in fact, as I was able to convince myself, completely, correctly, and true to the meanings.

Among this comments upon the individual themes, I shall single out the following:

He was entirely satisfied with the non-aggression pact with Moscow. He, himself, already in the Spring had offered such a suggestion to Field Marshal Goering, pointing out, indeed, at this juncture, the need of adopting a moderate attitude, since our two nations, who for ten years on account of ideological reasons have been oriented for a fight against Moscow, must have the time needed for a readjustment. In spite of the suggestion made at that time, he, himself, is and remains an implacable anticommunist.

(Here I interrupted with the view that the German position against communism self-evidently remains entirely unchanged and that in regard to this fact Moscow has never been left in doubt.)

The comment in the letter concerning the attitude of the Japanese Cabinet he regarded as being correct. The fault lies with the Japanese Ministry of the Navy, which is opposed to adopting an unambiguous position against England.

The reaction he also expects the pact with Moscow to have upon Rumania appeared to be of most lively interest to him. Consideration for Bessarabia would paralyze Rumania’s freedom of movement in favor of Poland in the case of conflict. Thus Rumania would be left to the Hungarians.

With an approving nod of the head he agreed that Turkey would now have to revise its attitude.

He described the worsening of German-Polish relations as so acute that an armed conflict can no longer be avoided. The moment to consider possibilities of preventing the conflict has now passed, because the Polish mentality—supported by England’s attitude—is no longer responsive to reasonable suggestions, no matter from which side they might come. Otherwise he might have imagined that the Poles would have sought, for example, immediate reapproachment with Germany, if they correctly appreciated the danger threatening their existence; and, to prove clearly their willingness to negotiate, they would first of all have given Danzig to Hitler, without reservations and without any talks on negotiations. Then one might have considered the removal of further reasons for discord—he cited the Polish Corridor and Silesia—by means of direct German-Polish talks; in his opinion that would have been possible. Finally, a general conference might have followed in order to solve the other big controversial questions—points of differences between Italy and France, German colonies, distribution of raw materials, armament questions. This would have assured European peace for 15-20 years, as is desired by all. Such considerations, however, are outdated by the precipitous course of events. He had now adjusted himself to the fact that the outbreak of a general conflagration is not only unavoidable but immediately imminent. The question of the exact date interested him most, and he wanted to know whether I could tell him more about that. I answered the question by pointing out the corresponding places in the letter. He seemed to realize that nothing more could be said at the moment by anybody. But he emphasized that he attached much value, for obvious reasons, to the fact that he should be informed as fast as possible. But in view of the speed of the developments he understood the difficulties of such notification. Finally, he stated again that he would have preferred open conflict 2 to 3 years hence and gave his reasons. And he believed the reasons also applied to us, especially in view of the condition of our fleet. However, developments are now forcing us in another direction. In any case, he expressly emphasized, he is with us, unconditionally and with everything.

At the end of the talk he made comments about the prospects of an armed German-Polish conflict which should be decided in our favor by our army in a very short time.

Ciano, who led me out after I took leave of the Duce, summarized his impressions of the situation by saying that any discussion over possibilities to keep the peace was outdistanced by the course of events. No longer the word “peace,” but “victory” would govern his action.

Mackensen

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1823-PS

Telegram in Cipher (Good) Sent Berlin 27 Aug 1939 00-32 hours Rec Rome same day 02-25 Rec Embassy 27 Aug 1939 03-40

Deciphering Nr. 403 of 26 Aug 1939

[illegible pencil mark] For Chief of Agency personally. Sealed matter. Decipher personally. Strictly secret. To Ambassador v. Mackensen personally.

The Reich Minister requests that the following reply of the Fuehrer be forwarded to the Duce immediately.

Duce!

I have received the information concerning your final attitude. I respect the motives and influences determining your resolution. Perhaps it will nevertheless be for the best. Of course, in my opinion, this will be true only if the world does not receive any inkling of the intended attitude of Italy, at least not till actual fighting starts. For this reason I beg you heartily to support my struggle psychologically in your press and any other means. I also beg of you, Duce, if it is possible for you to force at least England and France to immobilize certain parts of their strength, by demonstrative military actions, or to keep them in any case, in a state of uncertainty. But the most important thing is this, Duce: should, as mentioned, the big war start, the situation in the East will be solved, before the two Western powers can achieve any success. This winter or at the latest by spring I intend to deploy in the West forces at least equal to those of France and England. The blockade will be of little effect, especially under the altered circumstances in the East and as a result of my autarchic preparations. Its danger during the progress of war will not increase but decrease. Now I have a big favor to ask you, Duce. You and your people could help me most in this hard struggle by supporting me with Italian manpower, manpower for industrial as well as agricultural purposes. Should you later on in the course of developments be forced or be in a position to intervene, the intensified autarchic basis of the Reich would be of the utmost importance to you. In reiterating my entreaty for the granting of this special favor, I wish to thank you for all the efforts you have made in our common cause.

Adolf Hitler

End of Letter: Schmidt.

COPY

Letter of the Fuehrer transmitted telegraphically to his Excellency Ambassador v. Mackensen, received at 3:40 o’clock, 27 August 1939, for immediate delivery to Il Duce.

DUCE!

[Text of message the same as above].

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1828-PS

Extract from Memorandum Handed to German Foreign Office by Count Magistrati, forwarded by von Weizacker to Ambassador von Mackensen in Rome 7 August 1939.

2. * * * Above all it must be most clearly and unmistakably stated that when the Fuehrer decides that the opportune time to start a war has come, Italy is ready to agree a hundred percent. If Germany has to mobilize, Italy will also do so at the same time, since it intends to meet its obligations fully and with all its forces. As said already before, this should be clearly understood. * * *

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1831-PS

BTSCH/KR

NOTE

On behalf of the Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs, VLR Kordt calls at 11:15 with the information that two telegrams, numbered 439 and 440 are on the way to me. The Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs requests that I should get in touch with the postal authorities to have these telegrams delivered to me with the greatest possible speed. They contained the text of two letters by the Fuehrer to the Duce, but I was to keep this information to myself. I was to hand these to the Duce personally as quickly as possible. When I asked when were the telegrams sent off and how long they were which I had to know in order to estimate for when to make an appointment with the Duce, Mr. Kordt stated that until then only No. 439 had been sent off at 10:30, whereas No. 440 was still being in the process of coding. One of the telegrams was about half a page long, the other, two. I told Mr. Kordt that I would take the necessary steps, but that I had to point out already now that one should not entertain any false hopes as to the time that would elapse.

At 11:50 the Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs calls me up from the Reich Chancellery personally and requests me to have the Fuehrer’s two letters to the Duce received immediately by telephone, as their transmission by telegraph would presumably take too long and then to deliver the letters to the Duce with greatest speed. Then the telephonic transmission of the text of the two telegrams followed immediately.

Immediately afterwards VLR Kordt called me and told me that he had just transmitted to us the Fuehrer’s two letters to the Duce by telephone. Referring to our previous telephone conversation he asked me to take the further steps. I answered that meanwhile the Minister for Foreign Affairs has called me personally and that I had already received the text of the letters over the telephone through another line. We ascertained together that thus the text of these letters has arrived here over three routes.

At 12:15, I informed the office RM by telephone that the Duce would receive me at 1 o’clock.

After the audience with the Duce, I informed by telephone the Office RM at 1:50 about the delivery of the letters, adding that a telegram about my conversation with the Duce would be sent immediately.

ROME, 1 September 1939

(Signed) Mackensen

Coded Telegram (Copy)

From Berlin: 3 September 1939, 2:50 hours Arr. Rome: 3 September 1939, 3:00 hours. Arr. Embassy: 3 September 1939, 6:30 hours

DECODING

No. 450 dated 2 September 1939. For High Officials or their representatives in person. Top Secret. To be decoded in person. Top Secret. For the Chief of the Mission for personal and confidential information.

The Italian Ambassador handed to the State Secretary at the Duce’s order following copy for the Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor and for The Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs:

Italy sends the information, leaving, of course, every decision to the Fuehrer, that it still has a chance to call a conference with France, England and Poland on following basis: 1. Armistice which would leave the Army Corps where they are at present. 2. Calling the conference within 2-3 days. 3. Solution of the Polish-German controversy which would be certainly favorable for Germany as matters stand today.

This idea which originated from the Duce has its foremost exponent in France.

Danzig is already German and Germany is holding already securities which guarantee most of her demands. Besides, Germany has had already its “moral satisfaction.” If it would accept the plan for a conference, it will achieve all her aims and at the same time prevent a war which already today has the aspect of being universal and of extremely long duration.

Duce does not insist on it, but he lays particular emphasis that above should be brought to the immediate attention of von Ribbentrop and of the Fuehrer.

End of Copy

The answer to the Italian Ambassador was promised by 3 September.

Woermann

Telegram Heading in Italian 773 S Berlin AW1/2 977 630/626 3/9 2051 Etat—459 For the Ambassador

I request that the following message from the Fuehrer be forwarded to the Duce personally:

Duce

I first want to thank you for your last attempt at a mediation. I would have been ready to accept, but only under condition, that there would be a possibility to give me certain guarantees that the conference would be successful. Because, for the last two days the German troops are engaged in an extraordinarily rapid advance in Poland. It would have been impossible to devaluate the bloody sacrifices made thereby by diplomatic intrigues. Nevertheless, I believe that a way could have been found, if England would not have been determined to wage war under all circumstances. I have not given in to the English, because, Duce, I do not believe that peace could have been maintained for more than ½ year or 1 year. Under these circumstances, I thought that, in spite of everything, the present moment was better for resistance. At present, the superiority of the German armed forces in Poland is too overwhelming in all fields that the Polish Army will collapse in a very short time. I doubt whether this fast success could be achieved in one or two years. England and France would have armed their allies to such an extent that the crushing technical superiority of the German armed forces could not have become so apparent anymore. I am aware, Duce, that the fight which I enter, is one for life and death. My own fate does not play any role in it at all. But I am also aware that one cannot avoid such a struggle permanently and that one has to choose after cold deliberation the moment for resistance in such a way that the probability of the success is guaranteed and I believe in this success, Duce, with the firmness of a vouch. Recently you have given me the kind assurance that you think you will be able to help me in a few fields. I acknowledge this in advance with sincere thanks. But I believe also—even if we march now over different roads—that fate will finally join us. If the National Socialistic Germany were destroyed by the Western democracies, the Fascist Italy would also have to face a grave future. I was personally always aware of this community of the future of our two governments and I know that you, Duce, think the same way. To the situation in Poland, I would like to make the brief remark that we lay aside, of course, all unimportant things, that we do not waste any man in unimportant tasks, but direct all on acts in the light of great operational considerations. The Northern Polish Army which is the Corridor, has already been completely encircled by our action. It will be either wiped out or will surrender. Otherwise, all operations proceed according to plan. The daily achievements of the troops are far beyond all expectations. The superiority of our air force is complete, although scarcely one third of it is in Poland. In the West I will be on the defensive. France can here sacrifice its blood first. Then the moment will come when we can confront the enemy also there with the full power of the nation. Accept my thanks, Duce, for all your assistance which you have given to me in the past and I ask you not to deny it to me in the future.

(Signed) Adolf Hitler

End of message. Cable report is requested

Ribbentrop

Rome, 4 September 1939 Foreign Berlin No. 418 of 4 September 1939 Telegram, secret code procedure (good)

CITISSIME to telegram No. 495 of 3rd of this month and in connection with telegram No. 414 of 3 September.

TOP SECRET

Duce remarked during the presentation of the Fuehrer’s message, which took place in Ciano’s presence at 0940, that he would forward his view point by letter. He explained somewhat as follows, during the ensuing conversation of a half an hour: they never had considered in the least to let himself be used in an action of arbitration, which had as prerequisite the withdrawal of German troops. No man on earth can seriously consider the thought as worthy of discussion, to make such an offer to troops, which, furthermore, are advancing successfully. He refused such ideas with actual indignation, also he would not consider the “symbolic withdrawal” suggested by Paris. In view of the strong appeal by France to make one last attempt, he had forwarded the suggestion under the self-evidence supposition, that the remaining of the army corps, where it should be a prerequisite. In this case, if we had considered the agreement of the Fuehrer to the suggestion possible, he would perhaps even have advised it. However, England, which is guilty for the entire development of the German-Polish conflict, did apparently not want to let it come to a compromise. He seemed to know, that the Polish Ambassador in London still exercised in the last minutes a decisive influence on the position at the British Cabinet. The declaration by England, which brought about the stage of war, and which France followed up the last, only hesitantly, is absolutely “diotic,” brought about by people who apparently have never even studied a map. For what form should such a war take? It can only be waged on water, on land or in the air. Breaking out of the Maginot Line on land, over-running of the West Wall would be a hopeless undertaking, which will hardly be attempted by the French. Even if our fleet is modest, in any case the Navy cannot undertake anything decisive. The air force would attempt to drop a few bombs, maybe it would destroy this and that installation, but even that has nothing to do with the decision, especially if we limit ourselves in the air as well to the defensive. In brief, the declaration of war is an absolutely absurd undertaking, because the only thing actually left would be the war of attrition and that would also be harmful to the one who declares it.

If the Fuehrer’s message says that the Fuehrer and the Duce “would now go separate ways”, he is of an entirely different opinion. On the contrary, the most complete agreement in respect to methods and goal prevails, and especially militarily, he has done everything to the last, what the Fuehrer desired of him, and he continues his preparation most intensively. In Lybya, the critical month for him is September, after which even there, he will be armed for a successful defense. Already today, he ties down 400,000 men of the opponent by his measures on the Alpine frontier and in Africa. He will send to the Fuehrer, via the military attaché (who is invited this evening to the home of Gen. Pariani) all the details of his military measures with appropriate carbo-graphic material, which he also showed me and explained most thoroughly. I can leave the reporting on this to the military attaché. I only wish to emphasize the Duce’s remark, that the mobilization measures did not only pass without any friction, but also that the spirit of those conscripted and of their families, thanks to the generous subsidy allotted to them, is excellent.

At the end, the Duce repeated his assurance of every assistance desired by us, particularly, in the question of workers and (on a suggestion of mine) by the press.

Duce was in a confidential mood.

/s/ MACKENSEN.

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1832-PS

The Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs called me on the telephone at 2200 hours from the Reich Chancellery and reported as follows:

According to authentic information, the rumors spreading in Rome, by way of the Italian embassy in Berlin, that a relaxation of the situation is to be noted and that conferences are being held. We wanted to state on the contrary, that just the opposite is true and that the situation is getting more serious from hour to hour. “The Armies are marching”. It would be good if I would see to it that the rumor mentioned above should not be believed by the Duce and Ciano.

Rome, 27 August 1939.

to the notice of:

Mackensen

1. B. R. [initialed] 2. Military attaché [initialed] 3. Naval attaché [initialed] 4. Air attaché [initialed] 5. to be returned to me. Rome, 27 August 1939. [initialed]

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1834-PS

FOREIGN OFFICE RAM NO. 56/R

Berlin, 2 March 1941

STRICTLY SECRET

Personal

In the inclosure is forwarded, for strictly confidential and purely personal information, an extract of a report on my conference with the new Japanese Ambassador Oshima in Fuschl on 23 February 1941. These statements are of fundamental significance for orientation on the general political situation facing Germany in early Spring 1941.

Signed: Ribbentrop

To: The German Embassy in

Ankara Madrid Moscow Rome (Quir.) Rome (Vat.)

The German Legation in

Athens Belgrade Bern Budapest Bukarest Helsinki Lisbon Pressburg (Bratislava) Sofia Stockholm one each

65215

Enclosure To RAM No. 56/R

STRICTLY SECRET

Extract from the report of the conference of the Reich Foreign Minister with Ambassador Oshima in Fuschl on 13 February 1941

After particularly cordial mutual greetings, the RAM (Reich Foreign Minister) declared that Ambassador Oshima had been proved right in the policy he had pursued regarding Germany in the face of the many doubters in Japan. By Germany’s victory in the west these policies had been fully vindicated. He (the RAM) regretted that the alliance between Germany and Japan, for which he had been working with the Ambassador for many years already, had come into being only after various detours, but public opinion in Japan had not been ripe for it earlier. The main thing was, however, that they are together now.

Expanding upon the general political situation the Reich Foreign Minister declared: The Fuehrer had always looked for an understanding with England and he (RAM) had himself been sent to England as an ambassador in his time to undertake a last attempt in this direction. A certain possibility had existed in the person of King Edward, even though it had been doubtful from the beginning whether the king would prevail. He (the RAM) had been more than skeptical already at his arrival in London, and had considered the chances for an understanding as 100 to 1. Thus the war-inciter clique in England had then won the upper hand. When he (the RAM) left England, war was unavoidable. Then when it came to war the Fuehrer decided on a treaty with Russia—a necessity for avoiding a two-front war. Perhaps this moment was difficult for Japan. The treaty was, however, in the interest of Japan, for the Japanese empire was interested in as rapid a German victory as possible, which was assured by the treaty with Russia. Furthermore he (the RAM) had made it clear to Stalin as well as to the public that the treaty between the Reich and Russia in no way affected the German-Japanese relationship. Now the German-Japanese alliance has been concluded. Ambassador Oshima is the man who gets credit for it from the Japanese side. After conclusion of the alliance the question of its further development now stands in the foreground. How is the situation in this respect?

* * * * * * *

As for the war against England, we had poor weather for our bombers during the Fall and Winter to be sure, but in spite of this, heavy damage has been done which has had a strongly retarding effect on English war production, etc. The bombings would continue in increasing measure so that we hope to destroy very much more than America was able to replace. We now had air supremacy over the whole continent. The time when we should win air supremacy over England would depend on further developments.

At sea the commitment of U-boat weapon had thus far been comparatively slight; after the end of March the commitment of the U-boat weapon would multiply in a short time. Then with the combination Air Force-U-Boat weapon we would deal terrible blows to England. The loss of tonnage already was making considerable difficulties for the English food supply. Meat and fats were already scarce. It was now a matter of reducing imports by sinking to a definite level below the absolute minimum for English existence. Thereby England’s situation would take catastrophic shape overnight. The landing in England is prepared; its execution, however, depends on various factors, above all on weather conditions.

Concerning America, the Reich Foreign Minister went on, it must be noted that Roosevelt is the most bitter enemy of Germany and Japan. As far as he was concerned he would like to enter the war. However we have an interest in keeping America out of the war. Should America enter the war in spite of this it could not wage the war militarily at all. The vast spaces of the oceans lying between us and America made this impossible. In East Asia, America would hardly dare to send its fleet beyond Hawaii, as it would then be threatened with destruction by the Japanese fleet. In the Atlantic Ocean there is a lack of commitment possibilities with the exception of England. Landing in Europe is impossible, and Africa also is too far removed. Supply points for the fleet and land troops are lacking. This points to the creation of American air bases in England for practical purposes. But in an air war we are located in a strategically advantageous position with respect to England. We could bomb England concentrically from the broad basis of the European coast while England had to spread out in fanlike fashion in its attacks on Europe and must thereby split up its forces. In an air duel—Europe vs. England—Germany would always be superior. We believed, however, that it should be possible to keep America out of the war by skillfully coordinated politics of the allied powers.

The Fuehrer would beat England wherever he would encounter her. Besides our strength is not only equal, but superior to a combined English-American air force at any time. The number of pilots at our disposal was unlimited. The same was true for our airplane production capacity. As far as quality is concerned ours was always superior to the English (to say nothing about the American) and we were on the way even to enlarge this lead. By order of the Fuehrer the anti-aircraft defense too would be greatly reinforced. Since the army had been supplied far beyond its requirements, and enormous reserves had been piled up (the ammunitions plants have been slowed down because of the immense stock of material), production would now be concentrated on submarines, airplanes and anti-aircraft guns.

Every eventuality had been provided for; the war has been won today militarily, economically and politically. We had the desire to end the war quickly and to force England to sue for peace soon. The Fuehrer was vigorous and healthy, fully convinced of victory and determined to bring the war to a quick and victorious end. To this end the cooperation with Japan was of importance. However, Japan, in its own interest, should come in as soon as possible. This would destroy England’s key position in the Far East. Japan, on the other hand, would thus secure its position in the Far East, a position which it could acquire only through war. There were three reasons for quick action:

1. Intervention by Japan would mean a decisive blow against the center of the British Empire (threat to India, cruiser-warfare, etc.). The effect upon the morale of the British people would be very serious and this would contribute toward a quick ending of the war.

2. A surprising intervention by Japan was bound to keep America out of the war. America, which at present is not armed as yet and would hesitate greatly to expose her Navy to any risks West of Hawaii, could do this even less so in such a case. If Japan would otherwise respect the American interests, there would not even be the possibility for Roosevelt to use the argument of lost prestige to make war plausible to the Americans. It was very unlikely that America would declare war if it then would have to stand by helplessly while Japan takes the Philippines without America being able to do anything about it.

3. In view of the coming new world order it seems to be in the interest of Japan also, to secure for herself already during the war the position she wants to hold in the Far East at the time of a peace treaty. Ambassador Oshima agreed with me entirely and said that he would do everything to carry through this policy.

The Reich Foreign Minister mentioned further that, if America should declare war because of Japan’s entry into the war, this would mean that America had had the intention to enter the war sooner or later anyway. Even though it would be preferable to avoid this, the entry into the war would, as explained above, be by no means decisive and would not endanger the final victory of the countries of the Three-Power Pact. The Foreign Minister further expressed his belief that a temporary lift of the British morale caused by America’s entry into the war would be cancelled by Japan’s entry into the war. If, however, contrary to all expectations, the Americans should be careless enough to send their Navy in spite of all, beyond Hawaii and to the Far East, this would represent the biggest chance for the countries of the Three-Power Pact to bring the war rapidly to an end. He, the Foreign Minister, is convinced that the Japanese fleet would then do a complete job. Ambassador Oshima replied to this, that, unfortunately he does not think the Americans would do it, but he is convinced of a victory of his fleet in Japanese waters.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs further explained that closest cooperation was required for the common waging of the war, particularly as far as intelligence service and press were concerned. The cooperation with the Italians is already exemplary; the same is true for the cooperation with Rumania, Hungary and Slovakia. The press, radio, etc. of these countries were already so synchronized with each other that they form one single weapon. The same kind of close contact must be established with Japan. The Ambassador welcomed this and intends to set up a program with our men determining how our Japanese propaganda can be most effectively intensified in all fields.

Ambassador Oshima explained that when the Three-Power Pact was concluded, various opinions were still present in Japan. It was then that the Emperor intervened with an edict. It must be stated, however, that, impressed by the German victory in the West, the Japanese people are now entirely for the Three-Power Pact.

Ambassador Oshima remarked further that in Japan, under the influence of the events, the hard feelings against America had risen considerably. The Reich Foreign Minister referred to the recent statement of Nomura, the Japanese Ambassador in the U.S.A., concerning Japan’s attitude in case of America’s entry into the war, and mentioned that he considered it appropriate to talk plain language with the U.S.A. Ambassador Oshima remarked hereto that the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs had given instructions to that effect. The Minister for Foreign Affairs pointed out that particularly in view of the desire to keep America out of the war, plain language must be used. Only if the U. S. realized that they were confronting firm determination, would they hold back. The people in the U. S. did not like National Socialism. However, they were not willing to sacrifice their sons and therefore were against an entry into the war. The American people felt instinctively that they were drawn into the war for no reason, by Roosevelt and the Jewish wire-pullers. Therefore, our politics with the U. S. should be plain and firm, but, of course, not aggressive. In the U. S. they must realize that Germany, Italy and Japan had no hard feelings for the American people, but that should the U.S.A. have any aggressive desires, they would confront an iron front of determined people, a front, at that, which includes practically the whole world. One would therefore have to work in close cooperation against the attempts of misrepresentation by the British propaganda. As far as speeches and addresses of a principle nature are concerned it would be necessary to keep up a continuous exchange of ideas. In this connection the Minister for Foreign Affairs referred to a recent remark by Matsuoka concerning Japanese willingness to act as mediator for peace negotiations. This remark had been extensively exploited by the enemy propaganda.

The Reich Foreign Minister continued by saying that it was Japan’s friendship which had enabled Germany to arm after the Anti-Comintern Pact was concluded. On the other hand, Japan had been able to penetrate deeply into the English sphere of interest in China. Germany’s victory on the continent has brought now, after the conclusion of the Three Power Pact, great advantages for Japan. France, as a power, was eliminated in the Far East (Indochina). England too was considerably weakened, Japan had been able to close in steadily on Singapore. Thus, Germany had already contributed enormously to the shaping of the future fate of the two nations. Due to our geographical situation we should have to carry the main burden of the final battle in the future, too. If an unwanted conflict with Russia should arise we should have to carry the main burden also in this case. If Germany should ever weaken, Japan would find itself confronted by a world-coalition within a short time. We were all in the same boat. The fate of both nations was being determined now for centuries to come. The same was true for Italy. The interests of the three countries would never intersect. A defeat of Germany would also mean the end of the Japanese imperialistic idea.

Ambassador Oshima definitely agreed with these statements and emphasized the fact that Japan was determined to keep its imperial position. The Reich Foreign Minister then discussed the great problems which would arise after the war for the parties of the Three Power Pact from the shaping of a new order in Europe and East Asia. The problems arising then would require a bold solution. Thereby no overcentralization should take place, but a solution should be found on a basis of parity, particularly in the economic realm. In regard to this the Reich Foreign Minister advanced the principle that a free exchange of trade should take place between the two spheres of interest on a liberal basis. The European-African hemisphere under the leadership of Germany and Italy, and the East-Asian sphere of interest under the leadership of Japan. As he conceived it, for example, Japan would conduct trade and make trade agreements directly with the independent states in the European hemisphere, as heretofore, while Germany and Italy would trade directly and make trade agreements with the independent countries within the Japanese orbit of power, such as China, Thailand, Indochina, etc. Furthermore, as between the two economic spheres, each should fundamentally grant the other preferences with regard to third parties. The Ambassador expressed agreement with this thought.

The Reich Foreign Minister then touched upon the question, explicitly pointed out as theoretical, that the contracting powers might be required, on the basis of new affronts by the U.S.A., to break off diplomatic relations. Germany and Italy were fundamentally determined on this; after signing of the Three-Power Pact we should proceed if the occasion arises, but also jointly in this matter. Such a lesson should open the eyes of the people in the U.S.A. to the situation and under certain conditions bring about a swing toward isolation in public opinion. Naturally a situation had to be chosen in which America found herself entirely in the wrong. The common step of the signatory powers should be exploited correspondingly in propaganda. The question, however, was in no way acute at the time.

* * * * * * *

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1835-PS

Urgent. To Ambassador:

Fuehrer and RAM request you immediately to transmit the following letter by Fuehrer to Duce.

Report execution.

Berlin, 28.3.41. 0,5 -

Duce, events force me to give you, Duce, by this quickest means, my estimation of the situation and the consequences which may result from it.

1. From the beginning, I have regarded Yugoslavia as a dangerous factor in the controversy with Greece. Considered from the purely military point of view, German intervention in the war in Thrace would not be at all justified, as long as the attitude of Yugoslavia remains ambiguous and she could threaten the left flank of the advancing columns, on our enormous front.

2. For this reason, I’ve done everything and honestly have endeavored to bring Yugoslavia into our community bound together by mutual interests. Unfortunately these endeavors did not meet with success, or they were begun too late to produce any definite result. Today’s reports leave no doubt as to the imminent turn in the foreign policy of Yugoslavia.

3. I don’t consider this situation as being catastrophic but nevertheless a difficult one, and we, on our part, must avoid any mistake if we do not want, in the end, to endanger our whole position.

4. Therefore, I have already arranged for all necessary measures in order to meet a critical development with necessary military means. The change in the deployment of our troops has been ordered also in Bulgaria. Now I would cordially request you, Duce, not to undertake any further operations in Albania in the course of the next few days. I consider it necessary that you should cover and screen the most important passes from Yugoslavia into Albania with all available force.

These measures should not be considered as designed for a long period of time but as auxiliary measures designed to prevent for at least fourteen days to three weeks a crisis arising.

I also consider it necessary, Duce, that you should reinforce your forces on the Italian-Yugoslav front with all available means and with utmost speed.

5. I also consider it necessary, Duce, that everything which we do and order be shrouded in absolute secrecy and that only personalities who necessarily must be notified, know anything about them. These measures will completely lose their value should they become known.

6. Today I called in the Bulgarian and the Hungarian ministers and outlined to them my thoughts on the situation and, with view to military developments, to arouse their interest by explaining to both of them, the negative and positive effects which would arise for them in this case. Since without the aid of Hungary and Bulgaria, operations, Duce, cannot develop with the swiftness which might be necessary under the circumstances.

If possibly in the course of tomorrow, I will inform you, Duce, more thoroughly about all this.

7. Therefore, General von Rintelen will report to you, Duce, tomorrow if the weather is suitable for flying and will tell you the military dispositions which are being prepared, and which we shall carry out.

Duce, should secrecy be observed as to these measures, then in case action on our part should become necessary, I have no doubt that we will both achieve a success no less than the success in Norway a year ago. This is my unshaken conviction.

Accept my heartfelt and friendly greetings. Yours.

(Signed) Adolf Hitler

End of letter, Bureau of Minister.

With the directive that Ambassador Mackensen transmit this letter tonight to Duce.

Howel 27.3.41 2400

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1842-PS

Notes on the discussion of the Reich Foreign Minister Von Ribbentrop with the Duce in the presence of Count Ciano as well as the ambassadors von Mackensen and Alfieri, in Rome on the 19th September 1940.

* * * * * * *

All the same, Germany had won air superiority, and was bombing England, and particularly London, by day and by night, whilst the British were at most sending a few planes over Germany at night, in order to drop bombs there at random. During the day no British plane dared to fly over German territory. Germany, however, was carrying out strong reprisal attacks by day as well as by night. On one occasion the German Luftwaffe had been ready for a large scale attack as early as August. But this attack had to be called off because of bad weather. A really large scale attack had not taken place since, because the Fuehrer wanted to accept the responsibility for this only when it was certain, that such an attack would mean the beginning of England’s destruction. Although Germany had merely carried out reprisal bombings from the air, their results for England had already been extraordinarily serious. With a continuation of these attacks London would be in ruins within a short time. The British armament factories had been seriously affected, and important ports, such as Portland, had been entirely crippled. Moreover, all aerodromes from the South Coast to London had been made unusable.

* * * * * * *

With regard to Greece and Yugoslavia, the Foreign Minister stressed, that it was exclusively a question of Italian interests, the settling of which was a matter for Italy alone, and in which Italy could be certain of Germany’s sympathetic assistance. But it seemed to us to be better not to touch on these problems for the time being, but to concentrate on the destruction of England with all our forces instead. Where Germany was concerned, she was interested in the northern German districts (Norway etc.), and this was acknowledged by the Duce.

* * * * * * *

The Reich Foreign Minister further announced a statement by the Fuehrer regarding the military part of the Spanish problem, i.e., the conquest of Gibraltar. The Spaniards wanted to conquer Gibraltar by themselves. But so as to prevent any failure, Germany would provide Spain with special troops equipped with special weapons, and a few squadrons of planes. The Fuehrer had carefully examined the Gibraltar problem from the military point of view, and had come to the conclusion, that the conquest of the rock was absolutely possible, but only then, if the Spaniards were to be given assistance.

The Reich Foreign Minister then showed the Duce the German map regarding the Spanish territorial demands, and this was duly noted by the Italian gentlemen. A question which was put to the Duce by the Reich Foreign Minister, showed, that the Spanish ambitions did not clash with Italy’s in any way. In this connection the Reich Foreign Minister announced Serrano Suner’s intention, also to make a visit to Rome.

On his return to Berlin, he (the Reich Foreign Minister) intended to sign a secret protocol with Serrano Suner, dealing with Spain’s entry into the war, as well as the supplying of Spain with the aforementioned materials, recognizing the Spanish ambitions, and providing an attack against Gibraltar as a declaration of war. The protocol would also state, that Spain’s entry into the war would be left to the judgment of that country. It had been verbally provided, that Spain would come into the war as soon as Franco had completed his preparations, and particularly after the German special weapons and troops as well as planes had arrived at their destinations in Spain.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1850-PS

Filing reference 11 C-2 [in ink]

Subject: Negotiation between Obergruppenfuehrer Krueger, Oberst Karmann, Oberst Lorenz, in the Chambers of the Reich Board of Trustees on 8 July 1933.

Oberst Karmann stated that the Armed Forces had so far maintained no contact whatsoever with the ex-service men. The only contact which the ex-service men have, is the vote of their maintenance at the Reich Ministry of Labor. Oberst Karmann intends to establish an Ex-service men’s Association for which membership of the SA is laid down as a condition. Ex-service men wait for about 3 years from the time their active service ends until they obtain a Civil Service post. Roughly estimated, they number about 20,000 men. In addition, approximately 8,000 non-commissioned officers and men are released yearly. The demand for these ex-service men is so great that, for example, Oberst Karmann has difficulty in obtaining personnel for his establishment. Oberst Karmann, however, wishes to send ex-service men compulsorily to the S.A., as soon as this is required by the Chief of Training. As a rule, the ex-service men go where they receive the best pay. Furthermore, Oberst Karmann explained his ideas on the recruitment of non-commissioned officers of the reserve. Forestry and customs officials should, for example, do several years military service with the Reichswehr. A similar provision should be made for officials of other categories. The settling of the question regarding the disadvantages of ex-service men in the SA, compared to those in the Labor Service has been postponed until a later date. Oberst Karmann mentioned that ex-service men, who were not appointed to good, regularly paid positions in the S.A. would, when they claimed their right to maintenance, be at a great practical disadvantage as regards their financial circumstances by reason of their S.A. service. He would see that there was official compensation for this.

Berlin, 8 July 1933.

131 Fl [ink] C002167

Confidential filing reference [in ink]

5 July 33 [ink]

Discussion with Oberst v. Vietinghoff, Chief of Armed Forces Division, on Wednesday the 5th July 33.

1. Leadership of Reich Youth [Reichsjugendfuehrung]. The question of the powers of the Head of the Reich Youth in connection with pre-military training.

I state that, by a decision of the Fuehrer, the spheres of duty of the Head of the Reich Youth, the Reich Commissar for Sport and the Chief of Training are sharply defined. I sent a draft to Munich to that effect.

2. Students. A discussion is taking place today between Oberst v. Vietinghoff and Gerullis regarding the question of military sports for students. Oberst v. Vietinghoff is of the opinion that these matters also should be placed under the control of the Chief of Training.

I mentioned my preliminary negotiations with Herr Schwab, formerly with the General Armed Forces Office [AWA-Allgemeines Wehrmachtsamt] who, as liaison official on the Staff, was arranging this matter of military sports for students on the right lines.

Oberst v. Vietinghoff believes that the Prussian Ministry of Education and Public Worship, will make certain difficulties and would very much like to take a service-officer into the ministry as technical advisor. He suggested Hauptmann von Bernuth for this purpose.

3. I then gave an extensive outline of Bernuth’s duties; he was working out the guiding principles for the training of men and the leaders for the military camps and schools for leaders in accordance with the wishes of the Reich Minister for Defense [Reichswehrministerium] with regard to pre-military training, in addition, however, he should make the technical preparations for weapon-training. Oberst v. Vietinghoff declared himself in agreement.

Hauptmann v. Bernuth is being given a long-term appointment to my staff. 002168 131 F2 [ink]

4. Labor Service. Military sports in Labor service camps are suspended for considerations of foreign policy. Dr. Stellbrecht has been to Oberst v. Vietinghoff to inform him that the Labor Service is being organized on the wrong lines.

5. The Office for Defence Policy [Wehrpolitisches Amt]. My answer to Oberst v. Vietinghoff’s question was that of the “Wehrpolitisches Amt” must not interfere with my sphere of duties and that I considered it advisable to dissolve it.

Oberst v. Vietinghoff is of the opinion that the “Wehrpolitisches Amt” has become superfluous and that all questions relating to military sports should again be decided by the Chief of Training.

6. The budget. I drew Oberst von Vietinghoff’s attention to the fact that the budget question must find its solution through the S.A., that it was not advisable for the Reich Ministry for Defence to put the care for the budget on behalf of the Chief of Training, for that might cause difficulties. I drew attention to Oberst v. Reichenau’s suggestion and how it would work out.

Oberst v. Reichenau recommends that the budget adviser to the Chief of Training should contact Major Osterkamp, the expert of the Reich Ministry for Defense, who is very experienced in these matters. It would then be easier to get the budget passed by the Reich Ministry for Finance.

I declared myself ready to examine the budget, in conjunction with the Reich Ministry for Defense, as soon as it was decided upon. Furthermore, the Fuehrer’s demand in Reichenhall that I should train 250,000 SA men and leaders within a year so that they would be at the disposal of the Reichswehr in case of emergency, is the basis on which I shall act.

In accordance with this demand of Hitler’s I should have to examine the possibilities of instructional training and draw up my budget accordingly. Deductions from the budget made by the Reich Ministry would not be allowed.

7. The Reich Trusteeship. Oberst v. Vietinghoff asked when I was taking over the Trusteeship of the Reich, to which I answered that I had had a talk with Neuville today and that he had requested me in the course of this discussion to go with him the next morning to Minister Seldte to obtain information regarding the winding-up of affairs.

Oberst v. Vietinghoff considers this step superfluous, and only calculated to cause further delay. I assured him that I was of the same opinion.

8. Branch Leaders [Zweigstellenleiter]. I referred to my order to the main groups; it is to be left to them to employ Branch Leaders as Training Inspectors as they are required. If they were not needed, the former Branch Leaders would have to leave their posts.

Berlin, 5 July 1933.

131 F4 C002170

SECRET

Filing Reference 11 C-3 [Ink] Bauen

Discussion with Reich Defense Minister v. Blomberg on 15 July, 0930 hours.

1. My note of 13.7 to General v. Blomberg showed both parties that, in fact, there had been a misunderstanding in the way the budget question was viewed. General v. Blomberg had not been informed that Oberst v. Reichenau had tried to have the budget for the Chief of Training of the S.A. introduced by the Reich Ministry for Defense.

The Fuehrer’s statement of 12.7 regarding the basic regulations for pre-military fitness training for youth, which had been shown to him today, had cleared all doubts.

At the last discussion he had merely intended to grant to the Chief of Training from his own special Fund for Training purposes, money which might possibly be refused by the Reich Minister for Finance. He had only wished to offer his services for this purpose, and today agreed with me that the Reich Ministry of the Interior should decide upon the budget for the Chief of Training and put the case before the cabinet.

2. With a view to a practical solution of the budget problems he suggests that a discussion should take place between the Chiefs at the beginning of August, in which the Ministers Frick, Schwerin-Krosigk, and v. Blomberg should take part; he recommended also that I should first have a word with State Secretary Reinhard in the Reich Ministry for Finance to smooth the way.

3. General v. Blomberg had me explain to him the forms of training in the military camps and requested that the very necessary camouflage measures be taken.

4. Relationship of the higher S. A.—Fuehrerkorps to the Reich Ministry for Defense. Berlin, 15.7.33.

C002171.

Ki/Eg

Berlin, 1 Sept. 1933.

Filing Reference

Subject: Enrollment in the SA of members of the Reichswehr who are due for release.

for the archives [in ink]

Discussion (1.9. 1933/0936 hours) between Oberst Hinria and Hauptmann von Wolf (general section and Armed Forces Section of Reich Ministry of Defense) on the one hand and Stabsfuehrer Waehmann and Adjutant Kiefer on the other.

Oberst Hinria expressed the wishes of the members of the Reichswehr. The latter wish, on entering the SA after their demobilization to receive a rank corresponding to their last appointment. They consider it inadvisable that, for example a non-commissioned officer on entering the SA should have, as his superior in rank, a man who was formerly under him.

As opposed to this, Stabsfuehrer Waehmann holds that this idea is contrary to the spirit and the service instructions of the SA, for it is a demand which is particularly stressed in the SA that one should place oneself voluntarily under the orders of another.

With regard to the Unions [Treubuende] the commonly held opinion is voiced that their main purpose was to prevent the members of the Reichswehr due for release from going over to the left. After the assumption of power, since this danger was averted, this purpose will no longer be held good in future. Nevertheless, Oberst Hinria advocates their continued existence, for the reasons stated below.

Suggestions for a temporary solution: In future the Reichswehr will presumably only be recruited from members of the S.A. Thus the men being demobilized, will automatically return to the S.A. Therefore, the solution for this period is simple.

Filing reference [in ink]

131 Gi [in ink]

SECRET

Filing reference

11 C-5 [in ink]

Discussion with State Secretary Reinhard, Reich Ministry for Finance on the morning of 18.7

1. I reported to State Secretary Reinhard on the whole question of the budget for the new sphere of duties assigned to Chief of Training; I also asked that the further payment of the budget funds granted by the Reich Ministry for Finance and belonging to the Reich Trusteeship, since dissolved, should be cleared up for the current financial year.

2. Preliminary examination of the supplementary budget drafted by me for the financial year 33/34 and an additional demand of approximately 25 millions.

State Secretary Reinhard considers it very difficult under the circumstances to carry through the supplementary budget for the current financial year. He was informed that the Reich Ministry for Finance wishes to dispose of the funds granted from the Reich Trusteeship, but on the other hand considers it necessary that the discussion of Chiefs mentioned by General v. Blomberg should take place between the Ministries. Taking the long view, State Secretary Reinhard believes that the estimated budget could still be approved if the unemployment problem were solved in the autumn. This is in his opinion a preliminary condition.

In addition, however, Finance Minister Krosigk had the matter of the budget in his own hands, for he [Reinhard] has to solve all the problems relating to unemployment.

Berlin, 18 July 1933.

[illegible initials] R. [ink]

131 E (1) [in ink]

SECRET

11 C-4 [in ink] Bauen

Filing Reference

Discussion with Ministerial Director Gerullis, Prussian Ministry for Public Worship and Instruction, on 17 and 18.7.33

1. Gerullis is fundamentally of the opinion that all military sports in the colleges and universities should be in the hands of the Chief of Training. He declared himself to be in agreement with my suggestion to take onto my staff as liaison officer a Student Leader who is still to be nominated, (Schwab or Krueger) and who, according to my suggestion, is to be responsible for all training in military sports.

In addition it is necessary for carrying this out further, that the S.A. Leaders etc., at present appointed as instructors in military sport in the Colleges and universities, should once again be summoned to a special course in order to do their training on the new lines. Gerullis suggests Councillor Ministerialrat Haupt, present at today’s discussion, as representative for Prussia. [3 illegible words in ink and illegible initials follow]

2. From 1 October, five officers of the General Staff are to be appointed for 3 years to the Universities of Koenigsberg, Breslau, Berlin, Cologne, and Frankfurt-on-Main to teach military tactics, leave of absence being granted for that period.

(Regulars, 5 senior Staff officers for this) [marginal note in pencil]

They will give lectures on military tactics in those universities. On 1 September these gentlemen will be brought to Berlin and will make contact with the Chief of Training. Questions regarding Military Training are to be cleared up with me by these gentlemen. This ruling is the joint decision as mentioned by Oberstleutnant Weissenberger, who also took part in the discussion of the Reich Ministry for Defense and the Prussian Ministry for Public Worship and Education.

3. With regard to the former soldiers of the Reichswehr now united in the Unions it was said: The SA has no interest in incorporating the Unions, for all elements who do not believe firmly in the principles of the new idealogy, are unwanted. (There is also no power of authority over these unions). The troop commanders should, however, be guaranteed authoritative influence over the unions in their commands. They should then see to it that:

1. All those who have hitherto been members of the Unions, who are suitable by reason of their ideology, are incorporated into the S.A.

2. That the members of the Reichswehr due for release in the future continue to join the unions which are under the supervision of the Commanders, but are without exception incorporated into the SA. The necessary foundations for this enrollment are to be laid immediately upon entry into the Reichswehr and also constantly during military service.

Oberst Hinria has also set up for future use the following organization and order of service:

1. SA with preparation for the Reichswehr.

2. Period of service with the Reichswehr.

3. Re-entry into SA after release.

4. Transfer to the S.A. Reserve [SA—Handwehr] after the age of 45.

(Expansion of the Kyffhaeuser Union to form the SA Reserve.)

[illegible pencilled initials] 131 G 2 [in ink]

Personal [in pencil]

Ch 25/4/33 [in ink] [Illegible initials]

11C- 7 [in ink] 5 September 1933.

To the Chief of Naval Command for the attention of Konteradmiral Dr. N. C. Gross.

Berlin W. 10 Koenigin Augustastrasse 38-42.

K/Kl.

Sir:

I am very much obliged for the dates of the Fleet Maneuvers sent to me at the request of the Chief of Naval Staff [Chf der Marineleitung].

On the 17th inst. I shall go on board in Pillan punctually at 1200 and will take the liberty of reporting in good time when and where, I shall be arriving in Pillan, for before that I shall probably be on a duty visit in East Prussia.

I take this opportunity of expressing a personal wish.

The Chief of Staff, Oberstleutnant Roehm, informed me that he will also be present at the Fleet Maneuvers. I should be very grateful if I could go on board the same cruiser, for I think that particularly with regard to the whole question of the training of Naval-SA units, my presence might be of value. Since the problems relating to this are my responsibility, it would be a great advantage to me, if the opportunity were offered me, to discuss the question and all its complications with the Chief of Staff. In Nurnberg I took the opportunity of discussing the matter with Korvettenkapitaen Kieseritzky, who is assigned to my staff. Korvettenkapitaen Kieseritzky believes, however, that it is unlikely that my request will be fulfilled on account of the distribution already on hand.

For this reason, Sir, I am again applying directly to you.

Perhaps Korvettenkapitaen Kieseritzky could inform me briefly whether my request can be granted.

Your very faithfully,

Heil Hitler K. [Krueger] Obergruppenfuehrer. C—2177 131 D2 (in ink)

For filing 11C-8

received 31.10.33 Initials [ink]

SECRET

Filing reference

1. The speech delivered by the Fuehrer to the SA leaders on the evening of Tuesday the 17.10, has induced me to bring up for decision by the Chief of Staff, the question, as to whether it is right that the SA training in the Army of the Reich should be continued. In the clearly expressed declaration of the Fuehrer there might be lost a suggestion of apprehension, if we trained the SA in the Reichswehr; informers and spies might have the opportunity of passing information regarding that training to our foreign political opponents.

The Chief of Staff intends to decide this question before the Gruppenfuehrer at the Gruppenfuehrer discussion on 23.10, while I am commissioned to discuss the decision intended at the Reich Ministry for Defense. If the Reich Minister for Defense assumes complete responsibility for the resulting consequences, the Chief of Staff agrees to the training of the SA in the army.

I informed Hauptmann von Dernuth on 18.10 of this wish of the Chief of Staff, with the request that he would inform Oberst von Reichenau to that effect, and obtain the decision of the Reich Minister for Defense.

On 19.10, 1100 hours, Oberst von Reichenau asked me to attend a discussion during which this question was approached again. Oberst von Reichenau drew attention to the fact that, to reject the training of the SA in the Army of the Reich, by this decision of the Chief of Staff, would mean that the training by special courses would also be a thing of the past and also the entire training in frontier-guard duties would be rendered impossible. I replied that, with regard to the questions of frontier protection, no conversation had taken place between the Chief of Staff and myself. This point would therefore need special consideration.

C002177/1 P.T.O.

Filing reference [in ink]

The Chief of Staff is placing the decision with the Reich Minister for Defense, who, for his part, bears the responsibility for the training of the SA in the Army of the Reich.

The clearly-expressed speech of the Fuehrer on 17.10 caused the Chief of Staff to clear up the question of responsibility in such a way as to leave no room for doubt; for this reason it was absolutely necessary that the Reich Minister for Defense should make inquiries of the Chancellor.

If the Reich Minister for Defense assumed full and complete responsibility for the training in the Army of the Reich, the Chief of Staff saw no reason to cease training the SA in the Army.

II. Oberst von Reichenau showed me the letter written by Obergruppenfuehrer von Jagow to the Reich Minister for Defense by way of reply to the complaint made by the Reich Minister for Defense regarding Obergruppenfuehrer von Jagow.

Since it was possible to misinterpret the wording of von Jagow’s letter, I repeated to Oberst von Reichenau the remarks I had made to Jagow, which the Reich Minister for Defense made in my presence. It appeared that Obergruppenfuehrer von Jagow had had the opportunity on the occasion of his visit to Berlin on 17.10, to speak to Korvettenkapitaen von Langsdorff at the Reich Defense Ministry on the suspension of weapon training in the SA camps. A remark made by Jagow on this subject, which was quite unimportant and only reached Minister von Blomberg in the course of a report, was the reason for Minister von Blomberg’s complaint regarding Obergruppenfuehrer von Jagow.

Oberst von Reichenau remarked that there had been a misunderstanding on the part of the Reich Minister for Defense and, after examining the facts, he was of the opinion that the complaint made by the Reich Minister for Defense about Obergruppenfuehrer von Jagow, which was reported by word of mouth to Obergruppenfuehrer Krueger had been unnecessary.

C002178/1

Reich Minister for Defense von Blomberg would now feel induced to write to Jagow.

III. Discussion regarding the appointment of personnel to the Reich Ministry for Defense.

IV. Discussion about the case of von Reichenau, von Obernity, and Gruppenfuehrer Franken. It so happened that, through Hauptmann Fenchtlinger, Nurnberg, a conversation between himself and Gruppenfuehrer von Obernity has come to the knowledge of the ministry.

Oberst von Reichenau is very anxious that this misunderstanding should be removed. He will therefore write a personal letter to Gruppenfuehrer von Obernity.

Berlin, 19 October 1933.

/s/ Ringen. C002179/1

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1851-PS

THE NEW GERMANY SPEAKS HERE

Book 11, Reichsfuehrer SS HEINRICH HIMMLER.

The Security Squadron as an Anti-Bolshevist Battle Organization. 1936.

Central Publishing House of the NSDAP., Franz Eher, Succ. Munich

OBEDIENCE.

* * * * * * *

[Page 23, line 31 to page 24, line 27]

The fourth directive and virtue, which applies to us, is that of obedience; of obedience, which arises unconditionally through the highest spontaneity, through the service to our ideology [Weltanschauung], which is ready to make every necessary sacrifice of pride, superficial honors and of everything, which is dear and valuable to us; of obedience, not hesitating once, but following every order, which is given by the Fuehrer, or has lawfully been given by one of the superiors; the virtue of obedience, which keeps silent even during the time of the political fight, when the will of freedom believes to have to rise indignantly, which, with wide-awake senses and with strict attention toward the enemy, does not raise a finger, which also obeys unconditionally, and goes over to the attack, even if it should believe, in its heart, that it cannot conquer.

We are so honest, that we do not claim about ourselves, that all these laws are understood by the very last man, and in their last deepest sense. But we believe to be able to claim, that now for six years, the SS has generally assembled according to these directives, was organized and lives according to them. We know, that year for year, we will accept more of these virtues, and that they will more and more become the natural property of every SS man. We are convinced, when fate determines sooner or later, that as the first generation of the SS, we are no more, then we can hand down these virtues as a full heritage, as the best tradition to those, who are SS men after us.

* * * * * * *

[Page 28, line 17 to page 29, line 9]

BLOOD and SOIL

I, as Reichsfuehrer SS, who am myself a peasant according to ancestry, blood and being, would like to state this second fact in front of you, German peasants: The idea of blood, advocated by the SS from the beginning would be condemned, if it were not tied eternally with the conviction about the value and holiness of the soil. From the beginning, the Race and Settlement Main Office [Rasse- und Siedlungs-Hauptamt], has incorporated the term “Blood and Soil” in its name, although with different words, but in the same meaning. I can assure you, that it is not a coincidence, that the Reich Leader of Peasants [Reichsbauernfuehrer des Deutschen Reiches] has belonged to the SS as a leader for years, and that he, as a SS Lt. Gen. is Chief of its Race and Settlement Main Office, as much as it is no coincidence, that I am a peasant, and belong to the Reich Council of Peasants [Reichsbauernrat]. Peasants and SS men both do not belong to those kind of men, who speak superfluously many kind and friendly words. But let it be said here clearly and plainly, as it was until now, so it should be according to our will in the future. Wherever Adolf Hitler’s peasants stand, they shall always have the SS at their side as their most faithful friend, just as we know, that wherever Adolf Hitler’s SS stands, it will have at its side the German peasant as its best friend and comrade. That is how it is today, and that is how it will be forever.

[Page 29]

I know that there are some people in Germany who become sick when they see these black coats; we understand the reason for this and do not expect that we shall be loved by too many. All those who love Germany close at heart will and shall respect us; those who shall fear us, in any way or at any time, must have a bad conscience toward the Fuehrer and the nation. For these persons we have established an organization called Security Service, and likewise, we the SS, place the men for the service in the Secret State Police. We shall unremittingly fulfill our task, the guaranty of the security of Germany from the interior, just as the Wehrmacht guarantees the safety of the honor, the greatness, and the peace of the Reich from the exterior. We shall take care that never again in Germany, the heart of Europe, will the Jewish-Bolshevistic revolution of sub-humans be able to be kindled either from within or through emissaries from without. Without pity we shall be a merciless sword of justice for all those forces whose existence and activity we know on the day of the slightest attempt, may it be today, may it be in decades or may it be in centuries.

* * * * * * *

[Page 31]

Every one of us knows, that he does not stand alone, but that this tremendous force of two hundred thousand men, who are bound together by oath, gives him unmeasurable strength, and he knows as well, that he, as a representative of the black corps, must do honor to this community by his best performance at his place. Thus we assemble and march according to unalterable laws as a national socialist, soldierly order of distinctly Nordic men, and as a sworn community, of its clans, on our way into a far future, and we wish and believe, that we do not only want to be the descendants who fought it out better, but above that the ancestors of later generations, necessary for the eternal life of the German, Germanic people.

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1852-PS

“THE GERMAN POLICE” by Dr. Werner Best, Pp. 14-20 1940 edition.

III. LAW. The conception and formation of “police” law, which governs the duties and activities of the “police” in detail, is based on the conception of the law and its formation in general.

1. Law. a. The personal-human (individual-human) conception of law.

For the personal-human (individual-human) conception, “law” is only that law laid down by those who are concerned with the validity of the law or those commissioned by them, in accordance with the rules of the fundamental law—the “constitution”—or a legal decree based on law, whereas the administrative decree which governs the actions of the authorities is not regarded as law. Every action which is not based upon the law and does not come within its framework, is wrong and illegal, insofar as it concerns individual men, because their agreement to such action cannot be stated or supposed.

b. The people’s conception of “Law”.

According to the people’s conception, law is every rule which fulfills the unity of the people’s “organs”—organizations and individuals—and which is sanctioned or approved by the leaders. There is, therefore, no difference between stronger and weaker “rules”, between “constitutional Law” and “common law”, between “law”, “orders” and “decrees”, between “public” and “private” law. The will of the leaders, in whatever form it is expressed whether through law, order, decree, single order or collective order, regulation of an organization or regulation of competence, etc., administers law and alters all theretofore valid law.

2. “Police” law. There is no written “Police” law of the German Reich, which rules the duties and activities of the Police (actual “Police” law).

The only government ruling, in which the “police duties” are mentioned, without any more detailed specification, is in the Fuehrer’s and Reich Chancellor’s decree concerning the appointment of the Chief of the German Police and Reich Ministry of the Interior, dated 17th June 1936 (Reichsgesetzblatt I, p. 487):

For the unification of the police duties in the Reich, a chief of German Police of the Reichs Ministry of the Interior is appointed who will be commissioned with the leadership and organization of all police matters in the administrative sphere of the Imperial and Prussian Ministry of the Interior.

The contents of the “police duties”, which in this are specifically recognized by the leader as special State duties, must be gathered from the written and unwritten “law”, through which the action of the police is at present determined.