PREFACE

The fall of Morocco under European control marks the nadir in the annals of Islam. The land was the last important Mohammedan territory to be taken by the Christians. Thereafter began the Islamic revival which is still in course. This volume, however, deals not with that subject but with the history of a conflict in European diplomacy, referring to Morocco proper only when necessary to explain the moves of the Powers.

The Moroccan crisis of 1904-6 contained all those elements that were present at the other crises on the road to the great war—desire for colonial acquisition, trade and investment rivalries, national honor, diplomacy which contained the threat of war, the principle of the balance of power, fears, and counterfears. The special interest of this episode lies in the fact that, as the first of the series, it shows the Powers choosing sides and fixing their opinions and policies. It determined the mental attitude of the players in the subsequent struggles and gave direction and mind, so to speak, to the later events.

In the history of the Moroccan affair from approximately 1898 to 1906, when the first crisis ended, are mirrored almost all the important movements of the Powers with reference to one another. The grouping of the Powers around France, the development of Anglo-German rivalry, the failure of Germany’s policy of playing between Great Britain and the Dual Alliance, Germany’s riposte and attempts to restore her position—all are either intimately connected with the Moroccan question or can be explained in the light of it. The Moroccan problem was the political barometer of Europe.

In making this study I have relied chiefly upon the official documents contained in Die Grosse Politik der Europäischen Kabinette, 1871-1914, in British Documents on the Origins of the War, 1898-1914, and in the two Livres jaunes concerning the Moroccan affair from 1901-1906. The presence of so much new material has rendered antiquated most of the older accounts of the subject. I have therefore not cited all of this secondary literature, preferring to give source references.

In spite of this rich material, there are still obstacles to a complete, impartial, and balanced account of this episode. The outstanding one is the absence of adequate French documents. The French policy has practically to be studied through British or German eyes and on the basis of the accomplished fact. The British and the German policies are thus treated with more understanding and detail. But even here difficulties arise. History cannot be written alone on the basis of the official diplomatic documents of today. The variety and amount of information which Ranke found condensed in the reports of the Venetian ambassadors of the sixteenth century is now scattered in a hundred places. The improved facilities for communication and transportation have limited and specialized the correspondence of governments and their foreign representatives. Information is now obtained as well from personal interviews, newspapers, and all those means which create governmental as well as public opinion. Much of great importance is never written down at all. Foreign secretaries often give orders to their ambassadors without explaining their reasons. This is particularly true of the British, less true of the Germans. Moreover, statesmen are at times inclined for reasons of policy to write down how they wish a certain event to be viewed, not how they actually view it. To check and supplement the official documents, therefore, the intimate and more personal information in biographies, autobiographies, and memoirs has been especially valuable, although neither the number of those works, particularly on the French side, nor the material in them is complete.

While international relations were more complex in the pre-war days than ever before in history, the study of them is facilitated by the fact that diplomacy was still secret, that a relatively few individuals guided it. By focusing attention upon these individuals, one can interpret the motives which consciously or unconsciously determined foreign policy. These men sublimated and represented the diplomatic mind of the nations. A new actor had also made its appearance in their midst, that combination of Proteus and Fata Morgana, public opinion; but even it was given tangible shape in the minds of the responsible statesmen who had to interpret it and respond to its demands. I have tried to test these interpretations by checking them against the opinions of contemporaries and by reading in the contemporary newspapers, magazines, speeches, and letters.

Diplomatic policies and situations cannot be explained in a formula. Statesmen are all more or less opportunists; they usually keep several alternatives in mind. To assert that one country is bent on war and another on peace, one on revenge and aggression and another on defense, is to give an incomplete view. In handling the fluid and shifting materials of diplomacy, one must avoid both oversimplicity and historical fatalism. Further information will probably add or change many details in this study, but I believe that the main lines of the history of this crisis are herein explained.

I wish especially to express my appreciation to Professor Bernadotte E. Schmitt, Professor Ferdinand Schevill, Associate Professor Arthur P. Scott, and Associate Professor Louis R. Gottschalk—all of the University of Chicago—for much beneficial advice and criticism in reading this work in manuscript, and to thank my sister, Dr. Jesse May McFadyen, of the University of Minnesota, for many hours of help in searching for the right phrase.

Eugene N. Anderson

Chicago, 1929