Chapter XVIII

CONCLUSION

The conclusion of the Conference relaxed the tension in Europe and cleared the way for a gradual improvement in the relations of the Powers. Both sides expressed satisfaction with the results, which, according to official interpretation, left behind neither victor nor vanquished.[1222] None the less it was evident that Germany had been defeated. She had tried to obtain a material interest in Morocco; she had endeavored to break the Entente Cordiale and therewith the other French ententes; she had sought to disrupt or to modify the Dual Alliance. And she had failed in every effort. In attempting to restore her dominating position of the time before the formation of the Entente Cordiale, Germany had only driven France, Great Britain, and Russia into closer intimacy and had furthered the very alignment of the Powers which she had feared. By defending an international right which no one else valued she had permitted her isolation, except for the support of Austria, to be exposed to all the world. At the Conference she had forced Russia, Italy, and even the United States reluctantly to take the French side. Germany had entirely miscalculated the situation.[1223]

The German statesmen realized that their international position had grown more serious. Italy’s meager support at the Conference was further proof that Germany could not rely upon that ally.[1224] The increased importance of Austria to Germany was tacitly admitted when, on April 13, the Emperor William thanked Count Goluchowski for playing the “brilliant second” at the Conference and promised him: “You can also be certain of similar service from me in a similar case.”[1225] Prince Bülow, whom his master had not consulted beforehand, warned him, however, “(1) that our relations with Austria have now become more important than ever, since that state is our only reliable ally; (2) that we must let our relative political isolation be noticed by the Austrians as little as possible.”[1226] And in September the Emperor commented sarcastically: “Fine prospects! In the future we can count on the Franco-Russian Alliance, Anglo-French Entente Cordiale and Anglo-Russian Entente, with Spain, Italy, and Portugal as appendages thereto in the second line!”[1227]

To counteract this isolation the German government could do little for the time being except remain quiet.[1228] It permitted relations with Italy to continue as before.[1229] It assumed a “correct but reserved attitude toward France.”[1230] It refused to sanction German participation in the Russian loan, but otherwise remained on friendly terms with that Power.[1231] Its main desire was to reach some kind of an understanding with Great Britain so as to share in the entente movement.[1232] Anglo-German relations did improve, but the British government replied to German soundings that more time should elapse before the two governments should attempt any concerted efforts to bring their countries closer together.[1233]

German public opinion was dissatisfied with the way in which its foreign affairs were being conducted; its alarm over the international situation increased as the year progressed. When the debate in the Reichstag on that subject, delayed because of the Chancellor’s illness, was held on November 14, Herr Bassermann of the National Liberal party remarked as follows:

Today the Triple Alliance has no further practical utility. The Italian press and population lean more and more towards France. Austria has been too much praised for this rôle of “brilliant second” which she herself declined. The Franco-Russian Alliance remains intact, and the disposition of France towards us is less friendly than formerly. The explanations at Cronberg between the English and German sovereigns does not prevent England from pursuing her old policy of isolating us. We live in an era of alliances between other nations. . . . . Our policy lacks tranquillity and consistency, and we see brutal hands derange well prepared plans.[1234]

As these criticisms were widespread, Prince Bülow replied in a long and carefully prepared speech. Admitting the deep hostility of France to Germany, he expressed the hope that the two nations would live peacefully together. As to Anglo-German relations he declared: “A long period of misunderstanding lies behind us. The needle of the political barometer has happily gone from rain and wind to changing.” He denied that any deep antagonisms divided the two countries and that the German fleet was a menace to Great Britain. He suggested that time should be allowed for the two nations to approach each other. “We have no thought,” he said, “of wishing to push ourselves in between France and Russia or France and England.” He announced that “for some time negotiations between Russia and England have been under way which promise that an understanding will be reached over certain Central Asiatic regions. . . . .” He added: “We have no reason at all to disturb these negotiations or to regard their probable result with mistrustful eyes.” But he issued the following warning: “The Entente Cordiale without good relations between the Powers and Germany would be a danger to European peace. . . . . Such an encirclement is not possible without the exercise of a certain pressure. Pressure produces counter-pressure, from pressure and counter-pressure explosions may finally arise.” He denied that Germany was isolated and testified to the loyalty of her two allies; but he declared that Germany was strong enough to defend herself alone. Urging the nation not to be uneasy, he said: “More than once we have been in situations where the danger of a general grouping against us lay nearer than today. . . . . The political world is still agitated by a certain excitement which calls for carefulness and prudence, but gives no cause for pusillanimity.” He concluded with a vigorous defense of his own and the Emperor’s methods of conducting foreign affairs. His words were widely applauded, even though they did not assuage German fears or stop criticism.[1235]

The satisfaction of the French and British governments with the results of the Conference was real. Although France had had to recognize the international character of Moroccan reforms, she had practically asserted her position in that land. She had also preserved her ententes and alliance against Germany’s attacks, and had herself shown a determined spirit hitherto lacking in the Third Republic. The British government had had no direct interest in the Moroccan crisis except from the point of view of general policy, but it was well pleased that the Entente Cordiale had stood the test, that it had grown firmer than before.[1236]

Out of this crisis the Entente Cordiale emerged as a lasting dynamic combination for checking Germany. As Sir Edward Grey remarked to the French Ambassador, July 9, 1906, “If we [Great Britain] were called on to take sides [between France and Germany], we must take sides with France as at Algeciras. As long, however, as Germany kept quiet, there was no reason for trouble, and things would go on quietly.”[1237] The British Foreign Secretary did not thereby give France a blank check against Germany, nor had he done so during the crisis. He had cautioned the French that British support would in last analysis depend upon public opinion. But as the crisis at the Conference in March had shown, he could be forced to take the French side even though he disapproved of it.

The Entente Cordiale was so necessary to both Powers and yet so loose in form that it acquired a peculiar character. Dependent not upon the written word but upon feeling, it had constantly to be kept warm. It partook more of the nature of a jealous engagement than of a trustworthy and tolerant marriage. Each party was particularly mistrustful of any playing by the other with Germany. Still other causes divided them from Germany. They regarded the latter’s interference in the Moroccan affair as gratuitous and unjustified. “All that is necessary,” wrote Sir Edward Grey in May, 1906, “is for the Germans to realize that they have got nothing to complain of.”[1238] France and Great Britain feared that Germany might attempt another aggression. As the British Foreign Secretary stated in June, 1906, implying an accusation in doing so, “The Germans do not realize that England has always drifted or deliberately gone into opposition to any Power which establishes a hegemony in Europe.”[1239] The French and English believed so firmly that German diplomacy called for the arousing of discord between Powers at every opportunity that they were almost reluctant to have any dealings with the Wilhelmstrasse. They saw German intrigues everywhere—in Persia, in Abyssinia,[1240] in Paris, in London. When the German Ambassador in Paris spoke in July of a detente in Anglo-German relations, the French and British governments suspected therein an attempt to weaken the Entente Cordiale.[1241] Each government, therefore, was cool toward the renegade Power. “When one recovers from a year’s sickness,” stated the semiofficial Le Temps with reference to Franco-German relations, “the convalescence cannot be immediate.”[1242] Sir Edward Grey appeared friendlier; in July he described Anglo-German relations as again normal. But he refused Germany’s bid for an understanding because public opinion was not prepared and especially because France would object. Count Metternich remarked to him on July 31 that M. Delcassé’s policy had been to encircle Germany and that at present the British and French press also asserted that this aim should be accomplished with the help of Russia. The Count warned Sir Edward Grey that that dangerous game might call forth a situation which would make it necessary for Germany to break the circle.

A peaceful policy on the other hand is [he said] to extend the hand to Germany and to draw her into the circle of the others. . . . . But so long as in England the German attempts at rapprochement are repulsed through fear of arousing displeasure among the French, it appears to me that the policy of creating a balance of power is preferred here to that of drawing Germany into the circle of friendship.

The Foreign Secretary denied that the policy of agreement with Russia was directed in any way against Germany. But when the Ambassador asked “Are, openly avowed, friendly relations with Germany compatible with England’s friendship with France?” he replied, “That depends on German politics.” The Ambassador immediately countered, “No, it rather seems to depend on French interpretation of German politics.”[1243] The British Foreign Secretary, however, was not to be moved by German criticisms. The British as well as the French put Germany on her good behavior.

Notwithstanding Sir Edward Grey’s denial, this mistrust of the Central Power was an important inducement for Great Britain and France to complete the Entente Cordiale by an entente between Great Britain and Russia.[1244] Conditions were more favorable for success than they had ever been. The Moroccan affair no longer occupied international attention. The domestic situation in Russia was more stable with the calling of the Duma. And M. Iswolsky, who succeeded Count Lamsdorff in the Russian foreign office in 1906, brought new vigor into the Russian policy. As a partisan of an agreement with Great Britain, he took up the negotiations, and after an intermittent pursuit of them, brought them to completion in the next year.[1245] Thus the work of insuring against Germany was continued.

What the entente Powers regarded as insurance, Germany called encirclement. Both sides had been playing the game of the balance of power. France had tried to abandon this game in the previous year, but Germany’s refusal of her offers had driven her back into the play. Neither side appreciated the other’s point of view; neither heeded the other’s warnings. Each side accused the other of aiming at its defeat, of being a menace. Each scoffed at the other’s fears, but each continued to arm and to broaden and tighten the policy which each warned the other was leading to trouble. Neither side had learned anything from this episode except to be more cautious. Neither changed its method.

The motives that caused this crisis still obtained as guiding forces. Prestige and national interests were at stake on both sides. Having become deeply engaged in the Moroccan affair, Germany, France, and Great Britain could not easily back out of it, especially since the Conference of Algeciras had given a better sanction than ever to both sides. That France and Spain would give Germany opportunities for intervening was, in view of the difficulty which they would encounter in reforming Morocco, just as certain as that Germany would take advantage of those opportunities. The Moroccan problem both in its local and in its international aspects left behind plenty of raw material from which future conflicts could arise. The crisis was only the first of these episodes born of the clashings of mutual fears and ambitions, nurtured on hazardous playing with war and on diplomatic blunderings. The road to Armageddon lay open.

INDEX