VOLUME IX SLICE I Edwardes to Ehrenbreitstein (continued 11)

The reign of Ismail (q.v.), from 1863 to 1879, was for a while hailed as introducing a new era into modern Egypt. In spite of his vast schemes of reform and the éclat of his Europeanizing innovations, his oriental extravagance Ismail’s megalomania led to bankruptcy, and his reign is historically important simply for its compelling European intervention in the internal affairs of Egypt. Yet in its earlier years much was done which seemed likely to give Ismail a more important place in history. In 1866 he was granted by the sultan a firman—obtained on condition of the increase of the tribute from £376,000 to £720,000—by which the succession to the throne of Egypt was made to descend “to the eldest of thy male children and in the same manner to the eldest sons of thy successors,” instead of, after Turkish law, to the eldest male of the family. In the following year another firman bestowed upon him the title of khedive in lieu of that of vali, borne by Mehemet Ali and his immediate successors. In 1873 a further firman placed the khedive in many respects in the position of an independent sovereign. Ismail re-established and improved the administrative system organized by Mehemet Ali, and which had fallen into decay under Abbas’s indolent rule; he caused a thorough remodelling of the customs system, which was in an anarchic state, to be made by English officials; in 1865 he established the Egyptian post office; he reorganized the military schools of his grandfather, and gave some support to the cause of education. Railways, telegraphs, lighthouses, the harbour works at Suez, the breakwater at Alexandria, were carried out by some of the best contractors of Europe. Most important of all, the Suez Canal was opened in 1869. But the funds required for these public works, as well as the actual labour, were remorselessly extorted from a poverty-stricken population.

A striking picture of the condition of the people at this period is given by Lady Duff Gordon in Last Letters from Egypt. Writing in 1867 she said: “I cannot describe the misery here now—every day some new tax. Every beast, camel, cow, sheep, donkey and horse is made to pay. The fellaheen can no longer eat bread; they are living on barley-meal mixed with water, and raw green stuff, vetches, | &c. The taxation makes life almost impossible: a tax on every crop, on every animal first, and again when it is sold in the market; on every man, on charcoal, on butter, on salt.... The people in Upper Egypt are running away by wholesale, utterly unable to pay the new taxes and do the work exacted. Even here (Cairo) the beating for the year’s taxes is awful.”

In the years that followed the condition of things grew worse. Thousands of lives were lost and large sums expended in extending Ismail’s dominions in the Sudan (q.v.) and in futile conflicts with Abyssinia. In 1875 the Steps leading to the deposition of Ismail. impoverishment of the fellah had reached such a point that the ordinary resources of the country no longer sufficed for the most urgent necessities of administration; and the khedive Ismail, having repeatedly broken faith with his creditors, could not raise any more loans on the European market. The taxes were habitually collected many months in advance, and the colossal floating debt was increasing rapidly. In these circumstances Ismail had to realize his remaining assets, and among them sold 176,602 Suez Canal shares to the British government for £3,976,58225 (see Beaconsfield). This comparatively small financial operation brought about the long-delayed crisis and paved the way for the future prosperity of Egypt, for it induced the British government to inquire more carefully into the financial condition of the country. In December 1875 Mr Stephen Cave, M.P., and Colonel (afterwards Sir John) Stokes, R.E., were sent to Egypt to inquire into the financial situation; and Mr Cave’s report, made public in April 1876, showed that under the existing administration national bankruptcy was inevitable. Other commissions of inquiry followed, and each one brought Ismail more under European control. The establishment of the Mixed Tribunals in 1876, in place of the system of consular jurisdiction in civil actions, made some of the courts of justice international. The Caisse de la Dette, instituted in May 1876 as a result of the Cave mission, led to international control over a large portion of the revenue. Next came (in November 1876) the mission of Mr (afterwards Lord) Goschen and M. Joubert on behalf of the British and French bondholders, one result being the establishment of Dual Control, i.e. an English official to superintend the revenue and a French official the expenditure of the country. Another result was the internationalization of the railways and the port of Alexandria. Then came (May 1878) a commission of inquiry of which the principal members were Sir Rivers Wilson, Major Evelyn Baring (afterwards Lord Cromer) and MM. Kremer-Baravelli and de Blignières. One result of that inquiry was the extension of international control to the enormous landed property of the khedive. Driven to desperation, Ismail made a virtue of necessity and accepted, in September 1878, in lieu of the Dual Control, a constitutional ministry, under the presidency of Nubar Pasha (q.v.), with Rivers Wilson as minister of finance and de Blignières as minister of public works. Professing to be quite satisfied with this arrangement, he pompously announced that Egypt was no longer in Africa, but a part of Europe; but before seven months had passed he found his constitutional position intolerable, got rid of his irksome cabinet by means of a secretly-organized military riot in Cairo, and reverted to his old autocratic methods of government. England and France could hardly sit still under this affront, and decided to administer chastisement by the hand of the suzerain power, which was delighted to have an opportunity of asserting its authority. On the 26th of June 1879 Ismail suddenly received from the sultan a curt telegram, addressed to him as ex-khedive of Egypt, informing him that his son Tewfik was appointed his successor. Taken unawares, he made no attempt at resistance, and Tewfik was at once proclaimed khedive.

After a short period of inaction, when it seemed as if the change might be for the worse, England and France summoned up courage to look the situation boldly in the face, and, in November 1879, re-established the Dual Control in the persons of Major Baring and M. de Blignières. For two years the Dual Control governed Egypt, and initiated the work of progress that England was to continue alone. Its essential defect was what might be called insecurity of tenure. Without any Re-establishment of Dual Control. efficient means of self-protection and coercion at its disposal, it had to interfere with the power, privileges and perquisites of a class which had long misgoverned the country. This class, so far as its civilian members were concerned, was not very formidable, because these were not likely to go beyond the bounds of intrigue and passive resistance; but it contained a military element who had more courage, and who had learned their power when Ismail employed them for overturning his constitutional ministry. Arabi and the revolt of 1882. Among the mutinous soldiers on that occasion was a fellah officer calling himself Ahmed Arabi the Egyptian. He was not a man of exceptional intelligence or remarkable powers of organization, but he was a fluent speaker, and could exercise some influence over the masses by a rude kind of native eloquence. Behind him were a group of men, much abler than himself, who put him forward as the figurehead of a party professing to aim at protecting the Egyptians from the grasping tyranny of their Turkish and European oppressors. The movement began among the Arab officers, who complained of the preference shown to the officers of Turkish origin; it then expanded into an attack on the privileged position and predominant influence of foreigners, many of whom, it must be confessed, were of a by no means respectable type; finally, it was directed against all Christians, foreign and native.26 The government, being too weak to suppress the agitation and disorder, had to make concessions, and each concession produced fresh demands. Arabi was first promoted, then made under-secretary for war, and ultimately a member of the cabinet. The danger of a serious rising brought the British and French fleets in May 1882 to Alexandria, and after a massacre (11th of June) had been perpetrated by the Arab mob in that city, the British admiral bombarded the forts (11th of July 1882). The leaders of the national movement prepared to resist further aggression by force. A conference of ambassadors was held in Constantinople, and the sultan was invited to quell the revolt; but he hesitated to employ his troops against Mussulmans who were professing merely to oppose Christian aggression.

(3) Egypt occupied by the British.—At last the British government determined to employ armed force, and invited France to co-operate. The French government declined, and a similar invitation to Italy met with a similar refusal. England therefore, having to act alone, landed troops at Ismailia under Sir Garnet Wolseley, and suppressed the revolt by the battle of Tell-el-Kebir on the 13th of September 1882. The khedive, who had taken refuge in Alexandria, returned to Cairo, and a ministry was formed under Sherif Pasha, with Riaz Pasha as one of its leading members. On assuming office, the first thing it had to do was to bring to trial the chiefs of the rebellion. Had the khedive and Riaz been allowed a free hand, Arabi and his colleagues would have found little mercy. Thanks to the intervention of the British government, their lives were spared. Arabi pleaded guilty, was sentenced to death, the sentence being commuted by the khedive to banishment; and Riaz resigned in disgust. This solution of the difficulty was brought about by Lord Dufferin, then British ambassador at Constantinople, who had been sent to Egypt as high commissioner to adjust affairs and report on the situation. One of his first acts, after preventing the application of capital punishment to the ringleaders of the revolt, was to veto the project of protecting the khedive and his government by means of a Praetorian guard recruited from Asia Minor, Epirus, Austria and Switzerland, and to insist on the principle that Egypt must be governed in a truly liberal spirit. Passing in review all the departments of the administration, he laid down the general lines on which the country was to be restored to order and prosperity, and endowed, if possible, with the elements of self-government for future use.

The laborious task of putting these general indications into a practical shape fell to Sir Evelyn Baring (Lord Cromer), who arrived as consul-general and diplomatic agent, in succession to Sir Edward Malet, in January 1884. Sir Evelyn Baring appointed consul-general, 1884. At that moment the situation was singularly like that which had existed on two previous occasions: firstly, when Ismail was deposed; and secondly, when the Dual Control had undermined the existing authority without having any power to enforce its own. For the third time in little more than three years the existing authority had been destroyed and a new one had to be created. But there was one essential difference: the power that had now to reorganize the country possessed in the British army of occupation a support sufficient to command respect. Without that support Sir Evelyn Baring could have done little or nothing; with it he did perhaps more than any other single man could have done. His method may be illustrated by an old story long current in Cairo. Mehemet Ali was said to have appointed as mudir or governor in a turbulent district a young and inexperienced Turk, who asked, “But how am I to govern these people?” “Listen,” replied the pasha; “buy the biggest and heaviest kurbash you can find; hang it up in the centre of the mudirieh, well within your reach, and you will very seldom require to use it.” The British army of occupation was Sir Evelyn’s kurbash; it was well within his reach, as all the world knew, and its simple presence sufficed to prevent disorder and enforce obedience. He had one other advantage over previous English reformers in Egypt: his position towards France was more independent. The Dual Control had been abolished by a khedivial decree of 18th January 1883, and replaced by an English financial adviser. France naturally objected; but having refused to co-operate with England in suppressing the revolt, she could not reasonably complain that her offer of co-operation in the work of reorganization was declined. But though Dual Control was at an end, the Caisse de la Dette remained, and this body was to prove a constant clog on the financial measures of the Egyptian government.

At first the intention of the British government was simply to restore the power of the khedive, to keep his highness for some time in the right path by friendly advice, and to withdraw the British troops as soon as possible. As The Policy of evacuation. Lord Granville explained in a circular to the powers, the position of England in Egypt imposed on her “the duty of giving advice with the object of securing that the order of things to be established shall be of a satisfactory character and possess the elements of stability and progress.” But there was to be no embarking on a general scheme of reforms, which would increase unnecessarily the responsibilities of the protecting power and necessitate the indefinite prolongation of the military occupation. So far, therefore, as the British government had a definite policy in Egypt, it was a politique de replâtrage. Even this policy was not strictly adhered to. Mr Gladstone’s cabinet was as unstable as the public opinion it sought to conciliate. It had its hot fits and its cold fits, and it gave orders now to advance and now to retreat. In the long run circumstances proved too strong for it, and it had to undertake a great deal more than it originally intended. Each little change in the administration engendered a multitude of others, so that the modest attempts at reform were found to be like the letting out of water. A tiny rill gradually became a boisterous stream, and the boisterous stream grew into a great river, which spread to all sections of the administration and ended by inundating the whole country.

Of the numerous questions awaiting solution, the first to claim immediate attention was that of the Sudan. The British government had begun by excluding it from the problem, and by declaring that for events in these The Sudan question. outlying territories it must not be held responsible. In that sphere of activity, therefore, the Egyptian government might do as it thought fit. The principle of limited liability which this attitude assumed was soon found to be utterly untenable. The Sudan was an integral part of the khedive’s dominions, and caused, even in ordinary times, a deficit of £200,000 to the Egyptian treasury. At that moment it was in a state of open rebellion, stirred up by a religious fanatic who proclaimed himself a mahdi of Islam. An army of 10,000 men under an English officer, Colonel William Hicks, formerly of the Bombay army, otherwise Hicks Pasha, had been sent to suppress the revolt, and had been annihilated in a great battle fought on the 5th of November 1883, near Obeid. The Egyptian government wished to make a new attempt to recover the lost province, and the idea was certainly very popular among the governing class, but Sir Evelyn Baring vetoed the project on the ground that Egypt had neither soldiers nor money to carry it out. In vain the khedive and his prime minister, Sherif Pasha, threatened to resign, and the latter actually carried out his threat. The British representative remained firm, and it was decided that the Sudan should be, for the moment at least, abandoned to its fate. Nubar, though as strongly opposed to the abandonment policy as Sherif, consented to take his place and accepted somewhat reluctantly the new régime, which he defined as “the administration of Egypt under the government of Baring.” By this time the Mahdi was master of the greater part of the Sudan, but Khartum and some other fortified points still held out. The efforts made to extricate the garrisons, including the mission of General Gordon, the fall of Khartum, and the Nile Expedition under Lord Wolseley, are described below separately in the section of this article dealing with the military operations. The practical result was that the khedive’s authority was limited to the Nile valley north of Wadi Halfa.

With the internal difficulties Sir Evelyn Baring had been struggling bravely ever since his appointment, trying to evolve out of the ever-changing policy and contradictory orders of the British government some sort of coherent Internal reorganization line of action, and to raise the administration to a higher standard. For two or three years it seemed doubtful whether he would succeed. All over Egypt there was a feeling of unrest, and the well-meant but not very successful efforts of the British to improve the state of things were making them very unpopular. The introduction of English officials and English influence into all the administrative departments was resented by the native officials, and the action of the irrigation officers in preventing the customary abuses of the distribution of water was resented by the great landowners, who had been, from time immemorial, in the habit of taking as much as they wanted, to the detriment of the fellahin. Even these latter, who gained most by the reforms, considered that they had good reason to complain, for the defeat of Arabi and the re-establishment of order had enabled the Christian money-lenders to return and insist on the payment of claims, which were supposed to have been extinguished by the rebellion. Worst of all, the government was drifting rapidly towards insolvency, being quite unable to fulfil its obligations to the bondholders and meet the expenses of administration. All departments were being starved, and even the salaries of poorly paid officials were in arrear. To free itself from its financial difficulties the government adopted a heroic remedy which only created fresh troubles. On the advice of Lord Northbrook, who was sent out to Cairo in September 1884 to examine the financial situation, certain revenues which should have been paid into the Caisse for the benefit of the bondholders were paid into the treasury for the ordinary needs of the administration. Immediately the powers protested against this infraction of the law of liquidation, and the Caisse applied for a writ to the Mixed Tribunals. In this way the heroic remedy failed, and to the internal difficulties were added international complications.

Fortunately for Egypt, the British government contrived to solve the international difficulty by timely concessions to the powers, and succeeded in negotiating the London Convention of March 1885, by which the Egyptian government was relieved from some of the most onerous stipulations of the law of liquidation, and was enabled to raise a loan of £9,000,000 for an annual payment of £135,000. After paying out of the capital the sums required for the indemnities due for the burning of Alexandria and the deficits of the years 1882 and 1883, it still had a million sterling, and boldly invested it in the improvement of irrigation. The investment proved most remunerative, and helped very materially to save the country from bankruptcy and internationalism. The danger of being again subjected to the evils of an international administration was very great, for the London Convention contained a stipulation to the effect that if Egypt could not pay her way at the end of two years, another international commission would be appointed.

To obviate this catastrophe the British reformers set to work most energetically. Already something in the way of retrenchment and reform had been accomplished. The public accounts had been put in order, and the abuses in the collection of the land tax removed. The constant drain of money and men for the Sudan had been stopped. A beginning had been made for creating a new army to replace the one that had been disbanded and to allow of a portion of the British garrison being withdrawn. In this work Sir Evelyn Wood had shown much sound judgment as well as great capacity for military organization, and had formed an efficient force out of very unpromising material (see the section above on the Egyptian Army). His colleague in the department of public works, Sir Colin Scott-Moncrieff, had been not less active. By mitigating the hardships of the corvée, and improving the irrigation system, on which the prosperity of the country mainly depends, he had conferred enormous benefits on the fellahin, and had laid the foundation of permanent budgetary equilibrium for the future. Not less active was Sir Edgar Vincent, the financial adviser, who kept a firm hold on the purse-strings and ruthlessly cut down expenditure in all departments except that of irrigation (see § Finance).

The activity of the British officials naturally produced a certain amount of discontent and resistance on the part of their Egyptian colleagues, and Lord Granville was obliged to declare very plainly that such resistance could not be tolerated. Writing (January 1884) to Sir Evelyn Baring, he said:

“It should be made clear to the Egyptian Ministers and Governors of Provinces that the responsibility which for the time rests on England obliges H.M. Government to insist on the adoption of the policy which they recommend; and that it will be necessary that those Ministers and Governors who do not follow this course should cease to hold their offices.”

Nubar Pasha, who continued to be prime minister, resisted occasionally. What he chiefly objected to was direct interference in the provincial administration and the native tribunals, and he succeeded for a time in Relations between British and native officials. preventing such interference. Sir Benson Maxwell and Mr Clifford Lloyd, who had been sent out to reform the departments of justice and the interior, after coming into conflict with each other were both recalled, and the reforming activity was for a time restricted to the departments of war, public works and finance. Gradually the tension between natives and foreigners relaxed, and mutual confidence was established. Experience had evolved the working principle which was officially formulated at a much later period: “Our task is not to rule the Egyptians, but as far as possible to teach the Egyptians to rule themselves.... European initiative suggests measures to be executed by Egyptian agency, while European supervision controls the manner in which they are executed.” If that principle had been firmly laid down and clearly understood at the beginning, a good deal of needless friction would have been avoided.

The international difficulty remained. The British position in Egypt was anomalous, and might easily give rise to international complications. The sultan might well protest against the military occupation of a portion of his International problems. empire by foreign troops. It was no secret that France was ready to give him diplomatic support, and other powers might adopt a similar attitude. Besides this, the British government was anxious to terminate the occupation as soon as possible. With a view to regularizing the situation and accelerating the evacuation, Sir Henry Drummond Wolff was sent to Constantinople in August 1885 on a special mission. On the 24th of October of that year he concluded a preliminary convention by which an Ottoman and a British high commissioner, acting in concert with the khedive, should reorganize the Egyptian army, tranquillize the Sudan by pacific means, and consider what changes might be necessary in the civil administration. When the two commissioners were assured of the security of the frontier and the good working and stability of the Egyptian government, they should present reports to their respective governments, and these should consult as to the conclusion of a convention regulating the withdrawal of the English troops. Mukhtar Pasha and Sir Henry Drummond Wolfe were appointed commissioners, and their joint inquiry lasted till the end of 1886, when the former presented his report and the latter went home to report orally. The remaining stipulations of the preliminary convention were duly carried out. Sir Henry Drummond Wolff proceeded to Constantinople and signed on the 22nd of May 1887 the definitive convention, according to which the occupation should come to an end in three years, but England should have a right to prolong or renew it in the event of internal peace or external security being seriously threatened. The sultan authorised the signature of this convention, but under pressure of France and Russia he refused to ratify it. Technically, therefore, the preliminary convention still remains in force, and in reality the Ottoman commissioner continued to reside in Cairo till the close of 1908.

The steadily increasing prosperity of the country during the years 1886 and 1887 removed the danger of national bankruptcy and international interference, and induced Sir Evelyn Baring to widen the area of administrative Progress of reform. reforms. In the provinces the local administration and the methods of dispensing justice were still scandalously unsatisfactory, and this was the field to which the British representative next directed his efforts. Here he met with unexpected opposition on the part of the prime minister, Nubar Pasha, and a conflict ensued which ended in Nubar’s retirement in June 1888. Riaz Pasha took his place, and remained in office till May 1891. During these three years the work of reform and the prosperity of the country made great progress. The new Egyptian army was so far improved that it gained successes over the forces of the Mahdi; the burden of the national debt was lightened by a successful conversion; the corvée was abolished;27 the land tax was reduced 30% in the poorest provinces, and in spite of this and other measures for lightening the public burdens, the budgetary surplus constantly increased; the quasi-judicial special commissions for brigandage, which were at once barbarous and inefficient, were abolished; the native tribunals were improved, and Mr (afterwards Sir John) Scott, an Indian judge of great experience and sound judgment, was appointed judicial adviser to the khedive. This appointment was opposed by Riaz Pasha, and led to his resignation on the plea of ill-health. His successor, Mustafa Pasha Fehmi, continued the work and co-operated cordially with the English officials. The very necessary reform of the native tribunals was then taken seriously in hand. The existing procedure was simplified and accelerated; the working of the courts was greatly improved by a carefully organized system of inspection and control; the incompetent judges were eliminated and replaced by men of better education and higher moral character; and for the future supply of well-qualified judges, barristers, and law officials, an excellent school of law was established. Later on the reforming activity was extended to prisons, public health, and education, and has attained very satisfactory results.

In January 1892 the khedive Tewfik, who had always maintained cordial relations with Sir Evelyn Baring, died suddenly, and was succeeded by his son, Abbas Hilmi, a young man without political experience, who failed at first Accession of Abbas. to understand the peculiar situation in which a khedive ruling under British protection is necessarily placed. Aspiring to liberate himself at once from foreign control, he summarily dismissed Mustafa Pasha Fehmi (15th January 1893), whom he considered too amenable to English influence, and appointed in his place Fakhri Pasha, who was not a persona grata at the British Agency. Such an incident, which might have constituted a precedent for more important acts of a similar kind, could hardly be overlooked by the British representative. He had always maintained that what Egypt most required, and would require for many years to come, was an order of things which would render practically impossible any return to that personal system of government which had well-nigh ruined the country. In this view the British agent was warmly supported by Lord Rosebery, then secretary of state for foreign affairs. The young khedive was made therefore to understand that he must not make such changes in the administration without a previous agreement with the representative of the protecting power; and a compromise was effected by which Fakhri Pasha retired, and the post of premier was confided once more to Riaz. With this compromise the friction between the khedive and Sir Evelyn Baring, who had now become Lord Cromer, did not end. For some time Abbas Hilmi clung to his idea of liberating himself from all control, and secretly encouraged a nationalist and anti-British agitation in the native press; but he gradually came to perceive the folly, as well as the danger to himself, of such a course, and accordingly refrained from giving any overt occasion for complaint or protest. In like manner the relations between the British officials and their Egyptian colleagues gradually became more cordial, so that it was found possible at last to reform the local administration in the provinces according to the recommendations of Mr (afterwards Sir) Eldon Gorst, who had been appointed adviser to the ministry of the interior. Nubar Pasha, it is true, who succeeded Riaz as prime minister in April 1894, objected to some of Mr Gorst’s recommendations, and in November 1895 resigned. He was succeeded by Mustafa Fehmi, who had always shown a conciliatory spirit, and who had been on that account, as above stated, summarily dismissed by the khedive in January 1893. After his reinstatement the Anglo-Egyptian condominium worked without serious friction.

The success of the Anglo-Egyptian condominium, and the consequent economic and financial prosperity of Egypt proper, rendered it possible, during 1896-1898, to recover from the Mahdists the Sudanese provinces (see Military Operations), Fashoda. and to delimit in that part of Africa, in accordance with Anglo-Egyptian interests, the respective spheres of influence of Great Britain and France. The arrangement was not effected without serious danger of a European conflict. Taking advantage of the temporary weakness of Egypt, the French government formed the project of seizing the Upper Nile valley and uniting her possessions in West Africa with those at the entrance to the Red Sea. With this object a small force under Major Marchand was sent from the French Congo into the Bahr-el-Ghazal, with orders to occupy Fashoda on the Nile; whilst a Franco-Abyssinian Expedition was despatched from the eastward, to join hands with Major Marchand. The small force from the French Congo reached its destination, and a body of Abyssinian troops, accompanied by French officers, appeared for a short time a little higher up the river; but the grand political scheme was frustrated by the victorious advance of an Anglo-Egyptian force under General Kitchener and the resolute attitude of the British government. Major Marchand had to retire from Fashoda, and as a concession to French susceptibilities he was allowed to retreat by the Abyssinian route. By an agreement signed by Lord Salisbury and the French ambassador on the 21st of March 1899, and appended to Art. IV. of the Anglo-French convention of June 14th, 1898, which dealt with the British and French spheres of influence in the region of the Niger, France was excluded from the basin of the Nile, and a line marking the respective spheres of influence of the two countries was drawn on the map from the northern frontier of the Congo Free State to the southern frontier of the Turkish province of Tripoli.

The administration of the Sudan (q.v.) was organized on the basis of an agreement between the British and Egyptian governments signed on the 19th of January 1899. According to that agreement the British and Egyptian flags are used together, and the supreme military and civil command is vested in a governor-general, who is appointed by the khedive on the recommendation The Anglo-Egyptian Sudan. of the British government, and who cannot be removed without the British government’s consent. Neither consular jurisdiction, nor that of the mixed tribunals, was permitted, the Sudan being made absolutely free of the international fetters which bound Egypt. Sir Reginald Wingate, the sirdar of the Egyptian army (in which post he succeeded Lord Kitchener at the close of 1899) was named governor-general, and in the work of regeneration of the country, the officials, British, Egyptian and Sudanese, had the cordial co-operation of the majority of the inhabitants.

The growing prosperity of Egypt in the opening years of the 20th century was very marked, and is reflected in the annual reports on the country supplied to the British foreign office by Lord Cromer. Thus, in 1901 he was able to Egypt’s growing prosperity. declare that “the foundations on which the well-being and material prosperity of a civilized community should rest have been laid.... The institution of slavery is virtually defunct. The corvée has been practically abolished. Law and order everywhere reign supreme. The curbash is no longer employed as an instrument of government.” So little danger to internal peace was apprehended that during this year Arabi Pasha, who had been in exile in Ceylon since 1882, was permitted to return to Egypt. This happy condition had been brought about largely as the result of giving fiscal reform, accompanied by substantial relief to the taxpayers, the first place in the government’s programme, and with the abolition of octroi duties in 1902 disappeared the last of the main defects in the fiscal system as existing at the time of the British occupation. In these conditions the machinery of government, despite its many imperfections and anomalies, worked smoothly. Land increased in value as irrigation schemes were completed, and European capital was increasingly eager to find employment in the country. The bulk of the fellahin enjoyed a material prosperity to which they had been strangers for centuries. In the midst of this return of plenty Lord Cromer (in his report for 1903) sounded a note of warning:—

“As regards moral progress (he wrote), all that can be said is that it must necessarily be slower than advance in a material direction. I hope and believe, however, that some progress is being made. In any case the machinery which will admit of progress has been created. The schoolmaster is abroad.... Every possible facility and every encouragement are afforded for the Egyptians to advance along the path of moral improvement. More than this no government can do. It remains for the Egyptians to take advantage of the opportunities offered to them.”

The facilities enjoyed by the British and Egyptian governments for securing the material if not the moral development of Egypt were greatly enlarged in 1904, as the result of the understanding then come to between France The Anglo-French understanding of 1904. and Great Britain. The natural irritation in France arising from the British occupation of the Nile valley, and the non-fulfilment of the pledge to withdraw the British garrison from Egypt, which had grown less acute with the passing of years, flamed out afresh at the time of the Fashoda crisis, while the Anglo-Boer war of 1899-1902 led to another access of irritation against England. During 1903 a great change came over public opinion on both sides of the Channel, with the result that the statesmen of both countries were enabled to complete negotiations settling many points in dispute between the two nations. On the 8th of April 1904 a declaration was signed by the representatives of France and Great Britain which virtually recognized the dominant position of France in Morocco and of Britain in Egypt. The chief provisions concerning Egypt were:—

“His Britannic Majesty’s government declare that they have no intention of altering the political status of Egypt.

“The government of the French Republic, for their part, declare that they will not obstruct the action of Great Britain in that country by asking that a limit of time be fixed for the British occupation, or in any other manner.

“His Britannic Majesty’s government, for their part, will respect the rights which France, in virtue of treaties, conventions and usage, enjoys in Egypt.”

Similar declarations and engagements were made by Germany, Austria and Italy. Annexed to the Anglo-French agreement was the text of a proposed khedivial decree altering the relations between Egypt and the foreign bondholders. With the consent of the powers this decree (promulgated on the 28th of November 1904) came into operation on the 1st of January 1905. The combined effect of the declaration and the khedivial decree was great. The first-named put an end to an anomalous situation and gave a practically valid sanction to the presence of Britain in Egypt, removing all ground for the reproach that Great Britain was not respecting its international obligations. In effect it was a European recognition that Britain was the protecting power in Egypt. It put a period to a question which had long embittered the relations between England and France, and locally it caused the cessation of the systematic opposition of the French agents in Cairo to everything tending to strengthen the British position—however beneficial to Egypt the particular scheme opposed might be. Scarcely less important were the results of the khedivial decree. By it Egypt achieved in effect financial independence. The power of the Caisse de la Dette, which had virtually controlled the execution of the international agreements concerning the finances, was swept away, together with almost all the other financial fetters binding Egypt. The Railway and Port of Alexandria Board ceased to exist. For the first time since 1875 Egypt was free to control her own revenue. In return she pledged the greater part of the land tax to the service of the debt. The functions of the Caisse were restricted to the receipt of the funds necessary for this service. It was entirely deprived of its former power to interfere in the machinery of government. Moreover, some £10,000,000, being accumulated surpluses in the hands of the Caisse after meeting the charges of the debt, were handed over to the Egyptian treasury. The Egyptian government was henceforth free to take full advantage of the financial prosperity of the country.

In one respect the Anglo-French agreement made no alteration—it left untouched the extra-territoriality enjoyed by Europeans in Egypt in virtue of the treaties with Turkey, i.e. the system of Capitulations. One of the anomalies Evils of the Capitulations. under that system had, it is true, been got rid of, for, as has been stated, consular jurisdiction in civil matters had been replaced in 1876 by that of the Mixed Tribunals. In criminal cases, however, foreign consuls still exercised jurisdiction, but the main evil of the Capitulations régime was the absence of any proper machinery for enacting laws applicable to the whole of the inhabitants of Egypt. No change could be made in any law applicable to Europeans without the unanimous consent of fifteen foreign powers—a state of affairs wholly incompatible with the condition of Egypt in the 20th century, “an oriental country which has assimilated a very considerable portion of European civilization and which is mainly governed by European methods.” It was, however, far easier to acknowledge that the Capitulations régime was defective and had outlived its time than to devise a remedy and get all the nations interested to accept it. The solution favoured by Lord Cromer (vide Blue-books, Egypt No. 1 (1906), pp. 1-8, and Egypt No. 1 (1907), pp. 10-26) was the creation of a council—distinct from the existing native legislative council and assembly—composed of Europeans, which should have the power to pass legislation which when promulgated by the Egyptian government, with the assent of the British government, would bind all foreigners resident in Egypt. Every reservation for the benefit of British subjects should enure for the benefit of subjects of other powers. The jurisdiction exercised by consuls in civil and criminal affairs Lord Cromer proposed should cease pari passu with the provision by the Egyptian government, under the powers conferred by the treaty required to set up the new council, of courts having competence to deal with such matters, various safeguards being introduced to prevent injustice in criminal cases. As to civil cases the proposal was to make permanent the Mixed Tribunals, hitherto appointed for quinquennial periods (so that if not reappointed consular jurisdiction in civil cases would revive).

While the removal of ancient jealousies among the European powers interested in Egypt helped to smooth the path pursued by the Egyptian administration under the guiding hand of Great Britain, the intrigues of the Turks and The pan-Islamic movement. the danger of a revival of Moslem fanaticism threatened during 1905-1906 to disturb the peace of the country. A party had also arisen, whose best-known leader was Mustafa Kamel Pasha (1874-1908), which held that Egypt was ready for self-government and which saw in the presence of the British a hindrance to the attainment of their ideal. This “national” party lent what weight it had to the pan-Islamic agitation which arose in the summer and autumn of 1905, regardless of the fact that a pan-Islamic triumph meant the re-assertion of direct Turkish rule in Egypt and the end of the liberty the Egyptians enjoyed. The pan-Islamic press, allowed full licence by the Cairo authorities, spread abroad rumours that the Egyptian government intended to construct fortifications in the Sinai peninsula with the design of menacing the railway, under construction by Turkey, from Damascus to Mecca. This baseless report led to what is known as the Taba incident (see below). This incident inflamed the minds of many Egyptians, and almost all the opposition elements in the country were united by the appeal to religious fanaticism, of which the incident was partly the effect and partly the cause. The inflammatory writing of the newspapers indicated, encouraged by many persons holding high positions both inside and outside Egypt, created, by every process of misrepresentation, an anti-Christian and anti-European feeling among the mass of the people. After more than a quarter of a century of just rule, i.e. since the accession of Tewfik, the tyranny of the Turkish system was apt to be forgotten, while the appeal to rally in support of their khalif found a response in the hearts of many Egyptians. The feeling entertained by large numbers even of the educated class of Egyptians was strikingly illustrated by the terms of an anonymous letter received by Lord Cromer in May 1906. The writer, probably a member of the Ulema class, addressing the British agent as the reformer of Egypt, said:—

“ ... He must be blind who sees not what the English have wrought in Egypt; the gates of justice stand open to the poor; the streams flow through the land and are not stopped by order of the strong; the poor man is lifted up and the rich man pulled down, the hand of the oppressor and the briber is struck when outstretched to do evil. Our eyes see these things and they know from whom they come.... While peace is in the land the spirit of Islam sleeps.... But it is said, ’There is war between England and Abdul Hamid Khan.’ If that be so a change must come. The words of the Imam are echoed in every heart, and every Moslem hears only the cry of the Faith.... Though the Khalif were hapless as Bayezid, cruel as Murad, or mad as Ibrahim, he is the shadow of God, and every Moslem must leap up at his call.... You will say, ’The Egyptian is more ungrateful than a dog, which remembers the hand that fed him. He is foolish as the madman who pulls down the roof-tree of his house upon himself.’ It may be so to worldly eyes, but in the time of danger to Islam the Moslem turns away from the things of this world and thirsts only for the service of his Faith, even though he looks in the face of death....”

To establish confidence in the minds of the Egyptian public that the authorities could maintain order and tranquillity, it was determined to increase permanently the strength of the British garrison. An incident occurred in June 1906 which illustrated the danger which might arise if anything happened to beget the idea that the protecting power had weakened its hold. While mounted infantry of the British army were marching from Cairo to Alexandria, five officers went (on the 13th of Denshawai. June) to the village of Denshawai to shoot pigeons.28 An attack was made on the party by the villagers. The officers were told by their guide that they might shoot, but the villagers had not given permission and were incensed at the shooting of their pigeons by other officers in the previous year. A premeditated attack was made on the officers; a gun seized from one of them went off and slightly injured four natives—one a woman. The attack had been preceded by a trifling fire at a threshing floor, either accidentally caused (but not by the officers’ shots) or lit as a signal for the assault. Captain S. C. Bull of the 6th Dragoons received serious injuries and died a few hours later, and two other officers were seriously injured. A number of persons were arrested and tried by a special tribunal created in 1895 to deal with offences against the army of occupation. On the 27th of the same month four of the ringleaders were sentenced to death, others received various terms of imprisonment,29 and seven were sentenced to fifty lashes. The executions and floggings were carried out the next day at the scene of the outrage and in the presence of some five hundred natives. The quieting effect that this drastic action might have had was marred by the fact that certain members of the British parliament called in question the justice of the sentences—passed unanimously by a court of which the best English and the best native judge were members. For a time there was considerable ferment in Egypt. The Anglo-Egyptian authorities received, however, the firm support of Sir Edward Grey, the foreign secretary in the liberal administration formed in December 1905. As far as responsible statesmen were concerned the change of government in Great Britain made no difference in the conduct of Egyptian affairs.

The Taba incident, to which reference has been made, arose in the beginning of 1906 over the claim of the sultan of Turkey to jurisdiction in the Sinai peninsula. The origin of the dispute dated back, however, to 1892, when Abbas The Taba incident. Hilmi became khedive. Mehemet Ali and his successors up to and including Tewfik had not only administered the Sinai peninsula but certain posts on the Hejaz or Arabian side of the gulf of Akaba. The firman of investiture issued by the sultan on the occasion of the succession of Abbas differed, however, from the text of former firmans, the intention being, apparently, to exclude Egypt from the administration of the Sinai peninsula. The British government intervened and after considerable pressure upon Turkey obtained a telegram (dated the 8th of April 1892) from the grand vizier in which it was declared that the status quo was maintained in the Sinai peninsula, but that the sultan resumed possession of the posts in the Hejaz heretofore garrisoned by Egypt. To this last course Great Britain raised no objection. As officially stated by the British government at the time, the eastern frontier of the Sinai peninsula was taken to be a line running in a south-easterly direction from Rafa, a place on the Mediterranean, east of El Arish, to the head of the gulf of Akaba. The fort of Akaba and other posts farther east Egypt abandoned. So matters rested until in 1905 in consequence of lawlessness among the Bedouins of the peninsula a British official was appointed commandant and inspector of the peninsula and certain administrative measures taken. The report was spread by pan-Islamic agents that the intention of the Egyptian government was to construct fortifications on the frontier near Akaba, to which place the Turks were building a branch railway from the Damascus-Mecca line. In January 1906 the sultan complained to the British ambassador at Constantinople of Egyptian encroachments on Turkish territory, whereupon the khedive asked that the frontier should be delimited, a request which Turkey rejected. A small Egyptian force was then directed to occupy Taba, a port near Akaba but on the western side of the gulf. Before this force could reach Taba that place had been seized by the Turkish commandant at Akaba. A period of considerable tension ensued, the Turks removing the boundary posts at Rafa and sending strong reinforcements to the frontier. The British government intervened on behalf of the khedive and consistently maintained that the Rafa-Akaba line must be the frontier. In April a conference was held between the khedive and Mukhtar Pasha, the Ottoman commissioner. It then appeared that Turkey was unwilling to recognize the British interpretation of the telegram of the 8th of April 1892. Turkey claimed that the peninsula of Sinai consisted only of the territory south of a straight line from Akaba to Suez, and that Egyptian territory north of that line was traced from Rafa to Suez. As a compromise Mukhtar Pasha suggested as the frontier a line drawn direct from Rafa to Ras Mahommed (the most southern point of the Sinai peninsula), which would have left the whole of the gulf of Akaba in Turkish territory. In other words the claim of the Porte was, to quote Lord Cromer:—

“to carry the Turkish frontier and strategical railways to Suez on the banks of the canal; or that if the Ras Mahommed line were adopted, the Turkish frontier would be advanced to the neighbourhood of Nekhl, i.e. within easy striking distance of Egypt, and that ... the gulf of Akaba ... would practically become a mare clausum in the possession of Turkey and a standing menace to the security of the trade route to the East.”

Such proposals could not be entertained by Great Britain; and as the sultan remained obstinate the British ambassador on the 3rd of May presented a note to the Porte requiring compliance with the British proposals within ten days. The Turkish ambassador in London was informed by Sir Edward Grey, foreign secretary, that if it were found that Turkish suzerainty in Egypt were incompatible with the rights of the British government to interfere in Egyptian affairs, and with the British occupation, the British position in Egypt would be upheld by the whole force of the empire. Thereupon the sultan gave way and agreed (on the 14th of May) that the line of demarcation should start at Rafa and run towards the south-east “in an approximately straight line as far as a point on the gulf of Akaba at least 3 m. distant from Akaba.”30 The Turkish troops were withdrawn from Taba, and the delimitation of the frontier was undertaken by a joint Turco-Egyptian commission. An agreement was signed on the 1st of October finally settling the frontier line.

With the ending of this dispute and the strengthening of the British garrison in Egypt a demonstration was given of the ability of the protecting power to maintain its position. At the same time encouragement was given to that section of Egyptian society which sought the reform of various Moslem institutions without injury to the principles underlying the faith of Islam: a more truly national movement than that of the agitators who clamoured for parliamentary government.

In April 1907, a few days after the appearance of his report for 1906, in which the “Nationalist” and pan-Islamic movements were shown to be detrimental to the welfare of Egypt, Lord Cromer resigned his post of British agent Resignation of Lord Cromer. and consul-general. His resignation, dictated by reasons of health, was described by Sir Edward Grey as “the greatest personal loss which the public service of this country (Britain) could suffer.” Lord Cromer’s work was in a sense complete. He left the country in a state of unexampled material prosperity, free from the majority of the international fetters with which it was bound when he took up his task in 1883, and with the legitimate expectation that the work he had done would endure. The magnitude of the task he had accomplished is shown by the preceding pages, and it need only be added that the transformation effected in Egypt and the Sudan, during his twenty-four years’ occupancy of the British Agency, was carried out in every department under his guidance and inspiration. Lord Cromer was succeeded by Sir Eldon Gorst, who had served in Egypt eighteen years under him, and was at the time of his appointment to Cairo an assistant under secretary of state for foreign affairs.

Notwithstanding, or, rather, as a consequence of, the unexampled material prosperity of the country, 1907 was a year of severe financial crisis, due to over-trading, excessive credit and the building mania induced by the rapid economic progress of Egypt, and aggravated by the unfavourable monetary conditions existing in America and Europe during the latter part of the year. Though the crisis had results disastrous to the speculators, the position of the fellahin was hardly affected; the cotton crop was marketed with regularity and at an average price higher than that of 1906, while public revenue showed a satisfactory increase. The noisy “Nationalist” agitation which was maintained during this period of financial stringency reacted unfavourably on public order. Although the degree of insecurity prevailing in the provinces was greatly exaggerated—serious crime in 1907 being less than in the preceding year—an increasing number of crimes were left untraced to their authors. The release of the Denshawai prisoners in January 1908 and the death of Mustafa Kamel in the following month had a quieting effect on the public mind; while the fact that in the elections (December 1907) for the legislative council and the general assembly only 5% of the electors went to the polls, afforded a striking commentary alike on the appreciation of the average Egyptian of the value of parliamentary institutions and of the claims of the “Nationalist” members of the assembly to represent the Egyptian people. The “Nationalists” were, too, divided into many warring sections—Mahommed Bey Ferid, chosen as successor to Mustafa Kamel, had to contend with the pretensions of several other “leaders.” The khedive, moreover, markedly abstained from any association with the agitation of the Nationalists, who viewed with disfavour his highness’s personal friendship with Sir Eldon Gorst. The agitators gained their chief strength from the support accorded them by certain Radical politicians in England. A number of members of the council and assembly visited England in July 1908 and were received by Sir Edward Grey, who gave them assurances that Great Britain would always strive to remedy the legitimate grievances of Egyptians.

The establishment of constitutional rule in Turkey in the summer of 1908 excited the hopes of the Egyptian Nationalists, and a deputation was sent to Constantinople to confer with the Young Turk committee. From the Young Turks, however, the deputation received no encouragement for their agitation and returned with the advice to work in co-operation with the British. In view of the rumours current, Sir Eldon Gorst, in the form of an interview in El Mokattam, a widely read native paper, restated (October 1908) the British view as to the occupation of the country and the demand for a parliament. Great Britain, he declared, had no intention of proclaiming a protectorate over Egypt; on the other hand, recent events in Turkey in no way affected the question of self-government in Egypt. It would be folly to think of introducing unrestricted parliamentary government at present, the conditions for its successful working not existing. The “wild and foolish” agitation on this question only served to confirm the impression that the Egyptians were not yet fit to govern themselves. At the same time steps were being taken to give them a much greater part in the management of local affairs. If the Egyptians showed that the existing institutions and the new provincial councils could do useful work, it would prove the best argument for extending their powers. Sir Eldon Gorst’s statements were approved by the British government.

In November 1908 Mustafa Fehmi, who had been premier since 1895, resigned, and was succeeded by Boutros Pasha, a Copt of marked ability, who had been for several years foreign minister. Boutros incurred the enmity of the “Nationalists” and was murdered in February 1910.

(D. M. W.; F. R. C.)

Authorities.—D. A. Cameron, Egypt in the Nineteenth Century (London, 1898), a clear and useful summary of events up to 1882; E. Dicey, The Story of the Khedivate (London, 1902); J. C. McCoan, Egypt under Ismail (London, 1899); P. Mouriez, Histoire de Méhémet-Ali (4 vols., Paris, 1855-1858); L. Bréhier, L’Égypte de 1789 à 1900 (Paris, 1901); C. de Freycinet, La Question d’Égypte (Paris, 1905). See also Mehemet Ali.

For the period immediately preceding and during the British occupation the standard authority is Lord Cromer’s Modern Egypt (2 vols., London, 1908). In this invaluable work the history of Egypt from 1875 to 1892 and that of the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan from 1882 to 1907 is treated fully. Lord Cromer’s annual reports (1888-1906) to the British government on the affairs of Egypt should also be consulted. Next in interest are Alfred (Lord) Milner’s England in Egypt (11th ed., London, 1904), and Sir A. Colvin’s The Making of Modern Egypt (London, 1906). Consult also Khedives and Pashas (London, 1884), by C. F. Moberly Bell (published anonymously); D. M. Wallace, Egypt and the Egyptian Question (London, 1883); W. S. Blunt, Secret History of the English Occupation of Egypt (2nd ed., London, 1907), a partisan record; C. v. Malortie, Egypt, Native Rulers and Foreign Interference, 2 vols. (London, 1883); O. Borelli, Choses politiques d’Égypte, 1883-1895 (Paris, 1895); H. Resener, Ägypten unter englischer Okkupation (Berlin, 1896). Morley’s Life of Gladstone and Fitzmaurice’s Life of Granville throw considerable light on the inner history of the period 1880-1893. See further the historical works cited in Sudan: Anglo-Egyptian, and those given at the end of the first section of this article.

For military operations 1882-1899 see C. Royle, The Egyptian Campaigns 1882 to 1899, revised ed. (London, 1900); H. Brackenbury, Narrative of the Advance of the River Column of the Nile Expeditionary Force (Edinburgh, 1885); Sir W. F. Butler, Campaign of the Cataracts (London, 1887); Count A. E. W. Gleichen, With the Camel Corps up the Nile (London, 1888); Gordon’s Last Journal (London, 1885); Sir C. W. Wilson, From Korti to Khartum (Edinburgh, 1886); J. Grant, Cassell’s History of the War in the Soudan, 6 vols. (London, 1885 et seq.); “An Officer,” Sudan Campaigns 1896-1899 (London, 1899); G. W. Steevens, With Kitchener to Khartum (Edinburgh, 1898); W. S. Churchill, The River War, new edition (London, 1902).

Bibliographical notes for each section of this article are given in their several places. The following bibliographies may be consulted: Ibrahim Hilmi, Literature of Egypt and the Soudan, 2 vols. (London, 1886-1888); H. Jolowicz, Bibliotheca aegyptiaca (Leipzig, 1858; supplement, 1861); M. Hartmann, The Arabic Press of Egypt (London, 1899).

(F. R. C.)

Military Operations of 1882-1885

In February 1879 a slight outbreak of discharged officers and soldiers occurred at Cairo, which led to the despatch of British and French ships to Alexandria. On the 26th of June of that year Ismail Pasha was removed from Egypt, and Tewfik assumed the khediviate, becoming practically the protégé of the two western powers. On the 1st of February 1881 a more serious disturbance arose at Cairo from the attempt to try three colonels, Ahmed Arabi, Ali Fehmy, and Abd-el-Al, who had been arrested as the ringleaders of the military party. The prisoners were released by force, and proceeded to dictate terms to the khedive. Again British and French warships were despatched to Alexandria, and were quickly withdrawn, their presence having produced no apparent impression. It soon became clear that the khedive was powerless, and that the military party, headed by Arabi, threatened to dominate the country. The “dual note,” communicated to the khedive on the 6th of January 1881, contained an intimation that Great Britain and France were prepared to afford material support if necessary; but the fall of Gambetta’s ministry produced a reaction, and both governments proceeded to minimize the meaning of their language. The khedive was practically compelled to form a government in which Arabi was minister of war and Mahmud Sami premier, and Arabi took steps to extend his influence throughout his army. The situation now became critically serious: for the third time ships were sent to Alexandria, and on the 25th of May 1882 the consuls-general of the two powers made a strong representation to Mahmud Sami which produced the resignation of the Egyptian ministry, and a demand, to which the khedive yielded, by the military party for the reinstatement of Arabi. The attitude of the troops in Alexandria now became threatening; and on the 29th the British residents pointed out that they were “absolutely defenceless.” This warning was amply justified by the massacres of the 11th of June, during which more than one hundred persons, including an officer and two seamen, were killed in the streets of Bombardment of Alexandria. Alexandria, almost under the guns of the ships in harbour. It was becoming clear that definite action would have to be taken, and on the 15th the channel squadron was ordered to Malta. By the end of June twenty-six warships, representing the navies of Great Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Austria, Russia, the United States, Spain, Greece and Turkey, lay off the port of Alexandria, and large numbers of refugees were embarked. The order received by Admiral Sir Beauchamp Seymour (afterwards Lord Alcester) on the 3rd of July was as follows:—

“Prevent any attempt to bar channel into port. If work is resumed on earthworks, or fresh guns mounted, inform military commander that you have orders to prevent it; and if not immediately discontinued, destroy earthworks and silence batteries if they open fire, having given sufficient notice to population, shipping and foreign men-of-war.”

On the 9th the admiral received a report that working parties had been seen in Fort Silsileh “parbuckling two smoothbore guns—apparently 32-pounders—towards their respective carriages and slides, which were facing in the direction of the harbour.” Fort Silsileh was an old work at the extreme east of the defences of Alexandria, and its guns do not bear on the harbour. On the 10th an ultimatum was sent to Toulba Pasha, the military commandant, intimating that the bombardment would commence at sunrise on the following morning unless “the batteries on the isthmus of Ras-el-Tin and the southern shore of the harbour of Alexandria” were previously surrendered “for the purpose of disarming.” The fleet prepared for action, and the bearer of the reply, signed by the president of the council, and offering to dismount three guns in the batteries named, only succeeded in finding the flagship late at night. This proposal was rejected, and at 7 A.M. on the 11th of July the “Alexandra” opened fire and the action became general. The attacking force was disposed in three groups: (1) the “Alexandra,” “Sultan” and “Superb,” outside the reef, to engage the Ras-el-Tin and the earthworks under weigh; (2) the “Monarch,” “Invincible” and “Penelope,” inside the harbour, to engage the Meks batteries; and (3) the “Inflexible” and “Temeraire,” to take up assigned stations outside the reef and to co-operate with the inshore squadron. The gunboats “Beacon,” “Bittern,” “Condor,” “Cygnet” and “Decoy” were to keep out of fire at first and seek opportunities of engaging the Meks batteries. Meks fort was silenced by about 12.45 P.M., and a party from the “Invincible” landed and disabled the guns. As the fire delivered under weigh was not effective, the offshore squadron anchored at about 10.30 A.M., and succeeded in silencing Fort Ras-el-Tin at about 12.30 P.M., and Fort Adda, by the explosion of the main magazine, at 1.35 P.M. The “Inflexible” weighed soon after 8 A.M. and engaged Ras-el-Tin, afterwards attacking Forts Pharos and Adda. The “Condor,” followed by the “Beacon,” “Bittern” and “Decoy,” engaged Fort Marabout soon after 8 A.M. till 11 A.M., when the gunboats were recalled. After the works were silenced, the ships moved in closer, with a view to dismount the Egyptian guns. The bombardment ceased at 5 P.M.; but a few rounds were fired by the “Inflexible” and “Temeraire” on the morning of the 12th at the right battery in Ras-el-Tin lines.

The bombardment of the forts of Alexandria is interesting as a gauge of the effect to be expected from the fire of ships under specially favourable conditions. The Egyptians at different times during the day brought into action about 33 R.M.L. guns (7-in. to 10-in.), 3 R.B.L. guns (40 prs.), and 120 S.B. guns (6.5-in. and 10-in.), with a few mortars. These guns were disposed over a coast-line of about 10 sea miles, and were in many cases indifferently mounted. The Egyptian gunners had been little trained, and many of them had never once practised with rifled ordnance. Of seventy-five hits on the hulls of the ships only five can with certainty be ascribed to projectiles from rifled guns, and thirty were unquestionably due to the old smoothbores, which were not provided with sights. The total loss inflicted was 6 killed and 27 wounded. The British ships engaged fired 1741 heavy projectiles (7-in. to 16-in.) and 1457 light (7-prs. to 64-prs.), together with 33,493 machine-gun and rifle bullets. The result was comparatively small. About 8 rifled guns and 19 smoothbores were dismounted or disabled and 4 and 1 temporarily put out of action respectively. A considerable portion of this injury was inflicted, after the works had been silenced, by the deliberate fire of the ships. As many as twenty-eight rifled guns and 140 smoothbores would have opened fire on the following day. The Egyptians made quite as good a stand as could be expected, but were driven from their guns, which they were unable to use with adequate effect; and the bombardment of Alexandria confirms previous experience that the fire of ships cannot really compete with that of well-mounted and well-handled guns on shore.

In the afternoon of the 12th, fires, which were the work of incendiaries, began to break out in the best quarters of Alexandria; and the town was left to murder and pillage till the following day, when a party of bluejackets and marines was landed at about 3 P.M.

Military intervention being now imperatively demanded, a vote of credit for £2,300,000 was passed in the British House of Commons on the 27th of July. Five days later the French government failed to secure a similar vote, and Great Britain was left to deal with the Egyptian question alone. An expeditionary force detailed from home stations and from Malta was organized in two divisions, with a cavalry division, corps British expedition under Sir Garnet Wolseley. troops, and a siege train, numbering in all about 25,000 men. An Indian contingent numbering about 7000 combatants, complete in all arms and with its own transport, was prepared for despatch to Suez. General Sir Garnet Wolseley was appointed commander-in-chief, with Lieutenant-General Sir J. Adye as chief of the staff. The plan of operations contemplated the seizure of Ismailia as the base for an advance on Cairo, Alexandria and its suburbs to be held defensively, and the Egyptian forces in the neighbourhood to be occupied by demonstrations. The expeditionary force having rendezvoused at Alexandria, means were taken by Rear-Admiral Hoskins and Sir W. Hewett for the seizure of the Suez canal. Under orders from the former, Captain Fairfax, R.N., occupied Port Said on the night of 19th August, and Commander Edwards, R.N., proceeded down the canal, taking possession of the gares and dredgers, while Captain Fitzroy, R.N., occupied Ismailia after slight opposition. Before nightfall on the 20th of August the canal was wholly in British hands. Meanwhile, leaving Sir E. Hamley in command at Alexandria, Sir G. Wolseley with the bulk of the expeditionary force arrived at Port Said on the 20th of August, a naval demonstration having been made at Abukir with a view to deceive the enemy as to the object of the great movement in progress. The advance from Ismailia now began. On the 21st Major-General Graham moved from Ismailia with about 800 men and a small naval force, occupying Nefiche, the junction with the Suez line, at 1.30 A.M. without opposition. On the 22nd he made a reconnaissance towards Suez, and on the 23rd another to El-Magfar, 4 m. from Nefiche. It now appeared that the enemy had dammed the sweet-water canal and blocked the railway at Tell-el-Mahuta, where entrenchments had been thrown up and resistance seemed to be contemplated. At 4 A.M. on the 24th Sir Garnet Wolseley advanced with 3 squadrons of cavalry, 2 guns, and about 1000 infantry, placed under the orders of Lieutenant-General Willis. The enemy showed in force, estimated at 7000 with 12 guns, and a somewhat desultory action ensued. Reinforcements from Ismailia were ordered up, and the British cavalry, operating on the right, helped to check the enemy’s attack, which showed little vigour. At night the troops, now reinforced by the Guards Brigade, an infantry battalion, 2 cavalry regiments and 10 guns, bivouacked on the ground. Early on the morning of the 25th the advance was continued to Tell-el-Mahuta, which the enemy evacuated, while the mounted troops and horse artillery pressed on to Mahsama, capturing the Egyptian camp, with 7 guns and large quantities of ammunition and supplies. On the same evening Major-General Graham, with about 1200 marines (artillery and light infantry), reached Mahsama, and on the following day he occupied Kassassin without opposition. The advance guard had now outrun its communications and was actually short of food, while a considerable force was distributed at intervals along the line Ismailia-Kassassin. The situation on the 27th tempted attack by an enterprising enemy, and Major-General Graham’s force, consisting of a squadron of the 19th Hussars, the York and Lancaster Regiment, the duke of Cornwall’s Light Infantry, the Marine Artillery Battalion and two R.H.A. guns, short of ammunition, was in danger of being overwhelmed by vastly superior numbers from Tell-el-Kebir. On the 28th Major-General Graham’s troops were attacked, and after repulsing the enemy, made a general advance about 6.45 P.M. The cavalry, summoned by heliograph from Mahsama, co-operated, and in a moonlight charge inflicted considerable loss. The British casualties amounted to 14 killed and 83 wounded. During the lull which followed the first action of Kassassin, strenuous efforts were made to bring up supplies and troops and to open up railway communication to the front. On the 9th of September the Egyptians again attacked Kassassin, but were completely repulsed by 9 A.M., with a loss of 4 guns, and were pursued to within extreme range of the guns of Tell-el-Kebir. The British casualties were 3 killed and 78 wounded. The three following days were occupied in concentrating troops at Kassassin for the attack on Tell-el-Kebir, held by about 38,000 men with 60 guns. The Egyptian defences consisted of Tell-el-Kebir. a long line of trench (2½ m.) approximately at right angles to the railway and the sweet-water canal. At 11 P.M. on the 12th of September the advance of about 15,000 men commenced; the 1st division, under Lieutenant-General Willis, was on the right, and the 2nd division, under Lieutenant-General Hamley, was on the left. Seven batteries of artillery, under Brigadier-General Goodenough, were placed in the centre. The cavalry, under Major-General Drury Lowe, was on the right flank, and the Indian contingent, under Major-General Macpherson, starting one hour later, was ordered to move south of the sweet-water canal. The night was moonless, and the distance to be covered about 6¼ m. The ground was perfectly open, slightly undulating, and generally firm gravel. The conditions for a night march were thus ideal; but during the movement the wings closed towards each other, causing great risk of an outbreak of firing. The line was, however, rectified, and after a halt the final advance began. By a fortunate accident the isolated outwork was just missed in the darkness by the left flank of the 2nd Division; otherwise a premature alarm would have been given, which must have changed all the conditions of the operation. At dawn the Highland Brigade of the 2nd Division struck the enemy’s trenches, and carried them after a brief struggle. The 1st Division attacked a few minutes later, and the cavalry swept round the left of the line of entrenchments, cutting down any fugitives who attempted resistance and reaching the enemy’s camp in rear. The Indian contingent, on the south of the canal, co-operated, intercepting the Egyptians at the canal bridge. The opposition encountered at some points was severe, but by 6 A.M. all resistance was at an end. The British loss amounted to 58 killed, 379 wounded and 22 missing; nearly 2000 Egyptians were killed, and more than 500 wounded were treated in hospital. An immediate pursuit was ordered, and the Indian contingent, under Major-General Macpherson, reached Zagazig, while the cavalry, under Major-General Drury Lowe, occupied Belbeis and pushed on to Cairo, 65 m. from Tell-el-Kebir, next day. On the evening of the 14th the 10,000 troops occupying Abbasia barracks, and 5000 in the citadel of Cairo, surrendered. On the 15th General Sir Garnet Wolseley, with the brigade of Guards under H.R.H. the duke of Connaught, entered the city.

The prompt following up of the victory at Tell-el-Kebir saved Cairo from the fate of Alexandria and brought the rebellion to an end. The Egyptian troops at Kafr Dauar, Abukir and Rosetta surrendered without opposition, and those at Damietta followed on the 23rd of September, after being threatened with attack. On the 25th the khedive entered Cairo, where a review of the British troops was held on the 30th. The expeditionary force was now broken up, leaving about 10,000 men, under Major-General Sir A. Alison, to maintain the authority of the khedive. In twenty-five days, from the landing at Ismailia to the occupation of Cairo, the rebellion was completely suppressed, and the operations were thus signally successful.

The authority of the khedive and the maintenance of law and order now depended absolutely on the British forces left in occupation. Lord Dufferin, who had been sent to Cairo to draw up a project of constitutional reforms, The Sudan question. advocated the re-establishment of a native army, not to exceed 5000 to 6000 men, with a proportion of British officers, for purely defence purposes within the Delta; and on the 13th of December 1882 Sir Evelyn Wood left England to undertake the organization of this force, with the title of sirdar. Lord Dufferin further advised the formation of a gendarmerie, which “should be in a great measure a mounted force and empowered with a semi-military character” (despatch of January 1st, 1883). The strength of this military police force was fixed at 4400 men with 2562 horses, and Baker Pasha (General Valentine Baker) was entrusted with its formation, with the title of inspector-general.

In a despatch of the 6th of February 1883 Lord Dufferin dealt with the Sudan, and stated that Egypt “could hardly be expected to acquiesce” in a policy of withdrawal from her Southern territories. At the same time he pointed out that,

“Unhappily, Egyptian administration in the Sudan had been almost uniformly unfortunate. The success of the present mahdi in raising the tribes and extending his influence over great tracts of country was a sufficient proof of the government’s inability either to reconcile the inhabitants to its rule or to maintain order. The consequences had been most disastrous. Within the last year and a half the Egyptians had lost something like 9000 men, while it was estimated that 40,000 of their opponents had perished.”

Moreover, to restore tranquillity in the Sudan,

“the first step necessary was the construction of a railway from Suakin to Berber, or what, perhaps, would be more advisable, to Shendi, on the Nile. The completion of this enterprise would at once change all the elements of the problem.”

The immense responsibilities involved were most imperfectly understood by the British government. Egyptian sovereignty in the Sudan dates from 1820, when Mehemet Ali sent a large force into the country, and ultimately established his authority over Sennar and Kordofan. In 1865 Suakin and Massawa were assigned to Egyptian rule by the sultan, and in 1870 Sir Samuel Baker proceeded up the Nile to the conquest of the Equatorial provinces, of which General Gordon was appointed governor-general in 1874. In the same year Darfur and Harrar were annexed, and in 1877 Gordon became governor-general of the Sudan, where, with the valuable assistance of Gessi Pasha, he laboured to destroy the slave trade and to establish just government. In August 1879 he returned to Cairo, and was succeeded by Raouf Pasha. Misrule and oppression in every form now again prevailed throughout the Sudan, while the slave traders, exasperated by Gordon’s stern measures, were ready to revolt. The authority of Egypt was represented by scattered garrisons of armed men, badly officered, undisciplined and largely demoralized. In such conditions a leader only was required to ensure widespread and dangerous rebellion. A leader appeared in the person of Mahommed Ahmed, born in 1848, who had taken up his abode on Abba Island, and, acquiring great reputation for sanctity, had actively fomented insurrection. In August 1881 a small force sent by Raouf Pasha to arrest Mahommed Ahmed was destroyed, and the latter, proclaiming himself the mahdi, stood forth as the champion of revolt. Thus, at the time when the Egyptian army was broken up at Tell-el-Kebir, the Sudan was already in flames. On the 7th of June 1882, 6000 men under Yusef Pasha, advancing from Fashoda, were nearly annihilated by the mahdists. Payara and Birket in Kordofan quickly fell, and a few days before the battle of Tell-el-Kebir was fought, the mahdi, with a large force, was besieging El Obeid. That town was captured, after an obstinate defence, on the 17th of January 1883, by which time almost the whole of the Sudan south of Khartum was in open rebellion, except the Bahr-el-Ghazal and the Equatorial provinces, where for a time Lupton Bey and Emin Pasha were able to hold their own. Abd-el-Kader, who had succeeded Raouf, telegraphed to Cairo for 10,000 additional troops, and pointed out that if they were not sent at once four times this number would be required to re-establish the authority of the government in the Sudan. After gaining some small successes, Abd-el-Kader was superseded by Suliman Niagi on the 20th of February 1883, and on the 26th of March Ala-ed-din Pasha was appointed governor-general. Meanwhile 5000 men, who had served in the Egyptian army, were collected and forcibly despatched to Khartum via Suakin. In March Disaster to Hicks Pasha. 1883 Colonel William Hicks, late of the Bombay army, who in January had been appointed by the khedive chief of the staff of the army of the Sudan, found himself at Khartum with nine European officers and about 10,000 troops of little military value. The reconquest of the Sudan having been determined upon, although Sir E. Malet reported that the Egyptian government could not supply the necessary funds, and that there was great risk of failure, Colonel Hicks, who had resigned his post on the 23rd of July, and had been appointed commander-in-chief, started from Khartum on 9th September, with a total force of about 10,000 men, including non-combatants, for Kordofan. On the 22nd of May Sir E. Malet had informed Sherif Pasha that,

“although Colonel Hicks finds it convenient to communicate with Lord Dufferin or with me, it must not be supposed that we endorse in any way the contents of his telegrams.... Her Majesty’s government are in no way responsible for his operations in the Sudan, which have been undertaken under the authority of His Highness’s government.”

Colonel Hicks was fully aware of the unfitness of his rabble forces for the contemplated task, and on the 5th of August he telegraphed: “I am convinced it would be best to keep the two rivers and province of Sennar, and wait for Kordofan to settle itself.” Early in November the force from Khartum was caught by the mahdists short of water at Kashgil, near El Obeid, and was almost totally destroyed, Colonel Hicks, with all his European officers, perishing. Sinister rumours having reached Cairo, Sir E. Baring (Lord Cromer), who had succeeded Sir E. Malet, telegraphed that “if Colonel Hicks’s army is destroyed, the Egyptian government will lose the whole of the Sudan, unless some assistance from the outside is given,” and advised the withdrawal to some post on the Nile. On the following day Lord Granville replied: “We cannot lend English or Indian troops; if consulted, recommend abandonment of the Sudan within certain limits”; and on the 25th he added that “Her Majesty’s government can do nothing in the matter which would throw upon them the responsibilities for operations in the Sudan.” In a despatch of the 3rd of December Sir E. Baring forcibly argued against British intervention in the affairs of the Sudan, and on the 13th of December Lord Granville telegraphed that “Her Majesty’s government recommend the ministers of khedive to come to an early decision to abandon all territory south of Assuan, or, at least, of Wadi Halfa.” On the 4th of January 1884 Sir E. Baring was directed to insist upon the policy of evacuation, and on the 18th General Gordon left London to assist in its execution.

The year 1883 brought a great accession of power to the mahdi, who had captured about 20,000 rifles, 19 guns and large stores of ammunition. On the Red Sea littoral Osman Digna, a slave dealer of Suakin, appointed amir of the Defeat of General Baker. Eastern Sudan, raised the local tribes and invested Sinkat and Tokar. On the 16th of October and the 4th of November Egyptian reinforcements intended for the former place were destroyed, and on the 2nd of December a force of 700 men was annihilated near Tamanieb. On the 23rd of December General Valentine Baker, followed by about 2500 men, gendarmerie, blacks, Sudanese and Turks, with 10 British officers, arrived at Suakin to prepare for the relief of Sinkat and Tokar. The khedive appears to have been aware of the risks to be incurred, and in a private letter he informed the general that “I rely upon your prudence and ability not to engage the enemy except under the most favourable circumstances.” The tragedy of Kashgil was repeated on the 4th of February 1884, when General Baker’s heterogeneous force, on the march from Trinkitat to Tokar, was routed at El Teb by an inferior body of tribesmen. Of 3715 men, 2375, with 11 European officers, were killed. Suakin was now in danger, and on the 6th of February British bluejackets and marines were landed for the defence of the town.

Two expeditions in the Sudan led by British officers having thus ended in disaster, and General Gordon with Lieutenant-Colonel J. D. Stewart having reached Khartum on the 18th of February, the policy of British non-intervention British expedition under Sir G. Graham: battles of El Teb and Tamanieb. in regard to Sudan affairs could no longer be maintained. Public opinion in England was strongly impressed by the fact that the Egyptian garrisons of Tokar and Sinkat were perishing within striking distance of the Red Sea littoral. A British force about 4400 strong, with 22 guns, made up of troops from Egypt and from units detained on passage from India, was rapidly concentrated at Suakin and placed under the orders of Major-General Sir G. Graham, with Major-Generals Sir R. Buller and J. Davis as brigadiers. News of the fall of Sinkat, where the starving garrison, under Tewfik Bey, made a gallant sortie and was cut to pieces, reached Suakin on the 12th of February. On the 24th General Graham’s force disembarked at Trinkitat and received information of the surrender of Tokar. At 8 A.M. on the 29th the force advanced towards Tokar in square, and came under fire at 11.20 A.M. from the enemy entrenched at El Teb. The tribesmen made desperate efforts to rush the square, but were repulsed, and the position was taken by 2 P.M. The cavalry, 10th and 19th Hussars, under Brigadier-General Sir H. Stewart, became involved in a charge against an unbroken enemy, and suffered somewhat severely. The total British loss was 34 killed and 155 wounded; that of the tribesmen was estimated at 1500 killed. On the following day Tokar was reached, and on the 2nd of March the force began its return to Suakin, bringing away about 700 people belonging to the late garrison and the civil population, and destroying 1250 rifles and a quantity of ammunition found in a neighbouring village. On the 9th of March the whole force was back at Suakin, and on the evening of the 11th an advance to Tamai began, and the force bivouacked and formed a zeriba in the evening. Information was brought by a native that the enemy had assembled in the Khor Ghob, a deep ravine not far from the zeriba. At about 8.30 A.M. on the 13th the advance began in echelon of brigade squares from the left. The left and leading square (2nd Brigade) moved towards the khor, approaching at a point where a little ravine joined it. The enemy showing in front, the leading face of the square was ordered to charge up to the edge of the khor. This opened the square, and a mass of tribesmen rushed in from the small ravine. The brigade was forced back in disorder, and the naval guns, which had been left behind, were temporarily captured. After a severe hand-to-hand struggle, in which the troops behaved with great gallantry, order was restored and the enemy repulsed, with the aid of the fire from the 1st Brigade square and from dismounted cavalry. The 1st Brigade square, having a sufficient field of fire, easily repelled all attempts to attack, and advancing as soon as the situation had been restored, occupied the village of Tamai. The British loss was 109 killed and 104 wounded; of the enemy nearly 2000 were killed. On the following day the force returned to Suakin.

Two heavy blows had now been inflicted on the followers of Osman Digna, and the road to Berber could have been opened, as General Graham and Brigadier-General Sir H. Stewart suggested. General Gordon, questioned on the point, telegraphed from Khartum, on the 7th of March, that he might be cut off by a rising at Shendi, adding, “I think it, therefore, most important to follow up the success near Suakin by sending a small force to Berber.” He had previously, on the 29th of February, urged that the Suakin-Berber road should be opened up by Indian troops. This, and General Gordon’s proposal to send 200 British troops to Wadi Halfa, was opposed by Sir E. Baring, who, realizing soon afterwards the gravity of the situation, telegraphed on the 16th of March:—

“It has now become of the utmost importance not only to open the road between Suakin and Berber, but to come to terms with the tribes between Berber and Khartum.”

The government refused to take this action, and Major-General Graham’s force was employed in reconnaissances and small skirmishes, ending in the destruction of the villages in the Tamanieb valley on 27th March. On the 28th the whole force was reassembled at Suakin, and was then broken up, leaving one battalion to garrison the town.

The abrupt disappearance of the British troops encouraged the tribesmen led by Osman Digna, and effectually prevented the formation of a native movement, which might have been of great value. The first attempt at intervention Entanglement of General Gordon at Khartum. in the affairs of the Sudan was made too late to save Sinkat and Tokar. It resulted only in heavy slaughter of the tribesmen, which afforded no direct or indirect aid to General Gordon or to the policy of evacuation. The public announcement of the latter was a grave mistake, which increased General Gordon’s difficulties, and the situation at Khartum grew steadily worse. On the 24th of March Sir E. Baring telegraphed:—

“The question now is, how to get General Gordon and Colonel Stewart away from Khartum.... Under present circumstances, I think an effort should be made to help General Gordon from Suakin, if it is at all a possible military operation.... We all consider that, however difficult the operations from Suakin may be, they are more practicable than any operations from Korosko and along the Nile.”

A telegram from General Gordon, received at Cairo on the 19th of April, stated that

“We have provisions for five months and are hemmed in.... Our position will be much strengthened when the Nile rises.... Sennar, Kassala and Dongola are quite safe for the present.”

At the same time he suggested “an appeal to the millionaires of America and England” to subscribe money for the cost of “2000 or 3000 nizams” (Turkish regulars) to be sent to Berber. A cloud now settled down upon Khartum, and subsequent communications were few and irregular. The foreign office and General Gordon appeared to be somewhat at cross purposes. The former hoped that the garrisons of the Sudan could be extricated without fighting. The latter, judging from the tenor of some of his telegrams, believed that to accomplish this work entailed the suppression of the mahdi’s revolt, the strength of which he at first greatly underestimated. He had pressed strongly for the employment of Zobeir as “an absolute necessity for success” (3rd of March); but this was refused, since Sir H. Gordon advised at this time that it would be dangerous. On the 9th of March General Gordon proposed, “if the immediate evacuation of Khartum is determined upon irrespective of outlying towns,” to send down the “Cairo employés” and the garrison to Berber with Lieutenant-Colonel J. D. Stewart, to resign his commission, and to proceed with the stores and the steamers to the equatorial provinces, which he would consider as placed under the king of the Belgians. On the 13th of March Lord Granville gave full power to General Gordon to “evacuate Khartum and save that garrison by conducting it himself to Berber without delay,” and expressed a hope that he would not resign his commission.

By the end of March 1884 Sir E. Baring and the British officers in Egypt were convinced that force would have to be employed, and the growing danger of General Gordon, with the grave national responsibility involved, began to be Relief expedition: question of route. realized in Great Britain. Sir Henry Gordon, however, who was in personal communication with Mr Gladstone, considered that his brother was in no peril, and for some time disbelieved in the need for a relief expedition. Meanwhile it was at least necessary to evolve some plan of action, and on the 8th of April the adjutant-general addressed a memorandum to the secretary of state for war detailing the measures required for placing 6500 British troops “in the neighbourhood of Shendi.” The battle of the routes began much earlier, and was continued for some months. Practically the choice lay between the Nile and the Suakin-Berber road. The first involved a distance of 1650 m. from Cairo along a river strewn with cataracts, which obstructed navigation to all but small boats, except during the period of high water. So great was this obstruction that the Nile had never been a regular trade route to the Sudan. The second entailed a desert march of about 250 m., of which one section, Obak-Bir Mahoba (52 m.), was waterless, and the rest had an indifferent water supply (except at Ariab, about half-way to Berber), capable, however, of considerable development. From Berber the Nile is followed (210 m.) to Khartum. This was an ancient trade route with the Sudan, and had been used without difficulty by the reinforcements sent to Hicks Pasha in 1883, which were accompanied by guns on wheels. The authorities in Egypt, headed by General Stephenson, subsequently supported by the Admiral Lord John Hay, who sent a naval officer to examine the river as far as Dongola, were unanimous in favour of the Suakin-Berber route. From the first Major-General Sir A. Clarke, then inspector-general of fortifications, strongly urged this plan, and proposed to begin at once a metre gauge railway from Suakin, to be constructed by Indian labour under officers skilled in laying desert lines. Some preliminary arrangements were made, and on the 14th of June the government sanctioned certain measures of preparation at Suakin. On the other side were the adjutant-general (Lord Wolseley) and a small number of officers who had taken part in the Red River expedition of 1870. The memorandum of the adjutant-general above referred to was based on the hypothesis that Khartum could not hold out beyond the 15th of November, and that the expedition should reach Berber by the 20th of October. Steamers were to be employed in such reaches as proved practicable, but the force was to be conveyed in special whale-boats, by which “the difficulty of transport is reduced to very narrow limits.” The mounted force was to consist of 400 men on native horses and 450 men on horses or camels. The question of routes continued to be the subject of animated discussion, and on the 29th of July a committee of three officers who had served in the Red River expedition reported:—

“We believe that a brigade can easily be conveyed in small boats from Cairo to Dongola in the time stated by Lord Wolseley; and, further, that should it be necessary to send a still larger force by water to Khartum, that operation will present no insuperable difficulties.”

This most inconclusive report, and the baseless idea that the adoption of the Nile route would involve no chance of bloodshed, which the government was anxious to avoid, seem to have decided the question. On the 8th of August the Lord Wolseley sent out; Nile route adopted. secretary of state for war informed General Stephenson that “the time had arrived when some further measures for obtaining accurate information as to his (General Gordon’s) position, and, if necessary, for tendering him assistance, should be adopted.” General Stephenson still urged the Suakin-Berber route, and was informed on the 26th of August that Lord Wolseley would be appointed to take over the command in Egypt for the purposes of the expedition, for which a vote of credit had been taken in the House of Commons on the 5th of August. On the 9th of September Lord Wolseley arrived at Cairo, and the plan of operations was somewhat modified. A camel corps of 1100 men selected from twenty-eight regiments at home was added, and the “fighting force to be placed in line somewhere in the neighbourhood of Shendi” was fixed at 5400. The construction of whale-boats began on the 12th of August, and the first batch arrived at Wadi Halfa on the 14th of October, and on the 25th the first boat was hauled through the second cataract. The mounted forces proceeded up the banks, and the first half-battalion embarked at Gemai, 870 m. from Khartum, on the 5th of November, ten days before the date to which it had been assumed General Gordon could hold out. In a straggling procession the boats worked their way up to Korti, piloted by Canadian voyageurs. The labour was very great, and the troops, most of whom were having their first lesson in rowing, bore the privations of their unaccustomed conditions with admirable cheerfulness. By the 25th of December 2220 men had reached Korti, of whom about 800 only had been conveyed by the whale-boats, the last of which did not arrive till the 27th of January. Beyond Korti lay the very difficult section of the river to Abu Hamed, which was quite unknown. Meanwhile news of the loss of the “Abbas” and of the murder of Colonel J. D. Stewart and his party on the 18th of September had been received. A letter from Gordon, dated the 4th of November and received on the 17th of November, stated that his steamers would await the expedition at Metemma, and added, “We can hold out forty days with ease; after that it will be difficult.” In his diary, on the 13th of December, when his difficulties had become extreme, he noted that “if the expeditionary force does not come in ten days, the town may fall.”