Chapter LI · (continued 3)

PROPOSITION CLXII.

Every multitude of unities which illuminates truly existing being, is occult and intelligible; occult indeed, as being conjoined with unity; but intelligible,[282] as participated by being.

For all the Gods are denominated from the things which are suspended from them; because from these it is possible to know their different hypostases, which are [of themselves] unknown. For every thing divine is of itself ineffable and unknown, as being connascent with the ineffable one. From the difference, however, of the participants it happens that the peculiarities of divine natures become known. The unities, therefore, which illuminate truly existing being are intelligible; because being, truly so called, is a divine intelligible, and imparticipable, subsisting prior to intellect. For this would not be suspended from the first Gods, unless they also possessed a primary hypostasis, and a power perfective of other Gods; since, as participants are to each other, so likewise are the hyparxes of the things that are participated.

PROPOSITION CLXIII.

Every multitude of unities which is participated by imparticipable[283] intellect, is intellectual.

For as intellect is to truly existing being, so are these unities to the intelligible unities. Since, therefore, the latter which illuminate being,[284] are intelligible, hence, the former which illuminate a divine and imparticipable intellect, are intellectual. Yet they are not intellectual in such a way, as if they subsisted in intellect, but as causally existing prior to intellect, and generating intellect.

PROPOSITION CLXIV.

Every multitude of unities which is participated by every imparticipable soul, is supermundane.

For because imparticipable soul is primarily above the world, the Gods also which are participated by it are supermundane, having the same analogy to the intellectual and intelligible Gods, which soul has to intellect, and intellect to truly existing being. As, therefore, every soul is suspended from intellect, and intellect is converted to the intelligible, thus also the supermundane are suspended from the intellectual, in the same manner as the intellectual from the intelligible Gods.

PROPOSITION CLXV.

Every multitude of unities which is participated by a certain [sensible body is mundane.]

For it illuminates the parts of the world, through intellect and soul as media.[285] For intellect is not present with any mundane body without soul, nor are deity and soul conjoined without a medium; since participations are through similars. Intellect itself also according to its intelligible summit, participates of unity. These unities, therefore, are mundane, as giving completion to the whole world, and as deifying visible bodies. For each of these is divine, not on account of soul; for soul is not primarily a God. Nor on account of intellect; for intellect is not the same with the one. But each of these visible bodies, is animated indeed on account of soul, and moved of itself. But it possesses a perpetual sameness of subsistence, and is moved in the most excellent order, on account of intellect. It is, however, divine on account of union. And if it possesses a providential power, it possesses it through this cause.

PROPOSITION CLXVI.

Every intellect is either imparticipable or participable. And if participable, it is either participated by supermundane, or by mundane souls.

For imparticipable intellect having the first order, is the leader of every multitude of intellects. But of participable intellects, some illuminate supermundane and imparticipable soul, but others the mundane soul. For the mundane multitude is not immediately derived from the imparticipable; since progressions are through similars. But that which is separate from the world, is more similar to the imparticipable, than that which is divided about it. Nor has a supermundane multitude alone a subsistence, but there are also mundane intellects; since there is likewise a mundane multitude of Gods, and the world itself is animated, and at the same time intellectual. The participation also of the supermundane Gods by mundane souls, is through mundane intellects as the media.

PROPOSITION CLXVII.

Every intellect intellectually perceives itself. But the first intellect indeed, perceives itself alone; and in this, intellect and the intelligible are one in number. But each of the subsequent intellects, perceives itself, and the natures prior to itself. And the intelligible to each of these,[286] is partly that which it is, and partly that from which it is derived.

For every intellect, either[287] intellectually perceives itself, or that which is above, or that which is posterior to itself. But if indeed it perceives that which is posterior to itself, it will through intellect be converted to that which is less excellent than itself; and thus will not know that to which it is converted, as not being in itself, but external to itself. But it will only know the image of this thing, as being generated in itself from it. For it knows that which it possesses, and the manner in which it is affected, but not that which it does not possess, and by which it is not affected.

But if it perceives that which is above itself, if indeed, this is accomplished through the knowledge of itself, it will at one and the same time both know itself and that superior nature. But if it knows that alone, it will be ignorant of itself, though it is intellect. In short, by knowing that which is prior to itself, it will know that it is a cause, and will also know the things of which it is the cause. For if it is ignorant of these, it will likewise be ignorant of that which is the cause of them; not knowing that which produces what it produces, by its very being, and what the things are which it does produce. Hence, by knowing the things of which it is the cause, it will also know itself, as deriving its subsistence from thence. By knowing, therefore, that which is prior to itself, it will likewise entirely know itself. Hence, if there is a certain intelligible intellect, this by knowing itself, will also know the intelligible, being itself intelligible. But each of the intellects posterior to this, will intellectually perceive the intelligible which is in itself, and at the same time that which is prior to itself. Hence, in intellect there is the intelligible, and in the intelligible intellect. But one intellect is the same with the intelligible; and another is the same with the intelligible which is in itself, but is not the same with the intelligible prior to itself. For that which is simply intelligible is one thing, and the intelligible in that which intellectually perceives is another.

PROPOSITION CLXVIII.

Every intellect knows in energy that which it intellectually perceives, and it is not the peculiarity of one part of it to perceive, and of another to perceive that it perceives.

For if it is intellect in energy, and perceives itself as not any thing different from the object of intellectual perception, it will know itself, and see itself. But seeing that which perceives intellectually, and knowing that which sees, it will know that it is intellect in energy. But knowing this, it will know that it perceives intellectually, and will not alone know the objects of its intellection. Hence, it will at once both know the intelligible, and that it intellectually perceives it, and by intellection it will be intellectually perceived by itself.

PROPOSITION CLXIX.

Every intellect has its essence, power and energy in eternity.

For if it intellectually perceives itself, and intellect is the same with the intelligible, intelligence also is the same with intellect and the intelligible. For being the medium between that which intellectually perceives, and the object of intellectual perception, and these being the same, intelligence also will be the same with both. Moreover, that the essence of intellect is eternal, is evident.[288] For the whole of it subsists at once. And this being the case, intelligence also will be eternal, since it is the same with the essence of intellect. But if intellect is eternal,[289] it will not be measured by time, neither according to its being, nor its energy. But these subsisting with invariable sameness, the power also of intellect will be eternal.

PROPOSITION CLXX.

Every intellect at once intellectually perceives all things. But imparticipable intellect indeed, simply perceives all things. And each of the intellects posterior to it perceives all things [according to one].

[For if][290] every intellect establishes its essence in eternity, and together with its essence its energy, it will intellectually perceive all things at once. For to every thing which is not established in eternity, the successive objects of its perception subsist according to parts. For every thing which is successive, is in time; the successive consisting of prior and posterior, but the whole of it not existing at once. If therefore all intellects similarly perceive all things,[291] they will not differ from each other. For if they perceive all things similarly,[292] they are similarly all things, since they are the very things which they intellectually perceive. But being similarly all things, one intellect will not be imparticipable, and another not. For their essences are the same things as the objects of their intellection; since the intellection of each is the same with the being of each, and each is both intellection and essence. It remains therefore, either that each intellect does not similarly perceive all things, but one thing, or more than one, but not all things at once; or that it perceives all things according to one.[293] To assert however, that each intellect does not perceive all things, is to make intellect to be ignorant of some particular being. For if it suffers transition in its energy, and intellectually perceives, not at once, but according to prior and posterior, at the same time possessing an immoveable nature, it will be inferior to soul, which understands all things in being moved, [or in a mutable energy]; because intellect on this hypothesis, will only understand one thing by its permanent energy. It will therefore understand all things according to one. For it either intellectually perceives all things, or one thing, or all things according to the one of intellection. For in all intellects indeed, there is always an intellectual perception of all things; yet so as to bound all things in one of all. Hence there is something predominant in intellection, and the objects of intellection; since all things are at once understood as one, through the domination of one, which characterizes all things with itself.

PROPOSITION CLXXI.

Every intellect is an impartible essence.

For if it is without magnitude, incorporeal, [and immoveable, it is impartible. For every thing][294] which in any way whatever is partible, is either partible on account of magnitude, or multitude, or on account of energies which are borne along with the flux of time. But intellect is eternal according to all things, and is beyond bodies, and the multitude which is in it is united. It is, therefore, impartible. That intellect also is incorporeal, is manifest from its conversion to itself. For no body is converted to itself. But that it is eternal, the identity of its energy with its essence evinces. For this has been before demonstrated. And that the multitude in it is united is evident from the continuity of intellectual multitude with the divine unities. For these are the first multitude; but intellects are next to these. Hence, though every intellect is a multitude, yet it is an united multitude. For prior to that which is divided, that which is collected into profound union, and is nearer to the one, subsists.

PROPOSITION CLXXII.

Every intellect is proximately the producing cause of beings perpetual and immutable according to essence.

For every thing which is produced by an immoveable cause, is immutable according to essence. But immoveable intellect being all things eternally, and abiding in eternity, produces by its very being that which it produces. If however it always is, and is invariably the same, it always produces, and after the same manner. Hence, it is not the cause of things which sometimes have existence, and at other times not, but it is the cause of things which always exist.

PROPOSITION CLXXIII.

Every intellect is intellectually both the things which are prior and posterior to itself.

For it is those things which are posterior to itself, according to cause, but those things which are prior to itself, according to participation. Yet it is still intellect, and is allotted an intellectual essence. [Hence it defines] all things [according to its essence];[295] both such as are according to cause, and such as are according to participation. For every thing participates of more excellent beings in such a way as it is naturally adapted to participate, and not according to their subsistence. For otherwise, they would be similarly participated by all things. Participations therefore, are according to the peculiarity and power of the participants. Hence in intellect, the natures prior to it subsist intellectually. But intellect is likewise intellectually the things posterior to itself. For it does not consist of its effects, nor does it contain these, but the causes of these in itself. But intellect is by its very being the cause of all things. And the very being of it is intellectual. Hence it contains intellectually the causes of all things. So that every intellect possesses all things intellectually, both such as are prior, and such as are posterior to it. As therefore, every intellect contains intelligibles intellectually, so likewise it contains sensibles intellectually.

PROPOSITION CLXXIV.

Every intellect gives subsistence to things posterior to itself, by intellection, and its fabrication consists in intellection, and its intellection or intelligence, in fabrication.

For if intelligible and intellect are the same, the essence also of every intellect will be the same with the intellection in itself. But it produces that which it produces by essence, and produces according to the very being, which it is. By intellection therefore, it will produce the things which are produced. For in intellect, being and intellection are both of them one. For intellect is the same with every being which it contains. If therefore, it makes by its very being, but its very being is intellection, it makes by intellection. Intelligence also which is in energy, consists in intellection. But this is the same with the essence of intellect. And the essence of intellect consists in producing. For that which produces immoveably, [always possesses] its very being [in producing. The intelligence of intellect therefore consists in fabrication or production.[296]]

PROPOSITION CLXXV.

Every intellect is primarily participated by those natures which are intellectual, both according to essence, and according to energy.

For it is necessary that it should either be participated by these, or by other natures, which possess indeed an intellectual essence, but do not always energize intellectually. It is however impossible that it should be participated by the latter of these. For the energy of intellect is immoveable. And hence, the natures by which it is participated, always participate of intellectual energy, which always causes the participants of it to be intellectual. For that which possesses its energy in a certain part of time, is unadapted to be conjoined with an eternal energy. But that which has perfection according to the whole of time, is the medium between every eternal energy, and that which is perfect in a certain time, as well in the mutations of energy, as in essences. For progressions are never effected without a medium, but through kindred and similar natures, both according to hypostases, and the perfections of energies. After a similar manner therefore, every intellect is primarily participated by those beings that are able to perceive intellectually, according to the whole of time, and who always energize intellectually, though their intellection is in time, and is not eternally in energy.

COROLLARY.

From this therefore, it is evident that it is impossible for the soul which sometimes perceives intellectually and sometimes does not, to participate proximately of intellect.

PROPOSITION CLXXVI.

All intellectual forms are in each other, and each is at the same time separate and distinct from the rest.

For if every intellect is impartible, and the multitude which is in it is united through intellectual impartibility, all things in it will be in one, impartibles will be united to each other, and all intellectual forms will pervade through all. But if all intellectual forms subsist immaterially and incorporeally, they are unconfused with each other and separate, and each preserving its own purity, remains that which it is. The peculiar participation however of each participating in a separate manner, manifests the unconfused nature of intellectual forms. For unless the forms which are participated were distinguished separate from each other, the participants of each of them would not participate in a separate manner, but in the subordinate natures [i.e. in the participants] there would be, in a much greater degree, an indistinct confusion, these being according to their order of an inferior condition. For whence would there be a separation of these, if the natures which give subsistence to, and perfect them, were without distinction, and were confused together? But again the impartible hypostasis, and uniform essence of that which contains forms, evinces their united nature. For things which have their hyparxis in the impartible and the uniform, are impartibly in the same thing. For how can you divide the impartible and the one? Hence, they have a simultaneous subsistence, and are in each other, each wholly pervading through the whole of each, in a manner unaccompanied with interval. For that which comprehends them is not extended with interval, nor is one of them in this thing, but another elsewhere, as in that which has interval; but every thing is at once in the impartible and in one. So that all intellectual forms are in each other, and are in each other unitedly, and at the same time each is distinctly apart from each.

COROLLARY.

But if some one, in addition to these demonstrations, should require also examples, let him direct his attention to the theorems which exist in one soul. For all these are in the same essence, which is truly without magnitude,[297] and are united to each other. For that which is without magnitude, does not locally contain the things which are in it, but the natures which it contains are united and separated, impartibly and without interval. For the soul genuinely produces all things, and each apart from each, attracting nothing from the rest, which, unless they were always separated according to habit, would not be separated by the energy of the soul.

PROPOSITION CLXXVII.

Every intellect being a plenitude of forms, one indeed, is comprehensive of more total, but another of more partial forms. And the superior intellects contain in a more total manner, such things as those posterior to them contain more partially. But the inferior intellects contain more partially, such things as those that are prior to them contain more totally.

For the superior intellects employ greater powers, having more the form of the one than secondary intellects. But the inferior intellects being more multiplied, diminish the powers which they contain. For things that are more allied to the one, being contracted in quantity, surpass the natures that are posterior to them. And on the contrary, things more remote from the one, as they are increased in quantity, are inferior to the natures that are nearer to the one. Hence the superior intellects, being established according to a greater power, but being less in multitude, produce a greater number of effects, according to power, through fewer things according to the quantity of forms. But the intellects posterior to them produce fewer effects through a greater number of things, according to a defect of power.[298] If therefore, the former produce a greater number of effects, through fewer things, the forms in them are more total. And if the latter produce fewer effects, through a greater number of things, the forms in them are more partial.

COROLLARY.

Hence it happens that the natures which are generated from superior intellects according to one form, are produced [in a divided manner from secondary intellects[299]] according to many ideas. And again, those natures which are produced by inferior intellects through many and distinct forms, are produced by superior intellects through fewer, but more total forms. And that indeed which is a whole and common, accedes supernally to all its participants. But that which is divided and peculiar accedes from secondary intellects. Hence secondary intellects, by the more partial separation of peculiarities, accurately and subtly distinguish the formations of primary intellects.

PROPOSITION CLXXVIII.

Every intellectual form gives subsistence to eternal natures.

For if every intellectual form is eternal and immoveable, it is essentially the cause of immutable and eternal hypostases, but not of such as are generated and corrupted. So that every thing which subsists according to an intellectual form is an eternal intellectual nature. For if all forms produce things posterior to themselves by their very being, but their essence possesses an invariable sameness of subsistence, the things produced by them will also be invariably the same, and will be eternal. Hence, neither the genera which subsist from a formal cause, according to a certain time, nor corruptible natures so far as they are corruptible, have a pre-existent intellectual form. For they would be incorruptible and unbegotten, if they derived their hypostasis from intellectual forms.

PROPOSITION CLXXIX.

Every intellectual number is bounded.

For if there is another multitude posterior to this, essentially inferior to it, and thus [more remote from the one, but the intellectual number is nearer to the one;[300]] and if that which is nearer to the one, is less according to quantity, but that which is more remote from it, is more according to quantity;—if this be the case, the intellectual number also will be less than every multitude posterior to it. Hence, it is not infinite. The multitude of intellects therefore, is bounded. For that which is less than a certain thing is not infinite, because the infinite, so far as infinite, is not less than any thing.

PROPOSITION CLXXX.

Every intellect is a whole, so far as each consists of parts, and is united to other things, and at the same time separated from them. But imparticipable intellect indeed, is simply a whole, as containing all parts in itself totally. But each partial intellect possesses the whole as in a part; and thus is all things partially.

For if a partial intellect is all things according to one, but a subsistence according to one thing is nothing else than a subsistence partially, the whole is in each of these intellects partially, being defined according to a certain one particular thing which predominates in all of them.

PROPOSITION CLXXXI.

Every participated intellect is either divine, as being suspended from the Gods, or is intellectual only.

For if a divine and imparticipable intellect has a primary subsistence, the intellect which is allied to this, is not that which differs from it in both respects, viz. which is neither divine, nor imparticipable. For things which are dissimilar in both these respects, cannot be conjoined with each other. It is evident therefore, that the medium between these is partly similar to that which is primarily intellect, and partly dissimilar to it. Either[301] therefore, it is imparticipable and not divine; or it is participated and divine. But every thing imparticipable is divine, as being allotted an order in multitude analogous to the one. Hence, there will be a certain intellect which is divine and at the same time participated. It is necessary however that there should be [an intellect which does not participate[302]] of the divine unities, but intellectually perceives them only. For in each series, such things as are first, and which are conjoined with their monad, are able to participate of things proximately situated in a superior order. But such as are far distant from the primary monad, cannot be suspended from the natures that proximately belong to a higher order. There is therefore both [a divine intellect,[303]] and an intellect which is intellectual only; the latter indeed, being established according to an intellectual peculiarity, which it possesses from its own monad, and from imparticipable intellect; but the former subsisting according to the union which it receives from the participated monad.

PROPOSITION CLXXXII.

Every [divine[304]] participated intellect, is participated by divine souls.

For if participation assimilates the participant to that which is participated, and renders the former connascent with the latter, it is evident that the participant of a divine intellect must be a divine soul, as being suspended from a divine intellect, and that through intellect as a medium it must participate of the deity which it contains. For deity conjoins his soul which participates of it with intellect, and binds that which is divine to that which is divine.

PROPOSITION CLXXXIII.

Every intellect which is participated indeed, but is intellectual alone, is participated by souls which are neither divine, nor subsisting in a mutation from intellect into a privation of intellect.

For neither are divine souls of this kind, nor such as participate of intellect. For souls participate of the Gods through a divine intellect, as was before demonstrated. Nor are souls which admit of mutation, of this kind. For every intellect is participated by natures which are always intellectual, both according to essence and according to energy. For this is evident from what has been before shown.

PROPOSITION CLXXXIV.

Concerning Soul.

Every soul is either divine, or is changed from intellect into a privation of intellect; or always remains as a medium between these, but is inferior to divine souls.

For if a divine intellect indeed, is participated by divine souls, but an intellectual intellect by those souls alone which are neither divine, nor receive a mutation from intelligence into a privation of intellect (for there are souls of this kind, which sometimes perceive intellectually, and sometimes do not);—if this be the case, it is evident that there are three genera of souls. And the first of these indeed, are divine. But the second are not divine, yet always participate of intellect. And the third are those, which are sometimes changed into an intellectual condition, and sometimes into a privation of intellect.

PROPOSITION CLXXXV.

All [divine][305] souls, are indeed Gods psychically. But all those that participate of an intellectual intellect, are the perpetual attendants of the Gods. And all those that are the recipients of mutation, are sometimes only the attendants of the Gods.

For if some souls have divine light supernally shining upon them, but others are endued with perpetual intelligence, and others again only sometimes participate of this perfection;—if this be the case, the first of these will among the multitude of souls be analogous to the Gods. But the next to these, will always follow the Gods, in consequence of always energizing according to intellect, and will be suspended from divine souls, having the same relation to them as that which is intellectual[306] to that which is divine. And the souls which sometimes energize intellectually and follow the Gods, neither participate of intellect after a manner always the same, nor are always able to be converted [to the intelligible] in conjunction with divine souls. For that which sometimes only participates of intellect, cannot by any contrivance whatever be always conjoined with the Gods.

PROPOSITION CLXXXVI.

Every soul is both an incorporeal essence, [and separate from body].[307]

For if it knows itself, but every thing which knows itself, is converted to itself, and that which is converted to itself, does not pertain to body (since every body is without conversion to itself) nor is inseparable from body, since that which is inseparable from body is not naturally adapted to revert to itself as it would thus be separated from body;—if this be the case, every soul is neither a corporeal essence, nor inseparable from body. Moreover, that the soul knows itself is evident. For if it knows the natures that are above itself, and is also naturally adapted to know itself, it will in a much greater degree know itself from the causes prior to itself.

PROPOSITION CLXXXVII.

Every soul is indestructible, and incorruptible.

For every thing which can in any way whatever be dissolved and destroyed, is either corporeal and a composite, or is allotted its hypostasis in a subject. And that indeed, which is dissolved, is corrupted as consisting of many things. But that which is naturally adapted to be in another thing, vanishes into non-entity when separated from its subject. Moreover, the soul is incorporeal, and external to every subject, subsisting in itself, and being converted to itself. Hence, it is indestructible and incorruptible.

PROPOSITION CLXXXVIII.

Every soul is both life and vital.

For that to which soul accedes necessarily lives. And that which is deprived of soul, is immediately left destitute of life. Either therefore it lived through soul, or through something else, and not through soul. It is however impossible that it should have lived through something else alone. For every thing which is participated, either imparts itself, or something pertaining to itself to its participant. But if it suffers neither of these, it will not be participated. Soul however, is participated by that to which it is present. And that which participates of soul is said to be animated. If therefore that which is participated introduces life to animated natures, it is either life, or vital alone, or both life and vital. If however, it is alone vital, but not also life, it will consist of life and non-life. It will not therefore know itself, nor be converted to itself. For knowledge is life, and the gnostic power so far as it is such is vital. If therefore, there is any thing in soul without life, this will not possess essentially the power of knowing. But if soul is life alone, it will no longer participate of the intellectual life. For the participant of life is vital, and is not life alone, i.e. the first and imparticipable life; but the life which is posterior to this, is both vital and life. Soul however, is not imparticipable life. And hence it is at the same time both life and vital.

PROPOSITION CLXXXIX.

Every soul is self-vital.

For if it is converted to itself, but every thing which is converted to itself is self-subsistent, the soul also is self-subsistent, and produces itself. But it is likewise life and vital, and its hyparxis is according to vitality. For it imparts life by its very being to the natures to which it is present. And if the participant is adapted, it immediately becomes animated and vital, [soul in effecting this not reasoning][308] nor acting from deliberate choice, nor vivifying by cogitation and judgment, but by its very essence, and by that which it is, supplying the participant with life. Hence the being of soul is the same as to live. If therefore the soul possesses being from itself, and this is the same as to live, and it has life essentially;—if this be the case, it will impart life to itself, and will possess it from itself. And this being admitted, soul will be self-vital.

PROPOSITION CXC.

Every soul is a medium between impartible natures, and the natures which are divisible about bodies.

For if soul is self-vital and self-subsistent, and has an hyparxis separate from bodies, it is, in consequence of being more excellent than, exempt from every thing divisible about body. For the natures which are divided about bodies, are entirely inseparable from their subjects, being co-distributed with divisible bulks. They also depart from themselves, and their own impartibility, and are co-extended with bodies. And though they subsist in lives, yet these are not the lives of themselves, but of participants. Though likewise they exist in essence and in forms, yet they are not the forms of themselves, but of those things which are fashioned by forms. If therefore, soul is not these, it is a self-subsistent essence, a self-vital life, and a knowledge gnostic of itself. Hence, it is entirely separate from bodies, but is a participant of life. If however, this be the case, it also participates of essence. But it likewise participates of knowledge from other causes. It is evident therefore, that it is inferior to impartible natures, because it is filled [with life externally.][309] But if with life, it is evident that it is also externally filled with essence. For imparticipable life and imparticipable essence are prior to soul.[310] That soul however is not primarily gnostic is evident.[311] For every soul indeed, so far as soul is life, but not every soul, so far as it is soul possesses knowledge. For a certain soul while it remains soul, is ignorant of [real] beings. Soul therefore, is not primarily gnostic, nor does it possess knowledge from its very being. Hence, it has an essence secondary to those natures that are primarily, and by their very being, gnostic. Since however, the essence of soul is divided from its knowledge, soul does not belong to natures [entirely] impartible. But it has been demonstrated that neither does it rank among the natures that are divisible about bodies. Hence, it is a medium between both.

PROPOSITION CXCI.

Every participable soul has indeed an eternal essence, but its energy is accompanied with time.

For either it possesses both eternally, or both temporally; or the one eternally, but the other temporally. It cannot however, possess both eternally: for it would be an impartible essence, and the nature of soul would in no respect differ from an intellectual hypostasis, viz. a self-motive from an immoveable nature. Nor can it possess both temporally: for thus it would be generated alone, and would neither be self-vital, nor self-subsistent. For nothing which is essentially measured by time is self-subsistent. But soul is self-subsistent. For that which is converted to itself, according to energy, is also essentially converted to itself, and proceeds from itself. It remains therefore, that every soul is partly eternal, and partly participates of time. Either therefore, it is essentially eternal, [but participates of time according to energy,[312]] or vice versa. The latter however, is impossible. Hence, every participable soul, is allotted an eternal essence, but a temporal energy.

PROPOSITION CXCII.

Every participable soul ranks among the number of [truly existing] beings, and is the first of generated natures.

For if it is essentially eternal, it is truly being according to its hyparxis, and always is. For that which participates of eternity, participates likewise of perpetual existence. But if it is in time according to energy, it is generated. For every thing which participates of time, since it is always becoming to be, or rising into existence, according to the prior and posterior of time, and is not at once that which it is, is wholly generated. But if every soul is in a certain respect generated according to energy, it will be the first of generated natures. For that which is in every respect generated, is more remote from eternal natures.

PROPOSITION CXCIII.

Every soul subsists proximately from intellect.

For if it has an immutable and eternal essence, it proceeds from an immoveable essence. For that which proceeds from a moveable essence, is essentially changed in every respect. The cause, therefore, of every soul is immoveable. But if it proximately subsists from intellect, it is perfected by, and converted to intellect. And if it participates of the knowledge which intellect imparts to the natures that are able to partake of it; (for all knowledge is derived from intellect, and all things have their progression essentially from that to which they are naturally converted)—if this be the case, every soul proceeds from intellect.

PROPOSITION CXCIV.

Every soul contains all the forms which intellect primarily possesses.

For if it proceeds from intellect, and intellect gives subsistence to soul; and if intellect subsisting immoveably produces all things by its very being, it will also impart to soul which it fabricates, the essential reasons [or producing principles] of all things which it contains. For every thing which produces by its very being, imparts secondarily to the thing generated by it, that which it is itself primarily. The soul, therefore, contains secondarily the representations of intellectual forms.

PROPOSITION CXCV.

Every soul is all things, containing indeed sensibles paradigmatically, or after the manner of an exemplar; but intelligibles iconically, or after the manner of an image.

For subsisting as a medium between impartible natures, and such as are divisible about body, it produces and gives subsistence to the latter of these, but pre-establishes in itself the causes from which it proceeds. Those things, therefore, of which it is the pre-existent cause, it antecedently comprehends paradigmatically. But it possesses according to participation, and as the progeny of first natures the causes of its subsistence. Hence it antecedently comprehends according to cause all sensible natures, and contains the immaterial productive principles of things material, the incorporeal principles of things corporeal, and without interval, the principles of things which possess interval. But it contains intelligibles and the forms of them after the manner of an image; so that it receives partibly indeed impartibles, with multiplication unical natures, and in a self-motive manner, things immoveable. Hence it is all beings, containing such as are first, according to participation, but paradigmatically such as are posterior to its own nature.

PROPOSITION CXCVI.

Every participable soul, primarily uses a perpetual body, which possesses an unbegotten and incorruptible hypostasis.

For if every soul is essentially eternal, and by its very being primarily animates some particular body, [it will always animate this body. For the essence of every soul is immutable]. But if this be the case, that which is animated by it is always animated, and always participates of life. That, however, which always lives, by a much greater priority always exists. But that which always is, is perpetual. Hence, that which is primarily suspended from every soul, is perpetual. But indeed every participable soul is primarily participated by a certain body, since it is participable and not imparticipable, and animates its participant by its very being. Every participated soul, therefore, uses a body which is primarily perpetual, and essentially unbegotten and incorruptible.

PROPOSITION CXCVII.

Every soul is an essence vital and gnostic, and a life essential and gnostic, and is knowledge, essence, and life. All things likewise subsist in it at once, the essential, the vital, and the gnostic; and all things are in all, and each is separate from the rest.

For if it is the medium between impartible forms, and those which are divided about bodies, it is neither so impartible as all intellectual natures, nor so partible as corporeal forms. Since, therefore, essences, lives and cognitions are divided in corporeal natures, these subsist in souls impartibly, unitedly, and incorporeally, and all of them exist at once, through their immateriality and impartibility. Since, likewise, in intellectual natures, all things subsist according to union, they are distinguished and divided in souls. All things, therefore, subsist together in these, and at the same time apart. But if all impartibles subsist together and in one, they pervade through each other, and if they are separate, they are again divided without confusion; so that each subsists by itself, and all are in all. For in the essence of soul there is both life and knowledge;[313] since every soul would not know itself, if the essence of it was of itself deprived of life and knowledge. And in the life of the soul there are both essence and knowledge. For unessential[314] life, and which is without knowledge, pertains to material lives, which are neither able to know themselves, nor are genuine essences. Knowledge, also, which is unessential and without life, is without subsistence. For all knowledge belongs to that which is vital, and which is of itself allotted an essence.

PROPOSITION CXCVIII.

Every thing which participates of time, and is always moved, is measured by periods.

For since it is measured by time, the motion of it also participates of measure and bound, and proceeds according to number. But because it is always moved, and this always is not[315] eternal, but temporal, it is necessary that it should use periods. For motion indeed is a mutation from some things to others. But beings are terminated by multitude and magnitude. These, however, being bounded, there can neither be a mutation to infinity according to a right line, nor can that which is always moved, make its transitions finitely. Hence, that which is always moved, will proceed from the same to the same, and thus will proceed periodically.

PROPOSITION CXCIX.

Every mundane soul uses periods of its proper life, and restitutions to its former state.

For if it is measured by time, it energizes transitively, and possesses a peculiar motion.[316] But every thing which is moved and participates of time, if it is perpetual, uses periods, periodically revolves, and is restored from the same things to the same. And every mundane soul possessing motion, and energizing according to time, will have periods of motions, and restitutions to its pristine state. For every period of perpetual natures is apocatastatic, or restorative to a former condition.

PROPOSITION CC.

Every period of soul is measured by time. The period of other souls indeed is measured by a certain time; but that of the first soul, since it is measured by time, is measured by the whole of time.

For if all motions have prior and posterior, so likewise have periods, and on this account they participate of time. That also which measures all the periods of souls is time. But if indeed there were the same periods of all souls, and they were about the same things, the time of all would be the same. If, however, the restitutions of different souls are different, the periodic time also and which restores to a pristine state, is different in different souls.

That the soul, therefore, which is primarily measured by time, is measured by the whole of time, is evident. For if time is the measure of all motion, that which is primarily moved, will entirely participate of time, and will be measured by the whole of time. For if the whole of time did not measure its first participant, it would not measure any thing else, according to the whole of itself. From these things, however, it is evident that all souls are measured by certain measures which are more partial than the whole of time. For if these souls are more partial than the soul which primarily participates of time, neither can they adapt their periods to the whole of time. The multitude of their restitutions, however, will be parts of the one period, and of the one restitution of things to their pristine state, which is effected by the soul that primarily participates of time. For a more partial participation pertains to a less power; but a more total to a greater power. Other souls, therefore, are not naturally adapted to receive the whole temporal measure according to one life, because they are allotted an order inferior to that of the soul which is first measured by time.

PROPOSITION CCI.

All divine souls have triple energies; some indeed as souls; but others as receiving a divine intellect; and others as suspended from the Gods. And they provide indeed for the whole of things as Gods; but they know all things through an intellectual life; and they move bodies through a self-moved hyparxis.

For because they psychically[317] participate of the natures situated above them, and are not simply souls, but divine souls, and are established according to an order, in the psychical extent, analogous to the Gods, they energize not only psychically, but also divinely, being allotted a deified summit of their essence, and also because they have an intellectual hypostasis, through which they are spread under intellectual essences. Hence, they not only energize divinely, but also intellectually; the former indeed according to the one which they contain; but the latter through an energy established according to intellect. A third energy, likewise, is present with them, according to their own hyparxis, which is motive indeed of things naturally alter-motive, but is vivific of such as possess an adventitious life. For this is the proper employment of every soul; but such energies as are intellectual and providential, they possess according to participation.

PROPOSITION CCII.

All souls attending upon, and always following the Gods, are inferior to divine, but are expanded above partial souls.

For divine souls participating of intellect and deity, on which account, they are at the same time both intellectual and divine, are the leaders of other souls, just as the Gods also are the leaders of all beings. But partial souls are deprived of a suspension from intellect, in consequence of not being able to participate proximately of an intellectual essence. For they would not fall from intellectual energy, if they essentially participated of intellect, as has been before demonstrated [in Prop. 184]. Hence, the souls which always follow the Gods are of a middle condition; receiving indeed a perfect intellect, and through this surpassing partial souls, yet not being suspended from the divine unities. For the intellect which they participate is not divine.

PROPOSITION CCIII.

Of every psychical multitude, divine souls indeed being greater in power than other souls, are contracted according to number. But those that always follow divine souls have a middle order among all souls, both in power and quantity. And partial souls indeed are inferior in power to the others, but proceed into a greater number.

For divine souls are more allied to the one, on account of their hyparxis being divine; but souls of a middle rank, through the participation of intellect; and those of the last order, are essentially dissimilar both to those of the middle, and those of the first rank. Among perpetual natures, however, those that are nearer to the one, are more single in number, and are more contracted in multitude, than such as are more remote from it. But such as are more remote from the one, are more multiplied. The powers, therefore, of superior souls are greater, and have the same ratio to those of souls in the second rank, which the divine has to the intellectual, and the intellectual to the psychical peculiarity. Inferior souls also are more in number. For that which is more remote from the one, is a greater, and that which is nearer to it, is a less multitude.

PROPOSITION CCIV.

Every divine soul is the leader of many souls that always follow the Gods; and of a still greater number of such as sometimes receive this order.

[For if it is a divine soul] it is necessary that it should be allotted an order [which is the leader or generator[318]] of all things, and which has a primary rank among souls. For in all beings that which is divine, is the leader of wholes. It is likewise requisite that every divine soul should neither alone preside over such souls as perpetually follow the Gods, nor over those alone that are sometimes their attendants. For if any divine soul should alone preside over those that sometimes follow the Gods, how can there be a contact between these and a divine soul, since they are entirely different from it, and neither proximately participate of intellect, nor much less of the Gods. But if it only presides over those that always follow the Gods, how is it that the series proceeds as far as to these [alone]? For thus intellectual natures will be the last, and will be unprolific, and unadapted to perfect and elevate. It is necessary, therefore, that such souls as follow the Gods, and energize according to intellect, and which are elevated to intellects more partial than divine intellects, should be primarily suspended from a divine soul. But it is necessary that partial souls, and which through those that are divine as media, participate of intellect and a divine life, should be suspended from a divine soul in the second place. For through those which always participate of a more excellent condition, those that sometimes only participate of it, are perfected. And again, it is necessary that about every divine soul, there should be a greater number of those that only sometimes follow, than of those that always attend on the Gods. For the power of the monad always proceeds into multitude, according to diminution; being deficient indeed in power, but redundant in multitude. Since every soul also of those that always follow the Gods, is the leader of a greater multitude of partial souls, imitating in this a divine soul; and elevates a greater number of souls to the primary monad of the whole series. Every divine soul, therefore, is the leader of many souls that always follow the Gods, but presides over a still greater number of those that sometimes only receive this order.

PROPOSITION CCV.

Every partial soul has the same ratio to the soul under which it is essentially arranged, as the vehicle of the one to the vehicle of the other.

For if the distribution of vehicles to souls is according to nature, it is necessary that the vehicle of every partial soul should have the same ratio to the vehicle of the soul which ranks as a whole, as the essence of the one to the essence of the other. The distribution, however, is according to nature. For things which primarily participate are spontaneously conjoined with the natures which they participate. If, therefore, as a divine soul is to a divine body, so is a partial soul to a partial body, each soul essentially participating,—if this be the case, that which was at first asserted is true, that the vehicles of souls have the same ratio to each other, as the souls themselves of which they are the vehicles.

PROPOSITION CCVI.

Every partial soul is able to descend infinitely into generation, and to ascend from generation to real being.

For if it sometimes follows the Gods, but sometimes falls from an extension to a divine nature, and participates of intellect and the privation of intellect, it is evident that it is alternatively conversant with generation and the Gods. For since it is not for an infinite time with the Gods, it will not for the whole of the following time be conversant with bodies. For that which has not a temporal beginning will never have an end; and that which never has an end is necessarily without a beginning. It remains, therefore, that every partial soul must make periods of ascents from, and of descents into generation, and that this must be unceasing through an infinite time. Every partial soul, therefore, is able to descend and ascend infinitely. And this never ceases to be the case with all of them.

PROPOSITION CCVII.

The vehicle of every partial soul, is fabricated by an immoveable cause.

For if it is perpetually and connascently suspended from the soul that uses it,[319] being immutable according to essence, it is allotted its hypostasis from an immoveable cause. For every thing which is generated from moveable causes, is essentially changed. Moreover, every soul has a perpetual body, which primarily participates of it. Hence, the cause of a partial soul, and therefore of its vehicle,[320] is immoveable, and on this account supermundane.

PROPOSITION CCVIII.

The vehicle of every partial soul is immaterial, essentially indivisible and impassive.

For if it proceeds from an immoveable fabrication, and is perpetual, it will have an immaterial and impassive hypostasis. For such things as are adapted to suffer essentially, and to be changed, are all of them material, and in consequence of subsisting differently at different times, are suspended from moveable causes. Hence, likewise, they receive an all-various mutation, being moved in conjunction with their principal causes. Moreover, that this vehicle is indivisible, is manifest. For every thing which is divided, so far as it is divided, is corrupted, in consequence of departing from the whole, and from its continuity. If, therefore, it is essentially immutable and impassive, it will be indivisible.

PROPOSITION CCIX.

The vehicle of every partial soul descends indeed with the addition of more material vestments, but becomes united to the soul by an ablation of every thing material, and a recurrence to its proper form, analogous to the soul that uses it.

For this soul indeed descends irrationally, assuming irrational lives; but it ascends laying aside all the generation-producing powers, with which it was invested in its descent, and becoming [pure, returns to the pristine condition of its nature. For the vehicle[321]] imitates the lives of the souls that use it, and they being every where moved, it is moved in conjunction with them. By its circulations likewise it represents the intellections of some souls; but the falling of others through their inclination to the realms of generation; and the purifications of others, through the circumductions which lead to an immaterial nature. For because it is vivified by the very essence of souls,[322] and is connascent with them, it is all-variously changed in conjunction with their energies; follows them every where; becomes co-passive with them; is restored to its pristine state together with them when they are purified;[323] and is elevated when they are elevated, and aspires after its own perfection. For every thing is perfected when it obtains its proper perfection.

PROPOSITION CCX.

Every connascent vehicle of the soul, always possesses both the same figure and magnitude. But it is seen to be greater and less, and of a dissimilar figure, through the additions and ablations of other bodies.

For if it derives its essence from an immoveable cause, it is evident that both its figure and its magnitude are defined by this cause, and each is immutable and invariable. Moreover, at different times it appears to be different, as likewise greater and less. Hence, through other bodies added from the material elements, and again taken away, it exhibits a different appearance both in quantity and form.

PROPOSITION CCXI.

Every partial soul descending into generation descends wholly; nor does one part of it remain on high, and another part descend.

For if something pertaining to the soul remained on high in the intelligible world, it will always perceive intellectually, without transition or transitively. But if without transition, it will be intellect, and not a part of the soul, and this partial soul will proximately[324] participate of intellect. This, however, is impossible. But if it perceives intellectually with transition, from that which always [and from that which sometimes[325]] energizes intellectually, one essence will be formed. This, however, also is impossible. For these always differ, as has been demonstrated. To which may be added, the absurdity resulting from supposing that the summit of the soul is always perfect, and yet does not rule over the other powers, and cause them to be perfect. Every partial soul, therefore, wholly descends.

ON

PROVIDENCE AND FATE,

AND THAT

WHICH IS IN OUR POWER.

TO

THEODORUS, THE MECHANIST.

1. I am of opinion, my friend Theodorus, that the conceptions of your mind are mature, and adapted to a man who loves the contemplation of beings; and I am gratified that you have thought fit to write to us on these subjects, though there are many among you that are able to investigate and doubt with you about such like problems. But it is requisite, as it seems, that we also should adduce[326] what appears to us to be the truth on the subjects which you have proposed for our discussion, and what we conceive to accord with things themselves, and with the opinions of the most celebrated of the philosophers prior to us; and that we should not in vain hear the inquiries of a man eminently skilled in mechanics, who was formerly known to us, as I conceive, and as you have asserted. You inquire however, about things which have been a thousand times investigated, and which in my opinion will never have any rest, because the soul is excited to the discussion of them, much light having been already thrown on them by the elaborate writings of Plotinus and Iamblichus, and prior to these by the divine Plato; and if it be not too much to say, such particulars respecting them have been proclaimed by the divinely-inspired mouth of theologists, as Plato alone has unfolded by demonstrations. And why is it requisite to adduce to you Plato, and men who were divinely wise, since they have been most luminously developed[327] by the Gods themselves, who transcendently know what pertains to themselves, and what they have produced, and have not been delivered by them in enigmas, as by theologists. It is requisite therefore, that we also writing conformably to them, should as I have said adduce to you what appears to us to be the truth respecting the subjects of your inquiry.

2. You deserve indulgence if looking to the all-various tragic and comic, and other connexions of human affairs, you have conceived that there is only one fabricator and maker of such colligations in the universe, and have called this Fate; or rather you have denominated it the series and consequent generation of things; have thought that such a dramatic scene is alone directed by some inevitable necessity; and have celebrated this as providence, and asserted that it alone possesses freedom of will, and is the lord of all things. But you have conceived that the freedom of will of the human soul is only a name, and is truly nothing, since she has an arrangement in the world, is subservient to the energies of other things, and is a part of the mundane fabric. Or rather, that I may use your own words, the human soul is a machine, since there is an irrefragable cause which moves all things that the world comprehends in itself. But the universe being as it were one machine, the whole spheres are complicated in each other analogously to certain drums, but the partial animals and souls that are moved by them, and in short, all things, depend on one mover. And perhaps in consequence of honouring your art, you have conceived that the maker of the universe is a certain mechanic, and that you are an imitator of the best of causes. These things however we have written, mingling the jocose with the serious.

3. Betaking ourselves therefore to the contest, we say, that the difference of these three things ought especially to be considered by you, if you intend to arrive at the gate of the subjects of investigation. And of these, the first indeed is, that Providence and Fate do not differ in the way in which you conceive they do, viz. that the one is a connected consequence, but the other is necessity, the cause of this consequence. For both indeed are the causes of the world, and of whatever is produced in the world, but Providence subsists prior to Fate; and all that is produced according to Fate, is by a much greater priority produced by Providence, but the contrary is not true; for in short,[328] the natures which are governed by Providence are more divine than those which are governed by Fate. The second thing is this, that the soul which is separable from the body, and which descends into this mortal abode from the Gods, is different from the soul which is in bodies, and which subsists in, and is inseparable from its subjects; and that the latter essentially depends on Fate, but the former on Providence. The third particular is, that the science and truth which are inherent in souls conversant with generation, though they may lead an immaculate life, are different from the science and truth in souls that have fled from this abode, and are established in that place whence they first fell, and descended into the realms of mortality. Of these three particulars therefore, as we have said, if you can discover sufficient solutions, you will obtain a satisfactory answer to your inquiries. For Providence indeed, differing in the above mentioned manner from Fate, it will be evident that many things escape Fate, but that nothing escapes Providence; that Providence supernally governs Fate, produces it, and has limited its empire[329] by alter-motive natures, viz. by things which are allotted their first subsistence in beings that are moved by something else. But again, having shown that the soul which is separable from bodies, is different from that which is planted in bodies, it will be manifest to you which of these two possesses freedom of will, and that which is in our power; which is subservient to necessity, and is under the dominion of Fate; and where the complication of these is to be found, on account of which the one dulls the freedom of the will through a subordinate life, but the other participates of a certain image of election, in consequence of its greater proximity to a more excellent nature.[330] And science appearing to you to be twofold, it will be evident after what manner both Plato and Socrates, and to these also may be added the great Parmenides, assert, that the soul while here is capable of knowing truth, when it is purified from material darkness, and the passions introduced into it by the body, and its commixture with corporeal natures, but that it is allotted science in a greater degree, and in a mote genuine mode, when it exists beyond bodies, and generation, and bitter matter.

4. These three problems therefore, being necessary and having been well discussed[331] by the ancients, partly by Iamblichus, in his copious and elaborate treatises On Providence and Fate, and partly by all the lovers of Plato, who proclaim that the soul is twofold, by Plotinus likewise in many places, and also by Porphyry, who make a distinction between contemplation, and contemplative virtue, and in short, by all who are able to understand Plato,—this being the case, it is necessary that beginning from the first thing proposed, we should discover the difference between Providence and Fate. “But in every thing, says Plato, it is requisite to know the one principle of that which is the subject of speculation, or we must err in every thing.” It is necessary however, as the dæmoniacal Aristotle teaches, after inquiring if a thing is, to investigate in the next place what it is. If therefore, you inquired whether Providence is, or is not, and in a similar manner concerning Fate, it would be requisite in the first place to show you that each of them is,[332] and if you still doubted, I should be unwilling after this to answer your doubts, but since you acknowledge that both of them have a subsistence, and that all things are comprehended in their dominion, it evidently remains, I conceive, that I should demonstrate to you what each of them is; for from this it will be evident what it is in which they differ. And this being known, many of your doubts, as we have said, will be solved. But again, because to the discovery of what a thing is, the dividing method is said to contribute, which Socrates in the Philebus celebrates as the gift of the Gods to men, and because what are called our common conceptions contribute to the discovery of principles, from which conceptions it is possible, as Aristotle writes, to investigate many things that are demonstrable,—hence it is requisite that we also employing both these, should unfold Providence and Fate; so far as pertains to what we say they are, using common conceptions, but so far as pertains to other things, employing distinctly the divisions of beings, from which, as it appears to me, we can alone discover what the definitions are of Providence and Fate. But these being known will enkindle a clear light in the subjects of investigation, and will perhaps free us from the doubts by which we are at present detained.

5. The common conceptions therefore of all men, and which possess indubitable evidence, assert, that Providence is indeed the cause of good to those beings for which it provides, and that Fate is also a cause, but the cause of a certain connexion and consequence to those things that are generated. For that all of us have these irrefragable conceptions about Providence and Fate, is evident from our asserting that men who are the procurers of good to others, have well provided for the subjects of their beneficence; and again, we denominate that which is evolved through many causes complicated with each other and unknown to us, no otherwise than Fate. Our life also is full of these names, because names testify the truth of these conceptions. For the word Providence (προνοια) indicates[333] that energy which is prior to intellect, and which it is necessary to attribute to the good alone; for this alone is more divine than intellect, because much-honoured intellect desires good, together with all things and prior to all things. But the word Fate (ειμαρμενη) indicates that which connects all things that are naturally adapted to have such a connexion. Moreover, that the thing which is provided for is not the imparting, nor that which is connected, Fate, nor that which proceeds into this, connexion, but that which connects, you may assume from this, that all of us conceive Providence and Fate to be certain productive powers. But every where effective causes are distinct from their effects: and these three things differ from each other, viz. that which makes, that which is made, and the energy of making.[334] Just as in what pertains to Providence and Fate there are, that which provides, that which is provided for, and the effective energy which proceeds from the providing cause into that which is provided for: and again, there are, that which connects, that which is connected, and the effective energy proceeding from the connecting cause into the thing connected. And it is evident that according to each of these triads, that which makes is not such as that which is made, but if the latter is various, it is necessary that the former should be simple, and that if the participant of good is the thing made, the maker should be imparticipable. For every where that which makes is allotted a part more divine than that which is made. When we say therefore, that Providence is the cause of good, we must also say that it is the fountain of good, which does not require to be benefited by other things. And admitting Fate to be the cause of connexion, we must not say that it is itself connected by other things. Such therefore, being the common conceptions which we antecedently assume of these two, it remains in the next place that we should consider what it is in which each of them excels [and by which each is characterized]: and first, in what the characteristic of Fate consists.

6. From these conceptions therefore, we infer that Fate is the cause of things that are connected. But let us consider what the things are that are connected. Of beings therefore, some have their essence in eternity, but others in time. By beings however, whose essence is in eternity, I mean those whose energy[335] together with their essence is eternal: but by beings whose essence is in time, I mean those whose essence is not, but is always in generation, or rising into existence, though it should be in generation for an infinite time. And the natures that subsist between these, are such as have their essence indeed permanent, and better than generation, but their energy measured by time. For it is necessary that every progression from things first to last should be effected through media. Since therefore, there are beings which are eternal both in essence and energy, it is necessary that there should be a middle extent, and that it should either have an eternal essence, but an energy indigent of time, or the contrary. The contrary however is impossible, that we may not confess that we place energies prior to essences. Hence it remains that the medium must be that which has an eternal essence, but a temporal energy. We say therefore, that we have exhibited to you these three orders of beings, the intellectual, the psychical,[336] and the corporeal. But I call the intellectual that which exists and is intellective through all eternity; the corporeal, that which is always rising into existence, or becoming to be, either in an infinite time, or in a part of time; and the psychical, that which is eternal indeed in essence, but which employs temporal energies. Where then, must the things which are connected be arranged? Consider assuming from the Gods the meaning of the term ειρεσθαι to be connected, as implying nothing else than this, that the natures which are differently produced according to time, are conjoined with, and not separated from each other. And if existing at one and the same time they are distant from each other according to place, yet they have a certain co-ordination with each other. Hence being separated either by places or times, they are in a certain respect collected into unity, and into one sympathy, through connexion. And in short,[337] the things which are connected, cannot suffer this from themselves, but require something else which may impart to them connexion. If therefore the natures which are arranged under Fate, are such as are connected with each other, according to our common conception of Fate; but the things which are connected are partible, being distant either in places or times, and are naturally adapted to be connected by something else, on account of the opinion of connexion which prevails among all men; and these are moved by something else, and are corporeal; for of the natures which are beyond bodies, some [i.e. intellects] are better both than place and time, but others [viz. souls] though they energize according to time, appear to be pure from place;—if this be the case, it is evident that the things which are governed and connected by Fate, are moved by something else, and are entirely corporeal.

7. If however this is demonstrated, it is evident that admitting Fate to be the cause of connexion, we must also admit that it presides over alter-motive and corporeal natures. But assuming this, we will ask ourselves what that is which is said to be the cause of bodies, which is proximate to them, and by which things alter-motive are inspired[338] and contained, and accomplish whatever they are able to effect. And if you are willing, looking in the first place to our bodies, let us consider what it is that moves and nourishes, and always reweaves, and binds them together? Is not this that which is innate in bodies, which also in other animals exhibits a similar energy,[339] which extends as far as to things that are rooted in the earth, and possesses a twofold energy, this indeed renovating bodies that they may not by discerption entirely vanish, but that preserving the several individuals in a condition conformable to nature? For it is not the same thing to add what is deficient, and to preserve the power of things that are held together. If therefore, not only in us, and other animals and plants, but in this universe also[340] much prior to bodies, there is one nature of the world, which is connective and motive of the subsistence of bodies, as it is also in us, or why do we call all bodies the progeny of nature, it is indeed necessary that nature should be the cause of things that are connected, and that in this what is called Fate should be investigated. And on this account perhaps the dæmoniacal Aristotle also is accustomed to call those augmentations or generations which are effected beside the accustomed time, deviations from Fate. And the divine Plato says, “that the world considered by itself, without the intellectual Gods, is convolved as being corporeal by Fate, and innate desire.” The oracles of the Gods also accord with these and bear witness to our demonstrations when they say: “Look not upon Nature, for the name of it is fatal.” And thus we have discovered what Fate is, and how it is the nature of this world, and a certain incorporeal essence. For it presides over and is the life of bodies, and this essentially, since it internally moves bodies, and not externally, moves all things according to time, and connects the motions of all things that are distant both in times and places; according to which also, mortal are adapted to the participation of eternal natures, are convolved together with them, and these are mutually co-passive. For the nature which is in us, binds and connects all the parts of our body, and their operations on each other: and this also is a certain Fate of our body. As in our body likewise, some parts are more, but others are less principal, and the latter follow the former, so in the universe, the generations of the less principal follow the motions of the more principal parts, viz. the sublunary generations follow the periods of the celestial orbs, and the circle of the former is an image of the circle of the latter. And these things which have been divulged by all the ancients, I am unwilling to prolong.

8. It is not therefore, difficult for you to see what Providence is. For if you assert that the fountain of good is primarily the divine cause itself, you will speak rightly. For whence, except from divinity, is good imparted to all things? So that as Plato says, “no other cause of good than God, is to be admitted.” In the next place, Providence being established above both intelligibles and sensibles, is superior to Fate. And those things which are under Fate, are also under Providence, possessing indeed, their connexion from Fate, but their participation of good from Providence, so that the connexion may have a good end, and that Providence may contain the end of Fate in itself. But again, with respect to things that are under Providence, all of them are not likewise indigent of Fate, but intellectual natures are exempt from it. For the empire of Fate is entirely in corporeal natures;[341] since to be connected introduces time, and corporeal motion. To these things also, as it appears to me, Plato looking, says that a subsistence of this kind, is mingled from intellect and necessity, intellect ruling[342] over the necessity of bodies. And in this place, he calls the motive cause necessity, which he elsewhere denominates Fate, conceiving that bodies act by compulsion. And this rightly. For every body is compelled both to do whatever it does, and to suffer whatever it suffers, to heat, or to be heated, to impart or to receive cold. But choice is not in bodies, because you may say that their peculiarity is the necessary and an existence unaccompanied with choice. For if this were not the case, what could there be that is better than bodies? For the body which is moved in a circle, and which is of an illustrious nature, is thus moved from necessity, in the same manner as fire is from necessity moved to the circumference, but earth to the middle [of the universe]. Plato therefore asserts that necessity presides over the generations of bodies, and on this account, over their corruptions also; but he exalts intellect, and determines that it rules over necessity. If therefore Providence is above intellect, it is evident that it rules over intellect, and those things which are under this necessity; and that necessity alone rules over those things which are under its dominion. Hence, every thing indeed which has an intellectual subsistence, continues to exist under Providence alone, but every thing which has a corporeal subsistence, endures under necessity.

9. You must understand therefore, that there are two genera of things, the one intellectual, but the other sensible, and also that there are two kingdoms of these, the kingdom of Providence indeed above, which reigns over both intellectuals and sensibles, and the kingdom of Fate beneath, which has dominion over sensibles alone. And Providence differs from Fate, in the same way in which a God differs from that which is divine indeed, but by participation and not primarily. For in other things also, as you may see, one thing has a primary subsistence, and another is according to participation. Thus for instance, there is light in the sun,[343] and light in the air, but the former subsists primarily, and the latter subsists on account of the former. And life is primarily in the soul, but secondarily in the body, and subsists on account of the life of the soul. Thus also, Providence indeed, is essentially deity, but Fate is something divine, and not deity, for it depends on Providence, and is as it were its image. For if as Providence is to intellectual, so is Fate to sensible beings; since the former reigns over intellectuals, but the latter over sensibles; then alternately, as geometricians say, as Providence is to Fate, so are intellectuals to sensibles. But intellectuals are primarily beings, and sensibles derive their subsistence from them. Hence Providence is primarily that which it is, and from this the order of Fate is suspended. But of these things enough.

10. If you are willing, however, we will betake ourselves to the second discussion, viz. the consideration of the soul which is separable, and of that which is inseparable from bodies. But assume this also from the philosophy of Aristotle. For he says, that every soul which has an energy not at all indigent of body, is likewise allotted an essence beyond and separable from body. And this necessarily. For if we should arrange energy as existing independent of body, but essence inseparable from body, energy would be better than essence, since it would not be at all indigent of a subordinate essence, that being rooted in it, it might have a subsistence according to nature. This however is impossible. It is necessary, therefore, that the soul which has an energy separable from body, should also be itself separable. Consider then, my friend, what soul it is in us, which we acknowledge is not at all indigent of body, in the energies of itself according to nature? Is it sense? But every sensitive power uses corporeal instruments, and together with them energizes about its proper sensibles; viz. it uses the eyes, the ears, and all the other senses, being at the same time moved and co-passive with them. What then shall we say of anger and desire? But do you not see that these frequently co-operate with the corporeal parts, with the heart and the liver, and that these also are not pure from body? For how is it possible that things which energize with sense, should not also be indigent of body, since sense is always moved through body? But with respect to the orectic powers, that these energize with sense, is I conceive known to all of us. For what deprived of sense, can either be angry, or desire? Plotinus also rightly asserting, that all the passions are either senses, or are not without sense. If, therefore, that which is angry is so in conjunction with sense, possessing at the same time a sense of sorrow, and that which desires possesses a sense of delight; but that which energizes with sense energizes with body, for sense subsists with body;—if this be the case, it is necessary that every thing which is angry and desires, should energize with body. Hence, these species of life, being all of them irrational, have that energy which is according to nature in conjunction with body.

11. Looking now, however, to the rational nature itself, consider the life of it which is seated in the inferior lives, and corrects either what is deficient in them according to knowledge, as when from above it evinces that sense is deceived about its own objects of knowledge. I mean for instance, when it shows that sense is deceived in asserting that the sun is but a foot in diameter, or when sense with its usual deception asserts of such things any thing of a similar nature: or when reason disciplines anger,[344] which is immoderate in its motions, when it is agitated with fury. Hence Ulysses in Homer exclaims “endure, my heart,” and represses the impulse of anger barking like a dog: or when the rational nature represses the wantonness of desire, and frustrates its endeavours to detain the soul by the delights that germinate from the body, the petulance of these delights being ameliorated by the corporeal temperaments. For in all such energies the rational soul evidently represses all the irrational motions both gnostic and orectic, and liberates itself from them, as from things foreign to its nature. It is necessary, however, to investigate the nature of every thing, not from the perverted use of it, but from its natural energies. Hence, if reason, when it is moved in us as reason, restrains the shadowy impression of the delights of desire, punishes the precipitate motion of anger, and reproves sense as full of deception, asserting that we neither hear nor see any thing accurately,[345] and if it asserts these things looking to its internal reasons, none of which it knows through body, or through corporeal cognitions, it is evident that according to this energy it elongates itself from the senses, contrary to the decision of which it is separated from those sorrows and delights.

12. After this, however, I see another and a better energy of our rational soul, the inferior powers being now at rest, and exhibiting no tumult, as in many things they are accustomed to do, according to which energy she is converted to herself, sees her own essence and the powers[346] she contains, the harmonic ratios of which she consists, and the many lives of which she is the completion, and re-discovers herself to be a rational world, the image indeed of the natures prior to herself, and from which she has departed, but the paradigm of the natures posterior to herself, and over which she presides. To this energy of the soul, my friend, arithmetic, and geometry, the mother of your art, are said to contribute much,[347] which indeed elongate the soul from the senses, purify the intellect from the irrational forms of life with which it is surrounded, and lead it to the incorporeal comprehension of forms, extending as it were, the lustrations to the future mystics that are anterior to the most sacred mysteries. For consider from intellectual energies after what manner the above-mentioned sciences are allotted the purifying power of which we have been speaking. For if they assume the soul replete with images, and knowing nothing subtile, and unattended with material garrulity, and if they cause reasons to shine forth which possess an irrefragable necessity of demonstration, and forms full of all certainty and immateriality, and by no means calling to their assistance the grossness which is in sensibles, do they not evidently purify our intellectual life from those things that fill us with folly, and which are unadapted to the divine circumscription of beings?

13. After both these energies of the rational soul, let us survey her now running back to her highest intelligence, through which she sees her sister souls in the world, which are allotted the heavens and the whole of generation according to the will of the father, and of which she being a part, desires the contemplation of them. But she sees above all souls, intellectual essences and orders. For above every soul a deiform intellect resides, which imparts to the soul an intellectual habit. She also sees prior to these, the monads of the Gods themselves which are above intellect, and from which the intellectual multitudes receive their unions. For it is necessary that unific causes should be placed above things united, in the same manner as vivifying causes are above things vivified, causes that impart intellect are above things intellectualized, and in a similar manner imparticipable hypostases are above all participants. For according to all these elevating intellections, I conceive it is evident to those that are not perfectly blind, how the rational soul leaving sense and bodies behind, is led upward by intellectual surveys about the inflected and truly mystic intuitions of the supermundane Gods. Or whence, and from what kind of energies have the progeny of the Gods unfolded to us the occult dispensations of divinity? And after what manner are souls said to energize enthusiastically, and assuming a mania better than temperance[348] to be conjoined to the Gods themselves? I speak of the Sibyl who soon after she was born uttered admirable things, and told those who were present at the time who she was, and from what order she came into this terrestrial abode, and I allude to any other soul who in a similar manner was of a divine destiny.[349]

14. In short, we must say that the rational and intellectual soul in whatever way it may energize, is beyond body and sense; and therefore it is necessary that it should have an essence separable from both these. This however though of itself now evident, I will again manifest from hence, that when it energizes according to nature, it is superior to the influence of Fate, but that when it falls into sense, and becomes irrational and corporeal, it follows the natures that are beneath it, and living with them as with intoxicated neighbours, is held in subjection by a cause that has dominion over things that are different from the rational essence.[350] For again, it is necessary that there should be a certain genus of beings of this kind, which according to essence indeed is above Fate, but according to habitude is sometimes arranged under it. For if indeed the beings which are wholly eternal are placed above the laws of Fate, but there are beings which according to the whole of their life, are arranged under the periods of Fate, it will also be necessary that there should be an intermediate nature between these two, which sometimes indeed is above the productions of Fate, and sometimes is under its dominion. For the progression of beings much more than the situation of bodies, leaves no vacuum; but there are every where media between the extremes, which also bind the extremes to each other. And not only Plato, but likewise the oracles of the Gods have revealed these things to us. For in the first place indeed, they order those divine men who were thought worthy to be the auditors of those mystic discourses, “not to look upon nature, because the name of it is fatal.” And again, they order them “not to co-augment Fate.” Every where also, they exhort them to turn from the life which is according to Fate, and to avoid “becoming corporeal with the fatal herds;” by all which they withdraw us from the senses and material desires; for through these we become corporeal, and are then acted upon from necessity by Fate. For similitude every where copulates[351] beings to each other; but that which is assimilated enjoys the same polity as that to which it is assimilated, whatever it may be, and consequently is under the dominion of the ruler of that polity. For nothing is without a ruler and a principality in the universe, whether you speak of wholes, or of parts. But different things have different rulers, because these live in one way, and those in another. Afterwards, the oracles teaching concerning our most divine life, and that immaculate polity, which we enjoy when liberated from every polity of Fate, say, “The souls that become venerable by understanding the works of the father will escape the fatal wing[352] of Destiny.”

15. The soul, therefore, embracing this life, and such a life as this, will not rank among those souls that are led by Fate. But if it wishes to conform itself to body, aspires after what are called corporeal goods, and pursues honours, power and riches, it suffers the same thing as a philosopher who is chained, and in this condition enters a ship. For he becomes subservient to the winds that move the ship, [and cannot help himself] if some one of the sailors should trample on him, or some fettered slave should insult him. Bidding farewell, therefore, to the things to which we are bound, we should direct our attention to the strength of virtue, and consider Fate not as effecting any thing in us, but in the things which surround us. For with respect, my friend, to all external circumstances that may befal us, enemies may demolish the walls of our city, and reduce its buildings to ashes, they may deprive us of our possessions, and leave us in a state of indigence; but all these being mortal and external, are in consequence of this in the power of other beings, and not in ours. But with respect to the things which are in our power, there is no one so potent as to be able to take away any one of them, even though he should possess all human power. For if we are temperate, we shall still continue to be so, though these calamities may befal us, and if we are contemplators of true beings, neither shall we be plundered of this habit; but all these dreadful events taking place, we shall still persevere in celebrating the rulers of all things, and in investigating the causes of effects.

16. By no means, therefore, must we reprobate the necessity of the soul from its ultimate energies, but looking to its first energies, we should admire its unconquerable power. And if we are thus wise, nothing will disturb us pertaining to the passions of the inferior parts of the soul; but when the body is disturbed, and we say that we sustain something of a dreadful nature, it is not we who thus speak, but it is the language of desire;[353] for the delights of the body, and therefore its sorrows pertain to this part. When also being robbed of our wealth, or not obtaining riches, we are grieved, this passion belongs to that power of the soul which is a lover of wealth. And again, when being reproached, and falling from power, we are indignant, this is not the passion of the superior soul, but of that which dwells downward, about the heart. For this pertains to the part which is a lover of honour. But the reason which is in us, being in all such particulars deceived, follows and is at the same time disturbed with the subordinate powers of the soul, being a blind intellect, and not having that eye[354] yet purified, by which it is able to perceive itself, and the natures prior and posterior to itself. When, however, it becomes purified from those things with which it was invested when it fell, it will then know what that is which is in its power, how it is neither in corporeal natures; for these are posterior to reason; nor in those beings in whom there is the liberty of divine will; for they are prior to reason; but that it consists in living according to virtue. For this alone is free and unservile, and adapted to liberty, and is truly the power of the soul, and confers power on its possessor. For it is the province of all power to contain and preserve that which possesses it.

17. But he who directs his attention to vice, looks at the debility of the soul, though she should possess all other power. For the power of instruments is one thing, and the power of those beings that ought to use the instruments another. Hence, every soul, so far as it participates of virtue, and so far as it is [a rational soul], is free; but so far as it is vicious and debilitated, and is not [rational], it is subservient to other things,[355] and not to Fate only, but to every thing, in short, that is either willing to give that which is appetible, or is able to take it away. For he who possesses virtue is subservient to those beings who are alone sufficient to impart to and co-augment with him that which is desirable; but these are the Gods, with whom there is true virtue, and from whom that which is in our power is derived. Plato also somewhere says, that this voluntary servitude is the greatest liberty. For by being subservient to those who possess all the power of all things, we become assimilated to them, so that, as he says, we govern the whole world; i.e. when we are perfect and winged, and reign on high. This, therefore, pertains to the most divine of our souls, just as it pertains to the last of them, to be as it were bound in prison, and to live an involuntary, instead of a voluntary free life. But to the souls that have an intermediate subsistence between these, it belongs, so far as they are liberated from passions and the body, to ascend above necessity to a life which has dominion over generation.

18. For again, if intellect and deity are prior to soul, but passions and bodies are posterior to it; and if to these it belongs to act from compulsion, but to intellect and deity, to act in a manner better than all necessity, and which is alone free, it is necessary that the soul betaking itself either to the former or to the latter, should either enter under the necessity of subordinate, or exert the liberty of more excellent natures; and that it should be subservient either to a supernal dominion, or to a dominion inferior to itself.[356] But if it is subservient, it must either rule in conjunction with the powers that rule over it, or be alone subservient in conjunction with subservient natures. Here, therefore, the soul ascending and resuming its power, which is virtue, will consider nothing as dreadful whatever it may be, that takes place about and external to the body. For the passions of instruments do not pass to those that use them; but in whatever manner they may subsist, it is possible for the soul to energize according to virtue; strenuously indeed, if the body should happen to be languid, but moderately when it is sane. And when poverty is present, it may energize sublimely, but in affluence magnificently; but every where from occurring circumstances, it may extol virtue that uses them; and being ameliorated by its inward strength may vanquish external calamities. For you must not suppose that you mechanists alone, are to be permitted to say, that you can move a given weight with a given power; for this you are well known to assert; but it is much more possible for those who live according to virtue, truly to adorn a power given from every circumstance by another power. And he who does this is generous and free; but the bad man is the slave of all things though he should rule over all things. For he resembles those who are punished in Egypt, by laughing vizards that surround them. Over these also, who are not able to govern themselves, necessity prevails. For being elongated from the Gods, the universe uses them as brutes.

19. When, therefore, you wish to see that which is in our power, look at the soul living according to nature. But the soul which is not debile lives according to nature. For there is nothing debile in that which is conformable to nature. The soul, however, is not debile, which is not replete with vice, [the evil of the soul]; for in all things evil is debile. And if you consider the soul in this point of view, you will see what the nature is of that which is in our power. For you will see that it uses all circumstances rightly, and either prohibits them from taking place, or providentially attends to calamitous events when they occur. It also permits Fate to act upon those things which are posterior to Fate, and of which it is the lord; but is co-ordinated to the natures prior to itself, and from which being more excellent than itself, it is not divulsed. And thus much for the second particular which we proposed to discuss.