VOLUME XIII SLICE VI Home, Daniel to Hortensius, Quintus (continued 2)

Finally, Grote objected to the two last books that they prolong the action of the Iliad beyond the exigencies of a coherent scheme. Of the two, the twenty-third could more easily be spared. In language, and perhaps in style and manner, it is akin to the tenth; while the twenty-fourth is in the pathetic vein of the ninth, and like it serves to bring out new aspects of the character of Achilles.

Dr E. Kammer has given some strong reasons for doubting the genuineness of the passage in book xx. describing the duel between Achilles and Aeneas (79-352). The incident is certainly very much out of keeping with the vehement action of that part of the poem, and especially with the moment when Achilles returns to the field, eager to meet Hector and avenge the death of his friend. The interpolation (if it is one) is probably due to local interests. It contains the well-known prophecy that the descendants of Aeneas are to rule over the Trojans,—pointing to the existence of an Aenead dynasty in the Troad. So, too, the legend of Anchises in the Hymn to Aphrodite is evidently local; and Aeneas becomes more prominent in the later epics, especially the Cypria and the Ἰλίου πέρσις of Arctinus.

Structure of the Odyssey.—In the Odyssey, as in the Iliad, the events related fall within a short space of time. The difficulty of adapting the long wanderings of Ulysses to a plan of this type is got over by the device—first met with in the Odyssey—of making the hero tell the story of his own adventures. In this way the action is made to begin almost immediately before the actual return of Ulysses. Up to the time when he reaches Ithaca it moves on three distinct scenes: we follow the fortunes of Ulysses, of Telemachus on his voyage in the Peloponnesus, and of Penelope with the suitors. The art with which these threads are woven together was recognized by Wolf himself, who admitted the difficulty of applying his theory to the “admirabilis summa et compages” of the poem. Of the comparatively few attempts which have been made to dissect the Odyssey, the most moderate and attractive is that of Professor A. Kirchhoff of Berlin.13

According to Kirchhoff, the Odyssey as we have it is the result of additions made to an original nucleus. There was first of all a “Return of Odysseus,” relating chiefly the adventures with the Cyclops, Calypso and the Phaeacians; then a continuation, the scene of which lay in Ithaca, embracing the bulk of books xiii.-xxiii. The poem so formed was enlarged at some time between Ol. 30 and Ol. 50 by the stories of books x.-xii. (Circe, the Sirens, Scylla, &c.), and the adventures of Telemachus. Lastly, a few passages were interpolated in the time of Peisistratus.

The proof that the scenes in Ithaca are by a later hand than the ancient “Return” is found chiefly in a contradiction discussed by Kirchhoff in his sixth dissertation (pp. 135 sqq., ed. 1869). Sometimes Ulysses is represented as aged and worn by toil, so that Penelope, for instance, cannot recognize him; sometimes he is really in the prime of heroic vigour, and his appearing as a beggarly old man is the work of Athena’s wand. The first of these representations is evidently natural, considering the twenty eventful years that have passed; but the second, Kirchhoff holds, is the Ulysses of Calypso’s island and the Phaeacian court. He concludes that the aged Ulysses belongs to the “continuation” (the change wrought by Athena’s wand being a device to reconcile the two views), and hence that the continuation is the work of a different author.

Ingenious as this is, there is really very slender ground for Kirchhoff’s thesis. The passages in the second half of the Odyssey which describe the appearance of Ulysses do not give two well-marked representations of him. Sometimes Athena disguises him as a decrepit beggar, sometimes she bestows on him supernatural beauty and vigour. It must be admitted that we are not told exactly how long in each case the effect of these changes lasted. But neither answers to his natural appearance, or to the appearance which he is imagined to present in the earlier books. In the palace of Alcinous, for instance, it is noticed that he is vigorous but “marred by many ills” (Od. viii. 137); and this agrees with the scenes of recognition in the latter part of the poem.

The arguments by which Kirchhoff seeks to prove that the stories of books x.-xii. are much later than those of book ix. are not more convincing. He points out some resemblances between these three books and the Argonautic fables, among them the circumstance that a fountain Artacia occurs in both. In the Argonautic story this fountain is placed in the neighbourhood of Cyzicus, and answers to an actual fountain known in historical times. Kirchhoff argues that the Artacia of the Argonautic story must have been taken from the real Artacia, and the Artacia of the Odyssey again from that of the Argonautic story. And as Cyzicus was settled from Miletus, he infers that both sets of stories must be comparatively late. It is more probable, surely, that the name Artacia occurred independently (as most geographical names are found to occur) in more than one place. Or it may be that the Artacia of the Odyssey suggested the name to the colonists of Cyzicus, whence it was adopted into the later versions of the Argonautic story. The further argument that the Nostoi recognized a son of Calypso by Ulysses but no son of Circe, consequently that Circe was unknown to the poet of the Nostoi, rests (in the first place) upon a conjectural alteration of a passage in Eustathius, and, moreover, has all the weakness of an argument from silence, in addition to the uncertainty arising from our very slight knowledge of the author whose silence is in question. Finally, when Kirchhoff finds traces in books x.-xii. of their having been originally told by the poet himself instead of being put in the mouth of his hero, we feel that inaccuracies of this kind are apt to creep in wherever a fictitious story is thrown into the form of an autobiography.

Inquiries conducted with the refinement which characterizes those of Kirchhoff are always instructive, and his book contains very many just observations; but it is impossible to admit his main conclusions. And perhaps we may infer that no similar attempt can be more successful. It does not indeed follow that the Odyssey is free from interpolations. The Νεκυία of book xi. may be later (as Lauer maintained), or it may contain additions, which could easily be inserted in a description of the kind. And the last book is probably by a different hand, as the ancient critics believed. But the unity of the Odyssey as a whole is apparently beyond the reach of the existing weapons of criticism.

Chorizontes.—When we are satisfied that each of the great Homeric poems is either wholly or mainly the work of a single poet, a question remains which has been matter of controversy in ancient as well as modern times—Are they the work of the same poet? Two ancient grammarians, Xeno and Hellanicus, were known as the “separators” (οἱ χωρίζοντες); and Aristarchus appears to have written a treatise against their heresy. In modern times some of the greatest names have been on the side of the “Chorizontes.”

If, as has been maintained in the preceding pages, the external evidence regarding Homer is of no value, the problem now before us may be stated in this form: Given two poems of which nothing is known except that they are of the same school of poetry, what is the probability that they are by the same author? We may find a fair parallel by imagining two plays drawn at hazard from the works of the great tragic writers. It is evident that the burden of proof would rest with those who held them to be by the same hand.

The arguments used in this discussion have been of very various calibre. The ancient Chorizontes observed that the messenger of Zeus is Iris in the Iliad, but Hermes in the Odyssey; that the wife of Hephaestus is one of the Charites in the Iliad, but Aphrodite in the Odyssey; that the heroes in the Iliad do not eat fish; that Crete has a hundred cities according to the Iliad, and only ninety according to the Odyssey; that προπάροιθε is used in the Iliad of place, in the Odyssey of time, &c. Modern scholars have added to the list, especially by making careful comparisons of the two poems in respect of vocabulary and grammatical forms. Nothing is more difficult than to assign the degree of weight to be given to such facts. The difference of subject between the two poems is so great that it leads to the most striking differences of detail, especially in the vocabulary. For instance, the word φόβος, which in Homer means “flight in battle” (not “fear”), occurs thirty-nine times in the Iliad, and only once in the Odyssey; but then there are no battles in the Odyssey. Again, the verb ῥήγνυμι, “to break,” occurs forty-eight times in the Iliad, and once in the Odyssey,—the reason being that it is constantly used of breaking the armour of an enemy, the gate of a city, the hostile ranks, &c. Once more, the word σκότος, “darkness,” occurs fourteen times in the Iliad, once in the Odyssey. But in every one of the fourteen places it is used of “darkness” coming over the sight of a fallen warrior. On the other side, if words such as ἀσάμινθος, “a bath,” χέρνιψ, “a basin for the hands,” λέσχη, “a place to meet and talk,” &c., are peculiar to the Odyssey, we have only to remember that the scene in the Iliad is hardly ever laid within any walls except those of a tent. These examples will show that mere statistics of the occurrence of words prove little, and that we must begin by looking to the subject and character of each poem. When we do so, we at once find ourselves in the presence of differences of the broadest kind. The Iliad is much more historical in tone and character. The scene of the poem is a real place, and the poet sings (as Ulysses says of Demodocus) as though he had been present himself, or had heard from one who had been. The supernatural element is confined to an interference of the gods, which to the common eye hardly disturbs the natural current of affairs. The Odyssey, on the contrary, is full of the magical and romantic—“speciosa miracula,” as Horace called them. Moreover, these marvels—which in their original form are doubtless as old as anything in the Iliad, since in fact they are part of the vast stock of popular tales (Märchen) diffused all over the world—are mixed up in the Odyssey with the heroes of the Trojan war. This has been especially noticed in the case of the story of Polyphemus, one that is found in many countries, and in versions which cannot all be derived from Homer. W. Grimm has pointed out that the behaviour of Ulysses in that story is senseless and foolhardy, utterly beneath the wise and much-enduring Ulysses of the Trojan war. The reason is simple; he is not the Ulysses of the Trojan war, but a being of the same world as Polyphemus himself—the world of giants and ogres. The question then is—How long must the name of Ulysses have been familiar in the legend (Sage) of Troy before it made its way into the tales of giants and ogres (Märchen), where the poet of the Odyssey found it?

Again, the Trojan legend has itself received some extension between the time of the Iliad and that of the Odyssey. The story of the Wooden Horse is not only unknown to the Iliad, but is of a kind which we can hardly imagine the poet of the Iliad admitting. The part taken by Neoptolemus seems also to be a later addition. The tendency to amplify and complete the story shows itself still more in the Cyclic poets. Between the Iliad and these poets the Odyssey often occupies an intermediate position.

This great and significant change in the treatment of the heroic legends is accompanied by numerous minor differences (such as the ancients remarked) in belief, in manners and institutions, and in language. These differences bear out the inference that the Odyssey is of a later age. The progress of reflection is especially shown in the higher ideas entertained regarding the gods. The turbulent Olympian court has almost disappeared. Zeus has acquired the character of a supreme moral ruler; and although Athena and Poseidon are adverse influences in the poem, the notion of a direct contest between them is scrupulously avoided. The advance of morality is shown in the more frequent use of terms such as “just” (δίκαιος), “piety” (ὁσίη), “insolence” (ὕβρις), “god-fearing” (θεουδής), “pure” (ἁγνός); and also in the plot of the story, which is distinctly a contest between right and wrong. In matters bearing upon the arts of life it is unsafe to press the silence of the Iliad. We may note, however, the difference between the house of Priam, surrounded by distinct dwellings for his many sons and daughters, and the houses of Ulysses and Alcinous, with many chambers under a single roof. The singer, too, who is so prominent a figure in the Odyssey can hardly be thought to be absent from the Iliad merely because the scene is laid in a camp.

Style of Homer.—A few words remain to be said on the style and general character of the Homeric poems, and on the comparisons which may be made between Homer and analogous poetry in other countries.

The cardinal qualities of the style of Homer have been pointed out once for all by Matthew Arnold. “The translator of Homer,” he says, “should above all be penetrated by a sense of four qualities of his author—that he is eminently rapid; that he is eminently plain and direct, both in the evolution of his thought and in the expression of it, that is, both in his syntax and in his words; that he is eminently plain and direct in the substance of his thought, that is, in his matter and ideas; and, finally, that he is eminently noble” (On Translating Homer, p. 9).

The peculiar rapidity of Homer is due in great measure to his use of the hexameter verse. It is characteristic of early literature that the evolution of the thought—that is, the grammatical form of the sentence—is guided by the structure of the verse; and the correspondence which consequently obtains between the rhythm and the grammar—the thought being given out in lengths, as it were, and these again divided by tolerably uniform pauses—produces a swift flowing movement, such as is rarely found when the periods have been constructed without direct reference to the metre. That Homer possesses this rapidity without falling into the corresponding faults—that is, without becoming either “jerky” or monotonous—is perhaps the best proof of his unequalled poetical skill. The plainness and directness, both of thought and of expression, which characterize Homer were doubtless qualities of his age; but the author of the Iliad (like Voltaire, to whom Arnold happily compares him) must have possessed the national gift in a surpassing degree. The Odyssey is in this respect perceptibly below the level of the Iliad.

Rapidity or ease of movement, plainness of expression and plainness of thought, these are not the distinguishing qualities of the great epic poets—Virgil, Dante, Milton. On the contrary, they belong rather to the humbler epico-lyrical school for which Homer has been so often claimed. The proof that Homer does not belong to that school—that his poetry is not in any true sense “ballad-poetry”—is furnished by the higher artistic structure of his poems (already discussed), and as regards style by the fourth of the qualities distinguished by Arnold—the quality of nobleness. It is his noble and powerful style, sustained through every change of idea and subject, that finally separates Homer from all forms of “ballad-poetry” and “popular epic.”14

But while we are on our guard against a once common error, we may recognize the historical connexion between the Iliad and Odyssey and the “ballad” literature which undoubtedly preceded them in Greece. It may even be admitted that the swift-flowing movement, and the simplicity of thought and style, which we admire in the Iliad are an inheritance from the earlier “lays”—the κλέα ἀνδρῶν such as Achilles and Patroclus sang to the lyre in their tent. Even the metre—the hexameter verse—may be assigned to them. But between these lays and Homer we must place the cultivation of epic poetry as an art.15 The pre-Homeric lays doubtless furnished the elements of such a poetry—the alphabet, so to speak, of the art; but they must have been refined and transmuted before they formed poems like the Iliad and Odyssey.

A single example will illustrate this. In the scene on the walls of Troy, in the third book of the Iliad, after Helen has pointed out Agamemnon, Ulysses and Ajax in answer to Priam’s questions, she goes on unasked to name Idomeneus. Lachmann, whose mind is full of the ballad manner, fastens upon this as an irregularity. “The unskilful transition from Ajax to Idomeneus, about whom no question had been asked,” he cannot attribute to the original poet of the lay (Betrachtungen, p. 15, ed. 1865). But, as was pointed out by A. Römer16, this is exactly the variation which a poet would introduce to relieve the primitive ballad-like sameness of question and answer; and moreover it forms the transition to the lines about the Dioscuri by which the scene is so touchingly brought to a close.

Analogies.—The development of epic poetry (properly so called) out of the oral songs or ballads of a country is a process which in the nature of things can seldom be observed. It seems clear, however, that the hypothesis of epics such as the Iliad and Odyssey having been formed by putting together or even by working up shorter poems finds no support from analogy.

Narrative poetry of great interest is found in several countries (such as Spain and Servia), in which it has never attained to the epic stage. In Scandinavia, in Lithuania, in Russia, according to Gaston Paris (Histoire poétique de Charlemagne, p. 9), the national songs have been arrested in a form which may be called intermediate between contemporary poetry and the epic. The true epics are those of India, Persia, Greece, Germany, Britain and France. Most of these, however, fail to afford any useful points of comparison, either from their utter unlikeness to Homer, or because there is no evidence of the existence of anterior popular songs. The most instructive, perhaps the only instructive, parallel is to be found in the French “chansons de geste,” of which the Chanson de Roland is the earliest and best example. These poems are traced back with much probability to the 10th century. They are epic in character, and were recited by professional jongleurs (who may be compared to the ἀοιδοί of Homer). But as early as the 7th century we come upon traces of short lays (the so-called cantilènes) which were in the mouths of all and were sung in chorus. It has been held that the chansons de geste were formed by joining together “bunches” of these earlier cantilènes, and this was the view taken by Léon Gautier in the first edition of Les Épopées françaises (1865). In the second edition, of which the first volume appeared in 1878, he abandoned this theory. He believes that the epics were generally composed under the influence of earlier songs. “Our first epic poets,” he says, “did not actually and materially patch together pre-existent cantilènes. They were only inspired by these popular songs; they only borrowed from them the traditional and legendary elements. In short, they took nothing from them but the ideas, the spirit, the life; they ‘found’ (ils ont trouvé) all the rest” (p. 80). But he admits that “some of the old poems may have been borrowed from tradition, without any intermediary” (ibid.); and when it is considered that the traces of the “cantilènes” are slight, and that the degree in which they inspired the later poetry must be a matter of impression rather than of proof, it does not surprise us to find other scholars (notably Paul Meyer) attaching less importance to them, or even doubting their existence.17

When Léon Gautier shows how history passes into legend, and legend again into romance, we are reminded of the difference noticed above between the Iliad and the Odyssey, and between Homer and the early Cyclic poems. And the peculiar degradation of Homeric characters which appears in some poets (especially Euripides) finds a parallel in the later chansons de geste.18

The comparison of Homer with the great literary epics calls for more discursive treatment than would be in place here. Some external differences have been already indicated. Like the French epics, Homeric poetry is indigenous, and is distinguished by this fact, and by the ease of movement and the simplicity which result from it, from poets such as Virgil, Dante and Milton. It is also distinguished from them by the comparative absence of underlying motives or sentiment. In Virgil’s poetry a sense of the greatness of Rome and Italy is the leading motive of a passionate rhetoric, partly veiled by the “chosen delicacy” of his language. Dante and Milton are still more faithful exponents of the religion and politics of their time. Even the French epics are pervaded by the sentiment of fear and hatred of the Saracens. But in Homer the interest is purely dramatic. There is no strong antipathy of race or religion; the war turns on no political event; the capture of Troy lies outside the range of the Iliad. Even the heroes are not the chief national heroes of Greece. The interest lies wholly (so far as we can see) in the picture of human action and feeling.

Bibliography.—A complete bibliography of Homer would fill volumes. The following list is intended to include those books only which are of first-rate importance.

The editio princeps of Homer, published at Florence in 1488, by Demetrius Chalcondylas, and the Aldine editions of 1504 and 1517, have still some value beyond that of curiosity. The chief modern critical editions are those of Wolf (Halle, 1794-1795; Leipzig, 1804-1807), Spitzner (Gotha, 1832-1836), Bekker (Berlin, 1843; Bonn, 1858), La Roche (Odyssey, 1867-1868; Iliad, 1873-1876, both at Leipzig); Ludwich (Odyssey, Leipzig, 1889-1891; Iliad, 2 vols., 1901 and 1907): W. Leaf (Iliad, London, 1886-1888; 2nd ed. 1900-1902); Merry and Riddell (Odyssey i.-xii., 2nd ed., Oxford, 1886); Monro (Odyssey xiii.-xxiv. with appendices, Oxford, 1901); Monro and Allen (Iliad), and Allen (Odyssey, 1908, Oxford). The commentaries of Barnes, Clarke and Ernesti are practically superseded; but Heyne’s Iliad (Leipzig, 1802) and Nitzsch’s commentary on the Odyssey (books i.-xii., Hanover, 1826-1840) are still useful. Nägelbach’s Anmerkungen zur Ilias (A, B 1-483, Γ) is of great value, especially the third edition (by Autenrieth, Nuremberg, 1864). The unique Scholia Veneta on the Iliad were first made known by Villoison (Homeri Ilias ad veteris codicis Veneti fidem recensita, Scholia in eam antiquissima ex eodem codice aliisque nunc primum edidit, cum Asteriscis, Obeliscis, aliisque signis criticis, Joh. Baptista Caspar d’Ansse de Villoison, Venice, 1788); reprinted, with many additions from other MSS., by Bekker (Scholia in Homeri Iliadem, Berlin, 1825-1826). A new edition has been published by the Oxford Press (Scholia Graeca in Homeri Iliadem, ed. Gul. Dindorfius); six volumes have appeared (1875-1888), the last two edited by Professor E. Maass. The vast commentary of Eustathius was first printed at Rome in 1542; the last edition is that of Stallbaum (Leipzig, 1827). The Scholia on the Odyssey were published by Buttmann (Berlin, 1821), and with greater approach to completeness by W. Dindorf (Oxford, 1855). Although Wolf at once perceived the value of the Venetian Scholia on the Iliad, the first scholar who thoroughly explored them was C. Lehrs (De Aristarchi studiis Homericis, Königsberg, 1833; 2nd ed., Leipzig, 1865). Of the studies in the same field which have appeared since, the most important are: Aug. Nauck, Aristophanis Byzantii fragmenta (Halle, 1848); L. Friedländer, Aristonici περὶ σημείων Ἰλιαδος reliquiae (Göttingen, 1853); M. Schmidt, Didymi Chalcenteri fragmenta (Leipzig, 1854); L. Friedländer, Nicanoris περὶ Ἰλιακῆς στιγμῆς reliquiae (Berlin, 1857); Aug. Lentz, Herodiani Technici reliquiae (Leipzig, 1867); J. La Roche, Die homerische Textkritik im Alterthum (Leipzig, 1866) and Homerische Untersuchungen (Leipzig, 1869); Ad. Römer, Die Werke der Aristarcheer im Cod. Venet. A. (Munich, 1875); A. Ludwich, Aristarch’s Homerische Textkritik (2 vols. Leipzig, 1884-1885); and Die Homervulgata als vor-Alexandrinisch erwiesen (Leipzig, 1898).

The literature of the “Homeric Question” begins practically with Wolf’s Prolegomena (Halle, 1795). Of the earlier books Wood’s Essay on the Original Genius and Writings of Homer is the most interesting. Wolf’s views were skilfully popularized in W. Müller’s Homerische Vorschule (2nd ed., Leipzig, 1836). G. Hermann’s dissertations De interpolationibus Homeri (1832) and De iteratis apuà Homerum (1840) are reprinted in his Opuscula. Lachmann’s two papers (Betrachtungen über Homer’s Ilias) were edited together by M. Haupt (2nd ed., Berlin, 1865). Besides the somewhat voluminous writings of Nitzsch, and the discussions contained in the histories of Greek literature by K. O. Müller, Bernhardy, Ulrici and Th. Bergk, and in Grote’s History of Greece, see Welcker, Der epische Cyclus oder die homerischen Dichter (Bonn, 1835-1849); on Proclus and the Cycle reference may also be made to Wilamowitz-Möllendorf p. 328 seq.; E. Bethe, Rhein. Mus. (1891), xxvi. p. 593 seq.; O. Immisch, Festschrift Th. Gomperz dargebracht (1902), p. 237 sq.; Lauer, Geschichte der homerischen Poesie (Berlin, 1851); Sengebusch, two dissertations prefixed to the two volumes of W. Dindorf’s Homer in the Teubner series (1855-1856); Friedländer, Die homerische Kritik von Wolf bis Grote (Berlin, 1853); Nutzhorn, Die Entstehungsweise der homerischen Gedichte, mit Vorwort von J. N. Madvig (Leipzig, 1869); E. Kammer, Zur homerischen Frage (Königsberg, 1870); and Die Einheit der Odyssee (Leipzig, 1873); Ä. Kirchhoff, Die Composition der Odyssee (Berlin, 1869); Volkmann, Geschichte und Kritik der Wolf’schen Prolegomena (Leipzig, 1874); K. Sittl, Die Wiederholungen in der Odyssee (München, 1882); U. v. Wilamowitz-Möllendorf, Homerische Untersuchungen (Berlin, 1884); O. Seeck, Die Quellen der Odyssee (Berlin, 1887); F. Blass, Die Interpolationen in der Odyssee (Leipzig, 1905). The interest taken in the question by English students is sufficiently shown in the writings of W. E. Gladstone, F. A. Paley, Henry Hayman (in the Introduction to his Odyssey), P. Geddes, R. C. Jebb and A. Lang (see especially the latter’s Homer and his Age, 1907).

The Homeric dialect must be studied in the books (such as those of G. Curtius) that deal with Greek on the comparative method. The best special work is the brief Griechische Formenlehre of H. L. Ahrens (Göttingen, 1852). Other important works are those of Aug. Fick: Die homerische Odyssee in der ursprünglichen Sprachform wiederhergestelt (Göttingen, 1883); Die homerische Ilias (ibid., 1886); W. Schulze, Quaestiones epicae (Güterslohe, 1892). On Homeric syntax the chief book is B. Delbrück’s Syntactische Forschungen (Halle, 1871-1879), especially vols. i. and iv.; on metre, &c., Hartel’s Homerische Studien (i.-iii., Vienna); Knös, De digammo Homerico quaestiones (Upsala, 1872-1873-1878); Thumb, Zur Geschichte des griech. Digamma, Indogermanische Forschungen (1898), ix. 294 seq. The papers reprinted in Bekker’s Homerische Blätter (Bonn, 1863-1872) and Cobet’s Miscellanea Crilica (Leiden, 1876) are of the highest value. Hoffmann’s Quaestiones Homericae (Clausthal, 1842) is a useful collection of facts. Buttmann’s Lexilogus, as an example of method, is still worth study.

The antiquities of Homer—using the word in a wide sense—may be studied in the following books: Völcker, Über homerische Geographie und Weltkunde (Hanover, 1830); Nägelsbach’s Homerische Theologie (2nd ed., Nuremberg, 1861); H. Brunn, Die Kunst bei Homer (Munich, 1868); W. W. Lloyd, On the Homeric Design of the Shield of Achilles (London, 1854); Buchholz, Die homerischen Realien (Leipzig, 1871-1873); W. Helbig, Das homerische Epos aus den Denkmälern erläutert (Leipzig, 1884; 2nd ed., ibid., 1887); W. Reichel, Über homerische Waffen (Vienna, 1894); C. Robert, Studien zur Ilias (Berlin, 1901); W. Ridgeway, The Early Age of Greece (Cambridge, 1901); V. Bérard, Les Phéniciens et l’Odyssée (Paris, 1902-1903); C. Robert, “Topographische Probleme der Ilias,” in Hermes, xlii., 1907, pp. 78-112.

Among other aids should be mentioned the Index Homericus of Seber (Oxford, 1780); Prendergast’s Concordance to the Iliad (London, 1875); Dunbar’s id. to the Odyssey and Hymns (Oxford, 1880); Frohwein, Verbum Homericum, (Leipzig, 1881); Gehring, Index Homericus (Leipzig, 1891); the Lexicon Homericum, edited by H. Ebeling (Leipzig, 1880-1885) and the facsimile of the cod. Ven. A (Sijthoff; Leiden, 1901), with an introduction by D. Comparetti.

(D. B. M.)

1 This article was thoroughly revised by Dr D. B. Monro before his death in 1905; a few points have since been added by Mr. T. W. Allen.

2 See a paper in the Diss. Philol. Halenses, ii. 97-219.

3 Compare the Popular Rhymes of Scotland, published by Robert Chambers.

4 Compare the branch of myrtle at an Athenian feast (Aristoph., Nub., 1364).

5 The Iliad was also recited at the festival of the Brauronia, at Brauron in Attica (Hesych. s.v. βρανρωνίοις).

6 Contemporary Review, vol. xxiii. p. 218 ff.

7 The fact that the Phoenician Vau (ϝ) was retained in the Greek alphabets, and the vowel υ added, shows that when the alphabet was introduced the sound denoted by ϝ was still in full vigour. Otherwise ϝ would have been used for the vowel υ, just as the Phoenician consonant Yod became the vowel ι. But in the Ionic dialect the sound of ϝ died out soon after Homer’s time, if indeed it was still pronounced then. It seems probable therefore that the introduction of the alphabet is not later than the composition of the Homeric poems.

8 See D. B. Monro’s Homer’s Odyssey, books xiii.-xxiv. (Oxford, 1901, p. 455 sqq.), and the abstract of his paper on the Homeric Dialect read to the Congress of Historical Sciences at Rome, 1903: Atti del Congresso internazionale di scienze storiche, ii. 152, 153, 1905, “Il Dialetto omerico.”

9 See the chapter in Cobet’s Miscellanea critica, pp. 225-239.

10 The existence of two groups of the Venetian Scholia was first noticed by Jacob La Roche, and they were first distinguished in the edition of W. Dindorf (Oxford, 1875). There is also a group of Scholia, chiefly exegetical, a collection of which was published by Villoison from a MS. Ven. 453 (s. xi.) in his edition of 1788, and has been again edited by W. Dindorf (Oxford, 1877). The most important collection of this group is contained in the Codex Townleianus (Burney 86 s. xi.) of the British Museum, edited by E. Maass, (Oxford, 1887-1888). The vast commentary of Eustathius (of the 12th century) marks a third stage in the progress of ancient Homeric learning.

11 Prolegomena ad Homerum, sive de operum Homericorum prisca et genuina forma variisque mutationibus et probabili ratione emendandi. scripsit Frid. Aug. Wolfius, volumen i. (1795).

12 On this point see a paper by Professor Packard in the Trans. of the American Philological Association (1876).

13 Die Composition der Odyssee (Berlin, 1869). A full discussion of this book is given by Dr E. Kammer, Die Einheit der Odyssee (Leipzig, 1873).

14 “As a poet Homer must be acknowledged to excel Shakespeare in the truth, the harmony, the sustained grandeur, the satisfying completeness of his images” (Shelley, Essays, &c., i. 51, ed. 1852).

15 “The old English balladist may stir Sir Philip Sidney’s heart like a trumpet, and this is much; but Homer, but the few artists in the grand style, can do more—they can refine the raw natural man, they can transmute him” (On Translating Homer, p. 61).

16 Die exegetischen Scholien der Ilias, p. vii.

17 “On comprend que des chants populaires nés d’un événement éclatant, victoire ou défaite, puissent contribuer à former la tradition, à en arrêter les traits; ils peuvent aussi devenir le centre de légendes qui se forment pour les expliquer; et de la sorte leur substance au moins arrive au poëte épique qui l’introduit dans sa composition. Voilà ce qui a pu se produire pour de chants très-courts, dont il est d’ailleurs aussi difficile d’affirmer que de nier l’existence. Mais on peut expliquer la formation des chansons de geste par une autre hypothèse” (Meyer, Recherches sur l’épopée française, p. 65). “Ce qui a fait naître la théorie des chants ‘lyrico-épiques’ ou des cantilènes, c’est le système de Wolf sur les poëmes homériques, et de Lachmann sur les Nibelungen. Mais, au moins en ce qui concerne ce dernier poëme, le système est détruit.... On tire encore argument des romances espagnoles, qui, dit-on, sont des ‘cantilènes’ non encore arrivées à l’épopée.... Et c’est le malheur de cette théorie: faute de preuves directes, elle cherche des analogies au dehors: en Espagne, elle trouve des ‘cantilènes,’ mais pas d’épopée; en Allemagne, une épopée, mais pas de cantilènes!” (Ibid. p. 66).

18 A. Lang, Contemporary Review, vol. xvii., N.S., p. 588.

HOMER, WINSLOW (1836-1910), American painter, was born in Boston, U.S.A., on the 24th of February 1836. At the age of nineteen he was apprenticed to a lithographer. Two years later he opened a studio in Boston, and devoted much of his time to making drawings for wood-engravers. In 1859 he removed to New York, where he studied in the night-school of the National Academy of Design. During the American Civil War he was with the troops at the front, and contributed sketches to Harper’s Weekly. The war also furnished him with the subjects for the first two pictures which he exhibited (1863), one of which was “Home, Sweet Home.” His “Prisoners from the Front”—perhaps his most generally popular picture—was exhibited in New York in 1865, and also in Paris in 1867, where he was spending the year in study. Among his other paintings in oil are “Snap the Whip” (which was exhibited at the Philadelphia Centennial Exhibition of 1876, and, in company with “The Country Schoolroom,” at the Paris Salon the following year), “Eating Water-melon,” “The Cotton Pickers,” “Visit from the Old Mistress, Sunday Morning,” “The Life-Line” and “The Coming of the Gale.” His genius, however, has perhaps shown better in his works in water-colour, among which are his marine studies painted at Gloucester, Mass., and his “Inside the Bar,” “The Voice from the Cliffs” (pictures of English fisherwomen), “Tynemouth,” “Wrecking of a Vessel” and “Lost on the Grand Banks.” His work, which principally consists of genre pictures, is characterized by strength, rugged directness and unmistakable freshness and originality, rather than by technical excellence, grace of line or beauty of colour. He was little affected by European influences. His types and scenes, apart from his few English pictures, are distinctly American—soldiers in blue, New England children, negroes in the land of cotton, Gloucester fishermen and stormy Atlantic seas. Besides being a member of the Society of Painters in Water-color, New York, he was elected in 1864 an associate and the following year a member of the National Academy of Design.

HOMESTEAD, a borough of Allegheny county, Pennsylvania, U.S.A., on the Monongahela river, 8 m. S.E. of Pittsburg. Pop. (1890) 7911; (1900) 12,554, of whom 3604 were foreign-born and 640 were negroes; (U.S. census, 1910) 18,713. It is served by the Pennsylvania and the Pittsburg & Lake Erie railways, and by the short Union Railroad, which connects with the Bessemer & Lake Erie and the Wabash railways. The borough has a Carnegie library and the C.M. Schwab Manual Training School. Partly in Homestead but chiefly in the adjoining borough of Munhall (and therefore not reported as in Homestead by the U.S. Census) is one of the largest plants in the United States for the manufacture of steel used in the construction of bridges and steel-frame buildings and of steel armour-plate, and this is its chief industry; among Homestead’s other manufactures are glass and fire-bricks. The water-works are owned and operated by the municipality. Homestead was first settled in 1871, and it was incorporated in 1880. In 1892 a labour strike lasting 143 days and one of the most serious in the history of the United States was carried on here by the National Amalgamated Association of Iron and Steel Workers of the United States against the Carnegie Steel Company. The arrival (on the 6th of July) of a force of about 200 Pinkerton detectives from New York and Chicago resulted in a fight in which about 10 men were killed, and to restore order two brigades of the state militia were called out. See Strikes and Lockouts.

HOMESTEAD AND EXEMPTION LAWS, laws (principally in the United States) designed primarily either to aid the head of a family to acquire title to a place of residence or to protect the owner against loss of that title through seizure for debt. These laws have all been enacted in America since about the middle of the 19th century, and owe their origin to the demand for a population of the right sort in a new country, to the conviction that the freeholder rather than the tenant is the natural supporter of popular government, to the effort to prevent insolvent debtors from becoming useless members of society, and to the belief that such laws encourage the stability of the family.

By the cessions of several of the older states, and by various treaties with foreign countries, public lands have been acquired for the United States in every state and territory of the Union except the original thirteen, and Maine, Vermont, Kentucky, Tennessee and Texas. For a time they were regarded chiefly as a source of revenue, but about 1820, as the need of revenue for the payment of the national debt decreased and the inhabitants of an increasing number of new states became eager to have the vacant lands within their bounds occupied, the demand that the public lands should be disposed of more in the interest of the settler became increasingly strong, and the homestead idea originated. Until the advent of railways, however, the older states of the North were opposed to promoting the development of the West in this manner, and soon afterwards the Southern representatives in Congress opposed the general homestead bills in the interests of slavery, so that except in isolated cases where settlers were desired to protect some frontier, as in Florida and Oregon, and to a limited extent in the case of the Pre-emption Act of 1841 (see below), the homestead principle was not applied by the national government until the Civil War had begun. A general homestead bill was passed by Congress in 1860, but this was vetoed by President James Buchanan; two years later, however, a similar bill became a law. The act of 1862 originally provided that any citizen of the United States, or applicant for citizenship, who was the head of a family, or twenty-one years of age, or, if younger, had served not less than fourteen days in the army or navy of the United States during an actual war, might apply for 160 acres or less of unappropriated public lands, and might acquire title to this amount of land by residing upon and cultivating it for five years immediately following, and paying such fees as were necessary to cover the cost of administration; a homestead acquired in this manner was exempted from seizure for any debt contracted prior to the date of issuing the patent. A commutation clause of this act permitted title to be acquired after only six months of residence by paying $1.25 per acre, as provided in the Pre-emption Act of 1841. Act of 1872, amended in 1901, allows any soldier or seaman, who has served at least ninety days in the army or navy of the United States during the Civil War, the Spanish-American War or in the suppression of the insurrection in the Philippines, and was honourably discharged, to apply for a homestead, and permits the deduction of the time of such service, or, if discharged on account of wounds or other disability incurred in the line of duty, the full term of his enlistment, from the five years otherwise required for perfecting title, except that in any case he shall have resided upon and cultivated the land at least one year before the passing of title. Since 1866 mineral lands have been for the most part excluded from entry as homesteads.

In accordance with the provisions of the homestead law, 718,930 homesteads, containing 96,495,414 acres, were established in forty-two years, and besides this principal act, Congress has passed several minor ones of a like nature, that is, acts designed to benefit the actual settler who improves the land. Thus the Pre-emption Act of 1841 gave to any head of a family or any single person over twenty-one years of age, who was a citizen of the United States or had declared his intention to become one, permission to purchase not to exceed 160 acres of public lands after he had resided upon and improved the same for six months; the Timber-Culture Act of 1873 allowed title to 160 acres of public prairie-land to be given to any one who should plant upon it 40 acres of timber, and keep the same in good growing condition for ten years; and the Desert-Land Act of 1877 gave to any citizen of the United States, or to any person who had declared his intention to become one, the privilege of acquiring title to 640 acres of such public land as was not included in mineral or timber lands, and would not without irrigation produce an agricultural crop, by paying twenty-five cents an acre and creating for the tract an artificial water-supply. These several land acts, however, invited fraud to such an extent that in time they promoted the establishment of large land holdings by ranchmen and others quite as much as they encouraged settlement and cultivation, and so great was this evil that in 1891 the Timber-Culture and Pre-emption Acts were repealed, the total amount of land that could be acquired by any one person under the several land laws was limited to 320 acres, the Desert-Land Act was so amended as to require an expenditure of at least three dollars an acre for irrigation, and the original Homestead Act was so amended as to disqualify any person who was already proprietor of more than 160 acres in any state or Territory of the Union for acquiring any more land under its provisions; and in 1896 a residence of fourteen months was required before permitting commutation or the purchase of title. But even these measures were inadequate to prevent fraud. In 1894 Congress, in what is known as the Carey Act, donated to California, Oregon, Nevada, Washington, Idaho, Montana, Utah, Wyoming, Arizona, New Mexico and the Dakotas so much of 1,000,000 acres each of desert-lands as each should cause to be irrigated, reclaimed and occupied within ten years,1 not less than 20 acres of each 160 acres to be cultivated by actual settlers; and in several of these states and territories irrigating companies have been formed and land offered to settlers in amounts not exceeding 160 acres to each, on terms requiring the settler to purchase ample and perpetual water-rights. In 1902, Congress appropriated the proceeds of the sales of public lands in these states and territories to form a reclamation fund to be used for the construction and maintenance of irrigation works, and lands reclaimed by this means are open to homestead entries, the entry-man being required to pay for the cost of reclamation in ten equal annual instalments without interest. When Texas was admitted to the Union the disposal of its public lands was reserved to the state, and under its laws every person who is the head of a family and without a homestead may acquire title to 160 acres of land by residing upon and improving it for three years; every unmarried man eighteen years of age or over may acquire title to 80 acres in the same way.

A short time before the National Homestead Act for aiding citizens to acquire homesteads went into operation, some of the state legislatures had passed homestead and exemption laws designed to protect homesteads or a certain amount of property against loss to the owners in case they should become insolvent debtors, and by the close of the century the legislature of nearly every state in the Union had passed a law of this nature. These laws vary greatly. In most states the exemption of a homestead or other property from liability for debts can be claimed only by the head of a family, but in Georgia it may be claimed by any aged or infirm person, by any trustee of a family of minor children, or by any person on whom any woman or girls are dependent for support; and in California, although the head of a family may claim exemption for a homestead valued at $5000, any other person may claim exemption for a homestead valued at $1000. In some states exemptions may be claimed either for a farm limited to 40, 80, 160 or 200 acres, or for a house and one or more lots, usually limited in size, in a town, village or city; in other states the homestead for which exemption may be claimed is limited in value, and this value varies from $500 to $5000. With the homestead are usually included the appurtenances thereto, and the courts invariably interpret the law liberally; but many states also exempt a specified amount of personal property, including wearing apparel, furniture, provisions, tools, libraries and in some cases domestic animals and stock in trade. A few states exempt no homestead and only a small amount of personal property; Maryland, for example, exempts only $100 worth of property besides money payable in the nature of insurance, or for relief, in the event of sickness, injury or death. To some debts the exemption does not usually apply; the most common of these are taxes, purchase money, a debt secured by mortgage on the homestead and debts contracted in making improvements upon it; in Maryland the only exception is a judgment for breach of promise to marry or in case of seduction. If the homestead belongs to a married person, the consent of both husband and wife is usually required to mortgage it. Finally, some states require that the homestead for which exemption is to be claimed shall be previously entered upon record, others require only occupancy, and still others permit the homestead to be designated whenever a claim is presented.

Following the example of either the United States Congress or the state legislatures, the governments of several British colonial states and provinces have passed homestead laws. In Quebec every settler on public lands is allowed, after receiving a patent, an exemption of not to exceed 200 acres from that of his widow, of his, her or their children and descendants in the direct line. In Ontario an applicant for a homestead may have not to exceed 200 acres of unappropriated public land for farming purposes by building a house thereon, occupying it for five years, and bringing at least fifteen acres under cultivation; the exemption of such a homestead from liability to seizure for debts is, however, limited to twenty years from the date of application for the land, and does not extend even during that period to rates or taxes. Manitoba, British Columbia, Queensland, New South Wales, South Australia, West Australia and New Zealand also have liberal homestead and exemption laws.

See J. B. Sanborn, “Some Political Aspects of Homestead Legislation,” in The American Historical Review (1900); Edward Manson, “The Homestead Acts,” in the Journal of the Society of Comparative Legislation (London, 1899); S. D. Thompson, A Treatise on Homesteads and Exemptions (San Francisco, 1886); P. Bureau, Le Homestead ou l’Insaisissabilité de la petite propriété foncière (Paris, 1894), and L. Vacher, Le Homestead aux États-Unis (Paris, 1899).

(N. D. M.)

1 In 1901 it was provided that the ten years should date from the segregation of the lands from the public domain.

HOMEYER, KARL GUSTAV (1795-1874), German jurist, was born on the 13th of August 1795 at Wolgast in Pomerania. After studying law at the universities of Berlin, Göttingen and Heidelberg (1813-1817), he settled as a Privatdocent, in 1821, at the university of Berlin, where he became ordinary professor of law in 1827. His principal works are his edition of the Sachsenspiegel (in 3 vols., 1827, 3rd ed., 1861, containing also some other important sources of Saxon or Low German law), which is still unsurpassed in accuracy and sagacity of research, and his book on Die Haus- und Hofmarken (1870), in which he has given a history of the use of trade-marks among all the Teutonic nations of Europe, and which is full of important elucidations of the history of law and also contains valuable contributions to the history of art and civilization. In 1850 Homeyer was elected a member of the Berlin Academy of Sciences, in the Transactions of which he published various papers exhibiting profound learning (Über die Heimat, 1852; Genealogie der Handschriften des Sachsenspiegels, 1859; Die Stadtbücher des Mittelalters, 1860; Der Dreissigste, 1864, &c.). He died on the 20th of October 1874.

HOMICIDE (Lat. homicidium), the general and neutral term for the killing of one human being by another. The nature of the responsibility of the slayer to the state and to the relatives of the slain has been one of the chief concerns of all systems of law from the earliest times, and it has been variously considered from the points of view of the sanctity of human life, the interests of the sovereign, the injury to the family of the slain and the moral guilt, i.e. the motives and intentions, of the slayer.

The earliest recorded laws (those of Khammurabi) do not contain any sweeping general provision as to the punishment of homicide. The death penalty is freely imposed but not for homicide. “If a man strike a gentleman’s daughter that she dies, his own daughter is to be put to death, if a poor man’s the slayer pays ½ mina.” In the Mosaic law the general command “Thou shalt not kill” of the Decalogue is in terms absolute. In primitive law homicide, however innocent, subjected the slayer to the lawful vengeance of the kindred of the slain, unless he could make some composition with him. This lex talionis (a life for a life) resulted: (1) in a course of private justice which still survives in the vendetta of Corsica and Albania, and the blood feuds arising out of “difficulties” in the southern and western parts of the United States; (2) in the recognition of sanctuaries and cities of refuge within which the avenger of blood might not penetrate to kill an innocent manslayer; and (3) in the system of wite, bote and wer, by which the life of every man had its assessed price payable to his chief and his next of kin.

It took long to induce the relatives of the slain to appreciate anything beyond the fact of the death of their kinsman or to discriminate between intentional and accidental homicide. By the laws of Khammurabi (206, 208) striking a man in a quarrel without deadly intent but with fatal effect was treated as a matter for compensation according to the rank of the slain. The Pentateuch discriminates between the man “who lieth in wait for” or “cometh presumptuously” on “his neighbour to slay him with guile” (Exodus xxi. 13, 14), and the man “who killeth his neighbour ignorantly whom he hated not in time past” (Deut. xix. 4). But even killing by misadventure exposed the slayer to the avenger of blood. “As a man goeth into the wood with his neighbour to hew wood, and his hand fetcheth a stroke with the axe to cut down a tree and the head slippeth from the helve and lighteth upon his neighbour that he die: he shall flee into one of these cities (of refuge) and live” (Deut. xix. 5).

Under the early laws of Teutonic and Celtic communities the inconveniences of the blood feud were gradually mitigated (see Criminal Law) by the system of wite and wer (or eric), but the blood feud continued long in Friesland and Lower Saxony, and in parts of Switzerland until the 16th century. In England under the Norman system homicide became a plea of the crown, and the rights of the kindred to private vengeance and to compensation were gradually superseded in favour of the right of the king to forfeitures where the homicide amounted to a crime (felony).

Though homicide was thus made a public offence and not a matter for private vengeance, it took long to discriminate between those forms of homicide which should and those which should not be punished.

The terms of act in English law used to describe criminal homicide are murder (mord, meurtre, murdrum), manslaughter and felo de se (or suicide by a person of sound mind).

The original meaning of the word “murder” seems to have been secret homicide,—“Murdrum proprie dicitur mors alicujus occulta cujus interfector ignoratur” (Dialogus de Scaccario i, x.); and Glanville says: Duo sunt genera homicidii, unum est quod dicitur murdrum quod nullo vidente nullo sciente clam perpetratur, ita quod non assignatur clamor popularis (hue and cry), est et aliud homicidium quod diciter simplex homicidium. After the Conquest, and for the protection of the ruling race, a fine (also called murdrum) was levied for the king on the hundred or other district in which a stranger was found dead, if the slayer was not brought to justice and the blood kin of the slain did not present Englishry, there being a presumption (in favour of the Exchequer) that the deceased was a Frenchman. After the assize of Clarendon (1166) the distinction between the killing of Normans and Englishmen gradually evaporated and the term murder came to acquire its present meaning of deliberate as distinct from secret homicide. In 1267 it was provided that the murder fine should not be levied in cases of death by “misadventure” (per infortunium).1 But at that date and for long afterwards homicide in self-defence or by misadventure or even while of unsound mind involved at the least a forfeiture of goods, and required a pardon. These pardons, and restitution of the goods, became a matter of course, and the judges appear at a later date to have been in the habit of directing an acquittal in such cases. But it was not until 1828 that the innocence of excusable homicide was expressly declared. The rule is now expressed in s. 7 of the Offences against the Person Act 1861: “No punishment or forfeiture shall be incurred by any person who shall kill another by misfortune, or in his own defence, or in any other manner without felony.”

The further differentiation between different degrees of criminal homicide was marked by legislation of Henry VIII. (1531) taking away benefit of clergy in the case of “wilful murder with malice prepensed” (aforethought), and that phrase is still the essential element in the definition of “wilful murder,” which is committed “when a person of sound memory and discretion unlawfully killeth any reasonable creature or being and under the king’s peace with malice aforethought either express or implied” (3 Co. Inst. 47). The whole development of the substantive law as to murder rests on judicial rulings as to the meaning of malice prepense coupled with the extrajudicial commentaries of Coke, Hale and Foster; for parliament, though often tempted by bills and codes, has never ventured on a legislative definition. Much discussion has ranged round the phrase “malice aforethought,” and it has undoubtedly been expanded by judicial decision so as to create what is described as “constructive” murder. According to the view of the criminal code commissioners of 1879 (Parl. Pap., 1879, c. 23, 45, p. 23) the term “malice aforethought” is now a common name for all the following states of mind:—

1. An intent, preceding the act, to kill or do grievous bodily harm to the person or to any other person:

2. Knowledge that the act done is likely to produce such consequences, whether coupled with an intention to produce them or not:

3. An intent to commit any felony: or

4. An intent to resist an officer of police in the execution of his duty.

The third form of malice aforethought has been much controverted. When it was first recognized as creating a liability for wilful murder almost all felonies were capital offences: but even at the end of the 17th century Lord Holt expressed a view that it should be limited to felonies involving violence or danger to life, e.g. assault with intent to rob, or setting fire to a dwelling-house. And Sir James Stephen’s opinion is that, to justify conviction of murder by an act done with intent to commit a felony, the act done must be one dangerous to life or known to be likely to cause death.

Starting with the definition above given, English law still retains so much of its medieval character as to presume all homicide to be “malicious, and therefore murder, unless it is either justified by the command or permission of the law, excused on the ground of accident or self-preservation, or alleviated into manslaughter by being the involuntary consequence of some act not strictly lawful or occasioned by some sudden and sufficiently violent provocation.” The truth of the facts alleged in justification, excuse or alleviation, is for the jury to determine: the question whether if true they support the plea for which they are put forward is for the court.

In the administration of the English criminal law as to homicide the consequences of too strict an adherence to the technical definitions of the offences are avoided (a) by the exercise of the jury of their powers to convict of manslaughter only even in cases where they are directed that the offence is murder or nothing; (b) by the report of the judge as to the particular circumstances of each case in which a conviction of murder has been followed by the statutory sentence of death; (c) by the examination of all the evidence in the case by the Home Office in order to enable the secretary of state to determine whether the prerogative of mercy should be exercised.

Homicide is justifiable and not criminal when the killing is done in the execution of the law. The most important case of justifiable homicide is the execution of a criminal in due course of public justice. This condition is most stringently interpreted. “To kill the greatest of malefactors deliberately, uncompelled, and extrajudicially is murder.... And further, if judgment of death be given by a judge not authorized by lawful commission, and execution is done accordingly, the judge is guilty of murder” (Stephen’s Commentaries, book vi. c. iv.). The execution must be carried out by the proper officer or his deputy: any person executing the sentence without such authority, were it the judge himself, would be guilty of murder. And the sentence must be strictly pursued: to execute a criminal by a kind of death other than that to which he has been judicially condemned is murder.

Homicide committed by an officer of justice in the course of carrying out his duty, as such, is also justifiable; e.g. where a felon resists a legal arrest and is killed in the effort to arrest him (see 2 Pollock and Maitland, 476); where officers in dispersing a riotous assemblage kill any of the mob, &c. (see Riot). In these cases the homicide must be shown to have been absolutely necessary. Again, homicide is justifiable if committed in the defence of person or property against forcible and heinous crime, such as murder, violent robbery, rape or burglary. In this connexion there has been much discussion as to whether the person attacked is under a duty to retreat: and in substance the justification depends on the continuous necessity of attack or defence In order to prevent the commission by the deceased of the crime threatened.

Homicide is excusable and not criminal at all when committed either by misadventure or in self-defence. In the former case the homicide is excused; where a man in the course of doing some lawful work, accidentally and without intention kills another, e.g. shooting at a mark and undesignedly hitting and killing a man. The act must be strictly lawful, and death by misadventure in unlawful sports is not a case of excusable homicide. Homicide in self-defence is excusable when the slayer is himself in immediate danger of death, and has done all he could to avoid the assault. Accordingly, if he strikes and kills his assailant after the assault is over, this is not excusable homicide. But if the assault has been premeditated, as in the ease of a duel, the death of either antagonist has under English law always been held to be murder and not excusable homicide. The excuse of self-defence covers the case in which a person in defence of others whom it is his duty to protect—children, wife, master, &c.—kills an assailant. It has been considered doubtful whether the plea of self-defence is available to one who has himself provoked a fray, in the course of which he is so pressed by his antagonist that his only resource is to kill him.

In English law the term “manslaughter” is applied to those forms of homicide which though neither justifiable nor excusable are attended by alleviating circumstances which bring them short of wilful murder. The offence is not defined by statute, but only by judicial rulings. Its punishment is as a maximum penal servitude for life, and as a minimum a fine or recognizances to be of good behaviour. The quantum of punishment between the limits above stated is in the discretion of the court, and not, as under continental codes, with fixed minima; and the offence includes acts and omissions of very varying gravity, from acts which only by the charitable appreciation of a jury fall short of wilful murder, to acts or omissions which can only technically be described as criminal, e.g. where one of two persons engaged in poaching, by pure accident gets caught in a hedge so that his gun goes off and kills his fellow-poacher. This may be described as an extreme instance of “constructive crime.”

There are two main forms of “manslaughter”:—

1. “Voluntary” homicide under grave and sudden provocation or on a sudden quarrel in the heat of passion, without the slayer taking undue advantage or acting in an unusual manner. The substance of the alleviation of guilt lies in the absence of time for cool reflection or the formation of a premeditated design to kill. Under English law the provocation must be by acts and not by words or gestures, and must be serious and not trivial, and the killing must be immediately after provocation and while the slayer has lost his self-control in consequence of the provocation. The provocation need not be by assault or violence, and perhaps the best-recognized example is the slaying by a husband of a man found committing adultery with the slayer’s wife. In the case of a sudden quarrel it does not matter who began or provoked the quarrel. This used to be called “chance medley.”

2. “Involuntary” homicide as a result of great rashness or gross negligence in respect of matters involving danger to human life, e.g. in driving trains or vehicles, or in dealing with dangerous weapons, or in performing surgical operations, or in taking care of the helpless.

The innumerable modes in which criminal liability for killing others has been adjudged under the English definitions of murder and manslaughter cannot be here stated, and can only be studied by reference to the judicial decisions collected and discussed in Russell on Crimes and other English text-books, and in the valuable work by Mr J. D. Mayne on the criminal law of India, in which the English common law rulings are stated side by side with the terms and interpretations of the Indian penal code. Much labour has been expended by many jurists in efforts to create a scientific and acceptable classification of the various forms of unlawful homicide which shall properly define the cases which should be punishable by law and the appropriate punishment. Their efforts have resulted in the establishment in almost every state except the United Kingdom of statutory definitions of the crime, beginning with the French penal code and going down to the criminal code of Japan. In the case of England, as a result of the labours of Sir James Stephen, a code bill was submitted to parliament in 1878. In 1879 a draft code was prepared by Blackburn, Lush and Barry, and was presented to parliament. It was founded on and prepared with Sir J. Stephen, and is a revision of his digest of the criminal law.

After defining homicide and culpable homicide, the draft code (cl. 174) declares culpable homicide to be murder in the following cases: (a) if the offender means to cause the death of the person killed; (b) if the offender means to cause to the person killed any bodily injury which is known to the offender to be likely to cause death, and if the offender, whether he does or does not mean to cause death, is reckless whether death ensues or not; (c) if the offender means to cause death or such bodily injury as aforesaid to one person, so that if that person be killed the offender would be guilty of murder, and by accident or mistake the offender kills another person though he does not mean to hurt the person killed; (d) if the offender for any unlawful object does an act which he knows or ought to have known to be likely to cause death, and thereby kills any person, though he may have desired that his object should be effected without hurting any one.

Further (cl. 175), it is murder (whether the offender means or not death to ensue, or knows or not that death is likely to ensue) in the following cases:—“(a) if he means to inflict grievous bodily injury for the purpose of facilitating the commission of any of the offences hereinafter mentioned, or the flight of the offender upon the commission or attempted commission thereof, and death ensues from his violence; (b) if he administers any stupefying thing for either of the purposes aforesaid and death ensues from the effects thereof; (c) if he by any means wilfully stops the breath of any person for either of the purposes aforesaid and death ensues from such stopping of the breath.” The following are the offences referred to:—“high treason and other offences against the king’s authority, piracy and offences deemed to be piracy, escape or rescue from prison or lawful custody, resisting lawful apprehension, murder, rape, forcible abduction, robbery, burglary, arson.” Cl. 176 reduces culpable homicide to manslaughter if the person who causes death does so “in the heat of passion caused by sudden provocation”; and “any wrongful act or insult of such a nature as to be sufficient to deprive any ordinary person of the power of self-control may be provocation if the offender acts upon it on the sudden, and before there has been time for his passion to cool. Whether any particular wrongful act or insult amounts to provocation and whether the offender was deprived of self-control shall be questions of fact; but no one shall be deemed to give provocation by doing that which he had a legal right to do, or which the offender incited him to do in order to provide an excuse for killing him or doing grievous bodily harm to any person.” Further, “an arrest shall not necessarily reduce the offence from murder to manslaughter because an arrest was illegal, but if the illegality was known to the offender it may be evidence of provocation”; (cl. 177) “culpable homicide not amounting to murder is manslaughter.”

The definitions embodied in these clauses though not yet accepted by the British legislature, have in substance been embodied in the criminal codes of Canada (1892 ss. 227-230), New Zealand (1893, ss. 163-166), Queensland (1899, ss. 300-305), and Western Australia (1901, ss. 275-280).

From the point of view of civil as distinct from criminal responsibility homicide does not by the common law give any cause of action against the person causing the death of another in favour of the wife or blood relations of the deceased. In early law this was otherwise; and the wer or eric of the deceased came historically before the right of chief or state. But under English law the rights of relations, except by way of appeal for felony,2 were swept aside in favour of the crown, on the principle that every homicide is presumed felonious (murder) unless the contrary is proved, and that in all cases of homicide not justifiable by law a forfeiture was incurred. The rights of the relatives were also defeated by application of the maxim “actio personalis moritur cum personâ” (“a personal action dies with the person”) to all proceedings for injury to the person or to reputation. In Scotland the old theory was preserved in the law as to assythement.

In England the law was altered at the instance of Lord Campbell in 1846 (9 & 10 V. c. 93) so as to give a right of a claim by the husband, wife, parent or child of a person killed by a wrongful (or even criminal) act, neglect or default by another which would have given the deceased if he had survived a cause of action against the wrongdoer. The compensation payable is what the surviving relative has lost by the death, and under the Workmen’s Compensation Act 1906 (in all cases to which it applies) the employer is liable even without negligence to compensate the dependants of an employee killed by an accident arising out of and in the course of the employment; and in such cases even if the death was due to serious and wilful misconduct by the employee, compensation is payable.

In the Indian penal code the definitions of murder are so drawn as to limit the offences to cases where it was actually intended to cause death or bodily injury by the acts or omissions of the slayer, and the definition of culpable homicide short of murder is so drawn as to exclude the forms of unintentional manslaughter due to neglect of duty, e.g. in the conduct of trains or ships or vehicles. This last omission was supplied in 1870. The Indian code does not treat as murder either duelling or helping Hindu widows to commit suttee (s. 301, exception 5). In most of the British possessions in Asia and in east Africa the Indian definitions of homicide have been adopted. In the rest of the colonies, except South Africa, the law of homicide depends on the English common law as modified by colonial codes or statutes. In South Africa it rests mainly on the Roman Dutch law.

Europe.—In European codes distinctions corresponding to those of the English law are drawn between premeditated and other forms of criminal homicide; but more elaborate distinctions are drawn between the degrees of deliberation or criminality manifested in the slaying, and the minimum or maximum penalty is varied accordingly.

In the French penal code voluntary homicide is called murder (meurtre, art. 295): but if committed with premeditation or lying in wait is styled assassinat (guet-apens) (296-298). Poisoning (even if the poison is not fatal), is specially punished, as is parricide (on the lines of the obsolete English offence of petty treason), and infanticide, i.e. the killing of newly-born infants. Assassination, poisoning and parricide are at present capital offences; but a bill to abolish the death sentence has been laid before the French parliament.

The German code distinguishes between voluntary homicide which is done with deliberation and such homicide committed without deliberation (ss. 211, 212), and provides for mitigation of punishment where the slaying was provoked without fault in the slayer by any wrongful act or serious insult upon the slayer or his relatives by the slain (213). Parricide and infanticide are specially punished (214, 215), as is killing another person at his express and earnest request (216)—an offence which would in England be murder—and it is a separate offence to cause the death of another, the penalty being increased if the offender was peculiarly bound by office, calling or trade to use a care which he did not use (222).

The Italian code punishes as homicide those who with intention to kill cause the death of another (364). The death penalty is not imposed, but scales of punishment are provided to deal with aggravated forms of the offence. Thus ergastolo (penal servitude for life) is the punishment in the case of homicide of ascendants and descendants, or with premeditation, or under the sole impulse of brutal ferocity or with gross cruelty (gravi sevizie), or by means of arson, inundation, drowning and certain other crimes, or to secure the gains or conceal the commission, or to secure immunity from the consequences, of another crime (366). Personal violence resulting in death inflicted without intention to kill is punishable minore poenâ (368), and it is criminal to cause the death of another by imprudence, negligence or lack of skill in an art or profession (imperitia nella propria arte o professione), or by non-observance of regulations, orders or instructions.

The Spanish code has like those of Italy and France special punishments for parricide (417) and for assassination, in which are included killing for reward or promise of reward or by inundation (418), and for aiding another to commit suicide (421). Both the Italian and the Spanish codes afford a special mitigation to infanticide committed to avoid dishonour to the mother of the infant or her family.

America.—The most notable difference between England and the United States in regard to the law on this subject is the recognition by state legislation of degrees in murder. English law treats all unlawful killing not reducible to manslaughter as of the same degree of guilt in law. American statutes seek to discriminate for purposes of punishment between the graver and the less culpable forms of murder. Thus an act of the legislature of Pennsylvania (22nd of April 1794) declares “all murder which shall be perpetrated by means of poison or by lying in wait or by any other kind of wilful, deliberate and premeditated killing, or which shall be committed in the perpetration of or attempt to perpetrate any arson, rape, robbery or burglary shall be deemed murder of the first degree; and all other kinds of murder shall be deemed murder of the second degree.” This legislation has been copied or adopted in many if not most of the other states. There are also statutory degrees of manslaughter in the legislation of some of the states. The differences of legislation, coupled with the power of the jury in some states to determine the sentence, and the limitations on the right of the judges to comment on the testimony adduced, lead to very great differences between the administration of the law as to homicide in the two countries.

Authorities.—Stephen, Hist. Cr. Law, Digest Criminal Law; Russell on Crimes (7th ed., 1909); Archbold, Criminal Pleading (23rd ed., 1905); Bishop, American Criminal Law (8th ed.); Pollock and Maitland, Hist. English Law; Pike, History of Crime.

(W. F. C.)

1 See Select Pleas of Crown, 1 (Selden Society Publ.); Pollock and Maitland, Hist. Eng. Law, ii. 458, 476, 478.

2 Appeals remained in the law till 1819, but were long before this disused. In the middle ages they were used as a means of getting compensation.

HOMILETICS (Gr. ὁμιλητικός, from ὁμιλεῖν, to assemble together), in theology the application of the general principles of rhetoric to the specific department of public preaching. It may be further defined as the science that treats of the analysis, classification, preparation, composition and delivery of sermons. The formation during recent years of such lectureships as the “Lyman Beecher” course at Yale University has resulted in increased attention being given to homiletics, and the published volumes of this series are the best contribution to the subject.

The older literature is cited exhaustively in W. G. Blaikie, For the Work of the Ministry (1873); and D. P. Kidder, Treatise on Homiletics (1864).

HOMILY, a simple religious address, less elaborate than a sermon, and confining itself to the practical exposition of some ethical topic or some passage of Scripture. The word ὁμιλία from ὁμιλεῖν (ὁμοῦ, εἴλω), meaning communion, intercourse, and especially interchange of thought and feeling by means of words (conversation), was early employed in classical Greek to denote the instruction which a philosopher gave to his pupils in familiar talk (Xenophon, Memorabilia, I. ii. 6. 15). This usage of the word was long preserved (Aelian, Varia Historia, iii. 19); and the ὁμιλήσας of Acts xx. 11 may safely be taken to assign not only a free and informal but also a didactic character to the apostle Paul’s discourse in the upper chamber of Troas, when “he talked a long while, even till break of day.” That the “talk” on that occasion partook of the nature of the “exposition” (דרשה) of Scripture, which, undertaken by a priest, elder or other competent person, had become a regular part of the service of the Jewish synagogue,1 may also with much probability be assumed. The custom of delivering expositions or comments more or less extemporaneous on the lessons of the day at all events passed over soon and readily into the Christian Church, as may be gathered from the first Apology (c. 67) of Justin Martyr, where we read that, in connexion with the practice of reading portions from the collected writings of the prophets and from the memoirs of the apostles, it had by that time become usual for the presiding minister to deliver a discourse in which “he admonishes the people, stirring them up to an imitation of the good works which have been brought before their notice.” This discourse, from its explanatory character, and from the easy conversational manner of its delivery, was for a long time called ὁμιλία rather than λόγος: it was regarded as part of the regular duty of the bishop, but he could devolve it, if he thought fit, on a presbyter or deacon, or even on a layman. An early and well-known instance of such delegation is that mentioned by Eusebius (Hist. Eccl. vi. 19) in the case of Origen (216 A.D.).2 In course of time the exposition of the lesson for the day came more frequently to assume a more elaborate character, and to pass into the category of a λόγος or even φιλοσοφία or φιλοσόφημα; but when it did so the fact was as far as possible denoted by a change of name, the word ὁμιλία being reserved for the expository or exegetical lecture as distinguished from the pulpit oration or sermon.3 While the church of the 3rd and 4th centuries could point to a brilliant succession of great preachers, whose discourses were wont to be taken down in shorthand and circulated among the Christian public as edifying reading, it does not appear that the supply of ordinary homiletical talent kept pace with the rapidity of church extension throughout the Roman empire. In the smaller and remoter communities it not uncommonly happened that the minister was totally unqualified to undertake the work of preaching; and though, as is curiously shown by the case of Rome (Sozomen, Hist. Eccl. vii. 19), the regular exposition of the appointed lessons was by no means regarded as part of the necessary business of a church, it was generally felt to be advisable that some provision should be made for the public instruction of congregations. Even in Jerome’s time (De Vir. Ill. c. 115), accordingly, it had become usual to read, in the regular meetings of the churches which were not so fortunate as to possess a competent preacher, the written discourses of celebrated fathers; and at a considerably later period we have on record the canon of at least one provincial council (that of Vaux, probably the third, held in 529 A.D.), positively enjoining that if the presbyter through any infirmity is unable himself to preach, “homilies of the holy fathers” (homiliae sanctorum patrum) are to be read by the deacons. Thus the finally fixed meaning of the word homily as an ecclesiastical term came to be a written discourse (generally possessing the sanction of some great name) read in church by or for the officiating clergyman when from any cause he was unable to deliver a sermon of his own. As the standard of clerical education sank during the dark ages, the habit of using the sermons of others became almost universal. Among the authors whose works were found specially serviceable in this way may be mentioned the Venerable Bede, who is credited with no fewer than 140 homilies in the Basel and Cologne editions of his works, and who certainly was the author of many Homiliae de Tempore which were much in vogue during the 8th and following centuries. Prior to Charlemagne it is probable that several other collections of homilies had obtained considerable popularity, but in the time of that emperor these had suffered so many mutilations and corruptions that an authoritative revision was felt to be imperatively necessary. The result was the well-known Homiliarium, prepared by Paul Warnefrid, otherwise known as Paulus Diaconus (q.v.).4 It consists of 176 homilies arranged in order for all the Sundays and festivals of the ecclesiastical year; and probably was completed before the year 780. Though written in Latin, its discourses were doubtless intended to be delivered in the vulgar tongue; the clergy, however, were often too indolent or too ignorant for this, although by more than one provincial council they were enjoined to exert themselves so that they might be able to do so.5 Hence an important form of literary activity came to be the translation of the homilies approved by the church into the vernacular. Thus we find Alfred the Great translating the homilies of Bede; and in a similar manner arose Ælfric’s Anglo-Saxon Homilies and the German Homiliarium of Ottfried of Weissenburg. Such Homiliaria as were in use in England down to the end of the 15th century were at the time of the Reformation eagerly sought for and destroyed, so that they are now extremely rare, and the few copies which have been preserved are generally in a mutilated or imperfect form.6

The Books of Homilies referred to in the 35th article of the Church of England originated at a convocation in 1542, at which it was agreed “to make certain homilies for stay of such errors as were then by ignorant preachers sparkled among the people.” Certain homilies, accordingly, composed by dignitaries of the lower house, were in the following year produced by the prolocutor; and after some delay a volume was published in 1547 entitled Certain sermons or homilies appointed by the King’s Majesty to be declared and read by all parsons, vicars, or curates every Sunday in their churches where they have cure. In 1563 a second Book of Homilies was submitted along with the 39 Articles to convocation; it was issued the same year under the title The second Tome of Homilies of such matters as were promised and instituted in the former part of Homilies, set out by the authority of the Queen’s Majesty, and to be read in every Parish Church agreeably. Of the twelve homilies contained in the first book, four (the 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th) are probably to be attributed to Cranmer, and one (the 12th) possibly to Latimer; one (the 6th) is by Bonner; another (the 5th) is by John Harpsfield, archdeacon of London, and another (the 11th) by Thomas Becon, one of Cranmer’s chaplains. The authorship of the others is unknown. The second book consists of twenty-one homilies, of which the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 7th, 8th, 9th, 16th and 17th have been assigned to Jewel, the 4th to Grindal, the 5th and 6th to Pilkington and the 18th to Parker. See the critical edition by Griffiths, Oxford, 1869. The homilies are not now read publicly, though they are sometimes appealed to in controversies affecting the doctrines of the Anglican Church.

1 See Philo, Quod omnis probus liber, sec. 12 (ed. Mangey ii. 458; cf. ii. 630).

2 Sozomen (Hist. Eccl. vii. 19) mentions that in Alexandria in his day the bishop alone was in the custom of preaching; but this, he implies, was a very exceptional state of matters, dating only from the time of Arius.

3 To the more strictly exegetical lectures the names ἐξηγήσεις, ἐξηγήματα, ἐξηγητικά, ἐκθέσεις, were sometimes applied. But as no popular discourse delivered from the pulpit could ever be exclusively expository and as on the other hand every sermon professing to be based on Scripture required to be more or less “exegetical” and “textual,” it would obviously be sometimes very hard to draw the line of distinction between ὁμιλία and λόγος. It would be difficult to define very precisely the difference in French between a “conférence” and a “sermon”; and the same difficulty seems to have been experienced in Greek by Photius, who says of the eloquent pulpit orations of Chrysostom, that they were ὁμιλίαι rather than λόγοι.

4 Manuscript copies are preserved at Heidelberg, Darmstadt, Frankfort, Giessen, Cassel and other places. It was first printed at Spires in 1482. In the Cologne edition of 1530 the title runs—Homiliae seu mavis sermones sive conciones ad populum, praestantissimorum ecclesiae doctorum Hieronymi, Augustini, Ambrosii, Gregorii, Origenis, Chrysostomi, Bedae, &c., in hunc ordinem digestae per Alchuinum levitam, idque injungente ei Carolo M. Rom. Imp. cui a secretis fuit. Though thus attributed here to Alcuin, who is known to have revised the Lectionary or Comes Hieronymi, the compilation of the Homiliarium is in the emperor’s own commission entrusted to Paul, to whom it is assigned in the earlier printed editions also. A comparison of different editions shows that the contents increased with the ever-growing number of saints’ days and festivals, new discourses by later preachers like Bernard being constantly added.

5 Neander, Church History, v. 174 (Eng. trans. of 1851).

6 An ancient English metrical homiliarium is preserved in the library of the university of Cambridge. Earlier versions of it have existed, and a portion of perhaps the earliest copy, dating from about the middle of the 13th century, was published in 1862 by Mr J. Small, librarian to the university of Edinburgh.

HOMOEOPATHY (from the Greek ὅμοιος, like, and πάθος, feeling). The distinctive system of therapeutics which bears the name of homoeopathy is based upon the law similia similibus curentur,1 the originator of which was S. C. F. Hahnemann, a native of Meissen in Germany, who discovered his new principle while he was experimenting with cinchona bark in 1790, and announced it in 1796.2 The essential tenets of homoeopathy—with which is contrasted the “allopathy” (ἄλλος, other) of the “orthodox” therapeutics—are that the cure of disease is effected by drugs that are capable of producing in a healthy individual symptoms similar to those of the disease to be treated, and that to ascertain the curative virtues of any drug it must be “proved” upon healthy persons—that is, taken by individuals of both sexes in a state of health in gradually increasing doses. The manifestations of drug action thus produced are carefully recorded, and this record of “drug-diseases,” after being verified by repetition on many “provers,” constitutes the distinguishing feature of the homoeopathic materia medica, which, while it embraces the sources, preparation and uses of drugs as known to the orthodox pharmacopoeia, contains, in addition, the various “provings” obtained in the manner above described.

Besides the promulgation of the doctrine of similars, Hahnemann also enunciated a theory to account for the origin of all chronic diseases, which he asserted were derived either directly or remotely from psora (the itch), syphilis (venereal disease) or sycosis (fig-wart disease). This doctrine, although at first adopted by some of the enthusiastic followers of Hahnemann, was almost immediately discarded by very many who had a firm belief in his law of cure. In the light of advancing science such theories are entirely untenable, and it was unfortunate for the system of medicine which he founded that Hahnemann should have promulgated such an hypothesis. It served as a target for the shafts of ridicule showered upon the system by those who were its opponents, and even at the present time there still exists in the minds of many misinformed persons the conviction that homoeopathy is a system of medicine that bases the origin of all chronic disease on the itch or on syphilis or fig-warts.

Another peculiar feature of homoeopathy is its posology or theory of dose. It may be asserted that homoeopathic posology has nothing more to do with the original law of cure than the psora (itch) theory has, and that it was one of the later creations of Hahnemann’s mind. Most homoeopathists believe more or less in the action of minute doses of medicine, but it must not be considered as an integral part of the system. The dose is the corollary, not the principle. Yet in the minds of many, infinitesimal doses of medicine stand for homoeopathy itself, the real law of cure being completely put into the background. The question of dose has also divided the members of the homoeopathic school into bitter factions, and is therefore a matter for careful consideration. Many employ low potencies,3 i.e. mother tinctures, first, second, sixth dilutions, &c., while others use hundred-thousandths and millionths.

Some homoeopathists of the present day still believe with Hahnemann that, even after the material medicinal particles of a drug have been subdivided to the fullest extent, the continuation of the dynamization or trituration or succussion develops a spiritual acurative agency, and that the higher the potency, the more subtle and more powerful is the curative action. Hahnemann says (Organon, 3rd American edition, p. 101), “It is only by means of the spiritual influence of a morbific agent that our spiritual vital power can be diseased, and in like manner only by the spiritual operation of medicine can health be restored.” This is absolutely denied by others. Thus there exist two schools among the adherents of homoeopathy. On the one hand there are the Hahnemannians, the “Purists” or “High Potency” men, who still profess to regard the Organon as their Bible, who believe in all the teachings of Hahnemann, who adhere in their prescriptions to the single dose, the single medicine, and the highest possible potency, and regard the doctrine of the spiritual dynamization acquired by trituration and succussion as indubitable. On the other side there are the “Rational” or “Low Potency” men, who believe in the universality of the law of cure, but think that it cannot always be applied, on account of an imperfect materia medica and a lack of knowledge on the part of the physician. They believe that in many cases of severe and acute pain palliatives are required, and that they are free to use all the adjuvants at present known to science for the relief of suffering humanity—massage, balneology, electricity, hygiene, &c. The American Institute of Homoeopathy, the national body of the United States, has adopted the following resolution and ordered it to be published conspicuously in each number of the Transactions of the society: “A homoeopathic physician is one who adds to his knowledge of medicine a special knowledge of homoeopathic therapeutics. All that pertains to the great field of medical learning is his by tradition, by inheritance, by right.”

It is claimed that the effect produced upon both the laity and the general profession of medicine by the introduction of homoeopathy was salutary in many ways. It diminished the quantity of medicine that was formerly considered necessary for the eradication of disease, and thus revealed the fact that the vis medicatrix naturae is often sufficient, with occasional and gentle assistance, to cure many diseases, especially those fevers that run a definite and regular course. Corroboration of the law similia similibus curentur is seen, according to homoeopathists, in the adoption of the serum therapy, which consists in the treatment of the most malignant diseases (diphtheria, lock-jaw, typhoid fever, tuberculosis, bubonic plague) by introducing into the system a modified form (similar) of those poisons that produce them in the healthy individual. Hahnemann undoubtedly deserves the credit of being the first to break decidedly with the old school of medical practice, in which, forgetful of the teachings of Hippocrates, nature was either overlooked or rudely opposed by wrong and ungentle methods. We can scarcely now estimate the force of character and of courage which was implied in his abandoning the common lines of medicine. More than this, he and his followers showed results in the treatment of disease which compared very favourably with the results of contemporary orthodox practice.

Homoeopathy has given prominence to the therapeutical side of medicine, and has done much to stimulate the study of the physiological action of drugs. It has done service in directing more special attention to various powerful drugs, such as aconite, nux vomica, belladonna, and to the advantage of giving them in simpler forms than were common before the days of Hahnemann. But in the medical profession homoeopathy nevertheless remains under the stigma of being a dissenting sect. It has been publicly announced that if the homoeopathists would abolish the name “homoeopathy,” and remove it from their periodicals, colleges, hospitals, dispensaries and asylums, they would be received within the fold of the regular profession. These conditions have been accepted by a few homoeopathists who have become members of the most prominent medical association in the United States.

Homoeopathy as it exists to-day can, in the opinion of its adherents, stand by itself, and its progress for a century in face of prolonged and determined opposition appears to its upholders to be evidence of its truth. There are still, indeed, in both schools of medical thought, men who stand fast by their old principles. There are homoeopathists who can see nothing but evil in the practice of their brothers of the orthodox school, as there are allopathists who still regard homoeopathy as a humbug and a sham. There are, however, liberal-minded men in both schools, who look upon the adoption of any safe and efficient method of curing disease as the birthright of the true physician, and who allow every man to prescribe for his patients as his conscience may dictate, and, provided he be educated in all the collateral branches of medical science, are ready to exchange views for the good of suffering humanity.

Great Britain.—Homoeopathy is not rapidly extending in Great Britain, and its recognition has been slow. The first notice taken of the new system of therapeutics was by the Medical Society of London in 1826. In 1827 the physician of Prince Leopold of Saxe-Coburg, Dr F. H. F. Quin (1799-1878), who had previously studied homoeopathy in Germany and practised it in Italy, came to England, and it was through his efforts that the system was introduced. Three other physicians, Dr Belluomini, Dr Romani and Dr Tagliani, claimed priority, but careful research established Dr Quin’s title. Quin was a successful man professionally and socially, and brought upon himself in a short time the anathema of the Royal College of Physicians. In 1844 Dr William Henderson, professor of pathology in the university of Edinburgh, embraced the Hahnemannian system. A storm of opposition arose, and Professor J. Y. Simpson (the discoverer of chloroform anaesthesia) published a volume, with the alliterative title, Homoeopathy, its Tenets and Tendencies, Theoretical, Theological, and Therapeutical. This brochure was answered by Professor Henderson, the title of his book being Homoeopathy Fairly Represented. From 1827 to 1837 there were but a dozen practitioners of homoeopathy in London, but during 1837 to 1847 the number increased to between seventy and eighty. In 1857 there were upwards of two hundred practitioners in the kingdom, with thirty-three institutions in which the law of similars was used as a basis of practice. In 1867 the increase was not so rapid, the number being 261. A society was formed about this period for “the protection of homoeopathic practitioners and students,” which proved of great value in binding the sect together. In 1870 congresses were established, and annual meetings held, which have continued to the present time. In 1901 there were over three hundred homoeopathic physicians in the British Isles, of whom between seventy and eighty were in London alone. There were seventy-nine chemists, of whom seventeen were located in London, and eighty-two towns and cities in the country contained from one to ten homoeopathic practitioners each, together with many established chemists for dispensing homoeopathic medicines. The British Homoeopathic Society was founded by Quin in 1844, and has numerous members and fellows, besides corresponding members in all portions of the world, including Australia, India and Tasmania. The London Homoeopathic Hospital was founded in 1850, also largely through the efforts of Quin, and a few years afterwards moved to Great Ormond Street. During the cholera epidemic of 1854 the statistics of this hospital showed a mortality of 16.4%, against 51.8% of other metropolitan charities. The London Homoeopathic Hospital has a convalescent home under its management at Eastbourne. There are also dispensaries in Ealing and West Middlesex, Kensington, Notting Hill and Bayswater. Similar institutions are located in Bath, Birkenhead, Birmingham, Bootle, Bournemouth, Brighton, Bristol, Bromley, Cheltenham, Cheshire, Croydon, Dublin, Eastbourne, Edinburgh, Folkestone, Hastings and St Leonards, Ipswich, Leeds, Leicester, Liverpool, Newcastle, Northampton, Norwich, Oxford, Plymouth, Torquay, Tunbridge Wells, Weston-super-Mare. The homoeopathic journals include the Homoeopathic World, the London Homoeopathic Hospital Reports, the Journal of the British Homoeopathic Society, and the British Homoeopathic Review, the last being issued by the British Homoeopathic Association, which was founded in 1902 for the purpose of developing and extending homoeopathy in Great Britain. The British Journal of Homoeopathy was first published in 1843, and was edited by Drs Drysdale, Russell and Black. For many years it was the foremost homoeopathic journal in the world. Its motto was In certis unitas, in dubiis libertas, in omnibus charitas. One reason why homoeopathy has not advanced as rapidly in the British Isles as in America is said to be the discrimination exercised against it by the General Medical Council, and another is want of cohesion amongst the homoeopaths themselves.