Note 261 — Chapter LI · (continued 2)

That the principle of all things is something beyond intellect and being itself, was asserted by the most ancient Pythagoreans, as well as by Plato and his best disciples, as the following citations will abundantly evince.

And in the first place, this is evident from a fragment of Archytas, a most ancient Pythagorean, On the Principles of Things, preserved by Stobæus, Eclog. Phys. p. 82. and in which the following extraordinary passage occurs: ωστ’ αναγκα τρεις ειμεν τας αρχας, ταν τε εστω των πραγματων, και ταν μορφω, και το εξ αυτου κινατικον και αορατον δυναμει· το δε τοιουτον ον ου μονον[262] ειμεν δει, αλλα και νοω τι κρεσσον· νοω δε κρεσσον εστι, οπερ ονομαζομεν θεον φανερον.—i.e. “So that it is necessary to assert that there are three principles; that which is [the subject] of things (or matter), form, and that which is of itself motive, and invisible in power. With respect to the last of which, it is not only necessary that it should have a subsistence, but that it should be something better than intellect. But that which is better than intellect is evidently the same with that which we denominate god.” It must here however be observed, that by the word god we are not only to understand the first cause, but every god: for, according to the Pythagoric theology, every deity, considered according to the characteristic of his nature, is superior to intellectual essence. Agreeably to the above passage is that also of Brotinus, as cited by Syrianus in Arist. Meta. p. 102, b. who expressly asserts that the first cause νου παντος και ουσιας δυναμει και πρεσβειᾳ υπερεχει—“surpasses every intellect and essence both in power and dignity.” Again, according to the same Syrianus, p. 103, b. we are informed “that the Pythagoreans called god the one, as the cause of union to the universe, and on account of his superiority to every being, to all life, and to all-perfect intellect. But they denominated him the measure of all things, on account of his conferring on all things through illumination, essence and bound; and containing and bounding all things by the ineffable supereminence of his nature, which is extended beyond every bound.” Των θειων ανδρων εν μεν λεγοντων τον θεον ως ενωσεως τοις ολοις αιτιον, και παντος του οντος, και πασης ζωης, και νου του παντελους επεκεινα. μετρον δε των παντων ως πασι την ουσιαν, και το τελος επιλαμποντα, και ως παντα περιεχοντα, και οριζοντα ταις αφραστοις αυτου, και παντος υπερηπλωμεναις περατος υπεροχαις. And again, this is confirmed by Clinius the Pythagorean, as cited by Syrianus, p. 104, in which place præclari is erroneously substituted for Clinii. “That which is the one, and the measure of all things (says he), is not only entirely exempt from bodies, and mundane concerns, but likewise from intelligibles themselves: since he is the venerable principle of beings, the measure of intelligibles, ingenerable, eternal, and alone (μονον), possessing absolute dominion (κυριωδες), and himself manifesting himself (αυτο το εαυτο δηλουν).” This fine passage I have translated agreeably to the manuscript corrections of the learned Gale, the original of which he has not inserted. To this we may likewise add the testimony of Philolaus; who, as Syrianus informs us, p. 102, knew that cause which is superior to the two first elements of things, bound and infinite. For (says he) “Philolaus asserts that the deity established bound and infinite: by bound indeed exhibiting every co-ordination, which is more allied to the one; but by infinity a nature subjected to bound. And prior to these two principles he places one, and a singular cause, separated from the universality of things, which Archainetus (Αρχαινετος) denominates a cause prior to cause; but which, according to Philolaus, is the principle of all things.” To all these respectable authorities for the superessential nature of the first cause, we may add the testimony of Sextus Empiricus himself. For in his books against the Mathematicians (p. 425) he informs us “that the Pythagoreans placed the one as transcending the genus of things which are essentially understood.” και δη των μεν καθ’ αυτα νοουμενων γενος υπεστησαντο Πυθαγορικοι παιδες, ως επαναβεβηκος το εν. In which passage, by things which are essentially understood, nothing more is meant than intelligible essences, as is obvious to every tyro in the Platonic and Pythagoric philosophy.

But in consequence of this doctrine of the ancients concerning the one, or the first principle of things, we may discover the meaning and propriety of those appellations given by the Pythagoreans to unity, according to Photius and others: such as αλαμπια, σκοτωδια, αμιξία, βαραθρον υποχθονιον, Απολλων, &c. viz. obscurity, or without illumination, darkness, without mixture, a subterranean profundity, Apollo, &c. For, considered as ineffable, incomprehensible, and superessential, he may be very properly called obscurity, darkness, and a subterranean profundity; but considered as perfectly simple and one, he may with no less propriety be denominated without mixture, and Apollo; since Apollo signifies a privation of multitude. “For (says Plotinus) the Pythagoreans denominated the first God Apollo, according to a more secret signification, implying a negation of many.” Ennead. 5, lib. 5. To which we may add, that the epithets darkness and obscurity wonderfully agree with the appellation of a thrice unknown darkness, employed by the Egyptians, according to Damascius,[263] in their most mystical invocations of the first God; and at the same time afford a sufficient reason for the remarkable silence of the most ancient philosophers and poets concerning this highest and ineffable cause.

This silence is indeed remarkably obvious in Hesiod, when in his Theogony he says:

That is, “Chaos was the first thing which was generated”—and consequently there must be some cause prior to Chaos, through which it was produced; for there can be no effect without a cause. Such, however, is the ignorance of the moderns, that in all the editions of Hesiod, γενετο is translated fuit, as if the poet had said that Chaos was the first of all things; and he is even accused by Cudworth on this account, as leaning to the atheistical system. But the following testimonies clearly prove, that in the opinion of all antiquity, γενετο was considered as meaning was generated, and not was simply. And in the first place, this is clearly asserted by Aristotle in lib. 3, de Cælo. “There are certain persons (says he) who assert that there is nothing unbegotten, but that all things are generated.—And this is especially the case with the followers of Hesiod.”—εισι γαρ τινες οι φασιν ουθεν αγεννητον ειναι, αλλα παντα γιγνεσθαι.——μαλιστα μεν οι περι τον Ησιοδον. And again, by Sextus Empiricus in his treatise Adversus Mathemat. p. 383, edit. Steph. who relates, that this very passage was the occasion of Epicurus applying himself to philosophy. “For (says he) when Epicurus was as yet but a young man, he asked a grammarian, who was reading to him this line of Hesiod,

Chaos of all things was the first produc’d,

from what Chaos was generated, if it was the first thing generated. And upon the grammarian replying that it was not his business to teach things of this kind, but was the province of those who are called philosophers.—To those then, says Epicurus, must I betake myself, since they know the truth of things.” κομιδη γαρ μειρακισκος ων, ῃρετο τον επαναγινωσκοντα αυτῳ Γραμματιστην (η τοι μεν πρωτιστα Χαος γενετ’) εκ τινος το χαος εγενετο, ειπερ πρωτον εγενετο. τουτου δε ειποντος μη αυτου εργον ειναι τα τοιαυτα διδασκειν, αλλα των καλουμενων φιλοσοφων· τοινυν εφησεν ο Επικουρος, επ’ εκεινους μοι βαδιστεον εστιν, ειπερ αυτοι την των οντων αληθειαν ισασιν.

Simplicius too, in commenting on the passage above cited from Aristotle, beautifully observes as follows: “Aristotle (says he) ranks Hesiod among the first physiologists, because he sings Chaos was first generated. He says, therefore, that Hesiod in a particular manner makes all things to be generated, because that which is first is by him said to be generated. But it is probable that Aristotle calls Orpheus and Musæus the first physiologists, who assert that all things are generated, except the first. It is, however, evident that those theologists, singing in fabulous strains, meant nothing more by generation than the procession of things from their causes; on which account all of them consider the first cause as unbegotten. For Hesiod also, when he says that Chaos was first generated, insinuates that there was something prior to Chaos, from which Chaos was produced. For it is always necessary that every thing which is generated should be generated from something. But this likewise is insinuated by Hesiod, that the first cause is above all knowledge and every appellation.” (De Cœlo, p. 147.)