Chapter VIII

FRENCH POLICY AFTER THE MAKING OF THE ENTENTE CORDIALE

As friend of Great Britain and ally of Russia, France was in an uneasy situation after the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War. Hostility between those two Powers was increasing. Thereby the influence of Germany in St. Petersburg was greatly augmented, and Germany was assiduously courting Russia. M. Delcassé had to show enough sympathy and give enough help to Russia to prevent Germany from usurping France’s position at St. Petersburg and at the same time hold to the Anglo-French entente.

The task did not prove to be unduly arduous, for Russia did not require much of her ally. M. Delcassé sought to maintain harmony between Great Britain and Russia by helping them settle their disputes.[342] He also did what favors he could for Russia, such as permitting the Russian Baltic fleet to use French ports on the way to the Far East. But otherwise he left Russia to her own resources and devoted himself to other tasks.

The Anglo-French accord did not complete M. Delcassé’s work of establishing France’s right to preponderance in Morocco and of elevating her position in Europe, but it made the completion possible. The Foreign Minister still had to negotiate an agreement with Spain, to exclude Germany from the Moroccan settlement, and to execute the policy of pacific penetration in the Sherifian Empire. During the succeeding months he was occupied with these problems.

I. THE FRANCO-SPANISH AGREEMENT, 1904

When M. Delcassé, in accordance with Article VIII of the Anglo-French declaration, proposed to the Spanish government in April, 1904, that they negotiate over the Moroccan question, he immediately met with difficulty. Relying upon promises by Lord Lansdowne and M. Delcassé, the Spanish government had expected to be consulted before the conclusion of the bargain. It therefore complained because the negotiations had not been conducted à trois.[343] The Spanish Queen Mother branded the act as an “unfriendliness” to Spain, and the Marquis del Muni (M. Leon y Castillo), Spanish ambassador at Paris, “clinched his fist in his pocket” at the two Powers.[344] When the Cortes met, the Liberals took occasion on June 6, 7, and 9, to expose the main terms of the Franco-Spanish accord of 1902 which the Conservatives had refused to sign, and to accuse that party of having inadequately upheld Spain’s interests. As the nation remained apathetic, M. Maura, the prime minister, had no difficulty in defending his government.[345] Urged by the British government,[346] he accepted M. Delcassé’s overture.

The course of the negotiations, which began in April, was a rocky one. The Spanish accused the French of being too-hard bargainers; the French thought that the other party was too prone to alarm.[347] The Spanish government, ignorant of the secret articles in the Anglo-French agreement by which the Spanish sphere was already limited,[348] demanded the territorial terms which had been informally agreed upon in 1902. But M. Delcassé refused to give them, for, he asserted, Spain ought to bear her part of the sacrifice which France had had to make to Great Britain. Aroused by this reply, the Spanish government appealed late in April to the German government for an “active expression” of “sympathy . . . . at the opportune moment.” Although the German Chancellor was eager to give it,[349] Spain aimed to use this intimacy merely as a threat. While continuing the conversations more or less dilatorily with Germany, she asked for and relied chiefly upon the support of Great Britain to obtain satisfactory terms with France.

Through Lord Lansdowne’s mediation, M. Delcassé agreed in May to extend the Spanish sphere of influence in the north from Melilla to the mouth of the Moulouya—a particularly sore spot with the Spanish since they owned islands just off this coast—and to expand the limits of the Spanish sphere in Southern Morocco. The French Minister made these concessions dependent upon Spain’s accepting his other conditions, and asserted to the Spanish Ambassador that “he was not prepared to prolong the discussion of these details, and his offer was à prendre ou à laisser.”[350]

This bold speech did not impress the Spanish government, which, knowing France’s need for an agreement with it, followed Count Bülow’s advice of drawing out the negotiations.[351] Its views differed from those of M. Delcassé in that it desired Spanish control in Tangier, full commercial liberty throughout Morocco without any time limit, and the publication of the agreement—all of which the French Minister refused.[352] However, by the last of June accord was virtually reached, when M. Delcassé brought forth a new condition to the effect that Spain should be precluded from taking any action in her prospective sphere until the status quo in Morocco came to an end.[353]

M. Delcassé was confronted with the problem of how to maintain a unified Franco-Spanish policy in the peaceful penetration of Morocco, how to retain the initiative in that work in French hands, how to minimize Spain’s rights in Morocco in favor of France. Mistrusting Spain’s competence to handle subject peoples, he wished to prevent her from taking any action in her sphere that would arouse the Moroccans to a war not only against Spain but also against France and thus ruin the work of pacific penetration. He feared that Spain might precipitate the liquidation of Morocco so as to obtain full control of her area. The French policy was to postpone that event until a suitable occasion, in the meantime undermining Morocco’s integrity and independence while pretending to maintain them. He was legally within his rights in taking this line toward Spain, and was fortified against British intervention in the latter’s favor, because secret Article III of the Anglo-French agreement provided that the specified area should come within the sphere of influence of Spain and be administered by her “whenever the Sultan ceases to exercise authority over it.”[354]

The Spanish government, protesting that this proposal would reduce its position to that of a subprotectorate, demanded the same rights in its sphere of influence as France would enjoy in hers. It desired particularly that Tangier be policed by Spanish altogether. The Spanish Foreign Minister asserted that Spain was averse to disturbing the status quo in Morocco, but he and his colleagues suspected that France would never acknowledge a change in the political status in Morocco and would thus exclude Spain from any share in the land. The Spanish Minister declared that he “would not sign an agreement which abandoned Spanish rights,” and in complaining to the British government he threatened to “appeal to the Powers.”

Lord Lansdowne knew that by “Powers” was meant Germany, who was just then showing marked interest in helping Spain in the Moroccan affair. Wishing to obviate German intervention, he advised the Spanish to make concrete proposals to France concerning ways of exercising an influence in the proposed Spanish sphere—for instance, as to “the construction of railways and other useful works.” He also cautioned Spain against undertaking to police Tangier. At the same time he urged M. Delcassé to be more conciliatory toward Spain so as to avoid the possibility of “international difficulties.”[355]

M. Delcassé was willing to permit Spanish participation in the economic development of Morocco and also to associate Spanish officials with French ones in two of the three ports whose customs revenues were to be collected as security for the recent French loan. He refused to recede on the other points.[356] This reply so excited the Spanish that when M. Delcassé proposed a clause whereby Spain would be prohibited from alienating the Moroccan territory over which she should have control, the Spanish government rejected it as beneath its dignity. It offered instead to give France a right of preference in case Spain wished to alienate any or all of that area. Lord Lansdowne, who did not want France to gain this preferential right, persuaded the Spanish to accept the French proposal.[357]

The main issue, however, that of Spain’s independence of action in her sphere, remained unsolved. In the middle of July, while leaving the impression that the cause of difference was the question of full commercial freedom, the Spanish government informally asked the German government to give Spain a coup d’épaule in Paris. As the German government desired a more definite proposal, it did not carry out the request.[358] Nor was much support to be obtained from Great Britain. But as both French and British governments knew of Germany’s interest in the negotiations, M. Delcassé, in August, agreed to restrict Spain’s action for fifteen years only.[359] The Spanish government rejected that concession, but offered to take no action for that period without previous accord with France, provided France recognized that she “ought to proceed in accord with the Spanish Government in that which touches the zone of influence reserved to Spain.” Lord Lansdowne supported this proposal. So while M. Delcassé held to his previous stand, he agreed that “France would take no steps within the Spanish Sphere without giving previous notice to Spain.” Thus, although the Marquis del Muni thought that the two parties had reached a deadlock, there was in reality no great difference between the two demands. On October 3 the agreement was signed.[360]

The accord consisted of a published declaration and of sixteen secret articles. The former merely expressed the fact that Spain adhered to the Anglo-French declaration of April 8 concerning Morocco and Egypt and that Spain and France were in agreement “to fix the extension of their rights and guaranty of their interests” in Morocco.[361] The secret articles were of a far different caliber. Spain received as her sphere of influence not only the area from the Moulouya to Larache in Northern Morocco but also the coastal territory and hinterland extending from her possession Rio de Oro northward to the Wad Sus, just south of Agadir. The rest of Morocco constituted the French sphere (Arts. II, IV, V). Provision for a future change was included.

In case the political state of Morocco and of the Sherifian Government are unable to subsist, or if by the feebleness of the Government and by its continued impotence to introduce security and public order, or for any other cause to be stated in a common accord, the maintenance of the status quo becomes impossible, Spain will be permitted freely to exercise her action in . . . . her sphere of influence [Art. III].

Although the same rights of action were permitted to Spain in her sphere as to France in hers, yet for a period of not over fifteen years from the date of signing the convention Spain was prohibited from taking action in her sphere without previous understanding with France. The latter, however, could take action unrestricted by Spain in the French zone, and could also act in the Spanish zone after having notified Spain of her intention. After that first period expired and as long as the status quo obtained, France could not act in the Spanish zone without previous agreement with Spain (Art. II). By Articles VII and VIII Spain agreed not to cede or to alienate in any form any of the territory assigned to her or to seek the aid of a foreign Power other than France in taking any military action in her sphere of influence. Article IX preserved “the special character” of Tangier “which the presence of the diplomatic corps and the municipal and sanitary institutions give it.” Article X ran as follows:

So long as the actual political status continues, the enterprises for public works, railroads, roads, canals . . . . shall be executed by such companies as may be formed by French and Spanish. In the same manner it will be permissible for French and Spanish in Morocco to co-operate for the exploitation of mines, quarries, and, in general, of enterprises of an economic order.[362]

The two Powers immediately communicated the agreement to the British government, which accepted it.[363] The Spanish government thanked both British and German governments for their aid during the negotiations, and briefly informed the latter that by the treaty Tangier had been neutralized and complete equality and freedom of commerce and trade had been guaranteed.[364]

In Spain the agreement, grudgingly approved by the government as the best that it could obtain, was shown by the Premier to the various party leaders, and received their indorsement.[365] M. Delcassé informed none of the French politicians of the content of the treaty. During the debates in the French Parliament on the Anglo-French accord in November and December, however, the Franco-Spanish agreement was also accepted on faith.[366] The convention was a logical extension of the accord of April 8. Both agreements anticipated a change in the political status of Morocco and made provisions for a future division of the land. The one permitted commercial restriction at the end of thirty years; the other arranged for a Franco-Spanish monopoly of all economic enterprises. Both accords violated the principle of the open door. In fact, had the secret articles of the two agreements been known, they would have proved that the clauses concerning the independence and integrity of Morocco and the sovereignty of the sultan were complete shams. In declaring to the other Powers that commercial freedom would be absolutely respected, M. Delcassé was equivocating and attempting to disarm suspicions concerning his real intention of destroying economic freedom in Morocco.[367]

II. DELCASSÉ AND GERMANY, 1904

It was manifest during the Anglo-French negotiations that the French government planned to prevent Germany from gaining any foothold in Morocco or the Western Mediterranean.[368] Fearing that that Power might try to share in the Moroccan settlement when the Anglo-French accord became known, M. Delcassé endeavored to avoid a discussion of the agreement with it.[369]

When, therefore, on March 23, Prince Radolin asked the French Minister an “indiscreet question” about the reported Anglo-French negotiations, the latter replied that they had been going on for some time and would probably be successfully concluded. He said that they treated of Newfoundland, Egypt, and Morocco (the other questions he did not mention); and he explained the terms of the proposed agreement concerning the last-named land. “You know already our point of view on this subject. . . . . We wish to maintain in Morocco the existing political and territorial status; but that status, to endure, must manifestly be sustained and improved.” After citing the many occasions for intervention of which France had taken no advantage, he stated that the Sultan had already requested French aid. “It is now a matter of continuing it to him,” he said, and he assured the Prince that commercial liberty would be “rigorously and entirely respected. . . . . France wishes no special rights in Morocco, but it should be her task in the interest of all nations trading there to put an end, according to her power, to the anarchy in that land.” Moreover, the free passage through the straits should be secured by neutralizing their southern shore. As for Spain, her “positive interests and legitimate ambitions” in Morocco would be amicably treated. He did not mention either the clause limiting commercial freedom to thirty years or Article IX assuring mutual diplomatic support in the fulfilment of the accord. And of course he gave no hint of the existence of the secret articles.[370]

This informal and incomplete notification misrepresented the true aims of the agreement with respect to Morocco. M. Delcassé expected that by avoiding an official notification of the accord to the German government and by omitting to request an expression of opinion from it he would cause the German government either to permit him a diplomatic victory or to take the initiative for a Franco-German understanding.[371] He felt safe in his policy,[372] because France, in addition to her alliance with Russia, whose victory over Japan M. Delcassé and the French people confidently expected,[373] now enjoyed with her ally’s public approval[374] the friendship of Great Britain, Italy, and Spain, whereas the Triple Alliance was weakened by internal strife. Moreover, the French Minister learned on March 30[375] that at Vigo a few days before the Emperor William had denied having any territorial interests in Morocco. Hence by shunning the word “protectorate” he hoped to avoid the responsibility for endeavoring to establish one.[376] In October his notification of the Franco-Spanish agreement to the German government was even more perfunctory.[377]

III. “PACIFIC PENETRATION,” 1904

After the signing of the Anglo-French agreement, the French Parliament voted 600,000 francs with which to carry on the work of pacific penetration in Morocco.[378] The French government immediately dispatched a preliminary mission to Fez under Count de Saint-Aulaire, first secretary of the legation in Tangier. The Count gave the Sultan an exact Arabic translation of the published declaration of April 8; and, after setting forth the need for progressive reforms in Morocco and the special interest of France in executing them, he offered the friendly co-operation of his government to that end.[379] Thus, in spite of the persistent Moroccan raids across the Algerian border, the Sultan was asked to believe that France was once more manifesting her patience and good will.[380]

The Sultan scarcely knew what line of policy to take toward the Anglo-French agreement.[381] His subjects, from the religious groups to the merchants of Fez, were all hostile to any form of foreign control. Alarmed at the news of the agreement, they feared an immediate invasion by the Christians. Suspecting their ruler of conniving with the French, they became even more rebellious; many denied that he possessed the baraka, the divine benediction. At court the Conservative party, led by Si Feddoul Gharnet, grew stronger in its opposition to all French actions and policies. The Sultan realized the precariousness of his position, and was very anxious about the effects of his acts upon his people. He was uneasy and angry at having been ignored in the negotiations over his land. Nevertheless, as he did not comprehend the full significance of the accord, particularly since the French had explained it to him in soothing terms, he soon became calmer. Some of his officials were not opposed to the French, as they realized that the present conditions could not last and that the French had the power to change them. Furthermore, certain practical considerations prevented him from closing his ear to the French altogether. His ambition was, with the help of Europeans selected by himself, so to strengthen his land as to enable it to maintain its independence.[382] The Sultan had no funds; the small French, English, and Spanish loans of the previous year were exhausted, and he could not collect taxes or maintain an army. Forced to seek foreign aid, he had begun negotiations with the Banque de Paris et des Pays-Bas for a large loan late in January, and had besought the help of the French government in obtaining it. M. Delcassé had readily promised his support.[383]

In this situation the Sultan neither accepted nor rejected the Anglo-French agreement and Count de Saint-Aulaire’s explanation of it although he showed favor toward them.[384] On June 12 with the aid of the French government he concluded the transaction for the loan.

The loan, made by a consortium of eleven French banks headed by the Banque de Paris et des Pays-Bas, fulfilled political as well as economic purposes, for it was backed by the French government and was admirably adapted to the work of pacific penetration. The amount was 62,500,000 francs (Art. I), of which 80 per cent was actually to be credited to the Sultan (Art. XXIV). The interest was set at 5 per cent (Art. III). The loan was to be redeemed within thirty-six years, but the schedule of amortization was fixed and could not be hastened during the first fifteen years (Arts. IV, VII). The loan, guaranteed by the customs duties in all the ports of Morocco, was to have preference and priority over all other loans which might be similarly guaranteed (Art. XI). Sixty per cent of the customs revenues were reserved for the repayment of the obligation. If the necessary amount was not obtained thereby, the Moroccan government was to make up the deficit (Art. XVII). Two million francs were left in the bank at Paris to cover short payments; if withdrawn, this amount was to be re-established immediately by the Sultan’s government (Art. XXI). The remainder, after the Sultan’s outstanding loans were liquidated, was placed at the ruler’s disposal to be drawn upon at will (Arts. XXV, XXXV). By Article XIV the existing customs treaties and arrangements of Morocco with the Powers were guaranteed. Article XXXII prohibited the Sultan from using the customs receipts at his disposal to guarantee any other loan without a previous agreement with the French banks. By Article XXXIII those banks were given the right of preference in contracting new loans, coining money, or buying and selling gold and silver for Morocco, provided the conditions they offered were equal to those offered by others. The collection of the customs was to be supervised by a special group of French officials under the protection of the French legation. Their director should communicate with the Moroccan government through the French Minister at Tangier. Furthermore, if the stipulated funds were not turned over to the supervisors, the agents could appeal to the French Minister; and, with his consent and with due notification to the Sultan, they could collect the sums themselves. Thus, when by the last of July those officials were installed, the control of the customs was practically lost to the Sultan.[385]

In May an act of banditry occurred in Morocco which convinced public opinion everywhere that reform in that land was immediately necessary and which enabled France to take another step in her work of penetration. On May 18, Raisouli, a sherif, ex-cattle thief, robber and rebel, avenger of wrongs, opponent to Europeans—in short, a Moroccan Robin Hood—took prisoner an American citizen, Ion Perdicaris, and his English son-in-law, Varley, in their home near Tangier. As the price of their release he demanded a large ransom, the dismissal and punishment of certain of the Sultan’s loyal officials who were his enemies, and his own appointment as pasha for the district around Tangier. The Sultan had to accept his terms. On June 24, through the good offices of the French government, working through some of its Algerian religious leaders with followers in Morocco, the release was effected.[386] But the panic-stricken foreigners in Tangier, fearing that Raisouli would continue such lucrative business and that he would have imitators, demanded protection.[387] Thereupon the French government stationed two warships in Moroccan waters and secured the appointment of French and Algerian officers over the Tangier police.[388] The work of “pacific penetration” was most auspiciously under way.

Private French enterprise did not lag behind that of the government. Moroccan towns swarmed with hungry fortune-seekers eager to enjoy the opportunities for quick wealth which the opening of Morocco was expected to bring. The Comité du Maroc, formed in the preceding December from the ranks of the larger Comité de l’Afrique française, engaged energetically in directing and expanding the work of scientific exploration in the Sherifian Empire and of disseminating propaganda in France.[389] It received the financial support of the chief banks, maritime companies, steel works, railway companies, and some of the leading newspapers of France.[390] The list of guests present at a banquet held by it on June 15 to enlist public support reads like a French Who’s Who.[391]

In the autumn and early winter the French government made preparations to send a larger mission to Fez under the resident minister, M. Saint-René Taillandier, to obtain the Sultan’s approval of the French program of reforms. According to M. Delcassé’s instructions on December 15,[392] the Minister’s foremost task should be to institute police reforms similar to those inaugurated in Tangier, first in the towns already in contact with Europeans and then gradually in the other areas. In the border region order should be preserved by extending the co-operation of the two governments. The establishment of a state bank, the construction of means of transportation and of communication, the improvement of harbors, the support of philanthropic works, the spread of the French language, and the settlement of claims for damages inflicted on Algeria by Moroccan raiders were the other matters to be taken up. It was a comprehensive program, the achievement of which would end Moroccan isolation and independence.

The departure of the mission was delayed by the long negotiations for an accord with Spain and by the fact that the French Chamber did not approve the Moroccan accords until November. When the mission was prepared to start in December, the situation in Morocco, apparently favorable for France in the spring, had become adverse. The natives had grown bolder in their attacks upon foreigners, venting their hatred upon them even in Fez. The Sultan had begun to show signs of resisting. In September he had disgraced the pro-foreign minister el Menebhi and confiscated his property. Later in the year he had supplanted his pro-French ministers by anti-foreign ones, such as Si Feddoul Gharnet. In December he had dismissed all foreign employees at Fez and Rabat.[393] These signs augured trouble for the French. While assuming an optimistic manner publicly, M. Saint-René Taillandier acknowledged to his chief on December 12 that he might “be powerless to make the Sultan accept the minimum of reforms that the present state of Morocco demands.”[394] But as firmness was the best means to “recall the Moroccan government to a sense of reality,”[395] he immediately countered the dismissal of the French officers by a sharply worded letter to the Moroccan Foreign Minister. After reminding the latter of the acte international by which France had “assumed the task of aiding” the Makhzen[396] to reform the land, he stated that the Sultan’s co-operation was expected and desired, but that

if that co-operation were not forthcoming, France would know how to accomplish the work alone. Dangerous counselors [he wrote] have led the Sultan astray as to the true state of affairs. And in consequence the French Government has decided to postpone the departure of the mission, and to recall to Tangier from Fez within ten days the French military mission, vice-consul, and all French subjects resident there.[397]

The Sultan’s opposition wilted immediately. The French vice-consul at Fez reported that the Makhzen was “ready to welcome all French counsels and to accept all the reforms,” that it “withdrew all the actions which have offended us.”[398] But the Sultan’s submission was not so complete as it seemed. Although France was the victor in this encounter, the conflict had only begun.