Chapter LI · (continued 2)

PROPOSITION LXXII.

All things which in their participants have the relation of a subject, proceed from more perfect and total causes.

For the causes of a greater number of effects, are more powerful and total, and are nearer to the one than the causes of fewer effects. But the natures which give subsistence to such things as are antecedently the subjects of others, are among causes the sources of a greater number of effects.

COROLLARY.

From hence it is evident why matter which derives its subsistence from the one, is of itself destitute of form. And why body, though it participates of being, is of itself without the participation of soul. For matter being the subject of all things proceeds from the cause of all. But body being the subject of animation, derives its subsistence from that which is more total than soul, and participates after a certain manner of being.

PROPOSITION LXXIII.

Every whole is at the same time a certain being, and participates of being, but not every being is a whole.[237]

For either being and whole are the same, or the one is prior, but the other posterior. If, however, a part, so far as it is a part, is being (for a whole is from parts which have a being), yet it is not of itself also a whole. Being, therefore, and whole are not the same. For if this were the case, a part would be a non-entity. But if a part was a non-entity, the whole would have no existence. For every whole is a whole of parts, either as existing prior to them [and therefore causally containing them in itself], or as subsisting in them. But the part not existing, neither is it possible for the whole to exist. If, however, whole is prior to being, every being will immediately be a whole. Again, therefore, there will not be a part. This, however, is impossible. For if the whole is a whole, being the whole of a part, the part also being a part, will be the part of the whole. It remains, therefore, that every whole indeed is being, but that not every being is a whole.

COROLLARY.

From these things, it is evident that being which has a primary subsistence is beyond wholeness. For the one indeed, viz. being, is present with a greater number of things; since to be is present with parts, so far as they are parts. But the other, viz. wholeness, is present with a less number of things. For that which is the cause of a greater number of effects is more excellent; but the cause of a less number is of a subordinate nature, as has been demonstrated.

PROPOSITION LXXIV.

Every form is a certain whole; for it consists of many things, each of which gives completion to the form. But not every whole is a form.

For a particular[238] thing is a whole and also an individual, so far it is an individual, but neither of them is a form. For every whole consists of parts; but form is that which may be divided into individual forms. Whole, therefore, is one thing, and form another. And the one is present with many things, but the other with a few. Hence, whole is above the forms of beings.

COROLLARY.

From these things it is evident that whole has a middle order between being and forms. And hence it follows that being subsists prior to forms, and that forms are beings, but that not every being is form. Whence also, in effects, privations are in a certain respect beings, but are no longer forms, and in consequence of the unical power of being, they also receive a certain obscure representation of being.[239]

PROPOSITION LXXV.

Every cause which is properly so called, is exempt from its effect.

For if it is in the effect, it either gives completion to it, or is in a certain respect indigent of it in order to its existence, and thus it will be more imperfect than the thing caused. For being in the effect, it is rather a concause than a cause, and is either a part of that which is generated, or an instrument of the maker. For that which is a part in the thing generated, is more imperfect than the whole. The cause also which is in the effect, is an instrument of generation to the maker, being unable to define of itself the measures of production. Every cause, therefore, which is properly so denominated, if it is more perfect than that which proceeds from it, imparts to its effect the measure of generation, and is exempt from instruments and elements, and in short, from every thing which is called a concause.

PROPOSITION LXXVI.

Every thing which is generated from an immoveable cause, has a immutable hyparxis. But every thing which is generated from a moveable cause, has a mutable hyparxis.

For if that which makes is entirely immoveable, it does not produce from itself that which is secondary through motion, but by its very being. If, however, this be the case, it has that which proceeds from it concurrent with its own essence. And if this also be the case, it will produce as long as it exists. But it exists always, and therefore it always gives subsistence to that which is posterior to itself. Hence, this is always generated from thence, and always is, conjoining with the ever according to energy of the cause, its own ever according to progression. If, however, the cause is moved, that also which is generated from it will be essentially mutable. For that which has its being through motion, changes its being when its moveable cause[240] is changed. For if, though produced from motion, it should itself remain immutable, it would be better than its producing cause. This, however, is impossible. It will not, therefore, be immutable. Hence, it will be mutable, and will be essentially moved, imitating the motion of that which gave it subsistence.

PROPOSITION LXXVII.

Every thing which is in capacity proceeds from that which is in energy. And that which is in capacity, proceeds into energy. That also which is in a certain respect in capacity, so far as it is in capacity, is the offspring of that which is in a certain respect in energy. But that which is all things in capacity, proceeds from that which is all things in energy.

For that which is in capacity is not naturally adapted to produce itself into energy, because it is imperfect. For if being imperfect it should become the cause to itself of perfection, and this in energy, the cause will be more imperfect than that which is produced by it. Hence, that which is in capacity, so far as it is in capacity, will not be the cause to itself of a subsistence in energy. For on this hypothesis, so far as it is imperfect, it would be the cause of perfection; since every thing which is in capacity, so far as it is in capacity, is imperfect, but that which is in energy is perfect. Hence, if that which was in capacity becomes in energy, it will have its perfection from something else. And this will either be in capacity; but thus again the imperfect will be generative of the perfect; or it will be in energy, and either something else, or this which was in capacity will be that which becomes in energy. But if something else which is in energy produces, operating according to its own peculiarity, it will not by being in capacity make that which is in another to be in energy; nor will this which is now made be in energy, unless it becomes this so far as it was in capacity. It remains, therefore, that from that which is in energy, that which is in capacity must be changed into energy.

PROPOSITION LXXVIII.

Every power is either perfect or imperfect.

For the power which is prolific of energy is perfect. For it makes other things to be perfect through its own energies. That, however, which is perfective of other things is in a greater degree perfect, as being more self-perfect. But the power which is indigent of another that pre-exists in energy, according to which indigence it is something in capacity, is imperfect. For it is indigent of the perfection which is in another, in order that by participating of it, it may become perfect. Hence, such a power as this is of itself imperfect. So that the power of that which is in energy is perfect, being prolific of energy. But the power of that which is in capacity is imperfect, and obtains perfection from the power which is in energy.

PROPOSITION LXXIX.

Every thing which is generated, is generated from a two-fold power.[241]

For it is requisite that the thing generated should possess aptitude and an imperfect power. And that which makes being in energy[242] that which the thing generated is in capacity, antecedently comprehends a perfect power. For all energy proceeds from inherent power. For if that which makes did not possess power, how could it energize, and produce something else? And if that which is generated did not possess power according to aptitude, how could it be generated? For that which makes or acts, makes or acts in that which is able to suffer, but not in any casual thing, and which is not naturally adapted to suffer from the agent.

PROPOSITION LXXX.

Every body is naturally adapted of itself to suffer; but every thing incorporeal to act. And the former indeed is essentially inefficacious, but the latter is impassive. That which is incorporeal, however, suffers through its communion with body; just as bodies are able to act through the participation of incorporeals.

For body, so far as body, is alone divisible, and through this becomes passive, being entirely partible, and this to infinity. But that which is incorporeal, being simple, is impassive. For neither is that which is impartible, capable of being divided, nor can that be changed in quality which is not compounded. Either, therefore, nothing will be effective, or this must be affirmed of an incorporeal nature, since body, so far as body, does not act, because it is alone liable to be divided, and to suffer. For every thing which acts has an effective power; so that body, so far as it is body, will not act, but so far as it contains in itself a power of acting. Hence, when it acts, it acts through the participation of power. Moreover, incorporeal natures when they are inherent in bodies, participate of passions, being divided together with bodies, and enjoying their partible nature, though according to their own essence they are impartible.

PROPOSITION LXXXI.

Every thing which is participated in a separable manner, is present with its participant by a certain inseparable power which it inserts in it.

For if it is itself present with the participant in a separate manner, and is not in it, as if it possessed its subsistence in it, a certain medium between the two is necessary, connecting the one with the other, and which is more similar to that which is participated, and subsists in the participant. For if this medium is separable, how can it be participated by the participant, since the participant neither contains the medium, nor any thing proceeding from it? A power, therefore, and illumination proceeding from that which is separable into the participant conjoins both. Hence, one of these will be that through which the participation is effected, another will be that which is participated, and another that which participates.

PROPOSITION LXXXII.

Every thing incorporeal, which is converted to itself, when it is participated by other things, is participated in a separable manner.

For if in an inseparable manner, the energy of it would not be separate from its participant, as neither would its essence. If, however, this were the case, it would not be converted to itself. For being converted, it will be separate from its participant, each being different from the other. If, therefore, it is able to be converted to itself, it will be participated in a separable manner, when it is participated by other things.

PROPOSITION LXXXIII.

Every thing which has a knowledge of itself, is entirely converted to itself.

For knowing itself, it is evident that it is converted to itself in energy. For that which knows and that which is known are one. And the knowledge of itself is directed to itself as to that which is known. This knowledge also as pertaining to that which knows is a certain energy; but it is the knowledge of itself directed to itself, because it is gnostic of itself. Moreover, that it is converted to itself essentially, if it is so in energy, has been demonstrated. For every thing which by energizing is converted to itself, has also an essence verging to, and subsisting in itself.

PROPOSITION LXXXIV.

Every thing which always is, possesses an infinite power.

For if its hypostasis is never-failing, the power also according to which it is that which it is, and is able to exist, is infinite. For the power of existing being finite, it will some time or other fail. But this failing, the existence also of that which possesses it will fail, and it will no longer be that which always is. It is necessary, therefore, that the power of that which always is, and which connects and contains it essentially, should be infinite.

PROPOSITION LXXXV.

Every thing which is always becoming to be, or rising into existence, (αει γινομενον) possesses an infinite power of becoming to be.

For if it is always rising into existence, the power of generation in it is never-failing. For if this power was finite, it would cease in an infinite time. But the power of becoming to be ceasing, that which is rising into being according to this power would cease, and thus it would no longer be always becoming to be.[243] It is, however, supposed to be always becoming to be. Hence, it possesses an infinite power of rising into existence.

PROPOSITION LXXXVI.

Every thing which is truly being (οντως ον) is infinite, neither according to multitude, nor according to magnitude, but according to power alone.

For every infinite, is either in discrete, or in continued quantity, or in power. But that which always is, is infinite, as having an inextinguishable life, a never-failing hyparxis, and an undiminished energy. That which is eternally being, however, is neither infinite on account of magnitude; for that which is truly being is without magnitude, being self-subsistent; since every thing self-subsistent is impartible and simple. Nor is it infinite on account of multitude; for it has in the most eminent degree the form of the one, as being arranged most near, and being most allied to it. But it is infinite according to power. Hence, it is also impartible and infinite. And by how much the more it is one and impartible, by so much the more is it infinite. For the power which is divided, becomes imbecil and finite, and powers which are entirely divided, are in every respect finite. For ultimate powers, and which are most remote from the one, are in a certain respect finite, on account of their distribution into parts. But first powers, on account of their impartibility, are infinite. For a separation into parts divulses and dissolves the power of every thing. But impartibility compressing and contracting that which it contains, renders it never-failing, and undiminished in itself.

Moreover, infinity, according to magnitude, and also according to multitude, is entirely a privation and falling off from impartibility. For that which is finite is most near to the impartible, but the infinite is most remote from it, entirely departing from the one. Hence, that which is infinite according to power, is not infinite either according to multitude or magnitude, since infinite power subsists in conjunction with impartibility. But the infinite either in multitude or magnitude, is most remote from the impartible. If, therefore, that which is truly being was infinite either in magnitude or multitude, it would not possess infinite power. It does, however, possess infinite power; and therefore is not infinite either according to multitude, or according to magnitude.

PROPOSITION LXXXVII.

Every thing eternal indeed is being, but not every being is eternal.

For the participation of being is present in a certain respect with generated natures,[244] so far as each of these is not that which in no respect is. But if that which is generated is not entirely deprived of being, it is in a certain respect being. The eternal, however, is in no respect whatever present with generated natures, and especially not with such of these as do not even participate of the perpetuity which subsists according to the whole of time. Moreover, every thing eternal always is. For it participates of eternity, which imparts to the natures by which it is participated to be always that which they are. Being, therefore, is participated by a greater number of things than eternity. And hence being is beyond eternity. For by those natures by whom eternity is participated, being is also participated. But not every thing which participates of being, participates also of eternity.

PROPOSITION LXXXVIII.

Every thing[245] which is truly being, is either prior to eternity, or in eternity, or participates of eternity.

For that there is true being prior to eternity has been demonstrated. But true being is also in eternity. For eternity possesses the always in conjunction with being. And that which participates of eternity, has both the always and being, according to participation. Eternity, however, possesses the always primarily, but being according to participation. But being itself is primarily being.

PROPOSITION LXXXIX.

Every thing which is primarily being consists of bound and infinity.

For if it possesses infinite power, it is evident that it is infinite, and on this account consists from the infinite. If also it is impartible, and has the form of the one, through this, it participates of bound. For that which participates of unity is bounded. Moreover, it is impartible, and therefore possesses infinite power. Hence every thing which is truly [or primarily] being consists of bound and infinity.

PROPOSITION XC.

The first bound, and the first infinity subsist by themselves prior to every thing which consists of bound and the infinite.

For if beings which subsist by themselves, are prior to those which are certain beings, as being common to all essences, and principal causes, and not the causes of certain, but in short of all beings, it is necessary that the first bound, and the first infinity should be prior to that[246] which consists of both these. For the bound in that which is mixed [or the first being,] participates of infinity, and the infinite participates of bound. But of every thing, that which is the first, is nothing else than that which it is. It is not therefore proper that the first infinite should have the form of bound, or that the first bound should have the form of infinity. These therefore subsist primarily prior to that which is mixed.

PROPOSITION XCI.

Every power is either finite or infinite. But every finite power indeed derives its subsistence from infinite power. And infinite power subsists from the first infinity.

For the powers which have an existence at a certain time, are finite, falling from the infinity of existing always. But the powers of eternal beings are infinite, never deserting their own hyparxis.

PROPOSITION XCII.

Every multitude of infinite powers, is suspended from one first infinity, which does not subsist as a participated power, nor in things which are endued with power, but subsists by itself, not being the power of a certain participant, but the cause of all beings.

For though the first being possesses power, yet it is not power itself. For it has also bound. But the first power is infinity. For infinite powers are infinite, through the participation of infinity. Infinity itself therefore, will be prior to all powers, through which being also possesses infinite power, and all things participate of infinity. For infinity is not the first of things [or the ineffable principle of all] since that is the measure of all things, being the good and the one. Nor is infinity being. For this is infinite, but not infinity. Hence infinity subsists between that which is first and being, and is the cause of all infinite powers, and of all the infinity that is in beings.

PROPOSITION XCIII.

Every infinite which is in [true] beings, is neither infinite to the natures that are above beings, nor is it infinite to itself.

For that by which each thing is infinite, by this also it exists uncircumscribed. But every thing which is in [true] beings, is bounded by itself, and by all the things prior to it. It remains therefore, that the infinite which is in [true] beings, is infinite to subordinate natures alone, above which it is so expanded in power, as to be incomprehensible by all of them. For in whatever manner they may extend themselves towards this infinite, yet it has something[247] entirely exempt from them. And though all things enter into it, yet it has something occult, and incomprehensible by secondary natures. Though likewise it evolves the powers which it contains, yet it possesses something on account of its union insurmountable, contracted, and surpassing the evolution of beings. Since however, it contains and bounds itself, it will not be infinite to itself, nor much less to the natures situated above it, since it has a portion of the infinity which is in them. For the powers of more total natures are more infinite, in consequence of being more total, and having an arrangement nearer to the first infinity.

PROPOSITION XCIV.

Every perpetuity is indeed a certain infinity, but not every infinity is perpetuity.

For there are many infinites which have the infinite not on account of the always, such for instance, as the infinity according to magnitude, the infinity according to multitude, and the infinity of matter. And whatever else there may be of the like kind, which is infinite, either because it cannot be passed over, or through the indefiniteness of its essence. That perpetuity however is a certain infinity[248] is evident. For that which never fails is infinite. But this is that which always has its hypostasis inexhaustible. Infinity therefore, is prior to perpetuity. For that which gives subsistence to a greater number of effects, and is more total, is more causal. Hence, the first infinity is beyond eternity, and infinity itself is prior to eternity.

PROPOSITION XCV.

Every power which is more single, is more infinite than that which is multiplied.

For if of powers the first infinity is nearest to the one, that power which is more allied to the one, is in a greater degree infinite than that which recedes from it. For being multiplied it loses the form of the one, in which while it remained, it possessed a transcendency with respect to other powers, being connected and contained through its impartibility. For in partible natures themselves, the powers when congregated, are united,[249] but when divided, they are increased in number, and become obscured.

PROPOSITION XCVI.

The power which is infinite of every finite body, is incorporeal.

For if it were corporeal, if this body indeed is finite,[250] the infinite will be contained in the finite. But if the body is infinite, it will not be power so far as it is body. For if so far as it is body it is finite, but power is infinite, it will not be power so far as it is body. Hence, the power which is infinite in a finite body is incorporeal.

PROPOSITION XCVII.

In each series of things, every cause which has the relation of a leader, imparts to the whole series the peculiarity of itself; and that which the cause is primarily, the series is according to diminution.

For if it is the leader of the whole series, and all co-ordinate natures are co-arranged with reference to it, it is evident that it imparts to all that the series contains the one idea according to which they are arranged in that series. For either all things partake of similitude to this cause without a cause, or that which is the same in all is derived from it. But the former of these is impossible. For that which is without a cause is also fortuitous. But the fortuitous can never take place in things in which there is order, connection, and an invariable sameness of subsistence. From the cause therefore, which ranks as a leader, every series receives the peculiarity of the hypostasis of that cause. But if from it, it is evident that this is accompanied with a diminution and decrement adapted to secondary natures. For either the peculiarity exists similarly in the leader, and the natures that are secondary, and how in this case can the former be the leader, but the latter be allotted an hypostasis after the leader? Or it exists dissimilarly. And if this be the case, it is evident that sameness is derived to the multitude from one thing, but not vice versa. And the illustrious peculiarity of the series which is primarily in one thing [or the leader,] is secondarily in the multitude [suspended from the leading cause].

PROPOSITION XCVIII.

Every separate cause is at one and the same time every where and no where.

For by the communication of its own power it is every where. For this is a cause which replenishes the natures that are naturally adapted to participate of it, rules over all secondary beings, and is present to all things by the prolific progressions of its illuminations. But by an essence unmingled with things in place, and by its exempt purity, it is no where. For if it is separate, it is established above all things. In a similar manner also, it is in no one of the natures inferior to itself. For if it was alone every where, it would not indeed be prevented from being a cause, and from subsisting in all its participants. But it would not be prior to all of them in a separate manner. If also it was no where without being every where, it would not indeed be prevented from being prior to all things, and from being nothing pertaining to subordinate natures. But it would not be in all things, as causes are naturally adapted to be in their effects,[251] by the abundant and unenvying communications of themselves. In order therefore, that existing as a cause, it may be in all things that are able to partake of it, and that being separate in itself, it may be prior to all the natures that are filled by it, it is every where, and at the same time no where.

And it is not indeed partly every where and partly no where. For thus it would be divulsed and separate from itself, if one part of it was every where in all things, but another was no where, and prior to all things. But the whole of it is every where, and in a similar manner no where. For the things which are able to participate of it, meet with the whole of it, and find the whole present with themselves, that at the same time being wholly exempt from them. For the participant does not place this separate cause in itself, but participates of it as much as it is capable of receiving. Nor in the communication of itself does it become contracted by the multitude of the participations of it; for it is separate. Nor do its participants participate of it defectively; for that which imparts is every where.

PROPOSITION XCIX.

Every imparticipable, so far as it is imparticipable, does not derive its subsistence from another cause. But it is itself the principle and cause of all its participants. And thus every principle in each series is unbegotten.

For if it is imparticipable in its own proper series, it is allotted the principality, and does not proceed from other things. For it would no longer be the first, if it received this peculiarity, according to which it is imparticipable, from something else.[252] But if it is inferior to other things, and proceeds from them, it does not proceed from them so far as it is imparticipable, but so far as it participates. For of the things from which it originates, it doubtless participates, and it is not primarily the things of which it participates. Hence, it is not from a cause so far as it is imparticipable. For so far as it is from a cause it participates, and is not imparticipable. But so far as it is imparticipable, it is the cause of things that are participated, and is not itself a participant of other things.

PROPOSITION C.

Every series of wholes is extended to an imparticipable cause and principle. But all imparticipables are suspended from the one principle of all things.

For if each series suffers something which is the same [or a certain sameness,] there is something in each which is the leader, and the cause of this sameness. For as all beings are from unity, so every series is from unity. But again, all imparticipable monads are referred to the one; because all of them are analogous to the one. So far therefore, as they also suffer something which is the same through an analogy to the one, so far a reduction of them to the one is effected. And so far indeed, as all of them are from the one, no one of these is a principle. But so far as each is imparticipable, so far each is a principle. Hence, being the principles of certain things, they are suspended from the principle of all things. For that is the principle of all things of which all things participate. All things however alone entirely participate of the first; but of other things not all, but certain things participate. Hence also that [i.e. the ineffable] is simply the first, but other things are firsts with reference to a certain thing, but simply are not firsts.

PROPOSITION CI.

Imparticipable intellect is the leader of all things that participate of intellect, imparticipable life of all things that participate of life, and imparticipable being of all things that participate of being. But of these, being is prior to life, but life is prior to intellect.

For because in each series of beings, imparticipables are prior to things which are participated, it is necessary that intellect should be prior to intellectuals, that life should be prior to vital natures, and that being itself should be prior to beings. Because however, that which is the cause of a greater number of effects, precedes that which is the cause of a less number, hence, among these, being will be the first; for it is present with all things to which life and intellect are present. For every thing that lives and participates of intelligence necessarily is; but not vice versa. For many beings neither live, nor energize intellectually.[253] But life is the second. For all things that participate of intellect, participate also of life, but not vice versa. For many things live indeed, but are left destitute of knowledge. And intellect is the third. For every thing which is in any manner whatever gnostic, also lives and is. If therefore being is the cause of a greater number of effects, but life of a less number, and intellect of still fewer effects, being is the first, life the second, and intellect the third.

PROPOSITION CII.

All beings which exist in any manner whatever, consist of bound and the infinite through that which is primarily being. But all living beings are motive of themselves through the first life. And all gnostic beings participate of knowledge, through the first intellect.

For if that which is imparticipable in each series imparts its own peculiarity to all the natures under the same series, it is evident that the first being also imparts to all things bound, and at the same time infinity, since it is itself primarily mixed from these. Life also imparts to all things the motion which it possesses in itself. For life is the first progression and motion from the stable hypostasis of being. And intellect imparts knowledge to all things. For the summit of all knowledge is in intellect. And intellect is the first gnostic nature.

PROPOSITION CIII.

All things are in all, but appropriately in each.

For in being there is life and intellect; and in life, being and intellection; and in intellect being and life. But in intellect indeed, all things subsist intellectually, in life vitally, and in being, all things are truly beings. For since every thing subsists either according to cause, or according to hyparxis, or according to participation; and in the first, the rest are according to cause; in the second, the first is according to participation, but the third, according to cause; and in the third, the natures prior to it are according to participation;—this being the case, life and intellect have a prior or causal subsistence in being. Since however, each thing is characterized according to hyparxis, and neither according to cause (for cause pertains to other things, i.e. to effects) nor according to participation (for a thing derives that elsewhere of which it participates,)—hence in being there is truly life and intellection, essential life, and essential intellect. And in life, there is being indeed according to participation, but intellection according to cause. Each of these however, subsist there vitally. For the hyparxis is according to life. And in intellect, life and essence subsist according to participation, and each of these subsists there intellectually. For knowledge is the essence and the life of intellect.

PROPOSITION CIV.

Every thing which is primarily eternal, has both its essence and its energy eternal.

For if it primarily participates of the perpetuity of eternity, it does not partially participate of it, but entirely. For either it participates of it in energy, but not in essence. This however is impossible; since in this case, energy would be more excellent than essence. Or it participates of it according to essence, but does not participate of it according to energy. In this case however, that which is primarily eternal, and that which primarily participates of time will be the same. And time indeed, will primarily measure the essence of certain things, but eternity which is more excellent than all time, will not measure the essence of any thing, if that which is primarily eternal, is not essentially contained by eternity. Hence every thing which is primarily eternal, has both an eternal essence and energy.

PROPOSITION CV.

Every thing immortal is perpetual; but not every thing perpetual is immortal.

For if the immortal is that which always participates of life, but that which always participates of life, participates also of being, and that which always lives, always is,—hence, every thing immortal is perpetual. But the immortal is that which is unreceptive of death, and always lives. And the perpetual is that which is unreceptive of non-being, and always is. If however, there are many beings more and less excellent than life, which are unreceptive of death, but exist always;—if this be the case, not every thing which is perpetual is immortal. That however, there are many beings not immortal, that exist always, is evident. For there are certain beings indeed, which are destitute of life, but which exist always, and are indestructible. For as being is to life, so is the perpetual to the immortal. For the life which cannot be taken away is immortal, and the being which cannot be taken away is perpetual. But being is more comprehensive than life, and therefore the perpetual is more comprehensive than the immortal.[254]

PROPOSITION CVI.

The medium of every thing which is entirely eternal both in essence and energy, and of every thing which has its essence in time, is that which is partly indeed eternal, and partly is measured by time.

For that which has its essence comprehended by time, is entirely temporal. For by a much greater priority, this will be allotted a temporal energy. But that which is entirely temporal, is in every respect dissimilar to that which is entirely eternal. But all progressions are through similars. Hence there is something between these. The medium therefore, is either that which is eternal in essence, but temporal in energy, or vice versa. This latter however, is impossible. For energy would be more excellent than essence. It remains therefore, that the medium is the former of these.

PROPOSITION CVII.

Every thing which is partly eternal, and partly temporal, is at one and the same time being and generation.

For every thing eternal is being, and that which is measured by time is generation. So that if the same thing participates of time and eternity, yet not according to the same, it will be both being and generation.

COROLLARY.

From these things it is evident, that generation indeed, having a temporal essence, is suspended from that which partly partakes of being, and partly of generation, participating at once of eternity and time. But this is suspended from that which is in every respect eternal. And that which is in every respect eternal, is suspended from being which is prior to the eternal.

PROPOSITION CVIII.

Every thing which is partial in each order, is able to participate in a twofold respect of the monad which is in the proximately superior order, viz. either through its own wholeness or through that which is partial in the superior order, and co-ordinate with the thing according to an analogy to the whole series.

For if conversion is to all things through similitude, that which is partial in an inferior order, is dissimilar to that which is monadic and a whole in a superior order. And in short, is as that which is partial, to a whole, and as one order to another. But a partial nature is similar to a whole of the same series, through a communion of peculiarity, and to the proximately superior co-ordinate peculiarity through an analogous subsistence. It is evident, therefore, that through these media a conversion from one to the other is effected, as through similars to that which is similar.[255] For the one is similar as the partial to that which is partial, but the other as that which is the appropriate of the same series. But the whole of the superior series is dissimilar in both these respects.

PROPOSITION CIX.

Every[256] partial intellect participates of the unity which is above intellect and the first, both through the intellect which ranks as a whole, and through the partial unity which is co-ordinate with this partial intellect. Every partial soul, likewise, participates of the intellect which is a whole, through the soul which ranks as a whole, and through a partial intellect. And every partial nature of body participates of the soul which is a whole through the wholeness of nature, and a partial soul.

For every thing partial participates of the monad which is in a superior order, either through its proper wholeness, or through that which is partial in that order, and which is co-ordinate to the thing.

PROPOSITION CX.

Of all the things that are arranged in each series, such as are first, and are conjoined with their monad, are able to participate of the natures which are proximately established in the superior series, through analogy. But such as are more imperfect and remote from their proper principle, are not naturally adapted to enjoy these natures.

For because such things as are first, are allied to those in a superior series, being allotted a better and more divine nature in the order to which they belong, but such things as are more imperfect proceed further from their principle, and are allotted a secondary and ministrant, but not a primary and leading progression in the whole series;—this being the case, the former are necessarily connascently conjoined to the things in a superior order; but the latter are unadapted to be conjoined with them. For all things are not of an equal dignity, though they may belong to the same order. For there is not one and the same ratio in all. But all things proceed from their proper monad, as from one, and with reference to one thing. Hence, they are not allotted the same power. But some things are able to receive proximately the participations[257] of superior natures; while others being dissimilar to them by proceeding to a greater distance from their principles, are deprived of a power of this kind.

PROPOSITION CXI.

Of every intellectual series, some things are divine intellects, receiving the participations of the Gods; but others are intellects alone. And of every psychical series, some things are intellectual souls, suspended from their proper intellects; but others are souls alone. Of all corporeal natures, likewise, some have souls supernally presiding over them, but others are natures alone, destitute of the presence of souls.

For of each series, not the whole genus is adapted to be suspended from that which is prior to itself, but that which is more perfect in it, and sufficient to be connascent with superior natures. Neither, therefore, is every intellect suspended from deity, but those intellects only which are supreme and most single. For these are allied to the divine unities. Nor do all souls participate of participable intellect,[258] but such only as are most intellectual. Nor do all corporeal natures enjoy the presence of soul, and of the soul which is participated, but those only that are more perfect, and possess in a greater degree the form of reason. And this is the mode of demonstration in all things.

PROPOSITION CXII.

Of every order those things that are first, have the form of the natures prior to them.

For the highest genera in each order, are conjoined through similitude to the natures placed above them,[259] and through the connexion and coherence of the progression of wholes. Hence, such as the superior natures are primarily, such also is the form which these highest genera are allotted, and which is allied to the nature of those in the superior order. They are also such according to the peculiarity of subsistence as are the natures prior to them.

PROPOSITION CXIII.

Every divine number is unical.

For if a divine number has a precedaneous cause, viz. the one, just as an intellectual number has intellect, and a psychical number soul, and if multitude is every where analogous to its cause, it is evident that a divine number is unical, since the one is God. But this follows, since the one and the good are the same. For the good and God are the same. For that beyond which there is nothing, and after which all things aspire, is God. And also that from which all things proceed, and to which all things tend. But this is good. If therefore, there is a multitude of Gods, the multitude is unical. But that there is, is evident. For every principal cause is the leader of an appropriate multitude which is similar and allied to the cause.

PROPOSITION CXIV.

Every God is a self-perfect unity, and every self-perfect unity is a God.

For if the number of unities is twofold, as has been before demonstrated, and some are self-perfect, but others are illuminations from the self-perfect unities, and if a divine number is allied to and connatural with the one and the good, the Gods are self-perfect unities. And vice versa, if there is a self-perfect unity it is a God. For as unity is in the most eminent degree allied to the one, and the self-perfect to the good, so likewise according to both these the self-perfect participates of the divine peculiarity and is a God. But if a God was a unity, yet not a self-perfect unity, or a self-perfect hypostasis, yet not a unity, he would be arranged in another order, on account of the mutation of the peculiarity.[260]

PROPOSITION CXV.

Every God is superessential, supervital, and superintellectual.

For if each is a self-perfect unity, but neither being, life, or intellect is a unity, but that which is united, it is evident that every God is beyond each of these. For if these differ from each other, but all are in all, each of these being all will not be one only. Farther still, if the first God is superessential, but every God is of the series of the first, so far as a God, each will be superessential. But that the first God is superessential,[261] is evident. For essence is not the same with unity, nor is to exist the same thing as to be united. If, however, these are not the same, either the first God is both these, and in this case he will not be one only, but something else besides the one, and will participate of unity, but will not be the one itself; or he is one of these. But if indeed he is essence, he will be indigent of the one. It is, however, impossible that the good, and the first should be indigent. Hence, he is one alone; and therefore superessential. But if each thing imparts the peculiarity of that which it is primarily to the whole series [of which it is the leader], hence, every divine number is superessential; since every principal cause produces similars prior to dissimilars. If, therefore, the first God is superessential, all the Gods will be superessential. For they will be entirely similar [to the first]. Since, however, they are also essences, they will be produced from the first essence, as the monads of essences.

PROPOSITION CXVI.

Every deity except the one is participable.

For that the one is imparticipable is evident, since if it were participated, and on this account pertained to something else, it would no longer be similarly the cause of all things; both of such as are prior to beings, and of beings themselves. But that the other unities are participated, we shall thus demonstrate. For if there is another imparticipable unity after the first, in what does it differ from the one? For either it subsists after the same manner as that; and how in this case is the one the second, but the other first? Or it does not subsist after the same manner. And thus one of these will be the one itself, but the other one and not one. This non-one also, if it is no hypostasis whatever, will be one alone. But if it is a certain other hypostasis besides the one, in this case the one will be participated by the non-one. And that will be a self-perfect one, which conjoins the non-one with the one. So that again God will be this [viz. the one] so far as he is God. But that which is non-one will subsist in the participation of the one. Every unity, therefore, which subsists after the one is participable, and every God is participable.

PROPOSITION CXVII.

Every God is the measure of beings.

For if every God is unical, he defines and measures all the multitude of beings. For all multitudes being in their own nature indefinite, are bounded through the one. But that which is one being [or being characterized by the one] measuring and terminating the natures with which it is present, leads into bound that which according to its own power is not bounded. For the one being has the form of the one by participation.

But that which is uniform, or has the form of the one, recedes from indefiniteness and infinity. And by how much the more uniform it is, by so much the less[264] is it indefinite, and without measure. Every multitude of beings, therefore, is measured by the divine unities.

PROPOSITION CXVIII.

Every thing which is in the Gods pre-exists in them according to their peculiarities. And the peculiarity of the Gods is unical and superessential. Hence, all things are contained in them unically and superessentially.

For if every thing subsists in a three-fold manner, viz. either according to cause, or according to hyparxis, or according to participation, but the first number of all things is the divine number, nothing will be in the Gods according to participation, but all things will subsist in them either according to hyparxis, or according to cause. Such things, however, as they antecedently comprehend, as being the causes of all things, they antecedently comprehend in a manner appropriate to their own union. For every thing which is the leader of secondary natures causally, contains the cause of things subordinate, in a way naturally adapted to itself. All things, therefore, are in the Gods unically and superessentially.

PROPOSITION CXIX.

Every God subsists according to superessential goodness, and is good neither according to participation, nor according to essence, but superessentially; since habits and essences are allotted a secondary and manifold order from the Gods.

For if the first God is the one and the good, and so far as he is the one, he is also the good, and so far as the good, the one, if this be the case, every series of the Gods has the form of the one, and the form of the good, according to one peculiarity, and each of the Gods is not a unity and goodness according to any thing else. But each so far as he is a unity, so far he is a goodness, and so far as he is a goodness, so far he is a unity. So far also as the Gods posterior to the first God proceed from the first, they have the form of the good, and the form of the one, since the first is the one and the good. But so far as all of them are Gods, they are unities and goodnesses. As, therefore, the one of the Gods is superessential, so likewise is their goodness, since it is nothing else than the one. For each of them is not any thing else than the good, but is good alone; as neither is each any thing else than the one, but is one alone.

PROPOSITION CXX.

Every God possesses in his own hyparxis a providential inspection of the whole of things. And a providential energy is primarily in the Gods.

For all other things which are posterior to the Gods, energize providentially through the participation of them. But providence is connascent with the Gods. For if to impart good to the subjects of providential energy, is the prerogative of the providential peculiarity, but all the Gods are goodnesses, either they do not impart themselves to anything, and thus nothing will be good in secondary natures. And whence will that be derived which subsists according to participation, except from those natures that primarily possess peculiarities? Or if they do impart themselves, they impart good, and in consequence of this providentially attend to all things. Providence, therefore, subsists primarily in the Gods. For where is the energy which is prior to intellect, except in superessential natures? But providence (προνοια), as the name signifies, is an energy prior to intellect (ενεργεια εστι προ νου). The Gods, therefore, from being Gods, and from being goodnesses, provide for all things, and fill all things with the goodness which is prior to intellect.

PROPOSITION CXXI.

Every divine nature has indeed for its hyparxis goodness, but possesses a power which is unsubdued and at once incomprehensible by all secondary natures.

For if it providentially attends to the whole of things, there is in it a power which has dominion over the subjects of its providential energy; through which being unsubdued and uncircumscribed by all things, divine natures fill all things with, and subject all things to themselves. For every thing of a ruling nature, which is the cause of other things, and has dominion over them, rules through abundance of power, and predominates according to nature.

The first power, therefore, is in the Gods, not indeed having dominion over some things, but not over others, but equally comprehending in itself according to cause the powers of all beings, this power neither being essential, nor much less unessential; but being connascent with the hyparxis of the Gods, and superessential. Moreover, the boundaries of all knowledge, presubsist uniformly in the Gods. For through divine knowledge, which is exempt from the whole of things, all other knowledge has a subsistence; this knowledge neither being intellectual, nor much less, being a certain knowledge posterior to intellect, but being established according to the divine peculiarity above intellect. Whether, therefore, there is a divine knowledge, this knowledge is occult and uniform [or has the form of the one]. Or whether there is a power uncircumscribed by all things, this power is in a similar manner comprehensive of all things. Or whether there is a divine goodness, this goodness defines the hyparxis of the Gods. For if all things are in the Gods, knowledge, power, and goodness are also in them. But their hyparxis is characterized by that which is most excellent, and their hypostasis also is according to that which is best. But this is goodness.

PROPOSITION CXXII.

Every thing divine provides for secondary natures, and is exempt from the subjects of its providential care, providence neither relaxing the unmingled and unical transcendency of that which is divine, nor a separate union abolishing providence.

For divine beings abiding in their unical nature, and in their own hyparxis, fill all things with the power of themselves. And every thing which is able to participate of them, enjoys the good which it is capable of receiving, according to the measures of its proper hypostasis; divine natures, in the mean time, illuminating beings with good, by their very essence, or rather prior to essence. For that which is divine being nothing else than goodness, it supplies all things with an unenvying abundance of good, by its very being, not making a distribution according to a reasoning process; but other things receiving indeed according to their desert, and divine natures according to their hyparxis. Neither, therefore, in providing for other things, do they receive a habitude, or alliance with the subjects of their providential care. For they benefit all things by being that which they are. But every thing which makes by its very essence, makes without habitude, and with an unrestrained energy. For habitude is an addition to essence. Hence also it is preternatural. Nor being separate, do they withdraw their providential care. For thus they would subvert, which it is not lawful to say, their own hyparxis, the peculiarity of which is goodness. For it is the province of goodness to extend itself to every thing which is able to participate of it. And the greatest of all things is not that which is boniform, but that which is beneficent. Either, therefore, no being will possess this beneficent nature, or the Gods will possess it prior to beings. For it is not possible that a greater good should be present with the natures that are good by participation, but a less good with those that are primarily good.

PROPOSITION CXXIII.

Every thing divine is itself indeed, on account of its superessential union, ineffable and unknown to all secondary natures; but it is comprehended and known by its participants. Hence, that which is first, is alone perfectly unknown, as being imparticipable.

For all knowledge which subsists through reasoning and language, pertains to beings, and in beings possesses the apprehension of truth. For it comes into contact with conceptions, and subsists in intellections. But the Gods are beyond all beings. Neither, therefore, is that which is divine doxastic, or the object of opinion, nor is it dianoëtic, nor intelligible. For every being is either sensible, and on this account doxastic, or truly existing being, and on this account intelligible, or it is between these, subsisting as being and at the same time generation, and on this account is dianoëtic. If, therefore, the Gods are superessential, and subsist prior to beings, there is neither any opinion of them, nor science and dianoia, nor intellection. But the nature of their peculiarities is known by the beings that are suspended from them. And this by a necessary consequence. For the differences of participants are co-divided conformably to the peculiarities of the participated natures. And neither does every thing participate of every thing; for there is no co-ordination of things perfectly dissimilar. Nor does any casual thing participate of that which is casual. But that which is kindred is conjoined to that which is kindred, and proceeds from that to which it is allied.

PROPOSITION CXXIV.

Every God knows partible natures impartibly, temporal natures, without time, things which are not necessary, necessarily, mutable natures, immutably; and in short, all things in a manner more excellent than the order of the things known.

For if every thing which is with the Gods, is with them according to their peculiarity, it is evident that the knowledge in the Gods of things inferior, will not subsist according to the nature of the inferior things, but according to the exempt transcendency of the Gods. Hence, their knowledge of multiplied and passive natures, will be uniform and impassive. If, therefore, the object of knowledge is partible, divine knowledge will be impartible. If the objects that are known are mutable, the knowledge of the Gods will be immutable; if they are contingent, they will be known by the Gods necessarily; and if they are indefinite, definitely. For that which is divine, does not receive knowledge from subordinate beings, in order that thus the knowledge may be such as is the nature of the thing known. But subordinate beings become indefinite about the definite nature of the Gods, are changed about their immutability, receive passively that which is impassive in them, and temporally that which in them is without time. For it is possible for subordinate to be surpassed by more excellent natures; but it is not lawful for the Gods to receive any thing from beings inferior to themselves.

PROPOSITION CXXV.

Every God, from that order from which he began to unfold himself into light, proceeds through all secondary natures, always indeed multiplying and dividing the communications of himself, but preserving the peculiarity of his own hypostasis.

For progressions being effected through diminution, first natures are every where after a manner multiplied into the decrements of secondary natures. But these proceeding according to a similitude to their producing causes receive their orderly distribution, so that the whole of that which proceeds is after a manner the same with, and different from, that which abides; through its diminution indeed, appearing to be different, but through continuity with its cause, not departing from sameness with it. But such as that which abides is among first, such is that which proceeds, among secondary natures; and thus an indissoluble communion of the series is preserved. Each of the Gods, therefore, is unfolded into light appropriately, in the orders in which he makes his evolution. But he proceeds from thence, as far as to the last of things, through the generative power of first natures. He is always, however, multiplied according to a progression from unity into multitude. But he preserves sameness in the progression, through the similitude of the things that proceed to the leader and primary cause of each series.

PROPOSITION CXXVI.

Every God who is nearer to the one is more total, but the God who is more remote from it is more partial.

For the God, who is the cause of a greater number of effects, is nearer to that which produces all things; but he who is the cause of a less number is more remote from it. And he indeed, who is the cause of a greater number of effects, is more total; but he who is the cause of a less number, is more partial. And each indeed, is a unity; but the one is greater, and the other less in power. The more partial Gods also are generated from the more total; the latter not being divided, for they are unities; nor changed in quality, for they are immoveable; nor multiplied by habitude, for they are unmingled. But they generate secondary progressions from themselves, which are the decrements of the natures prior to them, through abundance of power.

PROPOSITION CXXVII.

Every thing divine, is especially primarily simple, and on this account most sufficient to itself.

For that it is indeed simple, is evident from its union; since every thing divine is most unical. But a thing of this kind is transcendently simple. That it is also most sufficient to itself, may be learnt by considering that a composite nature is indigent, if not of other things to which it is external, yet of those things of which it is composed. But that which is most simple and unical, and which establishes itself in the good, is most sufficient to itself. Such, however, is every thing divine. Neither, therefore, is it indigent of other things, existing as goodness itself, nor of things requisite to composition, because it is unical.

PROPOSITION CXXVIII.

Every God, when participated by natures nearer to himself, is participated without a medium; but when participated by natures more remote from himself, the participation is through a less or greater[265] number of media.

For the former through their alliance being uniform, are immediately able to participate of the divine unities; but the latter through their diminution, and extension into multitude, require other things which are more united, in order that they may participate of the unities themselves, and not of things united. For united multitude subsists between unity itself and divided multitude; being indeed able[266] to coalesce with unity, but allied in a certain respect to divided multitude, through the representation of multitude.

PROPOSITION CXXIX.

Every divine body is divine through a deified soul. But every soul is divine through a divine intellect. And every intellect is divine through the participation of a divine unity. And unity indeed is of itself a God; intellect is most divine; soul is divine; but body is deiform. For if every number of the Gods is above intellect, but participations are effected through kindred and similar natures, the impartible essence will primarily participate of the superessential unities. But the nature which comes into contact with generation will participate of them secondarily. And generation in the third place. Each of these likewise participates of them through the proximately superior natures. And the peculiarity of the Gods indeed proceeds, as far as to the last of things, in its participants; but through media allied to itself. For unity indeed imparts the transcendent power of itself to the first intellect, among divine natures, and causes this intellect to be like itself according to unical multitude. But through intellect it is also present with soul, conjoining soul with intellect and co-inflaming it [with divine fire], when this intellect is participable. And through the echo[267] of soul, imparting also to body its own peculiarity, if it is a body which participates something of soul. And thus body becomes not only animated and intellectual, but also divine. For it receives life indeed and motion from soul; but indissoluble permanency from intellect; and divine union from participated unity.[268] For each of these imparts its own hyparxis to the subsequent natures.

PROPOSITION CXXX.

In every divine order, such things as are first, are in a greater degree exempt from the natures proximately arranged under them, than these latter are from things subsequent. And secondary natures in a greater degree adhere to their proximate superiors, than following natures to these.

For by how much more unical and total any thing is, by so much the more is it allotted a greater transcendency with respect to subsequent natures. And by how much the more diminished it is according to power, by so much the more is it connascent with the natures posterior to itself. And more elevated natures indeed are more united with their more principal causes; but inferior natures are less united with them. For it is the province of a greater power to be more exempt from subordinate, and to be more united to better natures. As on the contrary, it is the province of a diminution of power, to recede in a greater degree from more excellent, and to be co-passive with subordinate natures. And this happens to secondary, but not to first natures, in every order of things.

PROPOSITION CXXXI.

Every God begins his own energy from himself.

For he first exhibits the peculiarity of his presence with secondary natures, in himself; because he imparts himself to other things also according to his own exuberant plenitude. For neither is deficiency adapted to the Gods, nor fulness alone. For every thing deficient is imperfect, and not being itself perfect, it is impossible it should make another thing to be perfect. But that which is full is alone sufficient to itself, and is not yet prepared to communicate. It is necessary, therefore, that the nature which fills other things, and which extends to other things the communications of itself should be super-plenary or exuberantly full. Hence, if a divine nature fills all things from itself with the good which it contains in itself, it is exuberantly full. And if this be the case, establishing first in itself the peculiarity which it imparts to others, it will extend to them the communications of super-plenary goodness.

PROPOSITION CXXXII.

All the orders of the Gods are bound in union by a medium.

For all the progressions of beings are effected through similars; and much more will the orders of the Gods possess an indissoluble continuity, as subsisting uniformly, and being defined according to the one, which is the principal cause of their existence. The decrements, therefore, are produced unitedly, and alone according to the similitude in beings of secondary to first natures. And this, because the hyparxis of the Gods much more consists in union than the subsistence of beings. All the divine genera, therefore, are bound together by appropriate media; and first natures do not proceed into progressions perfectly different without a medium, but through the genera common to each, from which they proceed, and of which they are immediately the causes. For these congregate the extremes into one union, being spread under some things connascently, but proximately exempt from others. And they preserve the well-ordered generation of divine natures.

PROPOSITION CXXXIII.

Every God is a beneficent unity or an unific (ενοποιος) goodness; and each, so far as a God, possesses this hyparxis. The first God, however, is simply good, and simply one. But each posterior to the first, is a certain goodness, and a certain unity.

For the divine peculiarity distinguishes the unities and goodnesses of the Gods, so that each according to a certain peculiarity of goodness, such as that of perfecting, or connectedly-containing, or defending, benefits all things. For each of these is a certain good, but not every good. But the first God pre-establishes a unical cause. Hence, that is the good, as giving subsistence to all goodness. For all the hyparxes of the Gods, are not together equal to the one; so great a transcendency is the first God allotted with respect to the multitude of the Gods.

PROPOSITION CXXXIV.

Every divine intellect, intellectually perceives indeed, as intellect, but energizes providentially as a God.

For it is the illustrious prerogative of intellect to know beings, and to have its perfection in intellections. But it is the province of a God to energize providentially, and to fill all things with good. This communication, however, and replenishing with good, is accomplished through the union of the replenishing natures with the causes prior to themselves; which intellect, also imitating, passes into sameness with intelligibles. A divine intellect, therefore, so far as it energizes providentially, is a God; providence being established in an energy prior to intellect. Hence, as a God it imparts itself to all things; but as intellect it is not present with all things. For a divine nature extends to things into which the intellectual peculiarity does not proceed. For beings which are without intellect desire to energize providentially, and to participate of a certain good. But this is because all things indeed do not aspire after intellect, not even all such as are able to participate of it. All things, however, aspire after good, and hasten to obtain it.

PROPOSITION CXXXV.

Every divine unity is participated by some being immediately, or without a medium; and every deified nature is extended to one divine unity. As many also as are the participated unities, so many are the participating genera of beings.

For neither two or more unities are participated by one being. For since the peculiarities in the unities are different, must not that which is connascent with each be different also, since contact is effected through similitude? Nor is one unity participated in a divided manner by many beings. For many beings are unadapted to be conjoined with unity, and as beings they are unconjoined with the unity which is prior to beings, and as many, they are separated from unity. It is necessary, however, that the thing which participates should be partly similar to that which is participated, and partly different and dissimilar. Since, therefore, that which participates is something belonging to beings, but unity is superessential, and according to this they are dissimilar; it is necessary that the participant should be one, in order that according to this, it may be similar to the one which is participated, though of these, the latter is one in such a manner as to be unity, but the former, so as to be passive to the one, and to be united through the participation of unity.

PROPOSITION CXXXVI.

Every God who is more total, and arranged nearer to the first, is participated by a more total genus of beings. But the God who is more partial, and more remote from the first, is participated by a more partial genus of beings. And as being is to being, so is one divine unity to another.

For if unities are as many in number as beings, and vice versa, and one unity is participated by one being, it is evident that the order of beings proceeds according to the order of the unities, being assimilated to the order prior to beings. And more total beings indeed are connascent with more total unities; but more partial beings with more partial unities. For if this were not the case, again similars would be conjoined with dissimilars, and there would not be a distribution according to desert. These things, however, are impossible. Since from thence the one, and an appropriate measure are luminously imparted to all things, and from these proceed. Much more, therefore, will there be an order of participation in these, similars being suspended as much as possible from similars.

PROPOSITION CXXXVII.

Every unity in conjunction with the one gives subsistence to the being which participates of it.

For the one, as it gives subsistence to all things, so likewise it is the cause of the participated unities, and of beings suspended from these unities. But the unity belonging to every being produces the peculiarity which shines forth in that particular being. And the one indeed is the cause of existence simply; but unity is the cause of alliance, because it is connascent with the one. Hence, unity is that which of itself defines the being which participates of it, and essentially exhibits in itself a superessential peculiarity. For every where, from that which is primary that which is secondary is that which it is. If, therefore, there is a certain superessential peculiarity of deity, this also belongs to the being which participates of it superessentially.

PROPOSITION CXXXVIII.

Of all the deified natures which participate of the divine peculiarity, the first and highest is being itself.

For if being is beyond intellect and life, as has been demonstrated, and if it is also after the one the cause of the greatest number of effects, being will be the highest deified nature. For it is more single than life and intellect, and is on this account entirely more venerable. But there is not any thing else prior to it except the one. For prior to unical multitude what else can there be except the one? But being is unical multitude as consisting of bound and infinity. And in short, the superessential one[269] is prior to essence. Since also in the illuminations which are imparted to secondary natures, the one alone extends beyond being. But being is immediately posterior to the one. For that which is being in capacity, but is not yet being, is nevertheless according to its own nature one. And that which follows the being that is in capacity is now being in energy. Hence, in the principles of things, non-being is immediately beyond being, as something more excellent, and no other than the one itself.

PROPOSITION CXXXIX.

All things which participate of the divine unities, originate indeed from being, but end in a corporeal nature.

For being is the first of participants, but body the last; for we say that there are divine bodies. For the highest of all the genera of bodies, souls and intellects, are attributed to the Gods, that in every order, things analogous to the Gods may connect and preserve secondary natures, and that each number may be a whole, containing all things in itself, according to the whole which is in a part, and possessing prior to other things the divine peculiarity. The divine genus, therefore, subsists corporeally, psychically, and intellectually. And it is evident that all these are divine according to participation. For that which is primarily divine subsists in the unities. Hence, the participants of the divine unities originate indeed from being, but end in a corporeal nature.

PROPOSITION CXL.

All the powers of divine natures, having a supernal origin, and proceeding through appropriate media, extend as far as to the last of things, and to places about the earth.

For neither does any thing intercept these powers, and exclude them from being present with all things. For they are not in want of places and intervals, on account of their unrestrained transcendency with respect to all things, and a presence every where unmingled. Nor is that which is adapted to participate of them, prohibited from participation. But as soon as any thing is prepared for participation, they also are present, neither then approaching, nor prior to this being absent, but always possessing an invariable sameness of subsistence. If, therefore, any terrene nature is adapted to the participation of these divine powers, they are present with it, and fill all things with themselves. And indeed they are in a greater degree present with superior natures. But they are present with those of a middle nature, according to the order which they possess. And with such natures as are last, they are present in an ultimate degree. From on high, therefore, they extend themselves as far as to the last of things. Hence also, in last natures there are representations of such as are first, and all things sympathize with all;[270] secondary indeed, pre-existing in first natures, but first natures presenting themselves to the view in such as are second. For every thing subsists in a three-fold manner, either according to cause, or according to hyparxis, or according to participation.

PROPOSITION CXLI.

Every providence of the Gods is twofold, one indeed being exempt from the natures for which it provides, but the other being co-arranged with them.

For some divine essences indeed, according to hyparxis, and the peculiarity of their order, are entirely expanded above the illuminated natures. But others being of the same order, provide for things subordinate that are of the same co-ordination; these also imitating the providential energy of the exempt Gods, and desiring to fill secondary natures with the good which they are able to impart.

PROPOSITION CXLII.

The Gods are present with all things after the same manner, but all things are not after the same manner present with the Gods. But every thing participates of their presence according to its own order and power. And this is accomplished by some things uniformly, but by others manifoldly; by some things eternally, but by others according to time; and by some things incorporeally, but by others corporeally.

For it is necessary that the different participation of the same things, should become different, either from the participant, or from that which is participated. But every thing divine always possesses the same order, and is without habitude to, and unmingled with all things. It remains therefore, that the mutation must subsist from the participants, and that in these that which is not invariably the same must be found, and that at different times they are differently present with the Gods. Hence, the Gods being present with all things with invariable sameness, all things are not after the same manner present with them. But other things are present with them as far as they are able, and according to the manner in which they are present they enjoy their illuminations. For the participation is according to the measure of the presence of the divinities.

PROPOSITION CXLIII.

All inferior natures fail before the presence of the Gods, though that which participates of them may be adapted to participation. Every thing foreign indeed from divine light becomes far removed from it. But all things are illuminated at once by the Gods.

For divine natures are always more comprehensive and more powerful than the things which proceed from them. But the inaptitude of the participants, becomes the cause of the privation[271] of divine illumination. For this inaptitude obscures it by its own imbecility. And this being obscured, something else appears to receive dominion, not according to its own power, but according to the imbecility of the participant, which seems to rise against the divine form of the illumination.

PROPOSITION CXLIV.

All beings, and all the distributions of beings, extend as far in their progressions, as the orders of the Gods.

For the Gods produce beings in conjunction with themselves, nor is any thing able to subsist, and to receive measure and order external to the Gods, [or beyond their influence.] For all things are perfected through their power, and are arranged and measured by the Gods. Prior therefore to the last genera in beings, the Gods pre-exist, who also adorn these genera, and impart to them life, formation and perfection, and convert them to the good. In a similar manner also, the Gods are prior to the middle and first genera of beings. And all things are bound and rooted in the Gods, and through this cause are preserved. But when any thing apostatizes from, and becomes destitute of the Gods, it entirely departs into non-entity and vanishes, in consequence of being perfectly deprived of those natures by which it was contained.

PROPOSITION CXLV.

The peculiarity of every divine order pervades through all secondary natures, and imparts itself to all the subordinate genera of beings.

For if beings proceed as far as the orders of the Gods extend, in every genus of beings, there is a supernally-illuminated peculiarity of the divine powers. For every thing receives from its proximate appropriate cause, the peculiarity according to which that cause is allotted its subsistence. I say for instance, if there is a certain cathartic or purifying deity, there is also a purification in souls, in animals, in plants, and in stones. And in a similar manner, if there is a guardian, a convertive, a perfective, and a vivific power. And a stone indeed participates of the divine cathartic power in a corporeal manner only. But a plant participates it still more clearly according to life. An animal possesses this form according to impulse; the rational soul rationally; intellect, intellectually; and the Gods superessentially and unically. The whole series also has the same power from one divine cause. And there is the same mode of reasoning with respect to the peculiarities of the other divine powers. For all things are suspended from the Gods. And different natures are illuminated by different Gods; every divine series extending as far as to the last of things. And some things indeed are suspended from the Gods immediately, but others through a greater or less number of media. But all things are full[272] of Gods. And whatever any thing naturally possesses, it derives from the Gods.

PROPOSITION CXLVI.

The ends of all the divine progressions are assimilated to their principles, preserving a circle without a beginning and without an end, through conversion to their principles.

For if every thing that has proceeded, is converted to the proper principle from which it proceeded, much more will total orders having proceeded from their summit be again converted to it. But the conversion of the end to the beginning, renders the whole order one, definite, and converging to itself, and exhibiting through the convergency, that which has the form of the one in the multitude.

PROPOSITION CXLVII.

The summits of all the divine orders are assimilated to the ends of the natures [proximately] situated above them.

For if it is necessary that there should be an uninterrupted connection of the divine progression, and that each order should be bound together by appropriate media, it is necessary that the summits of secondary should be conjoined with the terminations of first orders. But this contact is through similitude. Hence there will be a similitude of the principles of an inferior, to the ends of a [proximately] superior order.

PROPOSITION CXLVIII.

Every divine order is united to itself in a three-fold manner, from the summit which is in it, from its middle, and from its end.

For the summit possessing a power which is most single, transmits union to all the series, and unites the whole of it supernally abiding in itself. But the middle extending to both the extremes, binds together the whole order about itself; transmitting indeed, the gifts of primary divine natures, but extending the powers of such as are last, and inserting communion in all of them, and a conjunction with each other. For thus the whole order becomes one, from natures that replenish and those that are filled, converging to the middle as to a certain centre. And the end again returning to the beginning, and recalling the proceeding powers, imparts similitude and convergency to the whole order. And thus the whole order is one through the unific power of primary natures, through the connexion existing in the middle, and through the conversion of the end to the principle of the progressions.

PROPOSITION CXLIX.

Every multitude of the divine unities is bounded according to number.

For if this multitude is most near to the one it will not be infinite. For the infinite is not connascent with, but foreign from the one. Indeed, if multitude is of itself, or in its own nature, separated from the one, it is evident that infinite multitude is perfectly destitute of it. Hence it is powerless, and inefficacious. The multitude of the Gods therefore, is not infinite. Hence it has the form of the one and is finite, and is more finite than every other multitude. For it is nearer to the one than all other multitude. If therefore the principle of things was multitude, it would be necessary that what is nearer to the principle should be a greater multitude than what is more remote from it. For that which is nearer to any thing is more similar to it. Since however, that which is first is the one, the multitude which is conjoined with it, is a less multitude than that which is more remote from it. But the infinite is not a less, but is the greatest possible multitude.

PROPOSITION CL.

Every thing which proceeds in the divine orders, is not naturally adapted to receive all the powers of its producing cause. Nor in short, are secondary natures able to receive all the powers of the natures prior to themselves, but the latter have certain powers exempt from things in an inferior order, and incomprehensible by the beings posterior to themselves.

For if the peculiarities of the Gods differ from each other, those of the subordinate pre-exist in the superior divinities; but those of the superior being more total, are not in the subordinate. But more excellent natures impart indeed some things to their progeny, but antecedently assume others in themselves, in an exempt manner. For it has been demonstrated that those Gods who are nearer to the one are more total; and those more remote from it more partial. But if the more total have powers comprehensive of the more partial, those that have a secondary and more partial order, will not comprehend the power of the more total Gods. In the superior therefore, there is something incomprehensible and uncircumscribed by the inferior orders. For each of the divine orders is truly infinite.[273] Nor is that which is infinite, as has been demonstrated,[274] infinite to itself, nor much less to things above itself, but to all the natures posterior to itself. But infinite in these last is incapacity. The infinite however, is incomprehensible by those natures to which it is infinite. Subordinate natures therefore, do not participate of all the powers which more excellent natures antecedently comprehend in themselves. For the latter are incomprehensible by the former. Hence things of a secondary nature, from their more partial subsistence, will neither possess all the powers of more excellent beings, nor will they possess the powers which they do contain after the same manner as superior natures, on account of that infinity through which the latter transcend the former.

PROPOSITION CLI.

Every thing paternal in the Gods is of a primary nature, and is pre-established in the rank of the good, according to all the divine orders.

For it produces the hyparxes of secondary natures, and total powers and essences, according to one ineffable transcendency. Hence also it is denominated paternal, in consequence of exhibiting the united and boniform power of the one, and the cause which gives subsistence to secondary natures. And according to each order of the Gods, the paternal genus ranks as the leader, producing all things from itself, and adorning them, as being arranged analogous to the good. And of divine fathers, some are more total, but others are more partial, just as the orders themselves of the Gods, differ by the more total, and the more partial, according to the reason of cause. As many therefore, as are the progressions of the Gods, so many also are the differences of fathers. For if there is that which is analogous to the good in every order, it is necessary that there should be the paternal in all the orders, and that each order should proceed from the paternal union.

PROPOSITION CLII.

Every thing which is generative in the Gods, proceeds according to the infinity of divine power, multiplying itself, proceeding through all things, and transcendently exhibiting the never-failing in the progressions of secondary natures.

For to multiply things which proceed, and to produce things into progeny, from the occult comprehension in causes, of what else is it the prerogative, than of the infinite power of the Gods, through which all divine natures are filled with prolific good? For every thing which is full produces other things from itself according to a super-plenary power. The domination of power therefore is the peculiarity of generative deity, which multiplies the powers of the things generated, and renders them prolific, and excites them to generate and give subsistence to other things. For if every thing imparts the appropriate peculiarity which it possesses primarily to other things, every thing which is prolific will impart progression, and will adumbrate the infinity which is the primary leader of wholes, from which every generative power proceeds, and which in an exempt manner pours forth the ever-flowing progressions of divine natures.

PROPOSITION CLIII.

[Every thing which is perfect in the Gods,[275]] is the cause of divine perfection.

For as the hypostases of beings are of one kind, but those of superessential natures of another, so likewise with respect to perfections, those of the Gods themselves according to hyparxis, are different from those of beings, which are secondary and posterior to them. And the former indeed, are self-perfect and primary, because the good subsists primarily in them; but the latter possess perfection according to participation. Hence the perfection of the Gods is one thing, and that of deified natures is another. The perfection however, which is primarily in the Gods, is not only the cause of perfection to deified natures, but also to the Gods themselves. For if every thing so far as it is perfect, is converted to its proper principle, that which is the cause of all divine conversion, is the perfective genus of the Gods.

PROPOSITION CLIV.

Every thing which is of a guardian nature in the Gods, preserves every thing in its proper order, and is uniformly exempt[276] from secondary, and established[277] in primary natures.

For if a guard immutably preserves the measure of the order of every thing, and connectedly contains all the natures that are guarded in their appropriate perfection, it will impart to all things a transcendency exempt from subordinate beings, and will firmly establish each thing unmingled, in itself, existing as the cause of undefiled purity to the natures that are guarded, and fixing them in superior beings. For every thing is perfect which adheres to primary natures, but is in itself alone, and is expanded above things subordinate.

PROPOSITION CLV.

Every thing vivific in the Gods is [a generative cause, but every generative cause is not vivific.[278]]

For a generative is more total than a vivific cause, and is nearer to the principle of all things. For generation manifests a cause which produces beings into multitude. But vivification represents to us the deity who is the supplier of all life. If therefore the former multiplies the hypostases of beings, but the latter gives subsistence to the progressions of life,—if this be the case, as being is to life, so is the generative order to the vivific series. The former therefore, will be more total, and the cause of a greater number of effects, and will on this account be nearer to the principle of all things.

PROPOSITION CLVI.

Every cause of purity is comprehended in the guardian order. But on the contrary, not every thing of a guardian order is the same with the purifying genus.

For purity imparts to all the Gods the unmingled with things inferior, and the undefiled in the providence of secondary natures. But a guardian power also effects this, and contains all things in itself, and firmly inserts them in superior natures. The guardian therefore is more total than the purifying genus. For in short, the peculiarity of the guardian power, is to preserve the order of every thing the same with reference to itself, and to the natures prior and posterior to itself. But the peculiarity of purity is to keep more excellent natures exempt from such as are subordinate. These powers however primarily subsist in the Gods. For it is necessary that there should be one cause preceding that which is in all things, and in short, it is requisite that there should be uniform measures of all good, and that these should be comprehended by the Gods according to cause. For there is no good in secondary natures which does not pre-exist in the Gods. [Hence in the divinities purity is likewise a primary good, guardianship, and every thing of this kind.[279]]

PROPOSITION CLVII.

Every paternal cause is the supplier of being to all things, and gives subsistence to the hyparxes of beings. But every thing which is fabricative of the production of form, exists prior to composite natures, and precedes their order, and division according to number, and is also of the same co-ordination with the paternal cause, in the more partial genera of things.

For each of these belongs to the order of bound; since hyparxis also, number and form, have all of them the nature of bound. Hence, in this respect they are co-ordinate with each other. But the demiurgic or fabricative cause indeed, produces fabrication into multitude. And the uniform, or that which has the form of the one supplies the progressions of beings. And the former indeed, is the artificer of form, but the latter produces essence. So far therefore, as these differ from each other, viz. form and being, so far also does the paternal differ from the demiurgic cause. But form is a certain being.[280] Hence the paternal cause is more total and causal, and is beyond the demiurgic genus, in the same manner as being is beyond form.

PROPOSITION CLVIII.

Every elevating cause in the Gods, differs both from a purifying cause, and from the convertive genera.

For it is evident that this cause also has necessarily a primary subsistence in the Gods; since all the causes of total good pre-exist in the divinities. But it subsists prior to the purifying cause. For the one liberates from things of a subordinate nature, but the other conjoins with more excellent natures. The elevating however, has a more partial order than the convertive cause. For every thing which converts, [is converted either to itself, or to that which is more excellent than itself.[281]] But the energy of the elevating cause is characterized by a conversion to that which is more excellent, as leading that which is converted to a superior and more divine cause.

PROPOSITION CLIX.

Every order of the Gods consists of the first principles, bound and infinity. But one order is in a greater degree derived from bound, and another from infinity.

For every order proceeds from both these, because the communications of first causes pervade through all secondary natures. But in some things bound predominates in the mixture [of bound and infinity,] and in others infinity. And thus the genus which has the form of bound has its completion, in which the prerogatives of bound have dominion. This too is the case with the genus which has the form of the infinite, and in which the properties of infinity predominate.

PROPOSITION CLX.

Concerning Intellect.

Every divine intellect is uniform, or has the form of the one, and is perfect. And the first intellect subsists from itself, and produces other intellects.

For if it is a God it is filled with divine unities, and is uniform. But if this be the case, it is also perfect, being full of divine goodness. And if this be admitted, it is likewise primarily intellect, as being united to the Gods. But being primarily intellect, it also gives an hypostasis to other intellects. For all secondary natures obtain their hyparxis from such as have a primary subsistence.

PROPOSITION CLXI.

Every thing which is truly being, and is suspended from the Gods, is divine and imparticipable.

For since that which is truly being, is the first of the natures that participate of the divine union, it likewise fills intellect from itself. For intellect is being, as replete with being, and is therefore a divine intelligible. And so far indeed as it is deified it is divine, but as filling intellect, and being participated by it, it is intelligible. Intellect also is being, on account of that which is primarily being. But that which is primarily being itself is separate from intellect; because intellect is posterior to being. But imparticipables subsist prior to things which are participated. Hence being which subsists by itself and is imparticipable, is prior to the being which is conjoined with intellect. For it is intelligible, not as co-arranged with intellect, but as perfecting intellect in an exempt manner, because it imparts being to it, and fills it with truly existing essence.