CORRESPONDENCE CONTINUED. (continued 8)

Some weeks ago I agreed with the Duc de la Vauguyon to draw up a project of a memorial to their High Mightinesses, proposing a triple or quadruple alliance, according to my instructions to that purpose. The Duke, in his private capacity, has declared to me often that he is of opinion, that it would be advisable to make this proposition as soon as the treaty of commerce is signed; but could not give me any ministerial advice without consulting the Count de Vergennes. We agreed that he should transmit the project to the Count. Two days ago, the Duke called upon me, and informed me, that he had the Count's answer, which was, that he did not think this the time, because it would tend to throw obscurity upon the instructions lately given by the States-General to M. Brantzen, not to make any treaty or armistice, but simultaneously with all the belligerent powers.

By the tenth article of the Treaty of Alliance, the invitation or admission is to be made by concert. From my instructions, I supposed, and suppose still, that the concert was made at Philadelphia, between Congress and the Chevalier de la Luzerne, by the order of the King, his master; and my instructions being positive and unconditional to make the proposition, I shall be somewhat embarrassed. On the one hand, I would preserve not only a real harmony, but the appearance of it, between all steps of mine, and the Councils of the French Ministers. On the other, I would obey my instructions, especially when they are so fully agreeable to me, at all events. The proposition would have a good effect in England, in Holland, in France, America, and in all the neutral countries, as I think, and it could do no harm, that I can foresee. Nay, further, I am persuaded, that the French Ministry themselves, if they were to give me their private opinions, as the Duc de la Vauguyon does, would be glad if I should make the proposition against their advice.

It is possible, however, that they may secretly choose (notwithstanding the offer made at Philadelphia) not to be bound in an alliance with America and Holland. They may think they shall have more influence with their hands unbound, even to a system that they approve and mean to pursue. It is amidst all these doublings and windings of European politics, that American Ministers have to decide and act. The result is clear in my mind, that although it is proper to be upon good terms, and be communicative and confidential with the French Ministers, yet we ought to have opinions, principles, and systems of our own, and that our Ministers should not be bound to follow their advice, but when it is consonant to our own; and that Congress should firmly support their own Ministers against all secret insinuations. They must see, that a Minister of theirs, who is determined, as he is bound in honor, to be free and independent, is not in a very delectable or enviable situation in Europe, as yet.

There is but one alternative. Either Congress should recall all their Ministers from Europe, and leave all negotiations to the French Ministry, or they must support their Ministers against all insinuations. If Congress will see with their own eyes, I can assure them, without fear of being contradicted, that neither the color, figure, nor magnitude of objects will always appear to them exactly as they do to their allies. To send Ministers to Europe, who are supposed by the people of America to see for themselves, while in effect they see, or pretend to see nothing, but what appears through the glass of a French Minister, is to betray the just expectations of that people.

I have the honor to be, &c.

JOHN ADAMS.

TO ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON.

The Hague, September 7th, 1782.

Sir,

In answer to your letters, demanding my accounts, I have the honor to enclose the three numbers, 1, 2, 3.

No 1, is the account of my salary for two years and a half, and the payment of it by Dr Franklin, in obedience to the orders of Congress, the whole amounting to £6,250 sterling.[9]

No 2, is the account for the purchase of the Hôtel des Etats-Unis de l'Amérique, which amounts to fifteen thousand two hundred and seven florins, seven stivers, and eight duits. Over against it I have given credit for the cash I received of Messrs de Neufvilles' loan, six thousand six hundred and fifty florins. I have also given credit for twelve thousand four hundred and twentyeight French livres and five sols, which I received of M. Lagoanère in Spain. I have been informed, it was the intention of Congress, that the expenses of their Ministers to the places of their destination should be borne in addition to their salaries. The expenses, made by the Continental Navy Board, for the accommodations of the voyage, were, no doubt, intended to be so, for which reason I have taken no notice of them in my accounts, either of the first or second voyage. But whether the expenses of our horrid journey through Spain come within the intention of Congress or not, I cannot tell. It was our misfortune to be cast, in a leaky ship, on the Spanish coast, and to make a very distressing, and very expensive journey by land to Paris; but whether it is the design of Congress to allow us this expense or not, I know not, and very cheerfully submit to their decision. If they should allow it, they will erase it from this account, No. 2. But in that case they should erase another article from No. 3.

No. 3. That article is the first; four hundred dollars stolen out of my chest at Dr Franklin's. After I received my commission from Congress to borrow money in Holland, Mr Thaxter was obliged to come to assist me; but as it was not certain I should stay in Holland, it was not proper to remove my baggage from Paris. Accordingly, I wrote to Dr Franklin, requesting him to give house-room to my chests, which he was kind enough to agree to. They were all accordingly carried there; but while there, some thief broke out the bottom of one of my chests and carried off four hundred dollars, which I could never hear of. Mr Dana and Mr Thaxter knew, that the money was there, and Dr Franklin knows it was stolen; and as this misfortune has happened from my having two commissions, that called my attention different ways, and from no fault of mine, I think it is but reasonable I should be allowed it, provided Congress shall charge me with the whole sum of money received of M. Lagoanère. If they allow me that sum, I do not desire to be allowed this four hundred dollars.

The second article in No. 3, is my journey to Paris. As this was an additional and double expense, arising necessarily from my having two departments, one for peace, and one for Holland; and as it was a heavy expense, I submit to Congress the propriety of allowing it.

The other articles in No. 3, are deductions from my salary, which Dr Franklin wrote me ought to be allowed me by Congress, but he did not think himself authorised to pay any more than my net salary; so that all charges must fall upon me; whereas I apprehended the intention of Congress was, that the net salary should be paid me, and all necessary charges attending the payment of it, to be borne by the public. I submit it, however, to their decision.

The other articles, of house rent, stationary, salaries of clerks, postage of letters, and extra entertainments, are articles, which Dr Franklin wrote me he had charged to Congress, and since told me, that Mr Jay was of the same opinion with him and me, that they ought to be. I have not sent any particular account of these things, and shall not, until I know the determination of Congress; because it is extremely difficult for me to make out an account of them. My life has been such a wandering pilgrimage, that I have not been able to keep any distinct account of them. They are scattered about in thousands of receipts, with other things, which will require more time to bring together than I will spend upon it, until I know the pleasure of Congress. My house rent has, on an average, cost me more than one hundred and fifty pounds sterling a year, although mostly I have lived in furnished lodgings. I have had but one clerk, Mr Thaxter, to whom I hope Congress will make some compensation for his faithful and industrious services, in addition to what I have paid him, which has been only one hundred pounds sterling a year. If Congress will allow this to me, it may be easily added by them to the account.

The purchase of the house is a very good bargain. If Congress should pay the house rent of their Ministers, it will be cheaper here than anywhere, by reason of this purchase; if not, their Minister here may pay interest of the purchase money for rent, to Congress, as well as another. But in that case he will live at a cheaper rate than any other Minister. I have been at a small additional expense for repairs, which has put the house in order; but as the accounts are not yet brought in, I cannot exactly tell the sum. When they come in, I shall draw on the Messrs. Willinks, Van Staphorsts, and de la Lande and Fynjè, for the money, unless I shall have contrary orders from Congress.

I have ever made a large expense for newspapers, for the sake of public intelligence, and have sent them as often as I could, and in great numbers, to America. As I ever have, I ever shall send them all there, and if Congress shall think this a proper charge to the public, it may be added hereafter.

I have the honor to be, &c.,

JOHN ADAMS.

ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON TO JOHN ADAMS.

Philadelphia, September 15th, 1782.

Dear Sir,

I have been favored with your letters from the 19th of April to the 5th of July, by the Heer Adams. How impatiently they have been expected, you will be able to judge, by mine of the 29th ult. which you will receive with this. The events they announce, are considered of the utmost importance here, and have been directed to be officially communicated to the different States.

Your loan is approved, and the ratification herewith transmitted. The resolution, which will accompany this, will be a sufficient spur to induce you to extend every nerve to get it filled; for if the war continues, it will be essential to our exertions; if it should terminate, it will not be less necessary to enable us to discharge our army; in every view it is necessary. In the present situation of the States, money can be raised but slowly by taxation. New systems must be introduced, which cannot without difficulty be adopted in the hurry, confusion, and distress of a war. They will, however, be adopted. Congress are constantly employed in discussing the means for a regular payment of the interest, and the gradual discharge of the principal of their debt.

The other resolution arises from the difficulty of ascertaining what are really the funds of the United States in Europe, when more than one person can dispose of them. I am satisfied this resolution will meet your approbation, from the rule which you say you have prescribed to yourself. It will, I dare say, be equally agreeable to our Ministers to be released from the troublesome task of bankers to the United States.

You mention the negotiations on the tapis in Paris, but so slightly, as to leave us in the dark concerning their progress, presuming, (as, indeed, you might have done, on probable grounds) that we should receive information on that subject from Dr Franklin, but, unfortunately, we have learnt nothing from him. I must beg, therefore, in order to open as many channels of information as possible, that you would give me, not only the state of your own affairs, but every other information, which you may receive from our other Ministers, or through any other authentic channel.

I observe your last memorial, or note, is in French. Would it not be expedient, and more for our honor, if all our Ministers at every Court were to speak the language of our own country, which would at least preserve them from errors, which an equivocal term might lead them into. I mention this, merely as a hint, which is submitted to your judgment.

We are informed that the Aigle and Gloire, two frigates from France, have just entered the Capes, closely pursued by a British ship of the line, and three frigates. It is strongly apprehended from the situation in which they were left, that they must either be destroyed, or fall into the enemy's hands.

Pigot is arrived at New York, with twentysix sail of the line. The late changes in administration seem to have made such a change here, that I much doubt whether they will quit us this fall, at least, till they hear again from England, though they certainly were making every disposition for it before. I will keep this letter open till I hear the fate of the frigates, and know whether our despatches by them can be preserved.

M. Dumas's application is before Congress. They may possibly appoint him Secretary to the Legation, which I heartily wish they may, as he certainly has been an assiduous and faithful servant. But there is no probability of their going further, as they would not choose to appoint any but an American to so important an office, as that of Chargé des Affaires. Nor will their present system of economy permit them to make so great an addition to his salary as you mention, which is much greater than is usually allowed to secretaries, as their circumstances require it to be less.

September 18th. The Aigle, Captain La Fouche, has been driven on shore, and is lost within the Capes; her despatches, money, and passengers, have, however, happily been saved. The Gloire, the other frigate, has arrived at Chester. I find no despatches from you among the letters that have come to hand; nor anything from Holland, but duplicates of letters from M. Dumas. Congress yesterday passed the annexed resolution, which needs no comment.

I am, Sir, &c.

ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON

TO ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON.

The Hague, September 17th, 1782.

Sir,

This morning, I was in conference with M. Fagel, in order to make the last corrections in the language of the treaty, which is to be executed in English and Dutch, as that with the Crown of France, was in English and French. We have now, I hope, agreed upon every word, if not every point, and nothing remains, but to make five fair copies of it for signature, which, however, is no little labor. The Secretary thinks he shall accomplish them in the course of this week, and part of the next, so that they may be signed by the latter end of next week, or perhaps the middle. The Secretary, who has always been complaisant, was more so than ever today. He congratulated me, upon the prospect of a speedy conclusion of this matter; hoped it would be highly beneficial to both nations; and that our posterity might have cause to rejoice in it even more than we. He says the usage is, for two Deputies to sign it, on the part of Holland, and one on the part of each other Province, so that there will be eight signers in behalf of the Republic.

It is now nearly five months since I was publicly received, and proposed a project of a treaty. All this time it has taken the several Provinces and cities to examine, make their remarks, and fresh propositions, and bring the matter to a conclusion. It would not have been so long, however, if the Court had been delighted with the business. But, in a case where unanimity was requisite, and the Court not pleased, it was necessary to proceed with all the softness, caution, and prudence, possible, that no ill humors might be stirred. Yet, in a case, where the nation's heart is so engaged, in which its commerce and love of money is so interested, what wretched policy is it in this Court, to show even a lukewarmness, much more an aversion. Yet, such is the policy, and such it will be. The Prince of Orange is, to all appearance, as incurable as George the Third, his cousin.

I was afterwards an hour with the French Ambassador, at his house. He tells me, his last letters from the Count de Vergennes say, that he has yet seen no appearance of sincerity on the part of the British Ministry, in the negotiations for peace. Of this, Congress will be easily convinced by the copies I have transmitted of the commissions of Mr Fitzherbert and Oswald.

The subject of our conversation was the means of getting out the Dutch fleet, which is now in the Texel, although the British fleet, under Milbank, is returned to Portsmouth, and probably sailed with Lord Howe for Gibraltar. I asked the Duke, where was the combined fleet? His last accounts were, that they were off Cape Ortegal, endeavoring to get round Cape Finisterre to Cadiz. He speaks of it, as doubtful, whether they will give battle to Lord Howe, because the Spanish ships, with an equal number of guns, are of a smaller caliber than the English; but hopes that the blow will be struck before Howe arrives. The means of getting the fleet out of the Texel to intercept a fleet of English ships from the Baltic, came next under consideration. But the wind is not fair. It might have gone out, but they had not intelligence.

I asked, who it was that governed naval matters? He answered, the Prince. But surely the Prince must have some assistance, some confidential minister, officer, clerk, secretary, or servant. If he were a Solomon, he could not manage the fleet, and the whole system of intelligence, and orders concerning it, without aid. He said, it is the College of the Admiralty, and sometimes M. Bisdom, who is a good man, and sometimes M. Van der Hope, who may be a good man, he has sense and art, but is suspected. Very well, said I, M. Bisdom and M. Van der Hope ought to be held responsible, and the eyes of the public ought to be turned towards them, and they ought to satisfy the public. The Duke said the Prince is afraid of the consequences. He knows that the sensations of the people are very lively at present, and nobody knows what may be the consequence of their getting an opinion, that there has been negligence, or anything worse, which may have prevented them from striking a blow. I asked, if they had any plan for obtaining intelligence, the soul of war, from England? And he said the Grand Pensionary told him, he paid very dear for intelligence.

However, I cannot learn, and do not believe that they have any rational plan for obtaining intelligence necessary from every quarter, as they ought. They should have intelligence from every seaport in France, England, Scotland, Germany, and all round the Baltic, and they should have light frigates and small vessels out. But when war is unwillingly made, everything is not done. The next subject was the proposition from Amsterdam, for renewing the concert of operations for the next campaign.

Congress may hear of some further plans for a separate peace between Holland and England, but they will not succeed. The Republic will stand firm, though it will not be so active as we could wish, and the concert of operations will be renewed.

I have the honor to be, &c.

JOHN ADAMS.

Extract from the Records of the Resolutions of their High Mightinesses the States-General of the United Netherlands.

Tuesday, September 17th, 1782. "The Lord Van Randwyk and others, Deputies of their High Mightinesses for the Department of Foreign Affairs, in obedience to, and in compliance with their resolution of the 23d of April of the present year, having conferred with Mr Adams, Minister Plenipotentiary from the United States of America, respecting the entering into a treaty of amity and commerce with the said States, reported to this Assembly, that the said Mr Adams, on the 26th of April thereafter, did deliver to them a plan of such a treaty, requesting the same might be examined, and that such articles might be added, as might be deemed most serviceable. That the said gentlemen, Deputies, after having consulted and advised with the committees of the respective colleges of the Admiralty upon the said plan or sketch of a treaty, made sundry observations thereon, and also sundry separate propositions, all which on the 26th of August last they communicated to the said Mr Adams, who, on the 27th following, returned his answer thereto; which having compared with the said propositions, and finding the same in substance conformable thereto, and all difficulties that had occurred entirely removed, they drew up a new treaty, and also a new convention on the subject of retaken prizes, in conformity to the determination that has been previously adopted and resolved on, and the treaties so prepared, they handed to Mr Adams, on the 6th of this current month, who, since, has declared himself perfectly satisfied therewith.

"Wherefore, the said gentlemen, Deputies for Foreign Affairs, submit it to the consideration of their High Mightinesses to determine, whether it would not be proper and necessary to authorise them to conclude and sign with Mr Adams, the treaty and convention aforesaid.

"Whereupon having deliberated, it is found and judged right, that the said treaty and convention be drawn out afresh, and fair copies thereof made, in order that the finishing hand may be put thereto; and the said Lord Van Randwyk, and others, their High Mightinesses' Deputies for Foreign Affairs, are hereby requested and authorised to conclude and sign the said treaty and convention with the aforesaid Mr Adams.

W. Z. VAN BORSSELE.

Compared with the record.

H. FAGEL."

TO ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON.

The Hague, September 17th, 1782.

Sir,

You will naturally inquire, whether the neutral powers will continue their neutrality, or whether the neutral confederacy will be broken?

No certain answer can be given to these questions. We must content ourselves with probabilities, which are strong for the continuance of the neutrality. Who indeed should break it? The Emperor was thought to be the most unlikely potentate to accede to it; but he has acceded and has taken several steps, which prove that he will not break it, at least by leaning towards England. Sweden is the steady friend to France. The King of Prussia, whose affections and inclinations are certainly towards France and Holland, and alienated from England, would certainly at this age of life be too cautious a politician to wage war for England, against the Houses of Bourbon and Austria, Holland and America.

There remains only Russia and Denmark. What can Russia do? This is a maritime war. She cannot assist the English with land forces; a hundred thousand men would do no good to England, on land. Her boasted fleet, added to that of England, would only weaken it for several reasons. Among the rest, because England must maintain it with money, if not with officers and men, for cash is wanting in Russia. Denmark remains, but what can she do? Her Islands in the West Indies, and her trade are at our mercy, and she would not have force enough to defend her own, much less to assist England, if she should declare war.

A doctrine prevails that the acknowledgment of the independence of America, is a hostility against England, and consequently a breach of the neutrality. Our friends have sometimes favored this idea. The Duc de la Vauguyon has often expressed this sentiment to me; and if I am not mistaken, the Marquis de Verac has said the same to Mr Dana. If this opinion is not clear, it is very impolitic to favor it. The Court of France, in their public memorials, have denied it, and it would be difficult to prove it, either by the law or practice of nations. Sending or receiving Ambassadors, entering into peaceful commercial treaties, or at least negotiating at Philadelphia, the rights of neutral nations, is not taking arms against Great Britain.

But if an acknowledgment of our independence is a hostility, a denial of it is so too, and if the maritime confederation forbids the one, it forbids both. None of the neutral nations can take the part of Great Britain, therefore, without breaking to pieces that great system, which has cost so much negotiation, and embraces so great a part of mankind.

The neutral powers set so high a value upon it, and indeed make so great profit by it, that I think none of them will take the part of Great Britain. The connexions of the Duke Louis of Brunswick in Denmark and Russia, have set some little machines in motion, partly to favor him, and partly to hold out an appearance of something fermenting for the benefit of Great Britain. But these will never succeed so far as to draw any nation into the war, or to incline this Republic to make a separate peace.

It is to this source that I attribute certain observations that are circulated in pamphlets and in conversation, "that there is at present an incoherence in the general system of Europe. That the Emperor has deranged the whole system of the equilibrium of Europe, so that if ever the Northern Powers should think of stopping by a confederation the preponderance of the Southern Powers, Holland will be unable, on account of the demolition of the barriers, to accede to that confederation."

M. Magis, who has been eight and twenty years Envoy at the Hague from the Bishop of Liege, and who converses more with all the foreign Ministers here, than any other, has said to me, not long since, "Sir, the wheel rolls on too long and too rapidly one way; it must roll back again, somewhat, to come to its proper centre. The power of the House of Bourbon rises, and that of Great Britain sinks too fast, and I believe, the Emperor, although he seems perfectly still at present, will come out at length, and take the greatest part of any power in the final adjustment of affairs."

The Count de Mirabel, the Sardinian Minister, said to me, upon another occasion, "your country, Sir, will be obliged in the vicisitudes of things, to wheel round, and take part with England, and such allies, as she may obtain, in order to form a proper balance in the world." My answer to both was, "these sentiments betray a jealousy of a too sudden growth of the power of the House of Bourbon; but whose fault is it, if it is a fact, (which it does not appear to be as yet) and whose fault will it be, if it should hereafter become a fact? Why do the neutral powers stand still and see it, or imagine they see it, when it is so easy to put a stop to it? They have only to acknowledge American independence, and then, neither the House of Bourbon nor England will have a colorable pretence for continuing the war, from which alone the jealousy can arise."

The Prince de Gallitzin said, not long since, that the conduct of this Republic, in refusing a separate peace, &c. he feared would throw all Europe into a war, there were so many pretensions against England. I quote these sayings of foreign Ministers, because you express a desire to hear them, and because they show all the color of argument in favor of England that anybody has advanced. All these Ministers allow that American independence is decided, even the Ministers from Portugal, within a few days said it to me expressly. It is therefore very unreasonable in them to grumble at what happens, merely in consequence of their neutrality.

It is the miserable policy of the Prince of Orange's counsellors, as I suppose, which has set a few springs in motion here. M. Markow, one of the Ministers of Russia, and M. St Saphorin, the Minister from Denmark, are the most openly and busily in favor of England. But if, instead of endeavoring to excite jealousies and foment prejudices against the House of Bourbon, or compassion towards England, they would endeavor to convince her of the necessity of acknowledging American independence, or to persuade the neutral powers to decide the point, by setting the example, they would really serve England, and the general cause of mankind. As it goes at present, their negotiations serve no cause whatever, that I can conceive of, unless it be that of the Duke of Brunswick, and, in the end, it will appear that even he is not served by it.

I have the honor to be, &c.

JOHN ADAMS.

TO ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON.

The Hague, September 23d, 1782.

Sir,

As this is a moment of great expectation, news of the greatest importance from the East Indies, from the West Indies and North America, from Gibraltar, from Lord Howe's fleet, and the combined fleet, being hourly looked for, I took this opportunity to return to the Spanish Minister a visit, which I owed him.

He told me, that he trembled for the news we should have from Gibraltar. I asked him if he thought there would be a battle at sea. He answered, yes. He believed the combined fleet would meet Lord Howe, and give him battle. I said, in this case it will probably be but a running fight. His Lordship's object was to protect his convoy and get into the port, and he would not stop to fight more than should be unavoidable. D. Llano, however, said, that he believed the fate of Gibraltar would be decided before Howe could arrive, either the place taken, or the assault given over. By his advices, the attack was to begin the 4th or 5th of September. Howe sailed the 12th, and would be probably twenty days at least on his way, which would leave a space of twentyseven or twentyeight days for the attack, which would decide it one way or the other.

I did not think proper to tell him my own apprehensions, and I wish I may be mistaken, but I have no expectation at all, in my own mind, that the combined fleet will meet Howe; that there will be any naval engagement; or that Gibraltar will surrender. They will make a horrid noise with their artillery against the place; but this noise will not terrify Elliot, and Gibraltar will remain to the English another year, and Lord Howe return to England, and all Europe will laugh. England, however, if she were wise, would say, what is sport to you, is death to us, who are ruined by these expenses. The earnest zeal of Spain to obtain that impenetrable rock, what has it not cost the House of Bourbon this war? And what is the importance of it? A mere point of honor! a trophy of insolence to England, and of humiliation to Spain! It is of no utility, unless as an asylum for privateers in time of war; for it is not to be supposed, that the powers of Europe, now that the freedom of commerce is so much esteemed, will permit either England or Spain to make use of this fortress and asylum as an instrument to exclude any nation from the navigation of the Mediterranean.

From the Hôtel d'Espagne, I went to that of France, and the Duc de la Vauguyon informed me that he had a letter from the Count de Vergennes, informing him that he had received, in an indirect manner, a set of preliminary propositions, as from the British Ministry, which they were said to be ready to sign, that he had sent M. de Rayneval to London, to know with certainty whether those preliminaries came from proper authority or not.

Thus we see, that two Ministers from England, and another from Holland, are at Paris to make peace. The Count d'Aranda is said to have powers to treat on the part of Spain. Mr Franklin and Mr Jay are present on the part of the United States, and M. Gerard de Rayneval is at London. Yet, with all this, the British Ministry have never yet given any proof of their sincerity, nor any authority to any one to treat with the United States. I believe the British Ministry, even my Lord Shelburne would give such powers if he dared. But they dare not. They are afraid of the King, of the old Ministry, and a great party in the nation, irritated every moment by the refugees, who spare no pains, and hesitate at no impostures, to revive offensive hostilities in America. If Gibraltar should be relieved, and their fleets should arrive from the West Indies and the Baltic, and they should not have any very bad news from the East Indies, the nation will recover from its fright, occasioned by the loss of Cornwallis, Minorca, and St Kitts, and the Ministry will not yet dare to acknowledge American independence. In this case, Mr Fox and Mr Burke will lay their foundation of opposition, and the state of the finances will give them great weight. But the Ministry will find means to provide for another campaign.

But to return to the Duc de la Vauguyon, who informed me further, that he had received instructions to propose to the Prince of Orange a new plan of concert of operations, viz; that the Dutch fleet, or at least a detachment of it, should now, in the absence of Lord Howe, sail from the Texel to Brest, and join the French ships there, in a cruise to intercept the British West India fleet. The Prince does not appear pleased with the plan. He has not yet accepted it. The Grand Pensionary appears to approve it, and support it with warmth. There is now a fine opportunity for the Dutch fleet to strike a blow, either alone, upon the Baltic fleet, or in conjunction with the French, or even alone upon the West India fleet. But the main spring of the machine is broken or unbent. There is neither capacity nor good will among those that direct the navy.

At dinner, in the course of the day, with M. Gyzelaar, M. Visscher, and a number of the co-patriots, at the Hôtel de Dort, they lamented this incurable misfortune. Some of them told me, that the sums of money, granted and expended upon their marine, ought to have produced them a hundred and twenty vessels of war of all sizes; whereas they have not one quarter of the number. They have no more than twelve of the line in the Texel, reckoning in the number two fifties; and they have not more than six or seven in all the docks of Amsterdam, Zealand, the Meuse and Friesland, which can be ready next year.

I have the honor to be, &c.

JOHN ADAMS.

A MEMORIAL CONCERNING THE BANK OF AMSTERDAM.[10]

The Bank of Amsterdam is much more simple than the denomination implies, in general, in the ideas of foreigners.

It differs widely from those of Venice, London, and others, which have a capital, formed by proprietors (actionaries) to whose profit these banks operate. That of Amsterdam makes neither commerce nor loan, but upon real specie, upon their intrinsic value, and upon matters in bars (ingots) of gold and silver.

This bank was erected in 1609. The magistrates of the city opened the project of the bank for the convenience of the merchants; but it is probable it was invented by the merchants themselves, as a remedy for the difficulty of payments, which became more and more considerable and embarrassing.

1. Because there was a great deal of foreign money in the city, with which they made payments reciprocally, amidst eternal disputes, concerning the value to be given or received.

2. Because, in the great number of coins struck by the States, diversely altered, and singularly divided, they had not all a constant circulation, notwithstanding the orders of the sovereign. Some were declined, even below the fixed value, and others were worth more.

3. The external cashiers, which the merchants employed in those times, as they do at present to receive the money, which is due to them in the city, and to pay in their turn what they owe, profited, of the two inconveniences beforementioned to make to themselves gain, which augmented the disorder and the vexation of payments, as well as in writings.

The merchants contrived then to make reciprocal payments, by a simple transposition of debit from one, to the credit of the other; but to this end, it was necessary to assure the validity of payments made in this manner, by a known and real value, and solidly placed under the authority and warranty of the city. The magistracy lent themselves to arrangements, which answered to all these conditions, so that a number of merchants and cashiers deposited at first at their pleasure, a sum in specie, more or less considerable, which was then designated by the commissaries of the bank, as ducats, or rix dollars and others, which money was placed in one of the vaults of the State-House, under the departments assigned for the carrying on of this bank. Those, who carried there their money, were credited for it, upon a leaf of the great book, which was shown to them, and from that time they might make reciprocal payments, as is practised at this day, without handling any cash, with this simple formula, viz.

"Gentlemen, the commissioners of the bank; please to pay N. N. five thousand florins.

P. G.

Amsterdam, this ——."

By means of which, the book-keepers had not, and have not still, anything to do, but to debit P. G. with five thousand florins, and credit N. N. for the same sum; so that, if they had deposited each one ten thousand florins in cash, there would remain of it, to the credit of P. G. only five thousand florins, and N. N. would have fifteen thousand florins to his, whereof he might dispose, in his turn, the next day, in favor of one or more others having accounts open in the bank. This manner of making payments was found so convenient, and they took such a confidence in it, that all the bankers and merchants, even down to the petty traders, made haste to open an account, and to carry there money, more or less, relatively to approaching payments, which they had to make in bank; so that there was soon a sufficiency of specie deposited for a foundation of all the payments, which were from that time designed to be made in bank, viz. all the bills of exchange of above three hundred florins, drawn by foreigners upon Amsterdam, and in Amsterdam upon foreigners, all the merchandises of the East Indies, the wools of Spain, and some other articles.

It happened then, that they ceased to carry thither the monies of Holland, because the merchants, having occasion alternately, some of the money in bank for current money, and others, of current money for money in bank, they found a great facility in selling one for the other. From thence arose a commerce of agiotage, (pour l'agio) which had been already prepared, because it had been resolved, for good reasons without doubt, as in case of a flood of specie, &c. that the bank would not receive the monies, which they would deposit, but at five per cent below the current value; so that to have one thousand florins in bank to one's credit, it was necessary to deposit one thousand and fifty florins in current cash. Behold thus this agio establishment, and the money of the bank, worth five per cent more than the current money. This value of five per cent soon varied, because some one, who found that he had too much money in bank, and was in want of current, sought to sell the first for the second, found a purchaser, who would not give him more than four seveneighths per cent; that is to say, one thousand and fortyeight florins and fifteen stivers, for one thousand in bank. Thus of the rest in such sort, that at all times, when one would buy or sell the money in bank, there is no question but to agree upon the price of the agio, which is subject to a perpetual variation, and which is more or less high, according to the wants of epochs; as for example, when the company makes its sales, the merchants have greater want of money in bank to pay their purchases, which raises the agio, which falls again, when the company would sell that, which is come into them for current money, in which all payments are made for fitting out of vessels.

The payments of bills of exchange, being to be made, as it has been said, in bank money, the price of all exchanges of current money, which were heretofore fixed in bank money, for example, a crown tournois, of sixty sols, the intrinsic value of which, founded upon the price of the money mark, amounted to fiftyseven sols and threefourths, current money of Holland, was placed at fiftyfive sols of bank money; and thus of all the exchanges with all foreign countries; from whence it results, that having sold merchandises of a man of Bordeaux, the amount of which produces net one thousand and fifty florins current, or the credit of one thousand bank, the agio at one hundred and five, when they make him a remittance, or when he draws, they purchase so many crowns as are necessary for the one thousand florins bank, at fiftyfive sols fifteen derniers, which comes to the same thing as if they bought crowns for one thousand and fifty florins current, at fiftyseven and threefourths sols current. When any one would open himself an account in the bank, he goes there himself, and puts his signature upon a book to make it known, and they give him the page upon which his account shall be opened, which he ought always to place at the head of the billet, by which he pays.

They begin with debiting him with ten florins, once for all, after which he pays no more to the bank, but two sols for each bill that he writes, with which they debit him twice a year, when they make the balance of the books, viz. in January and July, at which epochs, each one is obliged to settle accounts with the bank, and to go and demand his pay, to see if they accord with the bank, under the penalty, after six weeks, if they fail or neglect, of paying a fine of twentyfive florins. The bank is shut at these epochs, and continues shut during fourteen or fifteen days, during which time, the bills of exchange sleep, and although they fall due the first day of the shutting, or any day following, they cannot be protested until the second or third day after the opening. There are other little shuttings of the bank, at the feasts, Christmas, Lent, Pentacost; and at the fair, which continue but a few days. One cannot dispose, till the next day, of the money, which enters by the bank, except the second days of the openings, and that of Pentacost. They call these days, the "returns of bills" (revirement de parties) or the "recounting," because they pay with that which they receive. One ought to take care, not to dispose beyond one's credit, for not only all the drafts whereof one has disposed are that day stopped, that is to say they are invalid, but one is condemned and obliged to pay a fine of triple of the whole, which one has disposed of more than that which one has in bank.

The person who writes, ought himself to carry his draft to the bank, or at least his attorney, between eight and eleven o'clock in the morning; those who come after until three o'clock, pay six sols fine for each draft. The merchants ordinarily pass a procuration, which it is necessary to renew once a year, to one of their clerks to carry their drafts and demand their payments, which no other person can do.

They transfer every day in the week, except Sunday, and during the shuttings, which are announced some weeks beforehand.

For arranging the merchants, and also for maintaining and favoring the price of matters, and specie of gold and silver, both foreign and that of the country, which are in strictness only of mere commerce, as our ducats and rix dollars, the bank receives them at a value determined and relative to the weight and the title known by the pay-master of the bank, but the sum which they there receive ought not to be below two thousand five hundred florins. The bank gives receipts for the specie, &c. which they deposit there for six months, which are to the bearer; so that, within the time, if the specie or matters exceed, the proprietor may sell his receipt to another, who pays him the surplus of what they are worth of the price at which the bank has received them, and this receipt may thus pass through several hands, as often happens by the idea which they form of the excess or of the deficiency. He who is the bearer of this receipt, may go and take away these matters or specie when he will, in paying at the bank, the value which it has advanced to him who has deposited them, and, moreover, half of a florin for the keeping of them the six months, both upon gold and upon bars of silver, and quarter of a florin upon Mexican dollars, rix dollars, and some other species of money. When this term is expired, one may cause to be renewed the receipts, in paying at the bank the half or quarter florin due thus from six months to six months; but if one let pass that time without taking away his deposit, or without renewing it, it is devolved to the bank, which keeps it to its profit.

The bank is governed under the inspection of the Burgomasters, by six commissaries, chosen and named by the Burgomasters from among the magistrates and principal merchants, under the care of whom is the deposited treasure. They furnish every year in the month of February, a balance of the bank to the Burgomasters, the youngest of whom goes down with them into the vaults, to verify and take account of the number of sacks, and of the specie contained in said balance, and forming the real and effective fund that each one has in the bank; and whatever may have been said or suspected upon this subject, it is very certain, that the fund rolling through the bank, is really there deposited in specie, ingots, and bars of gold and silver. This treasure is not, moreover, so immense as many people imagine. Some authors have written, (without doubt by estimation) that it went as far as three hundred millions of florins, which is not credible, when we consider the returns of the bills (revirements de parties) which are continually made, between those who have reciprocal payments to make among themselves. We know very nearly, that there are scarcely more than two thousand accounts open upon the books of this bank; so that in order to make three hundred millions of florins, it is necessary that these two thousand persons should have, one with another, one hundred and fifty thousand florins each in bank, which is beyond all probability, especially, if we consider that A and B having there each one, ten thousand florins, might reciprocally pay themselves sixty thousand florins per week, and thus make a circulation of transposition of one hundred and twenty thousand per week, with twenty thousand of sign effective. So that reducing the year to forty weeks of payment, with regard to the intervals which take place in the times of the shuttings, which is too large an allowance, it would result, that with fifty millions, there might be made twelve thousand millions of florins of payments per annum. According to this, and considering that the money in bank brings in no benefit, it is easy to imagine, that there is not much more than is necessary for the circulation of payments in bank, and that its treasure cannot be so considerable as many people imagine.

The bank never lends upon any species of merchandise, nor discounts any paper, nor makes any other profit than the half or quarter of a florin upon the gold and silver there deposited, and which, added to the ten florins for the opening of accounts, and two stivers for each draft of which I have spoken, serves to pay all the expenses of clerks and others, which is occasioned by the bank. The overplus, which is not very considerable, goes to the profit of the city.

No arrest or attachment can be made of any moneys which are in bank, under any pretext; the commissaries, book keepers, and others, who are in the service of the bank, are bound by oath to say nothing of what passes there. No man has a right to require of the bank, the reimbursement in specie of the sum with which he is credited; (a) each one having his account only in the receipts of the commissaries, which are in the term of six months. It is certain, that the primitive fund, the receipts for which they have suffered to be extinguished, is no longer demandable, and that one cannot force the commissioners to give specie, but it is not, therefore, the less true, that this fund exists really, and one ought not, and cannot doubt, that if the city was threatened with an inevitable invasion, and if the merchants should require their money, to place it elsewhere in safety, that the Burgomasters would cause it to be paid, by giving so many florins in current money, or value in bars or ingots, with which one should be credited.

(a) The author is here mistaken. All those who have an account in bank, may demand to be paid in ready money, but they cannot require the agio. By consequence, while the bank shall have credit, and there shall be commerce at Amsterdam, which cannot be carried on without the money of the bank, and while there shall be, consequently, an agio, no man will go and demand in ready money, a sum which is worth five per cent more. The author has not well distinguished between the sum of money, or rather the specie, which one may redemand in the term of six months, by means of a receipt, and the money for which one is credited in bank. Behold the difference.

When they have received at the bank a certain quality of gold or silver, whether in money or in bars, for the value of which the bank has credited upon its books the proprietor, (not according to the value which this money has in commerce, but according to its weight and denomination,) in this case, the depositor, or he who holds the receipt, has the right, by means of this receipt, and in restoring to the bank the sum for which the first depositor had been credited, to withdraw this gold or silver, paying one half per cent for the keeping. But, the six months elapsed, the receipt becomes useless, the gold or silver remains in propriety to the bank, and the depositor must content himself to have received in its place, the sum which this gold or silver has been valued at, by which sum he has been credited upon the books, and whereof he might have disposed as he saw good. It is this sum that he has the faculty of redemanding in ready money, when, and as often as he judges proper, and as he is acknowledged upon the books to be a creditor for that sum; but they are not bound to restore him more than the net sum without agio.

No man will be, by consequence, mad enough to cause himself to be paid four or five per cent less than the money of the bank is worth in commerce. But if the money of the bank should be so discredited, that there should be no longer an agio, in that case, all the world would have a right to come and demand at the bank, the amount of the sums for which they are credited; and the bank, whose credit would be ruined, would be obliged, without controversy to make this payment, or to commit bankruptcy. It can never acquire a right of propriety in the capitals for which it has credit upon its books; but in case of restitution, it is not obliged to restore the same matters, or the same money for which it originally gave these credits. Over these the right is lost, with the expiration of the time established for the duration of the receipts, but it is held to the restitution of the amounts of the credits, such as they appear upon the books.

September 26th, 1782.

For the use of Congress, from

JOHN ADAMS.

TO M. DE LAFAYETTE.

The Hague, September 29th, 1782.

My Dear General,

I should have written you since the 29th of May, when I wrote you a letter, that I hope you received, if it had not been reported sometimes that you were gone, and at other times, that you were upon the point of going to America.

This people must be indulged in their ordinary march, which you know is with the slow step. We have at length, however, the consent of all the cities and Provinces, and have adjusted and agreed upon every article, word, syllable, letter, and point, and clerks are employed in making out five fair copies for the signature, which will be done this week.

Amidst the innumerable crowd of loans, which are open in this country, many of which have little success, I was much afraid that ours would have failed. I have, however, the pleasure to inform you, that I am at least one million and a half in cash, about three millions of livres, which will be a considerable aid to the operations of our financier at Philadelphia, and I hope your Court, with their usual goodness, will make up the rest that may be wanting.

I am now as well situated as I ever can be in Europe. I have the honor to live upon agreeable terms of civility with the Ambassadors of France and Spain; and the Ministers of all the other powers of Europe, whom I meet at the houses of the French and Spanish Ministers, as well as at Court, are complaisant and sociable. Those from Russia and Denmark are the most reserved. Those from Sardinia and Portugal are very civil. The Ministers of all the neutral powers consider our independence as decided. One of those even from Russia, said so not long ago, and that from Portugal said it to me within a few days. You and I have known this point to have been decided a long time; but it is but lately, that the Ministers of neutral powers, however they might think, have frankly expressed their opinions; and it is now an indication, that it begins to be the sentiment of their Courts, for they do not often advance faster than their masters, in expressing their sentiments upon political points of this magnitude.

Pray what are the sentiments of the Corps Diplomatique, at Versailles? What progress is made in the negotiation for peace? Can anything be done before the British Parliament, or at least the Court of St James, acknowledge the sovereignty of the United States, absolute and unlimited?

It would give me great pleasure to receive a line from you, as often as your leisure will admit.

With great esteem, I have the honor to be, Sir, your most obedient servant,

JOHN ADAMS.

TO JOHN JAY.

The Hague, October 7th, 1782.

Dear Sir,

Your favor of the 28th ultimo, was brought me last night. On Friday last I was notified, by the messenger of their High Mightinesses, that the treaties would be ready for signature on Monday, this day. I am, accordingly, at noon, to go to the Assembly, and finish the business. But when this is done, some time will be indispensable, to prepare my despatches for Congress, and look out for the most favorable conveyances for them. I must also sign another thousand of obligations at least, that the loan may not stand still. All this shall be despatched with all the diligence in my power, but it will necessarily take up some time, and my health is so far from being robust, that it will be impossible for me to ride with as much rapidity as I could formerly, although never remarkable for a quick traveller. If anything in the meantime should be in agitation, concerning peace, in which there should be any difference of opinion between you and your colleague, you have a right to insist upon informing me by express, or waiting till I come.

8th. The signature was put off yesterday until today, by the Prince being in conference with their High Mightinesses, and laying his orders to the navy before them.

With great regard, your humble servant,

JOHN ADAMS.

TO ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON.

The Hague, October 8th, 1782.

Sir,

At twelve o'clock today I proceeded, according to appointment, to the State-House, where I was received with the usual formalities, at the head of the stairs, by M. Van Santheuvel, a Deputy from the Province of Holland, and M. Van Lynden, the first noble of Zealand, and a Deputy from that Province, and by them conducted into the Chamber of Business, (chambre de besogne) an apartment belonging to the Truce Chamber, (chambre de trêve) where were executed the Treaty of Commerce and the convention concerning recaptures, after an exchange of full powers.

The Treaty and Convention are both closed, or at least an authentic copy of each. If the copy should arrive before the original, which I shall reserve to be sent by the safest opportunity I can find, it will be a sufficient foundation for the ratification of Congress. I hope the treaty will be satisfactory to Congress. It has taken up much time to obtain the remarks and the consent of all the members of this complicated sovereignty. Very little of this time has been taken up by me, as Congress will see by the resolution of their High Mightinesses, containing the power to the Deputies to conclude the treaty; for although all communications were made to me in Dutch, a language in which I was not sufficiently skilled to depend upon my own knowledge, M. Dumas was ever at hand, and ever ready to interpret to me everything in French, by which means I was always able to give my answers without loss of time. The papers, in which the whole progress of this negotiation is contained in Dutch, French, and English, make a large bundle, and after all, they contain nothing worth transmitting to Congress. To copy them would be an immense labor, to no purpose, and to send the originals, at once would expose them to loss.

Several propositions were made to me, which I could not agree to, and several were made on my part, which could not be admitted by the States. The final result contained in the treaty, is as near the spirit of my instructions as I could obtain, and I think it is nothing materially variant from them. The Lords, the Deputies, proposed to me to make the convention a part of the treaty. My answer was, that I thought the convention, which is nearly conformable with that lately made with France, would be advantageous on both sides; but as I had no special instructions concerning it, and as Congress might have objections, that I could not foresee, it would be more agreeable to have the convention separate; so that Congress, if they should find any difficulty, might ratify the treaty without it. This was accordingly agreed to. It seemed at first to be insisted on, that we should be confined to the Dutch ports in Europe, but my friend, M. Van Berckel, and the merchants of Amsterdam, came in aid of me, in convincing all, that it was their interest to treat us upon the footing gentis-amicissimæ, in all parts of the world.

Friesland proposed, that a right should be stipulated for the subjects of this Republic to purchase lands in any of our States; but such reasons were urged as convinced them, that this was too extensive an object for me to agree to; 1st. It was not even stipulated for France. 2dly. If it should be now introduced into this treaty, all other nations would expect the same, and although at present it might not be impolitic to admit of this, yet nobody would think it wise to bind ourselves to it forever. 3dly. What rendered all other considerations unnecessary, was, that Congress had not authority to do this, it being a matter of the interior policy of the separate States. This was given up. A more extensive liberty of engaging seamen in this country was a favorite object; but it could not be obtained. The refraction, as they call it, upon tobacco, in the weigh-houses, is a thing, that enters so deeply into their commercial policy, that I could not obtain anything, more particular or more explicit, than what is found in the treaty. Upon the whole, I think the treaty is conformable to the principles of perfect reciprocity, and contains nothing, that can possibly be hurtful to America, or offensive to our allies, or to any other nation, except Great Britain, to whom it is indeed, without a speedy peace, a mortal blow.

The rights of France and Spain are sufficiently secured by the twentysecond article; although it is not in the very words of the project, transmitted me by Congress, it is the same in substance and effect. The Duc de la Vauguyon was very well contented with it, and the States were so jealous of unforeseen consequences from the words of the article as sent me by Congress, and as first proposed by me, that I saw it would delay the conclusion without end. After several conferences, and many proposals, we finally agreed upon the article as it stands, to the satisfaction of all parties.

The clause reserving to the Dutch their rights in the East and West Indies, is unnecessary, and I was averse to it, as implying a jealousy of us. But as it implies too a compliment to our power and importance, was much insisted on, and amounted to no more than we should have been bound to without it, I withdrew my objection.

The proviso of conforming to the laws of the country, respecting the external show of public worship, I wished to have excluded; because I am an enemy to every appearance of restraint in a matter so delicate and sacred as the liberty of conscience; but the laws here do not permit Roman Catholics to have steeples to their churches, and these laws could not be altered. I shall be impatient to receive the ratification of Congress, which I hope may be transmitted within the time limited.[11]

I have the honor to be, &c.

JOHN ADAMS.

TO ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON.

The Hague, October 12th, 1782.

Sir,

Yesterday afternoon M. Van der Burg Van Spieringshock, the Agent of their High Mightinesses, brought me the enclosed resolution, relative to a vessel of M. Dubbledemuts. I promised to enclose it to Congress. I would have it translated here, but I have not time. I presume Congress has, or will have, an interpreter for the Low Dutch.

It is much to be desired, that Congress would take some measures to inquire into this matter. The cause for my being so pressed for time, is, that I am preparing to set off for Paris, and have not only all my despatches to make up, to send the treaty, but have obligations to sign respecting the loan, that so essential a business may not stand still in my absence.

Mr Jay writes me, that Mr Oswald has received a commission to treat of peace with the Commissioners of the United States of America. I shall set off for Paris next week.

I have the honor to be, &c.

JOHN ADAMS.

TO ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON.

Paris, October 31st, 1782.

Sir,

Having executed the treaty of commerce at the Hague, and despatched four copies of it, by four different vessels bound to America from the Texel, and having signed a sufficient number of obligations to leave in the hands of Messrs Willinks, Van Staphorsts, and de la Lande and Fynjè, and having received information from Mr Jay, that Mr Oswald had received a commission from the King his master, under the Great Seal of Great Britain, to treat with the Commissioners of the United States of America, I set off for Paris, where I arrived on Saturday, the 26th of this month, after a tedious journey; the roads being, on account of long continued rains, in the worst condition I ever knew them.

I waited forthwith on Mr Jay, and from him learned the state of the conferences. It is not possible, at present, to enter into details. All I can say is in general, that I had the utmost satisfaction in finding, that he had been all along acting here upon the same principles upon which I had ventured to act in Holland, and that we were perfectly agreed in our sentiments and systems. I cannot express it better than in his own words; "to be honest and grateful to our allies, but to think for ourselves." I find a construction put upon one article of our instructions by some persons, which I confess I never put upon it myself. It is represented by some, as subjecting us to the French Ministry, as taking away from us all right of judging for ourselves, and obliging us to agree to whatever the French Ministers shall advise us to, and to do nothing without their consent. I never supposed this to be the intention of Congress; if I had, I never would have accepted the commission, and if I now thought it their intention, I could not continue in it. I cannot think it possible to be the design of Congress; if it is, I hereby resign my place in the commission, and request that another person may be immediately appointed in my stead.

Yesterday we met Mr Oswald at his lodgings; Mr Jay, Dr Franklin, and myself, on one side, and Mr Oswald, assisted by Mr Strachey, a gentleman whom I had the honor to meet in company with Lord Howe upon Staten Island in the year 1776, and assisted also by a Mr Roberts, a clerk in some of the public offices, with books, maps, and papers, relative to the boundaries.

I arrived in a lucky moment for the boundary of the Massachusetts, because I brought with me all the essential documents relative to that object, which are this day to be laid before my colleagues in conference at my house, and afterwards before Mr Oswald.

It is now apparent, at least to Mr Jay and myself, that, in order to obtain the western lands, the navigation of the Mississippi, and the fisheries, or any of them, we must act with firmness and independence, as well as prudence and delicacy. With these, there is little doubt we may obtain them all.

Yesterday I visited M. Brantzen, the Dutch Minister, and was by him very frankly and candidly informed of the whole progress of the negotiation on their part. It is very shortly told. They have exchanged full powers with Mr Fitzherbert, and communicated to him their preliminaries, according to their instructions, which I have heretofore transmitted to Congress. Mr Fitzherbert has sent them to London and received an answer, but has communicated to them no more of this answer than this, that those preliminaries are not relished at St James'. He excused his not having seen them for six or seven days, by pretence of indisposition, but they are informed that he has made frequent visits to Versailles during these days, and sent off and received several couriers.

How the negotiation advances between Mr Fitzherbert, and the Count de Vergennes, and the Count d'Aranda, we know not.

The object of M. de Rayneval's journey to London, is not yet discovered by any of us. It is given out, that he was sent to see whether the British Ministry were in earnest.[12] But this is too general. It is suspected that he went to insinuate something relative to the fisheries and the boundaries, but it is probable he did not succeed respecting the former, and perhaps not entirely, with respect to the latter.

With great respect, &c.

JOHN ADAMS.

TO ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON.

Paris, November 6th, 1782.

Sir,

Two days ago arrived by Captain Barney, the letters you did me the honor to write me, the 22d, 29th, 30th, triplicate of May, 4th of July, 29th of August, and 15th of September.

I was unconditionally received in Holland, and promised upon record conferences and audiences, whenever I should demand them, before I entered into any treaty, and without this I should never have entered into any; and full powers were given to the Committee of Foreign Affairs, before I entered into any conferences with them. I have ventured upon the same principle in the affair of peace, and uniformly refused to come to Paris, until our independence was unconditionally acknowledged by the King of Great Britain. Mr Jay has acted on the same principle with Spain, and with Great Britain. The dignity of the United States, being thus supported, has prevailed in Holland and Great Britain; not indeed as yet in Spain, but we are in a better situation in relation to her, than we should have been if the principle had been departed from. The advice of the Count de Vergennes has been contrary; but however great a Minister he may be in his own department, his knowledge is insufficient and his judgment too often erroneous in our affairs, to be an American Minister.

Intelligence from Holland is impossible through France. Events in Holland can seldom be foreseen one day. When they happen, they are inserted in the gazettes, transferred to the Courier de l'Europe, the English and French gazettes, and get to America before it is possible for me to transmit them directly. Besides, Sir, I have sometimes thought, that my time was better employed in doing business, that might produce other events, than in multiplying copies and conveyances of despatches, which would contain nothing, but what I knew the newspapers would announce as soon; my reputation may not be so well husbanded by this method, but the cause of my country is served. I am not insensible to reputation; but I hope it has not been a principal object. Perhaps it has not been enough an object. I see so much of the omnipotence of reputation, that I begin to think so. I know very well, however, that if mine cannot be supported by facts, it will not be by trumpeters.

If it were in my power to do anything for the honor of the department or Minister of Foreign Affairs, I would cheerfully do it, because I am a friend to both; and to this end, you will, I am sure, not take it amiss if I say, that it is indispensably necessary for the service of Congress, and the honor of the office, that it be kept impenetrably secret from the French Minister in many things. The office will be an engine for the ruin of the reputation of your Ministers abroad, and for injuring our cause in material points, the fishery, the western lands, and the Mississippi, &c. if it is not.

I thank you, Sir, for the hint about the English language. I think with you, that we ought to make a point of it, and after some time, I hope it will be an instruction from Congress to all their Ministers.

As to the negotiations for peace, we have been night and day employed in them ever since my arrival on the 26th of October. Doctor Franklin, without saying anything to me, obtained of Mr Jay a promise of his vote[13] for Mr W. T. Franklin, to be Secretary to the commission for peace; and as the Doctor and his Secretary are in the same house, and there are other clerks enough, I suppose he will transmit to Congress details of the negotiations. I shall be ready to lend them any assistance in my power; and I will endeavor as soon as I can to transmit them myself; but after spending forenoon, afternoon, and evening, in discussions, it is impossible to transmit all the particulars. No man's constitution is equal to it.

The English have sent Mr Oswald, who is a wise and good man, and, if untrammelled, would soon settle all, and Mr Strachey, who is a keen and subtle one, although not deeply versed in such things; and a Mr Roberts, who is a clerk in the Board of Trade, and Mr Whithead, who is private Secretary to Mr Oswald. These gentlemen are very profuse in their professions of national friendship; of earnest desires to obliterate the remembrance of all unkindnesses, and to restore peace, harmony, friendship, and make them perpetual, by removing every seed of future discord. All this, on the part of Mr Oswald personally, is very sincere. On the part of the nation, it may be so in some sense at present; but I have my doubts, whether it is a national disposition, upon which we can have much dependence, and still more, whether it is the sincere intention of the Earl of Shelburne.

He has been compelled to acknowledge American independence, because the Rockingham Administration had resolved upon it, and Carleton and Digby's letter to General Washington, had made known that resolution to the world; because the nation demanded that negotiations should be opened with the American Ministers, and they refused to speak or hear, until their independence was acknowledged unequivocally and without conditions, because Messrs Fox and Burke had resigned their offices, pointedly, on account of the refusal of the King, and my Lord Shelburne, to make such an acknowledgment; and these eloquent senators were waiting only for the session of Parliament to attack his Lordship on this point; it was, therefore, inevitable to acknowledge our independence, and no Minister could have stood his ground without it. But still I doubt, whether his Lordship means to make a general peace. To express myself more clearly, I fully believe he intends to try another campaign, and that he will finally refuse to come to any definitive agreement with us, upon articles to be inserted in the general peace.

We have gone the utmost lengths to favor the peace. We have at last agreed to boundaries with the greatest moderation. We have offered them the choice of a line through the middle of all the great lakes, or the line of 45 degrees of latitude, the Mississippi, with a free navigation of it at one end, and the river St Croix at the other. We have agreed, that the courts of justice be opened for the recovery of British debts due before the war, to a general amnesty for all the royalists, against whom there is no judgment rendered, or prosecution commenced. We have agreed, that all the royalists, who may remain at the evacuation of the States, shall have six months to sell their estates, and to remove with them.

These are such immense advantages to the Minister, that one would think he could not refuse them. The agreement to pay British debts, will silence the clamors of all the body of creditors, and separate them from the tories, with whom they have hitherto made common cause. The amnesty and the term of six months will silence all the tories, except those who have been condemned, banished, and whose property has been confiscated; yet I do not believe they will be accepted.

I fear they will insist a little longer upon a complete indemnification to all the refugees, a point, which, without express instructions from all the States, neither we nor Congress can give up; and how the States can ever agree to it, I know not, as it seems an implicit concession of all the religion and morality of the war. They will also insist upon Penobscot as the eastern boundary. I am not sure that the tories, and the Ministry, and the nation, are not secretly stimulated by French emisaries, to insist upon Penobscot, and a full indemnification to the tories. It is easy to see, that the French Minister, the Spanish and the Dutch Ministers would not be very fond of having it known through the world, that all points for a general peace were settled between Great Britain and America, before all parties are ready. It is easy to comprehend, how French, Spanish, and Dutch emisaries, in London, in Paris, and Versailles, may insinuate, that the support of the tories is a point of national and royal honor, and propagate so many popular arguments in favor of it, as to embarrass the British Minister. It is easy to see, that the French may naturally revive their old assertions, that Penobscot and Kennebec are the boundary of Nova Scotia, although against the whole stream of British authorities, and the most authentic acts of the Governors, Shirley, Pownal, Bernard, and Hutchinson. Mr Fitzherbert, who is constantly at Versailles, is very sanguine for the refugees. Nevertheless, if my Lord Shelburne should not agree with us, these will be only ostensible points. He cares little for either. It will be to avoid giving any certain weapons against himself, to the friends of Lord North, and the old Ministry.

The negotiations at Versailles between the Count de Vergennes and Mr Fitzherbert, are kept secret, not only from us, but from the Dutch Ministers, and we hear nothing about Spain. In general, I learn, that the French insist upon a great many fish. I dined yesterday with M. Berkenrode, the Dutch Ambassador, and M. Brantzen, his colleague. They were both very frank and familiar, and confessed to me, that nothing had been said to them, and that they could learn nothing as yet of the progress of the negotiation. Berkenrode told me, as an honest man, that he had no faith in the sincerity of the English for peace as yet; on the contrary, he thought that a part of Lord Howe's fleet had gone to America, and that there was something meditated against the French West India Islands. I doubt this, however; but we shall soon know where my Lord Howe is. That something is meditating against the French or Spaniards, and that they think of evacuating New York for that end, I believe. Berkenrode seemed to fear the English, and said, like a good man, that in case any severe stroke should be struck against France, it would be necessary for Holland and America to discover a firmness. This observation had my heart on its side; but without an evacuation of New York, they can strike no blow at all, nor any very great one with it.

Mr Oswald has made very striking overtures to us; to agree to the evacuation of New York, to write a letter to General Washington, and another to Congress, advising them to permit this evacuation, to agree, that neither the people nor the army should oppose this evacuation, or molest the British army in attempting it; nay, further, that we should agree, that the Americans should afford them all sorts of aid, and even supplies of provisions. These propositions he made to us, in obedience to an instruction from the Minister, and he told us their army were going against West Florida, to reconquer that from the Spaniards. Our answer was, that we could agree to no such things; that General Washington could enter into a convention with them, for the terms upon which they should surrender the city of New York, and all its dependencies, as Long Island, Staten Island, &c. to the arms of the United States. All that we could agree to was, that the effects and persons of those, who should stay behind, should have six months to go off, nor could we agree to this, unless as an article to be inserted in the general peace.

I have the honor to be, &c.

JOHN ADAMS.

ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON TO JOHN ADAMS.

Philadelphia, November 6th, 1782.

Sir,

The scene of action is so entirely transferred to your side of the Atlantic, that scarce any occurrence among us at present is sufficiently interesting to furnish matter for a public letter.

The resolutions, which have from time to time evinced the steady determination of Congress, in no event to relinquish the great object of the war, or think of peace but in connexion with their allies, have been already transmitted to you. The military force on both sides is perfectly inactive. By the enclosed extracts from General Carleton's, and General Washington's letters, you will see that the first is so bent on peace, that, notwithstanding the opinion of his superiors, he does not see that the war has any longer an object. It is high time that he disavows them, for their conduct is a direct disavowal of him.

The clauses of the commission to Mr Fitzherbert, which are designed to include us, are strong indications of the extreme reluctance of the British to give up their supposed dominion over this country. You have great credit with me for the judgment you have formed, from time to time, of the Court of Great Britain; though your opinions sometimes run counter to those generally received.

Nothing can be more conformable to our wishes, than the instructions you have transmitted; keep up that spirit in —— and we have nothing to fear from that quarter, but lengthy negotiations, even after they shall commence in earnest.

We have yet no accounts of the evacuation of Charleston, and that event begins daily to grow more uncertain. Such is the inconstancy of the enemy, that one may as well predict what appearances a cloud will put on two hours hence, by our knowledge of the wind, as reduce their conduct to any settled shape, by knowing their professions. Our troops have gone into winter quarters at West Point.

The French have marched to the eastward to be nearer their fleet, which lies at Boston. Part of the British fleet, consisting of fourteen sail of the line, and eight frigates, including a ship of forty guns, sailed from New York the 26th ultimo. They have such a decided superiority in the American seas, that if they had correspondent land forces, or even knew how to apply those they keep cooped up in America, they might render themselves very formidable in the West Indies. This however is, I hope, an evil, which will be ere long remedied.

Bills for the amount of your salary from January last have been regularly transmitted to Dr Franklin. You will receive with this the amount of the last quarter, ending the first of October. Mr Morris, my Secretary, will enclose you a state of your accounts. I should be glad if you would acknowledge the receipt of these moneys, as they come to hand, since I stand charged with them in the Treasury books.

The enclosed resolution will show you, that Mr Boudinott has succeeded Mr Hanson, as President of Congress.

I have the honor to be, &c.

ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON

TO ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON.

Paris, November 8th, 1782.

Sir,

In one of your letters you suppose, that I have an open avowed contempt of all rank. Give me leave to say, you are much mistaken in my sentiments. There are times, and I have often seen such, when a man's duty to his country demands of him the sacrifice of his rank, as well as his fortune and life, but this must be an epoch, and for an object worthy of the sacrifice. In ordinary times, the same duty to his country obliges him to contend for his rank, as the only means indeed, sometimes, by which he can do service, and the sacrifice would injure his country more than himself. When the world sees a man reduced to the necessity of giving up his rank, merely to serve the public, they will respect him, and his opinions will have the more weight for it; but when the same world sees a man yield his rank for the sake of holding a place, he becomes ridiculous. This, you may depend upon it, will not be my case.

Ranks, titles, and etiquettes, and every species of punctilios, even down to the visits of cards, are of infinitely more importance in Europe, than in America, and therefore Congress cannot be too tender of disgracing their Ministers abroad in any of these things, nor too determined not to disgrace themselves. Congress will, sooner or later, find it necessary to adjust the ranks of all their servants, with relation to another, as well as to the magistrates and officers of the separate governments.

For example, if, when Congress abolished my commission to the king of Great Britain, and my commission for peace, and issued a new commission for peace, in which they associated four other gentlemen with me, they had placed any other at the head of the commission, they would have thrown a disgrace and ridicule upon me in Europe, that I could not have withstood. It would have injured me in the minds of friends and enemies, the French and Dutch, as well as the English.

It is the same thing with the States. If Mr Jay and I had yielded the punctilio of rank, and taken the advice of the Count de Vergennes and Dr Franklin, by treating with the English or Spaniards, before we were put upon the equal footing, that our rank demanded, we should have sunk in the minds of the English, French, Spaniards, Dutch, and all the neutral powers. The Count de Vergennes certainly knows this; if he does not, he is not even an European statesman; if he does know it, what inference can we draw, but that he means to keep us down if he can; to keep his hand under our chin to prevent us from drowning, but not to lift our heads out of water?

The injunctions upon us to communicate, and to follow the advice that is given us, seem to be too strong, and too universal. Understood with reasonable limitations and restrictions, they may do very well. For example, I wrote a speculation, and caused it to be printed in the Courier du Bas Rhine, showing the interest, policy, and humanity of the neutral confederation's acknowledging American independence, and admitting the United States to subscribe to the principles of their Marine Treaty. This was reprinted in the Gazette of Leyden, the Politique Hollandais, the Courier de l'Europe, and all the Dutch gazettes. At the same time I caused to be transmitted to England some pieces on the same subject, and further showing the probability, that the neutral powers might adopt this measure, and the impolicy of Great Britain, in permitting all the powers of Europe to get the start of her, and having more merit with America than she, by acknowledging her independence first. These pieces were printed in the English papers, in the form of letters to the Earl of Shelburne, and can never be controverted, because they are in writing, and in print, with their dates. These fears thus excited, added to our refusal to treat on an unequal footing, probably produced his Lordship's resolution, to advise the King to issue the commission, under the great seal, to Mr Oswald; by which Great Britain has got the start, and gone to the windward of the other European powers. No man living, but myself, knew, that all these speculations, in various parts of Europe, came from me. Would it do for me to communicate all this to the French Ministers? Is it possible for me to communicate all these things to Congress? Believe me it is not, and give me leave to say it will not do to communicate them to my friend, the Chevalier de la Luzerne, nor my friend, M. Marbois. If they should be, long letters will lay all open to the Count de Vergennes, who, I assure you, I do not believe will assist me, or anybody else, in such measures of serving our country. When the French Ministers in America, or Europe, communicate everything to us, we may venture to be equally communicative with them. But when everything is concealed from us, more cautiously than it is from England, we shall do ourselves injustice, if we are not upon our guard.

If we conduct ourselves with caution, prudence, moderation, and firmness, we shall succeed in every great point; but if Congress, or their Ministers abroad suffer themselves to be intimidated by threats, slanders, or insinuations, we shall be duped out of the fishery, the Mississippi, much of the western lands, compensation to the tories, and Penobscot at least, if not Kennebec. This is my solemn opinion, and I will never be answerable to my country, posterity, or my own mind, for the consequences, that might happen from concealing it.

It is for the determinate purpose of carrying these points, that one man, who is submission itself, is puffed up to the top of Jacob's ladder in the clouds, and every other man depressed to the bottom of it in the dust. This is my opinion, let me be punished for it, for assuredly I am guilty.

With great respect, &c.

JOHN ADAMS.

TO ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON.

Paris, November 11th, 1782.

Sir,

On my first arrival at Paris, I found my colleagues engaged in conferences with Mr Oswald. They had been before chiefly conducted by Mr Jay, Dr Franklin having been mostly confined for three months, by a long and painful illness. At this time, however, he was so much better, although still weak and lame, as to join us in most of our subsequent conferences, and we were so constantly engaged forenoon, afternoon, and evening, that I had not been out to Versailles, nor anywhere else.

On Saturday last, the Marquis de Lafayette called upon me, and told me he had been to Versailles, and the Count de Vergennes had said to him, that he had been informed by the returns of the Police, that I was in Paris, but not officially, and he should take it well if I would come to see him.

I went out to dine with Dr Franklin the same day, who had just returned from delivering his memorial, and repeated to me the same message. I said to both, I would go the next morning, and, accordingly, on Sunday, the 9th, I went to make my court to his Excellency. He received me politely, and asked me questions about our progress. I answered him, that the English Minister appeared to me to divide with us upon ostensible points; that I still doubted his intentions to make a universal peace; that the cry of the nation was for something to be done or said with the American Ministers; and to satisfy this, the King of Great Britain had been advised to be the third power in Europe to acknowledge our independence. As this was a royal act, and under the great seal of his kingdom, it would never be denied or revoked; but still it did not render the nation unanimous, and to avoid, finally, disgusting any great party, the Minister would still pursue his usual studied obscurity of policy. Points must be conceded to the Americans, before a complete agreement could be made with them, even on terms to be inserted in the universal peace, which would open the full cry of a powerful party upon him, among which were the refugees. It could not be supposed, that the refugees and Penobscot were such points with the nation or Minister, that they would continue the war for them only, if they were ready to strike with France, Spain, and Holland.

The Count then asked me some questions respecting Sagadehock, which I answered, by showing him the records, which I had in my pocket, particularly that of Governor Pownal's solemn act of possession in 1759; the grants and settlements of Mount Desert, Machias, and all the other townships east of Penobscot river; the original grant of James the First, to Sir William Alexander of Nova Scotia, in which it is bounded on St Croix river; (this grant I had in Latin, French, and English) the dissertations of Governor Shirley, and Governor Hutchinson, and the authority of Governor Bernard, all showing the right of Massachusetts to this tract to be incontestable. I added, that I did not think any British Minister would ever put his hand to a written claim of that tract of land, their own national acts were so numerous, and so clear against them. The Count said, Mr Fitzherbert had told him, that it was for the masts, that a point was made of that tract. But the Count said, Canada was an immense resource for masts. I said, there were few masts there; that this could not be the motive; that the refugees were still at the bottom of this; several of them had pretensions to lands in Sagadehock, and the rest hoped for grants there.

The Count said, it was not at all surprising, that the British Ministry should insist upon compensation to the tories, for that all the precedents were in their favor; in the case of the United Provinces with Spain, all were restored to their possessions, and that there never had been an example of such an affair terminated by treaty, but all were restored. He said, it was a point well settled by precedents. I begged his Excellency's pardon for this, and thought there was no precedent in point. A restitution of an estate not alienated, although confiscated to a Crown or State, could not be a precedent in point, because, in our case, these estates had not only been confiscated, but alienated by the State, so that it was no longer in the power of the State to restore them. And when you come to the question of compensation, there is every argument of national honor, dignity of the State, public and private justice and humanity, for us to insist upon a compensation for all the plate, negroes, rice, and tobacco stolen, and houses and substance consumed, as there is for them to demand compensation to the tories; and this was so much the stronger in our favor, as our sufferers were innocent people, and theirs guilty ones.