BOOK I. HISTORY OF THE POLITICAL PARTIES OF THE UNITED STATES. (continued 11)

The Enforcement Acts.

To repress the Ku Klux outrages, Congress in May 31, 1870, passed an act giving to the President all needed powers to protect the freedmen in their newly acquired rights, and to punish the perpetrators of all outrages, whether upon whites or blacks. This was called in Congress the Enforcement Act, and an Amendatory Enforcement Act was inserted in the Sundry Civil Bill, June 10, 1872. The Ku Klux Act was passed April 20, 1871. All of these measures were strongly advocated by Senator Oliver P. Morton, who through this advocacy won new political distinction as the special champion of the rights of the blacks. Later on James G. Blaine, then the admitted leader of the House, opposed some of the supplements for its better enforcement, and to this fact is traceable the refusal on the part of the negroes of the South to give him that warm support as a Presidential candidate which his high abilities commanded in other sections.

The several Enforcement Acts and their supplements are too voluminous for insertion here, and they are of little use save as relics of the bitter days of reconstruction. They have little force now, although some of them still stand. They became a dead letter after the defeat of the “carpet-bag governments,” but the President enforced them as a rule with moderation and wisdom.

The enforcement of the Ku Klux Act led to the disbanding of that organization after the trial, arrest and conviction of many of the leaders. These trials brought out the facts, and awakened many Southern minds, theretofore incredulous, to the enormity of the secret political crimes which had been committed in all the Southern States, and for a time popular sentiment even in the South, and amongst former rebel soldiers, ran strongly against the Klan. With fresh political excitements, however, fresh means of intimidation were employed at elections. Rifle clubs were formed, notably in South Carolina and Mississippi, while in Louisiana the “White League” sprang into existence, and was organized in all of the neighboring States. These were more difficult to deal with. They were open organizations, created under the semblance of State militia acts. They became very popular, especially among the younger men, and from this time until the close of the Presidential election in 1876, were potent factors in several Southern States, and we shall have occasion further on to describe their more important movements.

Readmission of Rebellious States.

Before the close of 1869 the Supreme Court, in the case of Texas vs. White, sustained the constitutionality of the Reconstruction acts of Congress. It held that the ordinances of secession had been “absolutely null;” that the seceding States had no right to secede and had never been out of the Union, but that, during and after their rebellion, they had no governments “competent to represent these States in their relations with the National government,” and therefore Congress had the power to re-establish the relations of any rebellious State to the Union. This decision fortified the position of the Republicans, and did much to aid President Grant in the difficult work of reconstruction. It modified the assaults of the Democrats, and in some measure changed their purpose to make Reconstruction the pivot around which smaller political issues should revolve.

The regular session of the 41st Congress met Dec. 4th, 1869, and before its close Virginia, Georgia, Texas, and Mississippi had all complied with the conditions of reconstruction, and were re-admitted to the Union. This practically completed the work of reconstruction. To summarize:—*

194Tennessee was re-admitted July 24th, 1866; Arkansas, June 22d, 1868; North Carolina, South Carolina, Louisiana, Georgia and Florida under the act of June 25th, 1868, which provided that as soon as they fulfilled the conditions imposed by the acts of March, 1867, they should be re-admitted. All did this promptly except Georgia. Virginia was re-admitted January 25th, 1870; Mississippi, Feb. 23d, 1870; Texas, March 30th, 1870. Georgia, the most powerful and stubborn of all, had passed State laws declaring negroes incapable of holding office, in addition to what was known as the “black code,” and Congress refused full admission until she had revoked the laws and ratified the 15th Amendment. The State finally came back into the Union July 15th, 1870.

The above named States completed the ratification of the 15th amendment, and the powers of reconstruction were plainly used to that end. Some of the Northern States had held back, and for a time its ratification by the necessary three-fourths was a matter of grave doubt. Congress next passed a bill to enforce it, May 30th, 1870. This made penal any interference, by force or fraud, with the right of free and full manhood suffrage, and authorized the President to use the army to prevent violations. The measure was generally supported by the Republicans, and opposed by all of the Democrats.

The Republicans through other guards about the ballot by passing an act to amend the naturalization laws, which made it penal to use false naturalization papers, authorized the appointment of Federal supervisors of elections in cities of over 20,000 inhabitants; gave to these power of arrest for any offense committed in their view, and gave alien Africans the right to naturalize. The Democrats in their opposition laid particular stress upon the extraordinary powers given to Federal supervisors, while the Republicans charged that Seymour had carried New York by gigantic naturalization frauds in New York city, and sought to sustain these charges by the unprecedented vote polled. A popular quotation of the time was from Horace Greeley, in the New York Tribune, who showed that under the manipulations of the Tweed ring, more votes had been cast for Seymour in one of the warehouse wards of the city, “than there were men, women, children, and cats and dogs in it.”

The Legal Tender Decision.

The Act of Congress of 1862 had made “greenback” notes a legal tender, and they passed as such until 1869 against the protests of the Democrats in Congress, who had questioned the right of Congress to issue paper money. It was on this issue that Thaddeus Stevens admitted the Republicans were travelling “outside of the constitution” with a view to preserve the government, and this soon became one of his favorite ways of meeting partisan objections to war measures. At the December term of the Supreme Court, in 1869, a decision was rendered that the action of Congress was unconstitutional, the Court then being accidentally Democratic in its composition. The Republicans, believing they could not afford to have their favorite, and it must be admitted most useful financial measure questioned, secured an increase of two in the number of Supreme Justices—one under a law creating an additional Justiceship, the other in place of a Justice who had resigned—and in March, 1870, after the complexion of the Court had been changed through Republican appointments made by President Grant, the constitutionality of the legal tender act was again raised, and, with Chief Justice Chase (who had been Secretary of the Treasury in 1862 presiding) the previous decision was reversed. This was clearly a partisan struggle before the Court, and on the part of the Republicans an abandonment of old landmarks impressed on the country by the Jackson Democrats, but it is plain that without the greenbacks the war could not have been pressed with half the vigor, if at all. Neither party was consistent in this struggle, for Southern Democrats who sided with their Northern colleagues in the plea of unconstitutionality, had when “out of the Union,” witnessed and advocated the issue of the same class of money by the Confederate Congress. The difference was only in the ability to redeem, and this ability depended upon success in arms—the very thing the issue was designed to promote. The last decision, despite its partisan surroundings and opposition, soon won popularity, and this popularity was subsequently taken as the groundwork for the establishment of

The Greenback Party.

This party, with a view to ease the rigors of the monetary panic of 1873, advocated an unlimited issue of greenbacks, or an “issue based upon the resources of the country.” So vigorously did discontented leaders of both parties press this idea, that they soon succeeded in demoralizing the Democratic minority—which was by this time such a plain minority, and so greatly in need of new issues to make the people forget the war, that it is not surprising they yielded, at least partially, to new theories and alliances. The present one took them away from the principles of Jackson, from the hard-money theories of the early days, and would land them they knew not where, nor did 195many of them care, if they could once more get upon their feet. Some resisted, and comparatively few of the Democrats in the Middle States yielded, but in part of New England, the great West, and nearly all of the South, it was for several years quite difficult to draw a line between Greenbackers and Democrats. Some Republicans, too, who had tired of the “old war issues,” or discontented with the management and leadership of their party, aided in the construction of the Greenback bridge, and kept upon it as long as it was safe to do so. In State elections up to as late as 1880 this Greenback element was a most important factor. Ohio was carried by an alliance of Greenbackers and Democrats, Allen being elected Governor, only to be supplanted by Hayes (afterwards President) after a most remarkable contest, the alliance favoring the Greenback, the Republicans not quite the hard-money, but a redeemable-in-gold theory. Indiana, always doubtful, passed over to the Democratic column, while in the Southern States the Democratic leaders made open alliances until the Greenbackers became over-confident and sought to win Congressional and State elections on their own merits. They fancied that the desire to repudiate ante-war debts would greatly aid them, and they openly advocated the idea of repudiation there, but they had experienced and wise leaders to cope with. They were not allowed to monopolize this issue by the Democrats, and their arrogance, if such it may be called, was punished by a more complete assertion of Democratic power in the South than was ever known before. The theory in the South was welcomed where it would suit the Democracy, crushed where it would not, as shown in the Presidential election of 1880, when Garfield, Hancock and Weaver (Greenbacker) were the candidates. The latter, in his stumping tour of the South, proclaimed that he and his friends were as much maltreated in Alabama and other States, as the Republicans, and for some cause thereafter (the Democrats alleged “a bargain and sale”) he practically threw his aid to the Republicans—this when it became apparent that the Greenbackers, in the event of the election going to the House, could have no chance even there.

Gen’l Weaver went from the South to Maine, the scene of what was regarded at that moment as a pivotal struggle for the Presidency. Blaine had twice been the most prominent candidate for the Presidency—1876 and 1880—and had both times been defeated by compromise candidates. He was still, as he had been for many years, Chairman of the Republican State Committee of Maine, and now as ever before swallowed the mortification of defeat with true political grace. The Greenbackers had the year before formed a close alliance with the Democrats, and in the State election made the result so close that for many weeks it remained a matter of doubt who was elected Governor, the Democratic Greenbacker or the Republican. A struggle followed in the Legislature and before the Returning Board composed of State officers, who were Democrats, (headed by Gov. Garcelon) and sought to throw out returns on slight technicalities. Finally the Republicans won, but not without a struggle which excited attention all over the Union and commanded the presence of the State militia. Following Garfield’s nomination another struggle, as we have stated, was inaugurated, with Davis as the Republican nominee for Governor, Plaisted the Democratic-Greenback, (the latter a former Republican). All eyes now turned to Maine, which voted in September. Gen’l Weaver was on the stump then, as the Greenback candidate for President, and all of his efforts were bent to breaking the alliance between the Greenbackers and Democrats.

He advocated a straight-out policy for his Greenback friends, described his treatment in the South, and denounced the Democracy with such plainness that it displayed his purpose and defeated his object. Plaisted was elected by a close vote, and the Republicans yielded after some threats to invoke the “Garcelon precedents.” This was the second Democratic-Greenback victory in Maine, the first occurring two years before, when through an alliance in the Legislature (no candidate having received a majority of all the popular vote) Garland was returned.

The victory of Plaisted alarmed the Republicans and enthused the Democrats, who now denounced Weaver, but still sought alliance with his followers. General B. F. Butler, long a brilliant Republican member of Congress from Massachusetts, for several years advocated Greenback ideas without breaking from his Republican Congressional colleagues. Because of this fact he lost whatever of chance he had for a Republican nomination for Governor, “his only remaining political ambition,” and thereupon headed the Greenbackers in Massachusetts, and in spite of the protests of the hard-money Democrats in that State, captured the Democratic organization, and after these tactics twice ran for Governor, and was defeated both times by the Republicans, though he succeeded, upon State and “anti-blue blood” theories, in greatly reducing their majority. In the winter of 1882 he still held control of the Democratic State Committee, after the Greenback organization had passed from view, 196and “what will he do next?” is one of the political questions of the hour.

The Greenback labor party ceased all Congressional alliance with the Democrats after their quarrel with General Weaver, and as late as the 47th session—1881–82—refused all alliance, and abstained from exercising what some still believe a “balance of power” in the House, though nearly half of their number were elected more as Republicans than Greenbackers.

As a party, the Greenbackers, standing alone, never carried either a State or a Congressional district. Their local successes were due to alliances with one or other of the great parties, and with the passage of the panic they dissolved in many sections, and where they still obtain it is in alliance with labor unions, or in strong mining or workingmen’s districts. In the Middle States they won few local successes, but were strong in the coal regions of Pennsylvania. Advocates of similar theories have not been wanting in all the countries of Western Europe following great wars or panics, but it was reserved to the genius of Americans to establish an aggressive political party on the basis of theories which all great political economists have from the beginning antagonized as unsafe and unsound.

The Prohibitory Party.

The attempt to establish a third party in the Greenback, begot that to establish a National Prohibitory Party, which in 1880 ran James Black of Pennsylvania, as a candidate for the Presidency, and four years previous ran Neal Dow of Maine. He, however, commanded little attention, and received but sparsely scattered votes in all the States. The sentiment at the base of this party never thrived save as in States, particularly in New England, where it sought to impress itself on the prevailing political party, and through it to influence legislation. Neal Dow of Maine, first advocated a prohibitory law, and by his eloquent advocacy, secured that of Maine, which has stood for nearly thirty years. That of Massachusetts has recently been repealed. The prohibitory amendment to the Constitution of Kansas was adopted in 1881, etc. The Prohibitory Party, however, never accomplished anything by separate political action, and though fond of nominating candidates for State and local officers, has not as yet succeeded in holding even a balance of power between the political parties, though it has often confused political calculations as to results in New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Connecticut, Massachusetts, etc. It seems never to have taken hold in any of the Southern States, and comparatively little in the Western, until the whole country was surprised in 1880 by the passage of the Kansas amendment by over 20,000 majority in a vote of the people invoked by the Legislature. An effort followed to submit a similar amendment through the Pennsylvania Legislature in 1881. It passed the House by a large majority, but after discussion in the Senate, and amendments to indemnify manufacturers and dealers in liquor (an amendment which would cripple if it would not bankrupt the State) was adopted. Governor St. John of Kansas, a gentleman fond of stumping for this amendment, insists that the results are good in his State, while its enemies claim that it has made many criminals, that liquor is everywhere smuggled and sold, and that the law has turned the tide of immigration away from that great State. The example of Kansas, however, will probably be followed in other States, and the Prohibitory Party will hardly pass from view until this latest experiment has been fairly tested. It was also the author of “Local Option,” which for a time swept Pennsylvania, but was repealed by a large majority after two years’ trial.

Annexation of San Domingo.

The second session of the 41st Congress began December 5th, 1870. With all of the States represented, reconstruction being complete, the body was now divided politically as follows: Senate, 61 Republicans, 13 Democrats; House 172 Republicans, 71 Democrats. President Grant’s annual message discussed a new question, and advocated the annexation of San Domingo to the United States. A treaty had been negotiated between President Grant and the President of the Republic of San Domingo as early as September 4th, 1869, looking to annexation, but it had been rejected by the Senate, Charles Sumner being prominent in his opposition to the measure. He and Grant experienced a growing personal unpleasantness, because of the President’s attempt to negotiate a treaty without consulting Mr. Sumner, who was Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and it was charged that through the influence of the President he was removed by the Republican caucus from this Chairmanship, and Senator Simon Cameron put in his place. Whether this was true or not, the differences between Grant and Sumner were universally remarked, and Sumner’s imperious pride led him into a very vindictive assault upon the proposition. Grant gave few other reasons for annexation than military ones, suggested that as a naval station it would facilitate all home operations in the Gulf, while in the hands of a foreign power, in the event of war, it would prove the depot for many and dangerous warlike preparations. 197The question had little political significance, if it was ever designed to have any, and this second attempt to bring the scheme to the attention of Congress, was that a joint resolution (as in the annexation of Texas) might be passed. This would require but a majority, but the objection was met that no Territory could be annexed without a treaty, and this must be ratified by two-thirds of the Senate. A middle course was taken, and the President was authorized to appoint three Commissioners to visit San Domingo and ascertain the desires of its people. These reported favorably, but the subject was finally dropped, probably because the proposition could not command a two-thirds vote, and has not since attracted attention.

Amendatory Enforcement Acts.

The operation of the 15th Amendment, being still resisted or evaded in portions of the South, an Act was passed to enforce it. This extended the powers of the Federal supervisors and marshals, authorized in the first, and gave the Federal Circuit Courts exclusive jurisdiction of all cases tried under the provisions of the Act and its supplements. It also empowered these Courts to punish any State officer who should attempt to interfere with or try such cases as in contempt of the Court’s jurisdiction. The Republicans sustained, the Democrats opposed the measure, but it was passed and approved February 28, 1871, and another supplement was inserted in the Sundry Civil Bill, and approved June 10th, 1872, with continued resistance on the part of the Democrats. After the appointment of a committee to investigate the condition of affairs in the Southern States, Congress adjourned March 4th, 1871.

The Alabama Claims.

During this year the long disputed Alabama Claims of the United States against Great Britain, arising from the depredations of the Anglo-rebel privateers, built and fitted out in British waters, were referred by the Treaty of Washington, dated May 8th, 1871, to arbitrators, and this was the first and most signal triumph of the plan of arbitration, so far as the Government of the United States was concerned. The arbitrators were appointed, at the invitation of the governments of Great Britain and the United States, from these powers, and from Brazil, Italy, and Switzerland. On September 14th, 1872, they gave to the United States gross damages to the amount of $15,500,000, an amount which has subsequently proved to be really in excess of the demands of merchants and others claiming the loss of property through the depredations of the rebel ram Alabama and other rebel privateers. We append a list of the representatives of the several governments:

Arbitrator on the part of the United States—Charles Francis Adams.

Arbitrator on the part of Great Britain—The Right Honorable Sir Alexander Cockburn, Baronet, Lord Chief Justice of England.

Arbitrator on the part of Italy—His Excellency Senator Count Sclopis.

Arbitrator on the part of Switzerland—Mr. Jacob Stampfli.

Arbitrator on the part of Brazil—Baron D’Itajuba.

Agent on the part of the United States—J. C. Bancroft Davis.

Agent on the part of Great Britain—Right Honorable Lord Tenterden.

Counsel for the United States—Caleb Cushing, William M. Evarts, Morrison R. Waite.

Counsel for Great Britain—Sir Roundell Palmer.

Solicitor for the United States—Charles C. Beaman, Jr.

The Force Bill.

The 42d Congress met March 4, 1871, the Republicans having suffered somewhat in their representation. In the Senate there were 57 Republicans, 17 Democrats; in the House 138 Republicans, 103 Democrats. James G. Blaine was again chosen Speaker. The most exciting political question of the session was the passage of the “Force Bill,” as the Democrats called it. The object was more rigidly to enforce observance of the provisions of the 14th Amendment, as the Republicans claim; to revive a waning political power in the South, and save the “carpet-bag” governments there, as the Democrats claimed. The Act allowed suit in the Federal courts against any person who should deprive another of the rights of a citizen, and it made it a penal offense to conspire to take away any one’s rights as a citizen. It also provided that inability, neglect, or refusal by any State governments to suppress such conspiracies, or their refusal to call upon the President for aid, should be deemed a denial by such State of the equal protection of the laws under the 14th Amendment. It further declared such conspiracies “a rebellion against the government of the United States,” and authorized the President, when in his judgment the public safety required it, to suspend the privilege of habeas corpus in any district, and suppress any such insurrection by the army and navy.

198

President Hayes’s Civil Service Order.

Executive Mansion, Washington, June 22, 1877.

Sir:—I desire to call your attention to the following paragraph in a letter addressed by me to the Secretary of the Treasury, on the conduct to be observed by the officers of the General Government in relation to the elections:

“No officer should be required or permitted to take part in the management of political organizations, caucuses, conventions or election campaigns. Their right to vote and to express their views on public questions, either orally or through the press, is not denied, provided it does not interfere with the discharge of their official duties. No assessment for political purposes on officers or subordinates should be allowed.”

This rule is applicable to every department of the Civil Service. It should be understood by every officer of the General Government that he is expected to conform his conduct to its requirements.

Very respectfully, R. B. Hayes.

Some of the protests were strong, and it is difficult to say whether Curtis, Julian, or Eaton—its three leading advocates—or the politicians, had the best of the argument. It was not denied, however, that a strong and very respectable sentiment had been created in favor of the reform, and to this sentiment all parties, and the President as well, made a show of bowing. It was fashionable to insert civil service planks in National and State platforms, but it was not such an issue as could live in the presence of more exciting ones; and while to this day it has earnest and able advocates, it has from year to year fallen into greater disuse. Actual trial showed the impracticability of some of the rules, and President Grant lost interest in the subject, as did Congress, for in several instances it neglected to appropriate the funds necessary to carry out the provisions of the law. President Arthur, in his message, to Congress in December, 1881, argued against its full application, and showed that it blocked the way to preferment, certainly of the middle-aged and older persons, who could not recall their early lessons acquired by rote; that its effect was to elevate the inexperienced to positions which required executive ability, sound judgment, business aptitude, and experience. The feature of the message met the endorsement of nearly the entire Republican press, and at this writing the sentiment, at least of the Republican party, appears to favor a partial modification of the rules.

The system was begun January 1st, 1872, but in December, 1874, Congress refused to make any appropriations, and it was for a time abandoned, with slight and spasmodic revivals under the administration of President Hayes, who issued the foregoing order.

By letter from the Attorney-General, Charles Devens, August 1, 1877, this order was held to apply to the Pennsylvania Republican Association at Washington. Still later there was a further exposition, in which Attorney-General Devens, writing from Washington in October 1, 1877, excuses himself from active participation in the Massachusetts State campaign, and says: “I learn with surprise and regret that any of the Republican officials hesitate either to speak or vote, alleging as a reason the President’s recent Civil Service order. In distinct terms that order states that the right of officials to vote and express their views on public questions, either orally or through the press, is not denied, provided it does not interfere with the discharge of their official duties. If such gentlemen choose not to vote, or not to express or enforce their views in support of the principles of the Republican party, either orally or otherwise, they, at least, should give a reason for such a course which is not justified by the order referred to, and which is simply a perversion of it.”

Yet later, when the interest in the Pennsylvania election became general, because of the sharp struggle between Governor Hoyt and Senator Dill for Governor, a committee of gentlemen (Republicans) visited President Hayes and induced him to “suspend the operation of the order” as to Pennsylvania, where political contributions were collected.

And opposition was manifested after even the earlier trials. Benjamin F. Butler denounced the plan as English and anti-Republican, and before long some of the more radical Republican papers, which had indeed given little attention to the subject, began to denounce it as a plan to exclude faithful Republicans from and permit Democrats to enter the offices. These now argued that none of the vagaries of political dreamers could ever convince them that a free Government can be run without political parties; that while rotation in office may not be a fundamental element of republican government, yet the right of the people to recommend is its corner-stone; that civil service would lead to the creation of rings, and eventually to the purchase of places; that it would establish an aristocracy of office-holders, who could not be removed at times when it might be important, as in the rebellion for the Administration to have only friends in public office; that it would establish grades and life-tenures in civic positions, etc.

For later particulars touching civil service, see the Act of Congress of 1883, and the regulations made pursuant to the same in Book V.

199

Amnesty.

The first regular session of the 42d Congress met Dec. 4th, 1871. The Democrats consumed much of the time in efforts to pass bills to remove the political disabilities of former Southern rebels, and they were materially aided by the editorials of Horace Greeley, in the New York Tribune, which had long contended for universal amnesty. At this session all such efforts were defeated by the Republicans, who invariably amended such propositions by adding Sumner’s Supplementary Civil Rights Bill, which was intended to prevent any discrimination against colored persons by common carriers, hotels, or other chartered or licensed servants. The Amnesty Bill, however was passed May 22d, 1872, after an agreement to exclude from its provisions all who held the higher military and civic positions under the Confederacy—in all about 350 persons. The following is a copy:

Be it enacted, etc., (two-thirds of each House concurring therein,) That all legal and political disabilities imposed by the third section of the fourteenth article of the amendments of the Constitution of the United States are hereby removed from all persons whomsoever, except Senators and Representatives of the Thirty-sixth and Thirty-seventh Congress, officers in the judicial, military, and naval service of the United States, heads of Departments, and foreign ministers of the United States.

Subsequently many acts removing the disabilities of all excepted (save Jefferson Davis) from the provisions of the above, were passed.

The Liberal Republicans.

An issue raised in Missouri gave immediate rise to the Liberal Republican party, though the course of Horace Greeley had long pointed toward the organization of something of the kind, and with equal plainness it pointed to his desire to be its champion and candidate for the Presidency. In 1870 the Republican party, then in control of the Legislature of Missouri, split into two parts on the question of the removal of the disqualifications imposed upon rebels by the State Constitution during the war. Those favoring the removal of disabilities were headed by B. Gratz Brown and Carl Schurz, and they called themselves Liberal Republicans; those opposed were called and accepted the name of Radical Republicans. The former quickly allied themselves with the Democrats, and thus carried the State, though Grant’s administration “stood in” with the Radicals. As a result the disabilities were quickly removed, and those who believed with Greeley now sought to promote a reaction in Republican sentiment all over the country. Greeley was the recognized head of this movement, and he was ably aided by ex-Governor Curtin and Col. A. K. McClure in Pennsylvania; Charles Francis Adams, Massachusetts; Judge Trumbull, in Illinois; Reuben E. Fenton, in New York; Brown and Schurz in Missouri, and in fact by leading Republicans in nearly all of the States, who at once began to lay plans to carry the next Presidential election.

They charged that the Enforcement Acts of Congress were designed more for the political advancement of Grant’s adherents than for the benefit of the country; that instead of suppressing they were calculated to promote a war of races in the South; that Grant was seeking the establishment of a military despotism, etc. These leaders were, as a rule, brilliant men. They had tired of unappreciated and unrewarded service in the Republican party, or had a natural fondness for “pastures new,” and, in the language of the day, they quickly succeeded in making political movements “lively.”

In the spring of 1871 the Liberal Republicans and Democrats of Ohio—and Ohio seems to be the most fertile soil for new ideas—prepared for a fusion, and after frequent consultations of the various leaders with Mr. Greeley in New York, a call was issued from Missouri on the 24th of January, 1872, for a National Convention of the Liberal Republican party to be held at Cincinnati, May 1st. The well-matured plans of the leaders were carried out in the nomination of Hon. Horace Greeley for President and B. Gratz Brown for Vice-President, though not without a serious struggle over the chief nomination, which was warmly contested by the friends of Charles Francis Adams. Indeed he led in most of the six ballots, but finally all the friends of other candidates voted for Greeley, and he received 482 to 187 for Adams. Dissatisfaction followed, and a later effort was made to substitute Adams for Greeley, but it failed. The original leaders now prepared to capture the Democratic Convention, which met at Baltimore, June 9th. By nearly an unanimous vote it was induced to endorse the Cincinnati platform, and it likewise finally endorsed Greeley and Brown—though not without many bitter protests. A few straight-out Democrats met later at Louisville, Ky., Sept. 3d, and nominated Charles O’Conor, of New York, for President, and John Quincy Adams, of Massachusetts, for Vice-President, and these were kept in the race to the end, receiving a popular vote of about 30,000.

The regular Republican National Convention was held at Philadelphia, June 5th. It renominated President Grant unanimously, and Henry Wilson, of Massachusetts, 200for Vice-President by 364½ votes to 321½ for Schuyler Colfax, who thus shared the fate of Hannibal Hamlin in his second candidacy for Vice-President on the ticket with Abraham Lincoln. This change to Wilson was to favor the solid Republican States of New England, and to prevent both candidates coming from the West.

Civil Service Reform.

After considerable and very able agitation by Geo. W. Curtis, the editor of Harper’s Weekly, an Act was passed March 3d, 1871, authorizing the President to begin a reform in the civil service. He appointed a Commission headed by Mr. Curtis, and after more than a year’s preparation this body defeated a measure which secured Congressional approval and that of President Grant.

The civil service law (and it is still a law though more honored now in the breach than the observance) embraced in a single section of the act making appropriations for sundry civil expenses for the year ending June 30, 1872, and authorize the President to prescribe such rules and regulations for admission into the civil service as will best promote the efficiency thereof, and ascertain the fitness of each candidate for the branch of service into which he seeks to enter. Under this law a commission was appointed to draft rules and regulations which were approved and are now being enforced by the President. All applicants for position in any of the government departments come under these rules:—all classes of clerks, copyists, counters; in the customs service all from deputy collector down to inspectors and clerks with the salaries of $1200 or more; in appraisers’ offices all assistants and clerks; in the naval service all clerks; all lighthouse keepers; in the revenue, supervisors, collectors, assessors, assistants; in the postal really all postmasters whose pay is over $200, and all mail messengers. The rules apply to all new appointments in the departments or grades named, except that “nothing shall prevent the reappointment at discretion of the incumbents of any office the term of which is fixed by law.” So that a postmaster or other officer escapes their application. Those specially exempt are the Heads of Departments; their immediate assistants and deputies, the diplomatic service, the judiciary, and the district attorneys. Each branch of the service is to be grouped, and admission shall always be to the lowest grade of any group. Such appointments are made for a probationary term of six months, when if the Board of Examiners approve the incumbent is continued. This Board of Examiners, three in number in each case, shall be chosen by the President from the several Departments, and they shall examine at Washington for any position there, or, when directed by an Advisory Board, shall assign places for examination in the several States. Examinations are in all cases first made of applicants within the office or department, and from the list three reported in the order of excellence; if those within fail, then outside applicants may be examined. In the Federal Blue Book, which is a part of this volume, we give the Civil Service Rules.

When first proposed, partisan politics had no part or place in civil service reform, and the author of the plan was himself a distinguished Republican. In fact both parties thought something good had been reached, and there was practically no resistance at first to a trial.

The Democrats resisted the passage of this bill with even more earnestness than any which preceded it, but the Republican discipline was almost perfect, and when passed it received the prompt approval of President Grant, who by this time was classed as “the most radical of the radicals.” Opponents denounced it as little if any less obnoxious than the old Sedition law of 1798, while the Republicans claimed that it was to meet a state of growing war in the South—a war of races—and that the form of domestic violence manifested was in the highest degree dangerous to the peace of the Union and the safety of the newly enfranchised citizens.

The Credit Mobilier.

At the second session of the 42d Congress, beginning Dec. 2, 1872, the speaker (Blaine) on the first day called attention to the charges made by Democratic orators and newspapers during the Presidential campaign just closed, that the Vice-President (Colfax), the Vice-President elect (Wilson), the Secretary of the Treasury, several Senators, the Speaker of the House, and a large number of Representatives had been bribed, during the years 1867 and 1868, by Oakes Ames, a member of the House from Massachusetts; that he and his agents had given them presents of stock in a corporation known as the Credit Mobilier, to influence their legislative action for the benefit of the Union Pacific Railroad Company.

Upon Speaker Blaine’s motion, a committee of investigation was appointed by Hon. S. S. Cox, of New York, a noted Democrat temporarily called to the Chair.

After the close of the campaign, (as was remarked by the Republic Magazine at the time) the dominant party might well have claimed, and would have insisted had they been opposed to a thorough investigation 201and a full exposure of corruption, that the verdict of the people in the late canvass was sufficient answer to these charges; but the Republican party not merely granted all the investigations sought, but summoned on the leading committee a majority of its political foes to conduct the inquest.

The committee consisted of Messrs. Poland, of Vermont; McCreary, of Iowa; Banks, of Massachusetts; Niblack, of Indiana, and Merrick, of Maryland.

Messrs. Poland and McCreary—the two Republicans—were gentlemen of ability and standing, well known for their integrity, moderation, and impartiality. General Banks was an earnest supporter of Horace Greeley, upon the alleged ground that the Republican organization had become effete and corrupt: while Messrs. Niblack and Merrick are among the ablest representatives of the Democratic party; in fact, Mr. Merrick belonged to the extreme Southern school of political thought.

Having patiently and carefully examined and sifted the entire testimony—often “painfully conflicting,” as the committee remarked—their report ought to be considered a judicial document commanding universal approval, yet scraps of the testimony and not the report itself were used with painful frequency against James A. Garfield in his Presidential canvass of 1880. There has not been a state paper submitted for many years upon a similar subject that carried with it greater weight, or which bore upon its face a fuller realization of the grave responsibilities assumed, and it is the first time in the political history of the United States that an all important investigation has been entrusted by the dominant party to a majority of its political foes.

The report of the committee gives the best and by far the most reliable history of the whole affair, and its presentation here may aid in preventing partisan misrepresentations in the future—misrepresentations made in the heat of contest, and doubtless regretted afterwards by all who had the facilities for getting at the facts. We therefore give the

OFFICIAL REPORT OF THE CREDIT MOBILIER INVESTIGATING COMMITTEE.

Mr. Poland, from the select committee to investigate the alleged Credit Mobilier bribery, made the following report February 18, 1873:

The special committee appointed under the following resolutions of the House to wit:

Whereas, Accusations have been made in the public press, founded on alleged letters of Oakes Ames, a Representative of Massachusetts, and upon the alleged affidavits of Henry S. McComb, a citizen of Wilmington, in the State of Delaware, to the effect that members of this House were bribed by Oakes Ames to perform certain legislative acts for the benefit of the Union Pacific Railroad Company, by presents of stock in the Credit Mobilier of America, or by presents of a valuable character derived therefrom: therefore,

Resolved, That a special committee of five members be appointed by the Speaker pro tempore, whose duty it shall be to investigate whether any member of this House was bribed by Oakes Ames, or any other person or corporation, in any matter touching his legislative duty.

Resolved, further, That the committee have the right to employ a stenographer, and that they be empowered to send for persons and papers; beg leave to make the following report:

In order to a clear understanding of the facts hereinafter stated as to contracts and dealings in reference to stock of the Credit Mobilier of America, between Mr. Oakes Ames and others, and members of Congress, it is necessary to make a preliminary statement of the connection of that company with the Union Pacific Railroad Company, and their relations to each other.

The company called the “Credit Mobilier of America” was incorporated by the Legislature of Pennsylvania, and in 1864 control of its charter and franchises had been obtained by certain persons interested in the Union Pacific Railroad Company, for the purpose of using it as a construction company to build the Union Pacific road. In September, 1864, a contract was entered into between the Union Pacific Company and H. M. Hoxie, for the building by said Hoxie of one hundred miles of said road from Omaha west.

This contract was at once assigned by Hoxie to the Credit Mobilier Company, as it was expected to be when made. Under this contract and extensions of it some two or three hundred miles of road were built by the Credit Mobilier Company, but no considerable profits appear to have been realized therefrom. The enterprise of building a railroad to the Pacific was of such vast magnitude, and was beset by so many hazards and risks that the capitalists of the country were generally averse to investing in it, and, notwithstanding the liberal aid granted by the Government it seemed likely to fail of completion.

In 1865 or 1866, Mr. Oakes Ames, then and now a member of the House from the State of Massachusetts, and his brother Oliver Ames became interested in the Union Pacific Company and also in the Credit Mobilier Company as the agents for the construction of the road. The Messrs. Ames were men of very large capital, and of known character and integrity in business. By their example and credit, 202and the personal efforts of Mr. Oakes Ames, many men of capital were induced to embark in the enterprise, and to take stock in the Union Pacific Company and also in the Credit Mobilier Company. Among them were the firm of S. Hooper & Co., of Boston, the leading member of which, Mr. Samuel Hooper, was then and is now a member of the House; Mr. John B. Alley, then a member of the House from Massachusetts, and Mr. Grimes, then a Senator from the State of Iowa. Notwithstanding the vigorous efforts of Mr. Ames and others interested with him, great difficulty was experienced in securing the required capital.

In the spring of 1867 the Credit Mobilier Company voted to add 50 per cent. to their capital stock, which was then two and a half millions of dollars; and to cause it to be readily taken each subscriber to it was entitled to receive as a bonus an equal amount of first mortgage bonds of the Union Pacific Company. The old stockholders were entitled to take this increase, but even the favorable terms offered did not induce all the old stockholders to take it, and the stock of the Credit Mobilier Company was never considered worth its par value until after the execution of the Oakes Ames contract hereinafter mentioned.

On the 16th day of August, 1867, a contract was executed between the Union Pacific Railroad Company and Oakes Ames, by which Mr. Ames contracted to build six hundred and sixty-seven miles of the Union Pacific road at prices ranging from $42,000 to $96,000 per mile, amounting in the aggregate to $47,000,000. Before the contract was entered into it was understood that Mr. Ames was to transfer it to seven trustees, who were to execute it, and the profits of the contract were to be divided among the stockholders in the Credit Mobilier Company, who should comply with certain conditions set out in the instrument transferring the contract to the trustees. The Ames contract and the transfer to trustees are incorporated in the evidence submitted, and therefore further recital of their terms is not deemed necessary.

Substantially, all the stockholders of the Credit Mobilier complied with the conditions named in the transfer, and thus became entitled to share in any profits said trustees might make in executing the contract.

All the large stockholders in the Union Pacific were also stockholders in the Credit Mobilier, and the Ames contract and its transfer to trustees were ratified by the Union Pacific, and received the assent of the great body of stockholders, but not of all.

After the Ames contract had been executed, it was expected by those interested that by reason of the enormous prices agreed to be paid for the work very large profits would be derived from building the road, and very soon the stock of the Credit Mobilier was understood by those holding it to be worth much more than its par value. The stock was not in the market and had no fixed market value, but the holders of it, in December, 1867, considered it worth at least double the par value, and in January and February, 1868, three or four times the par value, but it does not appear that these facts were generally or publicly known, or that the holders of the stock desired they should be.

The foregoing statement the committee think gives enough of the historic details, and condition and value of the stock, to make the following detailed facts intelligible.

Mr. Oakes Ames was then a member of the House of Representatives, and came to Washington at the commencement of the session, about the beginning of December, 1867. During that month Mr. Ames entered into contracts with a considerable number of members of Congress, both Senators and Representatives, to let them have shares of stock in the Credit Mobilier Company at par, with interest thereon from the first day of the previous July. It does not appear that in any instance he asked any of these persons to pay a higher price than the par value and interest, nor that Mr. Ames used any special effort or urgency to get these persons to take it. In all these negotiations Mr. Ames did not enter into any details as to the value of the stock or the amount of dividend that might be expected upon it, but stated generally that it would be good stock, and in several instances said he would guarantee that they should get at least 10 per cent. on their money.

Some of these gentlemen, in their conversations with Mr. Ames, raised the question whether becoming holders of this stock would bring them into any embarrassment as members of Congress in their legislative action. Mr. Ames quieted such suggestions by saying it could not, for the Union Pacific had received from Congress all the grants and legislation it wanted, and they should ask for nothing more. In some instances those members who contracted for stock paid to Mr. Ames the money for the price of the stock, par and interest; in others, where they had not the money, Mr. Ames agreed to carry the stock for them until they could get the money or it should be met by the dividends.

Mr. Ames was at this time a large stockholder in the Credit Mobilier, but he did not intend any of these transactions to be sales of his own stock, but intended to fulfill 203all these contracts from stock belonging to the company.

At this time there were about six hundred and fifty shares of the stock of the company, which had for some reason been placed in the name of Mr. T. C. Durant, one of the leading and active men of the concern.

Mr. Ames claimed that a portion of this stock should be assigned to him to enable him to fulfill engagements he had made for stock. Mr. Durant claimed that he had made similar engagements that he should be allowed stock to fulfill. Mr. McComb, who was present at the time, claimed that he had also made engagements for stock which he should have stock given him to carry out. This claim of McComb was refused, but after the stock was assigned to Mr. Ames, McComb insisted that Ames should distribute some of the stock to his (McComb’s) friends, and named Senators Bayard and Fowler, and Representatives Allison and Wilson, of Iowa.

It was finally arranged that three hundred and forty-three shares of the stock of the company should be transferred to Mr. Ames to enable him to perform his engagements, and that number of shares were set over on the books of the company to Oakes Ames, trustee, to distinguish it from the stock held by him before. Mr. Ames at the time paid to the company the par of the stock and interest from the July previous, and this stock still stands on the books in the name of Oakes Ames, trustee, except thirteen shares which have been transferred to parties in no way connected with Congress. The committee do not find that Mr. Ames had any negotiation whatever with any of these members of Congress on the subject of this stock prior to the commencement of the session of December, 1867, except Mr. Scofield, of Pennsylvania, and it was not claimed that any obligation existed from Mr. Ames to him as the result of it.

In relation to the purpose and motives of Mr. Ames in contracting to let members of Congress have Credit Mobilier stock at par, which he and all other owners of it considered worth at least double that sum, the committee, upon the evidence taken by them and submitted to the House, cannot entertain doubt. When he said he did not suppose the Union Pacific Company would ask or need further legislation, he stated what he believed to be true. But he feared the interests of the road might suffer by adverse legislation, and what he desired to accomplish was to enlist strength and friends in Congress who would resist any encroachment upon or interference with the rights and privileges already secured, and to that end wished to create in them an interest identical with his own. This purpose is clearly avowed in his letters to McComb, copied in the evidence. He says he intends to place the stock “where it will do most good to us.” And again, “we want more friends in this Congress.” In his letter to McComb, and also in his statement prepared by counsel, he gives the philosophy of his action, to wit, “That he has found there is no difficulty in getting men to look after their own property.” The committee are also satisfied that Mr. Ames entertained a fear that, when the true relations between the Credit Mobilier Company and the Union Pacific became generally known, and the means by which the great profits expected to be made were fully understood, there was danger that congressional investigation and action would be invoked.

The members of Congress with whom he dealt were generally those who had been friendly and favorable to a Pacific Railroad, and Mr. Ames did not fear or expect to find them favorable to movements hostile to it; but he desired to stimulate their activity and watchfulness in opposition to any unfavorable action by giving them a personal interest in the success of the enterprise, especially so far as it affected the interest of the Credit Mobilier Company. On the 9th day of December, 1867, Mr. C. C. Washburn, of Wisconsin, introduced in the House a bill to regulate by law the rates of transportation over the Pacific Railroad.

Mr. Ames, as well as others interested in the Union Pacific road, was opposed to this, and desired to defeat it. Other measures apparently hostile to that company were subsequently introduced into the House by Mr. Washburn of Wisconsin, and Mr. Washburne of Illinois. The committee believe that Mr. Ames, in his distributions of stock, had specially in mind the hostile efforts of the Messrs. Washburn, and desired to gain strength to secure their defeat. The reference in one of his letters to “Washburn’s move” makes this quite apparent.

The foregoing is deemed by the committee a sufficient statement of facts as to Mr. Ames, taken in connection with what will be subsequently stated of his transactions with particular persons. Mr. Ames made some contracts for stock in the Credit Mobilier with members of the Senate. In public discussions of this subject the names of members of both Houses have been so connected, and all these transactions were so nearly simultaneous, that the committee deemed it their duty to obtain all evidence in their power, as to all persons then members of either House, and to report the same to the House. Having done this, and the House having directed that evidence transmitted to the Senate, the committee consider their own power and duty, as well as that of the House, fully performed, so 204far as members of the Senate are concerned. Some of Mr. Ames’s contracts to sell stock were with gentlemen who were then members of the House, but are not members of the present Congress.

The committee have sought for and taken all the evidence within their reach as to those gentlemen, and reported the same to the House. As the House has ceased to have jurisdiction over them as members, the committee have not deemed it their duty to make any special finding of facts as to each, leaving the House and the country to their own conclusions upon the testimony.

In regard to each of the members of the present House, the committee deem it their duty to state specially the facts they find proved by the evidence, which, in some instances, is painfully conflicting.

MR. JAMES G. BLAINE, OF MAINE.

Among those who have in the public press been charged with improper participation in Credit Mobilier stock is the present Speaker, Mr. Blaine, who moved the resolution for this investigation. The committee have, therefore, taken evidence in regard to him. They find from it that Mr. Ames had conversation with Mr. Blaine in regard to taking ten shares of the stock, and recommended it as a good investment. Upon consideration Mr. Blaine concluded not to take the stock, and never did take it, and never paid or received anything on account of it; and Mr. Blaine never had any interest, direct or indirect, in Credit Mobilier stock or stock of the Union Pacific Railroad Company.

MR. HENRY L. DAWES, OF MASSACHUSETTS.

Mr. Dawes had, prior to December, 1867, made some small investments in railroad bonds through Mr. Ames. In December, 1867, Mr. Dawes applied to Mr. Ames to purchase a thousand-dollar bond of the Cedar Rapids road, in Iowa. Mr. Ames informed him that he had sold them all, but that he would let him have for his thousand dollars ten shares of Credit Mobilier stock, which he thought was better than the railroad bond. In answer to inquiries by Mr. Dawes Mr. Ames said the Credit Mobilier Company had the contract to build the Union Pacific road, and thought they would make money out of it, and that it would be a good thing; that he would guarantee that he should get 10 per cent. on his money, and that if at any time Mr. Dawes did not want the stock he would pay back his money with 10 per cent. interest. Mr. Dawes made some further inquiry in relation to the stock of Mr. John B. Alley, who said he thought it was good stock, but not as good as Mr. Ames thought, but that Mr. Ames’s guarantee would make it a perfectly safe investment.

Mr. Dawes thereupon concluded to purchase the ten shares, and on the 11th of January he paid Mr. Ames $800, and in a few days thereafter the balance of the price of this stock, at par and interest from July previous. In June, 1868, Mr. Ames received a dividend of 60 per cent. in money on this stock, and of it paid to Mr. Dawes $400, and applied the balance of $200 upon accounts between them. This $400 was all that was paid over to Mr. Dawes as a dividend upon this stock. At some time prior to December, 1868, Mr. Dawes was informed that a suit had been commenced in the courts of Pennsylvania by former owners of the charter of the Credit Mobilier, claiming that those then claiming and using it had no right to do so. Mr. Dawes thereupon informed Mr. Ames that as there was a litigation about the matter he did not desire to keep the stock. On the 9th of December, 1868, Mr. Ames and Mr. Dawes had a settlement of their matters in which Mr. Dawes was allowed for the money he paid for the stock with 10 per cent. interest upon it, and accounted to Mr. Ames for the $400 he had received as a dividend. Mr. Dawes received no other benefit under the contract than to get 10 per cent. upon his money, and after the settlement had no further interest in the stock.

MR. GLENNI W. SCOFIELD, OF PENNSYLVANIA.

In 1866 Mr. Scofield purchased some Cedar Rapids bonds of Mr. Ames, and in that year they had conversations about Mr. Scofield taking stock in the Credit Mobilier Company, but no contract was consummated. In December, 1867, Mr. Scofield applied to Mr. Ames to purchase more Cedar Rapids bonds, when Mr. Ames suggested he should purchase some Credit Mobilier stock, and explained generally that it was a contracting company to build the Union Pacific road; that it was a Pennsylvania corporation, and he would like to have some Pennsylvanians in it; that he would sell it to him at par and interest, and that he would guarantee he should get 8 per cent. if Mr. Scofield would give him half the dividends above that. Mr. Scofield said he thought he would take $1,000 of the stock; but before anything further was done Mr. Scofield was called home by sickness in his family. On his return, the latter part of January, 1868, he spoke to Mr. Ames about the stock, when Mr. Ames said he thought it was all sold, but he would take his money and give him a receipt, and get the stock for him if he could. Mr. Scofield thereupon paid Mr. Ames $1,041, and took his receipt therefor.

Not long after Mr. Ames informed Mr. Scofield he could have the stock, but could 205not give him a certificate for it until he could get a larger certificate dividend. Mr. Scofield received the bond dividend of 80 per cent., which was payable January 3, 1868, taking a bond for $1,000 and paying Mr. Ames the difference. Mr. Ames received the 60 per cent. cash dividend on the stock in June, 1868, and paid over to Mr. Scofield $600, the amount of it.

Before the close of that session of Congress, which was toward the end of July, Mr. Scofield became, for some reason, disinclined to take the stock, and a settlement was made between them, by which Mr. Ames was to retain the Credit Mobilier stock and Mr. Scofield took a thousand dollars Union Pacific bond and ten shares of Union Pacific stock.

The precise basis of the settlement does not appear, neither Mr. Ames nor Mr. Scofield having any full date in reference to it; Mr. Scofield thinks that he only received back his money and interest upon it, while Mr. Ames states that he thinks Mr. Scofield had ten shares of Union Pacific stock in addition. The committee do not deem it specially important to settle this difference of recollection. Since that settlement Mr. Scofield has had no interest in the Credit Mobilier stock and derived no benefit therefrom.

MR. JOHN A. BINGHAM, OF OHIO.

In December, 1867, Mr. Ames advised Mr. Bingham to invest in the stock of the Credit Mobilier, assuring him that it would return him his money with profitable dividends. Mr. Bingham agreed to take twenty shares, and about the 1st of February, 1868, paid to Mr. Ames the par value of the stock, for which Mr. Ames executed to him some receipt or agreement. Mr. Ames received all the dividends on the stock, whether in Union Pacific bonds, or stock, or money; some were delivered to Mr. Bingham and some retained by Mr. Ames. The matter was not finally adjusted between them until February, 1872, when it was settled, Mr. Ames retaining the twenty shares of Credit Mobilier stock, and accounting to Mr. Bingham for such dividends upon it as Mr. Bingham had not already received. Mr. Bingham was treated as the real owner of the stock from the time of the agreement to take it, in December, 1867, to the settlement in February, 1872, and had the benefit of all the dividends upon it. Neither Mr. Ames nor Mr. Bingham had such records of their dealing as to be able to give the precise amount of those dividends.

MR. WILLIAM D. KELLEY, OF PENNSYLVANIA.

The committee find from the evidence that in the early part of the second session of the Fortieth Congress, and probably in December, 1867, Mr. Ames agreed with Mr. Kelley to sell him ten shares of Credit Mobilier stock at par and interest from July 1, 1867. Mr. Kelley was not then prepared to pay for the stock, and Mr. Ames agreed to carry the stock for him until he could pay for it. On the third day of January, 1868, there was a dividend of 80 per cent. on Credit Mobilier stock in Union Pacific bonds. Mr. Ames received the bonds, as the stock stood in his name, and sold them for 97 per cent. of their face. In June, 1868, there was a cash dividend of 60 per cent., which Mr. Ames also received. The proceeds of the bonds sold, and the cash dividends received by Mr. Ames, amounted to $1,376. The par value of the stock and interest thereon from the previous July amounted to $1,047; so that, after paying for the stock, there was a balance of dividends due Mr. Kelley of $329. On the 23d day of June, 1868, Mr. Ames gave Mr. Kelley a check for that sum on the Sergeant-at-Arms of the House of Representatives, and Mr. Kelley received the money thereon.

The committee find that Mr. Kelley then understood that the money he thus received was a balance of dividends due him after paying for the stock.

All the subsequent dividends upon the stock were either in Union Pacific stock or bonds, and they were all received by Mr. Ames. In September, 1868, Mr. Kelley received from Mr. Ames $750 in money, which was understood between them to be an advance to be paid out of dividends. There has never been any adjustment of the matter between them, and there is now an entire variance in the testimony of the two men as to what the transaction between them was, but the committee are unanimous in finding the facts above stated. The evidence reported to the House gives some subsequent conversations and negotiations between Mr. Kelley and Mr. Ames on this subject. The committee do not deem it material to refer to it in their report.

MR. JAMES A. GARFIELD, OF OHIO.

The facts in regard to Mr. Garfield, as found by the committee, are identical with the case of Mr. Kelley to the point of reception of the check for $329. He agreed with Mr. Ames to take ten shares of Credit Mobilier stock, but did not pay for the same. Mr. Ames received the 80 per cent. dividend in bonds and sold them for 97 per cent., and also received the 60 per cent. cash dividend, which together paid the price of the stock and interest, and left a balance of $329. This sum was paid over to Mr. Garfield by a check on the Sergeant-at-Arms, and Mr. Garfield then understood this sum was the balance of dividends after paying for the stock. Mr. Ames received 206all the subsequent dividends, and the committee do not find that, since the payment of the $329, there has been any communication between Mr. Ames and Mr. Garfield on the subject until this investigation began. Some correspondence between Mr. Garfield and Mr. Ames, and some conversations between them during this investigation, will be found in the reported testimony.

The committee do not find that Mr. Ames, in his negotiations with the persons above named, entered into any detail of the relations between the Credit Mobilier Company and the Union Pacific Company, or gave them any specific information as to the amount of dividends they would be likely to receive further than has been already stated. They all knew from him, or otherwise, that the Credit Mobilier was a contracting company to build the Union Pacific road, but it does not appear that any of them knew that the profits and dividends were to be in stock and bonds of that company.

The Credit Mobilier Company was a State corporation, not subject to congressional legislation, and the fact that its profits were expected to be derived from building the Union Pacific road did not, apparently, create such an interest in that company as to disqualify the holder of Credit Mobilier stock from participating in any legislation affecting the railroad company. In his negotiations with these members of Congress, Mr. Ames made no suggestion that he desired to secure their favorable influence in Congress in favor of the railroad company, and whenever the question was raised as to whether the ownership of this stock would in any way interfere with or embarrass them in their action as members of Congress, he assured them it would not.

The committee, therefore, do not find, as to the members of the present House above named, that they were aware of the object of Mr. Ames, or that they had any other purpose in taking this stock than to make a profitable investment. It is apparent that those who advanced their money to pay for their stock present more the appearance of ordinary investors than those who did not, but the committee do not feel at liberty to find any corrupt purpose or knowledge founded upon the fact of non-payment alone.

It ought also to be observed that those gentlemen who surrendered their stock to Mr. Ames before there was any public excitement upon the subject, do not profess to have done so upon any idea of impropriety in holding it, but for reasons affecting the value and security of the investment. But the committee believe that they must have felt that there was something so out of the ordinary course of business in the extraordinary dividends they were receiving as to render the investment itself suspicious, and that this was one of the motives of their action.

The committee have not been able to find that any of these members of Congress have been affected in their official action in consequence of their interest in Credit Mobilier stock.

It has been suggested that the fact that none of this stock was transferred to those with whom Mr. Ames contracted was a circumstance from which a sense of impropriety, if not corruption, was to be inferred. The committee believe this is capable of explanation without such inference. The profits of building the road, under the Ames contract, were only to be divided among such holders of Credit Mobilier stock as should come in and become parties to certain conditions set out in the contract of transfer to the trustees, so that a transfer from Mr. Ames to new holders would cut off the right to dividends from the trustees, unless they also became parties to the agreement; and this the committee believe to be the true reason why no transfers were made.

The committee are also of opinion that there was a satisfactory reason for delay on Mr. Ames’s part to close settlements with some of these gentlemen for stock and bonds he had received as dividends upon the stock contracted to them. In the fall of 1868 Mr. McComb commenced a suit against the Credit Mobilier Company, and Mr. Ames and others, claiming to be entitled to two hundred and fifty shares of the Credit Mobilier stock upon a subscription for stock to that amount. That suit is still pending. If McComb prevailed in that suit, Mr. Ames might be compelled to surrender so much of the stock assigned to him as trustee, and he was not therefore anxious to have the stock go out of his hands until that suit was terminated. It ought also to be stated that no one of the present members of the House above named appears to have had any knowledge of the dealings of Mr. Ames with other members.

The committee do not find that either of the above named gentlemen, in contracting with Mr. Ames, had any corrupt motive or purpose himself, or was aware that Mr. Ames had any, nor did either of them suppose he was guilty of any impropriety or even indelicacy in becoming a purchaser of this stock. Had it appeared that these gentlemen were aware of the enormous dividends upon this stock, and how they were to be earned, we could not thus acquit them. And here as well as anywhere, the committee may allude to that subject. Congress had chartered the Union Pacific road, given to it a liberal grant of lands, and promised a liberal loan of Government 207bonds, to be delivered as fast as sections of the road were completed. As these alone might not be sufficient to complete the road, Congress authorized the company to issue their own bonds for the deficit, and secured them by a mortgage upon the road, which should be a lien prior to that of the Government. Congress never intended that the owners of the road should execute a mortgage on the road prior to that of the Government, to raise money to put into their own pockets, but only to build the road.

The men who controlled the Union Pacific seem to have adopted as the basis of their action the right to encumber the road by a mortgage prior to that of the Government to the full extent, whether the money was needed for the construction of the road or not.

It was clear enough they could not do this directly and in terms, and therefore they resorted to the device of contracting with themselves to build the road, and fix a price high enough to require the issue of bonds to the full extent, and then divide the bonds or the proceeds of them under the name of profits on the contract. All those acting in the matter seem to have been fully aware of this, and that this was to be the effect of the transaction. The sudden rise of value of Credit Mobilier stock was the result of the adoption of this scheme. Any undue and unreasonable profits thus made by themselves were as much a fraud upon the Government as if they had sold their bonds and divided the money without going through the form of denominating them profits on building the road.

Now had these facts been known to these gentlemen, and had they understood they were to share in the proceeds of the scheme, they would have deserved the severest censure.

Had they known only that the profits were to be paid in stock and bonds of the Union Pacific Company, and so make them interested in it, we cannot agree to the doctrine, which has been urged before us and elsewhere, that it was perfectly legitimate for members of Congress to invest in a corporation deriving all its rights from and subject at all times to the action of Congress.

In such case the rules of the House, as well as the rules of decency, would require such member to abstain from voting on any question affecting his interest. But, after accepting the position of a member of Congress, we do not think he has the right to disqualify himself from acting upon subjects likely to come before Congress without some higher and more urgent motive than merely to make a profitable investment. But it is not so much to be feared that in such case an interested member would vote as that he would exercise his influence by personal appeal to his fellow-members, and by other modes, which often is far more potent than a single silent vote.

We do not think any member ought to feel so confident of his own strength as to allow himself to be brought into this temptation. We think Mr. Ames judged shrewdly in saying that a man is much more likely to be watchful of his own interests than those of other people. But there is a broader view still which we think ought to be taken. This country is fast becoming filled with gigantic corporations, wielding and controlling immense aggregations of money, and thereby commanding great influence and power. It is notorious in many State legislatures that these influences are often controlling, so that in effect they become the ruling power of the State. Within a few years Congress has, to some extent, been brought within similar influences, and the knowledge of the public on that subject has brought great discredit upon the body, far more, we believe, than there were facts to justify.

But such is the tendency of the time, and the belief is far too general that all men can be ruled with money, and that the use of such means to carry public measures is legitimate and proper. No member of Congress ought to place himself in circumstances of suspicion, so that any discredit of the body shall arise on his account. It is of the highest importance that the national legislature should be free of all taint of corruption, and it is of almost equal necessity that the people should feel confident that it is so.

In a free government like ours, we cannot expect the people will long respect the laws, if they lose respect for the law-makers.

For these reasons we think it behooves every man in Congress or in any public position to hold himself aloof, as far as possible, from all such influences, that he may not only be enabled to look at every public question with an eye only to the public good, but that his conduct and motives be not suspected or questioned. The only criticism the committee feel compelled to make on the action of these members in taking this stock is that they were not sufficiently careful in ascertaining what they were getting, and that in their judgment the assurance of a good investment was all the assurance they needed. We commend to them, and to all men, the letter of the venerable Senator Bayard, in response to an offer of some of this stock, found on page 74 of the testimony.

The committee find nothing in the conduct or motives of either of these members in taking this stock, that calls for any recommendation by the committee of the House.

208

MR. JAMES BROOKS, OF NEW YORK.

The case of Mr. Brooks stands upon a different state of facts from any of those already given. The committee find from the evidence as follows: Mr. Brooks had been a warm advocate of a Pacific Railroad, both in Congress and in the public press. After persons interested in the Union Pacific road had obtained control of the Credit Mobilier charter and organized under it for the purpose of making it a construction company to build the road, Dr. Durant, who was then the leading man in the enterprise, made great efforts to get the stock of the Credit Mobilier taken. Mr. Brooks was a friend of Dr. Durant, and he made some efforts to aid Dr. Durant in getting subscriptions for the stock, introduced the matter to some capitalists of New York, but his efforts were not crowned with success.

During this period Mr. Brooks had talked with Dr. Durant about taking some of the stock for himself, and had spoken of taking fifteen or twenty thousand dollars of it, but no definite contract was made between them, and Mr. Brooks was under no legal obligation to take the stock, or Durant to give it to him. In October, 1867, Mr. Brooks was appointed by the President one of the Government directors of the Union Pacific road. In December, 1867, after the stock of the Credit Mobilier was understood, by those familiar with the affairs between the Union Pacific and the Credit Mobilier, to be worth very much more than par, Mr. Brooks applied to Dr. Durant, and claimed that he should have two hundred shares of Credit Mobilier stock. It does not appear that Mr. Brooks claimed he had any legal contract for stock that he could enforce, or that Durant considered himself in any way legally bound to let him have any, but still, on account of what had been said, and the efforts of Mr. Brooks to aid him, he considered himself under obligations to satisfy Mr. Brooks in the matter.

The stock had been so far taken up, and was then in such demand, that Durant could not well comply with Brooks’s demand for two hundred shares. After considerable negotiation, it was finally adjusted between them by Durant’s agreeing to let Brooks have one hundred shares of Credit Mobilier stock, and giving him with it $5,000 of Union Pacific bonds, and $20,000 of Union Pacific stock. Dr. Durant testifies that he then considered Credit Mobilier stock worth double the par value, and that the bonds and stock he was to give Mr. Brooks worth about $9,000, so that he saved about $1,000 by not giving Brooks the additional hundred shares he claimed. After the negotiation had been concluded between Mr. Brooks and Dr. Durant, Mr. Brooks said that as he was a Government director of the Union Pacific road, and as the law provided such directors should not be stockholders in that company, he would not hold this stock, and directed Dr. Durant to transfer it to Charles H. Neilson, his son-in-law. The whole negotiation with Durant was conducted by Mr. Brooks himself, and Neilson had nothing to do with the transaction, except to receive the transfer. The $10,000 to pay for the one hundred shares was paid by Mr. Brooks, and he received the $5,000 of Pacific bonds which came with the stock.

The certificate of transfer of the hundred shares from Durant to Neilson is dated December 26, 1867. On the 3d of January, 1868, there was a dividend of 80 per cent. in Union Pacific bonds paid on the Credit Mobilier stock. The bonds were received by Neilson, but passed over at once to Mr. Brooks. It is claimed, both by Mr. Brooks and Neilson, that the $10,000 paid by Mr. Brooks for the stock was a loan of that sum by him to Neilson, and, that the bonds he received from Durant, and those received for the dividend, were delivered and held by him as collateral security for the loan.

No note or obligation was given for the money by Neilson, nor, so far as we can learn from either Brooks or Neilson, was any account or memorandum of the transaction kept by either of them. At the time of the arrangement or settlement above spoken of between Brooks and Durant, there was nothing said about Mr. Brooks being entitled to have 50 per cent. more stock by virtue of his ownership of the hundred shares. Neither Brooks nor Durant thought of any such thing.

Some time after the transfer of the shares to Neilson, Mr. Brooks called on Sidney Dillon, then the president of the Credit Mobilier, and claimed he or Neilson was entitled to fifty additional shares of the stock, by virtue of the purchase of the one hundred shares of Durant.

This was claimed by Mr. Brooks as his right by virtue of the 50 per cent. increase of the stock hereinbefore described. Mr. Dillon said he did not know how that was, but he would consult the leading stockholders, and be governed by them. Mr. Dillon, in order to justify himself in the transaction, got up a paper authorizing the issue of fifty shares of the stock to Mr. Brooks, and procured it to be signed by most of the principal shareholders. After this had been done, an entry of fifty shares was made on the stock-ledger to some person other than Neilson. The name in two places on the book has been erased, and the name of Neilson inserted. The committee are satisfied that the stock was first entered on the books in Mr. Brooks’s name.

Mr. Neilson soon after called for the certificate 209for the fifty shares, and on the 29th of February, 1868, the certificate was issued to him, and the entry on the stock-book was changed to Neilson.

Neilson procured Mr. Dillon to advance the money to pay for the stock, and at the same time delivered to Dillon $4,000 Union Pacific bonds, and fifty shares of Union Pacific stock as collateral security. These bonds and stock were a portion of dividends received at the time, as he was allowed to receive the same per centage of dividends on these fifty shares that had previously been paid on the hundred. This matter has never been adjusted between Neilson and Dillon. Brooks and Neilson both testify they never paid Dillon. Dillon thinks he has received his pay, as he has not now the collaterals in his possession. If he has been paid it is probable that it was from the collaterals in some form. The subject has never been named between Dillon and Neilson since Dillon advanced the money, and no one connected with the transaction seems able to give any further light upon it. The whole business by which these fifty shares were procured was done by Mr. Brooks. Neilson knew nothing of any right to have them, and only went for the certificate when told to do so by Mr. Brooks.

The committee find that no such right to fifty shares additional stock passed by the transfer of the hundred. And from Mr. Brooks’s familiarity with the affairs of the company, the committee believe he must have known his claim to them was unfounded. The question naturally arises, How was he able to procure them? The stock at this time by the stockholders was considered worth three or four times its par value. Neilson sustained no relations to any of these people that commanded any favor, and if he could have used any influence he did not attempt it; if he had this right he was unaware of it till told by Mr. Brooks, and left the whole matter in his hands. It is clear that the shares were procured by the sole efforts of Mr. Brooks, and, as the stockholders who consented to it supposed, for the benefit of Mr. Brooks. What power had Mr. Brooks to enforce an unfounded claim, to have for $5,000, stock worth $15,000 or $20,000? Mr. McComb swears that he heard conversation between Mr. Brooks and Mr. John B. Alley, a large stockholder, and one of the executive committee, in which Mr. Brooks urged that he should have the additional fifty shares, because he was or would procure himself to be made a Government director, and also that, being a member of Congress, he “would take care of the democratic side of the House.”

Mr. Brooks and Mr. Alley both deny having had any such conversation, or that Mr. Brooks ever made such a statement to Mr. Alley. If, therefore, this matter rested wholly upon the testimony of Mr. McComb, the committee would not feel justified in finding that Mr. Brooks procured the stock by such use of his official position; but all the circumstances seem to point exactly in that direction, and we can find no other satisfactory solution of the question above propounded. Whatever claim Mr. Brooks had to stock, either legal or moral, had been adjusted and satisfied by Dr. Durant. Whether he was getting this stock for himself or to give to his son-in-law, we believe, from the circumstances attending the whole transaction, that he obtained it knowing that it was yielded to its official position and influence, and with the intent to secure his favor and influence in such positions. Mr. Brooks claims that he has had no interest in this stock whatever; that the benefit and advantage of his right to have it he gave to Mr. Neilson, his son-in-law, and that he has had all the dividends upon it. The committee are unable to find this to be the case, for in their judgment all the facts and circumstances show Mr. Brooks to be the real and substantial owner, and that Neilson’s ownership is merely nominal and colorable.

In June, 1868, there was a cash dividend of $9,000 upon this one hundred and fifty shares of stock. Neilson received it, of course, as the stock was in his name; but on the same day it was paid over to Mr. Brooks, as Neilson says, to pay so much of the $10,000 advanced by Mr. Brooks to pay for the stock. This, then, repaid all but $1,000 of the loan; but Mr. Brooks continued to hold $16,000 of Union Pacific bonds, which Neilson says he gave him as collateral security, and to draw the interest upon all but $5,000. The interest upon the others, Neilson says, he was permitted to draw and retain, but at one time in his testimony he spoke of the amount he was allowed as being Christmas and New Year’s presents. Neilson says that during the last summer he borrowed $14,000 of Mr. Brooks, and he now owes Mr. Brooks nearly as much as the collaterals; but, according to his testimony, Mr. Brooks for four years held $16,000 in bonds as security for $1,000, and received the interest on $11,000 of the collaterals. No accounts appear to have been kept between Mr. Brooks and Neilson, and doubtless what sums he has received from Mr. Brooks, out of the dividends, were intended as presents rather than as deliveries of money belonging to him.

Mr. Brooks’s efforts procured the stock; his money paid for it; all the cash dividends he has received; and he holds all the bonds, except those Dillon received, which seem to have been applied toward paying for the fifty shares. Without 210further comment on the evidence, the committee find that the one hundred and fifty shares of stock appearing on the books of the Credit Mobilier in the name of Neilson were really the stock of Mr. Brooks, and subject to his control, and that it was so understood by both the parties. Mr. Brooks had taken such an interest in the Credit Mobilier Company, and was so connected with Dr. Durant, that he must be regarded as having full knowledge of the relations between that company and the railroad company, and of the contracts between them. He must have known the cause of the sudden increase in value of the Credit Mobilier stock, and how the large expected profits were to be made. We have already expressed our views of the propriety of a member of Congress becoming the owner of stock, possessing this knowledge.

But Mr. Brooks was not only a member of Congress, but he was a Government director of the Union Pacific Company. As such it was his duty to guard and watch over the interests of the Government in the road and to see that they were protected and preserved. To insure such faithfulness on the part of Government directors, Congress wisely provided that they should not be stockholders in the road. Mr. Brooks readily saw that, though becoming a stockholder in the Credit Mobilier was not forbidden by the letter of the law, yet it was a violation of its spirit and essence, and therefore had the stock placed in the name of his son-in-law. The transfer of the Oakes Ames contract to the trustees and the building of the road under that contract, from which the enormous dividends were derived, were all during Mr. Brooks’s official life as a Government director, must have been within his knowledge, and yet passed without the slightest opposition from him. The committee believed this could not have been done without an entire disregard of his official obligation and duty, and that while appointed to guard the public interests in the road he joined himself with the promoters of a scheme whereby the Government was to be defrauded, and shared in the spoil.

In the conclusions of fact upon the evidence, the committee are entirely agreed.

In considering what action we ought to recommend to the House upon these facts, the committee encounter a question which has been much debated: Has this House power and jurisdiction to inquire concerning offenses committed by its members prior to their election, and to punish them by censure or expulsion? The committee are unanimous upon the right of jurisdiction of this House over the cases of Mr. Ames and Mr. Brooks, upon the facts found in regard to them. Upon the question of jurisdiction the committee present the following views:

The Constitution, in the fifth section of the first article, defines the power of either House as follows:

“Each House may determine the rules of its proceedings, punish its members for disorderly behavior, and with the concurrence of two-thirds expel a member.”

It will be observed that there is no qualification of the power, but there is an important qualification of the manner of its exercise—it must be done “with the concurrence of two-thirds.”

The close analogy between this power and the power of impeachment is deserving of consideration.

The great purpose of the power of impeachment is to remove an unfit and unworthy incumbent from office, and though a judgment of impeachment may to some extent operate as punishment, that is not its principal object. Members of Congress are not subject to be impeached, but may be expelled, and the principal purpose of expulsion is not as punishment, but to remove a member whose character and conduct show that he is an unfit man to participate in the deliberations and decisions of the body, and whose presence in it tends to bring the body into contempt and disgrace.

In both cases it is a power of purgation and purification to be exercised for the public safety, and, in the case of expulsion, for the protection and character of the House. The Constitution defines the causes of impeachment, to wit, “treason, bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors.” The office of the power of expulsion is so much the same as that of the power to impeach that we think it may be safely assumed that whatever would be a good cause of impeachment would also be a good cause of expulsion.

It has never been contended that the power to impeach for any of the causes enumerated was intended to be restricted to those which might occur after appointment to a civil office, so that a civil officer who had secretly committed such offense before his appointment should not be subject upon detection and exposure to be convicted and removed from office. Every consideration of justice and sound policy would seem to require that the public interests be secured, and those chosen to be their guardians be free from the pollution of high crimes, no matter at what time that pollution had attached.

If this be so in regard to other civil officers, under institutions which rest upon the intelligence and virtue of the people, can it well be claimed that the law-making Representative may be vile and criminal with impunity, provided the evidences of 211his corruption are found to antedate his election?

In the report made to the Senate by John Quincy Adams in December, 1807, upon the case of John Smith, of Ohio, the following language is used: “The power of expelling a member for misconduct results, on the principles of common sense, from the interests of the nation that the high trust of legislation shall be invested in pure hands. When the trust is elective, it is not to be presumed that the constituent body will commit the deposit to the keeping of worthless characters. But when a man whom his fellow-citizens have honored with their confidence on a pledge of a spotless reputation, has degraded himself by the commission of infamous crimes, which become suddenly and unexpectedly revealed to the world, defective indeed would be that institution which should be impotent to discard from its bosom the contagion of such a member; which should have no remedy of amputation to apply until the poison had reached the heart.”

The case of Smith was that of a Senator, who, after his election, but not during a session of the Senate, had been involved in the treasonable conspiracy of Aaron Burr. Yet the reasoning is general, and was to antagonize some positions which had been taken in the case of Marshall, a Senator from Kentucky; the Senate in that case having, among other reasons, declined to take jurisdiction of the charge for the reason that the alleged offence had been committed prior to the Senator’s election, and was matter cognizable by the criminal courts of Kentucky. None of the commentators upon the Constitution or upon parliamentary law assign any such limitation as to the time of the commission of the offense, or the nature of it, which shall control and limit the power of expulsion. On the contrary they all assert that the power in its very nature is a discretionary one, to be exercised of course with grave circumspection at all times, and only for good cause. Story, Kent, and Sergeant, all seem to accept and rely upon the exposition of Mr. Adams in the Smith case as sound. May, in his Parliamentary Practice, page 59, enumerates the causes for expulsion from Parliament, but he nowhere intimates that the offense must have been committed subsequent to the election.